Any certainty dissolves into the vagueness of quantum foam. — apokrisis

There is no certainty that there is a quantum foam. Quantum foam is only a theory (Wikipedia - quantum foam).

Quantum foam (or spacetime foam, or spacetime bubble) is a theoretical quantum fluctuation of spacetime on very small scales due to quantum mechanics.

Some interpret quantum mechanics as describing an indeterministic universe, but others believe there is an underlying deterministic process.

For example, "Quantum mechanics in an entirely deterministic universe" by László E. Szabó published 1995 in the International Journal of Theoretical Physics.

This paper explores the compatibility of quantum mechanics with a deterministic universe, challenging the widely held belief that the two are incompatible.

There is no current certainty that the theory of quantum mechanics implies an indeterminate universe.

Mechanism versus teleology in a probabilistic universe — tom111

Is there any evidence that the universe is probabilistic?

For example, the equation ${d = 0.5 * g * t^{2}}$ gives the distance an object falls under gravity from rest. No probability is involved.

I may not know how far the object will fall in a certain amount of time, and it is true for me that the future is uncertain. For me, the future is about probabilities

But where is the evidence that the universe is probabilistic?

The problem seems to lie with the word 'essay' or perhaps in 'philosophy'.
Some take a narrow view of both. Some further clarification required. — Amity

From page 1 of this Thread:

Resources were requested for help on what exactly an academic philosophy essay should look like, and provided by @Amity so I've appended them here:

https://philosophy.tamucc.edu/graphics/berkich/texts/james-lenman-how-to-write-a-crap-philosophy-essay.pdf

https://philosophy.tamucc.edu/graphics/berkich/texts/james-pryor-guidelines-on-writing-a-philosophy-paper.pdf

https://www.southampton.ac.uk/~assets/doc/University_life/learning_teaching/posing_the_question.pdf

I'd like to participate next time! — Moliere

"My hope was to elicit both kinds of writing, at least, if with more effort than we usually put into OP's and responses."

This challenge was a fantastic opportunity to learn and improve. I look forward to next year's Philosophical Writing Challenge. I have an idea for my topic. (edited)

Philosophical Writing Challenge 2026

Attempt one at 4)

Perhaps Rule 4) should read "Must be philosophical writing. The Title and Topic are chosen by the author."

4) is a rule rather than a guideline, as a guideline can be ignored.

"Essay" has a specific meaning within philosophical writing.

The expression "fall under the broad category" is redundant and slightly confusing. "Must fall under the broad category of philosophical writing" says no more than "Must be philosophical writing".

This allows, as you say, "both kinds of writing".

As Zachary Fruhling writes, philosophical writing includes the novel, the poetic, the aphoristic, the journal, the epistle, the dialogue, the letter, the philosophical essay, the exegesis, the compare and contrast, the blog, the treatise, etc.

Attempt two at 4)

However, this wording doesn't avoid the problem of Threads that ramble in all directions. As you say "more effort than we usually put into OP's and responses"

The piece of philosophical writing must be a consistent piece of work. If it starts as a poem it shouldn't morph into a dialogue. If it purports to be a philosophical essay, it shouldn't leave out a thesis.

Perhaps Rule 4) should read "Must be philosophical writing. The Title, Topic and Form are chosen by the author. There are many different forms of philosophical writing, including the poetic, aphoristic, essay, etc, but whichever form the author chooses, their writing must be consistent within their chosen form"

These two sources may be useful

1) The Royal Institute of Philosophy and its Think Essay Prize

2) The John Locke Institute's Global Essay Prize and its questions for philosophy

It is interesting that both these sources restrict their philosophical entry to philosophical essays, where philosophical essays have specific requirements.

Do you prefer more analytic writing yourself or do you find something like what Nietzsche does equally worthy of attention (regardless of content, talking purely stylistically here!)? — I like sushi

It is not so much as preferring analytic to creative philosophical writing, or vice versa, as both have their place within philosophy. Philosophy needs both analytic and creative writings, and would be damaged if either were absent.

One of the first "serious" books I read was Nietzsche's "Thus Spoke Zarathustra". Three days ago I bought George Orwell's "Homage to Catalonia" and today have ordered Daniel Defoe's "Robinson Crusoe". So I do like creative writing.

The format of the analytic philosophical essay is certainly not unknown. For example the Philosophy Writing Challenge gave several resources, including James Pryor's "Guidelines on Writing a Philosophy Paper", who noted:

A philosophy paper consists of the reasoned defence of some claim. Your paper must offer an argument. It can't consist in the mere report of your opinions, nor in a mere report of the opinions of the philosophers we discuss. You have to defend the claims you make. You have to offer reasons to believe them.

Yes, the importance of the philosophical essay may be taken for granted by philosophers. However, on the one hand, in being taken for granted it can become the hinge on which philosophy is founded, and on the other hand in being taken for granted it can be ignored. When ignored, writing on philosophy may be no more than a list of personal opinions, a mere report of the opinions of other philosophers stripped of any context and claims made but not defended.

It seems to me that there is more to the creative philosophical writings of Nietzsche, Orwell and Defoe than being a negation of the philosophical essay. Creative philosophical writing is more than listing personal opinion, more than repeating other philosopher's opinions and more than making unjustified claims.

Taking the Forum as an example, it seems to me that much of the writing is neither one thing nor another. Neither creative, in the sense of Nietzsche, nor analytic, in the sense of the philosophical essay, where claims are made and then defended. I am including myself.

Even on this writing challenge, that specifically wanted a philosophical essay, perhaps only four essays fulfilled the role of philosophical essay: i) Wittgenstein's Hinges and Gödel's Unprovable Statements, ii) Cognitive Experiences are a Part of Material Reality, iii) Technoethics: Freedom, Precarity, and Enzymatic Knowledge Machines and iv) An Exploration Between the Balance Between State and Individual Interests.

Both creative and analytic philosophical writing are important. It may well be that the importance of the philosophical essay is taken for granted by philosophers, but that doesn't mean that the requirements of the philosophical essay should then be ignored.

If you could support that intuition then I think your essay would be strengthened. — Moliere

Appreciate your comments :up:

No, but it is an indication that there might be paradoxes or incoherences within the theory — Tobias

Radical individualism is a coherent political philosophy that may work in certain contexts and not in others.

It may work in a hippy commune of a dozen people living in the woods, but is unlikely to work if 100 million people in the USA decided to adopt it.

I am still missing where the paradox is.
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The libertarian conception of the individual extends to the assertion that self-ownership entails ownership of the fruit of one's labour. — Tobias

The essay is about radical individualism.

Has a connection been made between radical individualism and libertarianism.
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Also Benkei did not attack all forms of radical individualism, but a specific libertarian variation of it, if I understand correctly. — Tobias

He seemed to attack all forms of it.

This essay argues that radical individualism is less a coherent political philosophy than a theatrical pose that conceals its reliance on collective institutions, rationalizes inequality and rebrands domination as personal freedom.

If a philosophy is in practice unworkable, it may mean that its assumptions are flawed. — Tobias

Yes, but that does mean that an unworkable philosophy must be a paradox.
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Find problematic, counterintuitive or incoherent notions within the theory and then focus on how they shape the thoughts of notable figures. — Tobias

Exactly, that is what the essay should have done.
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There is less of a following for radical individualism in Europe — Tobias

I'm not so sure. There are plenty of hippy communes in Europe who could be called radical individualists. They renounce the power structure of institutions and the constraints these institutions put on their lives.

For example, there is the "free town" of Christiana in Copenhagen. It was founded in 1971 by a group of anarchic squatters and artists who took over an abandoned military base and proclaimed it a “free zone”.

Radical individualism is a coherent political theory that can work in certain contexts.

The institutions mentioned in the essay are as diverse as the (federal) state, the corporation and academia. None of the three people discussed though, draw any power from the European Union — Tobias

The essay is about individuals who pretend to be radical individualists but in fact rely on authoritarian, collective institutions that wield immense power.

This is not a problem particular to the USA.

but to point out the gross simplifications that liberals and libertarians tend to make. Which the author indeed unmasks very strongly. — Tobias

That radical individualism may in practice be unworkable doesn't make it a paradox. It is no more a paradox than Icarus' attempt at flight using a pair of wax wings made by his father Daedalus.

Even if it might be an incoherent decision to follow radical individualism in one's daily life, this does not mean that radical individualism as a political philosophy is incoherent.

Suppose we take the quote by John Stuart Mill as an example of a liberal or libertarian position. It may well be a simplification of his position, as it is just one quote.

However, it seems that the author of the essay is not attacking radical individualism in itself, but rather is attacking the hypocrite who purports to be a radical individualist, yet in fact does not believe in it.

This essay argues that radical individualism is less a coherent political philosophy than a theatrical pose that conceals its reliance on collective institutions, rationalizes inequality and rebrands domination as personal freedom. By examining its philosophical roots and public champions we expose a paradox at its core: the celebration of liberty through authoritarian means.

John Stuart Mill is not a hypocrite who purports to be a liberal but in practice does not believe in liberalism.

I would disagree with that. Why would institutions be 'suspect'? It is akin to saying gravity is suspect. Also the second part of the sentence is questionable. There are all sorts of examples of people sacrificing themselves for a higher goal and lo and behold, they are not derided but revered as heroes. — Tobias

It depends what is meant by "Institution".

I am sure many parents would sacrifice their lives for the institution of their family, and if they did would be revered as heroes.

However this is not the meaning of institution as used by the author in this essay. The author is referring to institutions as large, complex, highly formalized bodies with immense power. For example, in the European context, bodies such as the European Union.

We focus on three figures: Elon Musk, Donald Trump and Jordan Peterson. Though differing in style and domain all present the image of a self-legitimating individual opposed to collective authority. Yet each depends on immense institutional power. Musk benefits from public subsidies and corporate scale, Trump commands state machinery and nationalist rhetoric, Peterson draws authority from platforms and institutional critique.

I am sure that no one would sacrifice their lives for the institution of the European Union, and if they did, would be more derided than revered.

The EU in their publicity material may say that their goal is the benefit of its citizens, but in practice, the EU acts as if its citizens are there for the benefit of the EU. This is why institutions with immense power such as the EU are suspect. This is the type of institution referred to by the essay.

You mean the etymology of the word "Dimitri"? — Quk

No, more as you said "His biography from birth to the present time"

A history is hardly universal. — Quk

There is the concept of "chair" in the mind in thought and language and particular instantiations of it in the world, such as "this chair". Similarly, there is concept of "Dimitri" in the mind in thought and language and a particular instantiation of it in the world, having, as you say, a unique history.

Logic isn't a set of rules we invented to think clearly. It's not even something minds discover about reality. Logic is the automatic byproduct of existence itself. — tom111

If the OP is correct, in that logic is the automatic by-product of existence itself, then Kant's project in his Critique of Pure Reason has failed.

The Law of Identity states that each thing is identical to itself.

Kant in the CPR argues that we can never know anything about the thing-in-itself.

But if we know that the thing-in-itself follows the Law of Identity, and that the thing-in-itself is identical to itself, then we do know something about the thing-in-itself. IE, it is identical to itself.

The question is, where do things such as chairs exist. Do they exist in the mind as a concept in thought and language, or do they exist in a world independent of any observer?

If things only exist in the mind as a concept in thought and language, then the Law of Identity also only exists in the mind as a concept in thought and language.

However, If we define him by constants, his identity will remain constant. — Quk

The Law of Identity is about identity in logic and is not relevant to personal identity.

Dimitri's weight, which changes through his life, certainly doesn't define his identity. Even his personal identity may change throughout his life.

The only constant thing through his life, his identity, will probably be the label "Dimitri".

I think the Law of Identity, which is a tautology, is useful in analyses: "The person the photo refers to is identical to the person who wrote that letter."...For example, the identified person is the one which is named Dimitri and which was born in Athens in 1855 and died in 1911, and whose parents were Athena and Ioannis Papadopoulos. Dimitri is unique. There has been no second person with these attributes. — Quk

The Law of Identity states that a thing is identical with itself.

Yes, the name Dimitri Papadopoulos, born in Athens in 1855, points to a particular unique person. Assume that Dimitri in 1855 had a height of 50cm and weight of 3.3kg and in 1911 had a height of 180cm and weight 70kg.

In what way is something having a height of 50cm and weight of 3.3kg identical to something having a height of 180cm and weight of 70kg?

Does the Law of Identity apply in this situation?

I think the Law of Identity, which is a tautology, is useful in analyses: "The person the photo refers to is identical to the person who wrote that letter." — Quk

Suppose Dimitri was photographed in May and wrote the letter in June. In what way is Dimitri in May identical to Dimitri in June? There are many ways in which Dimitri could have changed. He could have learnt how to cook moussaka, been on a diet and lost weight or lost a parent and emotionally suffered.

Is anyone the identical person that they used to be?

Logic is the automatic byproduct of existence itself. — tom111

The Law of Identity is one of the three traditional laws of thought. By the Law of Identity, a being is identical to itself.

I tend to agree that our thoughts can never be independent of the world, as we are an intrinsic part of the world.

However, the issue of time may complicate matters.

The Law of Identity states that Being A is Being A, where Being A is identical to Being A.

But the Law of Identity is always about one moment in time, and at this moment in time, Being A does not change from being Being A.

But what is "one moment in time"? "One moment in time" is defined as a moment in time when there is no change.

Note: a Being may or may not change with time, but the Law of Identity is not referring to identity through time but rather is referring to identity at one particular moment in time.

Therefore, the Law of Identity is a tautology that is dependent upon a definition. IE, the Law of Identity states that at one moment in time Being A does not change into Being B, where a moment in time is defined as a moment where a Being does not change. As a tautology dependent upon a definition, it cannot tell us about the reality or the logic of the world.

In fact, there could be a Law of Identity that at one moment in time being A is not being A, where one moment in time is defined as a moment in time when there is change.

In practice, we don't define "one moment of time" as a moment in time when there is change, but there is no logical reason why we couldn't. The Law of Identity is about logic, not about the choices we make.

The Law of Identity, that at one moment in time a being is identical to itself is dependent upon the definition of "one moment in time". It is therefore a tautology dependent upon a definition and therefore cannot tell us about the reality or the logic of the world.

I am not sure philosophical discussions of time and space which precede our modern physics and which choose to ignore the seeming implications are relevant or reliable. — prothero

I agree that philosophy should not ignore modern physics, but this is not necessarily the case with quantum mechanics, where there is still much disagreement.

After just a quick look on the internet:

Sabine Hossenfelder. Did We Get the Double Slit Experiment All Wrong?

Sabine Hossenfelder. Gamechange: Theories Of Everything Can’t Exist, Physicists Show.

Sabine Hossenfelder. Why This Nobel Prize Winner Thinks Quantum Mechanics is Nonsense

Sean Carroll. Even Physicists Don’t Understand Quantum Mechanics. Worse, they donʼt seem to want to understand it.

As you said yourself, the mathematics of General Relativity breaks down at smaller scales.

Philosophy should take into account modern physics, but not those parts of modern physics that remain contentious, such as quantum mechanics, where there is even disagreement amongst the physicists themselves.
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There is clearly process and change in the universe....................All our measures of time depend on some other process, the earth moving around the sun...........................So it would appear there is no absolute time, and time is an abstraction from change. — prothero

Putting what you say into premises and conclusion:

Premise 1 - there is change in the universe
Premise 2 - the measurement of time depends on change
Conclusion - time is change

Premise 2 is a definition, where time is defined as change.
Putting this definition into premise 1, there is time in the universe

The conclusion that time is change is more a premise than it is a conclusion.
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The most productive path for the TOE (theory of everything) or Universal Field Theory would seem to be some form of Quantum Gravity (loop, string, etc.)........................This would imply that neither time nor space are continuous but both would have some kind of discrete quantum formulation....................No dimensionless points and no instants of zero duration. — prothero

It may be that in the future there is a TOE, and even if there is, it may be that this implies that neither space not time are continuous but discrete.

However, so far, this is not the case, so does not tell us at the moment that there are no dimensionless points and no instants of zero duration.

What would those real temporal parameters consist of? If you think about it, they are all reducible to relative positions. So your starting point, t1, is completely arbitrary. You choose a specific position, and begin. The time itself has nothing within it to indicate to you what position is the starting position. — Metaphysician Undercover

I must be missing what you are saying.

As time is relative, space is relative.

As there is no absolute point in space, there is no absolute point in time.

Therefore, as any starting point in time is arbitrary, then any starting position in space must also be arbitrary.

As I explain, that duration is arbitrary...The length of the duration is the product of choice in an absolute sense — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree when you say "The supposed object, the particle, is a real empirically observable object"

This particle can only exist at one position at one time.

I also agree when you say " therefore it's position cannot be arbitrarily chosen, there are real spatial parameters which limit the truth, and restrict the designation of location". I agree that when observed, as this particle can only exist at one position, its position has not been arbitrarily chosen.

However, I don't understand why one cannot equally say "therefore it's time cannot be arbitrarily chosen, there are real temporal parameters which limit the truth, and restrict the designation of time". When observed, as this particle can only exist at one time, its time has not been arbitrarily chosen.

I still don't see the difference you are trying to explain, in that distance is not arbitrary yet duration is arbitrary.

The particle is observed at a position and at a time. Neither are arbitrarily chosen. The position is the position I observe it to be at, and the time is the time I observe it to be at. As I cannot arbitrarily change the position I observe the particle to be at, I cannot arbitrarily change the time I observe the particle to be at.

Nevertheless, things in space have definable position, even if moving, and that provides the basis for spatial measurement. On the other hand, the points in time which serve as the boundaries for measurement are totally arbitrary. — Metaphysician Undercover

An object, or a particle, in space and time can only be at one position at one time (ignoring any debate in quantum mechanics). In other words, a particle in space and time at one moment in time can only be in one position.

I am using the word "arbitrary" as used in your post.

At one moment in time, if a particle is at position A in space then it cannot be at position B in space.

As position A is not position B, there is a spatial distance between A and B. This spatial distance is real, and therefore not arbitrary.

A particle cannot be at position A and B at the same time

Let the particle be at position A at time C and be at position B at time D

There is a temporal duration between C and D. This temporal duration is also real, and therefore also not arbitrary.

That a particle cannot be at two different positions at the same time means that neither spatial distance nor temporal duration are arbitrary.

The spatial measurement is not arbitrary..................The temporal measurement is completely arbitrary. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is interesting that since 2019 the metre has been defined as the length of the path travelled by light in vacuum during a time interval of 1/299 792 458 of a second.

Even distance cannot escape from time.

The essay does argue for the importance of essays within philosophy. However, it does have a narrow scope as to what that may mean, based on guidance for academic philosophy essays. This leaves little scope for the most creative possibilities and such guidelines are likely to be a factor in the decline of philosophy essays in the first place. — Jack Cummins

Yes, the philosophical essay does have a narrower scope than philosophical writing. Philosophical writing can include the novel, the poetic, the aphoristic, the journal, the epistle, the dialogue, the letter as well as the essay

But this philosophy writing challenge June 2025 specifically asks for a philosophical essay.

"4) Must fall under the broad category of a philosophical essay."

If the organisers ask for a philosophical essay, perhaps that is what they should be given.

Am I wrong?

Perhaps next year people may vote for something else.
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I would have to disagree with this though for a very particular reason:

Opinion and belief are the catalyst to philosophical enquiry, but without clear justification based on logical reason and solid evidence, philosophy will degenerate into multiple factions forever at odds with each other.

I think there is certainly danger in getting sidetracked, but I am of the opinion that many of the greatest achievements of humanity are accidental. By going off-piste we can stumble upon fertile ground in which to plant new ideas. Sometimes nothing grows, and sometimes something does. — I like sushi

I agree that some of the most important philosophical writing is not in the form of a philosophical essay, such as George Orwell's "Animal Farm".

I agree that many of humanity's greatest achievements are accidental, and far from structured.

I may feel that Animal Farm is philosophically important, whereas someone else may feel that it is not. It then comes down to my feeling over their feeling, and if a battle of feelings, the book may not reach the wider audience that it deserves.

If someone asks me why I feel that Animal Farm is an important piece of philosophical writing, it is surely inadequate to just say "because I feel it is". This is unpersuasive and the questioner my leave the conversation, lose interest in the book, never read it and miss out on a seminal piece of literature.

It would be better for me to try to justify my reasons why "Animal Farm" is an important piece of philosophy by making a case, making a solid argument, defending my claim, showing flaws in any counter-argument, providing evidence and all within a structured introduction, body and conclusion. In other words, using the format of a philosophical essay.

If I make a strong logical case using reasoned argument, they may begin to understand why I feel that the book is philosophically important, buy a copy, read it and come to their own feeling that it a great philosophical work.

A roomful of people just with feelings is not going to move society forwards.

The spatial boundaries are determined by empirical principles, while the temporal boundaries are stipulated arbitrarily. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, we can only know the object the edge of the object is at x = 1.2 metres empirically.

But how can we know that this happens when t = 75 seconds, if not empirically?

Yes, x = 1.2 metres is arbitrary, but also t = 75 seconds is arbitrary.

And the point? — Metaphysician Undercover

There are boundaries in time as well as space. Including the boundary between the present and past.

I don't think these two are similar at all. When we look at things in space, we see all sorts of boundaries, the edges to objects, etc., but we do not find any such boundaries in time. — Metaphysician Undercover

Imagine an object moving through space.

Suppose at t = 75 seconds the edge of the object is at x = 1.2 metres. Suppose at t = 80 seconds the edge of the object is at x = 1.6 metres.

As the edge x = 1.2 metres is a boundary between less than 1.2 m and more than 1.2 m, t = 75 seconds is a boundary between less that 75 seconds and more than 75 seconds.

These are simply units of measurements, not ultimate bounds in a some philosophical sense. If you were to ride on that photon as it traverses a Planck length, time would vanish completely for you......................I have wondered why certain physical facts about time have not entered into these discussions. — jgill

I have taken the following from an article by Zhen Liang - IS SPACE DISCRETE? AN INQUIRY INTO THE REALITY OF PLANCK LENGTH AND ITS PHILOSOPHICAL IMPLICATIONS

For time to vanish sounds philosophical.

Philosophically, in the past, space has been considered infinitely divisible.

Space has always been considered infinitely divisible and thus continuous throughout the western philosophical traditions beginning with the ancient Greeks......................However, this notion of space has also been questioned and challenged since the very beginning. Zeno of Elea, a disciple of the pre-Socratic philosopher Parmenides who denies the reality of motion, was the first and foremost (at least that we know of) to disturb our notion of space with his famous paradoxes.

Einstein's theory of relativity has changed our conception of space, time and motion, but does not refer to whether space is continuous or not.

Therefore, Einstein’s theory of relativity, although forever changed our conception of space, time, and motion, still leaves the continuity of space untouched.

As the metaphysical reality of the Planck length is problematic, whether space is infinitely divisible or not, the same seems to apply also to time, whether time is infinitely divisible or not.

Therefore, if time itself is actually continuous, without moments, yet our measurements of time are dependent on the use of such moments, then our measurements are fundamentally flawed, because they employ a concept which is not representative of time in reality. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is the same problem with space as there may be with time.

The Planck length is the smallest unit of length, approximately equal to 1.616 x 10^-35 meters.

In a sense, our measurements of both space and time may be fundamentally flawed, in that, as there is no position in space, there may be no moment in time.

However, this is not a problem in practice, as the minimum length and duration are so small. The standard metre bar introduced by the French more than 200 years ago has done pretty well at introducing a practical and usable system of linear measurement.

Our measurements may be approximate, but for most situations, approximate measurement are good enough
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If activity requires passing time, and there is no passing time in a moment, you would not be able to determine whether the tree is static or active without watching it for a duration. — Metaphysician Undercover

Even if time is just moments in time, we still have our memories.

Suppose time is just moments in time and has no duration. When I look at a tree in the present, I see the tree at only one moment in time, and I can only see a static tree.

However, at that moment in time in the present when looking at the tree, I also have a memory of the tree in the past. By comparing the state of the tree in the present to my memory of the tree in the past, I know that the state of the tree has changed, meaning that the tree has moved.

Even if time is just moments in time, because of my memories, I can still distinguish between a static tree and a moving tree.
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This makes no sense to me. — Metaphysician Undercover

One's opinion as to whether or not there are fixed moments in time in a large part depends on whether one believes objects such as trees exist independently of being observed (Direct Realism) or objects such as trees only exist in the mind. (Indirect Realism)

In part, when talking about a tree being static or moving, for the Direct Realist this tree (and the space and time it exists within) exists in a world independent of any observer and for the Indirect Realist this tree (and the space and time it exists within) only exists in the mind.

Direct Realism and Indirect Realism are obviously mainstream philosophical positions.

Which bit makes no sense.

The problem here seems to be that you are not allowing that seeing activities qualifies as evidence of seeing temporal duration, yet you do allow that seeing something relatively static, an object, qualifies as evidence of seeing objects like trees and mountains. — Metaphysician Undercover

I am assuming by temporal duration we mean that time itself cannot be reduced to a moment in time. As the Planck length is the smallest measurable unit of length, there is a smallest unit of time. ie, a duration.

As you wrote:

I believe we actually perceive motion, activity, and this requires temporal duration, therefore we do perceive duration. I think that the "moment in time" is an artificial construct.

I look at the world and can see a tree, static at one moment in time. I can also see the tree bending in the wind, an activity through time.

The static tree is evidence of there being an object, a tree, in the world. The tree actively bending in the wind is evidence of there being temporal duration in the world.

However, I believe that we approach this from different philosophical positions. I assume that you support Direct Realism (though I may be mistaken), whereas I support Indirect Realism.

From your position (if you do support Direct Realism), we perceive the world as it is, where trees and trees bending in the wind exist independently of our perception of them. From my position, the world of trees and trees bending in the wind exist in the mind.

From your position, within the world independent of any observer is temporal duration. From my position, as the world exists in the mind, temporal duration exists in the mind.

Therefore from your position, as the world exists independently of the mind, the temporal duration observed in the world exists external to any observer. From my position, as the world exists in the mind, the temporal duration observed in the world exists in the mind. It follows that for the Indirect Realist, whether there is or there is not temporal duration external to any observer is unknowable.

Still clinging to the narrow perspective of philosophy writing, then? — Amity

Still clinging to what was asked for in guideline 4) "Must fall under the broad category of a philosophical essay."

Still clinging to the meaning of the words "must" and "philosophical essay".

As I said, it's basically the same way that you can know anything about the environment which you live in. — Metaphysician Undercover

I know about my environment because I can see trees and mountains. But my experience of temporal duration only exists in my mind, and is not something that I can see in my environment.

Therefore, I cannot know about temporal duration in the same way that I know about my environment.
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You can be an extreme skeptic, and deny that you can know anything, but what's the point? — Metaphysician Undercover

A sceptic may deny that trees and mountains exist in the world. However, a sceptic cannot deny that they experience a sense of temporal duration.

Even for the sceptic, there is a difference between what exists in the mind and what exists outside the mind.

As a philosophical essay, this paper lacks a clear introductory thesis. No matter how interesting each part may be, there is no clear thesis that draws them together into a cohesive whole.

I believe we actually perceive motion, activity, and this requires temporal duration, therefore we do perceive duration. I think that the "moment in time" is an artificial construct. — Metaphysician Undercover

"Judge" is a much better word to use here than "perceive". — Metaphysician Undercover

From the Merriam Webster Dictionary, "perceive" can mean i) to attain awareness or understanding of, ii) to become aware of through the senses.

As regards sense ii), I perceive something and judge that it is a tree.

As regards sense i), I perceive not a moment in time but a duration of time. Judgment doesn't come into it

In order to be able to perceive not a moment in time but a duration of time, I must exist not at a moment in time but within a duration of time.

If I exist within a duration of time, how can I know that I exist within a duration of time?

No, my experience is not "me", it is a part of me, just like my heart is, and my brain is, except it is a different type of part of me, a different category. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree that "my experience" is a part of my being human, not being something separate.

But is it the case that my experiences are a part of me as my heart is a part of me?

My experiences being a part of me suggests that "I" could exist without them. But is this true?

"I" can exist without a heart, as long as I am on a life-support machine, but can "I" exist without my experiences. If "I" had no experiences, would there be an "I"?

"My experiences" are fundamental to the possibility of there being an "I" at all.

As there cannot be an "I" in the absence of experiences, my experiences cannot just be a part of what "I" am.
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So "an object moving from right to left" is not what you experience, it's an interpretation of a part of your experience, what you saw, heard, etc. The interpretation itself is another part of your experience. — Metaphysician Undercover

The words "experience" and "perceive" need to be defined. The word "experience" as with the word "perceive" has more than one meaning.

One meaning is independent of the senses and another meaning involves the sensations.

In the first meaning, contained within the mind, I am experiencing fear and I perceive their fear. In the second meaning, dependent upon the senses, I experience something moving from right to left and I perceive something moving from right to left.

When talking about being able to perceive duration, I would say that perceive is being used in the first sense.
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I believe we actually perceive motion, activity, and this requires temporal duration, therefore we do perceive duration. I think that the "moment in time" is an artificial construct. — Metaphysician Undercover

I am still interested in how we are able to perceive duration.

If I existed at one moment in time, I could not perceive the duration of time.

It is true, however, that if I did exist at one moment in time, I could compare my memory of the object being to the right at time 2pm and being to the left at time 2.05. This would allow me to perceive that there had been a duration of time.

Therefore, in order to be able to perceive the duration in time, it cannot be the case that I exist only at one moment in time, but in some way exist throughout that duration.

I can judge a duration from the viewpoint of one moment in time, but how can I judge a duration when I am part of that duration?

You're really not making sense Russel. People are not external to their experiences. Experience is an intrinsic aspect of being a human being. It doesn't make sense to talk about experiences which you are external to, or which are external to you. — Metaphysician Undercover

Probably so, in that I am not explaining myself very well.

Trying analogies: i) can one hand wash itself, ii) can a snooker ball at rest start to move without any external force, iii) can the mind be conscious of its own consciousness, iv) can something arise from nothing, v) can there be an effect without a cause, vi) does an evil person think that they are a good person.

Suppose I experience an object moving from right to left. What is the relation between "me" and "my experience"? Is "my experience" external or internal to "me". "My experience" cannot be external to "me", otherwise I wouldn't know about it. Therefore "my experience" must be internal to "me".

However, if "my experience" is internal to "me" but separate to "me" then this is the homunculus problem (Homunculus argument - Wikipedia).

Therefore, "my experience" must be "me", in that I am my experiences rather than I have experiences.

So, if I am my experience, there are not two things, "me" and "my experience", but there is only one thing, "me", where "me" and "my experience" are one and the same thing.

I agree when you say "Experience is an intrinsic aspect of being a human being."

But that means there exists only one thing, "me" This one thing can be called either "me" or "my experience", as they are one and the same thing.

My question is, accepting that one thing can be aware of a second thing, how can one thing be aware of itself?

This takes me back to my analogies, how can one hand wash itself.

How can a single thought think about itself?

How can a single thought that has a duration think about its own duration?

Why not? You have a multitude of senses, a brain, and all sorts of tools within your body, which could enable you to experience the very duration which you live in. Your question is like asking how can I experience the same world which I exist within? — Metaphysician Undercover

I exist within a world of trees and mountains, but I am external to these trees and mountains.

The problem arises when I am not external to what I experience.

Can an experience experience itself. Can a thought think about itself.

Can a duration be aware of its own duration?

Dante and the deflation of reason.

It could be that reason within the modern era is less admirable than reason in the medieval world of Dante, and there has been a deflation of "reason". Or it could be that the meaning of the word "reason" has changed between the medieval period of Dante and the modern era, in which case it would not be appropriate to say that there has been a deflation of "reason".

As I understand the essay, the author argues that in the medieval period of Dante, reason is about the "will" (the faculty of the mind in enabling action), "ratio" (reason using inference) and "intellectus" (intuition), and in the modern era, reason is just about "ratio". There has therefore been a deflation of reason.

However, there cannot be a deflation of "reason" if the meaning of reason in medieval times is different to the meaning of reason in the modern era.

For example, "my universe" could mean 1) all of time, space and its contents or it could mean 2) my family, job and daily life. Even though meaning 2 is more limited than meaning 1, it doesn't mean that meaning 1 has been deflated into meaning 2, as they mean different things.

In the same way, the word "mountain" cannot be deflated into the word "river", as they mean different things.

As the word "reason" in the Dante of medieval times means one thing and the word "reason" in the modern era means a different thing, the one cannot be deflated into the other.

Also, I think that when you speak of your awareness of an event which just happened, as part of your experience of the present, I think you need to include your awareness (anticipation) of an event which is about to happen, as part of your awareness of the present. — Metaphysician Undercover

How can I perceive a duration if I exist within this duration?

I have an experience of the present, and this experience might be a moment of time or might be a duration.

Prior to this moment in time or duration is the past. My memories of past events must be part of my present experience. My anticipation of future events must also be part of my present experience.

I am aware of my existence.

If I existed outside a duration, then I could be objectively aware of it.

In order to subjectively perceive a duration, I cannot exist at only one moment in time, but must exist within this duration.

But if I existed within a duration, then my awareness, which has a duration, cannot be aware of its own duration. My only awareness could be of a timelessness.

It seems that our perceptions may not be of duration but of timelessness.

Try reading the essay carefully. Not only what the paradox is, but its effects. — Amity

That is avoiding the question.

The author describes the Authoritarian Liberty Paradox as, for example, a worldview that denounces power while glorifying individuals who wield power.

This is what I call the Authoritarian Liberty Paradox: a worldview that denounces power, structure and constraint while glorifying individuals who wield all three.

Nowhere in the article does the author explain how a worldview that denounces power while glorifying individuals who wield power is a paradox.

It may be hypocritical, it may be nonsense, but that doesn't make it a paradox.

George Bernard Shaw's "youth is wasted on the young" is a paradox, because although initially it seems contradictory, on reflection it makes sense.

"A worldview that denounces power while glorifying individuals who wield power" is certainly contradictory, but also makes no sense.

Can you explain in your own words why it is a paradox?