A formal concept defines how the variables "T" and "x" are to "behave" or perhaps a better way to say it, is how they are to be understood. These aren't like "proper concepts", such as "red", "hard", etc. which settles the external properties of complex objects. — 013zen
We cannot, for example, input a proper number to which corresponds the formal concept of number for say, a simple object. — 013zen
So, while we can say: "There are two red fruits" this analyzes into:
∃x(P(x)) ∧ ∃y(P(y) ∧ (x≠y)) There is no sign corresponding to the formal concept "number" despite what appears to be a number presented in the proposition. — 013zen
An unhappy apple is an illogical proposition not an illogical object. An apple on the table or inside the sun is not a combination of objects it is a relation of the objects apple and table (on) or apple and sun (in). — Fooloso4
I don't know if you are attempting to interpret the Tractatus or argue against it. He makes a distinction between proper concepts such as grass and formal concepts such as 'simple object'. — Fooloso4
Book is not a formal concept. — Fooloso4
There are no ‘logical objects’ (4.441) — Fooloso4
As part of a propositional analysis apples and tables can function as simples. — Fooloso4
Conceptual atomism is a radical alternative to all of the theories we’ve mentioned so far is conceptual atomism, the view that lexical concepts have no semantic structure (Fodor 1998, Millikan 2000). Conceptual atomism follows in the anti-descriptivist tradition that traces back to Saul Kripke, Hilary Putnam, and others working in the philosophy of language (see Kripke 1972/80, Putnam 1975, Devitt 1981).
At 4.126 Wittgenstein introduces the term "formal concepts". — Fooloso4
we have observed that physical processes can form complex objects without human intervention, such as trees — amber
Eliminativism is the thesis that relations are mental abstractions that are not a part of external reality.
A picture theory, however, would allow speculation, as long as you’re positing possibilities that logically follow from experience — 013zen
I can't think of an object in space without a shape — 013zen
It is exhausting to have philosophers not explain themselves well..................I think Wittgenstein has just particularly been mythologized. — schopenhauer1
The problem here is where Schopenhauer (and previously Leibniz) actually laid out their reasoning for their premise and built a foundation, Wittgenstein simply asserts it to build his linguistic project of atomic facts and propositions that can be stated clearly. — schopenhauer1
Edit to add — Paine
At any rate, I agree with, like 90% of your post. Its just specifics we differ on, right now. — 013zen
One can say that he is castigating all the metaphysicians and epistemologists that came before. — schopenhauer1
I, actually, take Wittgenstein to be attempting to break away from this tradition (epistemology and metaphysics) — 013zen
His early work was influenced by that of Arthur Schopenhauer and, especially, by his teacher Bertrand Russell and by Gottlob Frege, who became something of a friend.
His philosophical education was unconventional (going from engineering to working first-hand with one of the greatest philosophers of his day in Bertrand Russell) and he seems never to have felt the need to go back and make a thorough study of the history of philosophy. He was interested in Plato, admired Leibniz, but was most influenced by the work of Schopenhauer, Russell and Frege.
The article is an attempt at explaining the category of logical form used by Ludwig Wittgenstein in his Tractatus logico-philosophicus by using concepts from Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s The Monadology.
Schopenhauer was the first and greatest philosophical influence on Wittgenstein, a fact attested to by those closest to him. He began by accepting Schopenhauer's division of total reality into phenomenal and noumenal, and offered a new analysis of the phenomenal in his first book, the Tractatus Logico‐Philosophicus.
1. Examples of names (the simple symbols for objects) are: "x,y,z,etc.
2. Examples of elementary propositions are functions such as: "'fx'', 'ϕ(x, y)', etc. — 013zen
We might be able to infer that an atomic fact, for something like this, might be something like: "v=d/t". I wonder. This could also explain why Witt lists: "time" as a "form of an object". — 013zen
These limits of what is said versus what is shown are a question for me in how this work is presented as solving particular issues for the future. But I think it puts 'idealism versus realism' into the diagram rejected in 5.6331. — Paine
Wittgenstein’s view of what philosophy is, or should be, changed little over his life. In the Tractatus he says at 4.111 that “philosophy is not one of the natural sciences,” and at 4.112 “Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts.” Philosophy is not descriptive but elucidatory. Its aim is to clear up muddle and confusion.
I don't see how saying: "no part of our experience is at the same time a priori" could be an expression of idealism. — Paine
The single mention of "pure realism' probably comes from it being a thought experiment appended to saying: — Paine
This difference between images built up through thoughts and words and what they show is evident throughout the book. — Paine
He does engage with the issue: — Paine
The problem here is Wittgenstein's muddling of epistemological and metaphysical concepts without clear distinction or marking what is what. — schopenhauer1
The problem here is Wittgenstein's muddling of epistemological and metaphysical concepts
It just looks like axiomatic assertions without much explanation that one must either accept or not.
Are objects actual entities or are they simply functional as a role?
One is a "realism" whereby the world exists independently of facts, and the other is an idealism of sorts whereby the world is simply the logical coherence of the world.
Objects become denuded of any of its usual attributions, other than its function to support atomic facts.
The ideas become anemic on their own (without the reader doing the heavy-lifting).
Your claim was that about his removal of relations and properties from his ontology. If ontology is about what exists, and properties and relations are shown, then even if they cannot be described they exist. — Fooloso4
He is not interested in the particular state of affairs that are modeled, but the possibility that is can be modeled. — Fooloso4
It is the substance of the world not the facts in the world that prevents this: — Fooloso4
One can perhaps understand Wittgenstein as a coherentist and not a correspondent theorist — schopenhauer1
He doesn't. — Fooloso4
It is impossible, however, to assert by means of propositions that such internal properties and relations obtain: rather, this makes itself manifest in the propositions that represent the relevant states of affairs and are concerned with the relevant objects.
Every object in the world is composed of simple objects. These simple objects are in this sense universal. — Fooloso4
And yet, the meaning is often not understood. Your reading of Wittgenstein is a case in point. If we must infer what is meant then it is not evident from the outward form. — Fooloso4
Objects are particulars. A universal property of objects is to combine with other objects. — Fooloso4
From the outward form, how the thought is expressed, we do not see the logical form that underlies it. — Fooloso4
1.13 - The facts in logical space are the world — Fooloso4
Here Wittgenstein draws an analogy between "clothes" and "a body" with "language" being the clothing and "thought" being the body that is clothed. So, there is a distinction that is made between the two — 013zen
These are examples of propositions, not elementary propositions, though. — 013zen
In contemporary mereology, a simple is any thing that has no proper parts. Sometimes the term "atom" is used, although in recent years the term "simple" has become the standard.
What does it mean to say that an object is simple? One thing Wittgenstein seems to mean is that it cannot be analyzed as a complex of other objects. This seems to indicate that if objects are simple, they cannot have any parts; for, if they did, they would be analyzable as a complex of those parts.
A proposition in some sense contains a thought, but a thought is not identical with a proposition............................Wittgenstein says it is becoming clear to him why he thought that thinking and language were the same. He didn't say that its become clear that they are the same — 013zen
I don't believe that an isomorphism necessarily suggests a certain independence between each structure, but in practice I admit it is used to talk about independent structures. — 013zen
Wittgenstein writes in unequivocal terms that we cannot think what we cannot think and therefore what we cannot think we cannot say either. It means what cannot be thought cannot possibly be spoken about either. These entries suggest that thinking and language (speaking) are coextensive.
First of all...why did you say grass is red and not green? xD Secondly, I don't take "Grass is red" or "Grass is green" or anything of the sort to be representative of an elementary proposition for Witt. These are examples of propositions. — 013zen
Leaving aside the perhaps trivial point that we can have thoughts that are non-propositional...I don't read him as suggesting that language is the only picture-making tool at our disposal. — J
Now it is becoming clear why I thought that thinking and language were the same. For thinking is a kind of language. For a thought too is, of course, a logical picture of the proposition, and therefore it just is a kind of proposition.
It is clear that, when a person believes a proposition, the person, considered as a metaphysical subject, does not have to be assumed in order to explain what is happening. What has to be explained is the relation between the set of words which is the proposition considered as a fact on its own account, and the “objective” fact which makes the proposition true or false.
the Tractatus presents a three part isomorphism between: 1. Thoughts 2. Language 3. Reality — 013zen
A proposition can be analyzed into an elementary proposition, and to this corresponds an atomic fact. — 013zen
it is impossible to directly receive that which is not real, for we would never be aware of an affect. — Mww
The relation of perception to the experience is one of identity. It is like the pain and the experience of pain. The experience of pain does not have pain as an object because the experience of pain is identical with the pain. Similarly, if the experience of perceiving is an object of perceiving, then it becomes identical with the perceiving. Just as the pain is identical with the experience of pain, so the visual experience is identical with the experience of seeing.
The trees are in the Mississippi delta backwaters.................I could take you there and show you in person..................None of those things and none of those places are in my mind. — creativesoul
What I'm saying is that it is possible for a capable creature to directly perceive green cups but because they do so by means of ways that they are completely unaware of, they're not conscious of perceiving. They're just doing it. — creativesoul
House cats can see green cups in cupboards and have no idea that they're called "green cups". — creativesoul
If the object has no inherently existing mind-independent property of color to speak of, then it makes no sense to accuse either one of you of not seeing the object 'as it really is'(whatever that's supposed to mean). It's appearing green to you and blue to them makes no difference - if the object has no inherently mind independent property of color. — creativesoul
Trees are in the yard. Concepts are in the language talking about the yard. Both are in the world. Concepts are in worldviews. Cypress trees are in the backwaters of the Louisiana delta. — creativesoul
I don't understand why you don't understand what I'm asking and I don't know how to explain it in any simpler terms. — Michael
it's literally impossible to describe one's experiences to another person coherently in adverbial language — Count Timothy von Icarus
Could an adverbial description do the same thing? — Count Timothy von Icarus
In general though, the adverbial view tends to apply adverbs only to the perceiver, e.g., to people "seeing greenly," but not to plants "reflecting light greenly." — Count Timothy von Icarus
Which is like saying "one difference could be that bachelors exist and unmarried men don't". — Michael
So if I'm wrong and there is a difference between sense data and qualia then what is that difference? — Michael
As I understand it, sense data and qualia are the same thing. — Michael
According to the SEP article adverbialists accept qualia. If sense data and qualia are the same thing then according to the SEP article adverbialists accept sense data. — Michael
Part of the point of adverbialism, as defended by Ducasse (1942) and Chisholm (1957) is to do justice to the phenomenology of experience whilst avoiding the dubious metaphysical commitments of the sense-datum theory. The only entities which the adverbialist needs to acknowledge are subjects of experience, experiences themselves, and ways these experiences are modified.
1. Against the Sense Datum View
The adverbialist rejects the Phenomenal Principle, that if there sensibly appears to a subject to be something which possesses a particular sensible quality then there is something of which the subject is aware which does possess that quality.
According to the adverbialist, statements that appear to commit us to the existence of sense data can be reinterpreted so as to avoid those commitments. In doing so, the adverbialism rejects the act/object model of perceptual experience—the model on which sensory experience involves a particular act of sensing directed at an existent object (e.g., a sense datum).
I don't get the distinction between sense data and qualia. — Michael
But indirect realists generally say we experience pain "directly," — Count Timothy von Icarus
The relation of perception to the experience is one of identity. It is like the pain and the experience of pain. The experience of pain does not have pain as an object because the experience of pain is identical with the pain. Similarly, if the experience of perceiving is an object of perceiving, then it becomes identical with the perceiving. Just as the pain is identical with the experience of pain, so the visual experience is identical with the experience of seeing.
Wittgenstein was a major influence on adverbial theories. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Since cause, matter, energy, and information appear to flow across this boundary in the same manner as any other, I am not sure how movement across the boundary is supposed to be more "indirect."...Is this logical necessity or causal? — Count Timothy von Icarus
Is there any knowledge that doesn't involve inference?...We don't see various shapes and hues and then, through some concious inferential process decide that we have knowledge of a chair in front us. We just see chairs. — Count Timothy von Icarus
It's not that when we perceive a tree we perceive a concept but that when we perceive a tree we are "perceiving treely", which is a mental state. — Michael