The world is totally separate from us, existing on its own never saying anything at all. — Corvus

You believe that the world is totally separate to us.

However, this was not the case for Wittgenstein.

According to GEM Anscombe in her paper "The Question of Linguistic Idealism", she considers Wittgenstein to be a partial linguistic idealist.

Partial, in that for Wittgenstein some things don't depend on linguistic practice, such as numbers, horses, wolves, days, etc, whilst some things do depend on linguistic practice, such as rules, rights, promises, etc.

Linguistic idealism is the position that our language does not describe an empirical reality that we are aware of through our sense perceptions, but rather our language determines what kind of contact we have we the reality of the world. Linguistic Idealism undermines the traditional Realist/Idealist debate.

For Wittgenstein, the world is not totally separate to the language that we use to describe it.

My point is that OC 206 says, "If someone asked us 'but is that true [referring to a hinge]?' we might say 'yes' to him..." — Sam26

OC 206. If someone asked us "but is that true?" we might say "yes" to him; and if he demanded grounds we might say "I can't give you any grounds, but if you learn more you too will think the same"

In other words, if someone asked me "is it true that hinges are beyond doubt", I might say "yes".

If someone asked me "is it true that one feels pain when stung by a wasp", I might say "yes"

The truth is that one feels pain when stung by a wasp. It is not the pain that is true.

The truth is that hinges are beyond doubt. It is not the hinge that is true.

Language alone cannot reveal the whole structure of the world. — Corvus

But is what Wittgenstein believed?

Is it not the case that Wittgenstein believed that our language "is" our world, where the world is embedded in language through the hinge proposition?

Part of the difficulty is translating experience, the anecdotal and intuition into the formula of philosophy arguments. — Jack Cummins

Introduction, Body, Conclusion.

Perhaps a Body of four sections.

In support:
Section one of 400 words - Ghandi. "There is no path to peace; peace is the path."
Section two of 400 words - Erasmus of Rotterdam. Perhaps the foremost humanist writer of the Renaissance, and arguably also one of the foremost philosophers of peace.
Section three of 400 words - Bertrand Russell. Established the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation. Launched in 1963, the Foundation was established to carry forward Russell's work for peace, human rights and social justice.

Counterargument:
Section four of 400 words - Nietzsche. Controversially valorizes struggle and war as necessary ingredients of human flourishing.

Section one as typical:
20 words as introduction
180 words just describing Ghandi's approach to peace. See https://www.mkgandhi.org/articles/fighting-for-peace-the-Gandhian-way.php
180 words giving your personal reasons why Ghandi was right. Here you include your own experiences and thoughts.
20 words as summary

This would make up an academic philosophical essay

There is this impossible epistemic and thus ontological distance between knowledge and the world, until, that is, this distance is closed. — Astrophel

But how can it be closed?

Our only direct knowledge is that of the sensations in our five senses.

We perceives shapes and colours, relations and quantities, which are clearly not the thing in the world.

From these sensations alone we infer a world that has caused these sensations

We can only make inferences when moving from the epistemology of our sensations to the ontology of a presumed world, but inference is not knowledge

Even though we only know our own sensations, there is an intersubjective agreement about things like the Moon, but is this public agreement about our intersubjective sensations or about a thing in the world causing these sensations?

Jack, you know you are one of my favorite people, but civilization as we know it may collapse — Athena

The good thing about a philosophical essay is that the author needs to defend their thesis using a clear and well structured argument, critically analyse the evidence and show that their premises are true and that their argument is valid.

Like the formal logic cannot capture or cope with the whole reality, language alone cannot capture or understand the world. — Corvus

Yes, but perhaps for a different reason.

There is language and there is the world.

For the Direct and Indirect Realist, there is a world that exists independently of any human observer. It would seem that for the Direct and Indirect Realist, language alone cannot fully capture or understand the world.

But for Wittgenstein, what is the relation between language and the world?

It seems to me that for Wittgenstein, language "is" the world.

It is not the case that the proposition "here is one hand" is a representation of a world or corresponds to a world, but rather the world is embodied in "here is one hand".

In a sense, a similar concept to that of the Indirect Realist who doesn't perceive a representation of the colour red but directly perceives the colour red.

374. We teach a child "that is your hand", not "that is perhaps (or "probably") your hand". That is how a child learns the innumerable language-games that are concerned with his hand. An investigation or question, 'whether this is really a hand' never occurs to him. Nor, on the other hand, does he learn that he knows that this is a hand.

There is nothing the other side of a world embodied in language.

"Here is one hand" is a hinge proposition not because it is needed to enable a language game that can represent or correspond with a world, but because the world is embodied in the hinge proposition.

What are the implications? We can only understand the world using language. But if the world is our language, and language cannot understand itself, then this inevitably puts a limit on our understanding of the world.

Above is not a hinge proposition, but it is the absolute true fact (which is verified via the logical reasoning and reality), and I don't doubt it at all. It is exempt from doubting. — Corvus

Wittgenstein defines what we call the hinge proposition as being a proposition that is exempt from doubt.

OC 341. That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn.

For Wittgenstein, if "here is one hand" is a hinge proposition and therefore exempt from doubt, there is no reason why "here is no hand" must also be a hinge proposition and therefore exempt from doubt.

Similarly, "here is the Jackpot", "here is no Jackpot", "here are winnings" and "here are no winnings" must also all be hinge propositions and therefore exempt from doubt.

These hinge propositions may be combined into language games:
1) "here is the Jackpot" and "here are winnings"
2) "here is the Jackpot" and "here are no winnings"
3) "here is no Jackpot" and "here are winnings"
4) "here is no Jackpot" and "here are no winnings"

Your particular case is 2) "I didn't win the jackpot"

It is true that your proposition "I didn't win the jackpot" is exempt from doubt.

But I assume that combining two hinge propositions doesn't form a single new hinge proposition.

This is perhaps why "I didn't win the Jackpot" is not a hinge proposition, even though exempt from doubt, as it is a combination of hinge propositons.

As I understand it:

A hinge proposition enables a language game.

A hinge proposition must be exempt from doubt in order to ground the language game.

A language game is contingent because it describes how the world is.

In the mind of the user of the language game, it would be wrong to say that this language game either represents or corresponds with the world. It would be more accurate to say that this language game "is" their world, meaning that there is no other world outside the language game itself.

In other words, we use the language game to understand the world, and this world is nothing other than the language game itself.

To clarify, this event is about 'Philosophy Writing'. So, that is the 'broad category'. — Amity

You are saying that rule 4 should have read "must fall under the broad category of philosophy writing"?

Moreover, we can't forget OC 206, where Wittgenstein points out that if someone asked, "but is that true" (referring to hinges), we might respond "yes," — Sam26

There is a difference between asking is it true that "here is one hand" and asking "is it true that here is one hand".

Asking is it true that "here is one hand"
See OC 204
"Here is one hand" is a hinge proposition because it is a rule that constitutes the language game. The end is not a certain proposition that strikes us as true, it is our acting.


Asking "is it true that here is one hand".
See OC 206
If someone asks us "is it true that here is one hand", we may answer "yes, but I cannot give you any grounds". The expression "here is one hand" in this instance is not being used as a hinge proposition. It is not being used as a rule that constitutes the language game but is being used as a part of the language game.

To my understanding, "here is one hand" can be used both as a rule that constitutes a language game and as an expression within a language game. The first is not truth-apt, but the second is.

So the world is what is said by true sentences. — Banno

Hence, they are not propositions that set out how things are in the world, but propositions that set out how we are to talk about the world. They are the rules that set up and constitute our language games. They don't represent the world; they set the terms on which representation takes place. — Banno

How does Wittgenstein overcome what seems to be a circularity?

1) Hinge propositions are the rules that constitute our language game.

2) Within this language game there can be representations of the world.

3) The world is what is said by true sentences.

Removing any reference to "world"

4) Hinge propositions are the rules that constitute a language game that can represent what is said by true sentences.

It seems that such a language game is self-referential.

However, perhaps the OP could be improved to lessen confusion. — Amity

@Moliere

As rule 4 says "must fall under the broad category of a philosophical essay", this seems to suggest that what is required is a philosophical essay.

There are many examples of how to write a philosophical essay on the internet, but taking University College Cork as an example.

Note 1: "philosophy paper" is synonymous with "philosophical essay"
Note 2: a philosophical essay is not about flowery language or story-telling technique.
Note 3: start with a proposition to be proved

Writing a Philosophical Essay: A Brief Tutorial

II. What is a philosophy paper?

Philosophical essays prove some point through the use of rational argument. A philosophical essay is not about flowery language, story-telling techniques, or surprising the reader. The beauty of a philosophical essay is found in your ideas; the language that you use is only a tool for conveying these ideas to the reader. The art is in proving one’s point clearly.

The philosophical essay generally follows a very simple structure:

1. State the proposition to be proved.
2. Give the argument for that proposition.
3. Show that the argument is valid.
4. Show that the premises are true.
5. Consider an objection to your argument and respond to that objection.
6. State the upshot of what has been proven. (Martinich, A.P. (1996) Philosophical
Writing. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. p. 53.)

However, this June event is wider. It is about philosophy writing. — Amity

I agree that there is a difference between philosophy writing and a philosophy essay, but rule 4) does say it must fall under the broad category of a philosophical essay.

4) Must fall under the broad category of a philosophical essay. The Essay's Title and Topic are chosen by the author. The philosophical viewpoint can be academic or less formal. It should be systematic with an Introduction, Main Body and Conclusion. This is non-fiction. Poetic expression is allowed if it completes or supports the philosophical exploration.

@Moliere does conclude by saying "Resources were requested for help on what exactly an academic philosophy essay should look like, and provided by @Amity so I've appended them here:

The first link is "How to write a crap philosophy essay"
The second link "Guidelines on writing a Philosophy Paper" notes "don't try to establish any earth shattering conclusions in your 5-6 page paper."
The third link is "An academic guide to planning essays"

All this suggests that this writing challenge is looking for a philosophy essay rather than philosophy writing.

Remember, it's all a story...with or without a definite conclusion. Open ended...for further exploration. Philosophy is a Conversation. Here, writers and readers can be in close dialogue or a wild dance — Amity

Yes, but I am not sure about "with or without a definite conclusion".

A philosophy essay is about making a claim and then defending it.

There must be a thesis, such as "I intend to argue that J.J.C. Smart’s criticism of rule utilitarianism is correct because, as he argues, there are clearly some cases where it is optimific to break a generally optimific rule"

There must be a conclusion, such as "I have argued that J.J.C. Smart’s criticisms of rule utilitarianism are correct"

They believe that doubts are also simulation — Corvus

I cannot doubt that I doubt, even if I am a simulation.

Folks who believe life could be simulation could doubt if the Earth exists. — Corvus

True, but they don't doubt that they have the doubt as to whether the Earth exists.

I have heard about "lived experience", but not "lived truths". What is "lived truths"? — Corvus

That was my question to @Sam26 who wrote "hinges are about lived truths".

Maybe I am misunderstanding the point here. It seems to me that we misunderstand and misuse words all the time...When Descartes starts doubting away in the Meditations, he doesn't stop writing in French. — Count Timothy von Icarus

As a starting position, Wittgenstein in On Certainty did write that some propositions are exempt from doubt.

OC 341 That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn.

You point out that in ordinary language we do doubt the meaning of some words all the time, so where in ordinary language are those propositions that are exempt from doubt?

In the Meditations, Descartes was discarding all beliefs that were not absolutely certain. He was not discarding all words about which he was not absolutely certain. I can doubt ever getting a good meal in Paris without doubting the meaning of the words "I can doubt ever getting a good meal in Paris". I can use words whose meaning I am certain about to express ideas about which I am not certain.

We may doubt the meaning of some words all the time but we never doubt the meaning of all the words all the time.

As an example consider the sentence "it seems to me that we misunderstand and misuse words all the time."

If I doubted the meaning of every expression within the sentence, the sentence as a whole would be meaningless to me, making it impossible for me to respond to it. But I am responding to it, meaning that in practice I am certain as to the meaning of the words used.

If I doubted the meaning of every expression within the sentence, language as a means of communication would be impossible.

For example, in the sentence "Inaonekana kwangu kwamba hatuelewi na kutumia vibaya maneno kila wakati." there is not a single expression whose meaning is exempt from doubt in my mind

But we know that language does work in enabling communication, therefore there must be some expressions within our language exempt from doubt, as Wittgenstein wrote.

It may be the case that in a sentence there are words whose meaning I am not certain about,
but in that situation I can refer to a dictionary, which may then remove any uncertainty as to its meaning.

If I find the meaning of a word uncertain, I would reach for the Dictionary, not stop writing.

Hinges are about lived truths, — Sam26

Wittgenstein wrote that some propositions are exempt from doubt.

OC 341 That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn.

Where does Wittgenstein write that those propositions which are exempt from doubt are "lived truths"?

But all language games are embedded in the world; the counting of apples involves apples and charts, the building involves blocks and slabs. It is not peculiar to hinge propositions to be about how things are - all propositions do that. — Banno

The language game that includes the sentence "Sherlock Holmes lives at 221B Baker Street" is embedded in a world of literature rather than a world outside literature.

It seems that Wittgenstein agrees that there is a world but never specifies exactly where this world exists.

My understanding is that in a sentence such as "here is one hand and in the hand is a mug and in the mug is an elephant", not only is every part a hinge proposition but also every part can form a T-sentence.

Each part, i) "Here is one hand", ii) "in the hand is a mug" and iii) "in the mug is an elephant" has to be a hinge proposition in order to allow the rest of the language game to take place.

That a language game is embedded in the world means that there is a correspondence between the language game and the world. If the language game was not embedded in the world, then there could be no correspondence between the language game and the world.

That there is a correspondence means that the T-sentence can be formed from each part, i) "here is one hand" is true IFF here is one hand. ii) "in the hand is a mug" is true IFF in the hand is a mug, iii) "in the mug is an elephant" is true IFF in the mug is an elephant.

In a T-sentence, what does "true" mean? It seems to mean that in the event that something is the case in the world, something does obtain in the world or something is a fact in the world, then that fact can be described by language.

What are the philosophical / epistemological / logical grounds for hinge propositions being exempt from doubt? — Corvus

What does "hapa kuna mkono mmoja na katika mkono huu kuna kikombe" mean?

I can tell you that this is a coherent language, where each part is fully in context with all the other parts of the sentence.

The question is, where is the key that unlocks the meaning of the whole?

Can the key be found inside the text, or can it only be found outside the text?

Only if the meaning of each part was exempt from doubt in your mind could you understand the meaning of the whole.

Any part whose meaning is exempt from doubt in your mind can be called a hinge proposition.

We treat hinges as true for practical reasons. And the fact that they're not doubted demonstrates they don't play the true/false game. We accept them as true, period. — Sam26

There are many different definitions of "truth" (SEP - Truth)

Wittgenstein did not consider the hinge proposition as being true.

OC 204 Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end; - but the end is not certain propositions' striking us immediately as true, i.e. it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-game.
OC 205. If the true is what is grounded, then the ground is not true, not yet false.

What definition of truth are you using when you say that hinge propositions are "true"?

So far, I've referenced only one philosopher on the subject, which has not been of general interest to philosophers, and I'm hard put to find a rebuttal. — Vera Mont

Can you slightly adjust the wording of your thesis such that you can find three philosophers that support it and one philosopher that opposes it?

If you can, then:

Write the 200 word Introduction in the future tense after you have written the Body.

Write the 200 word Conclusion in the past tense after you have written the Body.

Imagine a Body of four sections, each of 400 words. The first three sections based on three philosophers that support your thesis. The fourth section based on a philosopher that opposes your thesis.

Consider a typical 400 word section. An introduction of 20 words written after you have written the body of the section. A summary of 20 words also written after you have written the body of the section.

This leaves 360 words for the body of the section. The first 180 words describing the philosopher's position regarding your thesis. The second 180 words giving your thoughts about the philosopher's position, including why you think their argument is valid and where you think their argument can be improved.

Would this work?

Both what makes hypothesis and any possible experience that could validate or falsify it intelligible are already framed by the hinge conviction. — Joshs

:up: Continuing:

For example, in a language game, "here is one hand and the hand is holding a mug of coffee", "here is one hand" is the hinge proposition and "the hand is holding a mug of coffee" is the ordinary (non-hinge) proposition.

Being an ordinary proposition, "the hand is holding a mug of coffee " can be true or false, depending on whether or not it corresponds with what is actually the case in the world.

But the truth-aptness of this ordinary proposition is only intelligible if the language game has been founded on a hinge proposition.

Because, if a language game was not founded on a hinge proposition, and there were no hinge propositions, then the meaning of each expression would depend on its context within the language game.

IE, the meaning of "the hand" would depend on its context "the hand is holding a mug of coffee", and the meaning of "holding a mug of coffee" would depend on its context "the hand is holding a mug of coffee". Although this language game might be perfectly coherent, it would be ultimately be nonsensical.

For a language game to make sense, within the language game there must be something extra-linguistic that founds the language game within the world, and these things are the hinge propositions.

Hinge propositions are extra-linguistic, even they they are part of the language game.

My idea is that you can doubt on anything and everything if you choose to do so. Even the fact "Paris in France." could be doubted under the simple syllogism. — Corvus

"Exempt" is normally used for the situation where an object is free from liability, duty or restriction. Hence it seems not a proper word to use for doubt. — Corvus

In a language game are ordinary propositions such as "it is raining" and hinge propositions such as "here is one hand".

All ordinary propositions can be doubted. I say "it is raining". You say "are you sure?"

The whole point of a hinge proposition is that it is exempt from being doubted. Doubting a hinge proposition cannot even be considered.

Hinge propositions, like the earth has existed for more than ten minutes or "I have two hands” —aren’t true in the way we typically think of propositions being true (i.e., through evidence, justification, or correspondence to reality). — Sam26

"It is raining" is true1 IFF it is raining

You say that hinge propositions are true2, where true1 and true2 are different.

But how have true1 and true2 been defined? A proposition that corresponds with a fact is true1. A proposition that is exempt from doubt is true2 (OC 341)

The definition of true1 is well established, and there are many references in the literature. However, the definition of true2 does not seem to be established at all, and I haven't found any references to it in the literature.

It seems that true2 is your personal definition. There is nothing wrong with inventing definitions, in fact I invented the definition "peffel". However, no-one other than me uses it.
===============================================================================

Someone might ask you "Is it true that bishops move diagonally?" and you reply, "Yes," but does this mean that it's true in an epistemological sense? No, — Sam26

In other words, "bishops move diagonally" is true IFF bishops move diagonally.

Truth is the relation between the proposition and the fact.

Truth is neither the proposition nor the fact.

Seems to be delicate nuance in the uses, but the gist of the claim seems it is impossible to doubt? — Corvus

Not really. "Impossible to doubt" has a different meaning to "exempt from doubt" OC 341

For example, "food is exempt from vat".

How would you replace "exempt" by "impossible" in the above sentence?

What is the illocutionary difference between the two expressions? — Corvus

Cannot doubt vs exempt from doubt

My previous example was:

i) That Paris is in France cannot be doubted means that we started with a doubt and then concluded that our doubt was baseless.
ii) That Paris is in France is exempt from doubt means that we are not even allowed to doubt at all.

But in addition - cannot could mean:
i) not allowed - as in you cannot speak in an exam
ii) not able - as in you cannot climb Mount Everest because you are unfit

Exempt could mean
i) not applied - as in food is exempt from vat
ii) not present - as in summer nights are exempt from frost

I understand W said that hinge propositions / certainties cannot be doubted or not allowed doubting — Corvus

In OC 341 Wittgenstein writes "That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn."

"Exempt from doubt" has a different meaning to "cannot be doubted."

Is there anywhere in On Certainty where Wittgenstein writes that hinge propositions cannot be doubted?

There are different types of doubts too i.e. rational doubts based on reasoning, and psychological doubts based on feelings, emotions and beliefs. — Corvus

True, but on a thread about Wittgenstein's On Certainty, the question is, how did Wittgenstein describe doubt?

The other language game of truth is one of foundational convictions. The latter convictions are accepted as true and cannot be sensibly doubted. — Sam26

There is a difference in meaning between i) hinge propositions cannot be doubted and ii) hinge propositions are exempt from doubt

Wittgenstein says "exempt from doubt"

OC 341 That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn.

For example:
i) That Paris is in France cannot be doubted means that we started with a doubt and then concluded that our doubt was baseless.
ii) That Paris is in France is exempt from doubt means that we are not even allowed to doubt at all.

Well, we disagree. I think this position is clear and a common misinterpretation of OC. — Sam26

Do you have any support in the literature?

The truth of traditional propositions is tied to evidence or falsifiability. “It’s raining” is true if I look out and see rain; it’s false if I don’t. — Sam26

I agree that ordinary propositions are truth apt. For example, "it is raining" is true IFF it is raining

Hinges aren’t true in the same way that ordinary propositions are, i.e., they're beyond the truth-testing game. Their truth is their unshakeable role in our practices. — Sam26

It is not that "hinges aren’t true in the same way that ordinary propositions are", but rather that hinge propositions are not truth-apt at all.

It is not that "their truth is their unshakeable role in our practices", as hinge propositions have no truth.

It is true that in Philosophical Investigations there is a role for hinge propositions in the language game, but here the word "true" refers to the role that the hinge proposition is playing, not to the hinge proposition itself.

The word true shouldn't be applied to a hinge proposition. For example, as in "hinges aren't true in the same way" and "their truth".

I hope your essay is progressing well. Update? — Amity

Have managed to reduce my "how to write a philosophy essay" down to eight pages. Have starting researching, which gave me my plan. A bit more research then starting to write. Am learning, which is the main thing (using ??? for anonymity)

1) Wittgenstein’s hinges function as indubitable certainties outside the domain of epistemological justification.
2) They differ from traditional propositions by enabling traditional truth operations to function. — Sam26

These are contradictory statements.

A hinge proposition cannot be both outside the domain of epistemological justification, including justifications such as truth and falsity, and be inside the domain of epistemology justification that enables truth operations.

So I see what you're talking about, but I don't think he's talking in terms of a correspondence that a realist would approve of. — frank

I agree, more or less.

It seems to me that there are three main theories of perception: Idealism, Direct Realism and Indirect Realism

In the Tractatus, truth is basically a correspondence between language and the world. "Snow is white" is true if snow is white.

In Philosophical Investigations, truth is basically a correspondence between language and its own conditions for being true. "Theft is wrong" is true if theft is wrong.

I agree that Wittgenstein includes references in Tractatus to a "gramophone record" and in Philosophical Investigations to "bring me a slab". These objects exist in our world, which makes one assume his approach is that of Realism.

However, this is not necessarily the case, in that although gramophone records and slabs exist in a world, the question is, where does this world exist. This is something that Wittgenstein is very vague about.

For the Idealist, the world exists in the mind. For the Direct Realist we directly perceive the world and for the Indirect Realist we directly perceive representations of the world.

Wittgenstein in general should not be read from the viewpoints of either Idealism or Realism

Thinking of the "world" as either mind-dependent or mind-independent may not be how to approach Wittgenstein.

It exists in the physical world with no relation to the mind. — Corvus

:up:

Mind doesn't have outside or inside. — Corvus

Isn't the Moon, something that has a diameter of 3,475 km, outside the mind?

I think the point of the TLP is to show that when we talk about "understanding reality" in some rarified sense, we're doing something with language that it's not designed for. — frank

I think that you are partly right and partly wrong.

Partly wrong in that a Wittgenstein sentence, such as "snow is white", does correspond with the reality of the world. The Tractatus is basically setting out a correspondence theory.

There are two aspects to a Wittgenstein sentence. Simple sentences such as "snow is white" are true when they correspond with facts in the world. Complex sentences, such as "snow is white and trees are green" are true by virtue of the Truth Table.

Partly right in that Wittgenstein is vague in justifying whether a Wittgenstein proposition, such as "Jack believes that Mars is green", do correspond with the reality of the world.

When you talk about consciousness, it depends whether you mean from the point of view of the Rationalist, which includes Transcendental Apriorism, or from the point of view of the Empiricist.

Wittgenstein did not agree with the Rationalists, who believe that concepts and knowledge can come from a solitary thinker using pure reason isolated from contaminated empirical experiences.

It follows that the universe has the external somewhere. — Corvus

How could we ever know such a thing?

The Idealism of Berkeley doesn't think that anything physical exists outside the mind.