There is no Aeneas without the Trojans and future Romans. He is an exceptional individual. A hero. The son of a god. Yet his desires are continually subservient to the needs of the whole, and shaped by the destiny of the whole. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The Authoritarian Liberty Paradox

There seem to be three main points in this essay.

Point 1. The author is opposed to Nozick's Entitlement Theory, which he calls radical individualism. The author is in favour of the individual as being part of a society.

As the author puts it:

Real freedom is not the absence of others. It is the presence of shared conditions in which dignity, voice and action become possible. It is built not in retreat but in relationship. If we continue to treat liberty as a solitary performance rather than a shared foundation, we will not only mistake inequality for merit but we will also hollow out democracy itself. The Authoritarian Liberty Paradox is not just an intellectual contradiction; it is a political danger. One we must name clearly and confront together.

As you put it:

This is, for instance, not what one gets even looking at the old heroic epics. There is no Aeneas without the Trojans and future Romans. He is an exceptional individual. A hero. The son of a god. Yet his desires are continually subservient to the needs of the whole, and shaped by the destiny of the whole. Without the whole, he wouldn't be a hero.

Point 2. The author says that there are some people who pretend that they believe in radical individualism but are in fact using this to disguise their Authoritarianism.

Point 3. The author says that Musk, Trump and Peterson are examples of people referred to in Point 2.

As regards Point 2, I am sure many examples of such people can be found both in current and past administrations.

As regards Point 3, the author gives no evidence to support their claim. A philosophical essay makes a claim then defends it. The author has made this claim but neither defends it nor makes a counter-argument.

As regards Point 1, he is setting up a radical position few would probably agree with. He even calls it "radical individualism", almost a pejorative term, rather than a more mainstream term such as Libertarianism, which would have wider support.

Nozick's Entitlement Theory, radical individualism, I would suggest, would have minimal support (as the name suggests). I am sure that many figures in public life are hypocrites. The author does not defend his claim that Musk, Trump and Peterson pretend to support radical individualism yet are at heart Authoritarians.

That's pretty much the point. Institutions brought them fortune, power and fame and they're busily attacking and tearing down those institutions, in order to deprive other people of the protection they offer. — Vera Mont

Do you have any evidence that they are attacking and tearing down those institutions that brought them fortune, power and fame?

I am always willing to change my opinion if there is something that I don't know about.

[TPF Essay] The Authoritarian Liberty Paradox

I have the following comments just on the introduction to the paper.
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This essay argues that radical individualism is less a coherent political philosophy than a theatrical pose that conceals its reliance on collective institutions, rationalizes inequality and rebrands domination as personal freedom. — Moliere

The essay starts with a straw man fallacy (an argument that misrepresents an opponent's position and then attacks it). Radical individualism as a coherent political philosophy does not rely on collective institutions and domination, though it may rationalise inequality. If there is a coherent political philosophy that does rely on collective institutions, domination and rationalises inequality, then it is not radical individualism.

Logically, I cannot disagree with the idea that if Radical Individualism as a political philosophy is not about radical individualism, then it is not Radical Individualism.

The author is attacking a political philosophy for something it is not.
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Though differing in style and domain all present the image of a self-legitimating individual opposed to collective authority. — Moliere

Hardly accurate, when Musk's companies employ about 110,000 people worldwide, Trump in the 2024 US election gained 77,302,416 votes to Kamala Harris's 75,012,178 votes and Peterson is Emeritus of Psychology at the University of Toronto.

The use of the word "present" is ambiguous. Is the author saying that these three people deliberately present themselves as individuals opposed to authority, or is the author's subjective opinion.
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At its heart lies a contradiction between rejecting institutions in theory and relying on them in practice. — Moliere

I find it very hard to believe that Musk, Trump and Peterson reject institutions in theory, as each of them clearly depend on institutions for their livelihoods.

Is the author arguing that these three want to return to a time before there were any Institutions?
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In the world shaped by these figures, from techno-utopianism to populist grievance to self-help transcendence, the individual is imagined as sovereign, institutions as suspect and freedom as a solitary conquest. — Moliere

I am sure that most would agree that the individual is sovereign and institutions are suspect. Institutions were created for the benefit of the individual. The individual is not there for the benefit of the Institution.

I what way would the author disagree with John Stuart Mill about the individual as being sovereign?

The object of this Essay is to assert one very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control, whether the means used be physical force in the form of legal penalties, or the moral coercion of public opinion. That principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. … In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.

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What makes this paradox politically dangerous is not just its incoherence but its corrosive effect on democratic norms and public solidarity — Moliere

Any paradox in radical individualism is a construction of this essay. There is no paradox in radical individualism as a coherent political philosophy.

There is only a paradox when the paper describes radical individualism as something it is not.

There is only a paradox when the paper describes Musk, Trump and Peterson as holding opinions that they in fact don't hold, such as the dismantling of democracy. Where is the evidence that this is something they have promoted?

I have made the essays public, as promised. — Jamal

:100: After all, we are not a secret society.

I did very much like the paper, but this statement of the thesis (which occurs a few times) actually strikes me as somewhat ambiguous. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I also liked the paper, and liked that it was clearly written. As Prof. Adrian Piper wrote in his article "Ten Commandments of Philosophical Writing" Thou shalt not obscure thy ideas with turgid prose.

Being clearly written then allows me to understand what the author is trying to say, even if I disagree with the author's premise that "ungrounded certainties enable knowledge", and even if I find parts of the author's essay ambiguous.

The author is standing their ground in being clear in what they are saying. This enables the reader to properly engage with their argument, even if the reader then disagrees with the author's argument. It is then up to the reader to explain why they disagree with the author's argument, thereby moving the philosophical debate forwards. Philosophy should be a dialogue, as Adrian Piper says in his article "Ten Commandments of Philosophical Writing".

A clearly written philosophical essay is the hinge upon which new philosophical knowledge may be gained.
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The problem I see, which Joshs gets at, is that B seems to risk equivocating re many common and classical definitions of "knowledge." A critic could say that knowledge is about the possession of truth simpliciter. It is not about possession or assent to "what is true given some foundational/hinge belief" (which itself may be true or untrue). This redefinition seems to open the door on "knowing" things that are false. — Count Timothy von Icarus

As you say, to say that hinges give knowledge is not generally how we understand the word knowledge, as being something that is universally true.

For the animalist, all things, including animals, plants and rocks, possess a distinct spiritual essence. For the animalist, their hinge proposition may be "this plant possesses a spiritual essence". This gives them the knowledge that this plant possesses a spiritual essence.

For the atheist, no thing possesses a distinct spiritual essence. For the atheist, their hinge proposition may be "this plant doesn't possesses a spiritual essence". This gives them the knowledge that this plant doesn't possesses a spiritual essence.

The animalist sees a plant and knowing that all plants possess a spiritual essence knows that the plant they are looking at possesses a spiritual essence. The atheist sees the same plant and knowing that no things possess a spiritual essence knows that the plant that they are looking at doesn't possess a spiritual essence.

As you say, this is not how we understand knowledge, being something universally true.

The hinge proposition imposes itself on the world. We then observe this world. This enables us to confirm that the hinge proposition is true. The hinge proposition confirms its own truth self-referentially.

Another example. Let my hinge proposition be "the sun always rises in the east". In the event that I observe the sun rising in the east, this confirms my hinge proposition. In the event that I observe what I think is the sun rising in the west, then it cannot be the sun, thereby again confirming my hinge proposition.

A hinge proposition such as "here is one hand" gives knowledge that here is one hand. But this is self-referential knowledge, which is not how we generally understand knowledge as being universally true, as you say.

"This paper argues that ungrounded certainties enable knowledge, rather than undermining it, and that hinges and Gödel's unprovable statements serve a similar purpose."

If only all philosophy writing was as clearly written as this essay.

How do axioms and hinges relate to knowledge?

Let the axiom be "the sun rises in the east". This axiom can never be proved true. If one day the sun rose in the west, then the axiom is false. The axiom "the sun rises in the east" is not knowledge, as it can never be proved true.

Let the hinge be "the sun rises in the east". This hinge is a certainty. If one day what we think is the sun rises in the west, then what we see cannot be the sun. The hinge "the sun rises in the east" is knowledge regardless of what we observe.

Whereas hinges enable knowledge, axioms don't serve a similar purpose, as they can never be knowledge

So, taking for granted that it takes a few brief moments to say the word “instant”, then the moment “instant” is said, we have a duration long enough to find infinity. — Fire Ologist

Yes, it is hard to imagine that if time exists there would be any reason for it to end.

A moment of time, since it is “of time” must have some duration, and once you have a duration you see the infinite. — Fire Ologist

Suppose a stationary snooker ball on a snooker table is hit by a snooker cue at position zero and travels 1 metre in 2 seconds.

When the snooker ball passes through a location exactly 50cm from where it was hit, the time will be exactly 1 second.

As the ball can be exactly at 50cm, the time can be exactly 1 second.

There is no duration of time the moment, the instant, the ball is at 50cm.

Since the moment we first clocked the first moment,
We touched infinitely in all directions, before and forever after, all at that first instant of time. — Fire Ologist

Doesn't this lead to a logical contradiction? In an instant of time, by definition, there is no before or after. That is why it is an instant of time.

The mind not only causes subjective time but also causes the physical (this is discussed in my other thread here), so it is no surprise that there is synchrony between the passage of subjective time and changes in physical. — MoK

P1) Physical and experience exist and they are subject to change
P2) Experience is due to the existence of physical and the change in the state of physical is due to the existence of an experience.

I agree with P1)

As regards P2), "experience is due to the existence of physical", I can understand that I may experience happiness because of the physical existence of my dog.

I can understand the existence of an experience is due to the change in state of physical, in that the existence of my experience of sorrow is due to the change in the physical state of my dog from living to dead.

But as regards P2) "the change in the state of physical is due to the existence of an experience", I don't understand how the change in the physical state of my dog from living to dead is due to my experience of sorrow.

That is what I dispute (ie, I see a tree persisting through time). We can only see at the moment of the present, so that there is something there which persists through time, a tree in your example, is a conclusion drawn with the aid of memory.....................That's not true (ie, I can only be conscious of my present), because we have memory. So we are conscious of the past. Also, we anticipate the future, so we are conscious of the future too. — Metaphysician Undercover

The question is, whilst there is probably general agreement that we can perceive (see) a tree at one moment in time, can we perceive (see) a tree persisting through time, what Bergson calls "duration"?

Is what Kant calls the Transcendental Unity of Apperception a valid concept, where we can have a unity of consciousness about successive moments in time.

At this moment in time in the present I see a tree and a clock showing 2pm, and I have the memory of seeing the tree in the past when the clock showed 1pm.

I agree that at this moment in time I can be conscious of my memory of the tree in the past, but this is not to agree that at this moment in time I can be conscious of the tree in the past

It seems to me that we exist at one moment in time, including our mind and brain, as well as everything else in the world, including trees, tables and chairs.

That being said, I also feel that I am conscious of the persistence and duration of time. This raises the mysterious metaphysical problem of how a duration of time can exist at a moment in time. Kant thought it could, and he called it the Transcendental Unity of Apperception.

The Transcendental Unity of Apperception does not mean that at the moment in time in the present I can be conscious of the tree in the past. It still means that at the moment in time in the present I can be conscious of the memory of the tree in the past. But it does mean that at this moment in time I perceive that time persists and has a duration.

Suppose you are correct and we can only see a moment of the present. Let us say that in this present moment we see a tree and a clock showing 2pm and we have the memory of a tree and a clock showing 1pm.

How do we know that the tree we see at 2pm is the same tree we saw at 1pm?

It is a general problem. How do you know that the chair in your memory is the same chair you are now looking at. Only by inference, and if only by inference your inference could be wrong.

This is Hume's problem where we have to infer they are the same tree because of constant conjunction.

Kant's solution is we know that they are the same tree because we are conscious of the persistence of time, what Bergson calls the duration. Kant called it the Transcendental unity of Apperception.

You say that we can only see a moment in the present, which I agree with, but even so, even in this moment in the present, don't you feel the persistence of time?

What is perceived is change, not persistence..................................But it may be the case that this persistence is only within me, and projected onto the outside, creating the illusion of a thing outside me. — Metaphysician Undercover

It depends what is meant by perceive. It can mean to see something, such as "I perceive a tree in the distance". It can mean to know something, such as "I perceive that you are curious." Kant in B276 of the CPR talks about perceiving a thing outside me that is persistent, inferring by perceiving he means seeing rather than knowing.

It is not the case that I see a tree and a moment later I see the same tree, but rather I see a tree persisting through time.

The tree doesn't need to change in order to be persistent through time.

But I only exist at one moment in time, meaning that I can only be conscious of my present, my "now". It follows that it would therefore be impossible to project my consciousness of the persistence of objects onto the world outside me.

Therefore, the consciousness of my existence in time is possible only by the persistence through time of actual things outside me, thereby proving the existence of objects in space outside me.

You might want to read the Transcendental Deduction in the Critique of Pure Reason for a close look at the way Kant thinks. It has to be understood that whatever one can say about objective time presupposes subjective time. — Astrophel

There is the metaphysical problem of the possibility of subjective duration in the mind within an objective moment in time in the world. In Kant's terms, the transcendental unity of perception, a unified and simultaneous consciousness derived from different and successive experiences.

There is the necessity to clarify the meanings of objective and subjective time.

As regards what I call objective time, this is time external to any observer, and therefore not subjective time. This is the time referred to by Kant in B276 The Refutation of Idealism

I am conscious of my existence as determined in time. All time-determination presupposes something persistent in perception. This persistent thing, however, cannot be something in me, since my own existence in time can first be determined only through this persistent thing. Thus the perception of this persistent thing is possible only through a thing outside me and not through the mere representation of a thing outside me.

As regards what I call subjective time, this is time internal to an observer, and therefore not objective time. This is the time referred to by Kant in B140 of the CPR.

However, when he refers to the objective unity of consciousness, he is intending the a priori within the mind, the pure form of intuition in time and the pure synthesis of the understanding. When he refers to the subjective unity of consciousness, he is intending the a posteriori representations and appearances, also within the mind, the empirical synthesis and the inner sense.

One problem with the CPR is that Kant states what is the case, but not how it is the case. We may agree that it the case that we do have a transcendental unity of apperception, but we also want to know how this is the case.

Anyway, in the everyday sense of the terms, things are taken differently in different contexts, but Heidegger does ontology, which is meant to be the analytic context where things are understood in their "equiprimordiality" — Astrophel

There is the metaphysical problem as to how a subjective duration can exist in an objective instant.
Equiprimordial means that two or more different equal phenomena can only be understood in relation to each other, and are not based on another common fundamental phenomena.

It is true that duration and instant are different phenomena that can be understood in relation to each other, in that duration and instant are mutually contradictory, and that a temporal event cannot be both a duration and an instant.

But they do have something in common and that is they are both temporal events, so in this sense are not equiprimordial.

However, what is more important is the law of non contradiction. By this law, a temporal event cannot be both a duration and an instant. It follows that it is logically impossible for a subjective duration to exist in an objective instant

Then how to explain Kant's Transcendental Unity of Apperception?

1) This present indeed corresponds to an instant in objective time—the “now” that can be measured.
2) Yet, this present is not simply that isolated instant. It is formed through the passive synthesis of past and future moments, which are contracted and integrated into it. The synthesis constitutes a continuous temporal flow within the present; it is making it not just a single point but a dynamic duration where moments are interconnected and experienced as a unified flow of time. — Number2018

From 1), the present is an instant. From 2), the present is a duration.

Many words have more than one meaning. For example, "bank" may mean a) a financial institution b) a raised area of land alongside a body of water. "Train" may mean a) a series of connected cars or carriages b) to teach or prepare someone for a specific task or skill.

Linguistically, I agree that in different contexts, the same world may have more than one meaning. In one context, that of the world, "present" may mean an instant. In a different context, that of the mind, "present" may mean a duration.

However, this is a different problem to the metaphysical problem as to how a duration can exist in an instant.

Then the world is turned upside down as one encounters Kant's Copernican Revolution. — Astrophel

The question as to how the subjective duration of time in the mind relates to objective moments of time in the world has been around since at least Kant's Copernican Revolution, and his concept of the Transcendental Unity of Apperception.

Kant presented the Transcendental Unity of Apperception as a fact in his Critique of Pure Reason without explanation, and the problem is still awaiting an explanation more than two hundred years later.

In the Transcendental Unity of Apperception there is a unity of consciousness resulting from the coherent synthesis of a succession of different contents. This act of synthesis is not experienced. Only the consequence of this acts of synthesis is experienced, the unity of different contents.

Kant in his Transcendental Unity of Apperception is finding a necessary connection between different contents, whereas Hume only found a contingent connection through a constant conjunction of different events.

The problem is in part discovering necessary connections between different contents.

Depends on what you mean by 'present' — Astrophel

There is the present within the mind of an observer. Thinking about present experience, past memories and future implications.

There is the present in the absence of any observer. The Earth as part of a Solar System, preceded by the Big Bang and followed by the Big Freeze.

The present within the mind of an observer exists as a subjective duration. The present in a world absent of any observer exists as an objective instant.

However, the observer, where the present exists as a subjective duration, exists within this world, where the present exists as an objective instant.

One asks how subjective duration relates to objective instant.

Perhaps in order to answer this question, we should take on board Husserl's concept of phenomenological reduction. We should attempt a meditative approach, fully grounded in the present, absent of any preconceptions from our past and absent of any implications about our future.

But yes, you nearly have it here: "these recollections of the past and implications concerning the future must also exist in the present, in the "now"," but for one important matter: The now cannot be understood as a place where all things temporal intersect or settle. — Astrophel

Recollections of the past and implications of the future must exist in the present, in the "now".

But doesn't that mean that it is in the present where all things temporal (recollections, implications, the "now") intersect or settle?

It is not that the present is a dimension of time: the present alone exists. — Number2018

I agree.

In Bergson’s example, when the mind contemplates the sounds of the four o'clock strikes, each stroke or excitation is logically independent of the others. — Number2018

It seems so. When I hear the clock strike for the second time, I have the retention (memory) of the clock striking for the first time and the anticipation (future) of the clock striking for the third time. In objective time, each stroke is independent of the others, in that each successive ‘now’ of the clock contains nothing of the past because each objective moment is separate and distinct. In subjective time, each stroke is also independent of the others, in that we are able to distinguish them.

Unlike any mere memory of distinct elements, we contract them into a living temporal flow that is dynamic and continuous, differing from a mechanical sequence of moments...Both do not simply register a sequence of discrete sensory inputs but synthesize time, creating a continuous living flow. — Number2018

I don't understand Deleuze's explanation of "synthesis". On the one hand, the present alone exists. On the other hand, within this present there is a "temporal flow".

How can there be a flow of time within a single moment in time?

What if reality is not completely determined by physical principles? — Wayfarer

What is the physical reality of time?

Let us start by ignoring quantum mechanics contribution to this problem, because as you wrote "Likewise Roger Penrose and Albert Einstein said they thought quantum physics is radically incomplete."

Consider the equation ${d = 0.5 * g * t^{2}}$, which very accurately and very successfully predicts the position of a stone falling in a gravitational field .

This equation represents a physical principle, that ${d = 0.5 * g * t^{2}}$, and the undoubted success of equations such as this strongly suggests that reality is founded on physical principles.

It is not so much the case that reality has been determined by physical principles, but rather that reality is physical principles.

But in what sense is the reality of space understood by "d", and in what sense is the reality of time understood by "t"?

Equations such as the above are part of the undoubted success of science. They are able to very accurately predict future events in the observable world. This naturally leads to the principle of Scientific Realism, the philosophical view that the world of space and time exists independently of any observer (Wikipedia - Scientific Realism). Such a world would also exist independently of any scientific theory developed by these observers in their search to better understand this world.

But "t" is not time, it is a letter, a symbol. It is certainly not time as it exists in a physical world, even though it can be successfully used to accurately predict future events .

Cat Gillen in his article "Hossenfelder vs Goff: Do electrons exist?" refer to Scientific Realism, Scientific Antirealism as well as Structural Realism.

Hossenfelder and Goff argued whether electrons exist. Are scientific theories true and show us how the world really is or just useful tools for making predictions about events in the world. Even though Bohr's atomic model can make fantastically correct predictions, as a theory it is incorrect. Scientific Antirealism says that we should not ascribe truth to a scientific theory just because of its predictive success. But this misses an important point, that there must be some underlying truth to a scientific theory that is predicatively successful. Structural Realism may be a better approach, as it argues that even though we may overlay a semantic story onto a scientific theory, there must be an underlying structure from which it gains its predictive abilities. This underlying structure maps with the reality of the world. Both scientific theory and the reality in the world that it predicts must share the same inherent realism.

Superficially, "t" is the semantic overlay to the reality of time in the world, where "t" may be a symbol, figure of speech, metaphor or simile. But in order to account for its predictive success, "t" must share with time an unobserved yet common underlying structure as proposed by Structural Realism.

Therefore, if the symbol "t" and time share an underlying reality, it must be the case that the symbol "t" is able to give us insights about the nature of time.

Because of the predictive success of equations such as ${d = 0.5 * g * t^{2}}$, and of scientific theories in general, the reality of time must have consistent and unchanging principles.

Rather, your now always already IS the past and future.........So recollection is the ecstatic unity of the recalled, being recalled in the forward looking of the present event, an event that is continuously on the threshold of anticipating what comes next...................................They are closer to Meister Eckhart's "On Detachment" — Astrophel

In my present, my "now", are not only my recollections of the past, but also my anticipations of the future. In this sense, my "now" does include the past and future.

Meister Eckhart writes in "On Detachment" that God, in his immovable detachment, which he has had since all eternity, has no past and future and does not see in a temporal fashion.

You should also know that God has stood in this unmoved detachment from all eternity, and still so stands; and you should know further that when God created heaven and earth and all creatures, this affected His unmoved detachment just as little as if no creature had ever been created.

But he also writes that man is not God. Not being God, man does not have this detachment, does see in a temporal fashion and does have a past, present and future.

Therefore, if a man is to be like God, as far as a creature can have likeness with God, this must come from detachment.

So man does have a present, a past of recollection and a future of implications.

For man, unlike God, recollection and implication can only exist in the present, can only exist in the "now".

If man can only exist in the present, in the "now", yet can think about recollections from the past and can think about implications concerning the future, then these recollections of the past and implications concerning the future must also exist in the present, in the "now".

You say "your now is always already in the past and future". Perhaps, however, it is more the case that "your past and future is always in your now"?

Yes, but when you speak of 'now' you are simply localizing subjective time, and the concept remains abstract. Analysis shows that what we call 'now' is really an ecstatic relation between temporal categories and there "really" is no boundary at all. — Astrophel

There are articles that describe how meditation can alter how we perceive the passing of time, for example "Meditation May Change the Way We Perceive Time"

New research has found that meditation can change the way that we perceive the passing of time. Researchers published new findings in the journal PLoS One. The studies found that mindfulness meditation increased happiness, decreased anxiety, and also changed people’s perception of time.

I sit staring into space for ten minutes and feel that it was a long time. I read for ten minutes and feel that it was a short time. My subjective feeling about the duration of an objective period of time does change depending upon circumstances.

At the start of this ten minutes, I am conscious that the clock shows 10.55. This is my present and my "now". The clock showing 11.05 will be in my future. At the end of this ten minutes, I am conscious that the clock shows 11.05. This is my present and my "now". The clock showing 10.55 was in my past. Throughout this ten minute period I am only conscious of being in the present, of my being in the "now". I am never conscious of being either in the past or if the future.

If my "now" can never be in the past and can never be in the future, does this not mean that my "now" is a distinct boundary between my past and my future?

The implication is that the photon didn’t have a determinate path until we made a measurement. — Wayfarer

It is beyond my comprehension that in a Universe 93 billion light years across that has existed for around 13 billion years, the determinacy of the path of photons throughout this Universe is dependent on a few scientists making measurements on the 3rd rock from the Sun.

Tim Folger in his article "Does the Universe Exist if We're Not Looking?" mentions Wheeler's idea that the principles of the two-slit experiment can be applied to the Universe.

Wheeler's hunch is that the universe is built like an enormous feedback loop, a loop in which we contribute to the ongoing creation of not just the present and the future but the past as well. To illustrate his idea, he devised what he calls his "delayed-choice experiment," which adds a startling, cosmic variation to a cornerstone of quantum physics: the classic two-slit experiment.

However, there are doubts about the implications of this two-slit experiment. For example, Sabine Hossenfelder, asks Did We Get the Double Slit Experiment All Wrong?

The double-slit experiment is a famous quantum physics experiment that shows that light exhibits behaviour of both a particle and a wave. In a new paper, researchers claim they’ve proven the experiment wrong, and that light is just a particle. Instead of light also being a wave that interferes with itself they say that there are both light photons and dark photons. Let’s take a look.

She also poses the idea Why This Nobel Prize Winner Thinks Quantum Mechanics is Nonsense

Gerard ‘t Hooft won the Nobel Prize in 1999, and the recent Breakthrough Prize, for his work on the Standard Model of Particle physics. He also thinks that quantum mechanics is nonsense. Indeed, he has an alternative theory for quantum mechanics that he says is how the world really works. This theory has been almost entirely ignored by physicists. Which is unfortunate, because he predicts a limit for what quantum computers can do.

My knowledge about quantum mechanics is insignificant when compared to that of Sabine, but at the least she is pointing out that there is still much to learn about quantum mechanics, including about the path of photons.

Subjective time highlights the mind’s role in constructing and experiencing temporal flow. Hume and Bergson used the example of a clock to show how subjective time allows the mind to transcend a fleeting, current moment of experience. You are correct that all mental operations, including memory, occur within a single moment of objective time. However, the contents of memory do not coexist in the same way that physical objects like furniture in my room do. Instead, memories form an evolving, continuous whole possessing all dimensions of time. — Number2018

As you wrote, Bergson believed that subjective time ("duration", "lived time") of the conscious individual is able to transcend the objective time of the current moment of experience. I don't disagree with that, but it all depends on the meaning of "transcend".

Evan Thompson in his article Clock time contra lived time wrote that the difference between Einstein and Bergson as regards the nature of time has narrowed in the intervening years.

"In the century since 1922, the conceptual distance between the German physicist and the French philosopher seems to have shrunk."

I tend to agree with both Einstein and Bergson, as two different approaches to the same problem.

Einstein's approach is that of objective time. His approach is that of physics and mathematics. In his special theory of relativity, the time measured by a clock is no longer an absolute because simultaneous events are only simultaneous in one frame of reference.

Bergson's approach is that of subjective time. His approach is that of the psychologist. It is about human experience, the lived experience of the passage of time and the experience of duration. Things that cannot be measured as they elude the possibility of measurement.

Objective time independent of an observer and subjective time dependent upon an observer are two aspects of the true nature of time, and it for the the philosopher to unite them into a single cohesive whole. But this is problematic, as Kant showed in his Critique of Pure Reason. Kant may believe in the existence of an external world, yet never able to know the noumena that inhabit this external world. The clock may be part of an objective time, but only a subjective observer is able to read what the clock shows. As Thompson says "Clocks don’t measure time; we do." We may live in a block-universe, where the passage of time from past to present to future is an illusion. However, we could only know this if we were able to stand outside our own frame of reference, which is logically impossible.

I agree when you say that "all mental operations, including memory, occur within a single moment of objective time". I think that this has important and relevant implications, but not discussed within the Thompson article. As I wrote before "But this subjective time only exists for me in my "now", meaning that my subjective time is an instantaneous thing that requires no objective time at all." I agree with Bergson that the subjective time of our conscious mind is different to the objective time of the clock in the world, and we feel that our subjective duration of lived experience transcends the objective single moment of "now". Yet this subjective duration of time exists in a single objective moment of time.

For me, philosophically, an interesting question not raised by Thompson's article is how we are able to subjectively feel the duration of time within a single momentary objective instant of time.

The three modalities of time are really one. One cannot isolate any one modality and speak of it as such, for this analytically carries along with it the other two..............It is also what can properly be called metaphysics, simply because this apriority is not witnessable empirically, quantitatively. It is "about" the world", yet it is apriori! — Astrophel

You write that the three modalities of time, the past, the present and the future, are really one, and are to be understood within metaphysics, about the world yet outside the world.

I suggested that my subjective time only exists in my present.

But this subjective time only exists for me in my "now", meaning that my subjective time is an instantaneous thing that requires no objective time at all.

@Number2018 wrote about subjective time

The argument you provided suggests that the conscious mind exists only in the "now," comparing two memories that are themselves always part of the present moment. However, subjective time refers to a flow of past, present, and future that are inextricably interconnected.

The past, present and future certainly exist in language and thought. For example, "last year I visited Paris, today I am in Seville and next year I will visit Reno.".

However, the fact that I can talk and think about the future is no reason to believe that this future will ever exist. Similarly, that I can talk about the past is no reason to believe that this past ever existed. That I can think and talk about the past and future is no reason that this past and future ever existed or will ever exist.

I agree that the three modalities of time in thought and language are inextricably linked. I can only talk about visiting Reno in the future if I am not in Reno at the present, and I can only talk about having visited Paris in the past if also I not in Paris in the present. Talk about the past and future only make sense in relation to the present.

In thought and language there is an inevitable flow of past, present and future that are inextricably connected. In my conscious mind there is a subjective temporal flow between the past, present and future. Last year I visited Paris, I am now in Seville and next year I will be in Reno.

I think, therefore I am in the present.

But it is in this present that I talk and think about the past, present and future. It is accepted that it is not necessary to teletransport to a future existence in order to be to talk or think about it. Similarly, it is also not necessary to teletransport to a past existence to be able to talk or think about it.

But this talking and thinking about the past, present and future is the foundation for my conscious experience of subjective time. As my talking and thinking exists in my present, my conscious experience must also exist in my present.

My present is momentary, neither in the past nor the future. In effect, timeless. My subjective time, which also exists in this momentary present, must therefore also be timeless.

My subjective time flows from the past to the present to the future. All these exist in my present when I talk and think about them, meaning that my subjective time is also something that only exists, metaphysically speaking, in my present.

That picture of the photon passing through every point on a classical trajectory assumes a deterministic path and a continuous sequence of objective instants. — Wayfarer

Why should it be that because a photon's path through space and time is unknowable to an observer, that its path is not spatially and temporally objectively deterministic?

A photon of light leaves the Andromeda Galaxy and enters a person's eye 2.537 million light-years later.

The photon must have had a path, because it made its way from the Andromeda Galaxy to the Earth, even if the path cannot meaningfully be assigned by an observer.

In having a path, the photon must have had a spatial location at each moment in time, even if in the absence of any measurement by an observer its definite position was unknown and even if each moment in time is unknown because it depends on different observers' frame of reference.

Perhaps, as for Kant, even though he argued for the unknowability of noumena, he still believed in the objective existence of a world independent of any subjective observer.

But what if nobody is there to know the information (light beams) is reaching that point in space? The light beams still arrive so do they constitute a 'now'? — EnPassant

That's how I see it.

Suppose a photon of light leaves an object and arrives at an eye 100 metres away. On its way to the eye, the photon passes through every point between the object and the eye, of which there are an infinite number. As the photon can only be in one place at one time (ignoring complexities of quantum mechanics), at each point the photon passes through, it exists in the present time, it exists in the "now". Either there are an infinite number of "nows" between the object and the eye or there is only one "now", where the photon happens to be at any moment in time.

As the photon can only be in one place at one time, and at each place the photon is in the "now", this means that there can only be one "now".

The argument you provided suggests that the conscious mind exists only in the "now," comparing two memories that are themselves always part of the present moment. However, subjective time refers to a flow of past, present, and future that are inextricably interconnected. — Number2018

A clock strikes four times. There is the quantitative. In the world, each strike is independent of the others. As you wrote “Each successive ‘now’ of the clock contains nothing of the past because each moment, each unit, is separate and distinct.". There is the qualitative. In the mind, the four strikes are inextricably connected as part of a continuous flow of experience from past, present and future.

As I understand it, subjective time is the mind's consciousness of the relation between the four strikes, and objective time is the relation between the four strikes in the absence of any mind.

I know subjective time because it is in my mind. However, I can only infer objective time because it is outside my mind.

Let the clock strike four times.

At the moment I hear the clock strike for the fourth time, I have the memory of hearing the clock strike for the first time. When I hear the clock strike for the fourth time, for me, this is my "now". My memory of hearing the clock strike for the first time is also in my "now". In my "now" are both the memory of the clock striking for the first time and hearing the clock strike for the fourth time. The relation between the memory of the clock striking for the first time and hearing the clock strike for the fourth time comprises my awareness of subjective time. But this subjective time only exists for me in my "now", meaning that my subjective time is an instantaneous thing that requires no objective time at all.

In other words, subjective time requires no objective time.

You say that "subjective time refers to a flow of past, present and future that are inextricably interconnected".

I agree if you are saying that the past exists in our mind as a memory.

However, I may be wrong, but I infer that by past you are referring to an objective past, a past that exists independently of any observer. If that is the case, in order for the mind to have a consciousness of a subjective time, how exactly does the mind connect an objective past to an objective present?

1) Do people exist in both the objective past and objective present, thereby allowing them
an awareness of the flow of time?

2) Does the person only exist in the objective present, the "now", but their mind is able to go back to an objective past, thereby allowing them an awareness of the flow of time?

How exactly does a person connect an objective past to an objective present if not by a memory that exists in the objective present?

If 'now' is defined as the moment information reaches our senses (say light beams from various sources coincide with your position in space) we can define now in terms of information being at a certain point in space. But what if nobody is there to know the information (light beams) is reaching that point in space? The light beams still arrive so do they constitute a 'now'? — EnPassant

@Number2018 makes the point that clocks don't measure time, as each successive "now" of the clock contains nothing of the past.

@Number 2018 - Evan Thompson points out Bergson’s position regarding a relation between subjective and objective times: “Each successive ‘now’ of the clock contains nothing of the past because each moment, each unit, is separate and distinct.......................Clocks don’t measure time

By the same argument, as the clock is a physical mechanism and only exists in the "now", the brain can only exist in the "now", as the brain is also a physical mechanism.

Suppose I have the memory of a clock showing 2pm and the memory of a clock showing 3pm. As my mind can only exist in the "now", both my memory of a clock showing 2pm and my memory of a clock showing 3pm exist in my "now".

If there is nobody to have a memory of the clock showing 2pm, then as before, it remains the case that the clock exists in its "now".

The problem with defining "now" as the moment information reaches our senses is the use of the word "moment". "Moment" assumes the existence of time, which "now" specifically excludes.

The definition of "now" cannot include the word "moment".

As I mentioned in the OP, any change requires time, whether it is physical or mental. In the first case, we need subjective time, and in the second case, we need psychological time. Subjective time is caused by the Mind (capital M), whereas psychological time is caused by the mind. — MoK

A clock shows 2pm and then the clock shows 3pm. There is a physical change in what the clock shows.

You say that physical change requires subjective time, and subjective time is caused by the Mind.

In what sense is the physical change in the clock first showing 2pm and then showing 3pm caused by the Mind?

In other words, the mathematics that describe change, is time (spacetime as far as physical time is concerned). — EnPassant

Does mathematics describe change or does it in fact describe difference?

The conscious mind as well as the clock can only exist in the "now". As @Number2018 wrote about the clock, the same argument can apply to the conscious mind as a physical mechanism.

“Each successive ‘now’ of the clock contains nothing of the past because each moment, each unit, is separate and distinct.

We can only infer that there is an objective time, in that not only is there a "now" but there was also a "past."

In the "now", I have memory P that the clock shows 10 minutes, and I have memory Q that the clock shows 30 minutes. Mathematics describes the difference between 10 minutes and 30 minutes, which equals 20 minutes. We name this difference "a change in time". As mathematics is part of the conscious mind, mathematics can also only exist in the "now". Therefore, the difference that mathematics is describing also only exists in the "now". The concept of objective time, as something that exists between different "nows", is redundant as far as the mathematical equation that (30-10) = 10 is concerned.

When we talk about "a change in time", this is a figure of speech. It is no different to when we talk about "the wind whistling through the trees" or "she is like a star in the sky". "A change in time" is a figure of speech for this difference of 20 minutes, as it exists in the "now". It is not about any inferred objective time.

Mathematics describes difference. Only when "change" is used as a figure of speech does mathematics describe change

Our internal experience of "flow" and "duration" is directly related to the notion of subjective time. It is not something that can be reduced to a mental state or an objective process, but constitutes a fundamental dimension of the conscious experience of continuity, memory, and change. — Number2018

There is the question as to how "subjective time" relates to time.

We have a memory of driving through the city and we are aware of presently walking through the forest. But even our awareness of presently walking through the forest is a memory, because the transfer of information from the forest to our mind is limited by the speed of light.

Therefore, the conscious mind is always comparing two memories, the memory of driving in the city and the memory of walking through the forest. The conscious mind is aware that these two memories are different, and the conscious mind understands that memories that are different have different "times".

Yet, as the clock only exists in the "now", the conscious mind can only exist in the "now". As you wrote about the clock “Each successive ‘now’ of the clock contains nothing of the past because each moment, each unit, is separate and distinct". Exactly the same applies to the mind, such that “Each successive ‘now’ of the conscious mind contains nothing of the past because each moment, each unit, is separate and distinct".

The conscious mind, which only exists in the "now", can compare two memories, which also only exist in the "now". The conscious mind can be aware that these memories are different, and this difference is labelled as "time".

For the conscious mind, "time" is something that can only exist in the "now" as a difference in memories, which also can only exist in the "now".

In effect, a difference in memories that are both in the "now" can be labelled "a change in time".

Subjective time in the conscious mind is something that can only exist in the "now".

In fact, Kant demonstrated that without subjective time there could be no coherent experience of existence or consciousness. — Number2018

I'm not sure that this is exactly what Kant was proposing.

He writes about time and space in The Transcendental Aesthetic, B46 of the CPR.

Space and time are pure forms of intuition that enable the possibility of our being able to have experiences. But what kind of experiences is he referring to? He must be referring to experiences involving space and time.

As you say "It means that time and space are conditions for the possibility of experience, fundamental to how we reason and perceive the world"

In other words, space and time are pure forms of intuition that enable the possibility of our being able to have experiences involving space and time.

I can only conclude that different things are being referred to here. There is "time as a pure form of intuition" and there is "the experience of time". "Time" in ""time as a pure form of intuition" cannot be the same thing as "time" as in "the experience of time".

I don't think that Kant is demonstrating that without subjective time there could be no coherent experiences, but rather that without the a priori conditions that enable us to experience time, we would not be able to experience time.

Let me consider your argument in P4. It implies that if subjective time exists, it would be contained within the conscious mind, as though it’s something that is "added on" or superfluous. However, subjective time is likely inseparable from the experience of being conscious. — Number2018

It is a problem of terminology.

In my P4, I was thinking about @MoK's use of the terms "subjective time", "psychological time" and "objective time". My thought was that @MoK's use of the term "subjective time" was redundant, as "psychological time" and "objective time" should be sufficient as concepts.

However, it seems that your use of the term "subjective time" is the same as @MoK's use of the term "psychological time".

The question is, do we call our conscious experience of time "subjective time" or "psychological time"?

Kant's transcendental philosophy includes a well-known perspective on subjective time and its mode of existence. — Number2018

Yes, Kant in the "Transcendental Aesthetic" in his CPR argues that time and space are not properties of the external world, but are a priori forms of intuition that allow for the possibility of experience.

@MoK refers to subjective time, objective time and psychological time.

The question is, is @MoK's subjective time and Kant's time as an a priori form of intuition referring to the same thing. I don't think that they are.

@MoK writes that subjective time exists and changes when there is a change in the physical

P1) Subjective time exists and changes since there is a change in a physical (Consider an electron as an example of a physical)

However, on the one hand, Kant's time is not something that exists, but is something that allows for the possibility of experience, and on the other hand, is not something that changes as the physical changes.
Kant's time as an a priori intuition is neither psychological time not objective time, but is something that allows for the possibility of experiencing psychological time.

There are three types of time, namely subjective time, objective time, and psychological time. — MoK

Useful post. I can agree that there is objective time and psychological time, but I am unsure that there is subjective time.

P1 - Objective time is inferred to exist in the world.
P2 - Psychological time exists in the conscious mind, in that we are conscious that at one time we were driving in the city and at another time we were walking through a forest. As you say, "We, however, experience the passage of psychological time".
P3 - The conscious mind is a physical substance that changes with objective time.

P4 - If there was a subjective time, it would exist in the conscious mind.
P5 - At one moment in objective time, subjective time cannot change.
P6 - Between two different objective times, subjective time would change.
C1 - But as you say "We, however, cannot experience the subjective time since we exist within each instant of it"
C2 - We can experience psychological time and we can infer objective time, but as we cannot experience subjective time, then the concept of subjective time becomes redundant.

Objective time and psychological time are sufficient. Subjective time is a redundant concept. This avoids your problem of infinite regress with subjective time.

What is the "big picture" if not "all the details"? The big picture is a particular relation between its details.

Consider only three details: A, B and C
These can be related into seven possible big pictures: A B C AB AC BC ABC
So how do we know of the seven possible big pictures which if any are the actual big picture?

But there are not just three details in the world, but an almost infinite number. This means that the number of possible big pictures in the world is also almost infinite. Then the question is, of these almost infinite number of possible big pictures in the world, which are the actual big pictures?

The detail of all the aspects of how you end up looking at a chair and recognising it is a chair would fill a library. — Malcolm Parry

Books have been written about cognition, but the brain can be more direct. Given only eight pictures, each of which is labelled either as a "kitabi" or labelled not as a "kitabi", I would imagine that you could without too much difficulty be able to translate the word "kitabi" into English.

The abstraction of what goes above this is what puzzels me….. — Jan

I agree that when I see a chair, to me it is a chair, but to an ant it is probably not a chair. I agree that there is a lot in common to when I see a chair and when I see evil.

If I see a set of shapes, such as horizontals, verticals and planes, in order for me to recognize that this set of shapes is a chair I must first have the concept of a chair. My concept of chair must be prior to being able to recognise that this set of shapes is a chair. For example, could you recognize a "kitabu" if you had no concept of what a "kitabu" is?

The original metaphor talks about broad brush strokes and fine lines. But it depends what "broad brush strokes" and "fine lines" is referring to. I am assuming that "broad brush strokes" is referring to the general and universal, such as the nature of evil, and "fine lines" is referring to the particular and concrete, such as one particular evil act. Though this is just my assumption.

My concept of chair is abstract and universal. The set of shapes I see is one concrete and particular instantiation of my concept.

Where does my concept of a chair come from? Perhaps over a period of time I see many different concrete and particular sets of shapes, but each time this set of shapes has been labelled a "chair". Eventually, because of the nature of the brain, I will begin to understand the concept of "chair". IE, it is impossible to understand a new concept by seeing just one particular and concrete instantiation of it.

The brain is able to abstract the concept of "chair" from seeing different examples, different instantiations, of sets of shapes that have been labelled "chairs".

Philosophical talk.....................Copilot told me: “ It’s like painting with broad brush strokes while occasionally adding a few fine lines to bring the image to life.” I think its metaphore is spot on. — Jan

In Philosophical talk, there is the abstract and universal, the broad brush strokes, and the particular and concrete, the fine lines.

I don't agree with Copilot. I think it is back to front. I would reword it as: "Philosophical talk is like continually painting in fine lines, the particular and concrete, with the hope that occasionally the broad brush strokes, the abstract and universal, are brought to life".

Philosophy is about the big picture, the abstract and the universal, such as the nature of evil. Yet humans are not able to understand the abstract and universal in itself, such as the nature of evil. It is impossible for the human mind to understand the big picture as it exists in itself as a an abstract and universal concept.

The human is only able to understand particular concrete examples of abstract and universal concepts. For example, we can agree that the Holodomor, the forced famine perpetrated by Stalin’s regime against Ukraine from 1932-1933 killed millions and exemplifies the use of extreme cruelty for political control, was a particular and concrete act of evil.

From particular concrete examples, which may be known and understood, the abstract universal may be inferred. This means that the abstract universal, the nature of evil, can never be known but can only be inferred. Although philosophy talk is about the big picture, the abstract and the universal, philosophy talk can only progress by knowing and understanding particular concrete examples, the fine lines, from which the big picture, the broad brush strokes, may be inferred.

James Pryor in his article Guidelines on Writing a Philosophy Paper, James Pryor notes the importance of the concrete particular example in philosophy talk.

Give examples which help explain the thesis, or which help to make the thesis
more plausible
Explain it; give an example; make it clear how the point helps your argument.
It is very important to use examples in a philosophy paper. Many of the claims
philosophers make are very abstract and hard to understand, and examples are the best
way to make those claims clearer.
You may want to give some examples to illustrate the author's point.
Do you illustrate your claims with good examples?
"Give an example?"

Philosophy talk must begin by knowing and understanding the fine lines, the particular and the concrete, in the hope that occasionally the broader brush strokes, the abstract and universal, can be inferred and brought to life.

Appreciate your replies, but I have run out of time.

Being in the world is inherently moral/aesthetic — Astrophel

The world is not inherently moral/aesthetic, so why should being in the world be inherently moral/aesthetic.

Husserl argued like this and that famous essay Sartre wrote, the Transcendence of the Ego, argued against it, because it impeded freedom — Astrophel

Yes, it is not immediately obvious who is right.

How about just being happy? — Astrophel

It is possible just to be happy without being happy about something, so why is it not possible to have a thought without having a thought about something?

There is no concept that is not representational, and thus, all talk about what is non representational is always already represntational. — Astrophel

This cannot be the case, as this would lead into an infinite regression, which we know is not the case.

Just reducible to an extravagance ofo thought whereby ideas are constructed out of the thin air of concepts without intuitions. — Astrophel

That is why it is transcendental.

But how does one speak of such a ground in the very structure of ground itself? — Astrophel

But we do! So it must be possible.