Ah, the analytic/synthetic distinction. Long ago when I first wrote this philosophy, I used the analytic and synthetic distinction instead of distinctive and applicable knowledge. The problem was, as you likely know by now, I had very different definitions from the a/s distinction. When I shared the paper or ideas with other individuals I ran into major problems.
First, people wouldn't listen. They wouldn't try to amend the definitions, and insist that I was just "wrong". Not wrong in my underlying amendments of the definitions, but wrong in trying to change them to begin with. Understandable.
Second, people took their vast knowledge of analytic/synthetic knowledge and would cite philosophers or other criticisms of the a/s distinction without understanding or addressing the points I made. It was straw man after straw man, and few people I found are willing to hear, "No, that's not what this version of the a/s distinction means, this is why that doesn't apply."
So I created new terms. This forces people to understand the terminology if I want a conversation. Of course there are still people who don't want to explore something new, but they never wanted to listen when I was redefining the a/s distinction anyway. What I didn't lose were the people who wanted to discuss concepts, but were turned off by word redefinitions. Yes, I redefine some words slightly, but I think by that point people are in the conversation enough that it naturally leads to that.
Are the names I made very good. Probably not. I'm not great with coming up with names! I like distinctive, as it flowed nicely from discrete experience. "Applicable" is probably not very good, but I'm not sure what else to call it. I view words as place holders for concepts, and I view placeholders as contextual. As long as the word works in some sense within this context, that's fine by me. I see it as "Applying distinctive knowledge" to something other than itself.
But I am very open to new naming! Perhaps creative and comparative knowledge? Identity knowledge and confirmable? Dynamic and static? The problem of course with all of these comparisons is if you interpret the word meaning a particular contextual way, they don't quite work either. The contextual implication of the words in their general use gets in the way when trying to apply them in context to the argument. The reality is, the knowledge I'm proposing has never existed before. Its a concept no one (I have read) has proposed. So perhaps I need new words entirely and should research some latin.
At this point though, feel free to use the a/s distinction to help you understand the concept. I'll correct where the a/s distinction doesn't apply. Let me get to your points now.
...analytic expresses the contrary: "a proposition whose predicate concept is contained in its subject concept" — Bob Ross
To compare to distinctive knowledge, we need to remove proposition, predicate, and subject.
Distinctive knowledge - A deduced concept which is the creation and memorization of essential and accidental properties of a discrete experience.
This then leads into applicable knowledge, which is loosely based off of synthetic knowledge.
synthetic generally means (philosophically) "a proposition whose predicate concept is not contained in its subject concept but related" — Bob Ross
Applicable knowledge - A deduced concept which is not contained within its contextual distinctive knowledge set. This concept does not involve the creation of new distinctive knowledge, but a deduced match of a discrete experience to the contextual distinctive knowledge set.
Context- when the symbol/identity of one or more sets of distinctive knowledge are identical, while the essential and accidental properties of the symbol/identity are different. "A rock" in the context of geology has different essential and accidental properties than the context of a 5 year old child for example. This can further be compounded when a person is able to comprehend the essential and accidental properties of a distinctive context, but unable to actively apply those properties due to inability. For example, being a blind geologist has a different applicable context than those with sight.
As you can see, while there are some similarities, they are very different.
(Noting synthetic) which clearly describes (in my opinion) the extension of one's own "creations" (projections) onto the "world", so to speak. For example, the concept of a rock (or just a rock, so to speak) on the floor doesn't have any inherent properties that necessitate it be called a "rock": I synthetically projected that property onto it. — Bob Ross
Both distinctive and applicable knowledge can be seen as the extension of one's creation on the world. A discrete experience (the rock) has no inherent properties that necessitate it be called anything. Distinctive knowledge is when we create those essential and accidental properties that allow it to be called a "rock". This is our creation upon the world. Upon finding finding a new discrete experience (potential rock) we attempt to match our definition of a "a rock" to "the discrete experience". If we deduce that the essential properties match, we have applicable knowledge that "the discrete experience" is a match to "A rock". This is another extension of our creation upon the world.
this directly entails that a lot of topics traditionally viewed as "controlled" by the mind can also be applicable knowledge (analytical knowledge)(e.g. imagination, thoughts, etc). I'm not sure if you would agree with me on that. For example, thoughts are analyzed (~discovered), not synthesized (~projected). — Bob Ross
This doesn't quite fit. Projection can happen in both instances of knowledge. It is more about creation of identities versus deduced matching of experiences to already established identities. But both can involve the projected world.
In other words, and this goes back to my subtle disclaimer that "synthetic knowledge" is a child of "analytic knowledge", we analytically discover that we synthetically project. — Bob Ross
To translate into this epistemology, we always start with distinctive knowledge. So I distinctively create the identity of applicable knowledge. But then, I am also able to applicably know the distinctive knowledge of "applicable knowledge" successfully. So I both distinctively, and applicably know the concept of applicable knowledge.
Once I applicably know applicable knowledge, I can also applicably know that I distinctively know. We can then apply this knowledge back to the initial claim in the beginning that, "I discretely experience." I established a definition of discrete experience, then apply the concept successfully.
Moreover, going back to our discussion of whether "distinctive knowledge" can be induced, this also implies that the deduced validity of a subset of memories (in relation to another subset) is applicable knowledge (discovered: analytic), as opposed to being distinctive knowledge (projected: synthetic): which would be where, if I am currently understanding your view, we went sideways (our argument was presupposing the analysis of memories as "distinctive", which is incorrect). — Bob Ross
The act of experiencing a memory is part of the act of discrete experience itself. For example, "I remember seeing a pink elephant." Whether the memory is accurate when applied is irrelevant. It is the memory itself that is distinctive. The act of attempting to match your memory to a different discrete experience is application of that memory. The deduced outcome of that match is the applicable knowledge. But if I attempted to show there was a pink elephant that existed, the deduced outcome of that would be applicable knowledge.
For example, my assertion that memory A is valid in relation to the set of memories S would have to be analytical (because I am discovering the "truth" of the matter), whereas labeling it as "memory" + "A" and "memories" + "S" would be synthetic. — Bob Ross
Memories in relation to other memories are distinctive. "Pink elephant" combines our distinctive understanding of "pink" and "elephant". The application of that memory for its accuracy is applicable. "I remember seeing a pink elephant in my room last night," is distinctive. "My memory is an accurate representation of what happened in reality" is applicable. Was there really an elephant? Was it pink? The outcome is irrelevant to the knowledge of the memory itself.
If I am understanding your distinction correctly, then I agree here except that applicable knowledge is not relatable to an induction directly. — Bob Ross
There may be a misunderstanding of what is meant by "directly". If I make an induction that the next coin flip will be heads, the result that is experienced and deduced will be the outcome of the flip. If I deduce that the coin lands on heads, (instead of just guessing it did) then I have a "resolution" to my induction. This is the relation that I'm talking about. I guessed heads, and it ended up heads. My guess was correct. I guessed heads, and it ended up tails. My guess was incorrect. This resolution is applicable knowledge.
A hypothetical deduction is when we take an induction, and take the logical deductive conclusion if it resolves a particular way.
I don't think this is true. A hypothetical deduction is a deduction wherein each premise is hypothetically granted as true: it is a valid deduction due to it conforming to the necessary form of a deduction. — Bob Ross
The hypothetical is a possible resolution to an induction. If there was no induction, there would be no hypothetical. The coin can land either heads or tails. We can hypothetically deduce that if it lands heads, X occurs, and if it lands tails, y occurs. But the hypothetical cannot exist without the induction as a source of alternative outcomes. A deduction leads to a necessary conclusion, not a hypothetical conclusion. Only inductions can lead to hypothetical conclusions. That's the whole point of the IF. If there was no uncertainty in the outcome, we would not need the IF. I don't think we're in disagreement here beyond semantics.
the former implies inductions are valid premises of a hypothetical deduction (which is wrong), whereas the latter implies we can dispense of that induction. — Bob Ross
To correct this, I am saying inductions are necessary premises to create a hypothetical deduction. The IF implies uncertainty. If you remove the IF, it is no longer a hypothetical, it is not a deduction.
Hypothetical: IF the penny lands on heads (Implicit uncertainty of the initial premise happening)
Non-hypothetical: The penny lands on heads (A solid and certain premise)
I'm not certain I agree with this. The induction does not resolve a particular way: — Bob Ross
Can an induction ever resolve then? If I say, "I believe the next penny flip will land on heads" will I ever find out if I was correct in my guess? All I'm noting is how we figure out the outcome of the guess. That must be done applicably.
but, rather, a deduction can resolve an induction by either dispensing of it (as now it is known that the induction happened to be accurate or it wasn't) or retaining it as not directly pertinent to what is newly known. — Bob Ross
I'm simply noting the accuracy of the induction. I think you're taking two steps here, noting the accuracy of the induction, and then deciding to dispense or retain it. For example, I could deduce the penny lands on tails, but still insist it landed on heads by inventing some other induction like "an evil demon changed it", or simply not caring and insisting it landed on heads regardless of what I deduced. The second step of deciding to stick with or reject the induction is a step too far from what I'm saying. All I'm noting is the deduced outcome after the induction's prediction comes to pass.
However, now we must deal with a second order proof pertaining to why we ought to believe that because they related in a particular way in the past that it will hold in the future (aka hume's problem of induction). — Bob Ross
I have already concluded that you cannot make any knowledge claim about the future. You can only make inductions about the future. The smartest way to make inductions is to use the most cogent inductions we already know of. So we would make our decisions based on the hierarchy of the inductions we have at our disposal. Just because we can speculate that the rules of reality may change in the future, doesn't mean its possible they will. Since we know what is possible and probable, it is possible and probable they will continue to happen in the future.
Great points again Bob! I hope I adequately showed why the distinctive and applicable distinction of knowledge might be inspired by the a/s distinction, but is not the a/s distinction itself.