Hinges are about lived truths, — Sam26

Wittgenstein wrote that some propositions are exempt from doubt.

OC 341 That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn.

Where does Wittgenstein write that those propositions which are exempt from doubt are "lived truths"?

But all language games are embedded in the world; the counting of apples involves apples and charts, the building involves blocks and slabs. It is not peculiar to hinge propositions to be about how things are - all propositions do that. — Banno

The language game that includes the sentence "Sherlock Holmes lives at 221B Baker Street" is embedded in a world of literature rather than a world outside literature.

It seems that Wittgenstein agrees that there is a world but never specifies exactly where this world exists.

My understanding is that in a sentence such as "here is one hand and in the hand is a mug and in the mug is an elephant", not only is every part a hinge proposition but also every part can form a T-sentence.

Each part, i) "Here is one hand", ii) "in the hand is a mug" and iii) "in the mug is an elephant" has to be a hinge proposition in order to allow the rest of the language game to take place.

That a language game is embedded in the world means that there is a correspondence between the language game and the world. If the language game was not embedded in the world, then there could be no correspondence between the language game and the world.

That there is a correspondence means that the T-sentence can be formed from each part, i) "here is one hand" is true IFF here is one hand. ii) "in the hand is a mug" is true IFF in the hand is a mug, iii) "in the mug is an elephant" is true IFF in the mug is an elephant.

In a T-sentence, what does "true" mean? It seems to mean that in the event that something is the case in the world, something does obtain in the world or something is a fact in the world, then that fact can be described by language.

What are the philosophical / epistemological / logical grounds for hinge propositions being exempt from doubt? — Corvus

What does "hapa kuna mkono mmoja na katika mkono huu kuna kikombe" mean?

I can tell you that this is a coherent language, where each part is fully in context with all the other parts of the sentence.

The question is, where is the key that unlocks the meaning of the whole?

Can the key be found inside the text, or can it only be found outside the text?

Only if the meaning of each part was exempt from doubt in your mind could you understand the meaning of the whole.

Any part whose meaning is exempt from doubt in your mind can be called a hinge proposition.

We treat hinges as true for practical reasons. And the fact that they're not doubted demonstrates they don't play the true/false game. We accept them as true, period. — Sam26

There are many different definitions of "truth" (SEP - Truth)

Wittgenstein did not consider the hinge proposition as being true.

OC 204 Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end; - but the end is not certain propositions' striking us immediately as true, i.e. it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-game.
OC 205. If the true is what is grounded, then the ground is not true, not yet false.

What definition of truth are you using when you say that hinge propositions are "true"?

So far, I've referenced only one philosopher on the subject, which has not been of general interest to philosophers, and I'm hard put to find a rebuttal. — Vera Mont

Can you slightly adjust the wording of your thesis such that you can find three philosophers that support it and one philosopher that opposes it?

If you can, then:

Write the 200 word Introduction in the future tense after you have written the Body.

Write the 200 word Conclusion in the past tense after you have written the Body.

Imagine a Body of four sections, each of 400 words. The first three sections based on three philosophers that support your thesis. The fourth section based on a philosopher that opposes your thesis.

Consider a typical 400 word section. An introduction of 20 words written after you have written the body of the section. A summary of 20 words also written after you have written the body of the section.

This leaves 360 words for the body of the section. The first 180 words describing the philosopher's position regarding your thesis. The second 180 words giving your thoughts about the philosopher's position, including why you think their argument is valid and where you think their argument can be improved.

Would this work?

Both what makes hypothesis and any possible experience that could validate or falsify it intelligible are already framed by the hinge conviction. — Joshs

:up: Continuing:

For example, in a language game, "here is one hand and the hand is holding a mug of coffee", "here is one hand" is the hinge proposition and "the hand is holding a mug of coffee" is the ordinary (non-hinge) proposition.

Being an ordinary proposition, "the hand is holding a mug of coffee " can be true or false, depending on whether or not it corresponds with what is actually the case in the world.

But the truth-aptness of this ordinary proposition is only intelligible if the language game has been founded on a hinge proposition.

Because, if a language game was not founded on a hinge proposition, and there were no hinge propositions, then the meaning of each expression would depend on its context within the language game.

IE, the meaning of "the hand" would depend on its context "the hand is holding a mug of coffee", and the meaning of "holding a mug of coffee" would depend on its context "the hand is holding a mug of coffee". Although this language game might be perfectly coherent, it would be ultimately be nonsensical.

For a language game to make sense, within the language game there must be something extra-linguistic that founds the language game within the world, and these things are the hinge propositions.

Hinge propositions are extra-linguistic, even they they are part of the language game.

My idea is that you can doubt on anything and everything if you choose to do so. Even the fact "Paris in France." could be doubted under the simple syllogism. — Corvus

"Exempt" is normally used for the situation where an object is free from liability, duty or restriction. Hence it seems not a proper word to use for doubt. — Corvus

In a language game are ordinary propositions such as "it is raining" and hinge propositions such as "here is one hand".

All ordinary propositions can be doubted. I say "it is raining". You say "are you sure?"

The whole point of a hinge proposition is that it is exempt from being doubted. Doubting a hinge proposition cannot even be considered.

Hinge propositions, like the earth has existed for more than ten minutes or "I have two hands” —aren’t true in the way we typically think of propositions being true (i.e., through evidence, justification, or correspondence to reality). — Sam26

"It is raining" is true1 IFF it is raining

You say that hinge propositions are true2, where true1 and true2 are different.

But how have true1 and true2 been defined? A proposition that corresponds with a fact is true1. A proposition that is exempt from doubt is true2 (OC 341)

The definition of true1 is well established, and there are many references in the literature. However, the definition of true2 does not seem to be established at all, and I haven't found any references to it in the literature.

It seems that true2 is your personal definition. There is nothing wrong with inventing definitions, in fact I invented the definition "peffel". However, no-one other than me uses it.
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Someone might ask you "Is it true that bishops move diagonally?" and you reply, "Yes," but does this mean that it's true in an epistemological sense? No, — Sam26

In other words, "bishops move diagonally" is true IFF bishops move diagonally.

Truth is the relation between the proposition and the fact.

Truth is neither the proposition nor the fact.

Seems to be delicate nuance in the uses, but the gist of the claim seems it is impossible to doubt? — Corvus

Not really. "Impossible to doubt" has a different meaning to "exempt from doubt" OC 341

For example, "food is exempt from vat".

How would you replace "exempt" by "impossible" in the above sentence?

What is the illocutionary difference between the two expressions? — Corvus

Cannot doubt vs exempt from doubt

My previous example was:

i) That Paris is in France cannot be doubted means that we started with a doubt and then concluded that our doubt was baseless.
ii) That Paris is in France is exempt from doubt means that we are not even allowed to doubt at all.

But in addition - cannot could mean:
i) not allowed - as in you cannot speak in an exam
ii) not able - as in you cannot climb Mount Everest because you are unfit

Exempt could mean
i) not applied - as in food is exempt from vat
ii) not present - as in summer nights are exempt from frost

I understand W said that hinge propositions / certainties cannot be doubted or not allowed doubting — Corvus

In OC 341 Wittgenstein writes "That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn."

"Exempt from doubt" has a different meaning to "cannot be doubted."

Is there anywhere in On Certainty where Wittgenstein writes that hinge propositions cannot be doubted?

There are different types of doubts too i.e. rational doubts based on reasoning, and psychological doubts based on feelings, emotions and beliefs. — Corvus

True, but on a thread about Wittgenstein's On Certainty, the question is, how did Wittgenstein describe doubt?

The other language game of truth is one of foundational convictions. The latter convictions are accepted as true and cannot be sensibly doubted. — Sam26

There is a difference in meaning between i) hinge propositions cannot be doubted and ii) hinge propositions are exempt from doubt

Wittgenstein says "exempt from doubt"

OC 341 That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn.

For example:
i) That Paris is in France cannot be doubted means that we started with a doubt and then concluded that our doubt was baseless.
ii) That Paris is in France is exempt from doubt means that we are not even allowed to doubt at all.

Well, we disagree. I think this position is clear and a common misinterpretation of OC. — Sam26

Do you have any support in the literature?

The truth of traditional propositions is tied to evidence or falsifiability. “It’s raining” is true if I look out and see rain; it’s false if I don’t. — Sam26

I agree that ordinary propositions are truth apt. For example, "it is raining" is true IFF it is raining

Hinges aren’t true in the same way that ordinary propositions are, i.e., they're beyond the truth-testing game. Their truth is their unshakeable role in our practices. — Sam26

It is not that "hinges aren’t true in the same way that ordinary propositions are", but rather that hinge propositions are not truth-apt at all.

It is not that "their truth is their unshakeable role in our practices", as hinge propositions have no truth.

It is true that in Philosophical Investigations there is a role for hinge propositions in the language game, but here the word "true" refers to the role that the hinge proposition is playing, not to the hinge proposition itself.

The word true shouldn't be applied to a hinge proposition. For example, as in "hinges aren't true in the same way" and "their truth".

I hope your essay is progressing well. Update? — Amity

Have managed to reduce my "how to write a philosophy essay" down to eight pages. Have starting researching, which gave me my plan. A bit more research then starting to write. Am learning, which is the main thing (using ??? for anonymity)

1) Wittgenstein’s hinges function as indubitable certainties outside the domain of epistemological justification.
2) They differ from traditional propositions by enabling traditional truth operations to function. — Sam26

These are contradictory statements.

A hinge proposition cannot be both outside the domain of epistemological justification, including justifications such as truth and falsity, and be inside the domain of epistemology justification that enables truth operations.

So I see what you're talking about, but I don't think he's talking in terms of a correspondence that a realist would approve of. — frank

I agree, more or less.

It seems to me that there are three main theories of perception: Idealism, Direct Realism and Indirect Realism

In the Tractatus, truth is basically a correspondence between language and the world. "Snow is white" is true if snow is white.

In Philosophical Investigations, truth is basically a correspondence between language and its own conditions for being true. "Theft is wrong" is true if theft is wrong.

I agree that Wittgenstein includes references in Tractatus to a "gramophone record" and in Philosophical Investigations to "bring me a slab". These objects exist in our world, which makes one assume his approach is that of Realism.

However, this is not necessarily the case, in that although gramophone records and slabs exist in a world, the question is, where does this world exist. This is something that Wittgenstein is very vague about.

For the Idealist, the world exists in the mind. For the Direct Realist we directly perceive the world and for the Indirect Realist we directly perceive representations of the world.

Wittgenstein in general should not be read from the viewpoints of either Idealism or Realism

Thinking of the "world" as either mind-dependent or mind-independent may not be how to approach Wittgenstein.

It exists in the physical world with no relation to the mind. — Corvus

:up:

Mind doesn't have outside or inside. — Corvus

Isn't the Moon, something that has a diameter of 3,475 km, outside the mind?

I think the point of the TLP is to show that when we talk about "understanding reality" in some rarified sense, we're doing something with language that it's not designed for. — frank

I think that you are partly right and partly wrong.

Partly wrong in that a Wittgenstein sentence, such as "snow is white", does correspond with the reality of the world. The Tractatus is basically setting out a correspondence theory.

There are two aspects to a Wittgenstein sentence. Simple sentences such as "snow is white" are true when they correspond with facts in the world. Complex sentences, such as "snow is white and trees are green" are true by virtue of the Truth Table.

Partly right in that Wittgenstein is vague in justifying whether a Wittgenstein proposition, such as "Jack believes that Mars is green", do correspond with the reality of the world.

When you talk about consciousness, it depends whether you mean from the point of view of the Rationalist, which includes Transcendental Apriorism, or from the point of view of the Empiricist.

Wittgenstein did not agree with the Rationalists, who believe that concepts and knowledge can come from a solitary thinker using pure reason isolated from contaminated empirical experiences.

It follows that the universe has the external somewhere. — Corvus

How could we ever know such a thing?

The Idealism of Berkeley doesn't think that anything physical exists outside the mind.

But how can the internal exist without the external? — Corvus

This raises the question, how can the Universe exist without there being anything external to it?

Surely you are a part of the world. No? — Corvus

Yes, I am part of the world, but we must distinguish between that part of the world that is external to me and that part of the world that is internal to me.

I am part of the world and the Moon is part of the world, but the Moon is external to me.

I don't think he would accept or reject it. He would say we have no way of definitively answering the question. — frank

A believer in Transcendental Apriosis is a Rationalist who proposes that a solitary thinker using pure reason can understand reality.

Wittgenstein's hinge propositions are part of the language game. The language game is part of a form of life. A form of life is what society does in the world.

The Rationalist using pure reason could never know a form of life where someone asks of another "bring me a slab"

Surely, for this reason, Wittgenstein would reject Transcendental Apriorism?

The term "noesis" has been revived by modern thinkers in a number of ways that are quite different from the term's historical meaning, so perhaps that is a source of confusion here..................................I think it's fairly obvious that Wittgenstein doesn't think such a faculty exists — Count Timothy von Icarus

Not only Wittgenstein, but many modern philosophers don't accept the concept of Transcendental Aprioris, of which noesis is a part.

As described by MR Burgess, noesis is a part of Transcendental Apriorism, a Rationalist doctrine originated by Plato. It proposes that a solitary thinker using pure reason can unlock the deepest mysteries of external reality. This is an epistemological problem, the notion that the pure human intellect, purged of sensory contamination, can transcend the limits of experience to reach a Platonic understanding of reality.

Plato called the highest form of knowing "noesis". In modern terms, insight. Noesis is the highest form of human thought, and allows the mind direct apprehension of universal truths. Noesis is in opposition to dianoia, discursive thinking and analytical explanations. For example, explaining how a car engine works.

Many modern philosophers from Kant onwards, including the Logical Positivists and AJ Ayer, reject Transcendental Apriorism. However, Burgess argues that such rejection has been too cursory, and the theory should begin to be taken more seriously.

Defenders of Transcendental Apriorism will have a difficult task in justifying how a solitary thinker only having access to their sensations and just using pure reason will be able to unlock the mysteries of the reality of an external world. As WH Walsh wrote in Reason and Experience "There seems to be little difficulty in showing that metaphysics in this sense is an impossible undertaking".

(to be continued)

"I think therefore I am" is not an affirmation, but inference. He was still doubting his own existence, and the possibility that he thinks. — Corvus

It is "Cogito, Ergo Sum" or “I think, therefore I am.” There is a comma between "I think" and "therefore I am"

I agree that the sentences "I think that ghosts exists" and "I think that I am" imply doubt that "ghosts exist" and "I am".

But no doubt is implied in "I think, therefore I am", as these are independent thoughts.

At the start of the Second Meditation, Descartes wrote the following:

“I have convinced myself that there is absolutely nothing in the world, no sky, no earth, no minds, no bodies. Does it now follow that I too do not exist? No: if I convinced myself of something then I certainly existed. But there is a deceiver of supreme power and cunning who is deliberately and constantly deceiving me.
In that case I too undoubtedly exist, if he is deceiving me; and let him deceive me as much as he can, he will never bring it about that I am nothing so long as I think that I am something. So after considering everything very thoroughly, I must finally conclude that this proposition, I am, I exist, is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind.”(Cottingham et al, 1984)

I have the thought that nothing exists in the external world
Does it follow that I don't exist?
No, because if I have a thought then I must exist.

Perhaps hinge and ordinary propositions are not two sharply distinguishable entities , but more or less fluid, more or less hardened aspects of the same practical discursive processes. — Joshs

I would agree with that. Sometimes an atheist finds god and sometimes a religious person loses their faith.

Both could come from a discursive engagement with the world. But as different people engage in different ways with the world, some propositions may be hardened into ordinary propositions and some hardened into hinge propositions

For example, it could be accident of birth, in that 93% of the population of Saudis Arabia is Muslim and 2% in South Africa. It could be innate within a person's character. It could be the teaching that they have had. It could be peer pressure. It could be particular life experiences.

Even though there may be a state of flux in a societies hinge proposition, it is still a useful concept and perhaps informative in explaining the undoubted gulf between Christian and atheist, liberal and conservative and Indirect and Direct Realist.

But if noesis is possible his entire analysis is wrong. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Why?

Noesis seems to be the real content of consciousness. For example, the consciousness of the thought that here is one hand.

Wittgenstein's conclusion is that "here is one hand" is a hinge proposition within a language game.

It is the case, however, that Wittgenstein was of the general opinion that thinking and language were the same.

Notebooks 1914-16 - Now it is becoming clear why I thought that thinking and language were the same. For thinking is a kind of language. For a thought too is, of course, a logical picture of the proposition, and therefore it just is a kind of proposition.

Language would be of no use if the meaning of the words couldn't be thought about. Even though "here is one hand" is a hinge proposition, the meaning of the words can still be thought about.

The hinge proposition "here is one hand" doesn't negate the consciousness of thought that here is one hand.

The point would be that people have often held conceptions of truth that would invalidate Wittgenstein's conclusions. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Conceptions of truth don't invalidate Wittgenstein's conclusion.

Wittgenstein proposed that "here is one hand" is a hinge proposition. A hinge proposition is a foundation of the language game within which it is a part. This makes sense, in that "god exists" is a hinge proposition of the Christian language game and "god doesn't exist" is a hinge proposition in the Atheist language game.

As I see it, for Wittgenstein, within a language are hinge propositions and ordinary propositions, and these are different things. IE, not every proposition within a language is a hinge proposition.

There are many definitions of truth. For example, see SEP article on Truth. However, I find the most informative definition to be when a proposition in language corresponds with a fact in the world then that proposition is true.

The hinge proposition "here is one hand" does not engage with the world, and is therefore neither true nor false, whereas the ordinary proposition "the cat sat on the mat playing with the mouse" does engage with the world, and can therefore be either true or false.

Wittgenstein's main conclusion is that "here is one hand" is a hinge proposition. A hinge proposition is a foundation of the language within which it is a part. It is not a demonstration of the existence of the world.

I agree that the hinge proposition "here is one hand" is neither a tautology, axiom or truism. It is the foundation of the language of which it a part, and allows the rest of the language to take place.

In a different language game, "this is a mountain" could be a hinge proposition allowing the rest of the language to take place. Discussion could then be had about mountaineers, snow falling on the mountain tops, the difficulties of skiers, which ski lodge to visit and the best flights for the skier to use from their home country. It would include the truth or falsity of propositions such as "Italy is the best country to visit for the serious skier". But it wouldn't include the truth or falsity of the proposition "this is a mountain".

Being neither true nor false, the hinge proposition cannot be invalidated by conceptions of truth or falsity.

It isn’t independent of any world. On the contrary, it is the product of practical discursive engagement with others and with material circumstances in the actual world in which we live. — Joshs

The hinge proposition

You are conflating two different types of propositions within the language game. There is the hinge proposition and there is the ordinary proposition.

You are right that the ordinary proposition is the product of practical discursive engagement with others, but the hinge proposition is a different thing altogether.

This is why Wittgenstein critiques Moore's "here is one hand". The whole point of Wittgenstein's hinge proposition is that is not the product of practical discursive engagement with others.

"Here is one hand" is the hinge proposition that is a foundation of the language within which it is a part.

"Here is one hand that is slightly larger than the other and is wearing a yellow glove" is the ordinary proposition that does engage with the world.

From the perspective of the Patristics, or say, Thomism, Wittgenstein is simply deluded about the nature of truth, knowledge, and justification — Count Timothy von Icarus

@Sam26 suggested to me that "I don't want this thread to become an argument about the existence of God, and whether belief in God is a hinge."

However, it does seem that Pope Pius X did establish what Wittgenstein would call a hinge proposition about Thomism.

In the 1914 motu proprio Doctoris Angelici, Pope Pius X cautioned that the teachings of the Church cannot be understood without the basic philosophical underpinnings of Thomas's major theses:

The capital theses in the philosophy of St. Thomas are not to be placed in the category of opinions capable of being debated one way or another, but are to be considered as the foundations upon which the whole science of natural and divine things is based; if such principles are once removed or in any way impaired, it must necessarily follow that students of the sacred sciences will ultimately fail to perceive so much as the meaning of the words in which the dogmas of divine revelation are proposed by the magistracy of the Church. (Wikipedia - Thomism)

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For, leaving aside the proper interpretation of Wittgenstein, to say that "God exists" and "God does not exist" can both be simultaneously "tautologically true" obviously requires a view of truth that is likely to differ fundamentally (i.e. in terms of bedrock understanding) from most historical views, under which claims that something is simultaneously both true and not-true, without qualification, is absurd and "senseless." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, the Law of Non-Contradiction states that a proposition cannot be both true and false at the same time.

However, Wittgenstein's hinge propositions are neither true nor false.

There are many definition of "truth", but for me the most informative definition of truth is the correspondence between a proposition in language and a fact in the world.

Wittgenstein's hinge proposition is a foundation of the language of which it is a part, regardless of any correspondence between the hinge proposition and a fact in the world.

Therefore, the fact that the same hinge proposition may have different meanings in different language games does not break the LNC.

On the other side of the argument, “I have hands holds across contexts and language games. Atheists function without belief in God, but how would they function without the belief we have hands? — Sam26

Fair enough, putting God to one side.

One could argue that although the proposition "here is one hand" can be used across different language games, it could have different meanings. For example in the language games of the Direct and Indirect Realist.

For the Direct Realist (1), the proposition "here is one hand" is true, as they believe that the hand exists in the world. For the Indirect Realist (2), the proposition "here is one hand" may or may not be true, as they believe that the hand may or may not exist in the world.

The Indirect Realist is able to function successfully even though they believe that the hand they perceive may or may not exist in the world. For example, the Indirect Realist stops at a traffic light when they perceive the colour red, even though they believe that the colour red may or may not exist in the world.

For Wittgenstein, the hinge proposition "here is one hand" is independent of any world. As a hinge proposition, it is the foundation of the language within which it is a part, regardless of its truth, where truth is a correspondence between language and the world.

Notes
(1) Direct realism is the view that i) the external world exists independently of the mind (hence, realism) and ii) we perceive the external world directly (hence, direct). For the Direct Realist, we directly perceive hands that exist in the world.

(2) Indirect realism is the view that i) the external world exists independently of the mind (hence, realism) but ii) we perceive the external world indirectly, via sense data (hence, indirect). For the Indirect Realist, we also directly perceive hands, but the hands that we perceive may or may not exist in the world.

https://philosophyalevel.com/aqa-philosophy-revision-notes/theories-of-perception/

However, as mentioned above re noesis, the existence of God and of God as "truth itself" would seem to undermine Wittgenstein's conclusions in a rather radical manner. — Count Timothy von Icarus

For those who believe that god exists, then god exists. This is a tautology. It follows that they believe the proposition "god exists" to be true and the proposition "god doesn't exist" to be false. For those who believe that god exists, the proposition "god exists" is a hinge proposition and is a tautological truth.

For those who believe that god doesn't exist, then god doesn't exist. This is a tautology. It follows that they believe the proposition "god doesn't exist" to be true and the proposition "god exists" to be false. For those who believe that god doesn't exist, the proposition "god doesn't exist" is a hinge proposition and is a tautological truth.

For Wittgenstein, a hinge proposition is foundational to the system within which it is foundational. This is a tautology. For Wittgenstein, the proposition "hinge propositions are foundational to the system within which it is foundational" is a hinge proposition and is a tautological truth.

As the hinge propositions of the Christian and Atheist are tautological truths, they do not undermine Wittgenstein's conclusion, which is also a tautological truth.

Propositions can be true or false, but hinges are true as a condition of being a hinge, i.e., it's their foundational role. Moreover, it’s our acting that cements them in place, not any fact that establishes their truth. — Sam26

The Christian in acting their life cements the hinge "God as the ultimate source of all power", which is their truth. The Atheist in acting their life cements the hinge "there is no God", which is their truth. The Agnostic in acting their life cements the hinge "it is impossible to know whether there is a God", which is their truth.

The hinge is absolutely true within the system that it plays a foundational role. However, the truth of a hinge is relative to which system it is playing a foundational role.

The role of the hinge seems to be in ossifying differences between peoples. The hinge doesn't appear to include a mechanism for recognizing its own fallibility. Is this a correct understanding?

Would you reject out of hand the possibility that "God-realization" is a term, however fuzzy and encrusted with doctrines, that tries to answer this question? — J

The "I" here ceases to be entwined with thought, emotion, or perception - but instead is said to become, or else transcend into, pure awareness devoid of any duality. — javra

Pure consciousness. I'll have to mediate on that.

For pure consciousness is said to remain, even in the absence of the "I" and its objects — J

What would this consciousness be conscious of, if not the "I" or object of thought?

Yes, true, but the concept filled with sense data (in the IDR sense) is not synonymous with the concept. — AmadeusD

I agree. I may have the concept of a house in my mind. If I perceive something that I understand as one instantiation of my concept of a house, then I perceive this something as a house.

This, to be honest, because for it seems as though you are reifying the mind and its components (e.g. individual thoughts and percepts) into having similar characteristics to physical things in the external world, which can indeed hold separated givens. — javra

In the mind, there can be the concept of a house and the thought of a particular house. These are different things. I agree that there can be a concrete example of an abstract concept.

Yet to see a house (a percept) is indeed utterly separate from contemplating the concept/thought of "house". — javra

The Indirect Realist would argue that we never directly see the house, but only perceive a representation of a particular house.

Both the concept of a house and the representation of a particular house exist in the mind, and in this sense are not utterly separate, as both exist in the mind.

The "I" for example is not separate from its perceptions in so far as these perceptions are only so because they are perceived by the "I" - being in fact contingent on the "I"s awareness. — javra

As Nietzsche wrote:

What gives me the right to speak of an 'I' as cause, and finally of an 'I' as cause of thought?'

What gives me the right to say that the "I" causes thoughts, as if the "I" is separate to the thoughts it has?

I agree that the "I" is not separate to either its perceptions or thoughts. But what are the implications of this? The implication is that perceptions and thoughts are an intrinsic part of the "I".

In the same way, iron is an intrinsic part of the Eiffel Tower. Remove the iron, and what is left? Nothing.

Remove the perceptions and thoughts, and what is left? Nothing. There is no "I" remaining.