Well I have clearly missed the mark yet again ): It seems as though we are not semantically disagreeing but, rather, fundamentally disagreeing. — Bob Ross
Not a worry at all! Please continue to shoot arrows. I think comparing this epistemology to the a/s distinction is inevitable and necessary to fully understand it. I am glad we are exploring this route, as I think it can help clarify what my proposed epistemology means. Further, there needs to be a reason why we should use this epistemology over the a/s distinction if it is to have any worth. Lets dive in.
I have to perform this (comparison) for everything, which is the problem with your distinction. For example, if I distinctively define A and distinctively define B, but they are by happenstance defined the exact same, my conclusion that they are defined the same is a comparison of the two distinctively defined concepts, A and B, to derive that they are indeed a match: this didn't involve anything "outside of my control", so to speak. I think you would regardless consider it holistically in the realm of "distinctive knowledge", which I would disagree with. — Bob Ross
Again, this depends on how the comparison is made. Lets say I hold A and B in my head as merely definitions. Further, I define a synonym as "Two identities which have the same essential and non-essential properties. Then I say, "A and B are synonyms". At that point, I have to compare the essential and non-essential properties. But there is no uncertainty involved. How I define A, B, and synonyms are all in my solo context. I could change the identities of A, B, and synonym anytime I desired. But I don't. Perhaps this process should receive a new identity such as "logical distinction".
If a situation arises in which we are wondering if a distinctively unknown specific experience matches the definition of B, we are applying the identity to something else which is outside of our creative identification. We are still distinctively committing to what the identity of B is, but we are purposefully not creating a new identity for this currently undefined experience. At this point it requires an investigation of what this new identity is, and if it can deductively match to our B identity.
As such, applicable knowledge always involves the resolution of a distinctive uncertainty. There is no certainty that the match of this new uncertainty will match with something I distinctively know. I cannot change what B means, and I am choosing not to create a new identity for the undefined experience. The premise that the undefined experience matches B is not a necessary conclusion. But the attempt to match is the belief, or induction that it could. This is what I've been trying to narrow in on their difference. Distinctive knowledge has no uncertainty. Applicable knowledge only happens in the resolution of an uncertainty.
Distinctive knowledge - A deduced concept which is the creation and memorization of essential and accidental properties of a discrete experience.
Applicable knowledge - A deduced concept which is not contained within its contextual distinctive knowledge set. This concept does not involve the creation of new distinctive knowledge, but a deduced match of a discrete experience to the contextual distinctive knowledge set.
These are both very well written general definitions. For applicable knowledge, perhaps we need to tweak it a little with my above analysis. "A deduced resolution in the uncertainty of matching a distinctively undefined experience to a contextual distinctive knowledge set."
Applicable knowledge does involve the creation of a new concept: the synthetic joining of "A = B", which is a separate concept from A and B. There was a concept A and a concept B, now there's a new concept that "A = B". This is not necessitated in the concepts A nor B, but yet true of them (i.e. it is synthetic). But there was an analysis that was required to determine "A = B" which was the analysis of what is contained in the concept A and, likewise, what is in the concept B, which is analytical. So both were used to obtain "applicable knowledge". I think this, as of now, is the true pinpoint of the distinction we are both really trying to portray (but I may be wrong, as always). — Bob Ross
This also sounds good. If one uses the a/s distinction, they will have to use both within distinctive and applicable knowledge. Distinctive and applicable knowledge do not divide into a/s distinctions themselves however. I'll clarify further with the pink elephant example early.
Imagine I never imagined a "pink elephant" but, rather, I envisioned "pink", in isolation, and "an elephant" in isolation. If I then claimed "pink elephant", it would make just as little sense as envisioning a "pink elephant" and claiming "there's a pink elephant in my backyard". — Bob Ross
Distinctively, there is nothing strange about taking the terms pink and applying it to an elephant. We create whatever definitions we wish. The part that doesn't make sense is stating there is some unknown distinctive identity apart from our imagination or fiction that matches to the identity of a pink elephant. The creation of distinctive knowledge does not necessitate such knowledge can be applicably known. The a/s distinction is what causes the confusion, not the d/a epistemology.
Alright, back to the original flow!
It is more about creation of identities versus deduced matching of experiences to already established identities.
I don't think this directly explicates the recognition of indexical conflations. It is more of a byproduct. — Bob Ross
No, taken alone, the process of distinctive and applicable knowledge do not explicitly involve context.
Language A: A bachelor is an unmarried man. (Distinctive)
This person is found to be unmarried. (Applicable)
Therefore this man is a bachelor (Logical distinction)
Language B: A bachelor is a married man. (Distinctive)
This person is found to be married. (Applicable)
Therefore this man is married (Logical distinction)
By this I mean the context does not affect the logical process itself. The context only determines the defined starting point. The process itself is not contextual, only the identifications and capabilities of the observer/thinker.
To translate into this epistemology, we always start with distinctive knowledge.
I think that we start with analysis (which is empirical observation) and therefrom derive synthesis. I haven't found a way to neatly map this onto your d/a distinction. I don't think we always start with distinctive knowledge as you've defined it. — Bob Ross
You are correct! The analysis is the introduction to discovering we discretely experience. That is how we analyzed and discovered the term "distinctive knowledge". Nothing I've proposed is done without analysis, and all is attempted to be shown using distinctive and applicable knowledge where possible (barring inductions).
Likewise, I could then counter myself with "well, bob, you just performed synthesis in determining that you analytically discover synthesis". And I would be correct, however I didn't realize that necessarily until after I analytically observed the claim (i.e. that I analyze to discover what is synthesized). I am always one step behind the synthesis, so to speak. Hopefully that made a bit of sense. — Bob Ross
I believe so. It is one reason why I found the a/s distinction to not tell the whole story. It is a useful distinction, but one that diminishes in usefulness the more granular you get with them.
The act of experiencing imagery in ones mind is part of discrete experience: the conclusion that it is a remembrance of the past is not. — Bob Ross
I want to tweak this sentence a little to ensure we are on the same page.
The act of experiencing imagery in ones mind is part of discrete experience.
The act of experiencing that is a remembrance of the past is part of discrete experience.
The deduced conclusion that it is an accurate remembrance of the past is the discrete experience of applicable knowledge.
The deduced realization that I believe my memory to be an accurate remembrance is the discrete experience of distinctive knowledge.
Unfortunately, I don't think we are merely semantically disagreeing on this either. I think you are conflating "uncertainty" with "induction". You can have deduced uncertainty. — Bob Ross
I don't believe there is conflation, but perhaps I am wrong. An induction is a claim of uncertainty. Certainly we can deduce that an induction is all we can make.
Therefore, a premise that is hypothetical is not necessarily, when stripped of its if conditional, an induction. It could be a deduction or an induction. If I say Premise 1 = IF X, I am not thereby implying necessarily that X is an induction. — Bob Ross
No, X alone is not an induction. "IF X" is an induction. It is the same as my saying, "I believe it will rain tomorrow." If I remove "I believe", then we are left with "It will rain tomorrow" as a fact. I can create deductions based on the premise "It will rain tomorrow". The addition of the IF lets the reader know that this is not a fact, or a conclusion that followed from the premises we had. It may, or may not rain tomorrow.
Adding the IF makes it hypothetical.
Hypothetical - involving or being based on a suggested idea or theory : being or involving a hypothesis : CONJECTURAL
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/hypothetical
A hypothesis is an induction. A conjecture is an induction. A claim that asserts a conclusion that is not certain, is an induction. The IF is the assertion of a conclusion that is not certain, therefore an induction. IF the induction turns out to be correct, then we can deduce what will follow.
Hypothetical: IF the penny lands on heads (Implicit uncertainty of the initial premise happening)
Non-hypothetical: The penny lands on heads (A solid and certain premise)
Again, I agree with this analogy, yet it doesn't prove that the hypothetical is an induction when the if conditional is removed: I might deductively not know whether or not the penny will land heads. — Bob Ross
If the IF condition is removed, it is no longer a hypothetical deduction. At that point, it is simply a deduction. The penny lands on heads is not an uncertainty, but a certainty at that point. The identities of our chain of reasoning are based on the zero point we pick. Its all about the starting point in our analysis.
Pure Deduction chain: Deduction -> Deduction all the way down.
Hypothetical: induction -> Deduction with the induction stating an outcome that will happen (But has not yet).
Deduced induction: Deduction -> Induction due to limited information
A Deduced Inductions Hypothetical Deduction -> Induction -> Deduction.
So if I take a hypothetical induction, and remove the induction as a premise within my chain of reason (removing the IF) it is now just a deduction.
Again, this is implying to me the indexical conflation consideration: it seems to me you are implying, rightly so, that "a guess" entails uncertainty which entails that some sort of empirical observation (analysis) is required. I am simply noting that this is true of both "applicable" and "distinctive" knowledge. — Bob Ross
I hope I have explained why this is not true of both applicable and distinctive knowledge at this point. Distinctive knowledge does not require empirical observation. An induction itself is distinctively known. But the resolution to that induction is applicably known.
Then I think you may be agreeing with me that we do not know that a possibility is more cogent than a speculation in the relation to the future, we only know that it is true of the past. The grounds of the induction hierarchy in relation to the future (which is the whole purpose of it is for the future) is an induction. — Bob Ross
I want to make sure its understood that cogency does not mean "truth" or "deduced certainty" Cogency originally is defined as "a strong inductive argument with true premises." Here it is amended to be "A strong inductive argument based on how many steps it is removed from deductions in its chain of rationality."
That has been shown distinctively, and I believe can be shown applicably. But I don't claim that taking a cogent induction determines that the induction will come to pass. Its simply shown to be more likely to pass when taken over a large sample space. And if a person is to be rational, they will take the induction type that gives them the greatest odds of being correct.
Also I never claim that we can applicably know that any form of induction will necessarily lead to its outcome. It is reasonable to guess that an outcome that will occur 99% of the time will happen, but you will be wrong 1% of the time.
Any claim about the future is always an induction. The question is, do we have a rational way of sorting out which inductions are more reasonable based on logic and past experience? Yes. While it is an induction that logic and our past experiences will be the same tomorrow, we must also not forget that it is also an induction that our logic and past experiences will NOT be the same tomorrow. As no one has experienced logic suddenly altering, or the past suddenly shifting reality, it is a speculation that this may change, while it is a possibility it remains stable. Therefore it is more cogent to act as if the known certainties of today such as logic and needing to breath and eat to survive, will be the known certainties of tomorrow. My inductive hierarchy can justify itself. Can any other rationalization of inductions do so? I leave that to you.
Fantastic post Bob, and I hoped I adequately addressed your thoughtful points!