Surely we perceive the world via our senses doesn't necessarily mean that the world doesn't exist? — Corvus

Yes, if we perceive the world through our senses, then, of necessity, the world exists.

We perceive things in our senses, including touch, taste, smell, sight and hearing.

However, how do you know that these sensations are caused by a world that exists outside your mind rather than by a world that exists inside your mind?
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What is the reasons for George Dicker to claim that Kant's Refutation of Idealism has failed? Does it mean that Idealism prevails in CPR? — Corvus

George Dicker argues that the main difficulty with Kant's argument in B276 is the part "All time-determination presupposes something persistent in perception".

The problem is, how can we step outside of time in order to see ourselves existing in time

This doesn't mean that Idealism prevails in CPR, but rather, that Kant should have come up with a better argument to justify his belief that objects exist in space outside us.

I recall this part of CPR. It was about Refutation of Idealism. What was Kan't intention for the proof? Did he succeed in the Refutation? — Corvus

As our only access to a possible outside us is through our senses, how can we prove that there is a world on the other side of these senses when we only know of this possible world through our senses?

Not everyone believes that Kant succeeded. For example, George Dicker in his article Kant's Refutation of Idealism wrote: "I analyse Kant's Refutation of Idealism as he presents it in the Critique of Pure Reason and show that it is a failure".

His "proof" in B276 may be summarised as:
1) I am conscious of my existence though time
2) I can only be conscious of one moment in time
3) Therefore, there must be something outside me enabling my consciousness that I exist through time
However, assuming 2) to be correct, rather than being conscious of my existence through time, I could be conscious of memories at this one moment in time, thereby negating the proof.

I may be able to find justifications that there are objects outside me, but I doubt that a proof is possible. For example, if there are no objects outside me, if there is no world outside me, then I wrote "Anna Karenina", "To Kill a Mockingbird", "The Great Gatsby", "One Hundred Years of Solitude", "A Passage to India" and the "Invisible Man", which, although possible, I find highly unlikely.

What type of knowledge would it be? — Corvus

The knowledge as set out in his Theorem in B276 that objects exist in space outside us.

The "thing in itself" exists beyond the realm of human knowledge and experience. — Wayfarer

I don’t deny that Kant believed there were objects outside us. Only that we don’t know what they really are. — Wayfarer

For Kant, it was more than a belief that objects exist outside us, as from B276 onwards he goes on to propose a proof that objects do exist outside us.

On the assumption that Things in Themselves are objects outside us, then if they were beyond the realm of human knowledge, then it would not be possible to prove that they exist.

I agree that Kant may not know what Things in Themselves really are, but he does know that they do exist beyond our sensibilities.

IE, Kant proposes a proof in the Refutation of Idealism that we do have knowledge beyond our experiences.

Kant posited that human cognition is limited to what appears to us through our sensory perception and understanding. — Wayfarer

He did more than that.

In Bxxxix he writes:

"No matter how innocent idealism may be held to be as regards the essential ends of metaphysics (though in fact it is not so innocent), it always remains a scandal of philosophy and universal human reason that the existence of things outside us (from which we after all get the whole matter for our cognitions, even for our inner sense) should have to be assumed merely on faith, and that if it occurs to anyone to doubt it, we should be unable to answer him with a satisfactory proof.

From B275 onwards is Kant's Refutation of Idealism, where he states that our inner experience is only possible on the presupposition of outer experience.

He starts with the Theorem:

"The mere, but empirically determined, consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of objects in space outside me."

From B276 onwards is his proof of the existence of objects outside our sensory perception and understanding.

With Kant, I'm never sure if I'm just not following it or whether it's just not followable. — Hanover

I am sure that not only is it the case that for each paragraph making a substantive point, another paragraph may be found making a contradictory point but also that for each academic’s interpretation of a particular paragraphs, another academic may be found with an opposing viewpoint.

For me, the CPR becomes worthwhile when the individual paragraphs are used in support of a sensible whole rather than trying to take each of them literally, ie, for the CPR to be read in the spirit of the text rather than in the letter of the text.
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the equation of the noumena and thing in itself — Hanover

It seems right to distinguish between two seemingly different aspects of objects as they appear in our sensibilities regardless of what they are named, whether as an abstracted generality or concrete particular, whether epistemological or ontological or whether noumena or Thing in Itself.

For me, there is a similarity between the concepts abstracted generality, epistemological and noumena and there is a similarity between the concepts concrete particular, ontological and Thing in Itself.

The analogy of the colour red

Using an analogy, we perceive the colour red when looking at a wavelength of 700nm.

The object that appears in our sensibilities, the colour red, has been caused by the wavelength of 700nm. Although the colour red and wavelength of 700nm are of two very different kinds, they are two aspects of the same event.

We can think of the colour red and the wavelength of 700nm as "the same concept viewed from two different perspectives" (Wikipedia – Noumenon)

The colour red as an object as it appears in our sensibilities can be thought of as an abstracted generality that has been determined by a concrete particular wavelength of 700nm.

The colour red as an object as it appears in our sensibilities gives us epistemological knowledge about an ontologically existing wavelength of 700nm.

For me, the colour red as an object as it appears in our sensibilities may be described as a (Negative) Noumena, and the wavelength of 700nm may be described as a Thing in Itself.

The (Negative) Noumenon and Thing in Itself are two aspects of our thoughts about objects as they appear in our sensibilities.

I agree that Kant in the CPR never discussed wavelengths of 700nm, but this does not take away the power of an analogy to explain a complex topic.

Do you understand that lies are not true and only truth is included in knowledge? — PL Olcott

Who determines that the semantic meaning of cat is "animal" rather than "very large plant-eating mammals with a prehensile trunk"?

It could be that person A stipulates that "cats are animals" and person B stipulates that "cats are very large plant-eating mammals with a prehensile trunk".

Who determines whether person A or B is correct, if the person making the determination is not allowed to look at the world using their sense data through their their sense organs?

How can there be knowledge that cats are "animals" and not "very large plant-eating mammals with a prehensile trunk" without being able to look at the world?

Only when we clarify that analytic excludes sense data from the sense organs can we know that the full meaning of a {red rose} is excluded from analytic — PL Olcott

I already said that expressions that are not elements of the body of analytical knowledge are excluded. — PL Olcott

Why can't the expression "cats are very large plant-eating mammals with a prehensile trunk" be part of the body of analytic knowledge?

It fulfils both your requirements: i) the expression excludes sense data from the sense organs and ii) being part of the body of analytical knowledge there's no reason to exclude it from the body of analytical knowledge.

I have already stipulated {the body of analytic knowledge} which necessarily excludes {cats are elephants} and includes {cats are animals}. — PL Olcott

You have stipulated the definition of cat as an animal , meaning that the expression "cats are animals" is analytic and true.

I stipulate the definition of cat as "a very large plant-eating mammal with a prehensile trunk, long curved ivory tusks, and large ears, native to Africa and southern Asia", meaning that the expression "cats are elephants" is analytic and true.

You defined analytic expressions as "Analytic expressions are expressions of language that can be verified as completely true entirely on the basis of their connection to the semantic meanings that make them true. Example: "Cats are animals"".

If by "language" you are referring to PL Olcott's private language, then your definition of analytic expressions is true.

But if by "language" you are referring to the English Language, why do you have the authority to stipulate the meanings of words in the English Language rather than me, for example? :smile:

Kingdom: Animalia...We can determine that a {cat} is an {animal} on the basis of the above knowledge tree. — PL Olcott

True, if a cat is defined as part of the Kingdom Animalia , then a cat is an animal, and the expression "cats are animals" is true and analytic.

But then, if a cat is defined as an elephant, then a cat is an elephant, and the expression "cats are elephants" is true and analytic.

The problem is that there are an infinite number of possible analytic expressions including cats. For example, "cats are animals", "cats are elephants", "cats are part of the Kingdom Monera", "cats are part of the Kingdom Protista", "cats are trees", "cats are not anmals", etc.

I accept that analytic expressions are expressions of language that can be verified as completely true entirely on the basis of their connection to the semantic meanings that make them true, and synthetic expressions are expressions of language that also require sense data from the sense organs.

If cats are defined as part of the Kingdom Animalia, then the expression "cats are animals" is analytic and true. If cats are defined as part of the Kingdom Monera, then the expression "cats are animals" is analytic and false.

In the absence of sense data from the world, the expression "cats are animals" can be either true or false.

Only by sense data from the world can the expression "cats are animals" be verified as true, meaning it a synthetic rather than analytic expression.

1) Transcendental, in Kantian philosophy, is that by which pure a priori is the determining condition.
2) From all that, it follows that a transcendental deduction, first, must be purely a priori therefore can have no empirical predication whatsoever
3) Now, with respect to a transcendental deduction of the categories, which is in fact the title of a subsection dedicated to just that, this kind of argument cannot have to do with representations of objects, because, being purely a priori, there are no phenomena hence no representations of objects, but still must be a reduction from the general to the particular in order to qualify as a deduction.
4) If Kant deduces the categories in accordance with logical syllogisms having empirical content, he loses the capacity to enounce the conditions for pure thought of possible objects.
5) A transcendental deduction can never follow from an observation, by definition. — Mww

To my understanding, these comments seem to ignore the importance of the empirical in the nature of Kant's Transcendental Deductions.

My position is along the lines of the SEP article on The Historical Controversies Surrounding Innateness

In this respect Kant agrees with Locke that there are no innate principles or ideas to be ‘found’ in us. Both hold that all our ideas have their origin in experience. But Locke thinks that we build these ideas by abstracting from experience and recombining abstracted elements. Kant holds that such representations or ideas cannot be abstracted from experience; they must be the product of careful reflection on the nature of experience.

As regards the principles and ideas that we need to make sense of experiences, Kant does not agree with the Rationalist's innatism, does not agree with Locke that we can abstract such principles and ideas just from empirical experience but does believe that such principles and ideas may be discovered from careful reflection on empirical experiences using transcendental deduction.

However, I suggest that the term "Transcendental deduction" should be treated as a figure of speech rather than literally, as transcendental requires both induction and deduction, both from the general to the particular and from the particular to the general.

From the SEP article Kant's Transcendental Arguments, a Transcendental Argument begins with a strong premise, and then reasons to a conclusion that is a necessary condition for the premise.

As I see it, the transcendental deduction of either a priori pure intuitions of space and time, a priori empirical intuitions of things such as circles or a priori pure concepts of understanding (the Categories), is not possible in the absence of an empirical experience.

I am reasonably sure that Kant's position is that it is not possible to abstract these ideas and principles just from empirical experiences, but rather, transcendentally deduce them from empirical experiences.

I am new to all this. — Debra

On the left of the screen under "Categories" is a section "Help", but is quite minimal.

1) To reply to someone, highlight a relevant part of their post, and then click on the "quote" which appears.
2) To check you are happy with your draft, click on "Preview" before clicking on "Post Comment"
3) If you want to delete your draft, at the top left of the screen, click on "Drafts", then click on waste bin.
4) Even after posting, you can edit your post. At the bottom of your post, hover the cursor over the date, then click on the three dots, which brings up edit.

More generally anything that can be encoded in language (including formal mathematical languages) <is> Analytic(Olcott). — PL Olcott

To know whether the expression "cats are animals " is analytic, one needs to know the meaning of "cats", "are" and "animals".

As an example, how is "cats" encoded in language?

Rudolf Carnap derived the basis for Richard Montague to mathematically formalize natural language. — PL Olcott

From the SEP article: Montague Semantics- the most important feature is the principle of compositionality, such that the meaning of the whole is a function of the meaning of its parts.

An example is given:

Consider the two sentences John finds a unicorn and John seeks a unicorn. These are syntactically alike (subject-verb-object), but are semantically very different. From the first sentence follows that there exists at least one unicorn, whereas the second sentence is ambiguous between the so called de dicto (or non-specific, or notional) reading which does not imply the existence of unicorns, and the de re (or specific, or objectual) reading from which existence of unicorns follows.

It seems to me that Montague Semantics is about how expressions are built out of the words used, not whether the expression is true or not. IE, as the expression "John finds a unicorn" may or may not be true, the expression "cats are animals" may or may not be true.

Montague Semantics may be able to analyse how expressions are constructed out of their parts, but not whether the expression is analytic or not.

I would welcome an invitation to participate in a reading group focused on the reading and discussion of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Should a group be formed — Debra

I'm afraid @Shawn was last heard of 11 months ago.

I have never taken part in a Reading group, but I guess this thread is as close to a reading group as there is on the Forum. I know there is a section on the Forum titled Reading Groups, but even those threads are quite loosely organised. A Reading group sounds structured, which Threads on the Forum tend not to be.

Being on the Forum, you don't need an invitation as such to participate in any thread, apart from just diving in. :grin:

All of the words have every slight nuance of their meaning assigned to them by Rudolf Carnap / Richard Montague Meaning Postulates. — PL Olcott

In his article Meaning Postulates in Philosophical Studies, Carnap writes that his Meaning Postulates only refer to a semantical language-system, not a natural language.

Our explication, as mentioned above, will refer to semantical language-systems, not to natural languages. It shares this character with most of the explications of philosophically important concepts given in modern logic, e.g., Tarski's explication of truth. It seems to me that the problems of explicating concepts of this kind for natural languages are of an entirely different nature.

When you write "Analytic expressions are expressions of language that can be verified as completely true entirely on the basis of their connection to the semantic meanings that make them true", it depends whether you are referring to a semantical language-system or a natural language.

As Carnap writes, a natural language is of an entirely different nature.

There’s no need, no reason a justification be required. — Mww

How does Kant justify that transcendental deduction is possible?

Kant justifies that humans have this ability in giving an example of a Transcendental Deduction in the Refutation of Idealism in B274

However, in assuming that the Categories derive from careful reflection about experiences, rather than the innatism of the Rationalists, he is basing his theory on what is probably an incorrect premise.

The deeper problem remains that he doesn't justify his premise that the Categories derive from careful reflection about experiences rather than the innatism of the Rationalists.
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If the categories, or whatever serves the purpose of them, seem to have a justifiable purpose, then it is the requirement of reason to discover them — Mww

Kant's belief is that the Categories are not innate although they are a prior to experience, and are discovered from a careful reflection about experiences, "the product of careful reflection on the nature of experience" (SEP - The Historical Controversies Surrounding Innateness)

For example, within the the experience of looking at a phenomena, the category of the concept of a circle presents itself within the phenomena as being so necessary and universal that transcendentally conforms the existence of the category itself .

It is not so much that we need to reason in order to discover the categories, but the categories present themselves as being so necessary and universal within our experiences that we have no choice but to accept them.
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Kant is merely calling the discovery of the categories a transcendental deduction of them. — Mww

Though Kant does distinguish between general logic and transcendental logic.

Intro to CPR - After a brief explanation of the distinction between "general logic" and "transcendental logic" - the former being the basic science of the forms of thought regardless of its object and the latter being the science of the basic forms for the thought of objects (A 50-5 7/B 74- 82)

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What is transcendental Deduction

Any object must have Categories as its characteristics if it is to be an object of experience. For example, from the Category of quantity, there is unity in that all swans are white, plurality in that some swans are white and totality, in that Cygmund is white (SEP - Categories).

I see shapes, appearance, phenomena. Where does my concept of all, some and one come from. The Rationalists defend innatism, the Empiricist believes from experience and Kant by using a transcendental deduction on experience.

However, neither the Empiricists nor Kant can explain how when we see a wavelength of 700nm we perceive the colour red, as the colour red is not in the wavelength 700nm. Only innatism can explain that we have the innate ability to perceive the colour red when looking at a wavelength of 700nm

What is a transcendental deduction. If flying over a desert island I see a set of stones on a beach having the same arrangement as the word SOS, it is possible that they could have rolled into that shape by the wind, but the likelihood is remote. Using transcendental deduction, I deduce that on the island must be or has been human life. A Transcendental deduction deduces from an observation something that cannot be seen in the observation yet is essential to the existence of the observation.

In B276 within the section on The Refutation of Idealism Kant gives an example of a Transcendental Deduction

I am conscious of my existence as determined in time. All time-determination presupposes something persistent in perception. This persistent thing, however, cannot be something in me, since my own existence in time can first be determined only through this persistent thing. Thus the perception of this persistent thing is possible only through a thing outside me and not through the mere representation of a thing outside me. Consequently, the determination of my existence in time is possible only by means of the existence of actual things that I perceive outside myself. Now consciousness in time is necessarily combined with the consciousness of the possibility of this time-determination: Therefore it is also necessarily combined with the existence of the things outside me, as the condition of time-determination; i.e., the consciousness of my own existence is at the same time an immediate consciousness of the existence of other things outside me.

Have an enjoyable New Year, and wishing you all the best. :grin:

And, Happy New Year — Wayfarer

Yes, I agree that the Old Year did not cause the New Year, it was just an antecedent. However, without the Old Year there would be no New Year.

Thanks for your wishes, and looking forward to what the New Year brings. :grin:

We can reflect on the general nature of experience or perception and derive the ineliminable attributes. For example, perception of objects is unimaginable without space, time, form and differentiation. — Janus

Yes, we couldn't perceive objects without the footing of space, time, form and differentiation.

But suppose we never had this footing in the first place. Where did this footing come from?
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These categories seem to be Kant's attempt to pinpoint what is essential to the ways we understand things. Do you not think we can reflect on our experience and thinking in order to discover the essential elements? — Janus

Yes, we can look at swans in the world and know that all the swans are white. One question is, where did this ability come from. Who is right, the Rationalist's innatism or Kant's Transcendental Deduction?

Happy New Year :grin:

(This is also the basis of his rejection of accouting for reason in terms of evolutionary adaption - to appeal to successful adaptation as the grounds for reason, attempts to provide a grounding outside of reason itself, thereby undercutting the sovereignity of reason.) — Wayfarer

Aristotle called humans ‘rational animals’, the implication being that while we’re animals in some respects due to the power of reason we’re distinct. — Wayfarer

If human reason cannot be explained in terms of evolutionary adaption, how did it originate?
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Regarding the innate capacities of the mind - ‘capacities’ or ‘categories’ are not the same as ‘innate ideas’. — Wayfarer

Yes, I believe that humans are born with "knowledge how" rather than "knowledge that", using Gilbert Ryle's terminology.

Though the same question, if human "knowledge how" cannot be explained in terms of evolutionary adaption, how did it originate?

The meaning of those terms is the sum total of every detail of all of the general knowledge that applies to those terms (that can be written down using language). — PL Olcott

Can the expression "cats are animals" be analytic?

As you wrote "Analytic expressions are expressions of language that can be verified as completely true entirely on the basis of their connection to the semantic meanings that make them true."

To know that cats are animals I need to know the meaning of both cats and animals.

I cannot know the meaning of the word "cat" just from the word itself, but from the Merriam Webster Dictionary:
"cat" = "a carnivorous mammal (Felis catus) long domesticated as a pet and for catching rats and mice"

I cannot know the meaning of the word "carnivorous" just from the word itself

"Carnivorous" = "subsisting or feeding on animal tissues"

I cannot know the meaning of the word "subsisting" just from the word itself

"Subsisting" = "to have or acquire the necessities of life (such as food and clothing)"

However, as knowing the meaning of a single word ends up as an infinite regression, there can be no finite description of any word, meaning that no expression in language can be known to be analytic or not

The problem is that the "sum total" is infinite, negating the possibility of any analytic expression within language.

Analytic(Olcott) is a lot like the conventional meaning of {Analytic} in that every expression is verified as completely true entirely on the basis of its meaning. — PL Olcott

Consider "cats are animals".

However, there is no absolute meaning of "cat" and no absolute meaning of "animal", in that no two dictionaries will have the same definition, and even within the same dictionary the definition will change with time.

Therefore, if the expression "cats are animals" can only be analytic on the basis of the meanings of the words "cat" and "animal", but there is no absolute meaning of either "cat" nor "animal", then the expression cannot be analytic.

It is true that the National Geographic" wrote "As mostly nocturnal animals, cats have excellent vision and hearing, with ears that can turn like satellite dishes", but this is a synthetic judgement rather than an analytic truth.

Thomas Nagel says in his book The Last Word that there are thoughts or principles that one cannot "get outside of," meaning they are so basic to our understanding and reasoning that we cannot meaningfully doubt or reject them from a position outside of them. — Wayfarer

(This is also the basis of his rejection of accouting for reason in terms of evolutionary adaption - to appeal to successful adaptation as the grounds for reason, attempts to provide a grounding outside of reason itself, thereby undercutting the sovereignity of reason.) — Wayfarer

Kant doesn't believe that we have innate principles or ideas, but discover them from careful reflection on experience.

From the SEP article on The Historical Controversies Surrounding Innateness

In this respect Kant agrees with Locke that there are no innate principles or ideas to be ‘found’ in us. Both hold that all our ideas have their origin in experience. But Locke thinks that we build these ideas by abstracting from experience and recombining abstracted elements. Kant holds that such representations or ideas cannot be abstracted from experience; they must be the product of careful reflection on the nature of experience.

This seems similar to Nagel's position that it is not because of evolution that humans are able to reason.

For Kant, the source of pure reason is reason itself.

Intro to CPR

Kant says that "The transcendent principles are principles of the subjective unity of cognition through reason, i.e. of the agreement of reason with itself"; "Objective principles are principles of a possible empirical use." This suggests that whatever exactly the use of the transcendent principles of pure reason is, it is not to obtain any knowledge of external objects, which can only be achieved through the empirical use of the concepts of understanding, their application to representations in space and time for the exposition of appearances.

If reason itself is the transcendental source of being able to to reason, and not a consequence of evolutionary adaptation, why isn't it the case that other reasoning animals, such as cats, don't have the same ability of reasoning as humans?

The chess rules could be changed, just as we might think the laws of nature that determine that the Sun rises in the east could change. In fact it is far easier to see how the rules of chess might be changed. — Janus

Yes, this fits in with Hume.

The problem is with Kant. How can he discover what is necessary and universal just from experiences using transcendental deduction?

I think we already use the categories to make sense of experiences. It is on the basis of reflection upon how experiences must be for us in order that we can make sense of them that the synthetic a priori is generated, as I understand it. — Janus

Yes, we use the Categories to make sense of experiences.

However, Kant's transcendental deduction derives the Categories from these very same experiences.

How is this not circular?

Justifying possibility makes no sense. — Mww

Kant distinguishes transcendental deduction from empirical deduction

A85 - I therefore call the explanation of the way in which concepts can relate to objects a priori their transcendental deduction, and distinguish this from the empirical deduction, which shows how a concept is acquired through experience and reflection on it, and therefore concerns not the lawfulness but the fact from which the possession has arisen.

Many are not convinced that transcendental deduction is possible.

How does Kant justify that transcendental deduction is possible?

Every element of the body of analytic knowledge can be verified as true in that it is either an axiom of {BOAK} or is deduced from the axioms of {BOAK}.

The {body of analytic knowledge} (BOAK) is the subset of expressions of analytic truth that are known to be true. — PL Olcott

There is circularity here.
From 1): if an expression is part of a Body of Analytic Truth (BOAK), it is true and analytic.
From 2): if an expression is true and analytic, it becomes part of a Body of Analytic Truth (BOAK)

Given the proposition "X is Y", how do we know whether this is part of the Body of Analytic Truth (BOAK)?

all attempts at an empirical deduction, in regard to pure à priori conceptions, are vain — Mww

The question remains, how does Kant justify the possibility of a "transcendental deduction?

It is not at all that properties cannot be described using words. It is that some properties require first-hand direct experience of sense data from the sense organs to be fully described. The actual smell of a rose cannot be completely put into words, thus is not an element of
the body of analytic knowledge. We can still know that some {roses} are {red} even though
we lack the sense data from the sense organs showing exactly what {red} is. — PL Olcott

Consider a computer generated language that does not depend on any external information. Rather than the expression "cats are animals", consider the more general case "X is Y". If it is possible to verify the expression as true, then the expression is analytic.

To know whether "X is Y" means knowing the meaning of "X" and the meaning of "Y".

It is impossible to discover the meaning of "X" just from knowing the name "X", similarly for "Y"

Suppose "X" can be described as "a, b, c"

It is impossible to discover the meaning of "a" just from knowing the name "a", similarly for "b" and "c".

Suppose "a" can be described as "d, e, f"

It is impossible to discover the meaning of "d" just from knowing the name "d", similarly for "e" and "f".

Suppose "d" can be described as "g, h, i"

But this ends up as an infinite regression, in that there is no name whose meaning is contained within the name itself .

IE, within a computer generated language that does not depend on any external information, as the meanings of X and Y cannot be established with absolute certainty, as the language would have to be of infinite length, it becomes impossible to determine whether "X is Y". The consequence is that it becomes impossible to know whether any expression within such a language independent of the senses is analytic or not.

Analytic expressions are expressions of language that can be verified as completely true entirely on the basis of their connection to the semantic meanings that make them true. Example: "Cats are animals". — PL Olcott

We can call this the analytic(olcott) / empirical(olcott) distinction meaning that any expression of language that can be verified as true on the basis of the axioms of the verbal model of the actual world is analytical(olcott). — PL Olcott

Starting with the expression "X is Y", let the meaning of X be the same as the meaning of Y. The expression "X is Y" is then an analytic expression as it can be verified true .

As long as it is known that two words have the same meaning, analytic expressions are possible, meaning there is a distinction between the analytic and synthetic.

However, in order to know that two words have the same meaning, the meaning of each word must be known.

A computer could invent a language from scratch that was purely self-referential.

Stage one

For example, a simple language could consist of the proposition "X is Y", where X has the properties a and b and Y has the properties c and d.

So far, X and Y have been fully specified, but the properties a, b, c and d haven't. This means that it is impossible to know whether the expression "X is Y" is true or false, in which case it cannot be analytic.

Stage two

Let the property a be named A, the property b be named B, the property c be named C and the property d be named D

But as we still don't know what the names A, B, C and D refer to, we still don't know whether the expression is true or false, in which case it is still not analytic.

Fundamental problem

The fundamental problem is that at the end of the day properties cannot be described in words. How can the sensation of pain be described, the smell of a rose, the colour red, the feeling of missing an important appointment?

Therefore, even within a computer generated language, there will be some words whose meanings cannot be described using other words. The inevitable consequence will be that it is impossible to know whether expressions such as "X is Y" are true or false. IE, even a computer generated language will not be analytic.

I think we can only know what experience, and refelection on the nature of experience tells us. We can also elaborate and extrapolate from formal rule-based systems like logic, mathematics, chess, Go etc. — Janus

In chess, the rule that the Bishop can only move diagonally is arbitrary, in that the rule could equally have been that it moves vertically or horizontally. Therefore, what happens in the world, the Bishop moving diagonally, is necessary and universal once the rule has been made, even though the rule itself is neither necessary not universal.

For Hume, no knowledge about the world, discovered by a constant conjunction of events within experiences, can be either necessary nor universal, in that, even though the sun has risen in the east for 1,000 days, there is no guarantee that on the 1,001st day it doesn't rise in the west.

However, Kant wanted to show that it is possible to discover knowledge about the world that is both necessary and universal from experiences of the world using a transcendental argument. From a careful reasoning about one's experiences, it is possible to discover pure concepts of understanding, ie, the Categories, that are necessary and universal, which can then be used to make sense of these experiences.

Introduction to CPR - page 2 - Kant also sought to defend against empiricists its underlying claim of the possibility of universal and necessary knowledge - what Kant called a priori knowledge, knowledge originating independently of experience, because no knowledge derived from any particular experience, or a posteriori knowledge, could justify a claim to universal and necessary validity.

A pictorial representation of the Transcendental Argument:

For Hume, the rules of chess, even though necessary and universal, cannot be discovered from experiences of the world, but are invented by the human intellect. For Kant, using the Transcendental Argument, the rules of chess as necessary and universal can be discovered from experiences of the world.

Hard to call passages bracketed by quotation marks as plagiarized, innit? — Mww

As the topic is front page news at the moment, it may be worth a post or two.

True, the passage is in quotation marks and we know it is somewhere within an 800 page book, but to locate it requires quite a lot of reading.

From the little I know, it is a complex and subtle subject, complicated by the fact that there is weak plagiarism and strong plagiarism, although both are officially plagiarism

I am sure that I am often guilty of breaking the letter of the law, although try not the break the spirit of the law, in that I have not made it clear which translation of the CPR I am using.

The topic is also complicated by the fact that ten different sources end up giving ten different viewpoints.

However, the site Good academic practice and avoiding plagiarism advises to give the page number of the original, and gives the example:
"Never use the passive, when you can use the active." (Orwell, 1946, p.169)

In the service of survival though, right? — Wayfarer

Yes. If animals were born with minds empty of any built-in mental content, and had to learn the private subjective feeling of pain from their subsequent experiences, by the time they had learnt to avoid anything painful that threatened their survival, they would already have died out.

From the Wikipedia article on Tabula rasa
Tabula rasa is the idea of individuals being born empty of any built-in mental content, so that all knowledge comes from later perceptions or sensory experiences. This idea is the central view posited in the theory of knowledge known as empiricism. Empiricists disagree with the doctrines of innatism or rationalism, which hold that the mind is born already in possession of certain knowledge or rational capacity.

IE, if an animal species were Empiricists, they would quickly die out.

So Darwin explains Kant? — Wayfarer

Darwin explains the a priori, not Kant.

By presupposing it given some general observations, then constructing a theory that supports the presuppositions without contradicting the observations....................Even if all the predicates of transcendental philosophy are internally consistent with each other, and coherent as a whole in itself, there is nothing given from it that makes those predicates actually the case, at the expense of other relevant philosophies. — Mww

Kant and Hume

You are saying that we come up with a theory that we use as long as it corresponds with our experiences and is coherent with the other theories we have.

But this sounds more like Hume than Kant. For Hume, we look at the world, see a particular sunrise on 100 consecutive days and theorise that in general the sun rises in the east. This then becomes an axiom (a statement or proposition which is regarded as being established, accepted, or self-evidently true) that we henceforth live by. It may be that one day the sun doesn't rise in the east, in which case we come up with a different theory and a new axiom. An approach that is only loosely necessary and universal, but in practice, works.

Kant is saying something different to Hume, in that we can know certain axioms existent in the world of necessity and universally. The question is, how exactly?

Quotations

I agree with @Corvus that you should be giving attaching paragraph numbers to your quotes. As I am using a different translation to yours, sometimes it can take me 15 minutes to find the source of your quote.

I am using the Cambridge Edition translated and edited by Paul Guyer and Allen W Wood.

I know that the elite heads of universities are allowed to plagiarise, but I don't think us common people are given the same leeway.

As you say it initially comes, not sui generis, but from a careful reflection on the nature of experience (and of course also becomes culturally established), so in that sense it is dependent on experience. It is independent of experience in that once established it is clear that all possible experience must conform to the a priori categories — Janus

This sounds like Hume's position, in that we look at the world, see a particular sunrise on 100 consecutive days and theorise that in general the sun rises in the east. This then becomes an axiom (a statement or proposition which is regarded as being established, accepted, or self-evidently true) that we henceforth live by. It may be that one day the sun doesn't rise in the east, in which case we come up with a different theory and a new axiom. An approach that is only loosely necessary and universal, but in practice, works.

Though it seems to me that Kant is saying something different to Hume, in that we can know certain axioms existent in the world of necessity and universally. The question is, how exactly?

I am separating analytic truthmakers from synthetic .........Some of these expressions such as "cats are animals" are stipulated to be true (AKA axioms). Other expressions are proven to be true on the basis of deductions from these axioms..............Any expression of language that can only be proven true with sense data from the sense organs: "A cat is in my living room right now" are excluded. — PL Olcott

As the word "are" has many different meanings, is the expression "cats are animals" true under all possible meanings of "are"?

For example, possible uses of the word "are" can include i) football fans "are" animals, ii) mountains "are" beautiful, iii) recipes "are" difficult, iv) film stars "are" gods, v) apples "are" sweet, vi) EV's "are" moral.

The general problem is that as a word only has meaning in relation to other words, and as any such relation comes down to a personal judgement on behalf of the reader, whether an expression is analytic or not depends on personal judgements rather than absolute truths.

It seems to be no mystery to me...........Hume was correct that we don't see the actual operations of causation, we don't see the forces at work, but when our bodies are involved, we can certainly feel them........................but all it does take is reflection upon our felt experience to naturally form a notion of causation. — Janus

The mystery is with Kant not Hume

There is no mystery to me with Hume's inductive approach to making sense of experiences, inferring from several particular instances a generalized conclusion. For example, in that if for one hundred consecutive days the sun rose in the east, one can comfortably infer that "the sun rises in the east".

As the IEP article on David Hume: Causation wrote:

Hume shows that experience does not tell us much. Of two events, A and B, we say that A causes B when the two always occur together, that is, are constantly conjoined. Whenever we find A, we also find B, and we have a certainty that this conjunction will continue to happen. Once we realize that “A must bring about B” is tantamount merely to “Due to their constant conjunction, we are psychologically certain that B will follow A”, then we are left with a very weak notion of necessity.

I am sure that even animals have an inductive sense of causation.

Hume is not the problem. Kant is the problem.

@Mww is correct in saying "Now you wish Kant to be fixing the dogmatism of the rationalists, but the entire reason d’etre of the Critique is aimed at the empiricists in general and Hume in particular, regarding the lack of critical examination of the capabilities and employment of pure reason herself."

Within the Critique of Pure Reason, the concept of the synthetic a priori is central.

Intro to CPR, page 6 - He entitles the question of how synthetic a priori judgments are possible the "general problem of pure reason" (B 1 9), and proposes an entirely new science in order to answer it (A IO-16/B 24-30).

How does Kant explain the origin of the a priori? How does Kant explain the origin of the Categories, the pure concepts of the understanding?

I can understand them as being innate within the human as a consequence of life's 3.5 billion years of evolving in synergy with the world. However, this is definitely not Kant's position.

For Kant, we have no innate knowledge:

Intro to CPR - page 6 - Kant agrees with Locke that we have no innate knowledge, that is, no knowledge of any particular propositions implanted in us by God or nature prior to the commencement of our individual experience.

One empirical possibility is we discoverer the Categories from our experiences of the world. Another rational possibility is that we invented the Categories from pure thought independent of any particular experiences of the world. But, Kant categorically denies that they are innate, as if they were implanted in us prior to birth by a Creator.

CPR 168 - If someone still wanted to propose a middle way between the only two, already named ways, namely, that the categories were neither self-thought a priori first principles of our cognition nor drawn from experience, but were rather subjective predispositions for thinking, implanted in us along with our existence by our author in such a way that their use would agree exactly with the laws of nature along which experience runs (a kind of prefonnation-system of pure reason), then (besides the fact that on such a hypothesis no end can be seen to how far one might drive the presupposition of predetermined predispositions for future judgments) this would be decisive against the supposed middle way: that in such a case the categories would lack the necessity that is essential to their concept.

A priori knowledge is knowledge before experience, but this does not entail innate knowledge. All innate knowledge is a priori, but not all a priori knowledge is innate. For example, all knowledge of mathematical propositions is a priori, yet this knowledge is not innate. Kant also did not equate a priori knowledge with innate knowledge.

Whereas Hume's notion of knowledge by induction gives a very weak notion of necessity, Kant's aim in the CPR was to argue for the possibility of a type of knowledge that was both universal and necessary, what Kant called a priori knowledge.

Intro to CPR - page 2 - Yet while he attempted to criticize and limit the scope of traditional metaphysics, Kant also sought to defend against empiricists its underlying claim of the possibility of universal and necessary knowledge - what Kant called a priori knowledge, knowledge originating independently of experience, because no knowledge derived from any particular experience, or a posteriori knowledge, could justify a claim to universal and necessary validity.

Where for Kant is the origin of the a priori

Kant does not believe there are any innate principles or ideas to be found in us, but come from a careful reflection on the nature of our experiences.

From the SEP article on The Historical Controversies Surrounding Innateness

In this respect Kant agrees with Locke that there are no innate principles or ideas to be ‘found’ in us. Both hold that all our ideas have their origin in experience. But Locke thinks that we build these ideas by abstracting from experience and recombining abstracted elements. Kant holds that such representations or ideas cannot be abstracted from experience; they must be the product of careful reflection on the nature of experience.

In understanding how Kant treats knowledge as a priori but not innate, a section from the SEP article of A Priorism in Moral Epistemology may be useful, in that, for Kant, a priori knowledge can be discovered as a result of careful reasoning, both transcendental and deductive.

Kant viewed moral knowledge as fundamentally a priori in the sense that moral knowledge must be the result of careful reasoning (first transcendental, then deductive); one could discover through reason the fundamental moral principle, and then deduce from that principle more specific moral duties. Moore, on the other hand, explicitly rules out reasoning to fundamental moral principles; since these principles are self-evident, Moore denies that there are, properly speaking, any reasons for them. Thus, we find in Moore a distinctively intuitionist account of a priori knowledge, as opposed to Kant’s rationalist account. Moore’s account is intuitionistic because the reason why we believe, and ought to believe, fundamental moral principles is that they are self-evident propositions that appear true to us.

The problem with causation

Any explanation of the origin of necessary and universal a priori knowledge about a world the other side of appearances as phenomena will hit the massive obstacle as pointed out by Aenesidemus. According to Kant, the Categories, including the Category of Causality, only applies to objects of experience, not Things in Themselves as the cause of such appearances. A seemingly unsurmountable problem, reinforced by Schopenhauer, who, although agreeing with Kant that behind every phenomenon is a being-in-itself, said that Kant made the mistake of trying to derive the Thing in Itself from a given representation by laws known a priori, but because a priori cannot lead to anything independent of the phenomena or representation.

Prolegomena 32 - And we indeed, rightly considering objects of sense as mere appearances, confess thereby that they are based upon a thing in itself, though we know not this thing as it is in itself, but only know its appearances, viz., the way in which our senses are affected by this unknown something.

How does Kant justify the possibility of the a priori

The SEP article wrote:

Kant holds that such representations or ideas cannot be abstracted from experience; they must be the product of careful reflection on the nature of experience.

How does Kant justify the possibility of an a priori knowledge that is both universal and necessary, if:
i) it is not innate, as if implanted in us prior to birth by our Creator
ii) it has come from a careful reflection on the nature of experience
iii) yet does not suffer from the very weak notion of necessity and universality given by Hume's inductive inferences about the world?
iv) and the Categories, including the Category of Causation, only apply to objects of experience

That does not constitute an argument. — Wayfarer

True. It's not intended to constitute an argument, more a statement of fact.

In the same way that your statement "Thus, Kant's answer to Hume was to argue that while our knowledge is grounded against experience, the fundamental structure of knowledge relies on innate capacities of the mind" does not constitute an argument, but is more a statement of fact.

Once the groundwork has been laid, then a discussion may begin.

And what would provide the basis for such ‘careful reflection’ in the absence of an innate grasp of the issue at hand? — Wayfarer

It's a mystery to me, but that seems to be Kant's position.

According to Kant, certain concepts, like causation, are not derived from experience but are rather innate to the human mind (remember, Hume and the other empiricists denied innate capacities) — Wayfarer

This is debated. For example "Several scholars take Kant's statement at face value. They claim that Kant did not endorse concept innatism, that the categories are not innate concepts and that Kant's views on innateness are significantly different from Leibniz's."
(Alberto Vanzo - Leibniz on Innate Ideas and Kant on the Origin of the Categories)

From the SEP - The Historical Controversies Surrounding Innateness

But the Lockean Empiricist approach carried the day, and innateness was written off as a backward and discredited view. Nineteenth century Kantianism, although potentially friendlier to innateness, left it on the sidelines as philosophically irrelevant.

He is certainly not an Empiricist; he sees his philosophy as a response to the challenge of Humean Empiricism. Nevertheless, he is critical of Rationalist versions of the Innateness doctrine at every turn.

Kant’s main complaint against Rationalist Nativism was that it accepted that the innate had to correspond to an independent reality, but it could not explain how we could establish such a correspondence or use it to account for the full range of our knowledge. In this, it failed to meet Hume’s challenge. Kant finds the position guilty of a number of related fatal errors.

1) Warrant. How can we establish that innate principles are true of the world? In the Prolegomena he criticizes the Innateness doctrine of his contemporary Crusius because even if a benevolent non-deceiving God was the source of the innate principles, we have no way to reliably determine which candidate principles are innate and which may pass as such (for some).
2) Psychologism. At times Kant seems to suggest that the psychologism of Rationalist Nativism is itself a problem and makes it impossible to explain how we can get knowledge of objective necessary connections (as opposed to subjective necessities).
3) Modal concepts. Callanan 2013 reads Kant as offering a Hume-style argument that Rationalist Nativism cannot explain how we could come to have a concept of objective necessity, if all we had were innate psychological principles.

In this respect Kant agrees with Locke that there are no innate principles or ideas to be ‘found’ in us. Both hold that all our ideas have their origin in experience. But Locke thinks that we build these ideas by abstracting from experience and recombining abstracted elements. Kant holds that such representations or ideas cannot be abstracted from experience; they must be the product of careful reflection on the nature of experience.

I can understand the a priori as part of the innate structure of the brain, but I don't understand Kant's a priori as a product of careful reflection on the nature of experience.