Surely we perceive the world via our senses doesn't necessarily mean that the world doesn't exist? — Corvus
What is the reasons for George Dicker to claim that Kant's Refutation of Idealism has failed? Does it mean that Idealism prevails in CPR? — Corvus
I recall this part of CPR. It was about Refutation of Idealism. What was Kan't intention for the proof? Did he succeed in the Refutation? — Corvus
What type of knowledge would it be? — Corvus
The "thing in itself" exists beyond the realm of human knowledge and experience. — Wayfarer
I don’t deny that Kant believed there were objects outside us. Only that we don’t know what they really are. — Wayfarer
Kant posited that human cognition is limited to what appears to us through our sensory perception and understanding. — Wayfarer
"No matter how innocent idealism may be held to be as regards the essential ends of metaphysics (though in fact it is not so innocent), it always remains a scandal of philosophy and universal human reason that the existence of things outside us (from which we after all get the whole matter for our cognitions, even for our inner sense) should have to be assumed merely on faith, and that if it occurs to anyone to doubt it, we should be unable to answer him with a satisfactory proof.
"The mere, but empirically determined, consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of objects in space outside me."
With Kant, I'm never sure if I'm just not following it or whether it's just not followable. — Hanover
the equation of the noumena and thing in itself — Hanover
Do you understand that lies are not true and only truth is included in knowledge? — PL Olcott
Only when we clarify that analytic excludes sense data from the sense organs can we know that the full meaning of a {red rose} is excluded from analytic — PL Olcott
I already said that expressions that are not elements of the body of analytical knowledge are excluded. — PL Olcott
I have already stipulated {the body of analytic knowledge} which necessarily excludes {cats are elephants} and includes {cats are animals}. — PL Olcott
Kingdom: Animalia...We can determine that a {cat} is an {animal} on the basis of the above knowledge tree. — PL Olcott
1) Transcendental, in Kantian philosophy, is that by which pure a priori is the determining condition.
2) From all that, it follows that a transcendental deduction, first, must be purely a priori therefore can have no empirical predication whatsoever
3) Now, with respect to a transcendental deduction of the categories, which is in fact the title of a subsection dedicated to just that, this kind of argument cannot have to do with representations of objects, because, being purely a priori, there are no phenomena hence no representations of objects, but still must be a reduction from the general to the particular in order to qualify as a deduction.
4) If Kant deduces the categories in accordance with logical syllogisms having empirical content, he loses the capacity to enounce the conditions for pure thought of possible objects.
5) A transcendental deduction can never follow from an observation, by definition. — Mww
In this respect Kant agrees with Locke that there are no innate principles or ideas to be ‘found’ in us. Both hold that all our ideas have their origin in experience. But Locke thinks that we build these ideas by abstracting from experience and recombining abstracted elements. Kant holds that such representations or ideas cannot be abstracted from experience; they must be the product of careful reflection on the nature of experience.
I am new to all this. — Debra
More generally anything that can be encoded in language (including formal mathematical languages) <is> Analytic(Olcott). — PL Olcott
Rudolf Carnap derived the basis for Richard Montague to mathematically formalize natural language. — PL Olcott
Consider the two sentences John finds a unicorn and John seeks a unicorn. These are syntactically alike (subject-verb-object), but are semantically very different. From the first sentence follows that there exists at least one unicorn, whereas the second sentence is ambiguous between the so called de dicto (or non-specific, or notional) reading which does not imply the existence of unicorns, and the de re (or specific, or objectual) reading from which existence of unicorns follows.
I would welcome an invitation to participate in a reading group focused on the reading and discussion of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Should a group be formed — Debra
All of the words have every slight nuance of their meaning assigned to them by Rudolf Carnap / Richard Montague Meaning Postulates. — PL Olcott
Our explication, as mentioned above, will refer to semantical language-systems, not to natural languages. It shares this character with most of the explications of philosophically important concepts given in modern logic, e.g., Tarski's explication of truth. It seems to me that the problems of explicating concepts of this kind for natural languages are of an entirely different nature.
There’s no need, no reason a justification be required. — Mww
If the categories, or whatever serves the purpose of them, seem to have a justifiable purpose, then it is the requirement of reason to discover them — Mww
Kant is merely calling the discovery of the categories a transcendental deduction of them. — Mww
===============================================================================Intro to CPR - After a brief explanation of the distinction between "general logic" and "transcendental logic" - the former being the basic science of the forms of thought regardless of its object and the latter being the science of the basic forms for the thought of objects (A 50-5 7/B 74- 82)
I am conscious of my existence as determined in time. All time-determination presupposes something persistent in perception. This persistent thing, however, cannot be something in me, since my own existence in time can first be determined only through this persistent thing. Thus the perception of this persistent thing is possible only through a thing outside me and not through the mere representation of a thing outside me. Consequently, the determination of my existence in time is possible only by means of the existence of actual things that I perceive outside myself. Now consciousness in time is necessarily combined with the consciousness of the possibility of this time-determination: Therefore it is also necessarily combined with the existence of the things outside me, as the condition of time-determination; i.e., the consciousness of my own existence is at the same time an immediate consciousness of the existence of other things outside me.
And, Happy New Year — Wayfarer
We can reflect on the general nature of experience or perception and derive the ineliminable attributes. For example, perception of objects is unimaginable without space, time, form and differentiation. — Janus
These categories seem to be Kant's attempt to pinpoint what is essential to the ways we understand things. Do you not think we can reflect on our experience and thinking in order to discover the essential elements? — Janus
(This is also the basis of his rejection of accouting for reason in terms of evolutionary adaption - to appeal to successful adaptation as the grounds for reason, attempts to provide a grounding outside of reason itself, thereby undercutting the sovereignity of reason.) — Wayfarer
Aristotle called humans ‘rational animals’, the implication being that while we’re animals in some respects due to the power of reason we’re distinct. — Wayfarer
Regarding the innate capacities of the mind - ‘capacities’ or ‘categories’ are not the same as ‘innate ideas’. — Wayfarer
The meaning of those terms is the sum total of every detail of all of the general knowledge that applies to those terms (that can be written down using language). — PL Olcott
Analytic(Olcott) is a lot like the conventional meaning of {Analytic} in that every expression is verified as completely true entirely on the basis of its meaning. — PL Olcott
Thomas Nagel says in his book The Last Word that there are thoughts or principles that one cannot "get outside of," meaning they are so basic to our understanding and reasoning that we cannot meaningfully doubt or reject them from a position outside of them. — Wayfarer
(This is also the basis of his rejection of accouting for reason in terms of evolutionary adaption - to appeal to successful adaptation as the grounds for reason, attempts to provide a grounding outside of reason itself, thereby undercutting the sovereignity of reason.) — Wayfarer
In this respect Kant agrees with Locke that there are no innate principles or ideas to be ‘found’ in us. Both hold that all our ideas have their origin in experience. But Locke thinks that we build these ideas by abstracting from experience and recombining abstracted elements. Kant holds that such representations or ideas cannot be abstracted from experience; they must be the product of careful reflection on the nature of experience.
Kant says that "The transcendent principles are principles of the subjective unity of cognition through reason, i.e. of the agreement of reason with itself"; "Objective principles are principles of a possible empirical use." This suggests that whatever exactly the use of the transcendent principles of pure reason is, it is not to obtain any knowledge of external objects, which can only be achieved through the empirical use of the concepts of understanding, their application to representations in space and time for the exposition of appearances.
The chess rules could be changed, just as we might think the laws of nature that determine that the Sun rises in the east could change. In fact it is far easier to see how the rules of chess might be changed. — Janus
I think we already use the categories to make sense of experiences. It is on the basis of reflection upon how experiences must be for us in order that we can make sense of them that the synthetic a priori is generated, as I understand it. — Janus
Justifying possibility makes no sense. — Mww
Every element of the body of analytic knowledge can be verified as true in that it is either an axiom of {BOAK} or is deduced from the axioms of {BOAK}.
The {body of analytic knowledge} (BOAK) is the subset of expressions of analytic truth that are known to be true. — PL Olcott
all attempts at an empirical deduction, in regard to pure à priori conceptions, are vain — Mww
It is not at all that properties cannot be described using words. It is that some properties require first-hand direct experience of sense data from the sense organs to be fully described. The actual smell of a rose cannot be completely put into words, thus is not an element of
the body of analytic knowledge. We can still know that some {roses} are {red} even though
we lack the sense data from the sense organs showing exactly what {red} is. — PL Olcott
Analytic expressions are expressions of language that can be verified as completely true entirely on the basis of their connection to the semantic meanings that make them true. Example: "Cats are animals". — PL Olcott
We can call this the analytic(olcott) / empirical(olcott) distinction meaning that any expression of language that can be verified as true on the basis of the axioms of the verbal model of the actual world is analytical(olcott). — PL Olcott
I think we can only know what experience, and refelection on the nature of experience tells us. We can also elaborate and extrapolate from formal rule-based systems like logic, mathematics, chess, Go etc. — Janus
Hard to call passages bracketed by quotation marks as plagiarized, innit? — Mww
In the service of survival though, right? — Wayfarer
So Darwin explains Kant? — Wayfarer
By presupposing it given some general observations, then constructing a theory that supports the presuppositions without contradicting the observations....................Even if all the predicates of transcendental philosophy are internally consistent with each other, and coherent as a whole in itself, there is nothing given from it that makes those predicates actually the case, at the expense of other relevant philosophies. — Mww
As you say it initially comes, not sui generis, but from a careful reflection on the nature of experience (and of course also becomes culturally established), so in that sense it is dependent on experience. It is independent of experience in that once established it is clear that all possible experience must conform to the a priori categories — Janus
I am separating analytic truthmakers from synthetic .........Some of these expressions such as "cats are animals" are stipulated to be true (AKA axioms). Other expressions are proven to be true on the basis of deductions from these axioms..............Any expression of language that can only be proven true with sense data from the sense organs: "A cat is in my living room right now" are excluded. — PL Olcott
It seems to be no mystery to me...........Hume was correct that we don't see the actual operations of causation, we don't see the forces at work, but when our bodies are involved, we can certainly feel them........................but all it does take is reflection upon our felt experience to naturally form a notion of causation. — Janus
Hume shows that experience does not tell us much. Of two events, A and B, we say that A causes B when the two always occur together, that is, are constantly conjoined. Whenever we find A, we also find B, and we have a certainty that this conjunction will continue to happen. Once we realize that “A must bring about B” is tantamount merely to “Due to their constant conjunction, we are psychologically certain that B will follow A”, then we are left with a very weak notion of necessity.
Intro to CPR, page 6 - He entitles the question of how synthetic a priori judgments are possible the "general problem of pure reason" (B 1 9), and proposes an entirely new science in order to answer it (A IO-16/B 24-30).
Intro to CPR - page 6 - Kant agrees with Locke that we have no innate knowledge, that is, no knowledge of any particular propositions implanted in us by God or nature prior to the commencement of our individual experience.
CPR 168 - If someone still wanted to propose a middle way between the only two, already named ways, namely, that the categories were neither self-thought a priori first principles of our cognition nor drawn from experience, but were rather subjective predispositions for thinking, implanted in us along with our existence by our author in such a way that their use would agree exactly with the laws of nature along which experience runs (a kind of prefonnation-system of pure reason), then (besides the fact that on such a hypothesis no end can be seen to how far one might drive the presupposition of predetermined predispositions for future judgments) this would be decisive against the supposed middle way: that in such a case the categories would lack the necessity that is essential to their concept.
Intro to CPR - page 2 - Yet while he attempted to criticize and limit the scope of traditional metaphysics, Kant also sought to defend against empiricists its underlying claim of the possibility of universal and necessary knowledge - what Kant called a priori knowledge, knowledge originating independently of experience, because no knowledge derived from any particular experience, or a posteriori knowledge, could justify a claim to universal and necessary validity.
In this respect Kant agrees with Locke that there are no innate principles or ideas to be ‘found’ in us. Both hold that all our ideas have their origin in experience. But Locke thinks that we build these ideas by abstracting from experience and recombining abstracted elements. Kant holds that such representations or ideas cannot be abstracted from experience; they must be the product of careful reflection on the nature of experience.
Kant viewed moral knowledge as fundamentally a priori in the sense that moral knowledge must be the result of careful reasoning (first transcendental, then deductive); one could discover through reason the fundamental moral principle, and then deduce from that principle more specific moral duties. Moore, on the other hand, explicitly rules out reasoning to fundamental moral principles; since these principles are self-evident, Moore denies that there are, properly speaking, any reasons for them. Thus, we find in Moore a distinctively intuitionist account of a priori knowledge, as opposed to Kant’s rationalist account. Moore’s account is intuitionistic because the reason why we believe, and ought to believe, fundamental moral principles is that they are self-evident propositions that appear true to us.
Prolegomena 32 - And we indeed, rightly considering objects of sense as mere appearances, confess thereby that they are based upon a thing in itself, though we know not this thing as it is in itself, but only know its appearances, viz., the way in which our senses are affected by this unknown something.
Kant holds that such representations or ideas cannot be abstracted from experience; they must be the product of careful reflection on the nature of experience.
That does not constitute an argument. — Wayfarer
And what would provide the basis for such ‘careful reflection’ in the absence of an innate grasp of the issue at hand? — Wayfarer
According to Kant, certain concepts, like causation, are not derived from experience but are rather innate to the human mind (remember, Hume and the other empiricists denied innate capacities) — Wayfarer
But the Lockean Empiricist approach carried the day, and innateness was written off as a backward and discredited view. Nineteenth century Kantianism, although potentially friendlier to innateness, left it on the sidelines as philosophically irrelevant.
He is certainly not an Empiricist; he sees his philosophy as a response to the challenge of Humean Empiricism. Nevertheless, he is critical of Rationalist versions of the Innateness doctrine at every turn.
Kant’s main complaint against Rationalist Nativism was that it accepted that the innate had to correspond to an independent reality, but it could not explain how we could establish such a correspondence or use it to account for the full range of our knowledge. In this, it failed to meet Hume’s challenge. Kant finds the position guilty of a number of related fatal errors.
1) Warrant. How can we establish that innate principles are true of the world? In the Prolegomena he criticizes the Innateness doctrine of his contemporary Crusius because even if a benevolent non-deceiving God was the source of the innate principles, we have no way to reliably determine which candidate principles are innate and which may pass as such (for some).
2) Psychologism. At times Kant seems to suggest that the psychologism of Rationalist Nativism is itself a problem and makes it impossible to explain how we can get knowledge of objective necessary connections (as opposed to subjective necessities).
3) Modal concepts. Callanan 2013 reads Kant as offering a Hume-style argument that Rationalist Nativism cannot explain how we could come to have a concept of objective necessity, if all we had were innate psychological principles.
In this respect Kant agrees with Locke that there are no innate principles or ideas to be ‘found’ in us. Both hold that all our ideas have their origin in experience. But Locke thinks that we build these ideas by abstracting from experience and recombining abstracted elements. Kant holds that such representations or ideas cannot be abstracted from experience; they must be the product of careful reflection on the nature of experience.