• A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs
    So you are saying that intentional states are not directed at things in the world, but at Aristotelian universals that are mental objects? — Banno

    First part - yes
    As an Indirect Realist, I don't believe that I perceive the external world as it really is, what I perceive are mental objects. I have intentionality about my mental objects, things which exist in my mind rather than the world.

    Second part - partly
    My view is that a mental objects have three properties: particular perception, universal concept and linguistic naming. All mental objects include particular perception, of these, some but not all of these include universal concept, and of these, some but not all include linguistic naming.

    Particular perception relates to Frege's "referent" and Wittgenstein's "picture theory". The referent of a mental object is simply a particular entity that has been perceived in an assumed world. A mental object is a picture of a set of particular sensations through our five senses. However, particular perception by itself is insufficient for sentience, as a picture by itself cannot resolve the mereological problem of establishing the importance of relationships between the pictured parts.

    Universal concept relates to Frege's "sense" and Aristotle's "Theory of Universals". The sense is the thought that it expresses, whether or not it has a referent, in that Odysseus has a sense but no reference. In Aristotle's view, universals only exist when they are instantiated in the mind, where such universals are concepts. Sentience needs both particular perceptions and universal concepts.

    Linguistic naming relates to Kant's Theory of Judgement, where naming is a complex cognitive judgement about the usefulness of a concept. Whilst the mental objects of sentient life for the first 99% of its time of its existence on Earth has included particular perception and universal concepts, it is only in the recent 1% that the mental objects of sentient life have also included linguistic naming. IE, only some of our concepts have words attached, in that I have a word for the concept "chair", I have a word for the concept "Eiffel Tower", but I don't have a word for the concept of an object part chair and part Eiffel Tower.

    IE, my understanding is that intentional states are not directed at things in the world, but at mental objects, which have the three properties of particular perception, universal concept and linguistic naming.
  • A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs
    What's an "instantiated mental act" — Banno

    As I see it :

    Definition
    An instantiated mental act is the act of mentally making an instance of, or representing, something perceived.

    Instantiated mental acts precede intentionality
    In our consciousness, we are conscious about something, we think about something. This is called intentionality. Intentionality has to be directed at something. Intentionality has to do with the directedness, aboutness, or the reference of mental states. Intentionality allows us to represent the world using mental representations. But, something has had to been instantiated before being able to have intentionality about it, in that instantiation and intentionality are linked concepts.

    Instantiated mental acts are concepts
    A concept, whether abstract or concrete, is an internal cognitive symbol that can represent an external reality, things that have never been experienced, or things that don't exist. Within my mind, my cognition is not directed to the world but to the concept I have in my mind.

    Concepts are relevant whether a Direct Realist, an Indirect Realist or an Idealist.
    It may be that the Direct Realist is correct and my concepts are accurate copies of the world. It may be that the Indirect Realist is correct in that my concepts are only representations of the world. It may be that the Idealist is correct in that my concepts don't originate other than in my mind.

    Instantiated mental acts and universals
    Aristotle said that universals only exist when they are instantiated in a particular thing, where chairness is instantiated by a chair, in that there is not a Platonic Form of chairness. Knowledge of universals does not derive from a supernatural source but is obtained by means of the intellect.

    Instantiated mental acts are complete
    When observing the world through my senses and creating a model of the world, my sense perceptions necessarily only give me part of the full information about the world. Although my knowledge of the world is necessarily incomplete, my model is necessarily complete. My mental instantiation has made something complete out of something incomplete.

    Instantiated mental acts and causation
    In the problem of the causation of physical effects by mental causes, the mental event of my desire to eat cake plays a causal role in a physical event of raising my arm. A mental desire has been instantiated by a physical action.

    Instantiated mental acts and semantics
    I observe in the world the object "house" and I observe in the world the attached label "this is a house". I perceive both the "house" and its label as objects. Both these objects are instantiated in my mind as concepts, the concept "house" and the associated concept "this is a house". IE, whether referring to the concrete or abstract, linguistic semantic entities are not of a different kind to non-linguistic physical entities, they are expressions of the same thing.

    (I know I will be nearing a profound truth when you ask a 500 word question and I am able to give a 5 word answer.)
  • A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs
    Without words, what is it that you're referring to the meaning of — Isaac

    Even with the first human interaction with fire, perhaps 1.5 million years ago, fire would have had a meaning. Fire would have meant light and fire at night, protection against predatory animals and the smoke would have meant relief from insects. Even without words, the object fire would have had a meaning to these early humans.
  • A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs
    psychological meaning which seems in opposition to semantic meaning — Isaac

    Perhaps my distinction is along the lines of Frege's attack on Locke. For Locke, ideas exist independently of words, where words just serve as vehicles to ideas, whilst for Frege, meaning is in the structure of a sentence rather than any psychological state of the speaker or hearer.

    For most of its existence, as sentient life has not had language, meaning cannot have come from semantics, but from the psychological state of mind.
  • A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs
    He (Wittgenstein) everywhere undermines the notion of the meaning of a word, of a sentence — Banno

    There are perhaps two aspects to meaning: the semantic abstraction and the psychological instantiation. Frege and Husserl insisted on a clear distinction between the semantic and the psychological, but semantic entities can only exist within instantiated mental acts.

    Sentient life has existed on Earth for about 500 millions years, whereas language only developed about 200,000 years ago, meaning that sentient life has depended on psychological meaning for more than 99% of its existence, and has only used semantic meaning for less than 1% of its existence.

    One pertinent question is whether semantic meaning grew out of psychological meaning, or is semantic meaning of a different kind to psychological meaning.

    Because Wittgenstein has the position that meaning cannot be found in a semantic analysis of propositions independent of any user, but rather can only be discovered in how the user makes use of the propositions as part of an activity, this infers that for Wittgenstein, semantic meaning is no more than an expression of psychological meaning.

    It follows that the semantic meaning of a word such as "house" is just an expression of the user's psychological meaning of the concept "house". IE, for the user, a semantic "house" is a psychological "house", where "is " is being used as equality rather than a copula

    As sentient life has successful survived and evolved for more than 99% of its time on Earth
    where meaning is psychological, and following Wittgenstein that semantic meaning is no more than an expression of psychological meaning, we might agree with Wittgenstein that meaning can be understood purely in psychological terms.
  • A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs
    Do you have to name a rock to know about rocks? — Harry Hindu

    Naming
    I was thinking of "naming" more of an act of defining something rather than describing something - more "I name this ship Queen Elizabeth" than the name of this object is a rock.

    Parts and the whole
    A table is the relationship between a table top and four legs. Mereologically speaking, an object composed of a table top and the Eiffel Tower is as ontologically real as an object composed of a table top and four legs.

    Objects
    I observe the world. I observe the parts within the world, and observe that there is an almost infinite number of relationships between these parts. Each possible relationship will create a unique ontological object.

    Names
    Through observation, I discover a particular object. If the object is useful to me, I invent a name to give to the object in order to label that the object is useful. I don't need to name the object to know the object, as I know the object in discovering the relationship between its parts. IE, names in my language signify that the object they are attached to are useful to me in some way.
  • A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs
    how could you show that you know a language without using it? — Banno

    Language and use
    If I had lived amongst the Neanderthals, I could looked around me and named every object I saw - rock, water, gazelle, etc. This would be my language, albeit simple. I could remain an observer of the objects and never use my knowledge of their names, in which case I could have had a language without ever using it. It may be that after a while that I realized that having given names to objects around me would be of practical use, in that I may want someone to bring me water. IE, I had learnt a language before I had any use for it

    Language, meaning and use
    Wittgenstein said in sect. 43 of Philosophical Investigations that “For a large class of cases – though not for all – in which we employ the word “meaning” it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language.”
    Wittgenstein also denied there was such a thing as identity - i) to say two things are identical is nonsense - ii) to say one thing is identical with itself is to say nothing.
    I have a language consisting of the words rock, water, gazelle, etc. As Wittgenstein says, the word "water" has no meaning in itself, it only has meaning for me if I have a use for it, in that water means the abeyance of thirst, the presence of fish, etc. IE - i) I can have a language without it meaning anything - ii) a language only has meaning if it is useful.

    Language and meaning
    A Neanderthal may not have had a brain with the level of complexity required for modern speech, even though the Neanderthal had had the the physical apparatus for speech. But even without any words to describe their feelings, the sight of a woolly mammoth bearing down on them would certainly have meant something. IE, there can be meaning without language.
  • A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs
    "first meaning" — Dawnstorm

    I don't find Davidson's sentences the clearest.

    Basic linguistic competence
    It seems that principles 1, 2 and 3 set out the "basic linguistic competence", meaning a basic knowledge of linguistic conventions. (p. 254)

    What does Davidson mean by "first meaning" ?
    Consider the malapropism "we're all cremated equal". Initially, Davidson's "first meaning" could mean either - i) what the speaker intended to say "we're all created equal" or - ii) what the words literally mean - "we're all cremated equal". However, Davidson's principle 1 says that a competent interpreter will be able to interpret words independent of the speaker's meaning, meaning that "first meaning" reduces down to what the words literally mean, their normal or standard dictionary definition, ie, cremated means cremated.

    Ambiguities and principles 1, 2 and 3
    Consider the ambiguity "I saw the chair", where chair could refer to a piece of furniture or a person heading a committee. Davidson says that ambiguities can be resolved within principles 1, 2 and 3 within a "basic linguistic competence". IE, we can consider the full linguistic context using linguistic conventions, "I saw the chair, and he spoke to me"and conclude that here "chair" means a person heading a committee.

    Malapropisms and principles 1, 2 and 3
    Davidson says that malapropisms such as "we're all cremated equal" cannot be resolved within the conventions of "basic linguistic competence", in that there are no sets of words, that can determine whether "cremated" in "we're all cremated equal" means cremated or created. May or may not be true, however, to resolve the meaning of "we're all cremated equal" we need to look outside of linguistic conventions. Outside of linguistic conventions are social conventions, in that if the speaker of the sentence "we're all cremated equal" is wearing a black suit and black top hat then we can reasonably determine that cremated means cremated and resolve the malapropism.

    Conclusion
    Davidson does not seem to be distinguishing between linguistic conventions that are internal to the utterance and social conventions that are external to the utterance. As Davidson seems to be equating "convention" with linguistic convention, his conclusion on page 265 may be read as saying - "as we cannot understand language using linguistic convention alone, we should ignore linguistic convention" - which I don't think is a reasonable approach.
  • A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs
    Basically, with Gricean non-natural meanings, you need conventions to fix truth values, or else you have just unstructured conflict. — Dawnstorm

    Yes, when I hear someone say something like "I dance the flamingo", in order to understand what they mean I need some knowledge of social context, some knowledge of the social conventions that have to do with language. Accepting also that in practice social conventions aren't absolute but dependent on lasting consensus and without conventions to fix truth values you have just unstructured conflict.

    Following on from this, I don't agree with Davidson's conclusion that "we should give up the attempt to illuminate how we communicate by appeal to conventions" (p. 265), as although he may illustrate why conventions cannot give absolute interpretations, he doesn't show that conventions are not able to illuminate communication.
  • A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs
    codification would be inadequate — Banno

    Whilst conventions internal and external to an utterance have the potential to be studied and codified, I agree that any codification of such conventions would be inadequate to result in single and fixed interpretations, but, however, would be adequate to result in reasonable interpretations.

    Therefore, I still disagree with Davidson's conclusion that "we should give up the attempt to illuminate how we communicate by appeal to conventions" (p. 265), as even conventions
    that may only enable reasonable interpretations are better than no conventions at all.
  • A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs
    RussellA - The main difference as I see it is that both conventions internal and external to an utterance have the potential to be studied and codified, whereas prior and passing theories haven't.

    The present article seeks to show that theories based on convention are doomed to be incomplete, because they will necessarily be unable to deal with novel and eccentric uses — Banno

    It is true that theories based on convention are doomed to be incomplete, but, pragmatically, no-one needs conventions to be 100% complete. I probably only understand less than 10% of the conventions around me, but that is more than enough for me to have managed to have got through life. Most of what people experience in the world is novel to them, the trick is to keep those conventions that allow one to cope with novel situations and discard those conventions that cannot. In life, conventions are always being undermined to be replaced by new ones, but as long as one group of people follow the same convention at the same time, then conventions serve their purpose. Conventions are more guidelines than algorithms.

    I take it that you think convention can be saved — Banno

    As regards internal conventions, syntax and semantics, they are saved in books and articles on linguistics. As regards external conventions, that Goodman Ace was a humourist, people smile whan making a joke, they are saved in society - in personal memories, books, magazines, television shows, films, stories, etc

    Are internal and external conventions immune to malapropisms? — Banno

    It is not so much that internal conventions are immune to malapropisms, as internal conventions include within its framework the possibility of an expression being a malapropism. Internal conventions of syntax and semantics establishes a framework within which an expression, such as "cross my eyes and hope to die" (p. 251) has a set of possible meanings - malapropism, irony, pun, hyperbole, lie, etc. To know which particular meaning, one then has to consider the external conventions.

    It is not so much that external conventions are immune to malapropisms, as external conventions include the knowledge within its framework that humourists use malapropisms. External conventions within society establishes a framework within which we know that humourists such as Goodman Ace use a wide variety of linguistic tools, including malapropisms, irony, etc. Using our Shelockian proficiency of observation, deduction, forensic science, and logical reasoning, we investigate the physical context around Goodman Ace's utterance, such as prior sentences, speed of pronunciation, tone of voice, pitch of voice, audience reaction, etc and determine from our knowledge of the conventions of the world that he has most likely used a malapropism rather than a pun, for example.
  • A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs
    Russell A - "However, we should perhaps consider two types of conventions, those internal to the utterance and those external to the utterance"

    Isn't that the same as the distinction between prior and passing theory? — Banno

    The main difference as I see it is that both conventions internal and external to an utterance have the potential to be studied and codified, whereas prior and passing theories haven't. As Davidson says "Neither the prior theory nor the passing theory describes what we would call the language a person knows" (262)

    Internal conventions is the study of rules , principles, and processes, ie, a knowledge of syntax and sematic possibilities.
    Whereas for the prior theory, as Davidson says "An interpreter must be expected to have quite different prior theories for different speakers" (p. 262)

    External conventions are about physicalities in the world external to language that can be objectively observed and studied across a wide range of speakers, in that the speaker's tone of voice, for example, has a measurable objective existence.
    Whereas for the passing theory, as Davidson says "For there are no rules for arriving at passing theories" (p. 265)
  • A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs
    Because in interpreting the meaning of the utterance I have relied on many extra-linguistic facts — Srap Tasmaner

    This 'what cannot be said' is precisely the 'non-linguistic' element inherent in all use of language, and as such, co-extensive of it. Hence Davidson's conclusion: "we should realize that we have abandoned not only the ordinary notion of a language, but we have erased the boundary between knowing a language and knowing our way around in the world generally" — StreetlightX

    This might be sufficient to reinstate the relevance of malapropisms — Banno

    It may be that malapropisms are part of the problem, but they could also be part of the solution.

    Davidson concludes his article by saying that "we should give up the attempt to illuminate how we communicate by appeal to conventions" (p. 265)

    However - we should perhaps consider two types of conventions - those internal to the utterance and those external to the utterance

    When we hear an expression - "A nice derangement of epitaphs" - it is true that there are initially many possible interpretations - it could be a malapropism, it could be ironic, a pun, a hyperbole, a lie, a reference or an attribution or simply explained by a standard dictionary definition. It is true there are no conventions internal to the expression that gives us any information as to which of these it is.

    However - we need to consider conventions external to the expression in order to discover a reasonable interpretation. For example, our prior knowledge of the speaker, the speaker's tone of voice, the speaker's state of mind, the location of the utterance, whether in a bus station or comedy club, etc.

    Yes, as Davidson said "but we have erased the boundary between knowing a language and knowing our way around in the world generally" (p 265)
  • A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs
    The argument seems at first blush to be that malapropisms cannot, by their very nature, be subsumed and accounted for by such conventions of language. Is that the whole of Davidson's argument, and is it cogent? — Banno

    I agree with the concept of Wittgenstein's family resemblance, and I agree with Davidson's conclusion "We must give up the idea of a clearly defined shared structure which language-users acquire and then apply to cases", but I don't agree with Davidson's use of the malapropism to argue his case.

    Consider the malapropism "I dance the flamingo", which is linked with "I dance the flamenco"

    The quality of malapropism isn't exhibited in a single word or phrase, such as "flamingo"

    The quality of malapropism isn't exhibited in a single sentence, as a sentence such as "I dance the flamingo" is just as meaningful as the sentence "I dance the flamenco"

    Malapropism is exhibited in the relationship between two sentences, in that a sentence exhibits malapropism if it is different to the sentence the interpreter was expecting.

    When Davidson says "malapropisms introduce expressions not covered by prior learning", it is true the relationship between the two sentences hasn't been covered by prior learning, but it isn't true that a malapropism introduces an expression (defined as a word or phrase used to convey an idea) not covered by prior learning

    As the quality of a malapropism is in the relationship between two sentences, malapropism is included within Principle (1), as Principle (1) is about relationships. "Principle 1) requires a competent interpreter to be prepared to interpret utterances of sentences he or she has never heard uttered before", and "there is no clear upper limit to the number of sentences utterances of which can be interpreted"

    Davidson is therefore incorrect when he says, in discussing Principles 1), 2) and 3), "malapropisms fall into a different category".

    In summary, malapropism isn't relevant to the case he is arguing.
  • Creativity: Random or deterministic? Invention or discovery?
    For example, any group of yellow objects is also a group of things, of seeable things, and of colored things. How could you abstract yellowness instead of thinghood, seableness, or coloredness from the group? — Tristan L

    I agree that an object may have several features. Given a set of objects each having several properties, I could define a particular object as being yellow, ie, having yellowness, if it emits a wavelength of between 570 and 590 nm, regardless of what other properties it had.

    The observer abstracts what is beneficial to themselves and ignores what isn't. A bee abstracts the colours and scents in a flower indicative of nectar whilst ignoring the number of petals which isn't. The bee could have evolved to abstract the number of petals in a flower if it were of some benefit.Though a study by the University of Queensland has shown that bees can count up to a certain number in order to communicate between themselves using the "waggle dance", showing that animals can abstract when of some evolutionary advantage.
  • Creativity: Random or deterministic? Invention or discovery?
    For example, if all yellow objects are destroyed and all thoughts about yellowness are no more, the Shape of Yellowness would still exist. — Tristan L

    The SEP article "Abstract Objects" notes that there need not be one single "correct" way of explaining the abstract/concrete distinction.
    A version of Frege's account is what Stanford calls the Way of Negation, where an object is abstract if and only if it is both non-mental and non-physical.
    An alternative to the Way of Negation is the Way of Abstraction, where an object is abstract if it is (or might be) the referent of an abstract idea, ie, an idea formed by an abstraction.
    For example, the abstract idea of yellowness could be invented by considering several yellow objects and finding what feature they had in common

    In summary, I know that I can invent abstract ideas such as yellowness in my mind by observing the physical world, but I know that I can never discover whether or not yellowness is a non-physical and non-mental abstract idea. Following Occam's Razor in choosing the simplest explanation, I can therefore ignore non-physical and non-mental abstract ideas, because even if they exist I don't need them.
  • Creativity: Random or deterministic? Invention or discovery?
    Abstract entities, including (Platonish) Shapes (Forms, Ideas), do not exist in the mind or the external physical spacetimely realm. Rather, they exist in an abstract world which lays the ground for both the mindly and the physical. — Tristan L

    Thinking about the quote on abstract entities, how can abstract entities exist but neither in the mind nor the world external to the mind ?
    Because, if there was absolute nothingness, neither mind nor world external to the mind, there would be nothing for an abstract entity to be expressed in, and in absolute nothing nothing can exist.
    Therefore, abstract entities need their existence to either the mind, the world external to the mind, or both,
    Unless, however, there is a god that exists outside of both the mind and the world external to the mind, and it is in the mind of god that abstract entities exist.

    I agree , I should have written "I". But it was more of a "royal we", as, at the back of my mind, I suppose that I believe that the external world exists, although I can never prove it, in which case I sense that my uncertainty about the existence of the external world is also shared by another person's uncertainty about the existence of the external world.
  • Creativity: Random or deterministic? Invention or discovery?
    If the observer discovers the idea of squareness in the external world rather than in their own minds, this means that the observer has also discovered the external world.
    This raises the question of how we know that there is an external world.
    Three theories are Idealism, Indirect Realism and Realism.
    As for Idealism, as there is no external world, we can only discover ideas in our minds, ie, invent them.
    As for Indirect Realism, as what we perceive is only a representation of what is in the world, this means that we discover ideas in our representation of the external world and not in the external world, ie, invent them.
    As for Direct Realism, where we have a direct awareness of the external world and objects in the external world have the properties that they appear to us to have, there remains the problem as to how we can ever know whether we are experiencing an illusion or not.
    In summary, the idea of squareness being discoverable in the external world is up against Idealism, Indirect Realism and the problem of illusion in Direct Realism.
  • Creativity: Random or deterministic? Invention or discovery?
    . The square was a square (and many other things, too) before the observer saw it, so it must have been sharing in the idea of squareness (th.i. (that is) the Shape / Form / Idea of Squareness) before the obsever saw it. Hence, squareness itself must also have existed before the observer saw the shape. — Tristan L

    I am quite certain that abstract entities broadly and possibilities in particular do in fact “lie around” in some abstract “space”. — Tristan L

    This shows that all the ideas must be abstract and uncreated, — Tristan L
  • Creativity: Random or deterministic? Invention or discovery?
    ↪Tristan L
    Perhaps the observer finds an instance of a square and then creates an idea of it.
    If I didn't know the idea of squareness, when looking at shapes in the world, I could discover a particular shape having four equal straight sides and four right angles and have the idea that in the world there are shapes having four equal straight sides and four right angles, which for convenience I could name squareness. Ideas are external to the shape, as there is no information within the shape that can establish the shape has a single identity. As the idea of squareness has come after the discovery of the shape, it cannot be the idea that was discovered.

    True, the words invention and discovery have different meanings whether we are assuming a deterministic or non-deterministic world. Even in a deterministic world, it still makes sense to say that the billiard ball has discovered the corner pocket. It is likely that someone who assumes determinism when using the words invention and discovery means something different by them to someone who believes in non-determinism.

    However, I could have an idea and invent a definition to express my idea - for example - I could define X as a square with red inside - as long as I told someone else my definition of X - they would find the same Xness in the world as I do
  • Creativity: Random or deterministic? Invention or discovery?
    ↪jgill
    My mistake - I should have written Euclidian plane rather than configuration space.
  • Creativity: Random or deterministic? Invention or discovery?
    Considering four elements A, B, C and D spatially located in a "configuration space" , an algorithm could list every possible instantiation of these four elements within the space.

    An observer not knowing the idea of squareness could look at several instantiations and discover that sometimes the four elements ABCD form a plane figure with four equal straight sides and four right angles.

    After observing several instantiations, the observer could invent the idea of squareness, but the observer could never discover the idea of squareness within the instantiations themselves - because there is no discoverable information within the instantiations themselves that links in any special way one particular form within one instantiation to another particular form within a different instantiation.
  • Creativity: Random or deterministic? Invention or discovery?
    Creativity seems to be popularly held to be some kind of non-deterministic, random process of some kind of magical, metaphysically free will, but I hold that that is not the case at all. I hold that there really isn't a clear distinction between invention and discovery of ideas: there is a figurative space of all possible ideas, what in mathematics is called a configuration space or phase space, and any idea that anyone might "invent", any act of abstract "creation" (prior to the act of realizing the idea in some concrete medium), is really just the identification of some idea in that space of possibilities. — Pfhorrest
  • Creativity: Random or deterministic? Invention or discovery?
    ↪whollyrolling
    This relates to the problem of the Knowledge Argument (Mary's Room), the thought experiment proposed by Frank Jackson intended to argue against physicalism.

    As regards the Knowledge Argument, I agree that there is scientific equipment that can measure the wavelength of red light. But the question is, is the scientific instrument conscious of the colour red, as we are conscious of the colour red.

    As the concrete quality of the wavelength of red light exists independently of an observer it can be discovered in the world, but as the abstract quality of redness doesn't exist independently of any observer it cannot be discovered in the world.

    Similarly, scientific instruments could measure concrete alterations in the brain state when we observe a beautiful object, but there is no current scientific instrument that can measure our abstract consciousness of beauty.
  • Creativity: Random or deterministic? Invention or discovery?
    Considering a statue existing within a marble block before being carved by the artist.

    The statue, being art, must have both concrete qualities (in having a physical form that can be directly observed by the senses) and abstract qualities (such as beauty, that cannot be directly observed by the senses).

    However, both concrete ideas and abstract ideas are dependent on relationships - whether the concrete spatial relationships between the statue's particles of matter or the abstract conceptual relationships that determine the statue's beauty

    In the world independent of any observer, particles of matter exist and space exists. But do relationships exist in a world independent of any observer ?

    If relationships do objectively exist in the world, then in the world every possibility is already present, and the artist, when looking at the uncarved marble, can discover the concrete form and abstract beauty of a pre-existing statue.

    However, if relationships don't objectively exist in the world, and the existence of the statue's concrete and abstract qualities depends on relationships, then the possible relationships can only exist in the mind of the observer. This means that if relationships don't exist in the world then they cannot be discovered in the world, meaning that they must have been invented by the artist.

    My belief is that relationships only exist as mental concepts, because, if relationships objectively exist in the world independent of an observer, then this leads into the mereological nightmare where my pen together with the Empire States Building is a unique object, for example, as unique as a table or chair.

    Concrete ideas and abstract ideas are both mental concepts dependent upon relationships and therefore invented in the mind and not discovered in the world.
  • Patterns, order, and proportion
    Being new to the Forum, I didn't intend my previous post - but cannot see how to remove it.


    As regards whether patterns are objective or subjective, it is probably the same problem as to whether patterns are discovered or invented.

    As noted by Pfhorrest, the concepts quality and quantity are important in explaining a word. The word "pattern" has two meanings.

    As a quality, pattern is a mental concept, a universal definition, and therefore subjective.

    As a quantity, a pattern is a particular thing that exists in the world. A pattern is understood by the spatial or temporal regularities in the elements that make it up. But is such a pattern objective or subjective ?

    Start by considering a pattern dependent on time, such as a musical pattern, where the regularities in the elements that make up the pattern are through time. For a pattern to be objective, the pattern must exist in a world having a space-time of three spatial dimensions and one temporal dimension.
    But within our world only one moment of time exists. Therefore, in our world, the relationships between the elements that make up a musical pattern cannot be objective. If a musical pattern can only exist through time, then it can only exist in the mind, meaning that such a pattern is subjective.

    Patterns (considered as a quantity) exist in space and time. When we think about patterns - a wave on water, a Derain, a Santana, a fractal leaf, a William Morris design, a Sondheim - we generally don't treat patterns in space as being ontologically different to patterns in time. Therefore, if a pattern in time is subjective, we can deduce that patterns in space are also subjective, ie, all patterns are subjective.
  • Patterns, order, and proportion
    The substratum of what we see is beauty. We look with our right subjective mind and our left objective mind and conclude, with will, that it's objective. But that's choosing what's true. That is, there is faith. Hegel wanted to get rid of faith by knowing nothing and everything, balancing the objective and subjectice. The basic fact is beauty is subjectice, so tim wood has been correct. Hegel kept a homey natural faith to keep from scepticism — Gregory

    Which of his books talk about points and quantity? Wikipedia says Whitehead wrote stuff that was wrong about wholes and parts, while Husserl wrote good things. This is stuff that I'm interested in — Gregory

    I think that what underlies everything is the pure potentiality of Infinity and Finitude. If you have a segment pi in length, then a piece of the segment corresponds to each number. It goes on forever (Infinite) but has a limit (Finite). Where the infinite meets the finite (at the limit) is an infinity mystery. So nature can never even be understood — Gregory

    Chaos vs symmetry... That's a lot to think about. It's deep. Maybe because I suck at math in trying to make up for it by over thinking this stuff. Maybe there are truths that simply can't be said. The college I went to after high school was Catholic and they hated basing math on logic. I feel like I'm trying to do something similar, but I like it. — Gregory
  • Causality, Determination and such stuff.
    ↪Banno
    ↪Banno
    Anscombe follows that particular sentence with "for them to be deterministic is for them, together with the description of the situation, to entail unique results...."

    Anscombe may well mean that a closed system is deterministic if given a situation plus the laws of nature there will be a unique result, but she wrote that for a closed system if given a situation plus deterministic laws of nature there will be a unique result

    If deterministic has one meaning, then either the closed system is deterministic or the laws of nature are deterministic, it cannot be both.

    The problem for the reader is in judging what Anscombe means by the word "deterministic", when what she means may be different to what she has written.
  • Causality, Determination and such stuff.
    I agree. If Anscombe is, as I believe, using the word "deterministic" in an unusual way, then that certainly casts doubt on her conclusion that "the laws being deterministic does not tell us whether "determinism" is true".
  • Causality, Determination and such stuff.
    ↪Metaphysician Undercover
    It may well be that given Anscombe's particular usage of the word deterministic, her argument is logical and her conclusion sound

    However, the general reader who believes that they know the common usage of the word deterministic may find her argument unclear.

    In such a case, where the author uses a word in a way that is different to common usage, then the author should explain what they mean by the word at the beginning of their article.
    — RussellA

    It's questionable whether using a word in an unusual way produces a sound argument. For the sake of a logical argument, one can define a word in any way the person wants. But a definition ought to be taken as a premise. And a false definition is a false premise.     — Metaphysician Undercover
  • Causality, Determination and such stuff.
    ↪Banno
    I believe that Anscombe's use of the word "deterministic" is different to common usage.

    Throughout her article, Anscombe states that the laws of nature are deterministic, not that nature is deterministic, e.g., "It ought not to have mattered whether the laws of nature were or were not deterministic".

    In mathematics, computer science and physics, it is the system that is a deterministic, i.e., its initial state plus the physical laws as described by equations.

    Similarly, it is nature that is deterministic, i.e., its initial state plus the laws of nature. The laws of nature by themselves cannot determine anything. The laws of nature by themselves are not deterministic.

    It may well be that given Anscombe's particular usage of the word deterministic, her argument is logical and her conclusion sound

    However, the general reader who believes that they know the common usage of the word deterministic may find her argument unclear.

    In such a case, where the author uses a word in a way that is different to common usage, then the author should explain what they mean by the word at the beginning of their article.
  • Causality, Determination and such stuff.
    In her conclusion, Anscombe wrote: "it ought not to have mattered whether the laws of nature were or were not deterministic"
    Because Anscombe uses the words determine, determinate, determined, determinism and deterministic without prior explanation, it sometimes makes it difficult to follow her argument.
    For example, if the path of one ball (in the Galton Board) is determined by its initial state and the laws of nature (such as cause and effect), then nature is deterministic, not the laws of nature.
    Cause and effect is a law of nature. If an effect is determined by a cause, then determinism is a law of nature.
    Therefore, contrary to Anscombe, the laws of nature are not deterministic.
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