However, if you mean "induction" ~> "deductive conclusion" -> "analysis of induction" — Bob Ross
Yes, this is my intention.
With regard to the second sentence, I think you are suggesting that Applicable Knowledge can be a conclusion that is an induction, which I would strongly disagree with (if I am understanding that sentence correctly). — Bob Ross
No, I simply mean that someone can do induction ~> inductive conclusion -> analysis of second induction as a conclusion of the first induction, and this would not be applicable knowledge.
I think I am starting to understand better what you are conveying. Essentially (and correct me if I am wrong) you are utilizing "applicable knowledge" as a distinction to emphasize that which is not in our control and, thusly, must be discovered as opposed to projected. Although I think there is a meaningful distinction between "discovery" and "projection", I think ultimately it is all discovery. — Bob Ross
This is a good way to break it down. And yes, I've never denied that knowledge is ultimately deductions. But, ultimately all molecules are made up of atoms. It doesn't mean that the creation of the identity of separate molecules doesn't serve a helpful purpose. However, I think you've made some good points, and I will have to go back to my original definition of applicable knowledge. While I think we use applicable knowledge to resolve inductions, the act of resolving inductions in a deductive manner is not applicable knowledge itself. Applicable knowledge is when we attempt to match an experience to the distinctive knowledge we have created, and deductively resolve whether there is, or is not a match.
I can also flip a penny, look at the result and wonder if I've seen it before. I then try to match the symbol to what is considered "heads" in my mind, and I do so without contradiction. This is distinctive knowledge. — Bob Ross
No, distinctive knowledge is when I create an identity when I flip the coin. There are no limitations as to what I can create. I can call it one side "feet" and the other side "hands", with their own essential and non-essential properties. If I attempt to match the coin's side to an identity I created previously with distinctive knowledge, then I am attempting applicable knowledge. If I conclude what I see matches the essential properties of the definitions I hold, then I have applicable knowledge that there is a match.
When you stated "seems familiar", I can see how that could potentially imply an assertion that it actually is familiar, which would imply that it has been seen before (which is an induction). — Bob Ross
This is the induction I'm talking about. When you believe that what you've seen matches distinctive knowledge, this is an induction, not a deduction. The act of checking, understands that you don't know the answer until after you've checked. You can deduce, "I don't know if what I've observed matches my distinctive knowledge." But if you are going to try to match it, there is uncertainty until you arrive at a deduced outcome.
But I realize I am stretching what it means to be an induction here. The idea of deductively matching to the identities you distinctively know, vs creating identities you distinctively know, was the original way I described applicable knowledge. While I have tried to see if there is an implicit induction in the act of matching, I'm not sure there is now. Its not necessarily an induction, its the experience of the unknown, and how you attempt to deal with it. An induction is really just an extension of the unknown. And whether our deduction is distinctive or applicable (an attempt to match to distinctive) is really just a way a person has decided to resolve an induction. Do we attempt to match to our identities, or create a new one?
That being said, I'm glad we've explored this route, as I believe examining the resolution of an induction seems to be important. I also still claim that one can only resolve an induction applicably. Only after that can they create new distinctive knowledge. An induction relies on distinctive knowledge in its claim. First, one must resolve the induction based on that distinctive knowledge. If one changes the definitions prior to this induction, one is not really testing the induction, they are avoiding it and making another claim. After one has resolved the induction based on the distinctive knowledge of the definitions originally made, then one of course can change and amend their distinctive knowledge as I've noted before.
"Does this side of the penny match heads?" is a completely neutral assertion, because it isn't an assertion at all. I am not inducing that it does match or that it doesn't. So that "question" coupled with the "answer" would be, in this case, distinctive knowledge. — Bob Ross
While I agree with everything you've said here, I want to note the solution would be applicable knowledge if you tried to match "heads" with your distinctively known identities. If you decided to create an identity, that would be distinctive knowledge.
"resolution" of an induction is simply utilizing our knowledge to ascertain how aligned it was with true knowledge, which is a spectrum (it isn't a binary decision of "I resolved that it was true or that it was false): my induction could have been correct to any degree, and incorrect to any degree. Likewise, it is a continual process, we simply take the knowledge we have and utilize it to determine how "correct" our induction was, but we can very well keep doing this as our knowledge increases. — Bob Ross
An induction can be resolved with another induction, or a deduction. If one "resolves" an induction with another induction, its not really resolved. In the case of an induction's resolution being another induction, we have taken a belief, and believed a particular answer resulted. In the case where we applicably resolve an induction, we have removed uncertainty. Of course, this has never meant that knowledge could not change at a later time as new distinctive knowledge is learned, or we obtain new experiences and deductions that invalidate what we knew at one time. But the future invalidation of a deduction does not invalidate that at the time it was made it was a deduction, and what a person could applicably know in that situation with what they had.
But when considering something really complicated like evolution, it is much harder to see how one would ever holistically know such: it is more that we have ample knowledge grounding it (such as evolutionary facts and many aspects of the theory), but there's never a point where we truly can deduce it holistically. — Bob Ross
There are cases where if we analyze the chain of reasoning, we'll find inductions that have never been deductively resolved. That's where the hierarchy of induction comes in. Further, areas where cogent inductions are within our logic should always be noted as possibilities we can always go back an attempt to improve on. There is nothing wrong with noting that a claim to knowledge has inductions without deduced resolutions within it, if it truly is the best conclusion we can make. But glossing over that it is an induction is not a resolution either. Some things which we know are at their core cogent inductions, with hypothetical deductions as the assumed resolution. If that is the best we can do with what we have, then it is the tool we should pick.
And, yes, inducing that Gandolf is a real person does put it in a different light, which is simply that it no longer indexically refers to a movie. I'm not sure how this necessitates that this distinction ought to be made as "induction" ~> "deduction" vs "deduction". I know deductively the indexical properties of the given proposition, and thereby can ascertain whether my assertion actually does pertain to the subject at hand or whether I am misguided. — Bob Ross
This example was only to demonstrate the importance of looking at the chain of thinking, and how it is important to realize that deductions in isolation do not necessarily tell the full story of what a person knows.
Although I see the meaningful distinction here, I don't think this has any direct correlation to your "distinctive" vs "applicable" knowledge distinction. Firstly, someone could actually have meant to bet on Buttercup but instead associated the wrong horse with the name on accident. Secondly, they could be simply trying to change because their bet was wrong. It isn't that we want definitive "deduced answers", it is that we want definitive answers (which can be inductions). — Bob Ross
I went into societal context here. In this case, society will not accept an individual changing the definitions involved in the original bet. Despite the individuals intention that they bet on "the other horse", the reality recorded by society is that they bet on the losing horse.
This again is more of an example to demonstrate the importance of resolving a situation that is "unknown". While originally I proposed the resolution of the induction was applicable knowledge, I feel confident at this point to go back to my original meaning, which was that one could solve this uncertainty applicably, or distinctively. The point here is to emphasize once again that resolving inductions with deduced resolutions is an important societal need and should be considered in any theory of knowledge.
I am failing to see how hyperfocusing on one contextual distinction (distinctive and applicable) amongst a potential infinite of contextual differences is meaningful. — Bob Ross
As I've noted so far, I believe the decision to create an identity, vs match to an identity one has already created is a meaningful distinction that is important when trying to resolve knowledge questions. We can go into this deeper next discussion if needed.
I partially agree with you here. but it is vital to clarify that science does not solely seek to prove something is false and, in the event that it can't, deem it true (that is the definition of an appeal to ignorance fallacy). — Bob Ross
I did not mean to imply that science marks as "true" whatever is not disproven. It simply notes such alternatives are not yet disproven. I don't want to get into the philosophy of science here (We have enough to cover!), as long as there is an understanding science takes steps to disprove a hypothesis, that is the point I wanted to get across.
What do you mean by "potential inductions"? I would hold that there are no inductions in deductive premises. If conditionals are not inductions. — Bob Ross
A hypothetical deduction is when we take an induction, and take the logical deductive conclusion if it resolves a particular way. This deduction is not a resolution to the induction, this is a deductive conclusion if the induction resolves a particular way. Just as a hypothetical is a potential deductive conclusion, every hypothetical has a potential induction it is drawn from.
If I state "I think this is red", and then attempt to match it to "redness" abstractly am I making an induction (originally). However, I can see something and ask "what is this?" or "I wonder if this is a color?" and then match it to "redness" abstractly to deduce it is red. An induction is not necessary, but can occur. — Bob Ross
I agree. This is why I'm going back to my original definition of applicable knowledge, which is when we attempt to match our experiences with our previously established distinctive knowledge and deduce an answer.
Thank you for explaining your view on libertarian free will. I have no disagreement with this, as this is simply a distinctive context you've chosen. Part of what I refine into the distinctive knowledge of "I" is that which wills. How I am formed or determined is irrelevant to how I define myself. This does not negate your distinctive context either. If such a distinctive context is useful to yourself, then I see no reason not to use it.
But, does your distinctive context escape the epistemology proposed here? I would argue no. You still need a set of definitions. You can create a distinctive logic using the definitions you've come up with. The question then becomes whether you can applicably know it in your experience. If you can, then you have a viable distinctive and applicable set of knowledge that works for you. I of course can do the same with mine. If I expand the definition of the I to also include "will", then I can prove that I can will my arm to move, and it does. And in such a way, my definition of "I", and having control over particular things is applicably known as well. I personally find the idea that I control things useful to my outlook in life. You personally do not. For our purposes here, I'm not sure this difference between us is all that important to the main theory.
But what is this principle (Inductive hierarchy) based on? Knowledge or a belief? This is the presupposition of which I don't think we quite explored yet. I don't see how it is necessarily deduced (therefore knowledge) for them. — Bob Ross
The hierarchy of induction is distinctively known based on the logic proposed earlier. I have always stated that despite our conclusions of what is more cogent, they are always still inductions. Meaning that choosing a cogent induction does not mean the outcome of that induction will be correct.
The probability of a jack being pulled out of a deck of 52 cards. The most cogent guess with that information is that any card but a jack will be drawn next. But a jack can still be drawn. This is more cogent that not knowing how many of each card are in the deck, but knowing that at least one exists in it. We may guess a jack will be drawn without odds, but that is not as likely to be correct as when we guess with the odds that could have been known. Again, even if there is only 1 jack, it does not negate it may be drawn.
And of course, speculating that a jack can be drawn in a deck of cards, when we have never seen a jack be drawn, and do not know if there is even one in the deck, is even less cogent. There of course could be a jack, but its less reasonable to guess there is a jack before one knows the deck contains a jack. And of course, we could be shown the deck, that there is not a jack, but still guess a jack will be drawn. While this is irrational, perhaps the dealer did something outside of our applied knowledge, such as slipped a jack in when we weren't looking.
But is the hierarchy of inductions applicably known? No, that would require extensive testing. These are fairly easy tests to create however. First, mix different card types into a deck on each test. Show the person the odds of the cards in the deck, and have them guess what card will come next. Second, don't show the person the odds of the cards in the deck, just tell them what's in it. Third, don't show them what card types you shuffled into the deck. Finally, show them all the cards in the deck, then have them guess a card that is not in the deck. Do this hundreds of times, then chart the percentage of guesses that were correct for each cogency level. Do I have confidence that such a test will reveal the more cogent the induction, the higher chance a person's guess will be correct? Yes.
Great points again Bob. I think you have thoroughly shown that I can not expand applicable knowledge as the resolution of an induction. It is that we resolve inductions using applicable knowledge. The results of that resolution can then be used to make new distinctive knowledge. I think this is enough for me to cover right now, and I look forward to your further critique!