My apologies, but I have places to go this evening. I'll carry on our conversation tomorrow.

I went back through what you said and your position seems to be
that because there are cases where we cannot possibly confirm
that a belief is definitely true we should construe these cases as
knowledge even when they might be false. — PL Olcott

Close. Its more to the fact that there is no answer to the question, "How do we know if what we know is true?" Its impossible in regards to the synthetic, backed by many arguments. And yet we still use knowledge. We still need some way to say, "It is more reasonable to believe this, than that."

So then the only conclusion is that truth must not be a necessary component for knowledge. This makes sense the more we think about it. Prior to telescopes, ancient man knew that the sun crossed the sky from the East to the West. Today, we have greater knowledge and know that the Earth rotates around the Sun, not the other way around. Did that mean ancient man did not know that the Sun circled the sky? Of course not. That was the only thing they could deduce from the information they had.

To say they didn't know it is to make all beliefs have the same rational weight. That means someone who said the sun magically altered our senses and actually always traveled West to East would have an equally valid conclusion. To us, this is absurd. We innately understand that one statement is more rational than the other.

Back then, they knew that the Sun crossed the sky. Today, we know that its actually the Earth rotating away from and back to facing the sun. Perhaps we will know something different in the future. The point is that what we know is what is able to be most rationally concluded with the information and reasoning we have. Its a tool, not truth itself.

The trick then is how do we construct this system of reasoning to be more rational and the best chance to be as close to truth as possible? How do we separate "knowledge" from mere belief? I could go into it, but I wrote a whole paper on it already, and gave a very light summary earlier. Feel free to visit the page and scroll down a few replies. You can cntrl-F and type in Caerulea-Lawrence. They gave a better summary than I ever could have. Feel free to ask me further questions there or feel free to read the original post if it strikes your interest.

"Truth cannot be a necessary component of knowledge."
How so? — PL Olcott

Please re-read my previous comments. That's been the entire point of the conversation.

The the Gettier issues would seem to only involve making sure that
our physical sensations actually do correctly map to the correct elements
in the model of the actual world. — PL Olcott

Which again leaves us with, "How do we know that we're correctly matching the correct elements in the model of the actual (true) world?" Its the same question again. Truth cannot be a necessary component of knowledge.

You did not bother to notice that an argument can be valid
even if its premsies are false. — PL Olcott

I don't need to. My point had nothing to do with validity, and you know that because I explicitly noted your premises were not true. That's not honest discussion at that point.

I believe there's nothing more to discuss here either. You've already noted you cannot answer the major question of "How do we know what is true?" Without that, nothing has been solved. Not that I wouldn't try to continue tackling the question, but until that question is answered, your solution is a dead end.

A deductive argument is sound if and only if it is both valid, and all of its premises are actually true. — PL Olcott

You posted this up above. To be a sound deductive argument, the premises need to be true. This is getting into silly territory now. Do not be afraid to concede a point, or at least leave. Stubbornly trying to make a point without merit is not seeking truth, its seeking ego.

You haven't proven your premises as true, therefore you're argument is not deductive.

If we are living in a perfect simulation of reality like the brain-in-a-vat
thought experiment then all of our knowledge of physical realty is false
because physical reality does not exist. — PL Olcott

No, its only false if truth is a necessary pre-requisite for knowledge. You've made the claim that it is, but there are practical problems in doing so. I have claimed it is not by pointing out that means we cannot know anything besides our own analytic constructions. This is useless to us, as we deal with more than our analytic constructions in the world.

The synthetic side of the analytic / synthetic distinction simply assumes
that physical reality exists. Because it is possible that this is false then
there cannot be 100% certain knowledge of physical reality. — PL Olcott

No, the synthetic side does not assume "physical reality" exists. The synthetic side addresses the point that there is more to reality than simply our thoughts. Whether this is "physical" or "something else" is a different question entirely. Unless you champion solipsism, you must address the synthetic side of reality. Do you believe there is something that exists beyond your thoughts? Then you believe in situations that require synthetic judgements, and thus questions of synthetic knowledge.

With valid reasoning the premises are assumed to be true even if they
are false. — PL Olcott

This doesn't make any sense. Either the premises are true or false.

(1) It definitely true that synthetic knowledge actually does not exist. — PL Olcott

You have not proved this anywhere. In fact, this statement is a contradiction. When you speak of "exist" you mean, "exists apart from an analytic identity". That means you are trying to synthetically claim that synthetic knowledge does not exist.

You could try to analytically claim that synthetic knowledge does not exist, but then I could claim the opposite. Now we're left with the mess of everything being true, even contradictions. Again, why synthetic knowledge is, at least in the confines of this argument, a very real thing that needs addressing, not mere dismissal.

If synthetic knowledge does not actually exist and I have correctly
shown that it does not, then this corrects mere presumptions to the
contrary, thus objectively is progress. — PL Olcott

No, that's not progress at all. You haven't shown that there is no synthetic knowledge, you've simply set the definition of knowledge as something impossible to obtain. That's not useful, nor does it help us solve problems like science, facts, and knowing where I put my keys. Your solution to the Gettier argument is to burn everything down. That's not a solution.

We know that every element of the set of semantic tautologies is true.
AKA self-evident truth. — PL Olcott

Yes, analytic knowledge is true by definition. Few debate that. We're talking about synthetic, which is the entire target of the Gettier argument.

Everything else is at best a reasonably plausible estimate of knowledge.
Or we could say that it functions as if it was true. — PL Olcott

Which means that we have no synthetic knowledge of the world according to your Gettier fix. That's a failure, not a success.

How do we distinguish the difference between reality and a perfect
simulation of reality that has no distinguishable difference?

We Don't !!! — PL Olcott

Then we know nothing. That's why your fix to the Gettier problem fails. Knowledge is obviously something we use. It differentiates itself from mere belief. The specifics of how and why are the entire question of epistemology. Your viewpoint leads to the "nihilism" conclusion, which is rejected by most thinkers in the field.

If you tie truth as a necessary condition for knowledge, then the nihilism solution, "We know nothing, there is no knowledge" is the only solution. And quite frankly, that's silly. That's an indicator we're doing something wrong. And what's wrong? Making truth as a necessary pre-condition for knowledge. Check my paper out if you want an alternative.

Reviewing some of the Gettier cases it seems that they involve
an incorrect mapping from a set of physical sensations to their
corresponding elements in the model of the actual world. — PL Olcott

And again, the same question. How do we know we have the correct mapping, or know that what we know is true?

When we require that the justification for the belief necessitates
that the belief is true, then the incorrect mapping is excluded
from justification. — PL Olcott

Sure, if it was as simple as that the argument would have instantly died. But how do we know that the belief is true? You can't. Therefore you cannot have truth as a necessary pre-requisite for (synthetic) knowledge. No matter how much you try to avoid this, it will always be there.

Only the analytic side of the analytic / synthetic distinction has proof.
The synthetic side (that I call the empirical side) only has evidence. — PL Olcott

My adaptation of JTB requires proof that the belief is true, with less
than proof we only have presumption and thus not knowledge. — PL Olcott

Then according to your JTB, no one can ever know anything synthetically. Meaning I can't know if I'm really in my house or if I'm a brain in a vat. The Gettier argument is not a criticism of analytic, but synthetic arguments.

Until you answer the question, "How do I know what I know is true?" you've solved nothing. If we don't have a method to know that what we know is true, then we never have synthetic knowledge about anything. Its all beliefs. Is that where you want to go?

That the animal in front of you seems to have all of the properties of
a cat is evidence and not proof that it is a cat. — PL Olcott

Then how would we prove its a cat? How would we prove that its true that its a space monster, especially if its a perfectly disguised cat? Because it can't accidently be true right? That's the whole point of the Gettier argument.

↪Philosophim It is certainly not impossible to know with 100% complete certainty that a dog is an animal and my adaptation to JTB specifically excludes anything that is not known on the basis of complete proof. — PL Olcott

You ignored the key question about truth. How do you know its true? How do you know you have complete proof?

I have pondered this again and again for years.
"If truth is the necessary ingredient for knowledge, how do I know what I claim I know is true?"
Truth is a necessary yet insufficient condition for knowledge.

Knowledge requires:
Awareness that an expression is true on the basis of complete proof that the expression is true. — PL Olcott

The reason you've pondered it for years is that there is no answer. Logically, the only conclusion is its impossible. Therefore the only conclusion is that knowledge does not rely on truth as a necessary condition. That doesn't mean that knowledge isn't incredibly useful, or that we can suddenly start believing whatever we want. Check out my paper. There's a great summary of the ideas from another poster a few replies down from the paper.

"instance where there is something outside of our ability to know"
Does not count as knowledge under my adaptation of JTB. — PL Olcott

I'm putting forth some effort here, please do more than a few sentences if you're serious about engaging. Think about it. If truth is the necessary ingredient for knowledge, how do I know what I claim I know is true?

Somehow the replies got out of order. My point above is in regards to

↪Philosophim My adapted version of JTB does seems to perfectly divide knowledge from presumption and falsity and utterly eliminate the Gettier cases. — PL Olcott

As for the the cats DNA, you're missing the point of the thought experiment. The point is that we're in an instance where there is something outside of our ability to know, but from everything we observe and are capable of concluding, the only reasonable thing we can know is that its a cat. Thus we know something that isn't true.

When knowledge is defined as a justified true belief such that the justification necessitates the truth of the belief then the Gettier problem is no longer possible. — PL Olcott

And how do we know its true? I have a creature that's a space monster, and its absolutely beyond any human to find out its a space monster. We know it as a cat. Its not true that its a cat, but that's what we know it as. Under your point, no one could say they knew it as a cat. In which case, we can only say they believe it is a cat.

The problem is, you need some way to measure a belief against truth. How do you make it possible in this instance? How do we know that many things that we claim to know, are actually not knowledge if we discovered some new aspect of reality? We can't. This is why knowledge cannot be a claim of necessary truth.

↪Philosophim I always view these things in terms of pure logic. If a thing in the world can be empirically validated to have all of the properties of a cat including the DNA of a cat then this thing is necessarily a cat, all opinions to the contrary are counter-factual. The belief aspect of JTB is required because unless at least one person knows X then X is not knowledge even if X is true. — PL Olcott

To clarify, it is not that it is necessarily a cat. It is that you can logically conclude no other identity at the time of your identification. One could have the belief that its a space monster in disguise. In truth, it could be. But there's no way we could ever say, "I know its a space monster in disguise". Because knowledge is a tool of logic about what we can conclude with the information we have, not an assertation of truth itself.

I would say logic is the organization of thoughts and identities at an attempt to arrive at conclusions that are concurrent with reality. This is done using deduction. This is logic.

I solved the Gettier problem, as well as most classical epistemological problems such as the problem of induction here. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14044/knowledge-and-induction-within-your-self-context/p1

The problem with Gettier is he uses justification as being "true". Truth has nothing to do with knowledge. Knowledge is about creating identities in our minds first. We have the image of a creature, and we call it a cat for example. Then when we encounter something in reality, to know its a cat in reality, we must match what we find essential about our identity of a cat, to the creature before us. If we can successfully do so without induction, then we know its a cat.

If it turns out its actually some weird dog breed, but only because society created the identity of that creature as a dog, and we did not know that attribute that would have made it a dog, that doesn't negate what we know at the time. At that time, we know it as a cat. Once society introduces this new identity, or definition to us, we can decide to accept it, or reject it. If we accept it, now we know longer can know that creature as a cat, but a dog. But if we reject societies identity, we still know it as a cat.

In sum, knowledge is about what identity you accept in your mind, then applying that identity in a deductive manner to ascertain whether it matches based on your context. Truth has nothing to do with it. So when its claimed "Smith has five coins in his pocket" its not a deduced application of identity, but an induction of identity as the claimant doesn't actually have evidence that at that specific moment, Smith has five coins in his pocket. Belief that happens to be the case is not knowledge if the reasons we came to that belief are not deduced correctly. That's just an accident.

Truth is reality. Reality is what exists regardless of what we believe.
— Philosophim

How do you know when you are looking at it ? — plaque flag

The fact that you are looking at something is truth. That exists despite what you believe.

Certainty is not a standard for knowledge. This is because you can doubt anything. Being able to doubt something lends no credence to whether a doubt is correct. Its what is irrefutable that matters. That you experience is irrefutable. To refute the idea that you experience, you must be able to experience. Therefore it is proof by contradiction.

Truth is reality. Reality is what exists regardless of what we believe. When we have beliefs that are not contradicted by reality, we seem concurrent with truth. When reality contradicts our beliefs, we know our beliefs aren't true.

I am entirely matter. Suppose everything about me can be explained in terms of matter, in terms of biological, chemical, and electrical processes. Then matter can become conscious, as demonstrated by the fact that I, who am entirely matter, am conscious. So, obviously, “dumb” matter has enormous potential. It can appear as dumb as a rock, but don’t let it fool you. You exist. You are conscious. If you are entirely material, then not so much the worse for you, but so much the better for materialism! Look what matter can do. Clearly, it’s extraordinary. Clearly, I don’t know all matter can do. Let’s call this view “enlightened materialism.” — Art48

Finally someone else gets it. Its sometimes frustrating that people get stuck in the idea that being conscious matter is somehow despairing. What's the amazing conclusion they're missing? Matter can be CONSCIOUS. Matter and energy is amazing magic, and we've only scratched the surface of what we can do with it.

To me, that is just ungrammatical and, thusly, does not reference anything (except for being “a word”). Is it “an apple”? If so, then you just have “1 apple” minus “1 apple”, which is nothing. Are you talking about the essence of an apple? The concept? — Bob Ross

You are correct on all accounts. I'm fairly certain I understand what you mean by quantitative, but I'm trying to see what's qualitative. I didn't want to say "an" apple because that seems to be a quantity of a quality. There is a difference between one apple, one pear, and one penny. The quantity is the same, but its the qualities that separate them right?

The identity of the concept of "apple" cannot be quantitative, because no two apples are quantitatively alike. If we were to add two apples and compare them, we would see one is slightly lumpier than the other. The redness would not be the same, nor the height and size. All of these seem to be qualities. But qualities can be processed as quantities. After all, remove the qualities from the quantity, and you are left with a qualityless abstract number.

One the flip side, some qualities do not make sense without some quantity. Saying "apple" doesn't roll off the tongue like "an apple does". That is because in this case, the quality and quantity are inextricably linked. And because of this, I'm not sure you can set qualitative and qualitative up as if they cannot include one another in any process.

It could be that “a pile” is just a useful indefinite, and thusly qualitative or perhaps just ambiguous, colloquial term to note a hazy bit of reality; just like how there’s no exact spot where a heap becomes a pile of sand. We could force the terms to start somewhere definite, or just let it be qualitative (indefinite) and let people decide what is the most useful in the context. — Bob Ross

But then what about adding two piles of sand together? Is this not a mix of quantitative and qualitative?

Perhaps I am confused as to what you are saying, but I think the words that we use to describe reality single out things, which will make it quantitative; but the words themselves do not reference something that is quantitative. For example, yes, one red apple plus one red apple is two red apples; but “redness” and the “actual apple” are qualitative. We use quantities to estimate the qualitative. — Bob Ross

Let us remove the quality again however, and what are we left with? Isn't "oneness" itself a quality then?

I will try to answer faster next time, I am busy as of late.

Also: if the two of you would just read the formal argument you would realize I stipulate in (1) that only the subset of those laws that are formed by reasoning about consequences are relevant. — ToothyMaw

When you have two people tell you the structure of your paper has problems, its not their problem, its your problem. Your OP's intro is poorly written. The main point of your paper is that rule-consequentialism becomes more like act-utilitarianism no? Your first statement should reflect that, and has nothing to do with whether people are assumed to think rationally while considering morality.

I didn't expect people to attack the assumption that people often try to justify the laws they want with some forms of reasoning. — ToothyMaw

With philosophy your argument starts with the very first premise you put forth. Your entire thesis statement starts with this assumption. The only thing which should be assumed is that most people are not going to let assumptions pass by without asking you to prove them. You may want to see if this assumption is unnecessary for the rest of your OP and remove it if possible. If not, I would re-evaluate your entire OP.

When I say rational, I mean that they make sense according to some sort of ethical reasoning, not that they are purely derived from reason, and are thus indisputable truths. — ToothyMaw

I'm going to second T Clark here. This is twisting the idea of rationality into something its not. People are often not inclined to be rational at all. They'll smoke, they'll drink, etc. People rationalize, but that's not being rational. Many people don't even go that far.

Reason also does not mean an indisputable truth. Reason simply means we have derived a conclusion from a set of premises that is certain or highly probable. It does not mean the premises used are true, and consequently, does not mean our conclusion results in an indisputable truth either.

Reading your work is always a delight! Unique thinkers are what we need and I enjoy mulling over your work. With your initial definitions, I'm going to present a couple of potential questions and potential issues I see, but feel free to amend your definitions as we go into detail.

P1: A quantitative process cannot produce a quality — Bob Ross

Lets say I have 1 apple. The oneness denotes a quantity, but if I remove the 1 and just say, "apple", is this a quality? If so, then we can combine the quantitative and qualitative. If not, then what is "apple" in a non-quantitative sense?

Next, lets disregard whether "apple" is a quality or quantity, and just say I have 1 apple. I quantitatively add another apple to a "pile". What is a "pile"? Is that quantitative or qualitative? I could also call them a "pair" of apples now. Is the word pair quantitative or qualitative now? It seems to have the quality of "grouping", but the quantity of two.

Lets add one more apple to make 3 apples. Now I have a "few" apples? "Few" generally means more than 1 but not too many, or not a "lot". Is "few" a quantity, or a quality?

Finally, let us now add in the quality of "red". I add two red apples together. In my quantitative process did I not also produce the quality of 2 "red"? This refers back to my first point, so I'll let you answer before I continue with other thoughts.

Hello Bob! As you are using specific vocabulary, it would help to make your point clearer by also defining exactly what each piece of the vocabulary means to you. What is a quantity by your view? What is quantitative vs qualitative to your view?

Logic only works when you have immutable properties that do not change or are open to interpretation. Definitions often times are immutable based on the internal definitions of the reader, as well as the context in which they can be placed accidently by the user.

Without very explicit terminology, I do not think the proposal can be evaluated.

"But they're job creators!"

At the end of the day I've found that its simply people being convinced that a billionaire's self interest is somehow their personal self-interest. There is a significant portion of the population that has been convinced that all taxation is a waste or theft. There's more that have been convinced that "They deserve it" because they've worked harder than everyone else. And then there are people who hope to take advantage of those cheats themselves one day.

In my experience, you're not going to change these people's minds unless great suffering occurs for them. Thus corruption will build until it finally damages people, then people will fight..

I've viewed reality as, "That which does not contradict your identity of the world." So, if I viewed an apple as healthy, ate it and got sick, that's the end reality. If I ate the apple and did not get sick, that's the end reality.

The Paradox is roughly this: information or knowledge of the initial conditions and laws of nature should allow a true prediction of the action of some person or subsystem with those initial conditions and that is governed by those laws of nature. Such a prediction must be true. However, if the person or subsystem in question acts in a way that falsifies the prediction, then the prediction is not true. In brief, the prediction must be true, however it is not true when the prediction is falsified by the action of the person or subsystem considered. — NotAristotle

Its a paradox because commits the mistake of, "We know everything, yet we do not do not know everything".

What you're doing is taking the observer outside the calculation of the system despite insisting that you have all of the information in the system. You're essentially saying, "We predict up to the moment where the observer learns, 'They will pick blue," then ignore everything after. The learning itself must be then taken into the calculation to see what the person will do next. Essentially every time the person learns what they will do next, that learning itself is a new set of parameters that need to be considered in the prediction.

This simply limits how far ahead one could know what they would do next. Its practically calculating in real time. Meaning that a viable prediction of what a person will do next may only be possible within a very small window. It is neither an argument for or against determinism, just against removing the observer's discovery as part of the "we know everything" calculation itself.

I answer this hear if you're interested in something serious and not surface level. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14044/knowledge-and-induction-within-your-self-context/p1

We need balanced identity politics. Identities are useful in so long as they don't make us forget that we're all part of the same identity: the human race.

Well schopenhauer1, if that is your conclusion, then take that with you in your life. I will take mine. Good conversation.

The thought experiment works only if there is a rough symmetry between the situation of procreation and the already-existent, That is to say, in both cases the person would not be able to consent or know what the harms were. — schopenhauer1

Ok, that's fair. I don't want to divert from the intent of the thought experiment. If it is your parallel for procreation, then we also don't know what the benefits are either right? Further, we don't even know what we're gifting them. Its a mystery box to all involved. Since no one knows the outcome, is it even worth considering as part of your decision?

the ethics cuts much deeper than this kind of preference-fulfillment you are discussing regarding one's own life. It changes when you cause the life of another: — schopenhauer1

Its not like if we don't give them the gift they'll be fine. They won't exist. So we can really only judge by those who have received that gift. We can't ask those who did not get it. We look at ourselves, our friends, and our family. Even our enemies. Then we decide, "Is the gift overall worth gambling on?" That is up to each individual and their own experiences. No one can tell you "Yes." No one can tell you "No".

If you find that yourself, and people you agree with around you would rather not have lived then suffer through their life, then sure, don't have kids. That gift is a curse to you and those around you. But, you can't reasonably tell other people that they must follow your decision. The rational conclusion is it is a decision for each individual, not that there is a blanket answer that is the same for everyone.

I respect your nuanced position on this knotty subject. — Existential Hope

Much appreciated, it can be a difficult subject.

In other words, if you never cause happiness, you did nothing morally wrong. However, if you caused suffering, that does become morally significant. It is not symmetrical. Happiness causing and harm-creating are not commensurate. — schopenhauer1

Ok, I think I understand what you're saying here. You view positive and negative as "shift changes". So if someone were unhappy, it is not a moral imperative to shift them to neutral or happy. However, in your moral imperative its more important to not shift them down. So if they were happy, you shouldn't do anything that would put them to neutral or sad. So positive shifts are not moral imperatives, while avoiding negative shifts are.

Not to spoil your thought experiment, but I would think the only right thing to do would be to tell the friend what the gift entailed and let them decide. But this is probably how we can also save that thought experiment. Instead of a gift to others, why not shift the focus of the gift to oneself? It should keep the spirit of what you're trying to say.

I know that I would definitely take some of those detriments to obtain some of those positive goals in my life. It depends on what I value. I have sacrificed much in my life to obtain my personal goals and achievements. And I willingly knew it when I made those choices I did in my life. If I could save the lives of 100 good people by getting eaten by a lion, would I do it? Here in my comfortable home I would say, "Yes". Hopefully I would pass that test if it ever came to it in reality. ;)

My point is that in our own lives we must weight the costs for benefits in our lives. Nothing is free. Marriage is a loss of freedom. Children are a loss of financial independence for many people. It can add stress to your lives, poor health, etc. And yet if you asked many parents, they would do it all again in a heartbeat. So I would put that question to yourself. Are there things that are worth suffering through in life? Is avoiding suffering, the negative shift, the only goal, or is it simply the price we have to measure out for living?

Yet, I also fail to see much substantial value in making everything about risks, harms, and impositions. Opportunities, benefits, and benedictions are also of interest. — Existential Hope

However, having kids is also an event that brings about varying (and often great) harms and suffering for a future person. Thus, if one sees preventing harms as the moral sticking point and NOT benefits-giving (as this is supererogatory not obligatory like preventing known harms is), then indeed it would be wrong to bring about a future person who would suffer, and it would not be wrong to "prevent" a future person who would also have benefits. — schopenhauer1

So existential is considering both the positive and negative as the moral points, while shopenhauer1 is only considering the negative as the moral obligation points to consider. Does that sound about right?

It might just be a conceptualization difference. "Positive" and "Negative" are really relative terms. schopenhauer, couldn't the view point that you're noting is really about making life less negative overall? Which doesn't that translate into the relative idea that you're making life more positive overall? Someone being happy is a less negative experience then not feeling anything at all right? The point is I don't think its possible to compare negative without positive, as negative needs what is positive as a relative comparison. Vice versa naturally.

As for doing this comparison ourselves about having kids, that's extremely difficult. Should Steven Hawking never have been born if science had predicted he would have ALS in the womb and that's all we knew? Deciding to have or not have a kid based on known negatives of the kids life in the future runs parallel to abortion, and that debate is not likely to be settled anytime soon. That's why I think its more important that the person willing to have a child goes in with trying their best, while those who aren't interested should pass on having a kid.