The implication is that the photon didn’t have a determinate path until we made a measurement. — Wayfarer

It is beyond my comprehension that in a Universe 93 billion light years across that has existed for around 13 billion years, the determinacy of the path of photons throughout this Universe is dependent on a few scientists making measurements on the 3rd rock from the Sun.

Tim Folger in his article "Does the Universe Exist if We're Not Looking?" mentions Wheeler's idea that the principles of the two-slit experiment can be applied to the Universe.

Wheeler's hunch is that the universe is built like an enormous feedback loop, a loop in which we contribute to the ongoing creation of not just the present and the future but the past as well. To illustrate his idea, he devised what he calls his "delayed-choice experiment," which adds a startling, cosmic variation to a cornerstone of quantum physics: the classic two-slit experiment.

However, there are doubts about the implications of this two-slit experiment. For example, Sabine Hossenfelder, asks Did We Get the Double Slit Experiment All Wrong?

The double-slit experiment is a famous quantum physics experiment that shows that light exhibits behaviour of both a particle and a wave. In a new paper, researchers claim they’ve proven the experiment wrong, and that light is just a particle. Instead of light also being a wave that interferes with itself they say that there are both light photons and dark photons. Let’s take a look.

She also poses the idea Why This Nobel Prize Winner Thinks Quantum Mechanics is Nonsense

Gerard ‘t Hooft won the Nobel Prize in 1999, and the recent Breakthrough Prize, for his work on the Standard Model of Particle physics. He also thinks that quantum mechanics is nonsense. Indeed, he has an alternative theory for quantum mechanics that he says is how the world really works. This theory has been almost entirely ignored by physicists. Which is unfortunate, because he predicts a limit for what quantum computers can do.

My knowledge about quantum mechanics is insignificant when compared to that of Sabine, but at the least she is pointing out that there is still much to learn about quantum mechanics, including about the path of photons.

Subjective time highlights the mind’s role in constructing and experiencing temporal flow. Hume and Bergson used the example of a clock to show how subjective time allows the mind to transcend a fleeting, current moment of experience. You are correct that all mental operations, including memory, occur within a single moment of objective time. However, the contents of memory do not coexist in the same way that physical objects like furniture in my room do. Instead, memories form an evolving, continuous whole possessing all dimensions of time. — Number2018

As you wrote, Bergson believed that subjective time ("duration", "lived time") of the conscious individual is able to transcend the objective time of the current moment of experience. I don't disagree with that, but it all depends on the meaning of "transcend".

Evan Thompson in his article Clock time contra lived time wrote that the difference between Einstein and Bergson as regards the nature of time has narrowed in the intervening years.

"In the century since 1922, the conceptual distance between the German physicist and the French philosopher seems to have shrunk."

I tend to agree with both Einstein and Bergson, as two different approaches to the same problem.

Einstein's approach is that of objective time. His approach is that of physics and mathematics. In his special theory of relativity, the time measured by a clock is no longer an absolute because simultaneous events are only simultaneous in one frame of reference.

Bergson's approach is that of subjective time. His approach is that of the psychologist. It is about human experience, the lived experience of the passage of time and the experience of duration. Things that cannot be measured as they elude the possibility of measurement.

Objective time independent of an observer and subjective time dependent upon an observer are two aspects of the true nature of time, and it for the the philosopher to unite them into a single cohesive whole. But this is problematic, as Kant showed in his Critique of Pure Reason. Kant may believe in the existence of an external world, yet never able to know the noumena that inhabit this external world. The clock may be part of an objective time, but only a subjective observer is able to read what the clock shows. As Thompson says "Clocks don’t measure time; we do." We may live in a block-universe, where the passage of time from past to present to future is an illusion. However, we could only know this if we were able to stand outside our own frame of reference, which is logically impossible.

I agree when you say that "all mental operations, including memory, occur within a single moment of objective time". I think that this has important and relevant implications, but not discussed within the Thompson article. As I wrote before "But this subjective time only exists for me in my "now", meaning that my subjective time is an instantaneous thing that requires no objective time at all." I agree with Bergson that the subjective time of our conscious mind is different to the objective time of the clock in the world, and we feel that our subjective duration of lived experience transcends the objective single moment of "now". Yet this subjective duration of time exists in a single objective moment of time.

For me, philosophically, an interesting question not raised by Thompson's article is how we are able to subjectively feel the duration of time within a single momentary objective instant of time.

The three modalities of time are really one. One cannot isolate any one modality and speak of it as such, for this analytically carries along with it the other two..............It is also what can properly be called metaphysics, simply because this apriority is not witnessable empirically, quantitatively. It is "about" the world", yet it is apriori! — Astrophel

You write that the three modalities of time, the past, the present and the future, are really one, and are to be understood within metaphysics, about the world yet outside the world.

I suggested that my subjective time only exists in my present.

But this subjective time only exists for me in my "now", meaning that my subjective time is an instantaneous thing that requires no objective time at all.

@Number2018 wrote about subjective time

The argument you provided suggests that the conscious mind exists only in the "now," comparing two memories that are themselves always part of the present moment. However, subjective time refers to a flow of past, present, and future that are inextricably interconnected.

The past, present and future certainly exist in language and thought. For example, "last year I visited Paris, today I am in Seville and next year I will visit Reno.".

However, the fact that I can talk and think about the future is no reason to believe that this future will ever exist. Similarly, that I can talk about the past is no reason to believe that this past ever existed. That I can think and talk about the past and future is no reason that this past and future ever existed or will ever exist.

I agree that the three modalities of time in thought and language are inextricably linked. I can only talk about visiting Reno in the future if I am not in Reno at the present, and I can only talk about having visited Paris in the past if also I not in Paris in the present. Talk about the past and future only make sense in relation to the present.

In thought and language there is an inevitable flow of past, present and future that are inextricably connected. In my conscious mind there is a subjective temporal flow between the past, present and future. Last year I visited Paris, I am now in Seville and next year I will be in Reno.

I think, therefore I am in the present.

But it is in this present that I talk and think about the past, present and future. It is accepted that it is not necessary to teletransport to a future existence in order to be to talk or think about it. Similarly, it is also not necessary to teletransport to a past existence to be able to talk or think about it.

But this talking and thinking about the past, present and future is the foundation for my conscious experience of subjective time. As my talking and thinking exists in my present, my conscious experience must also exist in my present.

My present is momentary, neither in the past nor the future. In effect, timeless. My subjective time, which also exists in this momentary present, must therefore also be timeless.

My subjective time flows from the past to the present to the future. All these exist in my present when I talk and think about them, meaning that my subjective time is also something that only exists, metaphysically speaking, in my present.

That picture of the photon passing through every point on a classical trajectory assumes a deterministic path and a continuous sequence of objective instants. — Wayfarer

Why should it be that because a photon's path through space and time is unknowable to an observer, that its path is not spatially and temporally objectively deterministic?

A photon of light leaves the Andromeda Galaxy and enters a person's eye 2.537 million light-years later.

The photon must have had a path, because it made its way from the Andromeda Galaxy to the Earth, even if the path cannot meaningfully be assigned by an observer.

In having a path, the photon must have had a spatial location at each moment in time, even if in the absence of any measurement by an observer its definite position was unknown and even if each moment in time is unknown because it depends on different observers' frame of reference.

Perhaps, as for Kant, even though he argued for the unknowability of noumena, he still believed in the objective existence of a world independent of any subjective observer.

But what if nobody is there to know the information (light beams) is reaching that point in space? The light beams still arrive so do they constitute a 'now'? — EnPassant

That's how I see it.

Suppose a photon of light leaves an object and arrives at an eye 100 metres away. On its way to the eye, the photon passes through every point between the object and the eye, of which there are an infinite number. As the photon can only be in one place at one time (ignoring complexities of quantum mechanics), at each point the photon passes through, it exists in the present time, it exists in the "now". Either there are an infinite number of "nows" between the object and the eye or there is only one "now", where the photon happens to be at any moment in time.

As the photon can only be in one place at one time, and at each place the photon is in the "now", this means that there can only be one "now".

The argument you provided suggests that the conscious mind exists only in the "now," comparing two memories that are themselves always part of the present moment. However, subjective time refers to a flow of past, present, and future that are inextricably interconnected. — Number2018

A clock strikes four times. There is the quantitative. In the world, each strike is independent of the others. As you wrote “Each successive ‘now’ of the clock contains nothing of the past because each moment, each unit, is separate and distinct.". There is the qualitative. In the mind, the four strikes are inextricably connected as part of a continuous flow of experience from past, present and future.

As I understand it, subjective time is the mind's consciousness of the relation between the four strikes, and objective time is the relation between the four strikes in the absence of any mind.

I know subjective time because it is in my mind. However, I can only infer objective time because it is outside my mind.

Let the clock strike four times.

At the moment I hear the clock strike for the fourth time, I have the memory of hearing the clock strike for the first time. When I hear the clock strike for the fourth time, for me, this is my "now". My memory of hearing the clock strike for the first time is also in my "now". In my "now" are both the memory of the clock striking for the first time and hearing the clock strike for the fourth time. The relation between the memory of the clock striking for the first time and hearing the clock strike for the fourth time comprises my awareness of subjective time. But this subjective time only exists for me in my "now", meaning that my subjective time is an instantaneous thing that requires no objective time at all.

In other words, subjective time requires no objective time.

You say that "subjective time refers to a flow of past, present and future that are inextricably interconnected".

I agree if you are saying that the past exists in our mind as a memory.

However, I may be wrong, but I infer that by past you are referring to an objective past, a past that exists independently of any observer. If that is the case, in order for the mind to have a consciousness of a subjective time, how exactly does the mind connect an objective past to an objective present?

1) Do people exist in both the objective past and objective present, thereby allowing them
an awareness of the flow of time?

2) Does the person only exist in the objective present, the "now", but their mind is able to go back to an objective past, thereby allowing them an awareness of the flow of time?

How exactly does a person connect an objective past to an objective present if not by a memory that exists in the objective present?

If 'now' is defined as the moment information reaches our senses (say light beams from various sources coincide with your position in space) we can define now in terms of information being at a certain point in space. But what if nobody is there to know the information (light beams) is reaching that point in space? The light beams still arrive so do they constitute a 'now'? — EnPassant

@Number2018 makes the point that clocks don't measure time, as each successive "now" of the clock contains nothing of the past.

@Number 2018 - Evan Thompson points out Bergson’s position regarding a relation between subjective and objective times: “Each successive ‘now’ of the clock contains nothing of the past because each moment, each unit, is separate and distinct.......................Clocks don’t measure time

By the same argument, as the clock is a physical mechanism and only exists in the "now", the brain can only exist in the "now", as the brain is also a physical mechanism.

Suppose I have the memory of a clock showing 2pm and the memory of a clock showing 3pm. As my mind can only exist in the "now", both my memory of a clock showing 2pm and my memory of a clock showing 3pm exist in my "now".

If there is nobody to have a memory of the clock showing 2pm, then as before, it remains the case that the clock exists in its "now".

The problem with defining "now" as the moment information reaches our senses is the use of the word "moment". "Moment" assumes the existence of time, which "now" specifically excludes.

The definition of "now" cannot include the word "moment".

As I mentioned in the OP, any change requires time, whether it is physical or mental. In the first case, we need subjective time, and in the second case, we need psychological time. Subjective time is caused by the Mind (capital M), whereas psychological time is caused by the mind. — MoK

A clock shows 2pm and then the clock shows 3pm. There is a physical change in what the clock shows.

You say that physical change requires subjective time, and subjective time is caused by the Mind.

In what sense is the physical change in the clock first showing 2pm and then showing 3pm caused by the Mind?

In other words, the mathematics that describe change, is time (spacetime as far as physical time is concerned). — EnPassant

Does mathematics describe change or does it in fact describe difference?

The conscious mind as well as the clock can only exist in the "now". As @Number2018 wrote about the clock, the same argument can apply to the conscious mind as a physical mechanism.

“Each successive ‘now’ of the clock contains nothing of the past because each moment, each unit, is separate and distinct.

We can only infer that there is an objective time, in that not only is there a "now" but there was also a "past."

In the "now", I have memory P that the clock shows 10 minutes, and I have memory Q that the clock shows 30 minutes. Mathematics describes the difference between 10 minutes and 30 minutes, which equals 20 minutes. We name this difference "a change in time". As mathematics is part of the conscious mind, mathematics can also only exist in the "now". Therefore, the difference that mathematics is describing also only exists in the "now". The concept of objective time, as something that exists between different "nows", is redundant as far as the mathematical equation that (30-10) = 10 is concerned.

When we talk about "a change in time", this is a figure of speech. It is no different to when we talk about "the wind whistling through the trees" or "she is like a star in the sky". "A change in time" is a figure of speech for this difference of 20 minutes, as it exists in the "now". It is not about any inferred objective time.

Mathematics describes difference. Only when "change" is used as a figure of speech does mathematics describe change

Our internal experience of "flow" and "duration" is directly related to the notion of subjective time. It is not something that can be reduced to a mental state or an objective process, but constitutes a fundamental dimension of the conscious experience of continuity, memory, and change. — Number2018

There is the question as to how "subjective time" relates to time.

We have a memory of driving through the city and we are aware of presently walking through the forest. But even our awareness of presently walking through the forest is a memory, because the transfer of information from the forest to our mind is limited by the speed of light.

Therefore, the conscious mind is always comparing two memories, the memory of driving in the city and the memory of walking through the forest. The conscious mind is aware that these two memories are different, and the conscious mind understands that memories that are different have different "times".

Yet, as the clock only exists in the "now", the conscious mind can only exist in the "now". As you wrote about the clock “Each successive ‘now’ of the clock contains nothing of the past because each moment, each unit, is separate and distinct". Exactly the same applies to the mind, such that “Each successive ‘now’ of the conscious mind contains nothing of the past because each moment, each unit, is separate and distinct".

The conscious mind, which only exists in the "now", can compare two memories, which also only exist in the "now". The conscious mind can be aware that these memories are different, and this difference is labelled as "time".

For the conscious mind, "time" is something that can only exist in the "now" as a difference in memories, which also can only exist in the "now".

In effect, a difference in memories that are both in the "now" can be labelled "a change in time".

Subjective time in the conscious mind is something that can only exist in the "now".

In fact, Kant demonstrated that without subjective time there could be no coherent experience of existence or consciousness. — Number2018

I'm not sure that this is exactly what Kant was proposing.

He writes about time and space in The Transcendental Aesthetic, B46 of the CPR.

Space and time are pure forms of intuition that enable the possibility of our being able to have experiences. But what kind of experiences is he referring to? He must be referring to experiences involving space and time.

As you say "It means that time and space are conditions for the possibility of experience, fundamental to how we reason and perceive the world"

In other words, space and time are pure forms of intuition that enable the possibility of our being able to have experiences involving space and time.

I can only conclude that different things are being referred to here. There is "time as a pure form of intuition" and there is "the experience of time". "Time" in ""time as a pure form of intuition" cannot be the same thing as "time" as in "the experience of time".

I don't think that Kant is demonstrating that without subjective time there could be no coherent experiences, but rather that without the a priori conditions that enable us to experience time, we would not be able to experience time.

Let me consider your argument in P4. It implies that if subjective time exists, it would be contained within the conscious mind, as though it’s something that is "added on" or superfluous. However, subjective time is likely inseparable from the experience of being conscious. — Number2018

It is a problem of terminology.

In my P4, I was thinking about @MoK's use of the terms "subjective time", "psychological time" and "objective time". My thought was that @MoK's use of the term "subjective time" was redundant, as "psychological time" and "objective time" should be sufficient as concepts.

However, it seems that your use of the term "subjective time" is the same as @MoK's use of the term "psychological time".

The question is, do we call our conscious experience of time "subjective time" or "psychological time"?

Kant's transcendental philosophy includes a well-known perspective on subjective time and its mode of existence. — Number2018

Yes, Kant in the "Transcendental Aesthetic" in his CPR argues that time and space are not properties of the external world, but are a priori forms of intuition that allow for the possibility of experience.

@MoK refers to subjective time, objective time and psychological time.

The question is, is @MoK's subjective time and Kant's time as an a priori form of intuition referring to the same thing. I don't think that they are.

@MoK writes that subjective time exists and changes when there is a change in the physical

P1) Subjective time exists and changes since there is a change in a physical (Consider an electron as an example of a physical)

However, on the one hand, Kant's time is not something that exists, but is something that allows for the possibility of experience, and on the other hand, is not something that changes as the physical changes.
Kant's time as an a priori intuition is neither psychological time not objective time, but is something that allows for the possibility of experiencing psychological time.

There are three types of time, namely subjective time, objective time, and psychological time. — MoK

Useful post. I can agree that there is objective time and psychological time, but I am unsure that there is subjective time.

P1 - Objective time is inferred to exist in the world.
P2 - Psychological time exists in the conscious mind, in that we are conscious that at one time we were driving in the city and at another time we were walking through a forest. As you say, "We, however, experience the passage of psychological time".
P3 - The conscious mind is a physical substance that changes with objective time.

P4 - If there was a subjective time, it would exist in the conscious mind.
P5 - At one moment in objective time, subjective time cannot change.
P6 - Between two different objective times, subjective time would change.
C1 - But as you say "We, however, cannot experience the subjective time since we exist within each instant of it"
C2 - We can experience psychological time and we can infer objective time, but as we cannot experience subjective time, then the concept of subjective time becomes redundant.

Objective time and psychological time are sufficient. Subjective time is a redundant concept. This avoids your problem of infinite regress with subjective time.

What is the "big picture" if not "all the details"? The big picture is a particular relation between its details.

Consider only three details: A, B and C
These can be related into seven possible big pictures: A B C AB AC BC ABC
So how do we know of the seven possible big pictures which if any are the actual big picture?

But there are not just three details in the world, but an almost infinite number. This means that the number of possible big pictures in the world is also almost infinite. Then the question is, of these almost infinite number of possible big pictures in the world, which are the actual big pictures?

The detail of all the aspects of how you end up looking at a chair and recognising it is a chair would fill a library. — Malcolm Parry

Books have been written about cognition, but the brain can be more direct. Given only eight pictures, each of which is labelled either as a "kitabi" or labelled not as a "kitabi", I would imagine that you could without too much difficulty be able to translate the word "kitabi" into English.

The abstraction of what goes above this is what puzzels me….. — Jan

I agree that when I see a chair, to me it is a chair, but to an ant it is probably not a chair. I agree that there is a lot in common to when I see a chair and when I see evil.

If I see a set of shapes, such as horizontals, verticals and planes, in order for me to recognize that this set of shapes is a chair I must first have the concept of a chair. My concept of chair must be prior to being able to recognise that this set of shapes is a chair. For example, could you recognize a "kitabu" if you had no concept of what a "kitabu" is?

The original metaphor talks about broad brush strokes and fine lines. But it depends what "broad brush strokes" and "fine lines" is referring to. I am assuming that "broad brush strokes" is referring to the general and universal, such as the nature of evil, and "fine lines" is referring to the particular and concrete, such as one particular evil act. Though this is just my assumption.

My concept of chair is abstract and universal. The set of shapes I see is one concrete and particular instantiation of my concept.

Where does my concept of a chair come from? Perhaps over a period of time I see many different concrete and particular sets of shapes, but each time this set of shapes has been labelled a "chair". Eventually, because of the nature of the brain, I will begin to understand the concept of "chair". IE, it is impossible to understand a new concept by seeing just one particular and concrete instantiation of it.

The brain is able to abstract the concept of "chair" from seeing different examples, different instantiations, of sets of shapes that have been labelled "chairs".

Philosophical talk.....................Copilot told me: “ It’s like painting with broad brush strokes while occasionally adding a few fine lines to bring the image to life.” I think its metaphore is spot on. — Jan

In Philosophical talk, there is the abstract and universal, the broad brush strokes, and the particular and concrete, the fine lines.

I don't agree with Copilot. I think it is back to front. I would reword it as: "Philosophical talk is like continually painting in fine lines, the particular and concrete, with the hope that occasionally the broad brush strokes, the abstract and universal, are brought to life".

Philosophy is about the big picture, the abstract and the universal, such as the nature of evil. Yet humans are not able to understand the abstract and universal in itself, such as the nature of evil. It is impossible for the human mind to understand the big picture as it exists in itself as a an abstract and universal concept.

The human is only able to understand particular concrete examples of abstract and universal concepts. For example, we can agree that the Holodomor, the forced famine perpetrated by Stalin’s regime against Ukraine from 1932-1933 killed millions and exemplifies the use of extreme cruelty for political control, was a particular and concrete act of evil.

From particular concrete examples, which may be known and understood, the abstract universal may be inferred. This means that the abstract universal, the nature of evil, can never be known but can only be inferred. Although philosophy talk is about the big picture, the abstract and the universal, philosophy talk can only progress by knowing and understanding particular concrete examples, the fine lines, from which the big picture, the broad brush strokes, may be inferred.

James Pryor in his article Guidelines on Writing a Philosophy Paper, James Pryor notes the importance of the concrete particular example in philosophy talk.

Give examples which help explain the thesis, or which help to make the thesis
more plausible
Explain it; give an example; make it clear how the point helps your argument.
It is very important to use examples in a philosophy paper. Many of the claims
philosophers make are very abstract and hard to understand, and examples are the best
way to make those claims clearer.
You may want to give some examples to illustrate the author's point.
Do you illustrate your claims with good examples?
"Give an example?"

Philosophy talk must begin by knowing and understanding the fine lines, the particular and the concrete, in the hope that occasionally the broader brush strokes, the abstract and universal, can be inferred and brought to life.

Appreciate your replies, but I have run out of time.

Being in the world is inherently moral/aesthetic — Astrophel

The world is not inherently moral/aesthetic, so why should being in the world be inherently moral/aesthetic.

Husserl argued like this and that famous essay Sartre wrote, the Transcendence of the Ego, argued against it, because it impeded freedom — Astrophel

Yes, it is not immediately obvious who is right.

How about just being happy? — Astrophel

It is possible just to be happy without being happy about something, so why is it not possible to have a thought without having a thought about something?

There is no concept that is not representational, and thus, all talk about what is non representational is always already represntational. — Astrophel

This cannot be the case, as this would lead into an infinite regression, which we know is not the case.

Just reducible to an extravagance ofo thought whereby ideas are constructed out of the thin air of concepts without intuitions. — Astrophel

That is why it is transcendental.

But how does one speak of such a ground in the very structure of ground itself? — Astrophel

But we do! So it must be possible.

This is an issue. If I think, then the thought has content. It is never stand alone thinking, and if one is thinking about some object---a stone, a cloud, another thought, a feeling, whatever, then that object is an inherent part of the apodictic affirmation. Descartes cogito is an inherent affirmation of the world's "objects", physical or otherwise. — Astrophel

The SEP article Notes to Seventeenth-Century Theories of Consciousness writes that there is some dispute whether Descartes believed that there were non-intentional thoughts.

5.As noted above (see note 3), there is some dispute over whether Descartes believed that there were non-intentional thoughts.

For example, it is conceivable that consciousness of a thought is prior to the thought's intentionality.

One problem about the idea that thoughts must be of something, such as I think of the pain of a wasp sting, I think of a tree, I think of tomorrow or I think of my relatives, is that these thoughts are contingent on what is being thought about, thereby losing any necessary independent identity of the self. A self independent of whatever thoughts it may have.

Yes he did. — Astrophel

Kant may be a Representationalist, but not everything can be reduced to a representation. Is his space and time a representation? Are his Categories representations?

In the CPR B275 he writes that his perception of time is only possible because of it is not being represented.

Thus the perception of this persistent thing is possible only through a thing outside me and not through the mere representation of a thing outside me.

As regards the Categories, for example, in the quantity of unity, there is one blue object. In the quantity of plurality, some objects are blue. In the quantity of totality, all the objects are blue. A Category is needed for us to cognize that within a phenomena there is one blue object. Within the phenomena of shapes and colours is a representation of one blue object. The Category can synthesise a manifold of experiences that represent one blue object, but the Category itself cannot be a representation, otherwise there would be no solid ground for our cognitions. If the Category was a representation, what is it representing?

As Wittgenstein needs certain hinge propositions, Kant also needs a ground. In order to represent, representation needs a ground that is itself not a representation, and for Kant this ground is space, time and the Categories.

What Henry IS going to say is that Kant's is a thorough reduction to representation — Astrophel

Kant did not believe that everything must be reduced to representation.

In his Refutation of Idealism CPR B275, he concludes that both time determination and determination of the self in time requires us to posit the existence of a thing outside us.

This is in opposition to both Berkeley, who denies the possibility of spatial objects, and Descartes, in that we can only know the mind.
===============================================================================

There is no such thing as a disembodied thought, and it is not, "I think, therefore I am," but, "I am in a world, therefore I am." — Astrophel

From SEP - Notes to Seventeenth-Century Theories of Consciousness

Descartes said that there were no thoughts about which we are unconscious. In addition, he said that whilst the object of perception may be doubted, the perception itself cannot be doubted.

However, there is an academic dispute whether Descartes believed that a thought can be non-intentional.

Not the point at issue, if you read the post I responded to. — Wayfarer

The point at issue is Michel Henry's problem with Kant's Transcendental idealism which Henry characterises as "I represent to myself that I think"

This is a combination of Descartes "I think, therefore I am" and Kant's Transcendental Idealism.

To think means thinking about something. Therefore, Descartes might have said "I think about my hand, therefore I am".

Within Kant's Transcendental Idealism, when the subject encounters a hand, the subject recognizes the hand as an object of experience, not as it is in itself, but as it appears within the limitations that the Categories have imposed on it.

Therefore, Kant might have said "I think about my hand as an object of experience, not as it is in itself, but as it appears within the limitations that the Categories have imposed on it"

Kant might have more simply said "I think about a representation"

It is certainly not the case as Henry suggests that Kant is saying "I represent to myself that I think".

The hand that cannot grasp itself’ — Wayfarer

A hand cannot grasp itself, but nevertheless, is proof of an external world, as Moore wrote in Proof of an External World

In addition, as Descartes might have said, "I think about my hand, therefore I am".

In fact, it seems that my hand not only proves my existence but also that of the external world.

1) what is the aesthetic experience "as such"?.................What is sought, as with Kant, is something that is a stand alone, or, as Kierkegaard put is, "stands as its own presupposition".
2) the question goes to the nature of the this very mysterious term, mysterious when considered phenomenologically, and not in some framework of contingency that explains matters is "other terms" — Astrophel

We can experience an aesthetic, and we can experience the colour red. Both stand alone in the mind, in that an aesthetic experience is distinct from the experience of the colour red. Both can only result from phenomenological appearances in our sensibilities. Both the aesthetic experience and the experience of the colour red are contingent on the particular person and particular phenomena.

We experience something, such as a painting, music, dance or literature, which we may find aesthetic. These experiences will be spatially or temporally extended. We may or may not discover an aesthetic in the whole relationship between these extended parts. For example, we may experience an aesthetic in the phenomenological spatial relationship between the shapes and colours of a Derain painting.

But why do we have an aesthetic experience when we perceive a whole that has certain relationships between certain parts? Is this really mysterious?

We hear the sound of a fingernail scarping across a blackboard and physically shiver with visceral dislike, and more than likely even cringe at the thought. We see a Derain and may have an aesthetic experience.

Experiencing an aesthetic is a natural consequence of a physical human interacting with a physical world, as falling to the ground is a natural consequence of a physical apple interacting with a physical world.

An aesthetic experience may be mysterious, but no more mysterious than any of our experiences. No more mysterious than feeling pain when stung by a wasp, seeing the colour red when looking at a wavelength of 700nm, tasting something sweet when eating an apple or smelling something acrid because of a bonfire.

An aesthetic experience is no more mysterious that experiencing the colour red, both not unexpected natural consequences of a physical body existing within a physical world.

As I will be away shortly, I may not have time to fully respond to your previous post, though I will try.

1) So the "good" of the couch is a mostly public matter, and objectively conceived when the overt features of the couch are in question.
2) Not something good FOR, but something just plain Good.
3) All contingent goods, goods that are FOR something else, eventually end up at this determinacy, when, plainly put, you just say, I like it! This "liking" is just what it is, and the matter goes no further. — Astrophel

Person A says that this couch is good for sitting on. Person B also says that this couch is good for sitting on. Person C says that this couch is not good for sitting on.

Whether the couch is good for sitting on or not is contingent on who sits on it.

The question is, who in practice decides whether the essence of the couch is good or bad, regardless of being sat upon?
===============================================================================

So I argue that the good, as well as the bad (categories of experience merely) are not subjective in the essence of the judgment that is about art. — Astrophel

Person A says that this Derain has an aesthetic. Person B also says that this Derain has an aesthetic. Person C says that this Derain doesn't have an aesthetic.

Whether this Derain has an aesthetic or not is contingent on who is looking at it.

The question is, who in practice decides whether this Derain has the essence of being aesthetic, regardless of who is looking at it?
===============================================================================

This is not, I argue, unlike what Kant does: get past the contingencies of language's entanglements, the incidental features of the judgments we make, and look into essential structures of those judgments, experiences, and you will find something transcendental. The GOOD is transcendental. — Astrophel

In Kant's Transcendental Idealism, we are able to cognize appearances in our sensibilities as phenomena, but we can never cognize things as they are in themselves, things-in-themselves.

The ability to cognize things-in-themselves would be transcendent.

We can cognize the appearance of something, something as it appears to us, but we cannot cognize the essence of something, something as it is in itself

We can cognize that the couch is good, as it appears to us, in being comfortable to sit on, but we can never cognize that the couch is good, as it is in itself, its essence.

There are sixteen points I would like to respond to, but like a jigsaw puzzle I am tackling them one at a time. However, shortly I will be away for a week or more, so unfortunately will have to leave this interesting thread.

1) you would still hold the art expert's opinion high
2) Quine indirectly takes this kind of thing to task in his indeterminacy thesis
3) I argue that Saying X is good may disagree with someone else's opinion about X, BUT this is because we are not talking about the same X — Astrophel

I would perhaps listen to an art expert's opinion that Derain painted Le séchage des voiles in 1905, but I would take any art expert's opinion that this painting is a great work of art with a pinch of salt, even though in fact I do believe that this painting is a great work of art.

In the world, objects have properties. It is said that some properties are objective facts, such that Derain's painting was painted in 1905, and some properties are subjective judgements, such that Derain's painting is good.

Some properties, such as good, are clearly subjective judgements, but other properties, such that this object is a painting, which appear objective facts, are also subjective judgements.

As you say, Quine points out the indeterminacy of translation.

Person A born in 1950 and brought up in South Africa and person B born in 2005 and brought up in Nevada will have different understandings about the same concept. For example, person A's concept of a forest, a savanna woodland, will be different to person B's concept of a forest, sparse juniper pine.

As you also say, in fact, person A's understanding of every concept will be different to person B's understanding of the same concept.

No concept can be an objective fact in the world, but rather every concept must be a subjective judgement. Not only is saying that Derain's Le séchage des violes is good is a subjective judgment, but even saying that Derain's Le séchage des violes is a painting is a subjective judgment.

In fact, not only would I take an art expert's opinion that the Derain object is good with a pinch of salt, but philosophically, I should also take the art expert's opinion that the Derain object is a painting also with a pinch of salt.
===============================================================================

I've always though this a most curious use of the term "disinterested" — Astrophel

There some things in the world in which we are interested that have a physical affect on us, such as the wind, and there some things in the world in which we are interested that have a mental affect on us, such as an aesthetic.

It would be useful within the philosophy of art to be able to distinguish these two different kinds of interest.

As the term "transcendental idealism" is a definition rather than a description, in the philosophy of art, we can think of "disinterest" also as a definition rather than a description. In other words, we have an interest in things that physically affect us and a disinterest in things that mentally affect us.
===============================================================================

(as Kant discovered pure reason) — Astrophel

This needs to be be checked. Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason critiques pure reason, and it is my understanding that he concluded that pure reason is not possible.

But keep in mind that science has no interest in the aesthetic features of science any more than knitting qua knitting has interest in the joy of knitting. — Astrophel

There are similarities between the topics of science and aesthetics which are more than coincidental. One the one hand, aesthetics is about the relationship between the objective particular aesthetic object in the world and the subjective universal aesthetic object in the mind. On the other hand, science is about the relationship between the objective particular event in the world and the subjective universal law about that particular event in the mind. For both aesthetics and science, the particular in the world and the universal in the mind are connected by what Kant called transcendental apperception.

The aesthetic can be looked at in two ways. Firstly, the term was initially used by Alexander Baumgarten. It was borrowed from the Greek word for sensory perception, to denote concrete knowledge that we gain through our senses. Secondly, as a synonym for "taste", in being able to distinguish between those objects worthy of contemplation and those objects not worthy. When we observe an object about which we have a subjective aesthetic feeling, either we have an aesthetic feeling because the object is an aesthetic object, or the object is not an aesthetic object but we are able to perceive an aesthetic in the shapes and colours we experience as sensory phenomena. Post-Kant, the aesthetic is considered as the synthesis of both these, sensory experience and intellectual judgment.

You raise the question as to whether science has an interest in the aesthetic features of science, and as to whether that science is in its essence, aesthetic. Science starts with particular observations, and its goal is to discover from these particular observations universal laws. Such universal laws enable science to predict future phenomenal states. There are two ways of doing this. Either by looking at each particular observation one at a time and through reason and logic combine them into a whole, or by immediately perceiving a gestalt, an immediate unity of parts as an aesthetic. In Kant's words, a unity of apperception. Kant's transcendental apperception is the uniting and building of coherent consciousness out of different elementary inner experiences. Such experiences differ in both time and topic, but all belong to the individual's self-consciousness. Science discovers universal laws from particular observations, both by logical reasoning about the parts making up a whole and by aesthetic intuition about a whole made up of parts .

You also raise the question about Kant's rationalism, his logical reasoning. Though, as Hume said, reason cares nothing for human existence. In fact, reason does not "care" at all. Kant combined Rationalism with Empiricism though Transcendental Idealism. Rationalism is the belief that particular sense experiences are necessary in order for us to discover concepts and knowledge. However, they are not sufficient. One needs in addition the ability to logically reason about these particular sense experiences. Empiricism is the belief, as with Rationalism, that particular sense experiences are necessary in order for us to discover concepts and knowledge. However, for the Empiricists, these experiences can be sufficient. Sometimes, however, logical reasoning may be of assistance in clarifying certain sense experiences. The staring point for both the Rationalist and Empiricist are the phenomena of particular observations. It is through these phenomena that there is the possibility of discovering universal truths. There are two aspects to the aesthetic. First, there is the aesthetic object within sensory experience as an objective entity, and second there is the aesthetic object within the mind as subjective feeling. Science also has two similar aspects. First the particular object experienced as phenomena and second the universal object experienced as a concept. Science is the discovery of the universal from the particular. Science starts with the aesthetic objective object within sense experience and discovers the aesthetic subjective object within a concept.

One belief about the aesthetic object is that the aesthetic object needs no practical use to be aesthetic. Taking their cue from Kant, many philosophers have defended the idea of an aesthetic attitude as one divorced from practical concerns. This is a kind of “distancing,” or "standing back" from ordinary involvement. Kant described the recipients of aesthetic experience not as distanced but as disinterested. In other words, the recipient does not treat the object of enjoyment either as a vehicle for curiosity or as a means to an end. They contemplate the object as it is in itself and “apart from all interest.” An object such as a hammer, which has a practical use, is not aesthetic because it has a practical use, but rather an object, such as a Derain painting, which has no practical use, can still be aesthetic. Arthur Schopenhauer argued that people could regard anything aesthetically so long as they regarded it as independent of their will. That is, irrespective of any use to which they might put it.

Yet there is a paradox here. On the one hand we observe particular shapes and colours within our phenomenal sensory experience which we intuitively find aesthetic. This does not need a reasoned judgment. On the other hand, we instinctively reason that it is not the case that we subjectively perceive an object as aesthetic, but rather that there will be universal agreement amongst everyone perceiving the same object that the object is objectively aesthetic. The aesthetic object is an object of sensory experience. The aesthetic object is not merely as an object of sensory pleasure but also as the repository of significance and value. This synthesis is summarised in Hegel's "the sensuous embodiment of the Idea". There is the sensory: concrete, individual, particular and determinate, and there is the intellectual: abstract, universal, general and indeterminate. This synthesis however gives rise to a paradox, as described by Kant in his antimony of taste.

The human expresses their subjective pleasure in an object as if beauty was an objective property of the object. The human is making a universal general objective judgement about their immediate particular subjective feelings. Feelings about an object are particular and individual, so why do we want universal agreement about the nature of the object. There is a contradiction in making a universal judgment based on particular intuitions. The phrase "aesthetic judgment" is a contradiction in terms, yet we make aesthetic judgements all the time For example, I can accept someone as an expert in nuclear physics, of which I have no experience, yet I cannot accept someone as an expert as to the merits of a Derain painting unless I have had personal experience. There are universal rules in science but no universal rules in beauty. Yet we make aesthetic judgments, such that Derain is a great artist. We can make reasoned justifications for our aesthetic judgements, such as about Derain. We can do this because reasoned justifications can never be purely intellectual but must also be partly based on feeling.

Science and aesthetics are both about the relationship between the world and the mind, the concrete particular and the general universal.

References
Britannica - The Aesthetic Experience
SEP - Rationalism vs Empiricism

Science, as a philosophical ontology/epistemology goes absolutely nowhere, quite literally. And science doesn't even begin, again, literally, to talk about the most salient feature of your existence, ethics/aesthetics. — Astrophel

Science and aesthetics cannot be separated as they are two aspects of the same human imagination. Science depends on the beauty of the equation and aesthetic form cannot be created by the artists without reasoned and measured method.

Science is a systematic discipline that builds and organises knowledge in the form of testable hypotheses and predictions about the universe. Science can include the Natural Sciences, such as physics, chemistry, and biology, which study the physical world. There are the Social sciences, such as economics, psychology, and sociology, which study individuals and societies. The Applied sciences, such as engineering and medicine, are pragmatic and practical. Finally, the Formal sciences of logic, mathematics, governed by axioms and rules and uses deductive reasoning rather than empirical evidence.

Analytic philosophy is a broad 20th C movement within Western philosophy. It promotes clarity of prose, rigour in argument, and is founded on logic and mathematics. It is characterized by an interest in language, semantics and meaning, also known as the Linguistic Turn. Central figures were Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, G. E. Moore, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. The Logical Positivists included Rudolf Carnap, and Ordinary Language Philosophers included WVO Quine. With the decline of Logical Positivism, there was a revival in metaphysics, typified by Saul Kripke.

Analytic philosophy is closely aligned with the scientific method. Analytic philosophy uses clarity of prose, rigour in argument, logic and mathematics, Science systematically organises knowledge in the form of testable hypotheses. Several Analytic philosophers had a scientific, mathematical and logical background, including Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein. Analytic philosophy and science have an interest not only in facts about the world but also about the individual within society. In science are the social sciences of economics, psychology and sociology and in Analytic philosophy are the Ordinary language philosophers, such as Quine.

Aesthetics is included within the philosophy of art, an investigation into the nature of beauty and taste. Aesthetics examines the value of, and makes critical judgments about artistic taste and preferences. It asks how artists imagine, create, and perform works of art, as well as how people use, enjoy, and criticize art. Aesthetics tries to find answers to what exactly is art and what makes good art. The philosophy of art asks what happens in our minds when we view visual art, listen to music or read poetry. As Aristotle said, mimesis is a natural instinct of humanity that separates humans from animals.

Continental philosophy is derived from the Kantian tradition, although is more a family resemblance across disparate philosophical views. Whereas the Analytic is technical, the Continental is literary. Continental philosophy has four main attributes. It generally rejects the view that the natural sciences are the only or most accurate way of understanding natural phenomena. It takes into account Kant's conditions of possible experience, which in large part depends on context, language, culture, history. It accepts that if human experience is contingent, then this opens up the possibility of personal change in the Marxist tradition of personal, moral, political. Continental philosophy can be foundational a priori, can investigates both the cultural and practical and can also be of the opinion that no philosophy can succeed, a position taken by Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and the later Heidegger.

Continental philosophy can be associated with the aesthetic more than the factual, being a subjective state of mind in the individual rather than the objective fact in the world. Continental philosophy rejects the view that science is the best way to understand the world. Aesthetics is about what happens in the emotional mind of the observer when they see paintings, listen to music or read poetry. Continental philosophy in the belief that human experience is contingent allows the possibility of change , persona, moral and political. In aesthetics, the individual is not a passive recipient of beauty, but actively criticizes the art they experience, can imagine different possibilities and can create their own new experiences and invent new performatives. Continental philosophy accepts that even philosophy may not succeed in its own goals, seen in Nietzsche's perspectivism, the existentialism of Kierkegaard and Heidegger's questioning of the meaning of being. In aesthetics, there is no final goal, but the journey is the experience. The experience is both pleasurable in itself and sufficient in itself .

Science needs aesthetics and aesthetics needs science. The tension between art and science may be traced back to the Greeks, to the ancient conflict of Apollo and Dionysus, between order, reason, and logic and chaos, emotion, and ecstasy. There is the sublime in both the aesthetic and the scientific, in both its theory and practice. The aesthetics of science is the study of beauty and matters of taste within the scientific endeavour. Aesthetic features like simplicity, elegance and symmetry are sources of wonder and awe for many scientists, thus motivating scientific pursuit. Both use representation and the role of values. Both combine the subjective with the objective, imagination with creativity, the inspirational and the pragmatic. In e = mc 2 is an aesthetic beauty.

Science and aesthetics need each other. Science lacking aesthetic form blocks human understanding and the aesthetic experience without a solid methodical foundation will lack import.

(Using Wikipedia Science, Analytic Philosophy, Aesthetics, Continental Philosophy.)

Hinges operate on both the prelinguistic and linguistic levels, with their truth shown in our actions rather than in propositional form. — Sam26

A valuable post. If I may add my thoughts to your conversation.

I am using "here is one hand" to indicate a proposition in language and (here is one hand) to indicate something in the world.

The requirement for action is limited

In the beginning, the meaning of the proposition "here is one hand" can only be shown by an action, such as waving one hand or pointing to the one hand. In other words, in the beginning, how would anyone know that "here is one hand" means (here is one hand) rather than (here is one finger), unless there was some kind of action?

However, once the process has been repeated a sufficient number of times, then it may become a certainty beyond doubt in the minds of the community that "here is one hand" means (here is one hand). This is along the lines of JL Austin's Performative Utterance.

However, in the world, no action is required to know that (here is one hand) is a certainty beyond doubt. If I see (here is one hand), then there is no uncertainty in my mind that (here is one hand). I don't need to see it wave, be pointed at or open a door for me to be certain beyond doubt that (here is one hand). (Here is one hand) may remain static for me to know beyond doubt that (here is one hand).

The truth of (here is one hand) is no different to the truth of (an apple). As we don't say that (an apple) is true, there is no reason that say that (here is one hand) is true. Is (the Moon) true, is (Mount Everest) true? Then why should (here is one hand) be true?

Prelinguistically, action is not required to know (here is one hand) and in addition, truth is redundant.

Heidegger's Being and TIme — Astrophel

I cannot really respond as I have limited knowledge of Husserl, Heidegger and Existentialism in general.

However, in my agreement with Linguistic Idealism, I have sympathy with the notion in Husserl's Being and Time that the human is not a subjective spectator of objects, but rather that subject and object are inseparable. In my case, linked within language.

I don't know the background to Existentialism, have not read Kierkegaard and have only limited exposure to Nietzsche. However, I naturally agree with any critique of rationalism, and am supportive of their interest in the problem of meaning.

I have spent more time on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, respecting his attempt to understand the limits and scope of metaphysics, as well as investigating how reason may be used to gain knowledge about the world.

As regards Husserl's Logical Investigations, for me there is promise in Brentano's concept of Intentionality and the problem of intentional inexistence, the investigation of the relation between the act of consciousness and the phenomena at which it is directed. I tend more to agree more with the "bracketing" of assumptions about the existence of an external world than the Direct Realist who believes that they directly know the external world.

Continental philosophy opens up a whole new field of understanding.

This isn’t about hinges corresponding to facts in a propositional sense but about their truth being a lived engagement with facts as prelinguistic realities. — Sam26

Wittgenstein in Tractatus did not describe facts as lived truths

2 What is the case - a fact - is the existence of states of affairs

Do you have any reference that supports you in describing prelinguistic facts as lived truths?

Hinges are layered, arational (arational because they are not subject to the rational processes of justification, doubt, or proof that characterize traditional epistemological theory), foundational convictions shared by all humans within our forms of life that serve as indubitable certainties grounding our epistemological language, systems of doubt, and justification. They exist both prelinguistically and linguistically, with their truth shown through our actions rather than propositional validation. — Sam26

:smile: I appreciate your definition.

Prelinguistic

In the world are facts, such as i) here is one hand, ii) the apple is green, iii) the mountain is next to the tree.

These facts exist within human Forms of Life. They exist prelinguistically and are beyond doubt. They are bedrock certainties.

Question 1. Are these prelinguistic facts hinges?

The notion of truth is redundant.
If the apple is green then the apple is green.
Nothing is added - if the apple is green then it is true that the apple is green.

Linguistic meaning

Today, that "here is one hand" means here is one hand is beyond doubt.

The notion of truth is redundant
If "here is one hand" means here is one hand then "here is one hand" means here is one hand
Nothing is added - if "here is one hand" means here is one hand then it is true that "here is one hand" means here is one hand.

Linguistic correspondence

"Here is one hand" is a hinge proposition because its meaning is beyond doubt, as we know that it means here is one hand.

"Here is one hand" is true IFF here is one hand

The truth of the proposition "here is one hand" is contingent on there being here is one hand in the world.

1) What makes Moorean propositions ("Here is one hand.") a hinge, according to Wittgenstein, is their status as bedrock certainties.
2) This particular bedrock certainty is prelinguistic (not all hinges are prelinguistic, but bedrock certainties are), i.e., it's shown in our actions — Sam26

How are you defining "hinge"?

Is the hinge 1) the Moorean proposition "here is one hand", or 2) the prelinguistic bedrock certainty, here is one hand.

I build on this by showing how the truth of hinges is demonstrated in our actions. — Sam26

Today, that "here is one hand" means waving one hand is beyond doubt, and is therefore a hinge.

Neither "here is one hand" nor waving one hand is a hinge. "Here is one hand" means waving one hand is the hinge.

But suppose, as you say, that this hinge is true.

Then, this hinge is true because "here is one hand" means waving one hand.

IE, "here is one hand" means waving one hand is true because "here is one hand" means waving one hand.

But this is an example of the Law of Identity. where the notion of truth is redundant. We say A is A. We don't say A is true because A.

The world is not divided ontologically into any parts, things over there, thoughts and feeling here, and there is no epistemic distance between me and this tree at all. There never was! — Astrophel

I can understand Phenomenology as part of a personal philosophy, but it seems limited if it made up the whole of a personal philosophy.

Phenomenology rejects rationalism and empiricism in favour of a person's "lived experience", relying on an intuitive grasp of knowledge free from any philosophical intellectualising.

For example, in Bracketing, one withholds any conscious opinion of what is perceived, taking no position as to the reality of what is seen, but simply to witness it as it presents itself.

I agree that Phenomenology can be insightful in our understanding about the relation of the mind to the sensations it experiences, but it seems insufficient not to question these sensations and only witness them.

Philosophy must surely be about questioning, not simply about phenomenologically accepting.

Key Ideas in Phenomenology by Marc Applebaum, 2012

One might ask, is General Motors real? — Astrophel

There are thoughts, language and the world, and there is the question as to how these relate.

The three theories of perception, Idealism, Direct Realism and Indirect Realism are primarily interested in the relation between thought and the world, though of course language is needed to express their different epistemological positions. What we do know for certain are our thoughts and sensations.

I cannot answer for the Direct Realist who knows that they directly perceive the world as it is through their sensations, as I don't agree with them.

As an Indirect Realist, I believe that there is a world independent of my observing it that has caused my sensations. I can never know, but I believe that there is, because it a satisfactory explanation for the sensations that I experience. What is real is a mystery, a world of things-in-themselves. I believe a real world exists, but only because this is the most satisfactory explanation.

As regards thought, the phenomenological approach makes sense. In part by removing the Cartesian separation between the mind and the mind-independent and in part by removing the problem of the unknowable thing-in-itself. Phenomenology attempts to create the conditions for the objective study of what is usually regarded as subjective, our judgements, perceptions and emotions of our conscious experienced sensations. Phenomenology rejects both Rationalism and Empiricism in favour of the person's lived experiences.

As regards language, linguistic idealism makes sense. Language is not contingent on the world, but rather language underpins the world that we know. It is not the case that there are objects in the world that are nameable within language, but rather the objects in our world exist because they are named in the language that we use to describe them. An object being named can only exist within its context as a logical semantic part of the sentence it is within. As you say, language does stand for the world, but also "stands in" for the world. When Derrida wrote "there is nothing outside the text" some have interpreted this as linguistic idealism, which denies the existence of a real-world outside language. Wittgenstein as well said that he had come to believe that thoughts and language were two aspects of the same thing, in that we can only think using language.

We don't know for certain how thoughts, language and the world relate, but for me, a combination of Indirect Realism, Phenomenology and Linguistic Idealism seems to be a sensible combination.

There is this impossible epistemic and thus ontological distance between knowledge and the world, until, that is, this distance is closed. — Astrophel

There seems to be three main theories of perception: Idealism, Direct Realism and Indirect Realism.

For the Direct Realist, i) the external world exists independently of the mind (hence, realism) ii) and we perceive the external world directly (hence, direct). For the Indirect Realist, i) the external world exists independently of the mind (hence, realism) but ii) we perceive the external world indirectly, via sense data (hence, indirect).

In a sense we all start off as Direct Realists. As you say, in the world of infancy, the world is not something that has to be discursively determined. For the child, there is no psychological distance between their immediate sensations and the object of their sensations
.
But later, language introduces us to spatial and temporal concepts, such as near and far, above and below, before and after. These concepts make us to look more closely at the world, and philosophically question more deeply their meaning.

Some then become Indirect Realists, conscious of a distance between our sensations and the object of these sensations. Some remain Direct Realists.

There is the question about the role of language in distancing the language user to their world.. As the Direct Realist directly perceives the world as it is, there is no distance between themselves and the world. As the Indirect Realist only indirectly perceives the world as it is, there is a distance between themselves and the world. As both the Direct and Indirect Realist use the same language, it does not seem that it is language that is opening up a distance between the observer and the world.

I would rather agree with the world of Heideggerian or MP's, of which the structure or existence is disclosed or revealed by language. — Corvus

As Wittgenstein wrote, Moore knows that the earth existed long before his birth, and we all know the same as he (OC 84).

I only know about the earth because of language.

A person without language (suppose they had been born on a desert island and raised by Mona monkeys) could not know about the earth.

The problem is, how can I know about something that is independent of language when I can only know about it within language?

For example, in what sense does "earth" in language capture the reality of the earth, being 12,714 km in diameter and having a mass of 5.9722 × 10^24 kg.

You're going a bit too far. My point is that when referring to truth, Wittgenstein is not only thinking in terms of traditional propositions. He applies truth to hinges, too. This is in reference to my discussion with Banno. The truth is built into the actions. The actions show their truth. — Sam26

A historical individual or institution decided that when someone waves one hand the action is to be named "here is one hand", rather than "here are five fishes", for example. Similar to JL Austin's performative utterance.

With the passage of time, that "here is one hand" indicates the action of waving one hand is now beyond doubt, and is therefore a hinge.

Years later, Moore waves one hand and says "here is one hand"

The proposition "here is one hand" is true if and only if Moore waves one hand.

The action of waving one hand shows the truth of the proposition "here is one hand"

But the proposition "here is one hand" is not the hinge that is exempt from doubt.

Therefore, the action of waving one hand doesn't show the truth of the hinge.

The hinge that is exempt from doubt is that the proposition "here is one hand" indicates the action of waving one hand.

The hinge is neither true nor false. The hinge enables truth and falsity in the language game.