Yes, that’s what I show in the OP. — Michael

The paradox has nothing to do with probability at all. It's just an improper use of variables when calculating the expected value. :up:

That's the supposed paradox. Switching doesn't increase our expected return, but the reasoning given suggests that it does. So we need to make sense of this contradiction. — Michael

From Wikipedia Two Envelopes Problem

1) Denote by A the amount in the player's selected envelope.
2) The probability that A is the smaller amount is 1/2, and that it is the larger amount is also 1/2.
3) The other envelope may contain either 2A or A/2.
4) If A is the smaller amount, then the other envelope contains 2A.
5) If A is the larger amount, then the other envelope contains A/2.
6) Thus the other envelope contains 2A with probability 1/2 and A/2 with probability 1/2.
7) So the expected value of the money in the other envelope is:
$\frac{1}{2}(2A)$ + $\frac{1}{2}(\frac{A}{2})$ = $\frac{5}{4}A$
8) This is greater than A so, on average, the person reasons that they stand to gain by swapping.

In the first part of the equation: $\frac{1}{2}(2A)$ - the A is referring to the situation whereby the person has the smaller amount, say A is referring to £10.
In the second part of the equation: $\frac{1}{2}(\frac{A}{2})$ - the A is referring to the situation whereby the person has the larger amount, say A is referring to £20.

Therefore, within the same equation, A is referring to two different amounts. Am I correct in thinking that this is why the equation gives a false result.

Can you explain that more about why it cannot be the Real Object? — schopenhauer1

A round object is circular, where the boundary of a circle is the same distance from a centre. For a round object, the distance of the boundary from the centre is the same, not similar, otherwise an ellipse, or a square, or a triangle would be a circle.

Plenty of shapes have been observed in the real world that are approximately round, where the distance of the boundary from the centre is similar, but "similar" does not mean "same". 10 metres is not the same as 1 metre, 1 metre is not the same as 1mm, 1mm is not the same as 1 micron and 1 micron is not the same as the planck length.

A round object can exist as a concept in the mind, but no one has observed a shape in the real world where the distance of the boundary from the centre is the same, meaning known to be the same down to the planck length.

There is a clear distinction between round as a concept in the mind and round as existing in the real world.

If I talk about a round object, for my talk to make logical and coherent sense, I must be talking about something that exists. As the concept of a round object certainly exists in the mind, but a round object is highly unlikely to exist in the real world, I must be referring to the concept in my mind, not an impossible object in the real world.

Can objects be understood without reference to human subjectivity? — schopenhauer1

Object-oriented ontology maintains that objects exist independently of human perception.

Taking an object that is round as an example, there is the Real Object RO and the Sensory Object SO.

I agree that there are objects that are approximately round in the world, but my assumption is that no exactly round object has ever existed or will ever exist in the world, if exactly one means within the Planck length, being ${10^{-35}m}$

If no round object has ever existed or will ever exist, then any talk about round objects cannot be about Real Objects RO but must be about Sensory Objects SO.

I particularly noted that he's Chomsky) prone to saying that language and thought are unique to humans, and he has openly suggested that they are two different ways to talk about the same thing. So, it seems he tends to equate language and thought on a basic foundational or fundamental level — creativesoul

:grin:

If mysterianism is true, that would mean we would be unable to understand ChatGpt's solution to the Hard Problem, but that seems wrong. At the very least, we could ask a series of yes/no questions about consciousness and get quite a bit of understanding about ChatGpt's solution. — RogueAI

Humans are animals.

If someone could show that they enabled the gorilla, for example, but it could be any animal, to understand the American political system through a series of yes and no questions, then I would agree that a superior intellect could enable the human to understand the hard problem of consciousness also through a series of yes and no questions.

The gorilla's understanding is limited by the physical structure of its brain, as is the human's.

I mean, "practice makes perfect" holds good fairly often in my experience — creativesoul

I agree that "practice makes perfect".

The more one practices, the more competent one becomes, ie practice generates competency. The more competent one becomes the better one's performance will be, ie, competency generates performance.

As you say, and as Chomsky says, "competency generates performance".

I'm struggling to comprehend exactly what sort of language or grammar could be innate in such a way as for the user to be competent in it prior to E language acquisition. How is it not a private language? I mean, the very notion of I language seems to require either private meaning or meaningless language... neither seems palpable. — creativesoul

I hit my hand with a hammer and feel pain. I was born with the innate ability to feel pain, it is not something I needed to learn at school. Although I may express my pain using words in an E-language, I don't need an E-language to feel pain. Pain is a concept in my mind.

Chomsky says concepts wouldn't exist without language, and as concepts exist in the mind, this language exists in the mind as an I-language.

Chomsky has said that the relation between thought and language is that of identity:
"Take a look at the human species, what sharply differentiates it from any organic species we know of are two things, possession of language and possession of thought, I have two identifying features of a species. The first question that comes to mind is what is their relation. The simplest relation would be identity ...............language and thought are intimately related. Language has historically been called audible thought"

Chonmsy has said that concepts wouldn't exist without language:
"Even the simplest concepts, tree, desk, person, dog, whatever you want. Even these are extremely complex in the internal structure . If such concepts had developed in proto-human history when there was no language they would have been useless. It would have been an accident if they had developed and they would quickly have been lost because you cannot do anything with them"

My feeling of pain is a private concept, full of meaning to me and regardless of others.

As my private concepts make up my I-Language, my I-language has private meaning.

Chomsky is not saying that the I-language uses words, such as "pain", "tree", "circle". He is saying that the I-language has the characteristics of language as generally understood. A syntax of innate rules ensuring that the arrangement of thoughts and concepts are structurally well-formed, and semantic meaning of sense, reference, presupposition, implication in the relationship between thoughts and concepts.

If there was only an E-language and no I-language, inside the mind would be an empty void.

Philosophy doesn't need to be bound by problems. It creates its own problems. It's not even necessarily bound by the university. It created the university. — Moliere

:100:

Philosophy deliberates on those questions that the natural sciences don't need to think about, yet are still important questions.

Chomsky's view holds the reverse... that competence generates performance — creativesoul

Max Verstappen performed well at the 2022 Formula 1 would championships because he was competent driver.

Would anyone say that he only became a competent driver after performing well at the championships.

So 'analytic' for you just means 'true by virtue of some current definition'? — Janus

Yes.

Given the word "mkataba", what does it mean? It has no meaning until someone gives it a meaning. Suppose someone says it means "in a manner that is usually done", but someone else says it means "large hill", who determines what the word should mean. Presumably either an Institution or accepted by common usage . The meaning is decided by convention by the society within which the word will be used. Eventually, once agreed by common convention, it's accepted meaning may be codified in a dictionary.

Similarly with the word "analytic". The fact that we accept that it means "true by virtue of the meaning of the words or concepts used to express it, so that its denial would be a self-contradiction." rather than "vegetation consisting of typically short plants with long, narrow leaves, growing wild or cultivated on lawns and pasture, and as a fodder crop." must be because of convention.

In para 43 of PI, Wittgenstein wrote "For a large class of cases, though not for all, in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language".

The problem for philosophy, who use language as their primary tool, is that language is something self-referential, a Wittgensteinian language game or a Quinean web of belief. If Quine is correct and the distinction between the analytic and synthetic disappears, philosophy cannot differentiate itself from the natural sciences, where both discuss pragmatic synthetic generalities rather than logical analytic truths.

As with Tarski's Semantic Theory of Truth, where he showed that truth in a language can only be found in a language which is stronger than the language itself, ie, a metalanguage, if philosophy needs to consider analytic truths rather than synthetic generalities, then it must discover how to make the jump from the synthetic linguistic to the analytic extralinguistic.

It is not known. It is manifested in the interaction of ball with ground. It doesn’t need to be apprehended. The object does as it does in relation to the other object. In this case the object rolls down a hill. Properties of solidity and gravity are manifested in the relation of the two objects. — schopenhauer1

I can't resist. How do you know the object "rolls" down the hill, if, as you say "it is not known"?

Professor Chomsky, I've had this question for quite a while now, and this seems the perfect opportunity:

"Many believe that the human is born a blank slate having no innate capabilities. As with Skinner's Behaviourism, they believe that everything is learnt from the environment, including language.

What is the best argument we can use to persuade the Behaviourist of the impossibility that everything we know has been learnt from the environment without any foundation of certain innate abilities already built into the physical structure of the brain?"

it would be a shame not to ask for clarifications. — Manuel

I have a relevant question from before this thread started, that I have not yet found an answer to. Should I put it on the original thread "Guest Speaker: Noam Chomsky" ?

"Many on the Forum seem to believe that the human is born a blank slate having no innate capabilities. As with Skinner's Behaviourism, they believe that everything is learnt from the environment, including language.

What is the best argument we can use to persuade the Behaviourist of the impossibility that everything we know has been learnt from the environment without any foundation of certain innate abilities already built into the physical structure of the brain?"

But that’s what I’m saying, it doesn’t matter how it is labeled- an object manifested the property of rolling by its action with other objects. It may not be judged as round but acts that way. — schopenhauer1

I may be misunderstanding. You say that the object may not be judged as rolling, but it acts as if it were rolling.

How is it known that the object is acting as if it were rolling rather than acting in any other way, such as bouncing?

It isn’t judged, it is an event. Object rolls down a hill. The object interacts with the ground in the way round objects act. It’s manifest in how the object interacts. It’s roundness is manifest in how it rolls. No one needs to label it round to interact as round objects will. — schopenhauer1

You say the object rolled down the hill. Who is to say that it didn't bounce, slide, skid, glide, skip or skim down the hill.

A judgement must have been made as to the manner of the object moving down the hill.

What if, however unlikely it might seem, dogs turned out, on further investigation, not to be mammals? — Janus

If something that was not a mammal had been named "a dog", then the statement "a dog is not a mammal" would be analytic.

So then, what if the meanings of the words are ambiguous? Would that make the truth of such an expression undecidable and hence no longer analytic? — Janus

The statement "this is cool" is ambiguous, in that cool can mean "low temperature" or "fashionably attractive".

If "low temperature" has been named "cool", then "cool is a temperature" is analytic. If "fashionably attractive" has been named "cool", then "cool is fashionable" is analytic.

Even if the meaning of a word was ambiguous, for each meaning an analytic statement can be found.

What does i-langage do that is not captured by "cognition"? — Banno

Cognition is the mental action or process of acquiring knowledge and understanding through thought, experience, and the senses. The I-language exists in the physical structure of the brain.

Cognition requires thoughts in the brain, but doesn't distinguish between Chomsky's Innatism, where some thoughts result from structures biologically preset in the human brain, from Skinner's Behaviourism, where all thoughts are products of learning from interactions with the environment.

Wouldn’t degrees of roundness suffice? — schopenhauer1

Who judges the degree of roundness? There is nothing in a mind-independent world that can make judgements about the degree of roundness. Judgements can only be made in the mind.

I find it difficult to think of the brain as operating like a grammatic machine — Moliere

The SEP article The Computational Theory of Mind asks "Could the mind itself be a thinking machine?". This brings in the problem of consciousness, in that it doesn't seem that a thinking machine would need to be conscious in order to calculate. Does the fact that we are conscious mean that we are more than thinking machines, or is it the case that consciousness is a by-product of very complex thinking machines.

- that what we choose as an I-language, even if we delimit our domain to the brain, will be over-determined by the E-language we already know — Moliere

According to Chomsky, E-language (language) is something abstract externalized from the actual apparatus of our mind and I-language (grammar) is the physical mechanism of our brain. If the E-language is generated by the I-language, then, the E-language won't be over-determining the I-language, in the same way that naming the colour red as "red" isn't an instance of over-determination.

Grammar and language are as real as beans and brains, in my view. (it's the theories about grammar and language that end up in the land of abstractions) — Moliere

In a sense, everything is both abstract and concrete. For example, a university is both an abstract idea yet is concretely instantiated in buildings and staff.

The I-language, at least my understanding of it, is built upon my understanding of the E-language and my ability to use it — Moliere

E-language is what is written and spoken in our daily lives, and the I-language is the physical mechanism of the brain. E-language is the externalized language and I-language is the internalized grammar.

I agree that we have been using the E-language for quite some time, but no E-language can exist without the brain that has created it, even though the brain can exist without an E-language.

The E-language didn't evolve independently of any brain. Its form, character and nature can only be a function of the physical mechanism of the brain.

It cannot be the case that first there was an E-language existing in the world independent of any user, rather, first was the brain and subsequently there was the E-language.

Chomsky argued that it has been generally assumed that language is thought to be something existent whilst grammar is considered something abstract. So grammar, unlike language, does not exist in the same way as language.

However, Chomsky proposed instead that it is language that is abstract and grammar that is existent. He argued that language is something externalized from our brain whilst grammar is the physical mechanism of our brain. He named language “externalized language (E-language)” and grammar “internalized language (I-language)”.

I find it easier to believe that E-language has been founded on the physical mechanisms of the brain, an I-language, than there is an E-language operating in the world independently of any mind controlling it that is capable of making sense of the I-language.

How about like this -- if the only way we can express our I-language is through E-language, as we are doing in this thread, then what does "I-language" add? — Moliere

If the only way the Empire States Building can remain vertical is because of its foundations, one could also ask, then what do its foundations add ?

If we accept that analytic statements are analytic on the basis of convention then we accept that they are, at the same time, not going to have anything philosophically interesting about them. — Moliere

As the meaning of every word in language derives from convention, in what other way can a statement be analytic if not by convention.

Let's just grant the I-language of simple concepts and what-have-you. Somehow this allows us to use an E-language. The examples of analytic statements aren't in terms of simple concepts, though -- they're in E-language. And it seems you agree there's an element of convention in the E-language. Isn't analyticity on the side of E-language, rather than I-language? — Moliere

When driving through a busy city, I don't have time to put all my thoughts into words taken from my E-language. Yet, I couldn't successfully navigate the streets and other traffic without being aware of complex concepts existing within my I-language,

Chomsky in New Horizons in the Study of Language and Mind seemed to argue that not only are there complex concepts in the I-language but that they are also innate. I can understand primitive concepts being innate and complex concepts learnt but would agree that both are within our I-language.

If analyticity requires complex concepts, and complex concepts exist within the I-language, then analyticity can also exist within the I-language.

Are the metaphors supposed to reduce to very primitive ones? — schopenhauer1

Perhaps the advantage of a metaphor is that it doesn't need to be reduced to more primitive ones, but allows understanding by relating a complex abstract concept to more familiar concrete ones.

For example, I may be perplexed by the concept of gravity, but I feel I have some understanding by observing one snooker ball rotating around a football on a sheet of rubber stretching under their weight.

How can properties be said to be instantiated in the object and not the mind? ..........................That is to say, humans really do "see" a small portion of the essence of an object, but that the object is always withdrawn or "hidden" besides the vicarious properties of objects it interacts with. — schopenhauer1

As I see it, I observe something having the properties round, green and sweet and name it "apple".

When I observe the object apple, I am observing a set of properties, in that if each property was removed one by one, once all the properties had been removed, there would be nothing left.

It is not the case that the properties round, green and sweet are instantiated in the object apple, rather, the object apple is an instantiation of the properties round, green and sweet

It is not the case that an object has an essence hidden behind the properties of the object , rather, the essence of an object is its set of properties, in that if all the properties were removed, neither an essence nor an object would remain .

Bradley questioning the nature of properties. He started with the example of a lump of sugar. He noted that there appears to be such a thing as a lump of sugar and this thing appears to have qualities such as whiteness, sweetness, and hardness. But, asked Bradley, what is this “thing” that bears properties? On the one hand, he thinks it is odd to assume that there is something to the lump of sugar beside its several qualities, thus implying that postulating a property-less bearer of properties is incoherent. On the other hand, he notes that the lump cannot merely be its qualities either, since the latter must somehow be united. For Bradley, the unity properties presupposes relations, which is why he went on to question our concept of relations.

The alternative is that the apple supervenes on its properties, in that the apple has an essence which is more than the sum of its properties. But how this is possible needs to be justified.

If the property of roundness was instantiated in the object in the world rather than existed in the mind as a concept, as nothing in the world can be exactly round, how can roundness be instantiated in the world if no instantiation of roundness is possible in the world.

is the statement: "a dog is a mammal" analytic? — Janus

The meanings of words can change. For example, a dog can mean a domesticated mammal or it can mean a terrible film.

If a dog means a domesticated mammal, then the statement "a dog is a mammal" is analytic, whereas, if a dog means a terrible film, then the statement "a dog is a mammal" is not analytic.

IE, even though the same word may have different meanings, it is still possible for some statements, such as "a dog is a mammal" to be analytic.

Can analytic statements be ambiguous? — Janus

The Merriam Webster defines analytic as "being a proposition (such as "no bachelor is married") whose truth is evident from the meaning of the words it contains". The Cambridge dictionary defines analytic as "(of a statement) true only because of the meanings of the words, without referring to facts or experience"

There is some ambiguity between these definitions of analytic

IE, even though the definition of analytic may be ambiguous, given a particular definition, the analytic expression itself cannot be ambiguous.

So, would "The Eiffel Tower is located in France" still be be meaningful if all of humanity were suddenly wiped out, but it could not be true or false because no one would know it's meaning, or would it no longer be meaningful at all? — creativesoul

Consider "ya mnara lipo nchi". This object has no meaning until some one gives it a meaning. If there is no one to give it a meaning, it cannot have a meaning. As with a pebble, which is neither true not false, if "ya mnara lipo nchi" has no meaning, it cannot be either true or false. Similarly with "The Eiffel Tower is located in France".

Therefore, both will be true. As there would be no one around, i) it could not be true or false because no one would know it's meaning and ii) it would no longer be meaningful.

Metaphor? Can you explain? — schopenhauer1

It could be argued that any understanding we have is metaphorical. Some theorists have suggested that metaphors are not merely stylistic, but that they are cognitively important as well. In Metaphors We Live By, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson argue that metaphors are pervasive in everyday life, not just in language, but also in thought and action. Cognitive linguists emphasize that metaphors serve to facilitate the understanding of one's conceptual domain, typically an abstraction such as "life", "theories" or "ideas" through expressions that relate to another, more familiar conceptual domain, typically more concrete, such as "journey", "buildings" or "food".

For example, metaphors are commonly used in science, such as: evolution by natural selection, F = ma, the wave theory of light, DNA is the code of life, the genome is the book of life, gravity, dendritic branches, Maxwell's Demon, Schrödinger’s cat, Einstein’s twins, greenhouse gas, the battle against cancer, faith in a hypothesis, the miracle of consciousness, the gift of understanding, the laws of physics, the language of mathematics, deserving an effective mathematics, etc.

For example, within your own post one could say that the following are more metaphorical than literal: tricky, one can argue, created, one step beyond, primitive, indexed, tokenized, notion, abstractions, instantiations, riffing, idea, intermediary, analytic, reflection, externalization of the internal.

I observe something in the world that is round, but the Nominalist and Conceptualist would argue that roundness doesn't exist in the world, only in the mind. They would say that what I actually observe is one particular instantiation of roundness. In fact, nothing in the world can be exactly round, the most would be an approximation of roundness.

It is still the case, however, that I observe something round, even though no round thing can exist in the world. Therefore, the roundness that I am observing can only exist in the mind as an abstraction, as a concept. Merriam Webster lists abstraction as a synonym for concept.

I can name my concept of roundness as "round" and make the statement "I see a round ball", knowing that what I am referring to doesn't actually exist in the world but only in my mind.

Would "The Eiffel Tower is located in France" be true if all of humanity were suddenly wiped out? — creativesoul

Is "ya mnara lipo nchi" true if there is no one who knows what it means. If no one knows its meaning, then it isn't a language, it's an object like a pebble, and as a pebble cannot be true or false.

Similarly, "the Eiffel Tower is located in France" would no longer be a language, it would become an object, and just like a pebble, cannot be considered as either true or false.

Are primitive concepts concepts, or are they just primitive epistemological tools? — schopenhauer1

I think of concepts more as a metaphor than a literal physical thing.

My point being that, the very fact of such mechanisms discounts convention-only theories of language acquisition...Thus, nativists and empiricists are both right. — schopenhauer1

I totally agree. I understand certain primitive concepts as innate, such as the colour red, pain , etc. We then use these primitive concepts to build complex concepts based on our observations of the world, such as governments, mountains, etc.

Without the foundation of primitive concepts, the building of complex concepts would fall down.

Would the thing that we've named the "Eiffel Tower" be located in the place that we've named "Paris" if all of humanity were suddenly wiped out? — creativesoul

Yes.

We observe something in the world and then name it "The Eiffel Tower". This something existed before we named it. As this something existed before being named, its existence doesn't depend on being named.

Similarly, we observe somewhere in the world and then name it "Paris". This somewhere existed before we named it. As this somewhere existed before being named, its existence doesn't depend on being named.

As both the something that has been named "The Eiffel Tower" and the somewhere that has been named "Paris" can exist without a name, they can continue to exist even if there was no one around to name them.

RussellA seems to have avoided this conclusion by enlarging the notion of innate concepts to include everything, at least up to carburettors. — Banno

I limit innate concepts to primitive concepts, such as the colour red, pain, simple relationships such as to the left of, simple shapes such as a straight vertical line. Chomsky weirdly seems to extend innate concepts to carburettors.

Though I am pleased you are mixing me up with a major figure in analytic philosophy and one of the founders of the field of cognitive science.

RussellA would both eat the cake that all sentences are true by convention while keeping the cake that some sentences are true by the meaning of their terms. — Banno

All names are named by convention. It is by convention that the colour red has been named "red" rather than "sawdust", for example.

By convention, if a sentence is thought to correspond with the world it is named "true", otherwise it is named "false". For example, the sentence "the Eiffel Tower is in Paris" is true and the sentence "all unicorns live in Paris" is false. IE, some sentences are true by convention because the meaning of "true" has been agreed by convention.

Whether the statement "the Eiffel Tower is in Paris" is true or false can only be known by first knowing the meaning of its terms. IE, some sentences are true because the meaning of their terms has been agreed by convention.

it shows that the statement "a bachelor is an unmarried man" is not analytic, because it is not definitively and unambiguously true. — Janus

There seems to be three types of statements: "a bachelor is a bachelor", "a bachelor is an unmarried man" and a "bachelor is always rich".

It seems that there is general agreement that "a bachelor is a bachelor" is analytic and "a bachelor is always rich" is synthetic, though there doesn't seem to be agreement as to whether the statement "a bachelor is an unmarried man" is analytic or synthetic.

My argument that "bachelor is an unmarried man" is analytic because:

1) Before it can be decided whether "a bachelor is an unmarried man" is analytic or synthetic, the meaning of the words in the statement must be known.

2) We know that the set of words "unmarried" and "man" have been named "bachelor".

3) So knowing that the set "unmarried" and "men" has been named "bachelor", we know just by virtue of the meaning of the words alone that "bachelors are unmarried men" is an analytic statement.

Is there a flaw in my logic ?

In regard to language, it prompts me to question the clean separation between the 'innate' and the 'environment' as put forward by Chomsky. — Paine

I agree that it is very difficult to put a clean break between a person and their environment. Enactivism discusses this.

There are two aspects:

First, how an object can interact with its environment is a function of its physical form. For example, a kettle in having the physical form it has cannot play music, the horse having the physical form it has cannot enjoy the subtleties in a Cormac McCarthy novel and the human in having the physical form it has can probably never understand the nature of consciousness.

Second, an object's physical form has been determined by its environment.

There is feedback between the innate and the environment. The Wikipedia article on Feedback notes:

Simple causal reasoning about a feedback system is difficult because the first system influences the second and second system influences the first, leading to a circular argument. This makes reasoning based upon cause and effect tricky, and it is necessary to analyse the system as a whole. As provided by Webster, feedback in business is the transmission of evaluative or corrective information about an action, event, or process to the original or controlling source. Karl Johan Åström and Richard M.Murray, Feedback Systems: An Introduction for Scientists and Engineers.

Also, is identity ever proposed as an innate mechanism? — schopenhauer1

I see my brother enter the room and immediately leave the room. There is no doubt in my mind that I have seen my brother enter and leave the room.

There is no doubt in my mind that the person entering and leaving the room are identical.

I would suppose that the brain's ability to know that it is the same object that moves through space and time is an innate mechanism that has developed over 3.7 billion years of evolution, rather than something that needs to be learnt.

After all, when we see a snooker ball roll over a snooker table, we don't think that every second the old snooker ball disappears and a new snooker ball appears. We know without doubt that it is the same snooker ball. We know without doubt the nature of identity.

If I-language only refers to basically syntax (merge/compositionality) and not semantics, then indeed this would not have much to inform analyticity. — schopenhauer1

Chomsky said concepts wouldn't exist without an I-language, so, the semantic part of an I-language are its concepts.

Primitive innate concepts such as the colour red is one thing, but Chomsky weirdly argued for more complex innate concepts such as carburettors, Knowing that a carburettor is a device for mixing air and fuel means knowing the analytic fact that a carburettor is a device.

I think I answered in the affirmative in my opening post, while relying on a theory of analytic statements that reduces them to convention. — Moliere

The SEP article The analytic/synthetic distinction writes:
“Analytic” sentences, such as “Paediatricians are doctors,” have historically been characterized as ones that are true by virtue of the meanings of their words alone and/or can be known to be so solely by knowing those meanings.

As regards the statement "bachelors are unmarried men", it is not possible to know whether it is analytic or synthetic until first knowing the meanings of the words used, in the same way that it is not possible to know whether the statement "moja ndio si ndoa mwanadamu" is analytic or synthetic until knowing the meanings of the words used.

Therefore, the first task is to know what the words mean.

You are right that naming is by convention. The set of words "man" and "unmarried" has been named "bachelor", though the set could equally well have been named "giraffe", "mountain" or "sawdust".

Therefore, even before trying to determine whether the statement "bachelors are unmarried men" is analytic or synthetic, we know that the set "unmarried" and "men" has been named by convention "bachelor".

So knowing that the set "unmarried" and "men" has been named "bachelor", we know just by virtue of the meaning of the words alone that "bachelors are unmarried men" is an analytic statement.

Not to be pedantic, but does an unmarried man in a de facto relationship count as a bachelor, or must a bachelor live alone? — Janus

It depends on the definition of "marriage"

According to Merriam Webster, "A bachelor is an unmarried man".

But Merriam Webster goes on to say that the definition of "marriage" is changing:
The definition of the word marriage—or, more accurately, the understanding of what the institution of marriage properly consists of—continues to be highly controversial. This is not an issue to be resolved by dictionaries. Ultimately, the controversy involves cultural traditions, religious beliefs, legal rulings, and ideas about fairness and basic human rights.

In the past, "unmarried man" was defined as "a man who has not taken part in a contractual relationship with a woman recognised by the law". By this definition, an "unmarried man" includes a man living in a relationship with another person. Therefore, a bachelor may or may not be a man living in a relationship with another person.

Today, "unmarried man" may be defined as "a man who is not living in a relationship with another person". Therefore, a bachelor is a man not living in a relationship with another person.

The definition " a bachelor is an unmarried man" hasn't changed, but whether a bachelor, being a man, is or isn't living in a partnership with another person has changed.

Hume's argument was that concepts like causation are not inherent in the world but rather are products of our thought patterns or "habits of thought." However, if Hume's philosophy relies so heavily on a priori reasoning, why did Kant feel the need to refute him? — schopenhauer1

Hume is a realist about causation, in that although he believes that causation is real in the world it is unknowable. He rejects the idea that we directly know that events in the world are necessarily conjoined, as this would require a priori knowledge, but he does accept that we indirectly know about causation from the observation of constant conjunction of certain impressions across many instances.

Kant on the other hand, is also a Realist, but argued that a genuine necessary connection between events is required for their objective succession in time, and using his revolutionary conception of synthetic a priori judgments, rescues the a priori origin of the pure concepts of the understanding.

So yes, Hume rejected an a priori explanation for causation whilst Kant didn't.

But this raises the question, when patterns are observed in the world, how is the mind able to see these patterns. Is the mind's ability to see patterns innate a priori or learnt from the patterns themselves. Who is right, Chomsky's Innatism or Skinner's Empiricism.

Empiricism is a problem of circularity. If I have no innate rules, and I can only learn the rules from what I observe, then, as the Tortoise could have said to Achilles, where is the rule that tells me when I have discovered a rule. Empiricism proposes that there is something in the rule that I observe that tells me this is the rule that has to be followed, but where is the rule that tells me I have to follow it.

Kant expressed the problem of being able to gain all knowledge from observation in B5 of Critique of Pure Reason
Even without requiring such examples for the proof of the reality of pure a priori principles in our cognition, one could establish their indispensability for the possibility of experience itself, thus establish it a priori. For where would experience itself get its certainty if all rules in accordance with which it proceeds were themselves in turn always empirical, thus contingent?; a hence one could hardly allow these to count as first principles.

It is true that Hume argues we can only indirectly observe causation, and as such is not a priori, but it is also true that he does write about instinct, which is innate and a priori, as being more powerful than thought and understanding. It is perhaps this innate and a priori instinct that allows the mind to observe causation in the first place.

Hume in Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding wrote:
What, then, is the conclusion of the whole matter? A simple one; though, it must be confessed, pretty remote from the common theories of philosophy. All belief of matter of fact or real existence is derived merely from some object, present to the memory or senses, and a customary conjunction between that and some other object. Or in other words; having found, in many instances, that any two kinds of objects—flame and heat, snow and cold—have always been conjoined together; if flame or snow be presented anew to the senses, the mind is carried by custom to expect heat or cold, and to believe that such a quality does exist, and will discover itself upon a nearer approach. This belief is the necessary result of placing the mind in such circumstances. It is an operation of the soul, when we are so situated, as unavoidable as to feel the passion of love, when we receive benefits; or hatred, when we meet with injuries. All these operations are a species of natural instincts, which no reasoning or process of the thought and understanding is able either to produce or to prevent.

On the one hand, Hume argues that we only know causation from observation and not, as Kant argues, a priori, but on the other hand Hume many times refers to instinct, which is innate and a priori, and it is perhaps this innate a priori instinct that allows us to see patterns in our observations in the first place.

We agree analyticity is an aspect of language. — Moliere

This answers the OP, "Are there analytic statements?"

So all Brambles are Unbrimbled Tembres................................The example is meant to demonstrate how nonsense terms can come to make sense from the English grammar, rather than because of an I-language.. — Moliere

Yes, the E-language can be grammatical without making sense.

One advantage of the I-language is that every thought about a concept makes sense, in that meaning within an I-language is self-referential. IE, it is not possible to have a thought about a concept without that thought making sense, having meaning. If I think about the concept triangle, the thought is its own meaning. Unlike the E-language, it isn't necessary to go outside the I-language to find meaning.

The meaning of my concept of pain is the pain itself. As Searle wrote:
The relation of perception to the experience is one of identity. It is like the pain and the experience of pain. The experience of pain does not have pain as an object because the experience of pain is identical with the pain. Similarly, if the experience of perceiving is an object of perceiving, then it becomes identical with the perceiving. Just as the pain is identical with the experience of pain, so the visual experience is identical with the experience of seeing.

The SEP article Concepts wrote that "Concepts are the building blocks of thoughts". The Wikipedia article Concepts wrote "Concepts are defined as abstract ideas. They are understood to be the fundamental building blocks underlying principles, thoughts and beliefs". As the dictionary explains thoughts as occurring in the mind, concepts must also also occur in the mind.

As with many words in language, such as evolution by natural selection, F = ma, the wave theory of light, DNA is the code of life, the genome is the book of life, gravity, dendritic branches, Maxwell's Demon, Schrödinger’s cat, Einstein’s twins, greenhouse gas, the battle against cancer, faith in a hypothesis, the miracle of consciousness, the gift of understanding, the laws of physics, the language of mathematics, deserving an effective mathematics, etc, the word "concept" should also be thought of as a ,metaphor, not something that has a literal physical existence.

In an E-language, meaning is extralinguistic, whereas in an I-language, meaning is the I-language itself.

The relationship between the learner and the environment can mean very different things. In the Skinner model, stimulus is always on one side and response the other side of events. For Vygotsky, for example, there is a dynamic where the stimulus becomes modified by changes in the learner....................This approach does not cancel the domain of the 'innate' but neither does it make it a realm where 'e-language' can be clearly separated from 'I-language'. — Paine

I agree, sentient life must evolve through interaction with the world in which it exists, which is why it has taken 3.7 billion years for life to have evolved to its current form.

From the Wikipedia article Enactivism
Sriramen argues that Enactivism provides "a rich and powerful explanatory theory for learning and being."[66] and that it is closely related to both the ideas of cognitive development of Piaget, and also the social constructivism of Vygotsky.[66]

The I-language cannot be separated from the E-language, in the same way that the subject of a painting cannot be separated from the colours and shapes of the paint used in the painting, yet both fulfil different functions.