The hypothetical in the top quote is just using ‘must’ in a non-normative ‘moral’ sense to indicate that if there is a reason, then there is a reason — Bob Ross

Agreed.

whereas the assertion in the second to top quote is that there simply must/should be a reason, not that if it were to exist, then it would exist. — Bob Ross

This is the part I'm not understanding. Can you clarify? What does must/should mean?

It was identity in your point 2:

2. There must be a reason that everything should not exist — Bob Ross

An identity is A = A. I'm not seeing how I'm doing that here.

When reformulated, this just tautological:

2. For there to be a reason that everything should not exist, some reason should [has to] exist [such that everything should not exist]. — Bob Ross

This is true, but that's why I condensed it down into the revised version above.

If you are conveying, instead, that “if everything should not exist, then there must be a reason” then that is not taulogical, but that is not equivalent to point 2 (you made). — Bob Ross

Correct, that's not the same as what point 2 is saying. Its an odd thing that I agree with practically everything you're stating yet I can't understand the overall point you're trying to make. :) We're almost there I feel though, so please keep trying.

So if the truth of its own premise is that it shouldn't exist, but it must exist if it is to claim that it shouldn't exist, we're left with a contradiction

I agree, but that's not my conclusion. The contradiction is not in the fact that there must be a reason that exists if its the case that 'existence should not be.' The contradiction is in what it claims if this reason exists. The reason itself must be coherent. This is pointing to my language leading to ambiguity, so let me see if I can clarify.

For A to be, there must exist a B for it to exist, does not mean that "B must exist". After all, we don't know if A is true. Now if it is the case that A is true, then B must also be true. But we cannot prove that A is true, so this is an If 'A <-> B' statement, not a 'A is' statement. I feel like we've mixed up 'must' with true, so maybe this is where the confusion is coming from. Let me see if I can write this more cleanly then to avoid this unintentional ambiguity.

Remember, what is true or false is whether it 'should' be or not.

1. It is unknown whether, A, 'everything should not exist' is true. A = T/F
2. If A is true, then there must be a reason, B, and B must be true. A <-> B
3. If B is true, then B should not exist. B -> !B
4. But if B is true, then B is false by contradiction B = B = !B
5. If B should is false, then A is false. !B <-> !A
Therefore 'everything should not exist' cannot be true, because the reason itself notes that itself should not exist. The reason would note that its own existence is immoral, and should not be. Meaning what should be, is that the reason, and thus the initial moral claim, should not exist. And if there should not be a reason for 'nothing should exist', the only conclusion in the binary is that 'something should exist'.

This is good Bob, keep going please.

This is still incorrect: the claim is that if there is a reason that everything should not exist, then there is a reason that everything should not exist. — Bob Ross

Almost, but not quite. We're assuming if 'everything should not exist', there must be a reason. Its not an identity.

“There must <...>” is the same statement as “There should <...>”: same issue. — Bob Ross

Now I'm confused. Didn't you just have an issue with me swapping 'should' and 'must' earlier? I agree you had that right. What should exist is not the same as what must exist.

9. Because A cannot assert the truth of its own premise, or contradicts itself, it cannot exist. Therefore 2 is contradicted, and there cannot be a reason for why everything should not exist. — Bob Ross

Correct.

The truth of its own premise is that it shouldn’t exist, not that it should and should not exist. — Bob Ross

Also correct.

So if the truth of its own premise is that it shouldn't exist, but it must exist if it is to claim that it shouldn't exist, we're left with a contradiction. It means we cannot claim that "Everything should not exist." What this means is that the reason why there should be no existence, should not be. Remember, we're finding a foundational reason. A foundational reason must not be a contradiction.

The best we can do is alter the statement. "Everything should not exist, except the reason that everything should not exist." Why? That's not a foundation, that just leaves more questions and confusion. This can also be translated to, "At least one thing should exist." The reason? Because without a reason existing to indicate what should or should not be, there is no should or should not be. Meaning that once again, we cannot claim that 'everything should not exist'.

Does that clear it up?

hat it is exceedingly vague. As pointed out by me above, and by the SEP article, at issue the question of what constitutes the physical. — Wayfarer

For me, the physical is something that requires matter or energy to exist. I don't think its honestly all that detailed, its just an answer like: "What makes up molecules? "Atoms". The answer doesn't answer every question we have. It doesn't tell us how atoms can combine or be built into a world of humans. Its just noting the building blocks that everything fundamentally has at its core.

It also does not deny language that has arisen like 'mental', 'subjective' or 'feelings'. Its just important that while using different terminology that we don't forget that its all based in physical reality at the end of the day.

This is 'Hempel's dilemma': if physicalism is defined by reference to contemporary physics, then it is false — after all, who thinks that contemporary physics is complete? — Wayfarer

Hempel's dilemma is an issue of epistemology. Replace 'physicalism' with 'anythingism' and Hempel's dilemma still applies. All Hempel is noting is that what we know today may not be known tomorrow. As an epistemological problem, its trivial. Of course this is the case. That doesn't mean we dismiss what we know today for today. If we did, then we would be stuck in Hempel's dilemma every tomorrow as well. As such its a point that helps us understand epistemology, but does nothing about the issue of physicalism, idealism, or any other ism.

In effect, and this is the way you use it, 'physical' amounts to a general deference to science as an arbiter of reality — Wayfarer

Yes. I refer to what is known today. We always keep the possibility that what we know tomorrow may invalidate the knowledge of the day. But the only rational choice is to take what we know today and do our best with it. It doesn't mean we can't speculate! As I've noted many times, speculation is fun and can lead to some interesting ideas. The problem comes in when someone is so enamored with speculation, that they believe it must be true, and invalidates what we know today. This can never be the case.

To you, this is obvious, as you frequently say, never mind that a great deal of philosophy comprises questioning what is generally thought to be obvious. — Wayfarer

A great deal of philosophy is conjecture, fanciful ideas, and speculation. Many people love to think their viewpoint is obvious, but it must be proven, not assumed. All of these ideas are fun for sure, but its our job as philosophers to weed out philosophy that strays too far from logic and reality and begins to assert itself without proof. Philosophy is a giant brainstorm amongst multiple people, and most ideas will be wrong. Its why we study logic, logical fallacies, and means of thinking that have been proven as rational and air tight. Its so we can sail the storm to find the rare island of truth.

Please, keep brainstorming. Keep poking and prodding at what is known today. That is the only way we make progress and find things that have been missed. But a poke and a prod that does not reference what is known today, cannot demonstrate a valid and clear flaw in today's knowledge. A want, a wish, and our imagination may be desired as true, but that alone does not make it true.

One can interpret circular causality as saying that there is no initial cause, or as saying that what is considered "initial" is subjective or relative to the observer. — sime

No, whether there is an observer or not, there is still no reason, no prior existence why there is an infinite regress of causality. People seem to confuse the idea that you are needed for reality to exist. You are not. You are needed for reality to be interpreted. There still exists the thing in iteself that can be interpreted.

The important thing, is that causal circularity implies that every causal relation is symmetric and of the form A <--> B. or equivalently, that the causal order A --> B --> C comes equipped with a dual order in the opposite direction, C --> B --> A. — sime

This is one type of regressively infinite causality. There is also just flat regressive with no circularity. Understanding how the regressive causality works doesn't change the conclusion.

Also, a presentist might interpret the present as being the perpetual "first" cause , in spite of also admitting that present events are caused by "past" events when speaking in the vulgar. — sime

It depends on your measurement slice. Lets say I take a measurement slice to be as long as the universe has existed. While a fairly useless measurement slice for any other practical purpose other than this, we could do it. What prior existence caused the universe to have occurred? Whether its seconds, minutes, hours, or really, REALLY big, we're still left with the same conclusion when we complete the full set of prior causality. There is no prior reason that caused the set to exist, it simply is.

The point of the OP is to show you that no matter how causality regresses, you are left with the conclusion that there is no prior reason for existence period. Why does circular causality exist? Infinitely regressive causality? Finite causality? At some point you understand that it simply exists. There is no reason it should, or should not be. It is the first cause.

↪Philosophim I was indoctrinated in materialism for almost all my life. It's only recently that I've discovered it's incoherent. Materialism claims that we could be in a simulation. That would entail that all our feelings and imaginings and dreams and the essence of who we are are a collection of electronic switches. Doesn't that strike you as completely absurd? That the joy of playing with your children can emerge if you take some switches, run some current through them, and turn them on and off in a certain way? Why on Earth should I believe such nonsense? — RogueAI

A simulation? It means material is reality RogueAI. It doesn't strike me as absurd at all that this is how we work. Ever seen a bisection of the body? Seen the veins, muscle, viscera? You can come away with two opinions. Either its gross and unseemly, or you realize its a magnificent triumph of matter.

Yes, if someone messed with your brain, they could turn that joy off. Why should you believe such nonsense? For the same reason you should know that a bear can eat you. That if you want to continue to have joy with your kids, you have to treat your body and brain well. Eat well, don't drink alcohol beyond moderation, don't smoke, exersise, etc.

Even further, if you start having memory loss or strokes, you can go to the doctor and get treatment to fix or minimize the issue. That 'nonsense' is why we can treat brain disorders like schizophrenia, suicidal depression, and a whole host of other psychological issues. Because understanding reality gives you power to make it better instead of being completely at its whims, or worse, creating problems through choices of ignorance.

Picture Holmes in your mind right now. — RogueAI

In my physical mind? Of course. My brain is matter, and its a cacophony of electrical and chemical processes all letting me experience my individual subjective experience of "Sherlock Holmes".

Fictional characters and mathematical theorems and numbers are mental objects. — RogueAI

And aren't mental objects an experience of a physical brain? Do mental objects form in reality outside of brains? Do they exist in a subspace? What is a mental object made out of? I'm not trolling, I'm cracking your indoctrination. This is philosophy where we are supposed to freely think. Really think on it.

Let's say you describe all that rage and red-light running in purely physical terms and then showed it to an alien who didn't know if humans were p-zombies or not. Could the alien figure out, from that purely physical description of my rage-induced red-light running behavior, that I am not a p-zombie? — RogueAI

We don't know what an alien would say, as they may have a greater understanding of the universe then us. We don't need p-zombies either. Lets just separate consciousness into two parts. Behavioral consciousness and subjective consciousness. Currently, the only way we understand objective consciousness is through behavior. Currently, the only way we understand subjective consciousness is through our own personal experience.

In other words, science has never attempted to define objective consciousness through subjective behavior. That's because its impossible to know what its like to be another subject besides yourself. Did you know that some people do not have an inner monologue, while others cannot visualize a single thing? How can your or I ever objectively understand what that is like without experiencing it ourselves? We can't. Its beyond human knowledge.

A p-zombie is a 'pointless zombie'. We've never used subjective assessments of consciousness to objectively describe conscious behavior. So its irrelevant what a zombie subjectively experiences, its how a zombie behaves.

What we can do is tie behavior to the physical brain. Neuroscience and psychiatry are proven fields with real results in managing consciousness with medications, anesthesia, and brain surgery. Mental states are physical states. The subjective experience is the experience of being the brain matter. We can see the brain matter and watch your behavior. But we cannot know what you are feeling while your brain matter is responding with the behavior. And in no way does this discount that your subjective experience is also physical in origin.

Sherlock Holmes? The Pythagorean Theorem? — RogueAI

Yes, these are physical in origin too. Sherlock Holmes does not reside in a separate subspace or as a separate material from matter and/or energy. It was created by the physical brain of Arthur Conan Doyle. It was then written with physical ink on physical paper. Printed by a physical machine, and read by physical eyes and brains.

The Pythagorean Theorem is based off of a physical construct we call a triangle. We studied its physical properties, and came to the conclusion that the physical properties logically lead to certain consistent conclusions. It was communicated with physical speech as the air bent to philosopher's tongues. A physical feather written on physical parchment.

If you don't believe these things are physical in origin, then what are they made of? Where did they come from? In what space do they reside?

↪Philosophim So you dismiss all the arguments against physicalism in the source article? Or is it more that you think we can safely assume they’re wrong? Or you haven’t considered them? — Wayfarer

The topic here was about a snippet from the source article, in which I made my own addendums.

I would just modify one thing. I would state that everything that we've discovered so far is physical in origin. It does not mean that everything is physical, as we have not looked at everything yet. I also wouldn't even say this is a philosophy, this is just the fact of the known universe at this time. Finally, this does not preclude the use of terms such as metaphysics, ideas, or words that are not necessarily associated with 'the physical'. The point is to understand that the origin of everything so far known is physical, and shouldn't imply more than that. — Philosophim

Feel free to point out an issue with my proposal. If you feel one of the points in the article would be a good criticism for it, feel free to reference why it would.

Answering a question with a question is answering... — Banno

Bye Banno.

Philosophim Are you going to argue that traffic laws are physical? Wouldn't that be a category error? — Banno

Are you going to answer my question with a question, or answer it? This isn't a one sided conversation. Where do traffic laws come from Banno? Once you answer that, I'll answer any follow up questions you have. If you're going to avoid answering, I see no reason to continue discussing with you.

2. For there to be a reason that everything should not exist, some reason should [has to] exist [such that everything should not exist].

It is false that if a reason exists that it should exist, which is what you said in this point 2. When I convert, to try to be charitable — Bob Ross

Feel free to cross out or amend the statement to what you feel fits, its no problem for me and can help convey your point easily. Also, full agreement. That's a much better way to write the statement! Lets simplify this then to "There must be a reason that everything should not exist".

7. if A should exist, then it claims that A should not exist.
…
9 But if A should not exist, then it cannot assert that it should exist.

A doesn’t claim that A should exist, it claims that A should not exist. I think you are trying to infer this from point 2 (as far as I can tell), and 2 is just false or, when converted, a mere tautology that cannot be used to support the antecedent of point 7 (being that it is also false). — Bob Ross

No, I was not relying on P2 having the word 'should', just me poorly mixing up 'should' with 'must' in 2 which I can see made it confusing. With the amended point 2, the following points still hold.

2. There must be a reason that everything should not exist
...
7. If A exists, then it claims A should not exist.
8. But if A should not exist, then "Everything should not exist" should not be.
9. Because A cannot assert the truth of its own premise, or contradicts itself, it cannot exist.
Therefore 2 is contradicted, and there cannot be a reason for why everything should not exist.

P1: If one should eat babies, then they should find babies to eat. [p → q]
P2: One should eat babies. [p]
C: One should find babies to eat. [q] {Modus Ponens}

This is a logically sound and valid argument, and according to your own concession the contents of which are then objective. — Bob Ross

I see no problem with this. You did not prove that one should eat babies. All you did was prove that if P2 was true, then you can make the conclusion based on P1. That's fine.

We'll come back to subjectivity and objectivity after/if we resolve these points Bob. :)

we have not discovered anything that exists apart from matter and energy.
— Philosophim
Yeah, we have. Traffic laws. — Banno

Where did traffic laws come from?

There aren’t any: my point is just that I am predicating that only minds are ends-in-themselves and not equivocating them. — Bob Ross

Stating that something is self-evident doesn't demonstrate that its also not an equivocation though. If minds are not identical to ends-in-themselves, then we would need to see some difference between a mind and an end-in-itself. If you aren't seeing equivocation, could you note how they are not simply the same thing?

So that’s what I was asking about before: which premise do you currently reject? We can discuss further whichever one that is. — Bob Ross

Certainly! For me it is that I should value an end in itself beyond an opinion that I should do so. I see nothing concrete that binds me to it, or demonstrates a provable ethical decision. 180 proof is walking the same line I am, just in different details.

But, this would need proof of existence before it became anything more than speculation.

Well, that's what people believe they are demonstrating in their papers. In any event, the converse isn't decisively demonstrated. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I just wanted you to know that I think you're making fantastic points. I do understand that some people believe this, but I have not seen any success in this regards. Also yes, just because our best understanding today is that consciousness is from the brain, doesn't mean that tomorrow we could find something new which would change this. My point is that currently, the idea that consciousness does not come from the brain is speculative, and speculation cannot overrule the facts that we have today.

SO explain, using only physics, why folk stop at the red light. — Banno

Sure.

As you approach a red light, you physically move your eyes through nerve signals that allow waves of light that enter into your eye and bounce against the nerves at the back. These electrical and chemical signals are sent to the brain, where they are processed as 'a red light'. Your brain accesses memory through dendrite signaling, to know that a red light means stop.

Further processing results in a 'decision' to hit the brakes. Electrical and chemical signals are sent to the calf and leg muscles to coordinate muscle contraction in such a way that your foot depresses on the brake to stop the car.

I would state that everything that we've discovered so far is physical in origin.
— Philosophim

On what basis? — Wayfarer

Current discoveries in neuroscience and medicine. To my knowledge, we have not discovered anything that exists apart from matter and energy.

First, this is a nice discussion topic. Its always fun to think about things like this! Second, if you have any real interest in consciousness, my suggestion is not to look to philosophy, but neuroscience, psychology, and sociology. The days of wondering about consciousness as a concept alone are long gone, and without a good understanding of modern day science's explorations and conclusions about consciousness based on our subjective experience alone are intellectual play, not anything serious.

While there are a few areas of consciousness that are open to a philosophical lens, they must be done with the knowledge of what has already been discovered to have any bearing in reality.

2) Intuitively, consciousness is tied to the notion of individual:

But rationally, are they really tied together? Would the experience of consciousness be any different if we weren’t “one soul”, “one individual”? — Skalidris

I believe you are correct that they are not tied together. One can be conscious but not have any awareness of self as you mentioned. But often times the talk of consciousness has the fallacy of thinking it only applies to humans. If we are to look to animals, we can see other levels of consciousness without an indicator that they see a 'self'.

First there's "The mirror test". This is a test where animals, and even some human children as old as six cannot recognize that the image in the mirror is themselves. Now, I'm not saying that alone means that such subjects do not have a sense of "I". Its just a very visual example of creatures not recognizing 'Themselves". It could be because they have no notion of I, or it could be they simply lack the intellectual capacity to see the mirror as 'themself'.

Of course, there is an argument out there that animals are not truly conscious, only automatons. With the removal of biased hubris and a little thought, we can throw that notion out as ridiculous. You are familiar with the problem that we cannot objectively know what another person's subjective consciousness is like. And its true, we can't. Which means all of our judgements that other people are conscious are based on their behavior, and the fact that they're human. The lesson we can learn is that if something is confirmed to behave consciously, we cannot make an assessment as to whether they have a subjective, or non-subjective experience. Thus they could be conscious, but perhaps not have an "I".

When we get down to the point when a creature recognizes itself as a 'self' we find this much more difficult to determine through behavior. If a creature cannot communicate with us, how do we tell? It might fail the mirror test, but maybe it at some primitive level feels that it is, 'itself'. Considering we cannot know another creature's subjective experience by experiencing it ourselves, it seems extremely difficult for us to posit whether a being that behaves as a conscious entity has a sense of self without its explicit communication, or easily recognizable human behaviors.

Anyway, that's enough musing from me for now, hopefully it sparks some thoughts.

Being substrate independent, it seems difficult to reduce information to matter and energy, although some people do think it's possible. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Technically, its not substrate independent, we just minimize the differences to create a more manageable identity in our head. I'll use music as an example. You can play the same tune on a piano and a harp. While the 'notes' are the same, the expression is different because of the different medium. Meaning that the song on a harp and a piano are actually different, we just find a way of packaging certain information of actions that can be attempted on multiple mediums.

It might point to Hemple's Dilemma though, the idea that if "physical" = anything we have reason to believe exists, the term become vacuous. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, I'm keen on avoiding that as well. Perhaps there is something that exists that cannot be boiled down to energy and matter at its foundation. But, this would need proof of existence before it became anything more than speculation.

I am using energy as understood by E=mc^2.

"On the most basic level, the equation says that energy and mass (matter) are interchangeable; they are different forms of the same thing."

https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/einstein/lrk-hand-emc2expl.html#:~:text=%22Energy%20equals%20mass%20times%20the,forms%20of%20the%20same%20thing.

Does this follow from an argument? Or is it an assumption? — frank

Show me something that doesn't originate from matter and energy. What third type of substance would it be?

I would just modify one thing. I would state that everything that we've discovered so far is physical in origin. It does not mean that everything is physical, as we have not looked at everything yet. I also wouldn't even say this is a philosophy, this is just the fact of the known universe at this time. Finally, this does not preclude the use of terms such as metaphysics, ideas, or words that are not necessarily associated with 'the physical'. The point is to understand that the origin of everything so far known is physical, and shouldn't imply more than that.

Hello Boagie, thanks for contributing. So an OP like this is setting up a very particular argument and set of vocabulary. Its a 'proof' if you were. You can have your own opinion, but when examining papers with proofs you should look at the premises and the conclusions as your main point of criticisms. So I'm not saying you're wrong, I'm simply asking you to focus on the OP and point out where in the OP its wrong.

So first, the OP is not proving that objective morality exists. Its taking a premise. "Assume objective reality exists, what must that necessarily be?" Why are we doing this? Because I see no proof against there being an objective reality, nor there for being an objective reality.

Again, the measure and meaning of all things is the property of subjective consciousness. The world in the absence of subjective consciousness is utterly meaningless. — boagie

You may be using a different meaning of subjective. Sometimes people confuse 'a subjects view point' with the term 'subjective'. Objectivity and subjectivity are both things subjects can do. As is any word or meaning. Objectivity is an approach a subject can make that results in a solution that is rationally provable to all subjects, despite their subjective viewpoint on the matter. Thus, while subjectively you might beleive that there is no objective morality, can you objectively prove it? Again, I am not proving it in this argument, I am only introducing what it must be if it does exist.

The world in the absence of subjective consciousness is utterly meaningless. — boagie

Subjective consciousness is not the same as 'subjectivity'. For example, it is objectively true that you have a subjective consciousness correct? Or do you view that your own subjective conscious is only subjectively true? If so, that would leave it open to the logical possibility that your subjective consciousness is subjectively false, which is absurd.

Interestingly, if the objective morality I've proposed here exists, objective morality is something discovered, and does not need subjects to have discovered it for it to still be true. Kind of like a tree falling in a forest when no one is around. Yes the terms tree, and the relations between falling, ground etc. would not exist without subjects, but the existence of the action in itself still would be.

Fixed-point iteration, i.e. F(z) = z, is the mathematical description of circular causation, which can be considered a non-finite conception of causality that is symmetrical and has no initial-cause, thus also eliminating the causal arrow. — sime

No, that actually proves a first cause. "What caused a circular causation to exist instead of another type of causation?" As you noted it "Has no initial-cause", thus there is no prior explanation for its existence. Meaning, its a first cause as defined in the OP.

Its nice to see someone tackle the actual argument. First, let me point out what the definition of a first cause is. Its a cause that has no prior explanation for its existence. In other words,

"It simply is, there's no prior explanation for its being" Yes. — jgill

So then your conclusion is the same as mine. Its not the simplification of the formula for infinite regress that the OP is noting, its just noting the set of all steps can be considered to represent it. You illustrated that for me. The question is then asked, "What caused there to be an infinite regress of causality?" The answer is, "There is no prior explanation, it simply is." Meaning that without us knowing whether there is a set of infinite causal regression, or a set of finite causal regression, we will reach a point of finite causal regression. Even a set of infinite regression, cannot avoid ultimately arriving at finite regression.

Essentially, "What caused it to be finite/infinitely regressive?" has no answer but the fact of its own existence. Now, maybe my vocabulary could be better. Maybe what I'm explaining could be described another way. It is really this phrase, "It simply is, there is no prior explanation for its being." that is ultimately true in any causal relationship. Do we call that a first cause? An uncaused cause? What do you think?

You borrowed from Anselm but left off "and this we all call god". — Banno

Really, quit trolling the thread Banno. This goes nowhere near the ontological argument. I expect better out of someone who been here as long as you have. What a shame.

If infinite causality, then the entire thing in total cannot itself have a cause, but is instead, for lack of a better word, magical in its so occurring - this with all the natural laws, etc., it encapsulates. — javra

Yes, in other words something without prior cause. A first cause as defined by the OP.

If, however, one assumes a causal determinism with an initial starting point, then the same issue applies to existence in total: its occurrence is absurd (for the reasons just specified). — javra

This can be an unnerving existential reality/realization for some but, all the same, I see no other rational conclusion to be had. — javra

I think the realization is very important to have and prove. I follow it up with https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/12847/if-a-first-cause-is-logically-necessary-what-does-that-entail-for-the-universes-origins/p1

I think its a fantastic spring board into fun thoughts about cosmology. Unfortunately, because people think this always leads to "God", they shut down from thinking about this apart from God. The attempt here is to get knee jerk athiests and theists out of their focus on their fears on the ends of an argument and to actually think about it from a different perspective.

The OP assumes "a first cause to existence" instead of concluding in the position of absurdism - this as pertains to existence's being as a whole. — javra

No, I welcome the absurdism and form a conclusion from it. Too often the absurdism of reality existing is hand waved without thinking further into it beyond "God or not God". I appreciate the post.

↪Philosophim Yes, indeed. But it relies on the same supposed logic. — Banno

Does it? I'm not sure you understand it at all.

Too much invested, it seems. The cosmological argument is not as straight forward as you supose. — Banno

This is not a proof for God argument. I'm an atheist.

Silly of me to offer some familiarity with the literature. — Banno

Yes, silly of you to think that straw man posts that demonstrate you do not understand the OP would be anything useful or respectable. I read the Anscombe paper and saw what they were talking about didn't apply to the OP. This indicates that you simply posted the papers without YOU needing to think about how it applies to the OP, thus wasting my time. I am also not going to read an entire compilation of Russel's to find the point you think you're making. Point it out to me and how it applies to the OP.

Not only did insult me when I call out your laziness, you ignored my other points like a coward. So Banno, are you going to be one of those people who has spent years reading philosophy, yet sadly can't contribute anything more to a discussion then someone who has never studied it at all?

1. It is required to note that minds are ends in themselves because the identity of ‘an absolute end’ does not entail itself that those are only minds — Bob Ross

This is why I asked earlier if you could give an example of an end in itself that wasn't a mind.

FIS does not afford an equation that one can determine exactly what one should do in every given situation: it is a general formula, not an exact science. I have never heard a normative ethical theory that is able to afford such an equation without biting a lot of bullets. — Bob Ross

Yes, this is my general problem with ethical theories and why I feel we have a lot more work to do on the matter.

If one accepts that accepting the premises entails the conclusion that one should treat minds as sacred, then if they either have deny a premise or accept that they should treat mind as sacred. — Bob Ross

Right, but that's the answer to any valid syllogism. If we accept the premises, then the conclusion must necessarily be so. Yes, proving that first is essential. But after its proven, the question becomes, "Can you prove that I should accept your premises?" Its a different chunk of the argument. Its the trap many philosophies fall into, including my own. Its fun to make an argument with premises, but then the premises themselves must be worked back through to be justified as well. Its why so many philosophies fail. They become satisfied with asserting the assumptions as fact without proof, and people outside of the work just don't get why that should be.

Anyway, I think its a good start, but you have to address that new chunk if you want to convince people fully. And if you're not concerned about convincing people on those other points, all good as well. Sometimes philosophy is for us and people like us, not something that can be applied to everyone.

Nor can you escape to "agency," because that too yields manys, many different kinds of agency. — tim wood

I do not address agency at all. This theory states noting about it.

So is everything either part of an infinite/eternal chain of cause and effect, or alternatively is there some first thing? I don't know. — tim wood

I don't know either! And yet despite not knowing that, we arrive at the conclusion I posted in the OP. My point is that in either case we end up with a first cause.

Another way to express the Hard Problem is : "how does physical activity (neural & endocrinological) result in the meta-physical (mental) functions that we label "Ideas" and "Awareness"? — Gnomon

I still see that as the easy problem, as its a very clear approach. Eventually after research, we find that X leads to Y. Its a problem, and I'm not saying its 'easy', its easy in contrast to the hard problem. Its called a hard problem because there's no discernable path or approach towards finding the answer. If you shape a question about consciousness that has a clear path forward to attempt to solve the problem, that is an easy problem.

The word 'how' can easily allow the implicit 'why' to slip in where it shouldn't. "Why do we have subjective experience?" is a hard problem. We know how to influence and access consciousness in the brain though subjects such as in brain surgery. You can poke certain areas of the brain and ask the patient what they experience, and it will cause changes in their subjective experience. That's the how.

'Why' is an entirely different question. Why does matter if organized a particular way create consciousness? My point is that this is no harder a problem then asking why matter behaves in any way at all. Why does hydrogen and oxygen make water? Not how. We know that. But why does it do that at all? Its simply a narrower question to the big question of "Why does anything exists at all?". People seem to mix up the "how" and "why" portion of consciousness completely into the "how" point, which causes confusion. That's why philosophers and scientists are very pointed in showing what the easy problem entails. The easy is the 'how', the hard is the 'why'.

But, like Gravity, we only know what it does physically, not what it is essentially. — Gnomon

True. Part of human reasoning is limiting the types of questions to chase with the resources and understand we have. There are plenty of times when we reach a limit in how to proceed with further understanding of a particular nature. So we take what we understand as it is, and use it going forward. What we do understand is that gravity comes from mass. What we don't do is assume because we cannot answer the details, that there is some unidentified third property that must be responsible for it. That's a "God of the gaps" argument.

It is not that I have an issue with people speculating that consciousness is caused by something besides the brain. By all means, speculate away! It is when people assert that because we can speculate, that speculation has validity in overriding the only reasonable conclusions we can make at this time. If someone said, "Well it just doesn't make sense to me why mass creates gravity, therefore it must be the case that 'massicalism' is inadequate to express what's really going on, and that gravity is somehow separate from mass and energy. That's ridiculous.

The scientific fact as of today, is that consciousness is caused by the brain. There is zero evidence otherwise. The idea that consciousness is not caused by the brain is pure speculation, and speculation has no weight to assert anything besides the fact that it is merely speculation.

Recent scientific investigations have found that Information is much more than the empty entropic vessels of Shannon's definition. Information also is found in material & energetic forms. — Gnomon

Of course. If the brain is physical, this is the only reasonable conclusion. Further, computers have clearly shown that information can be stored and manipulated with matter and energy.

The "physical capability" of Energy to exist is taken for granted, because we can detect its effects by sensory observation, even though we can't see or touch Energy with our physical senses*2. Mechanical causation works by direct contact between material objects. But Mental Causation works more like "spooky action at a distance". So, Consciousness doesn't act like a physical machine, but like a metaphysical person. — Gnomon

The only disagreement I have with you is that I believe we act exactly like physical machines, only more advanced. I do not see anything about humanity that is separate from the universe, but is one of the many expressions of the universe.

Again, in my thesis, Consciousness is defined as a process or function of physical entities. We have no knowledge of consciousness apart from material substrates. But since its activities are so different from material Physics, philosophers place it in a separate category of Meta-Physics. And religious thinkers persist in thinking of Consciousness in terms of a Cartesian Soul (res cogitans), existing in a parallel realm. — Gnomon

Fantastic breakdown! The only addendum I would make is "But since its activities are not fully understood in terms of material physics".

But my thesis postulates that both Physical Energy and Malleable Matter are emergent from a more fundamental element of Nature : Causal EnFormAction*4(EFA). The Big Bang origin state was completely different from the current state, in that there was no solid matter as we know it. Instead, physicists imagine that the primordial state was a sort of quark-gluon Plasma, neither matter nor energy, but with the potential (EFA) for both to emerge later. And ultimately for the emergence of Integrated Information as Consciousness. :smile: — Gnomon

I also have no problem with constructing other language terms to describe consciousness. The only problem is when someone believes that a change in language undermines the fact of its underlying physical reality. Also, my understanding is that this primordial state is also matter and energy. It is a 'thing', and until we can find the state of a thing that exhibits itself differently from matter and/or energy, it fits in one of those two categories.

The evidential Gap, beyond the evidence, can be filled with speculation of Creation, or a Tower-of-Turtles hypothesis. — Gnomon

This is true. As long that speculation does not forget it is speculation and asserts that it must be so.

However, Philosophical questions about Mind & Consciousness depend on personal reasoning (Inference) from that physical evidence. If you can't make that deduction from available evidence, then you live in a matterful but mindless & meaningless world. And the mystery of Consciousness is dispelled, as a ghost, with a wave of dismissal. — Gnomon

Again, fantastic contribution. Agreed.

My point is that your moral judgments are subjective if they are true relative to the subjective moral judgment that one ought to be rational. But, then again, you seem to be defining objectivity in a manner where it is exactly that. — Bob Ross

We can revisit this later. For now, I do not believe that one should be rational is a subjective moral judgement. But we have to get the base down first before we build to that. :)

Thank you, but I still don’t see how you making that inference. Here’s the part I am referring to:
E. Assumption: There exists a reason that nothing should exist.
F. If that is the case, then according to the reason that nothing should exist, that reason should not exist. Thus a contradiction.

This is the part I need a syllogism from you about, not the rest. This is the crux that I don’t get at all. I don’t see how a reason which justifies its own non-existence entails a contradiction (whether that be metaphysical, logical, or actual). Can you please give me an argument or elaboration for this part? — Bob Ross

Sure, let me see if I can.

Lets see how I can communicate the structure more abstractly.

The question is whether at least one thing should exist, or only nothing should exist. "Everything should not exist" is the equivalent of "Nothing should exist".

1. Everything should not exist
2. For there to be a reason that everything should not exist, some reason should exist.
3. There is a proposed reason A, why everything should not exist.
4. Assume A exists.
5. A is part of everything that exists.
6. According to A, A should not exist.
7. if A should exist, then it claims that A should not exist.
8. If A should not exist, then the reason why everything should not exist, A, should not exist.
9 But if A should not exist, then it cannot assert that it should exist.
Therefore A cannot exist without a contradiction.

A contradiction is clear if the assumption of X assumption leads to its own negation. If you still don't see it, can you point out why A does not negate itself?

I just want to note, so far, this is a subjective moral judgment; and is the underpinning of all your moral judgments, thusly making them subjective as well. — Bob Ross

According to your definition of subjective, everything is subjective Bob. Not according to mine. Please use the definition I've put forward for now. It doesn't mean I'm right, it just makes sure we're on the same page. We can discuss which definition should be used after we get through the meat of the argument first.

What do you mean by “rationally or logically countered”? If make a syllogism that is logically valid which contains a moral judgment, is that moral judgment thereby ‘objective’ under your view? — Bob Ross

If you can prove that it is so, then yes. Rationality and logic are the best reflective tools we have about reality. It is in my view, the only way we can meaningfully assess it. Meaning if you have an argument that is air tight rationally and logically, which means it cannot be contradicted by reality in any way, you have an objective moral judgement.

Please help check if this classic allegory is inspiring for your question? — YiRu Li

If I understood the allegory correctly, the physical deformities do not excuse the man's act of morality and responsibility to his own welfare and the community where possible. Further, the man is not expected to perform duties that one with his deformity could not do. Sounds fair to me. I am of the opinion that every person find some way to make themselves of use in this world, no matter their deficiencies. In addition, we as society should serve where we can with everyone included in the benefits, not just a few or those deemed worthy.

With mischievous playfulness/smart assed remarks. — Vaskane

Ha ha! An honest troll with a sense of humor? You made me crack a smile over here. Genuinely, have a good day!

But not physically necessary! — Vaskane

Not that I disagree, but what do you mean by this? This is more of a cheerleader quote, we should back why we're cheering something. :)

First of all, it seems to me that to raise the possibility of a first cause one must start from a simple entity [non-composite: since if it is composite we cannot speak of a cause in the singular but of causes in the plural].

Secondly, the creation of the world [as an effect] must be treated as a binary relationship Where A causes B. More than two make several causes, and not a single cause.

Thirdly, this binary relationship must be understood as creation from nothing [as God is supposed to have created the universe from nothing: Creatio ex nihilo]. Since if there were a thing B affected by a thing A, B would have to be presupposed coexisting with A.

Fourthly, the first cause cannot be a single thing differentiating itself (monism) or being the cause of itself. That destroys the difference between cause and effect. The creator and the created. — JuanZu

Perfect except for one thing. A first cause does not necessitate that it is a 'creator'. A creator would be a complex conscious being with intention. I am not arguing that here at all. I'm just noting that there must exist at least one first cause, which does not require consciousness.

How can the first cause affect nothingness to produce the world?

Can not. Ex nihilo nihil fit. — JuanZu

Agreed. Something cannot create another from 'nothing'. The chain of causality demonstrates this. Once there is 'nothing' prior to there being something, that something is called a first cause. Now, there is a logic as to what is possible within a first cause, but that's not what this argument is about. Its just noting that there logically must be at least one first cause. If you agree with the logic here and want to discuss what that potentially means, I posted it here. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/12847/if-a-first-cause-is-logically-necessary-what-does-that-entail-for-the-universes-origins/p1

I had to divide it up because people got caught up on the later logic without understanding the former logic here.

I apologize: I mis-re-read it: nevermind! I re-read it again and, yes, this is purporting that a first cause (an ‘alpha) is logically necessary, since the form of the argument is that there are 3 exhaustive options (A, B, and C) and both A and B entail C, so C is logically necessary.

I really should not indulge myself in this OP while we have two pending discussions going, but I can’t help it (: — Bob Ross

Ha ha! Not a worry! I am always glad to have you in any discussion Bob. I understand the passion.

Let me just ask: what sense of the term ‘cause’ is being used here? It doesn’t seem to be physical causality but, rather, mere explanation: am I remembering correctly? — Bob Ross

Its about 'Why does X exist? Because Y happened a second prior.'

And what exactly is prior causality? — tim wood

Great descriptions tim wood! Lets add some specifications to causality. Measured causality vs total causality. Total causality includes everything everywhere in a all possible time positions that ultimately had a hand in determining the outcome of some X. That is largely unknowable.

But just like a line is 'infinite' we can measure it by feet. Measurable causality is when we put restrictions such as 'time'. The only restriction I'm putting on causality here is time, and that there is something else besides the existence itself that causes the existence to be at any particular time slice. It doesn't matter to me how many other sources are involved in creating X. In fact, my theory does not state that there cannot be multiple first causes, nor that first causes and entities that have prior causality cannot mix.

So then there are two options. Either everything is caused by something else than itself at a prior time slice, or we reach a point in which something exists that is not explained by something prior that is not itself. This first is caused, the second is a first cause, or something that has no prior explanation for its existence.

Since we cannot know the full specific chain of measurable causality, we can use sets. A set containing a first cause would simply go down the chain of causality until we reached a first cause. So we can take your dynamite example and start with one of the reasons you lit the dynamite was because three days ago somebody cut you off. I'm using the more absurd example to demonstrate that it doesn't matter where in the chain we start the measurement. Out of all the causes that lead up to the other man cutting you off, we choose one, then examine that. Choose one, then examine that, and so on. In a finite causality set, eventually we get to a point where our selection has no prior causality. This is a first cause.

So now lets examine an infinite set. Here we capture the set of infinite causality. However, there is still one question left within the set. What caused existence to have infinite causality? There is nothing prior and outside of the set, therefore this is a first cause. There is no outside reason or explanation for its existence, it simply is. As such, no matter the situation, everything always boils down to there being a first cause, or a point of existence which cannot be explained by anything prior and outside of itself.

I see that as a problem considering that minds and their status are the fundamental lynch pin of your argument. Perhaps this could be answered if you define whether it is possible for something that is not a mind to be an end in itself.

I think this is just the fallacy of the heap. — Bob Ross

I'm wondering if the tie in of minds to things in themselves is this fallacy. My thinking was that if minds are the only things that are ends in themselves, you can just remove ends in themselves and just note that minds are simply the things on this planet which should be protected and encouraged. It just simplifies the argument.

Likewise, it is not “the stronger wins”. It is entirely possible that, according to FIS, a mind holds higher precedence over another mind and the former is physically weaker than the latter. — Bob Ross

Sure, but what's the way we measure the precedence? I think it works in easily defined scenarios like "People who follow the FET and FES versus those who defy it," but what about situations in which everyone is a rational agent who follows this morality to a T? As a simple solution its a nice thought, but I'm not seeing how we can develop any air tight means of measurement when tough moral choices come up. Its not anything you have to debate with me about, these are just musings to think about.

So if you accept that ‘one ought to be rational’ and that ‘minds are ends in themselves’ and that ‘sole means are not ends’, then it logically follows that one should not treat them as a mere means. — Bob Ross

I get that. The question is why anyone should care if a mind thinks its an end to itself. There's nothing requiring me in that argument to not solely treat them as an ends in themselves. All you've noted is that we cannot solely view them as a means. Vice versa it also means we cannot solely view them as an ends. Also, I'm not really sure there's an iron bound logic demonstrating why I should care if a mind views themselves as a means to an ends.

Is it possible that you could demonstrate why using a person for one's own end is a contradiction? I believe you need to include Kant's universizability principle for it work. Essentially Kant believed "act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law.” With that you can make an argument that if a person does not treat themselves as a means to an end, they shouldn't expect anyone else to either.

Of course, we reach a similar question once more. What if I also treat myself as a means to an end? Further, why should I care if something becomes a universal law if it doesn't benefit me directly? What logically forces me to concede a universal law, and this law in particular? Just more things to think about.

An objective moral judgement would be a moral judgement that can be logically concluded on no matter the difference in subjective viewpoint
…
This is something that cannot be rationally agreed upon by all people.

That's kind of what I'm trying to solve here. :) Maybe I won't, but you never know until you try.

Firstly, although I am trying not to import my definitions, this is not what objectivity with respect to morality standardly means, and this would, within standard terminology, be a form of moral subjectivism. — Bob Ross

Call it whatever you want personally. The meaning behind the words being used here are all that matters. As I am using objectivity, its as a rational foundation of morality that can be concluded despite differences in subjective viewpoints. I've already noted that your definition of subjective makes everything subjective Bob, but I agree with its underlying meaning. You've read my theory of knowledge so you should also understand that all definitions come from discrete experiencers. Why I don't use your definition of subjectivity is I find the term becomes so broad as to lose the meaningful contrast that I'm trying to convey. Objectivity and subjectivity in the classical sense are approaches that subjects use to solve problems. As long as you understand that objectivity leaves no wiggle room for the rational subject to disagree, we're on the same page.

You are just subjectively stipulating that what one should do is what is rational, and then calling ‘objective’ whatever can be reached as a consensus by people committed to that subjective moral judgment. — Bob Ross

No, I'm just assuming you'll grant me rationality and logic are the best tools we have to measure reality. This is not an assumption I spelled out, but maybe I should have. If you want me to go into the question of whether we should or should not use logic, I can go into that as well. I leave that to you to decide if that is important at this stage or not.

Secondly, just to go with your terms here, if all you mean by objectivity is that there is a consensus amongst rational agents, then if your argument for ‘there should be nothing’ being logical contradictory is true then this would be an objective moral judgment by your terms. — Bob Ross

Yes.

1. There is an objective morality

This is where I am not following: how does stipulating morality is objective entail that a reason which justifies its own non-existence entails a contradiction? How does it entail that ‘nothing should exist’ becomes ‘nothing should not exist’? I am not following. — Bob Ross

Not a problem, I'll try again. If this is good, I'll likely edit the OP to make things clearer as well.

1. Morality is what 'should' be, given a choice between two outcomes.
2. Rationality and logic are our best tools at identifying and reflecting reality as accurately as possible.
3. An objective morality would be a morality of what should happen that cannot be rationally or logically countered.
4. Anything that 'should' exist must have a reason that is also concluded by rationality and logic.

But what would an objective morality entail? First, we must assume that it exists to see how if there is some logical necessity in how it would exist.

A. Assumption: There is an objective morality. This will be assumed true for the purposes of this discussion.
B. An objective morality must have a rational and logical foundation to build on. Every moral question must be examined to find the foundational reason underlying its claims. This foundation must necessarily demonstrate there is no reason beyond its own existence.
C. All moral claims must answer this question as its foundation before anything else can be built. "Should there be existence, or should there not?" (Just go with me on this one for now until you get the point. I will gladly return to that debate after we see if the conclusion works assuming this is true)
D. Because A stands true, there are two conclusions that cannot happen.
d1: The 'should' or 'should not' of existence cannot both be true.
d2: The 'should' or 'should not' of existence cannot both be false.
For if both were true or false, then there would be no 'should', no answer to the foundation, and thus no objective morality.
E. Assumption: There exists a reason that nothing should exist.
F. If that is the case, then according to the reason that nothing should exist, that reason should not exist. Thus a contradiction.
Therefore, since 'there should not be existence' leads to contradicting itself, it is false, and 'there should be existence' must be true.

Follow up:

Taking the conclusion above, there is one last test. To ensure that 'should there be existence' is not logically false as well.

G. Assumption: There should be existence
H. This statement is not contradicted by any of the previous statements.
I. There should be existence is not logically proven to be false, therefore it may stand that it is true.
Therefore, if we're assuming that an objective morality exists, the concluded logical foundation of this objective morality must be that 'existence should be'.

Alright, I hope that helped! Again, really great job drilling down on this for me Bob. I hope I'm making this clearer as we go.