Kant — Quixodian

A couple of thoughts.

Concept vs intuition
As there is a distinction between phenomena and noumena, for Kant, there is also a distinction between concept and intuition. In the third and fourth arguments of the Transcendental Aesthetic of the CPR, he writes that our intuition of space is neither a concept of space nor a sensation of space. IE, as you write, we can have the concept of a chiiiagon without having an intuition of a chilliagon.

Categories
On the one hand he writes in B308 of CPR that the categories cannot be used to know the thing-in-itself:
"But the understanding at the same time comprehends that it cannot employ its categories for the consideration of things in themselves"

On the other hand he writes in Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics 1783 that the category of cause and effect can be applied to things-in-themselves.
"And we indeed, rightly considering objects of sense as mere appearances, confess thereby that they are based upon a thing in itself, though we know not this thing as it is in itself, but only know its appearances, viz., the way in which our senses are affected by this unknown something."

IE, given an appearance, we can never know what in the world caused the appearance, though we can know that there is something in the world that caused the appearance.

From the fact that one can arrange words as one likes one cannot correctly deduce that one can rearrange thereby the facts — unenlightened

We see a large disorganised group of people, which are facts in the world.

One person may connect the fact disorganised with the fact group of people and say "I see a mob", and another person may connect the fact disorganised with the fact group of people and say "I see a crowd".

Within language, facts in the world may be combined to give grammatically correct propositions, yet the fact that a proposition is grammatically correct does not guarantee its truth.

The human mind is so hyper-ready and prepared to find meaning in any way possible, that it will find one in the most obtuse and obscure sources — schopenhauer1

Totally agree.

The Wikipedia article on Chaos Magic writes that our perception of the world is conditioned by our prior beliefs, and our perception of the world can be changed by changing those prior beliefs. An idea that relates back to Kant.
Chaos magic teaches that the essence of magic is that perceptions are conditioned by beliefs, and that the world as we perceive it can be changed by deliberately changing those beliefs.

The Wikipedia article also writes that William S Burroughs, who practised chaos magic, found importance in the cut-up technique as having a magical function, in not only politics but also science. The concept of the cut-up was developed by the Dadaists in the 1920's
Burroughs – who practised chaos magic, and was inducted into the Illuminates of Thanateros in the early 1990s – was adamant that the technique had a magical function, stating "the cut ups are not for artistic purposes". Burroughs used his cut-ups for "political warfare, scientific research, personal therapy, magical divination, and conjuration" – the essential idea being that the cut-ups allowed the user to "break down the barriers that surround consciousness".

One example of the cut-up technique may be found in poetic philosophical writings, including sometimes the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, where it is often the role of the reader to make sense of the article rather than the role of the writer.

Another example may be found in mainstream media, for example a BBC article on Trump. From observations about facts in the world, the following words may be used as a foundation for one's beliefs: supporters - Trump - America - great - threat - democracy - forces dominated - driven - intimidated - mob - stormed - patriots - insurrectionists.

We can then grammatically connect them to give:
Supporters of Donald Trump's "Make America Great Again" agenda are a threat to democracy. "Maga forces are determined to take this country backwards." "But there's no question, that the Republican party today is dominated, driven and intimidated by Donald Trump and the Maga Republicans, and that is a threat to this country." Trump supporters thought of the mob who stormed the US Capitol last year as patriots rather than insurrectionists.

Or we can put them in a different random order and then grammatically connect them to give:
Patriots must now stand together against the threat posed by those mysterious figures who wish to destroy and must not be driven into despair or intimidated into silence. We applaud the great supporters of America who stand against the insurrections hiding in our midst, and like the mob who stormed the Bastille in 1789, seen as a symbol of the abuse of power, Trump has marshalled the forces for democracy in a world dominated by forces subverting the will of the people.

It may be seen that two people observing the same facts in the world may come to two completely different coherent understandings. The fact that an understanding of the world based on the same facts is coherent is no guarantee that the understanding is either true or correct.

The cut-up technique of chaos magic gives insight into art, politics and science.

However, is there a contradiction if we talk of a "something" (i.e., a "thing"), since noumenon is not an object for a subject...even if we replace "thing" with "reality", "an existence,"...still it must be a reality/existence for a perceiving subject? — jancanc

This is the same problem with Direct Realism. For example, we see the colour red, yet science tells us the cause is a wavelength of 700nm.

In Kant's terms, our seeing the colour red is the appearance and the 700nm is the noumenon. If it weren't for science, just by seeing the colour red, we would have no idea that its cause was 700nm.

The mind has evolved to equate effect with cause, to equate appearance with its noumena. When seeing the colour red, the mind equates the appearance with its cause, such that the mind believes that the cause of our seeing red was the colour red. Yet we know that science tells us the cause was a wavelength of 700nm.

The noumenon is named after the appearance, in that, if the appearance is given the name "red", then the noumenon is also give the name "red", regardless of what the noumenon actually is.

Similarly with the other senses. If I hear a grating noise, I name its cause grating. If I smell an acrid smell, I name its cause acrid. If I feel something silky, I name its cause silky. If I taste something bitter, I name its cause bitter.

Therefore, any contradiction disappears, because when we talk about a "red post-box", we are not taking about something that exists in the world. We are not taking about a noumenon which we cannot know about. We are actually talking about how the something in the world appears to us, in that we are talking about an appearance.

What is the "referent" for the term "noumenon"? — jancanc

Kant wrote in A249 of Critique of Pure Reason that noumena, aka things-in-themselves, are given to a priori intuition. Note that intuitions are not concepts, which are a different thing altogether.

A249 - Appearances, to the extent that as objects they are thought in accordance with the unity of the categories, are called phenomena. If, however, I suppose there to be things that are merely objects of the understanding and that, nevertheless, can be given to an intuition, although not to sensible intuition (as coram intuiti intellectuali),then such things would be called noumena (intelligibilia).

Kant wrote in Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics 1783 that the category of cause and effect can be applied to things-in-themselves.

"And we indeed, rightly considering objects of sense as mere appearances, confess thereby that they are based upon a thing in itself, though we know not this thing as it is in itself, but only know its appearances, viz., the way in which our senses are affected by this unknown something."

A noumena is an unknown something that causes an appearance. Therefore, the referent of a noumena is the unknown something that causes such an appearance.

Because Kant applies the category of cause and effect to things-in-themselves, although the thing-in-itself cannot be known, that there is something that caused the appearance can be known.

The central defining tenet of chaos magic is arguably the idea that belief is a tool for achieving effects...............Excuse me if my thoughts got a bit jumbled near the end. — HarryHarry

The trick, as used by many writers on philosophy, including sometimes the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, is to start by arranging a set of appropriate terminology in some random order and then grammatically connecting them.

The cut-up technique is an important part off Chaos Magic, where a written text is cut up and rearranged, often at random, to create a new text.

For example, taking from the SEP article on Belief the following appropriate words: symbol - hot water - mind - particular fact - entities - representationalism - mass of water - memory - accessed- proposition.

We can then put them in one random order and then grammatically connect them to give:

Take the symbol of hot water as part of a belief in the mind, where hot water is taken as a particular fact in the world. Such facts lead to a novel entity in the mind, specifically an important feature of representationism. It follows that the representation of a mass of water as hot, as one says, hot water, is something stored in the memory and accessed when required in the form of a proposition.

Or we can put them in a different random order and then grammatically connect them to give:

Beliefs are part of propositions about entities that exist in an observed world, such as the object mass of water which is accessed by the mind from observation as having the form of hot water. Such objects become a symbol in the mind, things that have been been observed in the world, and retrieved as a memory when required, being brought back to light as a particular fact, in other words, as a form of representationalism

IE, as long as the terminology is appropriate, it is often the role of the reader to make sense of the article rather than the role of the writer.

Who was it who said "Great minds discuss ideas; average minds discuss events; small minds discuss people; tiny minds discuss grammar." — Jamal

Presumably not the philosopher who said "Half of good philosophy is good grammar.’

I struggle to see the sense in defining anything as relative. — Matt Thomas

In the mind, definitions and relations between absolutes exist. The world, however, is another matter.

As the SEP article on Relations wrote:

Some philosophers are wary of admitting relations because they are difficult to locate. Glasgow is west of Edinburgh. This tells us something about the locations of these two cities. But where is the relation that holds between them in virtue of which Glasgow is west of Edinburgh?

Bradley's Regress makes the same point.

Either a relation R is nothing to the things it relates, in which case it cannot relate to them. Or, it is something to them, in which case R must be related to them. But for R to be related to a and b there must be not only R and the things it relates, but also a subsidiary relation R' to relate R to them. But now the same problem arises with regard to R'. It must be something to R and the things it related in order for R' to relate R to them and this requires a further subsidiary relation R'' between R', R, a and b. But positing more relations to fix up the problem is only throwing good money after bad. We fall into an infinite regress because the same reasoning applies equally to R' and however many other subsidiary relations we subsequently introduce.

IE, I can say "the Sun is larger than the Earth", in that "larger" exists as a concept in my mind, but where in the world does "larger" actually exist ?

And brain states aren’t Innatism; they’re cognitive neuroscience. Or quantum biology maybe. Sure as hell ain’t proper metaphysics. — Mww

I wouldn't classify the mind-body problem, the debate between Dualism and Monism, and the debate between Innatism and Behaviourism, as not proper metaphysics.

As it should. Since it is Kant’s notion of space and time being discussed, we would use Kant’s notion of perception. Which is……? — Mww

As regards Kant's notion of perception, the the IEP article on Kant: Philosophy of Mind writes:

One has a perception, in Kant’s sense, when one can not only discriminate one thing from another, or between the parts of a single thing, based on a sensory apprehension of it, but also can articulate exactly which features of the object or objects that distinguish it from others. For instance, one can say it is green rather than red, or that it occupies this spatial location rather than that one. Intuition thus allows for the discrimination of distinct objects via an awareness of their features, while perception allows for an awareness of what specifically distinguishes an object from others.

From B147 of Critique of Pure Reason

Things in space and time, however, are only given insofar as they are perceptions (representations accompanied with sensation), hence through empirical representation.

For Kant, perception allows us to not only distinguish green from red, left from right, etc, but also to be aware of what distinguishes green from red, left from right, etc.

So Hume's explanation is not consistent with our natural sensation which is to see the object moving from right to left, in a manner of spatial-temporal continuity of the object — Metaphysician Undercover

Hume writes in An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding

When we say, therefore, that one object is connected with another, we mean only, that they have acquired a connexion in our thought, and give rise to this inference, by which they become proofs of each other's existence: A conclusion, which is somewhat extraordinary; but which seems founded on sufficient evidence.

I would have thought that Hume based his theory of constant conjunction on our natural sensations, not on some abstract philosophical reasonings.

Just as the itch requires more than its sensation for the determination of its cause, so too must an object’s relation to you, that it is left or right, that it is above or below, that it is this or that, require more than its mere perception. — Mww

It comes down to the meaning of perception.

From the Wikipedia article on Perception

Perception is the organization, identification, and interpretation of sensory information in order to represent and understand the presented information or environment. Perception is not only the passive receipt for of these signals, but it is also shaped by the recipient's learning, memory, expectation, and attention.

Many philosophers, such as Jerry Fodor, write that the purpose of perception is knowledge. However, evolutionary psychologists hold that the primary purpose of perception is to guide action. They give the example of depth perception, which seems to have evolved not to aid in knowing the distances to other objects but rather to aid movement. Evolutionary psychologists argue that animals ranging from fiddler crabs to humans use eyesight for collision avoidance, suggesting that vision is basically for directing action, not providing knowledge.

Perception is more than sensation. Perception is what interprets sensations. Perception is what gives us the spatial relationship between objects, whether to the left or to the right, whether above or below.

Perhaps this is why one reads in the SEP article on Kant's Views on Space and Time that

But leaving that complication aside, it is surely very surprising to hear that intuition, which in some regards is akin to perception (Parsons 1992, 65–66; Allais 2015, 147ff), can also be empirical or a priori in character.

According to Locke’s view, a version of which was also defended by Hume (Treatise, 1.2.3), we obtain a representation of space—not of places, but of the one all-encompassing space, which may be akin to geometric space—from the perception of spatial relations.

It is our perception of the world that allows us to distinguish left from right, above from below.

===============================================================================

Understanding. Plain and simple. It’s all in the text. Not in wiki. Space and time are irrefutably merely representations, all representations are products of either sensibility as phenomena, or thought as conceptions. Both sensibility and cognition insofar as they are active processes of the human intellect, are not themselves innate, thus it follows that neither are their respective products. That humans can sense and can think may indeed be innate, but the process by which these are done, which implies a system, is not that by which they are possible, which is given from a certain kind of existence alone. — Mww

From SEP - Kant's Views on Space and Time

Space is not an empirical concept which has been derived from outer experiences. A23/B38

Finally, transcendental idealism, in so far as it concerns space and time, has the following essential component: we have a non-empirical, singular, immediate representation of space. Part of Kant’s innovation is to introduce into the philosophical lexicon the very idea that we can have non-empirical intuition.

As you say, the ability to think is probably innate. The question is, is what we think, our understanding, limited or not by our "natural instincts".

For Kant, our non-empirical intuition of time and space doesn't come from observation, doesn't come from any perception of the world, but comes from pure cognition in our minds.

The question is, what is the link between the innate ability to think and what is thought. Even if we accept Innatism, that the mind is born with already-formed ideas, knowledge, and beliefs, is it possible for our thoughts to be independent of such ideas, knowledge and beliefs. Does our innate ability to think determine what we think, or can what we think be independent of such innate ability of thought.

Any thoughts we have must be expressed in the physical state of the brain. There must be some correspondence at any moment in time between what we are thinking and the physical state of the brain. Any new thought must require an altered state of the physical brain. But any physical change requires a physical cause, in that a physical state cannot spontaneously change without a preceding physical cause. An effect needs a cause.

Summing up, any new thought requires a change in the state of the physical brain, but any change in the state of the physical brain requires a preceding physical cause. But in its turn, any preceding physical cause must require its own preceding physical cause, and so on, leaving no possibility that our thoughts have not been determined by a pre-existing physical state of the brain.

IE, understanding cannot be free of the physical state of the brain. Cognition is a function of the state of the physical brain, not something that can be achieved free of the state of the physical brain.

So in answer to my question, regarding Kant's non-empirical intuition, if such intuition is non-empirical, then where is the source of such intuition. The source can only be the momentary physical state of the brain, which has been determined by the preceding physical state of the brain, and so on, eventually leading back, to the innate ability of humans to think. In other words, Innatism.

What would be called today, perhaps, insofar as Innatism, being a rather more psychological formalism, had no standing in Enlightenment metaphysics. — Mww

From the Wikipedia article on Innatism, Innatism refers to the philosophy of Descartes.

Innatism and nativism are generally synonymous terms referring to the notion of pre-existing ideas in the mind. However, more specifically, innatism refers to the philosophy of Descartes, who assumed that God or a similar being or process placed innate ideas and principles in the human mind.

Nativism represents an adaptation of this, grounded in the fields of genetics, cognitive psychology, and psycholinguistics. Nativists hold that innate beliefs are in some way genetically programmed in our mind—they are the phenotypes of certain genotypes that all humans share in common. Nativism is a modern view rooted in innatism. The advocates of nativism are mainly philosophers who also work in the field of cognitive psychology or psycholinguistics: most notably Noam Chomsky and Jerry Fodor.

Descartes' (1596 - 1650) rationalist system of philosophy is one of the pillars on which Enlightenment (1685 - 1815) thought rests.

Kant (1724 - 1804) came after Descartes, so we can assume that Kant was aware of the concept of Innatism.

Our friend Chomsky (b. 1928) is a contemporary supporter of Innatism against the Behaviourism of Skinner (1904 - 1990).

As regards Kant's non-empirical intuition, if such intuition is non-empirical, then where is the source of such intuition if not innate ?

I don't think that this is right at all. Think about how sensation works. Sight and hearing receive the activity of waves. But people were seeing and hearing long before they knew the manner of this motion. And the other senses perceive the activities of molecules, but the perceptions which result do not include anything about the manner in which the molecules are moving. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is true that I may perceive an itch on my hand, but the itch does not represent what caused it. This has been my argument in the past against Direct Realism. The Direct Realist's position is that just knowing an effect, say an itch, this would automatically enable them to know its cause, say a thistle.

At one moment in time I may perceive two objects spatially separated, say one to the left and one to the right. But perception is not only spatial, it is also temporal, in that I may perceive an object at one moment in time to the right and at a later moment in time to the left. Not only does perception allow spatial separation but perception also allows temporal separation. If that weren't the case, all my perceptions would be frozen in time, making life unworkable.

In driving along a busy road through a city centre, if all me perceptions were of instants of time, and I had to connect these frozen perceptions by cognitive judgement, I would have crashed my car within the first five minutes. No amount of quick thinking would allow the human to successfully succeed in any task requiring a quick response - such as driving through a city centre, playing tennis, reading a novel, cooking a meal, engaging in conversation - if they had to constantly consciously reason how one event at one moment in time is connected to a different event a fraction of a second later.

Humans, as animals, have evolved such that their perceptions are not only spatial but also temporal. As Kant said, humans have a unity of the manifold of intuition imposed by the unity of consciousness.

But the point is that Hume describes sensation as apprehending distinct states, then using what you call "natural instinct" to infer that motion has occurred between these distinct states. This is completely different from Kant who places the intuitions of space and time as necessary for the possibility of sensation. — Metaphysician Undercover

There is an object to the right of my field of vision, and one second later there is an object to the left of my field of vision. Hume induces that there is only one object and it is moving from right to left.

One can ask where the human faculty for induction came from. Is Innatism true, whereby humans are born with certain innate abilities, ie "natural instincts", or is Behaviourism true, whereby humans are born a blank slate having no innate abilities and everything is learnt from their environment.

Is the human faculty for induction an innate "natural instinct" or learnt from the environment.

There is evidence that Hume believed that not only animals but also humans are born with "natural instincts", ie, a form of Innatism. Kant argued for non-empirical intuitions, ie, in today's terms, a form of Innatism

In this regard, it can be seen that both Hume and Kant have an acceptance of what would be called today, Innatism.

That the truck is moving straight toward you is a conclusion, not a perception. You perceive (sense) motion, and you make a judgement as to whether the truck is coming toward you or not. The judgement that it is coming straight toward you is not a perception, and is independent from the sensation that it is moving. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree I perceive something moving towards me and then judge it to be a truck.

But I cannot perceive an object moving without perceiving the manner in which it is moving. When I perceive a moving object, my perception includes the manner in which it is moving. I don't perceive an object moving and then judge it to be moving to the left. I perceive an object moving to the left.

I agree judgement is independent to perception, but when perceiving a moving object, the fact that the object is coming straight towards me is part of the perception, not part of a subsequent cognitive judgement.

You make a judgement that the cause of your pain is cold water, rather than that it is something else, like hot water. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree, I perceive pain and then judge the cause to be cold water.

But according to Kant, you do perceive (sense) activity and motion. And this is why space and time, as a priori intuitions, are said to be prior to sensibility and sense experience in general, as necessary conditions for the possibility of sensation. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree. Perhaps would be called Innatism today.

This is perhaps the fundamental difference between Hume and Kant. Hume represents sensations as static, states of existence, which change from one moment to the next. Kant represents sensations as active, according to the necessary requirements for sensation, those pure a priori intuitions, space and time. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not necessarily.

It is true that Hume is described as an Empiricist, meaning he believed "causes and effects are discoverable not by reason, but by experience", such that the cornerstone of his epistemology was the problem of induction.

However, such a philosophy may be argued to be founded on Hume's belief in natural instinct, rather than reason, thereby discovering a strong link between Hume's inductive inference and Kant's non-empirical intuition.

The following is taken from James Hill's The Role of Instinct in David Hume's Conception of Human Reason

In a detailed and enlightening discussion of Hume's conception of instinct, Bertram Laing maintains that ‘a theory of instinct’ is fundamental and it ‘underlies his other doctrines’. Laing associates this implicit theory of instinct above all with the First Enquiry where, ‘in contrast to the Treatise,’ a doctrine of instinct can be seen ‘to stand out more prominently’ (Laing 1926). Let us set out this theory of instinct, starting with an enumeration of the different instincts that Hume attributes to man.

We should not be surprised to find the so-called ‘primary appetites’, such as hunger, thirst, and ‘affection between the sexes’, described as instincts (T 2.3.9.8/439 ; NHR Intro; EPM app. 2.12/301). Nor will we be surprised to learn that passions and desires such as love of progeny, love of fame,2 and ‘a desire of the happiness or misery of others, according to the love or hatred we bear them’, are all instincts for Hume (T 2.2.12.5/398 ; T 2.2.7.1/368 ; NHR Intro; EPM app. 2.12/301).

In addition to these ‘low’ appetites and often turbulent passions, Hume follows Francis Hutcheson (1756: 292) in treating more elevated and humane dispositions of the soul as instincts.3 The moral virtues expressed in the ‘calm desires’ of benevolence, compassion, generosity, appetite to good, aversion to evil are originally determined by nature and thus qualify as instincts (T 2.3.3.8/417–8; L 38). This means that, like Hutcheson, Hume takes moral judgement, and conduct in accordance with it, as stemming from instinct not reason, although reason and reflection will still have a part to play in the final determination of this judgement and conduct.

IE, Hume often makes the case that natural instinct, rather than reason, is the foundation of human behaviour, of which induction is one example.

Me, I reject that my mind perceives, preferring to leave such occupation to my senses, as Nature intended. — Mww

Unfortunately, when going to the dentist, it is my mind that perceives the pain of the cold water on a sensitive tooth. If only it was just my unconscious senses that perceived the pain.

As the Merriam-Webster dictionary writes, perception involves awareness:
Perception is the awareness of the elements of environment through physical sensation

However, can Kant's theory of sensible intuition be modified to better fit contemporary facts, or must it be completely discarded as a once very interesting, but now debunked, theory? — charles ferraro

Kant's non-empirical intuition seems very similar in principle to today's Innatism.

From Wikipedia - Innatism
In epistemology, innatism is the view that the mind is born with already-formed ideas, knowledge, and beliefs. The opposing doctrine, that the mind is a tabula rasa (blank slate) at birth and all knowledge is gained from experience and the senses, is called empiricism.

From SEP - Kant's Views on Space and Time
Now what are space and time? Are they actual entities [wirkliche Wesen]? Are they only determinations or also relations of things, but still such as would belong to them even if they were not intuited? Or are they such that they belong only to the form of intuition, and therefore to the subjective constitution of our mind, without which these predicates could not be ascribed to any things at all? (A23/B37–8).

Correct, insofar as experience requires perception, and space/time is not an experience, just means neither is space nor time a perception. — Mww

I am crossing a busy road and see a truck moving straight towards me. I perceive the truck and I perceive the truck moving through space and time.

If I wasn't able to perceive space and time, I wouldn't be able to perceive that the truck was moving straight towards me. It would appear stationary and not presenting an immediate danger.

My perceptions are my experiences. My perceptions of objects in space and time are my experiences of objects in space and time.

I clearly perceive objects, space and time in my mind.

How I am able to perceive objects, space and time in my mind is a subsequent question. Is Chomsky correct that humans are born with certain innate abilities, or is Skinner correct that the human is born a blank slate having no innate capabilities and everything is learnt from their environment or is Kant correct that humans have non-empirical intuition ?

Though it seems to me that Kant's non-empirical intuitions have similarities with Chomsky's innate abilities.

Kantian space and time are not experiences. — Mww

The SEP article on Kant’s Transcendental Idealism writes:

In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant argues that space and time are merely formal features of how we perceive objects, not things in themselves that exist independently of us, or properties or relations among them. Objects in space and time are said to be “appearances”, and he argues that we know nothing of substance about the things in themselves of which they are appearances.

It seems that Kant is arguing that the space and time we perceive is not the space and time that exists independently of us.

The space and time we perceive we must also experience, otherwise we wouldn't be able to perceive it. The space and time that exists independently of us we can neither perceive nor experience.

First there is perception and then there is cognition.

There seems to be two levels of perception.

First is the perception of simple concepts, such as colours, shapes, sizes, smells, sounds, tastes, feelings, etc. As these are directly from sensations and sense data, the observer cannot be mistaken about having perceived them.

Second is the perception of complex concepts, such as apples, trees, mountains, governments, etc. The brain combines simple concepts into complex concepts. As no cognitive judgment has been made, the observer cannot be mistaken about having perceived them.

Although the observer cannot be mistaken about what they have perceived, what they have perceived may not exist outside their perception of it.

With cognition, the brain combines these simple and complex concepts using memory, reasoning and language to understand what has been perceived, enabling propositions such as "the apple is on the table". As a cognitive judgment has been made, the observer can be mistaken about what they have judged to be the case.

So the I guess radical conclusion for me is that phenomenal properties cannot be illusory — goremand

Not a radical conclusion, but a very sensible one.

If I perceive certain phenomena, of touch, sight, sound, taste or smell, my perceiving such phenomena cannot be mistaken. My judgement of what caused these phenomena may be mistaken, in that I may think the postbox is red, but this would be an illusion, in that the postbox is actually emitting a wavelength of 700nm.

What is the difference between same kind and different kind? — Eugen

Dualism and Monism
Summing up: Dualism includes Substance Dualism and Property Dualism and Monism includes Physicalism, Idealism and Neutral Monism.

Substance Dualism is the idea that mental substances and physical substances are of different kinds. Property Dualism is the idea that there is only one physical substance, but mental properties and physical properties are of different kinds. Physicalism is the idea that there is only one physical substance and mental properties and physical properties are of the same kind. Idealism is the idea that there is only one mental substance and mental properties and physical properties are of the same kind. Neutral Monism is the idea that there is only one substance and mental properties and physical properties are of the same kind.

Pleonasm
In practice, trying to decide whether two things are of the same kind or of a different kind is almost impossible. Is a Monet painting of a water lily the same kind of thing or a different kind of thing to a Damien Hurst dot painting. They are the same in some respects but different in others. The question is so complex that the terms "same kind" and "different kind" become almost redundant. The Deflationary approach would be just to accept that the Monet is different to the Damien Hurst, ignoring altogether the term "kind".

Neutral Monism
My belief is in Neutral Monism, in that reality consists of elementary particles, elementary forces, space and time. Therefore, expressions such as motion, consciousness, matter, emotions, governments,mountains, existence, France, Socrates, etc are no more than certain mysterious combinations of elementary particles, elementary forces, space and time.

As Chomsky said in Mysterianism, Language, and Human Understanding about Mysterianism:
16min - "Well, returning to the impact of Newton's discoveries, his greatest achievement, David Hume wrote, was to draw the veil from some of the mysteries of nature, while also restoring nature's ultimate secrets to that obscurity in which they ever did, and ever will remain. We may add, for humans at least, other in forms of intelligence might view the world quite differently. All of this is dedicated Mysterionism for very substantial reasons".

Taking the example of a stone held motionless in a gravitational field and then released, at the initial state it will have a mass in a gravitational field and at a later state it will have a mass in a gravitational field and a velocity. Between the initial and final state the properties will have changed.

Theory and intuition
From observation, we can establish the theory that v = gt, but there is no intuition that we can discover from either the stone or the gravitational field that the stone will of necessity move when in a gravitational field. We know from observation that g = 9.81m/s2, but we have no intuition why 9.81 and not 3.43 for example.

IE, for Chomsky, we may have a theory how something happens but no intuition why it happens, which is Mysterianism.

Panpsychism
There cannot be consciousness without the matter of the brain. As there cannot be motion without the stone, yet motion is not in the stone, we can draw the analogy and say that consciousness is not in the matter of the brain.

IE, Chomsky does not believe that consciousness is fundamental within matter, as in panpsychism, but as Priestley writes, is the product of the whole rather than its parts.

Emergence
We may have a theory that v = gt, a theory why liquid emerges from molecules or a theory how consciousness emerges from the matter of the brain, but we have no intuition why any of these should be the case. In fact, I would suggest that there is no theory for which we have an intuition, in that all theories are based on mysterious intuitions. We may have theories explaining emergence, but if all intuitions for emergence are mysterious, then there is no distinction between weak and strong emergence as there is just the mystery of emergence.

IE, for Chomsky, there is no distinction between weak and strong emergence. It also follows that term radical emergence is redundant.

Properties
As the property of motion is different to the property of the stone that happens to be in motion, the property of consciousness is different to the property of the matter of the brain. Property dualism is the position that the property of consciousness is different in kind to the property of the matter of the brain, whereas Monism is that although the property of consciousness is different to the property of matter of the brain it is of the same kind. As the statement "it is true that x" does not add anything to the statement "x", then what does the statement "x and y are different in kind" add to the statement "x and y are different" ?

IE, within a deflationary approach, properties may be accepted to be different without needing to introduce the concepts of dualism or monism.

Proto-consciousness? That's fine, I suppose, but I'd add the caveat that whatever matter ends up being, it is also almost a "proto-everything", including proto-sensations, proto-liquid, proto-heart, etc. — Manuel

Whatever matter ends up being, it is not necessarily proto-everything according to some current theories.

For example, the two main current theories of consciousness can be broadly divided into Dualist solutions and Monist solutions.

Within the Dualist Solutions can be Substance Dualism, where the mental can exist independently of the body, or Property Dualism, where mental properties supervene on physical properties.

Within the Dualist Solutions, matter is not explained as being proto-conscious. Only within the Monist Solutions is matter explained as being proto-conscious.

As for the weak or strong emergence, I think the stress in Chomsky's quote should be focused on "Can there be what he calls radical emergence, entirely new properties somehow developing without any elements of them in earlier structures. I think that happens all the time." — Manuel

Water as a liquid is a collection of water molecules. One property of a liquid is that it takes the shape of the vessel it is in. One property of a molecule is that it has a definite and rigid structure and doesn't take the shape of the vessel it is in.

It is the case that liquid water has an entirely new property not seen in the individual water molecules from which it is composed. Chomsky calls this radical emergence, saying that this is something that happens all the time.

It is certainly true that liquid's property of taking the shape of the vessel it is in is radically different to the molecule's property of having a rigid structure and not taking the shape of the vessel it is in, but isn't this what we would intuitively expect.

If by "strong emergence" she means that particles in the LHC should show signs of consciousness when they collide, then of course it's not "strongly emergent" in that case. — Manuel

If panpsychism is true, when particles collide, consciousness would not emerge from the collision, as consciousness was already present in the particles before colliding.

If panprotopsychism is true, when particles collide, consciousness could emerge from the collision, as a proto-consciousness was present in the particles before colliding.

IE, there are some theories whereby consciousness doesn't emerge, as it is already fundamental and ubiquitous.

We may get a theory of consciousness, we may not, if we do get a theory then we would say the same thing about consciousness as we do about liquids. — Manuel

There is only one kind of emergence

I would agree that there is only one kind of emergence. In physics, all our examples of emergence are of the weak variety, such as sound from atoms or liquids from molecules. As you say "We may get a theory of consciousness, we may not, if we do get a theory then we would say the same thing about consciousness as we do about liquids"

As Chomsky said in: Noam Chomsky on the Big Questions (Part 4)
59 min - I don't go along with Strawson and as far as he does to defend panpsychism. His argument for panpsychism is based on a serious point . Can there be what he calls radical emergence, entirely new properties somehow developing without any elements of them in earlier structures. I think that happens all the time. There's nothing in the hydrogen atom which says you're a liquid. Changes take place with other levels of complexity increasing that bring about entirely new phenomena. So I don't think that's a strong argument.

As Sabine Hossenfelder said in What is Emergence
4min - A lot of people seem to think that consciousness of free will should be strongly emergent, but there's absolutely no reason to think that this is the case. For all we currently know, consciousness is weakly emergent, as any other collective phenomenon in large systems.

Parts exist in the world and wholes exist in the mind

Realism accepts that the parts exist in the world, but it may be argued that the whole, any collection of parts, only exists in the mind of an observer. Atoms may exist in the world, but sound only exists as a concept in the mind of an observer. Molecules may exist in the world, but liquids only exist as a concept in the mind of an observer.

I am taking atoms and molecules as metaphorical parts, in that atoms and molecules are in turn wholes made up of more fundamental parts.

Sound may emerge from atoms and liquid may emerge from molecules, but the emergent sound and liquid only exist as concepts in the mind.

The mind is conscious of both the physical parts, the atoms and molecules, and the conceptual wholes, the sounds and the liquids, even though only the physical parts exist in the world.

The emergence of consciousness from neurons hits the barrier of introspection

We are conscious of the atoms and the sounds they emerge into. We are conscious of the molecules and the liquids they emerge into.

How can we understand the neurons and the consciousness they emerge into.

I am taking neurons as metaphorical parts, in that neurons are in turn wholes made up of more fundamental parts.

We arrive at the self-referential problem of being conscious of the neurons and the consciousness they emerge into, ie, being conscious of consciousness itself.

Chomsky said in The Ideas of Chomsky (1977), our mind is inaccessible to introspection:
36min - For example, that same image dominates the rationalist tradition as well, where it was assumed that one could exhaust the contents of the mind by careful attention. You know, you could really develop those clear and distinct ideas, and their consequences, and so on. And in fact, even if you move to someone, let's say, like Freud, with his evocation of the unconscious, still I think that a careful reading suggests that he regarded the unconscious as, in principle, accessible. That is, we could really perceive that theater, and stage, and the things on it carefully if only the barriers of repression and so on could be overcome. Well if what I've been suggesting is correct, that's just radically wrong, I mean, even wrong as a point of departure. There's no reason all that I can see for believing that the principles of metal computation that enter so intimately into our action or our interaction or our speech-- to believe that those principles are all accessible to introspection any more than the analysing mechanisms of our visual system, or, for that matter, the nature of liver is accessible to introspection.

IE, the problem of consciousness emerging from neurons hits the barrier, as Chomsky pointed out, of the inaccessibility of introspection, of consciousness being conscious of itself, and therefore may never be solvable.

Actually you can, you can email him any time, and he would answer. I've met him personally and have asked him about the topic, it was part of my thesis. But, if you have doubts, see the following. See starting min. 59: — Manuel

I feel I have been, as they say, inadvertently "trying to teach my grandmother to suck eggs". Yes, Chomsky at 59min does suggest that he finds no distinction in emergence between weak and strong forms.

59 min - I don't go along with Strawson and as far as he does to defend panpsychism. His argument for panpsychism is based on a serious point . Can there be what he calls radical emergence, entirely new properties somehow developing without any elements of them in earlier structures. I think that happens all the time. There's nothing in the hydrogen atom which says you're a liquid. Changes take place with other levels of complexity increasing that bring about entirely new phenomena. So I don't think that's a strong argument.

Emergence is explained as occurring when an entity is observed to have properties its parts do not have on their own.

Chomsky makes a distinction between being able to understand the nature of reality and developing theories about the nature of reality. We can use the equation f = ma to predict what will happen without understanding why it happens.

page 173 - "Well accordingly the goals of scientific inquiry were implicitly restricted from the intelligibility of nature, which was in fact the criterion for true understanding in early modern science, Galilean science, and its successors, they abandoned that and moved to something much narrower, intelligibility of theories about the world".

Chomsky also makes the point that even though the mind may emerge from the physical matter of the brain, the nature of physical matter is still beyond our understanding.

56min - the problem is with the physical. When you talk about reducing Consciousness to physical you don't know what physical is. Physical is just whatever the Sciences say.
58min - whatever matter turns out to be

However, there is a difference between the emergence of the mind from the brain and the emergent behaviour of liquid due to its molecules. In Chomsky's terms, for the brain to mind we have neither a theory nor a grasp, whereas for the molecule to liquid we have a theory but no grasp.

63min - We can understand it to the extent that humans are capable of understanding things . I don't know about you, but I have no grasp of, I can follow the theory that explains how hydrogen and oxygen end up feeling like a liquid, but I have no grasp of it. I can follow the theory okay, and that's the way science works.

It comes down to how emergence is defined. If strong emergence is defined as having neither grasp nor theory, then from brain to mind is strong emergence, and if weak emergence is defined as having a theory but no grasp, then from molecule to liquid is weak emergence.

1) Noam Chomsky on the Big Questions (Part 4) | Closer To Truth Chats

2) Chomsky - The Mysteries of Nature: How deeply hidden ?

Chomsky and the question "has consciousness emerged from the matter of the brain"

Pity we can't ask Chomsky.

I think it is meant as somewhat ironic — Manuel

p 193 - There is something about the nature of Hydrogen and Oxygen “in virtue of which they are intrinsically suited to constituting water,” so the sciences discovered after long labors, providing reasons “in the nature of things why the emerging thing is as it is.” What seemed “brute emergence” was assimilated into science as ordinary emergence—not, to be sure, of the liquidity variety, relying on conceivability.

Chomsky is distinguishing between strong emergence and weak emergence. With scientific understanding, what used to be thought of a strong emergence is now understood as weak emergence. For example, closing the gap between chemistry and physics with a better understanding of the quantum theory. Today, how consciousness is related to the brain is a mystery. Various theories have been proposed, including strong emergence and panpsychism. But as Chomsky writes, we don't know enough at the moment to come up with a definitive solution.

As the quote in your quoting of him in p.171, says, "even if we are certain it does." We can't doubt that experience comes from the brain. — Manuel

page 171: “we do not really understand [because] we are still unable to form a conception of how consciousness arises in matter, even if we are certain that it does.”

Consciousness and matter are certainly related, but that does not mean consciousness has emerged from the matter of the brain. There are other possibilities, for example, panpsychism, whereby consciousness is fundamental in the natural world, and being fundamental, cannot be described as having emerged from matter.

As for the quote in page 178, the point is stress that it might not only be neurons that are the cause of consciousness, there is a whole lot of other activity going on in the brain. These other parts of the brain likely play an important role on consciousness, but we've still to figure it out. — Manuel

I agree. At this moment in time, Chomsky is saying we don't know enough about the relation of consciousness to the brain to sensibly propose how they are related, whether by emergence or otherwise.

He references Randy Gallistel, who he thinks is persuasive on this topic. — Manuel

page 177 - C.R. Gallistel points out that “we clearly do not understand how the nervous system computes,” or even “the foundations of its ability to compute,” even for “the small set of arithmetic and logical operations that are fundamental to any computation.”

This reinforces my point that Chomsky is saying we don't know how consciousness and brain are related, even to sensibly propose that the mind emerges from the brain, as opposed, for example, to panpsychism, whereby consciousness is fundamental in the natural world.

He doesn't make a difference between strong and weak emergence. He doesn't say it explicitly, but I think it's quite clear. — Manuel

Chomsky: The Mysteries of Nature: How deeply hidden ?

Chomsky makes the distinction between the weak emergence of liquids from molecules and "radical emergence", ie, strong emergence, between two entities that are “absolutely incompatible with one another.”

page 192 - common objection today is that such ideas invoke an unacceptable form of “radical emergence,” unlike the emergence of liquids from molecules, where the properties of the liquid can in some reasonable sense be regarded as inhering in the molecules.

I read Chomsky as saying that we don't know enough about consciousness to even sensibly theorise about its origin, including whether or not it emerges from the physical brain.

page 171: “we do not really understand [because] we are still unable to form a conception of how consciousness arises in matter, even if we are certain that it does.”

page 178: Similarly it is premature to hold that “it is empirically evident that states of consciousness are the necessary consequence of neuronal activity.” Too little is understood about the functioning of the brain

page 192: In Nagel’s phrase, “we can see how liquidity is the logical result of the molecules ‘rolling around on each other’ at the microscopic level,” though “nothing comparable is to be expected in the case of neurons” and consciousness.

According to him, consciousness is emergent — Manuel

Where does Chomsky say that "consciousness is emergent" ?

There is a difference between weak emergence, as liquid from molecules, and strong emergence, as minds from brains.

In the video Noam Chomsky Mysterianism, Language, and Human Understanding, at 13.40 min onwards he says that at the moment we do not understand the principles as to how a mind can emerge from a brain.

"The phrase we do not yet understand however should strike a note of caution."

Newton proved we don't understand motion: we provide descriptions for in our theories — Manuel

Yes, as Chomsky said in the video 9min onwards, we can create theories about something without understanding what that something is.

"Well accordingly the goals of scientific inquiry were implicitly restricted from the intelligibility of nature, which was in fact the criterion for true understanding in early modern science, Galilean science, and its successors, they abandoned that and moved to something much narrower, intelligibility of theories about the world".

Chat GPT says Chomsky does not believe in the complete reductionism of consciousness to matter. Unfortunately, I have not been able to obtain any quote in this regard. Do you think Chat GPT gave me the right answer? — Eugen

In his video interview Noam Chomsky - Mysterianism, Language, and Human Understanding, Chomsky says:

1min - "I'm cited as one of the culprits responsible for this strange post-modern heresy (New Mysterianism) which I happily accept though I would prefer a different term for it , namely Truism, that's what I thought forty years ago, in proposing a distinction between problems which fall within our cognitive capacities , which may be vary hard, but in principle fall within them , and mysteries that do not fall within them at all"

3min - "The reason it's Truism is that if we are biological organism s, not angels, then our cognitive faculties are similar to those that are called physical capacities and they should be studied much as other systems of the body are . These Truisms, and that is what they are, are commonly rejected in the study of mental faculties , language in particular, that seems to me to be one instance of a curious tendency to treat mental aspects of the human organism differently from so called physical aspects . It is a kind of methodological dualism, which is much more pernicious than Cartesian metaphysical dualism "

As Chomsky says that treating mental aspects differently to physical aspects is a pernicious dualism, it seems clear that Chat GPT is misleading to say that Chomsky does not believe in the complete reductionism of consciousness to matter. It is not about consciousness being reducible to matter, nor matter being reducible to consciousness, rather it is about there being no dualism between the mental and the physical.

What type of mysterianism does Chomsky embrace? — Eugen

As regards type 1 Mysterianism, as Chomsky said "our cognitive faculties are similar to those that are called physical capacities and they should be studied much as other systems of the body are ", for Chomsky, consciousness is fundamental, as gravity is fundamental.

As regards type 2 Mysterianism, as Chomsky said "in proposing a distinction between problems which fall within our cognitive capacities, which may be vary hard, but in principle fall within them , and mysteries that do not fall within them at all", for Chomsky some mysteries fall within our cognitive capacities and some fall outside it.

Naming is an event in Tarski's meta-language.

Tarski said that the truth of a statement cannot be found in an object language, but only in a metalanguage

Naming is extra-linguistic. For example, suppose I observe a colour in the world and name it "chekundu". As naming is extra-linguistic, naming is, in Tarski's terms, in a metalanguage. Once this colour has been named "chekundu", then the statement "this colour is chekundu" is true. The truth of the statement cannot be found in the object language itself, but in the act of naming, which is extra-linguistic, and part of a meta-language.

If you like, being true is what we do with felicitous statements; or "P" is true IFF P. — Banno

Given the expression "the bird is blue" is true IFF the bird is blue, "the bird is blue" exists in language, and the bird is blue exists in the world.

The question is, where does this world exist, in the mind or independent of the mind. Wittgenstein in the Tractatus, para 1 "The world is everything that is the case", carefully avoided giving his understanding of where this world existed.

The answer to the question whether is it true that in the world the bird is blue first depends on deciding where this world exists.

Is it true that in a world independent of the mind there is a bird that is blue, or is it true that in the world in the mind there is a bird that is blue.

If there is a realist, metaphysical truth existing in a world independent of the mind, how can we discover this truth, given the inherent problem of trying to understand a world that is independent of the mind when all we have to understand this mind-independent world is the mind.

I observe a colour in the world and name it blue. The statement "the colour is blue" is then true because I have named the colour blue. Regardless of whether the world I have observed exists independently of my mind or exists in my mind, the statement "the colour is blue" is true. IE, "The colour is blue" is true IFF I have named the colour blue.

The problem remains, what mechanism will enable the mind to know what is true independent of the mind?

Three Classic Objections and Responses — Banno

5.2 of SEP Pragmatic Theory of Truth concludes that pragmatic theories of truth do make a difference in shaping inquiry and assertoric discourse, and unlike other accounts of truth "do not block the way of inquiry".

It is also possible to ask this question of the pragmatic theory of truth itself: what difference does this theory make? Or to put it in James’ terms, what is its “cash value”? One answer is that, by focusing on the practical function of the concept of truth, pragmatic theories highlight how this concept makes certain kinds of inquiry and discourse possible. In contrast, as Lynch (2009) notes, some accounts of truth make it difficult to see how certain claims are truth-apt:

consider propositions like two and two are four or torture is wrong. Under the assumption that truth is always and everywhere causal correspondence, it is a vexing question how these true thoughts can be true. (Lynch 2009)

If that is so, then pragmatic theories have the advantage of preserving the possibility and importance of various types of inquiry and discourse. While this does not guarantee that inquiry will always reach a satisfying or definite conclusion, this does suggest that pragmatic theories of truth do make a difference: in the spirit of Peirce’s “first rule of reason”, they “do not block the way of inquiry”

Taking the statements "two and two are four", "torture is wrong", "grass" is green", "force equals mass times acceleration", "DNA is the code of life" or life evolved by natural selection" as examples, what Theory of Truth other than the Pragmatic Theory of Truth is able to give a useful answer as to the truth or falsity of these statements ?

Where is there a realist and metaphysical Theory of Truth that is capable of defining the truth of a statement ?

Which makes us see that truth is relative. — Alkis Piskas

:up:

The verification of the facts offered as evidence! And this may seem to go ad infinitum. So there must be some agreement --between all parts involved-- at some point, where we must conclude definitely about the truthfulness of the statement! This is how court decisions are made about the innocence or guiltiness of the accused when a jury is involved. — Alkis Piskas

As you say, the verification of the truth will go on ad infinitum until someone makes a determination as to the truth of a statement or situation.

I made the metaphorical comment that "truth is what the users of a language say it is."

As your example of a court decision shows, a jury made up of resident citizens and registered electors after deliberation determines guilt or innocence, upon which the judge passes sentence.

In this case, it is the jury after consideration of the evidence that makes the judgement as to the truth. What the jury says is the truth of the matter is then accepted as the truth by the wider society.

The puzzle is to find the flaw in the line of reasoning in the switching argument.

Re-wording my argument:

The puzzle states that one envelope contains twice as much as the other. Let one envelope contain x euros and the other 2x euros.
The player selects one envelope without opening it. This envelope contains either x euros or 2x euros
The puzzle states that the amount in the selected envelope is A

Possibility one
If the selected envelope contains x euros, then A = x
The puzzle goes on to state that the other envelope may contain either 2A or A/2, meaning either 2x euros or x/2 euros.
But the puzzle had previously established that the only amounts in the two envelopes are x euros and 2x euros.
Therefore, the statement "The other envelope may contain either 2A or A/2" leads to a contradiction.

Possibility two
If the selected envelope contains 2x euros, then A = 2x
The puzzle goes on to state that the other envelope may contain either 2A or A/2, meaning either 4x euros or x euros.
But the puzzle had previously established that the only amounts in the two envelopes are x euros and 2x euros.
Therefore, the statement "The other envelope may contain either 2A or A/2" leads to a contradiction.

Conclusion
It seems to me that the statement "The other envelope may contain either 2A or A/2" is where the flaw in the line of reasoning lies, as it leads to a contradiction.

Taken from Wikipedia Two envelopes problem
1) Imagine you are given two identical envelopes, each containing money. One contains twice as much as the other. You may pick one envelope and keep the money it contains. Having chosen an envelope at will, but before inspecting it, you are given the chance to switch envelopes. Should you switch?
2) Denote by A the amount in the player's selected envelope.
3) The probability that A is the smaller amount is 1/2, and that it is the larger amount is also 1/2.
4) The other envelope may contain either 2A or A/2.
5) If A is the smaller amount, then the other envelope contains 2A.
6) If A is the larger amount, then the other envelope contains A/2.
7) So the expected value of the money in the other envelope is: 1/2(2A) + 1/2(A/2) = 5/4A


Item 4) "The other envelope may contain either 2A or A/2" is a problem

1) Two envelopes containing £10 and £20
2) Selected envelope contains A, either £10 or £20
3) The probability that A is the smaller amount is 1/2, and that it is the larger amount is also 1/2.

Item 4) is a problem as it contradicts item 1).

If the selected envelope contains £10, then the other envelope must contain £20. It is not true that the other envelope may contain either £20 or £5. It cannot contain £5.

If the selected envelope contains £20, then the other envelope must contain £10. It is not true that the other envelope may contain either £40 or £10. It cannot contain £40.

Items 4), 5) and 6) should be reworded as: "the other envelope may contain either 2A if A is the smaller amount or A/2 if A is the larger amount."

It then follows that there is no value in switching.

The trouble with asserting that truth is a property of a statement is in finding a logical process by which the property of truth can be identified.(Tarski's artificial meta-system fails to answer this question.) — A Seagull

I observe a patch of colour and name the colour red. The statement "this patch of colour is red" is then true. Naming is a logical process, in that if I name a patch of colour red then it is true that the patch of colour is red.

Tarski proposed an object language and metalanguage, whereby the truth of a statement cannot be found in the object language but only externally in a metalanguage.

Given the statement "this patch of colour is red" in an object language, it is not possible to know whether the statement is true or false within the object language itself. The truth or falsity of the statement can only be found external to the object language, as Tarski proposed, in a metalanguage .

In an object language there may be a set of words "this patch of colour is red". This set of words is neither true nor false until the words have been given meaning by naming, where naming is external to the object language. The object language cannot name itself, it cannot talk about itself. Once I have named this patch of colour as red, then the statement "this patch of colour is red" becomes true.

Naming is external to the object language, and once the words in an object language have been given meaning by naming, then statements within the object language can then be known to be either true or false by reference to a naming external to the object language itself, ie, in a metalanguage.

What does it mean to say that a statement is true? — A Seagull

We see a patch of colour in the world. I label it as red and you label it as blue. A third person makes the statement "this patch of colour is red".

For me, the statement "this patch of colour is red" is true, whilst for you, the statement "this patch of colour is red" is false.

Whether the statement is true or false depends on what the patch of colour has been labelled.

Who or what determines what a patch of colour is labelled? It cannot be the world, as the world has no language. It could be a god if one believed in a god. It could be a Public Institution, but then one Public Institution could name it red and another name it rouge. Labelling could be up to each individual, but then the truth of a statement would be relative to each individual.

Whether the statement "this patch of colour is red" is true or not depends on what colour the patch of colour has been labelled as.

The problem is that there can be no mechanism of naming that is independent of the users of the language, meaning that naming can only be done by the users of the language. This results in the situation that a word only has meaning to the users of a language because the users of the language have given a meaning to that word.

So what does it mean to say that a statement is true. If the users of a language say "this patch of colour is the colour X" then it is true that "this patch of colour is the colour X".

IE, truth is what the users of a language say it is.

The switching argument, which produces a contradictory strategy for solving the two-envelope problem, starts by subjectively assuming, without evidence, the following conditional distribution, with respect to envelopes A and B whose values are a and b respectively — sime

Starting with the Wikipedia Two Envelopes Problem
Imagine you are given two identical envelopes, each containing money. One contains twice as much as the other. You may pick one envelope and keep the money it contains. Having chosen an envelope at will, but before inspecting it, you are given the chance to switch envelopes. Should you switch?

There are two identical envelopes A and B

Envelope A contains the value a, and envelope B contains the value b.

Either i) if the value a is 10 euros, then the value b is 20 euros or ii) if the value a is 20 euros, then the value b is 10 euros.

The probability of my picking an envelope with 10 euros is 50% and the probability of my picking an envelope with 20 euros is 50%.

What subjectivity are you referring to ?