Appreciate your replies, but I have run out of time.

Being in the world is inherently moral/aesthetic — Astrophel

The world is not inherently moral/aesthetic, so why should being in the world be inherently moral/aesthetic.

Husserl argued like this and that famous essay Sartre wrote, the Transcendence of the Ego, argued against it, because it impeded freedom — Astrophel

Yes, it is not immediately obvious who is right.

How about just being happy? — Astrophel

It is possible just to be happy without being happy about something, so why is it not possible to have a thought without having a thought about something?

There is no concept that is not representational, and thus, all talk about what is non representational is always already represntational. — Astrophel

This cannot be the case, as this would lead into an infinite regression, which we know is not the case.

Just reducible to an extravagance ofo thought whereby ideas are constructed out of the thin air of concepts without intuitions. — Astrophel

That is why it is transcendental.

But how does one speak of such a ground in the very structure of ground itself? — Astrophel

But we do! So it must be possible.

This is an issue. If I think, then the thought has content. It is never stand alone thinking, and if one is thinking about some object---a stone, a cloud, another thought, a feeling, whatever, then that object is an inherent part of the apodictic affirmation. Descartes cogito is an inherent affirmation of the world's "objects", physical or otherwise. — Astrophel

The SEP article Notes to Seventeenth-Century Theories of Consciousness writes that there is some dispute whether Descartes believed that there were non-intentional thoughts.

5.As noted above (see note 3), there is some dispute over whether Descartes believed that there were non-intentional thoughts.

For example, it is conceivable that consciousness of a thought is prior to the thought's intentionality.

One problem about the idea that thoughts must be of something, such as I think of the pain of a wasp sting, I think of a tree, I think of tomorrow or I think of my relatives, is that these thoughts are contingent on what is being thought about, thereby losing any necessary independent identity of the self. A self independent of whatever thoughts it may have.

Yes he did. — Astrophel

Kant may be a Representationalist, but not everything can be reduced to a representation. Is his space and time a representation? Are his Categories representations?

In the CPR B275 he writes that his perception of time is only possible because of it is not being represented.

Thus the perception of this persistent thing is possible only through a thing outside me and not through the mere representation of a thing outside me.

As regards the Categories, for example, in the quantity of unity, there is one blue object. In the quantity of plurality, some objects are blue. In the quantity of totality, all the objects are blue. A Category is needed for us to cognize that within a phenomena there is one blue object. Within the phenomena of shapes and colours is a representation of one blue object. The Category can synthesise a manifold of experiences that represent one blue object, but the Category itself cannot be a representation, otherwise there would be no solid ground for our cognitions. If the Category was a representation, what is it representing?

As Wittgenstein needs certain hinge propositions, Kant also needs a ground. In order to represent, representation needs a ground that is itself not a representation, and for Kant this ground is space, time and the Categories.

What Henry IS going to say is that Kant's is a thorough reduction to representation — Astrophel

Kant did not believe that everything must be reduced to representation.

In his Refutation of Idealism CPR B275, he concludes that both time determination and determination of the self in time requires us to posit the existence of a thing outside us.

This is in opposition to both Berkeley, who denies the possibility of spatial objects, and Descartes, in that we can only know the mind.
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There is no such thing as a disembodied thought, and it is not, "I think, therefore I am," but, "I am in a world, therefore I am." — Astrophel

From SEP - Notes to Seventeenth-Century Theories of Consciousness

Descartes said that there were no thoughts about which we are unconscious. In addition, he said that whilst the object of perception may be doubted, the perception itself cannot be doubted.

However, there is an academic dispute whether Descartes believed that a thought can be non-intentional.

Not the point at issue, if you read the post I responded to. — Wayfarer

The point at issue is Michel Henry's problem with Kant's Transcendental idealism which Henry characterises as "I represent to myself that I think"

This is a combination of Descartes "I think, therefore I am" and Kant's Transcendental Idealism.

To think means thinking about something. Therefore, Descartes might have said "I think about my hand, therefore I am".

Within Kant's Transcendental Idealism, when the subject encounters a hand, the subject recognizes the hand as an object of experience, not as it is in itself, but as it appears within the limitations that the Categories have imposed on it.

Therefore, Kant might have said "I think about my hand as an object of experience, not as it is in itself, but as it appears within the limitations that the Categories have imposed on it"

Kant might have more simply said "I think about a representation"

It is certainly not the case as Henry suggests that Kant is saying "I represent to myself that I think".

The hand that cannot grasp itself’ — Wayfarer

A hand cannot grasp itself, but nevertheless, is proof of an external world, as Moore wrote in Proof of an External World

In addition, as Descartes might have said, "I think about my hand, therefore I am".

In fact, it seems that my hand not only proves my existence but also that of the external world.

1) what is the aesthetic experience "as such"?.................What is sought, as with Kant, is something that is a stand alone, or, as Kierkegaard put is, "stands as its own presupposition".
2) the question goes to the nature of the this very mysterious term, mysterious when considered phenomenologically, and not in some framework of contingency that explains matters is "other terms" — Astrophel

We can experience an aesthetic, and we can experience the colour red. Both stand alone in the mind, in that an aesthetic experience is distinct from the experience of the colour red. Both can only result from phenomenological appearances in our sensibilities. Both the aesthetic experience and the experience of the colour red are contingent on the particular person and particular phenomena.

We experience something, such as a painting, music, dance or literature, which we may find aesthetic. These experiences will be spatially or temporally extended. We may or may not discover an aesthetic in the whole relationship between these extended parts. For example, we may experience an aesthetic in the phenomenological spatial relationship between the shapes and colours of a Derain painting.

But why do we have an aesthetic experience when we perceive a whole that has certain relationships between certain parts? Is this really mysterious?

We hear the sound of a fingernail scarping across a blackboard and physically shiver with visceral dislike, and more than likely even cringe at the thought. We see a Derain and may have an aesthetic experience.

Experiencing an aesthetic is a natural consequence of a physical human interacting with a physical world, as falling to the ground is a natural consequence of a physical apple interacting with a physical world.

An aesthetic experience may be mysterious, but no more mysterious than any of our experiences. No more mysterious than feeling pain when stung by a wasp, seeing the colour red when looking at a wavelength of 700nm, tasting something sweet when eating an apple or smelling something acrid because of a bonfire.

An aesthetic experience is no more mysterious that experiencing the colour red, both not unexpected natural consequences of a physical body existing within a physical world.

As I will be away shortly, I may not have time to fully respond to your previous post, though I will try.

1) So the "good" of the couch is a mostly public matter, and objectively conceived when the overt features of the couch are in question.
2) Not something good FOR, but something just plain Good.
3) All contingent goods, goods that are FOR something else, eventually end up at this determinacy, when, plainly put, you just say, I like it! This "liking" is just what it is, and the matter goes no further. — Astrophel

Person A says that this couch is good for sitting on. Person B also says that this couch is good for sitting on. Person C says that this couch is not good for sitting on.

Whether the couch is good for sitting on or not is contingent on who sits on it.

The question is, who in practice decides whether the essence of the couch is good or bad, regardless of being sat upon?
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So I argue that the good, as well as the bad (categories of experience merely) are not subjective in the essence of the judgment that is about art. — Astrophel

Person A says that this Derain has an aesthetic. Person B also says that this Derain has an aesthetic. Person C says that this Derain doesn't have an aesthetic.

Whether this Derain has an aesthetic or not is contingent on who is looking at it.

The question is, who in practice decides whether this Derain has the essence of being aesthetic, regardless of who is looking at it?
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This is not, I argue, unlike what Kant does: get past the contingencies of language's entanglements, the incidental features of the judgments we make, and look into essential structures of those judgments, experiences, and you will find something transcendental. The GOOD is transcendental. — Astrophel

In Kant's Transcendental Idealism, we are able to cognize appearances in our sensibilities as phenomena, but we can never cognize things as they are in themselves, things-in-themselves.

The ability to cognize things-in-themselves would be transcendent.

We can cognize the appearance of something, something as it appears to us, but we cannot cognize the essence of something, something as it is in itself

We can cognize that the couch is good, as it appears to us, in being comfortable to sit on, but we can never cognize that the couch is good, as it is in itself, its essence.

There are sixteen points I would like to respond to, but like a jigsaw puzzle I am tackling them one at a time. However, shortly I will be away for a week or more, so unfortunately will have to leave this interesting thread.

1) you would still hold the art expert's opinion high
2) Quine indirectly takes this kind of thing to task in his indeterminacy thesis
3) I argue that Saying X is good may disagree with someone else's opinion about X, BUT this is because we are not talking about the same X — Astrophel

I would perhaps listen to an art expert's opinion that Derain painted Le séchage des voiles in 1905, but I would take any art expert's opinion that this painting is a great work of art with a pinch of salt, even though in fact I do believe that this painting is a great work of art.

In the world, objects have properties. It is said that some properties are objective facts, such that Derain's painting was painted in 1905, and some properties are subjective judgements, such that Derain's painting is good.

Some properties, such as good, are clearly subjective judgements, but other properties, such that this object is a painting, which appear objective facts, are also subjective judgements.

As you say, Quine points out the indeterminacy of translation.

Person A born in 1950 and brought up in South Africa and person B born in 2005 and brought up in Nevada will have different understandings about the same concept. For example, person A's concept of a forest, a savanna woodland, will be different to person B's concept of a forest, sparse juniper pine.

As you also say, in fact, person A's understanding of every concept will be different to person B's understanding of the same concept.

No concept can be an objective fact in the world, but rather every concept must be a subjective judgement. Not only is saying that Derain's Le séchage des violes is good is a subjective judgment, but even saying that Derain's Le séchage des violes is a painting is a subjective judgment.

In fact, not only would I take an art expert's opinion that the Derain object is good with a pinch of salt, but philosophically, I should also take the art expert's opinion that the Derain object is a painting also with a pinch of salt.
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I've always though this a most curious use of the term "disinterested" — Astrophel

There some things in the world in which we are interested that have a physical affect on us, such as the wind, and there some things in the world in which we are interested that have a mental affect on us, such as an aesthetic.

It would be useful within the philosophy of art to be able to distinguish these two different kinds of interest.

As the term "transcendental idealism" is a definition rather than a description, in the philosophy of art, we can think of "disinterest" also as a definition rather than a description. In other words, we have an interest in things that physically affect us and a disinterest in things that mentally affect us.
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(as Kant discovered pure reason) — Astrophel

This needs to be be checked. Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason critiques pure reason, and it is my understanding that he concluded that pure reason is not possible.

But keep in mind that science has no interest in the aesthetic features of science any more than knitting qua knitting has interest in the joy of knitting. — Astrophel

There are similarities between the topics of science and aesthetics which are more than coincidental. One the one hand, aesthetics is about the relationship between the objective particular aesthetic object in the world and the subjective universal aesthetic object in the mind. On the other hand, science is about the relationship between the objective particular event in the world and the subjective universal law about that particular event in the mind. For both aesthetics and science, the particular in the world and the universal in the mind are connected by what Kant called transcendental apperception.

The aesthetic can be looked at in two ways. Firstly, the term was initially used by Alexander Baumgarten. It was borrowed from the Greek word for sensory perception, to denote concrete knowledge that we gain through our senses. Secondly, as a synonym for "taste", in being able to distinguish between those objects worthy of contemplation and those objects not worthy. When we observe an object about which we have a subjective aesthetic feeling, either we have an aesthetic feeling because the object is an aesthetic object, or the object is not an aesthetic object but we are able to perceive an aesthetic in the shapes and colours we experience as sensory phenomena. Post-Kant, the aesthetic is considered as the synthesis of both these, sensory experience and intellectual judgment.

You raise the question as to whether science has an interest in the aesthetic features of science, and as to whether that science is in its essence, aesthetic. Science starts with particular observations, and its goal is to discover from these particular observations universal laws. Such universal laws enable science to predict future phenomenal states. There are two ways of doing this. Either by looking at each particular observation one at a time and through reason and logic combine them into a whole, or by immediately perceiving a gestalt, an immediate unity of parts as an aesthetic. In Kant's words, a unity of apperception. Kant's transcendental apperception is the uniting and building of coherent consciousness out of different elementary inner experiences. Such experiences differ in both time and topic, but all belong to the individual's self-consciousness. Science discovers universal laws from particular observations, both by logical reasoning about the parts making up a whole and by aesthetic intuition about a whole made up of parts .

You also raise the question about Kant's rationalism, his logical reasoning. Though, as Hume said, reason cares nothing for human existence. In fact, reason does not "care" at all. Kant combined Rationalism with Empiricism though Transcendental Idealism. Rationalism is the belief that particular sense experiences are necessary in order for us to discover concepts and knowledge. However, they are not sufficient. One needs in addition the ability to logically reason about these particular sense experiences. Empiricism is the belief, as with Rationalism, that particular sense experiences are necessary in order for us to discover concepts and knowledge. However, for the Empiricists, these experiences can be sufficient. Sometimes, however, logical reasoning may be of assistance in clarifying certain sense experiences. The staring point for both the Rationalist and Empiricist are the phenomena of particular observations. It is through these phenomena that there is the possibility of discovering universal truths. There are two aspects to the aesthetic. First, there is the aesthetic object within sensory experience as an objective entity, and second there is the aesthetic object within the mind as subjective feeling. Science also has two similar aspects. First the particular object experienced as phenomena and second the universal object experienced as a concept. Science is the discovery of the universal from the particular. Science starts with the aesthetic objective object within sense experience and discovers the aesthetic subjective object within a concept.

One belief about the aesthetic object is that the aesthetic object needs no practical use to be aesthetic. Taking their cue from Kant, many philosophers have defended the idea of an aesthetic attitude as one divorced from practical concerns. This is a kind of “distancing,” or "standing back" from ordinary involvement. Kant described the recipients of aesthetic experience not as distanced but as disinterested. In other words, the recipient does not treat the object of enjoyment either as a vehicle for curiosity or as a means to an end. They contemplate the object as it is in itself and “apart from all interest.” An object such as a hammer, which has a practical use, is not aesthetic because it has a practical use, but rather an object, such as a Derain painting, which has no practical use, can still be aesthetic. Arthur Schopenhauer argued that people could regard anything aesthetically so long as they regarded it as independent of their will. That is, irrespective of any use to which they might put it.

Yet there is a paradox here. On the one hand we observe particular shapes and colours within our phenomenal sensory experience which we intuitively find aesthetic. This does not need a reasoned judgment. On the other hand, we instinctively reason that it is not the case that we subjectively perceive an object as aesthetic, but rather that there will be universal agreement amongst everyone perceiving the same object that the object is objectively aesthetic. The aesthetic object is an object of sensory experience. The aesthetic object is not merely as an object of sensory pleasure but also as the repository of significance and value. This synthesis is summarised in Hegel's "the sensuous embodiment of the Idea". There is the sensory: concrete, individual, particular and determinate, and there is the intellectual: abstract, universal, general and indeterminate. This synthesis however gives rise to a paradox, as described by Kant in his antimony of taste.

The human expresses their subjective pleasure in an object as if beauty was an objective property of the object. The human is making a universal general objective judgement about their immediate particular subjective feelings. Feelings about an object are particular and individual, so why do we want universal agreement about the nature of the object. There is a contradiction in making a universal judgment based on particular intuitions. The phrase "aesthetic judgment" is a contradiction in terms, yet we make aesthetic judgements all the time For example, I can accept someone as an expert in nuclear physics, of which I have no experience, yet I cannot accept someone as an expert as to the merits of a Derain painting unless I have had personal experience. There are universal rules in science but no universal rules in beauty. Yet we make aesthetic judgments, such that Derain is a great artist. We can make reasoned justifications for our aesthetic judgements, such as about Derain. We can do this because reasoned justifications can never be purely intellectual but must also be partly based on feeling.

Science and aesthetics are both about the relationship between the world and the mind, the concrete particular and the general universal.

References
Britannica - The Aesthetic Experience
SEP - Rationalism vs Empiricism

Science, as a philosophical ontology/epistemology goes absolutely nowhere, quite literally. And science doesn't even begin, again, literally, to talk about the most salient feature of your existence, ethics/aesthetics. — Astrophel

Science and aesthetics cannot be separated as they are two aspects of the same human imagination. Science depends on the beauty of the equation and aesthetic form cannot be created by the artists without reasoned and measured method.

Science is a systematic discipline that builds and organises knowledge in the form of testable hypotheses and predictions about the universe. Science can include the Natural Sciences, such as physics, chemistry, and biology, which study the physical world. There are the Social sciences, such as economics, psychology, and sociology, which study individuals and societies. The Applied sciences, such as engineering and medicine, are pragmatic and practical. Finally, the Formal sciences of logic, mathematics, governed by axioms and rules and uses deductive reasoning rather than empirical evidence.

Analytic philosophy is a broad 20th C movement within Western philosophy. It promotes clarity of prose, rigour in argument, and is founded on logic and mathematics. It is characterized by an interest in language, semantics and meaning, also known as the Linguistic Turn. Central figures were Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, G. E. Moore, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. The Logical Positivists included Rudolf Carnap, and Ordinary Language Philosophers included WVO Quine. With the decline of Logical Positivism, there was a revival in metaphysics, typified by Saul Kripke.

Analytic philosophy is closely aligned with the scientific method. Analytic philosophy uses clarity of prose, rigour in argument, logic and mathematics, Science systematically organises knowledge in the form of testable hypotheses. Several Analytic philosophers had a scientific, mathematical and logical background, including Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein. Analytic philosophy and science have an interest not only in facts about the world but also about the individual within society. In science are the social sciences of economics, psychology and sociology and in Analytic philosophy are the Ordinary language philosophers, such as Quine.

Aesthetics is included within the philosophy of art, an investigation into the nature of beauty and taste. Aesthetics examines the value of, and makes critical judgments about artistic taste and preferences. It asks how artists imagine, create, and perform works of art, as well as how people use, enjoy, and criticize art. Aesthetics tries to find answers to what exactly is art and what makes good art. The philosophy of art asks what happens in our minds when we view visual art, listen to music or read poetry. As Aristotle said, mimesis is a natural instinct of humanity that separates humans from animals.

Continental philosophy is derived from the Kantian tradition, although is more a family resemblance across disparate philosophical views. Whereas the Analytic is technical, the Continental is literary. Continental philosophy has four main attributes. It generally rejects the view that the natural sciences are the only or most accurate way of understanding natural phenomena. It takes into account Kant's conditions of possible experience, which in large part depends on context, language, culture, history. It accepts that if human experience is contingent, then this opens up the possibility of personal change in the Marxist tradition of personal, moral, political. Continental philosophy can be foundational a priori, can investigates both the cultural and practical and can also be of the opinion that no philosophy can succeed, a position taken by Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and the later Heidegger.

Continental philosophy can be associated with the aesthetic more than the factual, being a subjective state of mind in the individual rather than the objective fact in the world. Continental philosophy rejects the view that science is the best way to understand the world. Aesthetics is about what happens in the emotional mind of the observer when they see paintings, listen to music or read poetry. Continental philosophy in the belief that human experience is contingent allows the possibility of change , persona, moral and political. In aesthetics, the individual is not a passive recipient of beauty, but actively criticizes the art they experience, can imagine different possibilities and can create their own new experiences and invent new performatives. Continental philosophy accepts that even philosophy may not succeed in its own goals, seen in Nietzsche's perspectivism, the existentialism of Kierkegaard and Heidegger's questioning of the meaning of being. In aesthetics, there is no final goal, but the journey is the experience. The experience is both pleasurable in itself and sufficient in itself .

Science needs aesthetics and aesthetics needs science. The tension between art and science may be traced back to the Greeks, to the ancient conflict of Apollo and Dionysus, between order, reason, and logic and chaos, emotion, and ecstasy. There is the sublime in both the aesthetic and the scientific, in both its theory and practice. The aesthetics of science is the study of beauty and matters of taste within the scientific endeavour. Aesthetic features like simplicity, elegance and symmetry are sources of wonder and awe for many scientists, thus motivating scientific pursuit. Both use representation and the role of values. Both combine the subjective with the objective, imagination with creativity, the inspirational and the pragmatic. In e = mc 2 is an aesthetic beauty.

Science and aesthetics need each other. Science lacking aesthetic form blocks human understanding and the aesthetic experience without a solid methodical foundation will lack import.

(Using Wikipedia Science, Analytic Philosophy, Aesthetics, Continental Philosophy.)

Hinges operate on both the prelinguistic and linguistic levels, with their truth shown in our actions rather than in propositional form. — Sam26

A valuable post. If I may add my thoughts to your conversation.

I am using "here is one hand" to indicate a proposition in language and (here is one hand) to indicate something in the world.

The requirement for action is limited

In the beginning, the meaning of the proposition "here is one hand" can only be shown by an action, such as waving one hand or pointing to the one hand. In other words, in the beginning, how would anyone know that "here is one hand" means (here is one hand) rather than (here is one finger), unless there was some kind of action?

However, once the process has been repeated a sufficient number of times, then it may become a certainty beyond doubt in the minds of the community that "here is one hand" means (here is one hand). This is along the lines of JL Austin's Performative Utterance.

However, in the world, no action is required to know that (here is one hand) is a certainty beyond doubt. If I see (here is one hand), then there is no uncertainty in my mind that (here is one hand). I don't need to see it wave, be pointed at or open a door for me to be certain beyond doubt that (here is one hand). (Here is one hand) may remain static for me to know beyond doubt that (here is one hand).

The truth of (here is one hand) is no different to the truth of (an apple). As we don't say that (an apple) is true, there is no reason that say that (here is one hand) is true. Is (the Moon) true, is (Mount Everest) true? Then why should (here is one hand) be true?

Prelinguistically, action is not required to know (here is one hand) and in addition, truth is redundant.

Heidegger's Being and TIme — Astrophel

I cannot really respond as I have limited knowledge of Husserl, Heidegger and Existentialism in general.

However, in my agreement with Linguistic Idealism, I have sympathy with the notion in Husserl's Being and Time that the human is not a subjective spectator of objects, but rather that subject and object are inseparable. In my case, linked within language.

I don't know the background to Existentialism, have not read Kierkegaard and have only limited exposure to Nietzsche. However, I naturally agree with any critique of rationalism, and am supportive of their interest in the problem of meaning.

I have spent more time on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, respecting his attempt to understand the limits and scope of metaphysics, as well as investigating how reason may be used to gain knowledge about the world.

As regards Husserl's Logical Investigations, for me there is promise in Brentano's concept of Intentionality and the problem of intentional inexistence, the investigation of the relation between the act of consciousness and the phenomena at which it is directed. I tend more to agree more with the "bracketing" of assumptions about the existence of an external world than the Direct Realist who believes that they directly know the external world.

Continental philosophy opens up a whole new field of understanding.

This isn’t about hinges corresponding to facts in a propositional sense but about their truth being a lived engagement with facts as prelinguistic realities. — Sam26

Wittgenstein in Tractatus did not describe facts as lived truths

2 What is the case - a fact - is the existence of states of affairs

Do you have any reference that supports you in describing prelinguistic facts as lived truths?

Hinges are layered, arational (arational because they are not subject to the rational processes of justification, doubt, or proof that characterize traditional epistemological theory), foundational convictions shared by all humans within our forms of life that serve as indubitable certainties grounding our epistemological language, systems of doubt, and justification. They exist both prelinguistically and linguistically, with their truth shown through our actions rather than propositional validation. — Sam26

:smile: I appreciate your definition.

Prelinguistic

In the world are facts, such as i) here is one hand, ii) the apple is green, iii) the mountain is next to the tree.

These facts exist within human Forms of Life. They exist prelinguistically and are beyond doubt. They are bedrock certainties.

Question 1. Are these prelinguistic facts hinges?

The notion of truth is redundant.
If the apple is green then the apple is green.
Nothing is added - if the apple is green then it is true that the apple is green.

Linguistic meaning

Today, that "here is one hand" means here is one hand is beyond doubt.

The notion of truth is redundant
If "here is one hand" means here is one hand then "here is one hand" means here is one hand
Nothing is added - if "here is one hand" means here is one hand then it is true that "here is one hand" means here is one hand.

Linguistic correspondence

"Here is one hand" is a hinge proposition because its meaning is beyond doubt, as we know that it means here is one hand.

"Here is one hand" is true IFF here is one hand

The truth of the proposition "here is one hand" is contingent on there being here is one hand in the world.

1) What makes Moorean propositions ("Here is one hand.") a hinge, according to Wittgenstein, is their status as bedrock certainties.
2) This particular bedrock certainty is prelinguistic (not all hinges are prelinguistic, but bedrock certainties are), i.e., it's shown in our actions — Sam26

How are you defining "hinge"?

Is the hinge 1) the Moorean proposition "here is one hand", or 2) the prelinguistic bedrock certainty, here is one hand.

I build on this by showing how the truth of hinges is demonstrated in our actions. — Sam26

Today, that "here is one hand" means waving one hand is beyond doubt, and is therefore a hinge.

Neither "here is one hand" nor waving one hand is a hinge. "Here is one hand" means waving one hand is the hinge.

But suppose, as you say, that this hinge is true.

Then, this hinge is true because "here is one hand" means waving one hand.

IE, "here is one hand" means waving one hand is true because "here is one hand" means waving one hand.

But this is an example of the Law of Identity. where the notion of truth is redundant. We say A is A. We don't say A is true because A.

The world is not divided ontologically into any parts, things over there, thoughts and feeling here, and there is no epistemic distance between me and this tree at all. There never was! — Astrophel

I can understand Phenomenology as part of a personal philosophy, but it seems limited if it made up the whole of a personal philosophy.

Phenomenology rejects rationalism and empiricism in favour of a person's "lived experience", relying on an intuitive grasp of knowledge free from any philosophical intellectualising.

For example, in Bracketing, one withholds any conscious opinion of what is perceived, taking no position as to the reality of what is seen, but simply to witness it as it presents itself.

I agree that Phenomenology can be insightful in our understanding about the relation of the mind to the sensations it experiences, but it seems insufficient not to question these sensations and only witness them.

Philosophy must surely be about questioning, not simply about phenomenologically accepting.

Key Ideas in Phenomenology by Marc Applebaum, 2012

One might ask, is General Motors real? — Astrophel

There are thoughts, language and the world, and there is the question as to how these relate.

The three theories of perception, Idealism, Direct Realism and Indirect Realism are primarily interested in the relation between thought and the world, though of course language is needed to express their different epistemological positions. What we do know for certain are our thoughts and sensations.

I cannot answer for the Direct Realist who knows that they directly perceive the world as it is through their sensations, as I don't agree with them.

As an Indirect Realist, I believe that there is a world independent of my observing it that has caused my sensations. I can never know, but I believe that there is, because it a satisfactory explanation for the sensations that I experience. What is real is a mystery, a world of things-in-themselves. I believe a real world exists, but only because this is the most satisfactory explanation.

As regards thought, the phenomenological approach makes sense. In part by removing the Cartesian separation between the mind and the mind-independent and in part by removing the problem of the unknowable thing-in-itself. Phenomenology attempts to create the conditions for the objective study of what is usually regarded as subjective, our judgements, perceptions and emotions of our conscious experienced sensations. Phenomenology rejects both Rationalism and Empiricism in favour of the person's lived experiences.

As regards language, linguistic idealism makes sense. Language is not contingent on the world, but rather language underpins the world that we know. It is not the case that there are objects in the world that are nameable within language, but rather the objects in our world exist because they are named in the language that we use to describe them. An object being named can only exist within its context as a logical semantic part of the sentence it is within. As you say, language does stand for the world, but also "stands in" for the world. When Derrida wrote "there is nothing outside the text" some have interpreted this as linguistic idealism, which denies the existence of a real-world outside language. Wittgenstein as well said that he had come to believe that thoughts and language were two aspects of the same thing, in that we can only think using language.

We don't know for certain how thoughts, language and the world relate, but for me, a combination of Indirect Realism, Phenomenology and Linguistic Idealism seems to be a sensible combination.

There is this impossible epistemic and thus ontological distance between knowledge and the world, until, that is, this distance is closed. — Astrophel

There seems to be three main theories of perception: Idealism, Direct Realism and Indirect Realism.

For the Direct Realist, i) the external world exists independently of the mind (hence, realism) ii) and we perceive the external world directly (hence, direct). For the Indirect Realist, i) the external world exists independently of the mind (hence, realism) but ii) we perceive the external world indirectly, via sense data (hence, indirect).

In a sense we all start off as Direct Realists. As you say, in the world of infancy, the world is not something that has to be discursively determined. For the child, there is no psychological distance between their immediate sensations and the object of their sensations
.
But later, language introduces us to spatial and temporal concepts, such as near and far, above and below, before and after. These concepts make us to look more closely at the world, and philosophically question more deeply their meaning.

Some then become Indirect Realists, conscious of a distance between our sensations and the object of these sensations. Some remain Direct Realists.

There is the question about the role of language in distancing the language user to their world.. As the Direct Realist directly perceives the world as it is, there is no distance between themselves and the world. As the Indirect Realist only indirectly perceives the world as it is, there is a distance between themselves and the world. As both the Direct and Indirect Realist use the same language, it does not seem that it is language that is opening up a distance between the observer and the world.

I would rather agree with the world of Heideggerian or MP's, of which the structure or existence is disclosed or revealed by language. — Corvus

As Wittgenstein wrote, Moore knows that the earth existed long before his birth, and we all know the same as he (OC 84).

I only know about the earth because of language.

A person without language (suppose they had been born on a desert island and raised by Mona monkeys) could not know about the earth.

The problem is, how can I know about something that is independent of language when I can only know about it within language?

For example, in what sense does "earth" in language capture the reality of the earth, being 12,714 km in diameter and having a mass of 5.9722 × 10^24 kg.

You're going a bit too far. My point is that when referring to truth, Wittgenstein is not only thinking in terms of traditional propositions. He applies truth to hinges, too. This is in reference to my discussion with Banno. The truth is built into the actions. The actions show their truth. — Sam26

A historical individual or institution decided that when someone waves one hand the action is to be named "here is one hand", rather than "here are five fishes", for example. Similar to JL Austin's performative utterance.

With the passage of time, that "here is one hand" indicates the action of waving one hand is now beyond doubt, and is therefore a hinge.

Years later, Moore waves one hand and says "here is one hand"

The proposition "here is one hand" is true if and only if Moore waves one hand.

The action of waving one hand shows the truth of the proposition "here is one hand"

But the proposition "here is one hand" is not the hinge that is exempt from doubt.

Therefore, the action of waving one hand doesn't show the truth of the hinge.

The hinge that is exempt from doubt is that the proposition "here is one hand" indicates the action of waving one hand.

The hinge is neither true nor false. The hinge enables truth and falsity in the language game.

The world is totally separate from us, existing on its own never saying anything at all. — Corvus

You believe that the world is totally separate to us.

However, this was not the case for Wittgenstein.

According to GEM Anscombe in her paper "The Question of Linguistic Idealism", she considers Wittgenstein to be a partial linguistic idealist.

Partial, in that for Wittgenstein some things don't depend on linguistic practice, such as numbers, horses, wolves, days, etc, whilst some things do depend on linguistic practice, such as rules, rights, promises, etc.

Linguistic idealism is the position that our language does not describe an empirical reality that we are aware of through our sense perceptions, but rather our language determines what kind of contact we have we the reality of the world. Linguistic Idealism undermines the traditional Realist/Idealist debate.

For Wittgenstein, the world is not totally separate to the language that we use to describe it.

My point is that OC 206 says, "If someone asked us 'but is that true [referring to a hinge]?' we might say 'yes' to him..." — Sam26

OC 206. If someone asked us "but is that true?" we might say "yes" to him; and if he demanded grounds we might say "I can't give you any grounds, but if you learn more you too will think the same"

In other words, if someone asked me "is it true that hinges are beyond doubt", I might say "yes".

If someone asked me "is it true that one feels pain when stung by a wasp", I might say "yes"

The truth is that one feels pain when stung by a wasp. It is not the pain that is true.

The truth is that hinges are beyond doubt. It is not the hinge that is true.

Language alone cannot reveal the whole structure of the world. — Corvus

But is what Wittgenstein believed?

Is it not the case that Wittgenstein believed that our language "is" our world, where the world is embedded in language through the hinge proposition?

Part of the difficulty is translating experience, the anecdotal and intuition into the formula of philosophy arguments. — Jack Cummins

Introduction, Body, Conclusion.

Perhaps a Body of four sections.

In support:
Section one of 400 words - Ghandi. "There is no path to peace; peace is the path."
Section two of 400 words - Erasmus of Rotterdam. Perhaps the foremost humanist writer of the Renaissance, and arguably also one of the foremost philosophers of peace.
Section three of 400 words - Bertrand Russell. Established the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation. Launched in 1963, the Foundation was established to carry forward Russell's work for peace, human rights and social justice.

Counterargument:
Section four of 400 words - Nietzsche. Controversially valorizes struggle and war as necessary ingredients of human flourishing.

Section one as typical:
20 words as introduction
180 words just describing Ghandi's approach to peace. See https://www.mkgandhi.org/articles/fighting-for-peace-the-Gandhian-way.php
180 words giving your personal reasons why Ghandi was right. Here you include your own experiences and thoughts.
20 words as summary

This would make up an academic philosophical essay

There is this impossible epistemic and thus ontological distance between knowledge and the world, until, that is, this distance is closed. — Astrophel

But how can it be closed?

Our only direct knowledge is that of the sensations in our five senses.

We perceives shapes and colours, relations and quantities, which are clearly not the thing in the world.

From these sensations alone we infer a world that has caused these sensations

We can only make inferences when moving from the epistemology of our sensations to the ontology of a presumed world, but inference is not knowledge

Even though we only know our own sensations, there is an intersubjective agreement about things like the Moon, but is this public agreement about our intersubjective sensations or about a thing in the world causing these sensations?

Jack, you know you are one of my favorite people, but civilization as we know it may collapse — Athena

The good thing about a philosophical essay is that the author needs to defend their thesis using a clear and well structured argument, critically analyse the evidence and show that their premises are true and that their argument is valid.

Like the formal logic cannot capture or cope with the whole reality, language alone cannot capture or understand the world. — Corvus

Yes, but perhaps for a different reason.

There is language and there is the world.

For the Direct and Indirect Realist, there is a world that exists independently of any human observer. It would seem that for the Direct and Indirect Realist, language alone cannot fully capture or understand the world.

But for Wittgenstein, what is the relation between language and the world?

It seems to me that for Wittgenstein, language "is" the world.

It is not the case that the proposition "here is one hand" is a representation of a world or corresponds to a world, but rather the world is embodied in "here is one hand".

In a sense, a similar concept to that of the Indirect Realist who doesn't perceive a representation of the colour red but directly perceives the colour red.

374. We teach a child "that is your hand", not "that is perhaps (or "probably") your hand". That is how a child learns the innumerable language-games that are concerned with his hand. An investigation or question, 'whether this is really a hand' never occurs to him. Nor, on the other hand, does he learn that he knows that this is a hand.

There is nothing the other side of a world embodied in language.

"Here is one hand" is a hinge proposition not because it is needed to enable a language game that can represent or correspond with a world, but because the world is embodied in the hinge proposition.

What are the implications? We can only understand the world using language. But if the world is our language, and language cannot understand itself, then this inevitably puts a limit on our understanding of the world.

Above is not a hinge proposition, but it is the absolute true fact (which is verified via the logical reasoning and reality), and I don't doubt it at all. It is exempt from doubting. — Corvus

Wittgenstein defines what we call the hinge proposition as being a proposition that is exempt from doubt.

OC 341. That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn.

For Wittgenstein, if "here is one hand" is a hinge proposition and therefore exempt from doubt, there is no reason why "here is no hand" must also be a hinge proposition and therefore exempt from doubt.

Similarly, "here is the Jackpot", "here is no Jackpot", "here are winnings" and "here are no winnings" must also all be hinge propositions and therefore exempt from doubt.

These hinge propositions may be combined into language games:
1) "here is the Jackpot" and "here are winnings"
2) "here is the Jackpot" and "here are no winnings"
3) "here is no Jackpot" and "here are winnings"
4) "here is no Jackpot" and "here are no winnings"

Your particular case is 2) "I didn't win the jackpot"

It is true that your proposition "I didn't win the jackpot" is exempt from doubt.

But I assume that combining two hinge propositions doesn't form a single new hinge proposition.

This is perhaps why "I didn't win the Jackpot" is not a hinge proposition, even though exempt from doubt, as it is a combination of hinge propositons.

As I understand it:

A hinge proposition enables a language game.

A hinge proposition must be exempt from doubt in order to ground the language game.

A language game is contingent because it describes how the world is.

In the mind of the user of the language game, it would be wrong to say that this language game either represents or corresponds with the world. It would be more accurate to say that this language game "is" their world, meaning that there is no other world outside the language game itself.

In other words, we use the language game to understand the world, and this world is nothing other than the language game itself.

To clarify, this event is about 'Philosophy Writing'. So, that is the 'broad category'. — Amity

You are saying that rule 4 should have read "must fall under the broad category of philosophy writing"?

Moreover, we can't forget OC 206, where Wittgenstein points out that if someone asked, "but is that true" (referring to hinges), we might respond "yes," — Sam26

There is a difference between asking is it true that "here is one hand" and asking "is it true that here is one hand".

Asking is it true that "here is one hand"
See OC 204
"Here is one hand" is a hinge proposition because it is a rule that constitutes the language game. The end is not a certain proposition that strikes us as true, it is our acting.


Asking "is it true that here is one hand".
See OC 206
If someone asks us "is it true that here is one hand", we may answer "yes, but I cannot give you any grounds". The expression "here is one hand" in this instance is not being used as a hinge proposition. It is not being used as a rule that constitutes the language game but is being used as a part of the language game.

To my understanding, "here is one hand" can be used both as a rule that constitutes a language game and as an expression within a language game. The first is not truth-apt, but the second is.

So the world is what is said by true sentences. — Banno

Hence, they are not propositions that set out how things are in the world, but propositions that set out how we are to talk about the world. They are the rules that set up and constitute our language games. They don't represent the world; they set the terms on which representation takes place. — Banno

How does Wittgenstein overcome what seems to be a circularity?

1) Hinge propositions are the rules that constitute our language game.

2) Within this language game there can be representations of the world.

3) The world is what is said by true sentences.

Removing any reference to "world"

4) Hinge propositions are the rules that constitute a language game that can represent what is said by true sentences.

It seems that such a language game is self-referential.

However, perhaps the OP could be improved to lessen confusion. — Amity

@Moliere

As rule 4 says "must fall under the broad category of a philosophical essay", this seems to suggest that what is required is a philosophical essay.

There are many examples of how to write a philosophical essay on the internet, but taking University College Cork as an example.

Note 1: "philosophy paper" is synonymous with "philosophical essay"
Note 2: a philosophical essay is not about flowery language or story-telling technique.
Note 3: start with a proposition to be proved

Writing a Philosophical Essay: A Brief Tutorial

II. What is a philosophy paper?

Philosophical essays prove some point through the use of rational argument. A philosophical essay is not about flowery language, story-telling techniques, or surprising the reader. The beauty of a philosophical essay is found in your ideas; the language that you use is only a tool for conveying these ideas to the reader. The art is in proving one’s point clearly.

The philosophical essay generally follows a very simple structure:

1. State the proposition to be proved.
2. Give the argument for that proposition.
3. Show that the argument is valid.
4. Show that the premises are true.
5. Consider an objection to your argument and respond to that objection.
6. State the upshot of what has been proven. (Martinich, A.P. (1996) Philosophical
Writing. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. p. 53.)

However, this June event is wider. It is about philosophy writing. — Amity

I agree that there is a difference between philosophy writing and a philosophy essay, but rule 4) does say it must fall under the broad category of a philosophical essay.

4) Must fall under the broad category of a philosophical essay. The Essay's Title and Topic are chosen by the author. The philosophical viewpoint can be academic or less formal. It should be systematic with an Introduction, Main Body and Conclusion. This is non-fiction. Poetic expression is allowed if it completes or supports the philosophical exploration.

@Moliere does conclude by saying "Resources were requested for help on what exactly an academic philosophy essay should look like, and provided by @Amity so I've appended them here:

The first link is "How to write a crap philosophy essay"
The second link "Guidelines on writing a Philosophy Paper" notes "don't try to establish any earth shattering conclusions in your 5-6 page paper."
The third link is "An academic guide to planning essays"

All this suggests that this writing challenge is looking for a philosophy essay rather than philosophy writing.

Remember, it's all a story...with or without a definite conclusion. Open ended...for further exploration. Philosophy is a Conversation. Here, writers and readers can be in close dialogue or a wild dance — Amity

Yes, but I am not sure about "with or without a definite conclusion".

A philosophy essay is about making a claim and then defending it.

There must be a thesis, such as "I intend to argue that J.J.C. Smart’s criticism of rule utilitarianism is correct because, as he argues, there are clearly some cases where it is optimific to break a generally optimific rule"

There must be a conclusion, such as "I have argued that J.J.C. Smart’s criticisms of rule utilitarianism are correct"

They believe that doubts are also simulation — Corvus

I cannot doubt that I doubt, even if I am a simulation.

Folks who believe life could be simulation could doubt if the Earth exists. — Corvus

True, but they don't doubt that they have the doubt as to whether the Earth exists.

I have heard about "lived experience", but not "lived truths". What is "lived truths"? — Corvus

That was my question to @Sam26 who wrote "hinges are about lived truths".

Maybe I am misunderstanding the point here. It seems to me that we misunderstand and misuse words all the time...When Descartes starts doubting away in the Meditations, he doesn't stop writing in French. — Count Timothy von Icarus

As a starting position, Wittgenstein in On Certainty did write that some propositions are exempt from doubt.

OC 341 That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn.

You point out that in ordinary language we do doubt the meaning of some words all the time, so where in ordinary language are those propositions that are exempt from doubt?

In the Meditations, Descartes was discarding all beliefs that were not absolutely certain. He was not discarding all words about which he was not absolutely certain. I can doubt ever getting a good meal in Paris without doubting the meaning of the words "I can doubt ever getting a good meal in Paris". I can use words whose meaning I am certain about to express ideas about which I am not certain.

We may doubt the meaning of some words all the time but we never doubt the meaning of all the words all the time.

As an example consider the sentence "it seems to me that we misunderstand and misuse words all the time."

If I doubted the meaning of every expression within the sentence, the sentence as a whole would be meaningless to me, making it impossible for me to respond to it. But I am responding to it, meaning that in practice I am certain as to the meaning of the words used.

If I doubted the meaning of every expression within the sentence, language as a means of communication would be impossible.

For example, in the sentence "Inaonekana kwangu kwamba hatuelewi na kutumia vibaya maneno kila wakati." there is not a single expression whose meaning is exempt from doubt in my mind

But we know that language does work in enabling communication, therefore there must be some expressions within our language exempt from doubt, as Wittgenstein wrote.

It may be the case that in a sentence there are words whose meaning I am not certain about,
but in that situation I can refer to a dictionary, which may then remove any uncertainty as to its meaning.

If I find the meaning of a word uncertain, I would reach for the Dictionary, not stop writing.