In your first question, "a person who can speak English" is a description, not an object. — Metaphysician Undercover
It is not a true representation of how we use numbers, to think of a number as itself an object. — Metaphysician Undercover
If that is true, then even more reason why one would then consider the question in regard to mathematics. If it's meaningless in context C but defined in another context D, then it wouldn't make sense to say that then it is inapposite to context D. — TonesInDeepFreeze
The principal problem with set theory..............is that set theory is derived from a faulty Platonist premise, which assumes "mathematical objects" — Metaphysician Undercover
In a group of 100 persons, 72 people can speak English and 43 can speak French. How many can speak English only? How many can speak French only and how many can speak both English and French?
along with its fantastic representation of "infinite" — Metaphysician Undercover
There are infinite sets that have sizes different from one another. — TonesInDeepFreeze
Of course, but I'm saying that in context of sets in mathematics, 'infinity' as a noun invites misunderstanding, especially as it suggests there is an object named 'infinity' that has different sizes. — TonesInDeepFreeze
'infinity' is not an adjective. — TonesInDeepFreeze
If that is the case, then it seems barmy to talk about different size of the infinite sets. — Corvus
Infinity is a property of motion or action — Corvus
does that mean that there are infinitely infinite infinitely infinite infinitely infinite infinitely infinite infinitely… (etc.) infinities? — an-salad
But he is not denying the outside empirical world where you see all the daily objects and interact with them. — Corvus
Kant responded to his predecessors by arguing against the Empiricists that the mind is not a blank slate that is written upon by the empirical world, and by rejecting the Rationalists’ notion that pure, a priori knowledge of a mind-independent world was possible. Reason itself is structured with forms of experience and categories that give a phenomenal and logical structure to any possible object of empirical experience. These categories cannot be circumvented to get at a mind-independent world, but they are necessary for experience of spatio-temporal objects with their causal behaviour and logical properties. These two theses constitute Kant’s famous transcendental idealism and empirical realism.
So the indirect realist believes that what we can't see is what is real? — Wayfarer
Indirect realism is broadly equivalent to the scientific view of perception that subjects do not experience the external world as it really is, but perceive it through the lens of a conceptual framework.
Direct realism postulates that conscious subjects view the world directly, treating concepts as a 1:1 correspondence.
Isn't it fairly simple that our perceptual abilities, and also our intellectual abilities, are limited in some ways, so that what the world is outside of those bounds can't be known by us? — Wayfarer
How many external worlds do you have, and which one is the real world? Why do you need more than one world? — Corvus
What is the unknowable Things in themselves that exist outside you exactly mean? What are they? — Corvus
"And we indeed, rightly considering objects of sense as mere appearances, confess thereby that they are based upon a thing in itself, though we know not this thing as it is in itself, but only know its appearances, viz., the way in which our senses are affected by this unknown something."
So Things-in-themselves exist outside you, but it also exists in your mind? Are they the same Things-in-themselves? Or are they different entities? Are they visible or audible to you? Can you touch them? If they are not perceptible, then how do you know they actually even exist? — Corvus
Now the question goes back to Thing-in-itself. Is the Thing-in-itself something in the mind or does it exist outside of the mind? If outside, then would it be in the external world, or some other world totally separate from the external world? — Corvus
"The mere, but empirically determined, consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of objects in space outside me."
"And we indeed, rightly considering objects of sense as mere appearances, confess thereby that they are based upon a thing in itself, though we know not this thing as it is in itself, but only know its appearances, viz., the way in which our senses are affected by this unknown something."
I do believe in only one world i.e. the physical world. I was asking about the external world in the Refutation for the Idealist you quoted. — Corvus
How does one know one's own existence "determined in time" without yet being sure of the external world? — Corvus
===============================================================================I don't see it anywhere. Even with binoculars, telescope and magnifying glasses and microscopes, there is no such a thing as a Mind-independent world. There is just the empirical world with the daily objects I see, and interact with. That is the only world I see around me. Nothing else. — Corvus
Should the indirect realist not check the argument of the Refutation for the Idealism for any logical obscurity before accepting it? — Corvus
It would be likely to be a biased opinion. It is better to look at the original work first, and then various other commentaries rather than just relying on one 3rd party commentary source. — Corvus
You cannot prove the existence of the objects in space outside of you by simply saying you are conscious of your own existence. — Corvus
Not contradictory, but not making sense either. — Corvus
Do you have the CPR reference for backing that points up? No Wiki or SEP, but CPR. — Corvus
Welcome to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (SEP), which as of Summer 2023, has nearly 1800 entries online. From its inception, the SEP was designed so that each entry is maintained and kept up-to-date by an expert or group of experts in the field. All entries and substantive updates are refereed by the members of a distinguished Editorial Board before they are made public. Consequently, our dynamic reference work maintains academic standards while evolving and adapting in response to new research. — https://plato.stanford.edu/about.html
You seem to think a world is some logically reasoned object. — Corvus
A photograph is to show visual image, not the form of reason. It is nonsense to say that a photo can only show the form of reason. — Corvus
In that case, would it be the case that you have been mistaken Kant's refutation of Idealism as Kant's TI? — Corvus
Transcendental idealism is a philosophical system founded by German philosopher Immanuel Kant in the 18th century. Kant's epistemological program is found throughout his Critique of Pure Reason (1781). By transcendental, Kant means that his philosophical approach to knowledge transcends mere consideration of sensory evidence and requires an understanding of the mind's innate modes of processing that sensory evidence.
In that case, should it not be a representation of the empirical world in your mind, rather than an internal world inside you? — Corvus
There is only one world called the empirical world, and it is outside the mind. Appearance is from the empirical world....................When I see a book in front of me, it is via the appearance or phenomenon from the object (the book) in the empirical world (outside of the mind).................. The physical objects in the empirical world also continue to exist through time.................There is no such thing as an internal world. In your mind, there are only perceptions. — Corvus
The dispute between rationalism and empiricism takes place primarily within epistemology, the branch of philosophy devoted to studying the nature, sources, and limits of knowledge. Knowledge itself can be of many different things and is usually divided among three main categories: knowledge of the external world, knowledge of the internal world or self-knowledge, and knowledge of moral and/or aesthetical values.
I am not sure if a philosophical topic which is totally severed from the Empirical world has a meaning. Are you? — Corvus
In Kantian philosophy, the noumenon is often associated with the unknowable "thing-in-itself" (German: Ding an sich). However, the nature of the relationship between the two is not made explicit in Kant's work, and remains a subject of debate among Kant scholars as a result.
If you can see it, can you take a photo of a Mind-independent world, and upload here? — Corvus
This thread is for reading Kant's CPR. Why try to show Berkeley's Idealism is incorrect? — Corvus
===============================================================================Idealism (I mean material idealism) is the theory that declares the existence of objects in space outside us to be either merely doubtful and indemonstrable, or else false and impossible; the former is the problematic idealism of Descartes, who declares only one empirical assertion (assertio), namely I am, to be indubitable; the latter is the dogmatic Idealism of Berkeley, who declares space, together with all the things to which it is attached as an inseparable condition, to be something that is impossible in itself, and who therefore also declares things in space to be merely imaginary.
In summary how did you manage to cram in the whole universe into inside your mind? — Corvus
Even with a binoculars, telescope and magnifying glasses and microscopes, there is no such a thing as a Mind-independent world.............If you can see it, can you take a photo of a Mind-independent world, and upload here? — Corvus
Where is a Mind-independent world? — Corvus
Again what is the point even talking about something which is unknowable? — Corvus
If it was unknowable, then how did you know it was unknowable? — Corvus
And we indeed, rightly considering objects of sense as mere appearances, confess thereby that they are based upon a thing in itself, though we know not this thing as it is in itself, but only know its appearances, viz., the way in which our senses are affected by this unknown something. — Prolegomena, § 32 — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thing-in-itself
"The mere, but empirically determined, consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of objects in space outside me." B276
No one was claiming Kant said the Thing-in-itself, something that is knowable. — Corvus
When I see the book in front of me, I know the book. I know it is in blue colured cover, it is a paperback book, the title of the book is "CPR" by Kant. I cannot be wrong on that. It is the truths I know about the book in front of me. I don't need to worry anything about Thing-in-itself book of CPR. There is no such thing as Thing-in-itself CPR book, but there is a CPR book in front of me. — Corvus
B279 – Here it had to be proved only that inner experience in general is possible only through outer experience in general.
The mere, but empirically determined, consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of objects in space outside me.
Kant responded to his predecessors by arguing against the Empiricists that the mind is not a blank slate that is written upon by the empirical world, and by rejecting the Rationalists’ notion that pure, a priori knowledge of a mind-independent world was possible. Reason itself is structured with forms of experience and categories that give a phenomenal and logical structure to any possible object of empirical experience. These categories cannot be circumvented to get at a mind-independent world, but they are necessary for experience of spatio-temporal objects with their causal behaviour and logical properties. These two theses constitute Kant’s famous transcendental idealism and empirical realism.
There are different interpretations on this point. — Corvus
And we indeed, rightly considering objects of sense as mere appearances, confess thereby that they are based upon a thing in itself, though we know not this thing as it is in itself, but only know its appearances, viz., the way in which our senses are affected by this unknown something.— Prolegomena, § 32
Things-in-themselves are for the objects we have concepts, but not the matching physical objects in the empirical world. We can think about it via concepts, but we don't see them in the phenomena. They belong to Thing-in-itself. — Corvus
If you believe in the existence of invisible particles and forces in space and time, then why do you deny the existence of the physical objects such as the bent stick in the empirical world?
If you had a single particle of the bent stick, would you say that is a part of the bent stick, and it is a stick?
In the absence of humans, sounds a condition that you must clarify before progressing further.
Where does "if something cannot be judged" come from? — Corvus
You are still seeing an object external to you when you see the bend stick in the water jug. — Corvus
I understand Kant's Thing-in-itself, is not everything outside us in the world. If that was the case, Kant would be an extreme sceptic, who professes everything outside us is unknowable. That would render all our knowledge of external world impossible. In that case, Kant would have been rejected for being an extreme scpetic, and nobody would take him as a serious epistemologist or philosopher. To even suggest that would be a gross misunderstanding of Kant and his philosophy. — Corvus
Isn't your perception of the sticks enough evidence they exist? — Corvus
Even when no humans exist, all the material things must exist as they have been...............................Where humans don't exist, of course, there is no perception, no thoughts. But we can still make logical inference (from the human world), that things keep exist as they have done. — Corvus
What Kant would have said is, that even if your sensibility sees a bent stick in the water jug, your category of concepts and understanding (followed by reading the scientific explanation on why the stick looks bent), would come to a proper reasoning on the experience, and judge the stick is straight in actuality, even if it looks bent. — Corvus
===============================================================================In his doctrine of transcendental idealism, Kant argued the sum of all objects, the empirical world, is a complex of appearances whose existence and connection occur only in our representations.
Kant introduces the thing-in-itself as follows: And we indeed, rightly considering objects of sense as mere appearances, confess thereby that they are based upon a thing in itself, though we know not this thing as it is in itself, but only know its appearances, viz., the way in which our senses are affected by this unknown something. Prolegomena, § 32
What you have been calling as your internal world is nothing more than a figment of representation of the world in your mind via your sensibility from the external world. — Corvus
What else do you need for proof that bent sticks exist in the world? — Corvus
By virtue of drawing meaningful correlations between different things, some of which are not "internal to your mind". — creativesoul
It is like saying that you used your camera, and took a photo of the mountain across the field in your town, and then the camera thinks that it has a mountain in its memory card, because it cannot understand why the mountain is out there outside the camera. — Corvus
If X doesn't exist outside of RussellA, then X must exist inside of RussellA.
This sounds logically unsound. Groundless premise, and unsound conclusion. — Corvus
If X doesn't exist outside of RA? Under what ground do you claim that premise? — Corvus
What do you mean by "X exist"? — Corvus
You have a mental space which is total darkness without your visual perception — Corvus
The light reflected from the stick in the water, passes through the water with the refraction, so it looks like double or bent in the water of the jug. — Corvus
They are external. You can think about it, because you have the concepts in your mind. — Corvus
How do you know your pain is real? What if it were just itchy skin, and you might have mistaken the itch sensation for pain? — Corvus
Close your both eyes totally and decidedly for 10 minutes, you will see nothing, but a total darkness. — Corvus
How do you know you have a world internal to your mind? — Corvus
Is it a real world? — Corvus
How do you know it is the real world or just a imagination? — Corvus
Possible worlds, and worlds in your imagination and memories exist in your mind, but they don't cause your perception for the external world. — Corvus
How can you step outside of your concept or intuition? — Corvus
Kant's first premise in the refutation is that he is conscious in time. Some might ask to prove how does he know he is conscious in time? What if he was dreaming, or hallucinating? — Corvus