I am saying that choosing between “knowledge sets” is a comparison. — Bob Ross

As am I. But a knowledge set is the distinctive properties you are using at its base, not the inductions. The inductions rely on the base. You can compare inductions between the bases, but it always comes back to the bases in the end. I've noted there is no rational justification for comparing inductions between knowledge sets. So far you have not provided any either.

Why is rationality that which is not contradicted by reality? Why cannot not be “to be illogical”? — Bob Ross

Because illogical means irrational. The antonym of rationality doesn't explain what rationality is. Not being contradicted by reality is something objective and beyond human emotion the gives an applicable confirmation of the distinctive knowledge of "rational".

I don’t think you can justify this without it bottoming out at a desire: the desire to obtain and abide by that which most closely aligns with reality. — Bob Ross

Its not a desire, it starts with simple surviving. If you can't figure out what will kill you in reality, you're doing to die. Same with undue harm. That is the root of rationality. Rationality allows us to exist. We simply apply it beyond there to things that may not kill or harm us, but benefit us. This is not a subjective point, but objective. If I want something in reality, and I can identify it without contradiction, I can obtain with purpose and planning instead of chance.

As such, I'm going to ask you to drop the "relevant factors" and just communicate using the basic terminology we've already established.

I can’t because there is no term for it. They aren’t essential properties necessarily of anything. — Bob Ross

Then I see no argument and I believe this line is at an end. I do not understand nor see any justification for relevant factors. As it is a non-term that I see no application for, its not a point I cannot consider any longer.

What do you mean by “distinctive knowledge sets”? You said inductions are distinctive knowledge, and the sets (hierarchies) of inductions are also distinctive knowledge; so when you compare the hierarchies (sets) themselves, you are doing so to compare the inductions within different hierarchies to determine which one to use. — Bob Ross

I think I've been clear. Its the distinctive knowledge set needed to form the induction.

You compare the sets to compare the inductions. The end goal is to pick an induction and if there are two in different sets then you compare the sets to compare them. — Bob Ross

The end goal is not to pick an induction. The end goal is to pick a distinctive knowledge set that when applied, will give you a rational assessment of reality. Inductions within a hierarchy are a consequence of what set you choose, and the applicable knowledge you have with that distinctive knowledge set, not the other way around. I've said this enough at this point, and I'm still not seeing any viable objection besides an insistence that you want it to be the other way around. If nothing more is added I think this point needs no more consideration.

The lack of applicability is if you actually can’t compare the inductions, which I don’t think you are truly saying (although you keep saying it). If you can’t compare them, then you can’t say one set is more rational to hold than another and, in turn, that one induction (within one set) is more rational than another (in another set). At that point, you theory is effectively useless. — Bob Ross

Bob, I've been as clear at this point as I can. I've been saying I have no rational justification to compare inductions between hierarchy sets. I've asked you several times to give me a rational justification to compare inductions between distinctive knowledge sets. You just keep repeating yourself without providing this asked for justification. At this point, your critique is useless. I've tried to drill into it as much as I can to see if there's anything to your point. Mere disagreement or doubt is not an argument, so there is nothing more to be said here either.

P1 is not an induction itself: a probability is a deduction itself and the induction is the inference made utilizing it. So P1 should really be “the next pick is a A with X because there is a Z% chance of it happening”: I am going to call this rP1 (revised-P1). rP1 has an essential property of Z% chance of getting an A with X, which neither the pattern nor plausibility can ever have.

Without the utilization of Z%, rP1 is not longer rP1: it is another probability. That’s why I said talking about essential properties of particular inductions is trivial and useless.

Likewise, P2 has an essential property of the pattern (as, again, the patter itself is not the induction, the inference made about it—e.g., I will pull an A with X because of this pattern), and the probability, rP1 can never have that property. Without the pattern, the induction is not longer that induction: it is something else.

Same thing with the P3.

Now, the only other option when speaking about essential properties is the essence of a general class of things and, in this case, the essential properties of an induction (i.e., what makes an induction, at its core, an induction?)--and that affords no foreseeable use to your argument. — Bob Ross

Bob, I read this a few times and I could not understand what you were trying to say at all. Please see if a second pass can make this more clear.

I think you are thinking that the essential properties of the inductions are the “A with X” and “B with Y”, but that’s just plainly false. Firstly, the inductions themselves are not the patterns nor probabilities; — Bob Ross

Of course a probability and a pattern are an induction. They are noting that we predict something will happen next before we have applicable knowledge of what will happen. When we say something has X% chance of being, we are saying we don't know the actual outcome, we're just making a prediction based on the rational of what we applicably know. You can applicably know of a probability or pattern, but the probability or pattern is an induction. This is basic English, so I think you're trying to stretch far too hard to make your point. That's an indicator your point isn't based on a solid rationale Bob.

secondly, if we are talking about the essential properties of a particular induction (which is what you were talking about), then every property thereof is essential (because without even one property it would not longer be that exact induction). — Bob Ross

We are talking about the essential distinctive properties that are needed to make that induction. Then we examine what we applicably know in that distinctive set to determine whether we have a probability, possibility etc. So yes, you are absolutely correct that there are no accidental properties needed to form an induction. That could make it confusing as saying essential properties would be redundant.

To be clearer then:

I have a set of distinctive properties I consider important to a decision.
I have applicable knowledge based on those properties.
Inductions I make considering that full distinctive property set are then evaluated into a hierarchy based on the applicable knowledge I have of that full distinctive knowledge set.

This is what I think I ought to be doing epistemically, and does not exist apart from my will/mind. So if you're right, I'm right.

If we have conflicting views on what rationality is, then I would be wrong relative to you and you to me. We aren’t both right. Propositions that are subjective are indexical. — Bob Ross

Then again, the discussion is over. What's the point? I can just say you're wrong and I'm correct under your statement. When your point allows a contradiction of your point to stand, that's reality contradicting your point.

Its just like these statements, "Nothing is true." Is that a true statement? "Everything is relative." Is this certain? "Rationality is subjective". Then subjectively I can state that statement is irrational. Statements like this can be tempting because of the problems you think they can solve. They always cause the biggest problem of all however, in the fact that they are so easily contradicted and dismissed.

I ought to behave in a way that demonstrates your idea of rationality is wrong. This is my desire. Therefore it is rational that you're wrong

This just pushes the more important question back of what you think rationality is, as you are implicitly using it by saying that you demonstrate that my idea of rationality is wrong. — Bob Ross

Yes. And under your statement, I can. That's why it leads to a paradox, a contradiction, etc.

If by this you are just noting that it is possible for “rational is X” to be false for you and true for me (and that there is nothing objective to decipher which is “right”), then, yeah, that’s true. However, people tend to have productive conversations nonetheless — Bob Ross

No. People who hold this view do not have productive conversations. They are often dismissed as irrational, and people generally don't listen to further arguments they say. I know how rational you are Bob, so of course I don't.

I've been formerly trained in philosophy and have been around some incredibly intelligent, learned, and capable people. Every single one of them would dismantle your point without a second thought. I don't say this to be mean or imply that I hold special knowledge or pedigree. I'll be the first to say its the arguments that count in the end, and nothing else. I say this because you are insisting on holding onto an irrational argument, and if a person holds onto an irrational argument despite seeing it is irrational, the appeal must be to better people than myself. I don't want you to fall into this logic trap that a lot of early philosophers can fall into. You are far better than that Bob, and I want to see more people in awe of your persuasive prowess and insight! Your statement on rationality is a well tread and thoroughly debunked idea in any serious circle of thought, and I highly encourage that you think deeply on it before continuing to hold it.

As for my part, I'm not going to consider it anymore in this conversation. If you insist on holding that position of rationality, that is of course your choice. I see nothing more to explore here.

Alright, I think we have some focus again! Let me get right to your points.

1. That one has to compare the inductions in the box scenario or leave it up to an arbitrary decision. — Bob Ross

And I've informed you that not only do we not have to compare the inductions between the hierarchy sets, we logically can't justify doing so. Since the distinctive knowledge identities are not the same, we're comparing inductions between two sets of identities. While you note that it is arbitrary, I note that it does not have to be. We can reason why we should choose certain knowledge sets over others, and I've set different scenarios to demonstrate this.

In the box example, I noted that if the question was, "Will you pull a box with air next?" the X/Y properties are pointless, so we just go with the A/B set and use the probability. If you ask, "Is the Box with an X design filled with air?" we use the pattern because we do not have a probability within the A/B X/Y set.

This leaves the question, "What is the most rational distinctive knowledge set to hold?"

What is most rational to distinctively hold is what corresponds best to reality. — Bob Ross

I agree. This truly is the core of rationality without any extra detail. Just to specify a tad more, I would say it is that which is not contradicted by reality. Almost a semantic difference, but we are in agreement here. The problem when asking this question with distinctive knowledge sets is we won't know what will be contradicted by reality until we apply it.

This is why distinctive knowledge which is applicably known together is the complete picture of knowledge. When we need to make a prediction where we do not yet know the outcome, we need to make an induction. The most rational induction is of course that which has the least distance from our distinctive knowledge that has been applicably confirmed.

That relevant factors of a situation for resolving a dilemma are not necessarily essential properties of any induction: the former is a piece of information that could affect the conclusion, whereas the latter is a property that a formulated induction cannot exist without. — Bob Ross

The relevant factors of a situation are not distinctive knowledge, they are applicable knowledge. One can formulate distinctive knowledge about the relevant factors, but there are necessarily a set of relevant factors to the situation irregardless of what one distinctively claims to know — Bob Ross

Ah, ok! This clears this up a little bit. If you recall, applicable knowledge of our distinctive knowledge set is how we determine the cogency of the induction. An induction is not an applicable knowledge claim. An induction means you do not know the applicable conclusion. As such, you can only judge the rationality of the induction based on the distinctive knowledge set, and the applicable knowledge within that distinctive knowledge set.

If you already know the outcome, its not an induction anymore, its applicable knowledge of what happened. So we can say, "Induction Z (a plausibility compared to a probability for example) was the one that lead to the correct outcome," but in no way can we say it was rational to pick the Z plausibility when compared to a probability in the identity set when you didn't now what the outcome would be. If you are saying that the outcome of the induction is a relevant factor, it is not. Otherwise, I still do not see what a relevant factor is that necessitates its introduction from the vocabulary I've used.

As such, I'm going to ask you to drop the "relevant factors" and just communicate using the basic terminology we've already established. When there is debate on specifics, larger abstracts must be dropped for smaller abstracts to help us nail the points down. I don't think I quite understand what relevant factors are, and as such they are muddying the conversation. As the person who's established the theory, I want to see a contradiction or a lack using the terms involved first. If you can do so, then we can discuss trying to figure out what is missing. There shouldn't be anything that cannot be communicated through the vocabulary I've already introduced, and using a phrase that I have not introduced feels like its hiding something, whether intentional or not.

That because you have only provided a method of determining cogency of inductions within your concept of a “hierarchy induction” (and have adamantly asserted that we cannot determine cogency otherwise), I am left to conclude that the applicability of your epistemology to decipher what is most cogent to believe is severely wanting—as the vast majority of practical and theoretical situations force the person to compare two inductions that have different essential properties. — Bob Ross

And I've informed you that you're looking at it incorrectly. You compare the distinctive knowledge sets, not the inductions. You're doing it in the wrong order, and there's no reason to do so. Putting the cart before the horse I think they say! So you are incorrect that it does not apply to many cases. Your argument essentially boils down to this:

You: People want to compare inductions across different distinctive knowledge sets.
Me: Can't do that. Its incorrect thinking. If they want to think correctly, they need to look at the distinctive knowledge sets.
You But I don't want to. (I'm poking fun a little bit, I just don't see anything else in your argument so far)

Now, maybe there is a reason to compare the inductions without comparing the distinctive knowledge sets, but I've seen no reason why we should. The theory I've presented here doesn't claim we should. The theory has a logical solution to the problem you've proposed, to look at the distinctive knowledge sets and compare those instead. So I see no lack on my part.

By analogy, you're trying to use multiplication to solve a problem when you need to look to the base, addition, to do so. If I can show you how to solve the problem through addition, because you can't through multiplication, that doesn't make multiplication useless. So unless there's a very good reason that you can give that allows us to compare different hierarchy sets alone, I'm just not seeing why we should.

That I have provided a clear and concise definition of “rationality” (i.e., to be, to the best of one’s ability, logically consistent, internally/externally coherent, empirically adequate, considerate of credence, considerate of explanatory power, parsimonious, a person that goes with intellectual seemings, and a person that goes with their immediate apprehensions — Bob Ross

And I have not disagreed. As noted earlier, I also agree that what is rational at its core is that which is not contradicted by reality. My theory is rational. Its not this definition I have a problem with. Its that your argument in claiming H2 is more rational to use then H1 has not been demonstrated with any rational argument beyond confirmation bias. That we'll need.

Although I haven’t mentioned this yet, noting essential properties of an induction is trivial: — Bob Ross

Yes! This is why it has been odd to me that I've had to clarify this repeatedly. I feel like we've been talking past one another on this.

if that is the case, then there are no inductions which have the same essential properties. — Bob Ross

Please explain what you mean by this. By my example below:

Probability of A with X and B with Y is Z%
Pattern of A with X and B with Y predicts the next pull will be an AX
Plausibility of A with Y will be pulled next time, even though it hasn't happened yet.

How is that not a set of three different types of inductions that use the same essential properties to create those inductions? I feel this is the main source of our disagreement, and I feel either I or you keep missing something here when we address it. I feel if we can resolve this, the conversation can move forward.

Again, a induction being a probability and another being a possibility likewise would be, under your definition here, essential properties which one has and the other doesn’t; so they don’t have the same essential properties. — Bob Ross

To clarify again, a distinctive knowledge set happens first. The applicable knowledge involving that distinctive knowledge set is what determines the type of induction.

We decide what rationality means and it is contingent on what we think we ought to be doing epistmically which, in turn, doesn’t exist in reality apart from our wills/minds. — Bob Ross

If this statement is correct, then the discussion is over. I believe my point is more rational, you believe your point is more rational, and there's nothing that either can ever do.

This is clear straw man. We can both explicate what we think “rationality” should be and see where it goes from there. You haven’t even defined it yet. — Bob Ross

I think its not a straw man. This is what I think I ought to be doing epistemically, and does not exist apart from my will/mind. So if you're right, I'm right. If you say I'm wrong, then you're wrong. Its really not a very good argument Bob.

Therefore its pointless to even discuss it. Its the ultimate, get out of argument card Bob.

Again, straw man. I am not saying that “well, I want it to be that, so I am not going to hear what you think it should be”. That’s nonsense. I am saying that, fundamentally, how we define rationality is dependent on our obligation (as it is literally a definition about how we ought to behave), and obligations are subjective; so it will bottom out at a desire (because of Hume’s guillotine). That doesn’t mean we can’t discuss it just like morals. Are you a moral realist? — Bob Ross

The problem is you're saying its subjective, then asserting it can't be a certain way. If its fully subjective, then I subjectively believe you're wrong, and you have to agree with me to keep your proposal. Something which is fully subjective cannot be wrong if the subject says its right. To say I'm wrong is to claim something objective, and defeat your own statement.

Example: I ought to behave in a way that demonstrates your idea of rationality is wrong. This is my desire. Therefore it is rational that you're wrong. But then you're right! But then you're not. Its just a contradiction Bob and doesn't hold up in any serious discussion. When you've introduced an argument for rationality, that by its own argument, allows everyone to say its wrong; that's an argument that just doesn't work. Reality is the objective arbiter of rationality, and the reality is, your argument leads to contradicting itself.

As for morality, I may one day post my thoughts on it. Its a little more complicated then something as simple as moral realism. You have to have knowledge before you can know morality. So we'll have to finish this up first. :)

Ok, at this point I can see nothing new is being said, and I think I understand your points. We're going round and round at this point, so I'm going to summarize where things stand to really narrow in on what's important, and what you need to do if you're going to have a valid case. After we address this major point, we can bring back in any point you still feel needs addressing. First, I ask you to trust my good faith that if a point is proven, I will concede. I trust you'll do the same.

First: My points

1. The hierarchy of induction allows a rational way of comparing inductions based on their distance from what is and can be applicably known. You know how this works from the paper, so no need to repeat it here.

2. In detail, the inductions compared must involve the same essential properties used to construct the induction. Thus comparing an induction about a space ship to an induction about a sun is pointless.

3. Because we can have different distinctive knowledge sets, we could create a different set of inductions to compare within each knowledge set. Once you choose your distinctive knowledge set, you then look within the hierarchy that results within that distinctive knowledge set to choose the most rational induction.

4. This leaves the question, "What is the most rational distinctive knowledge set to hold?" I've put forward several discussion points, but this will have to wait as we must first address the one point you hold that prevents us from doing so.

Second: Your point

1. You claim that I can somehow cross compare inductions despite the essential properties needed to make the inductions being different. You do this as follows:

You take an identity, then have non-essential properties about that identity, an air box. Second, you then use a non-essential property of the previous identity as part of an induction about the air box. I point out that it may be non-essential in your original identity, but now it is essential to you needing to make the induction. You disagree by saying "relevant properties" are different.

My counterpoint:

I've informed you that the only definition I will accept for relevant properties is "essential properties for the formation of the induction", as adding any knew vocabulary or concepts apart from this would not be addressing the hierarchy, but something else.

I have not seen any justification from your end that we should view "relevant properties" as anything different than I've noted. As such, for this point only, we are going to drop the phrasing "relevant properties" and examine only the vocabulary I've introduced. This is the only way to ensure that you are discussing the theory, and not something else. I claim X and Y are essential to the inductions conclusions in the second case. You can prove me wrong by doing the following:

Demonstrate how you can create the induction pattern that involves X and Y without using X and Y. If X and Y are accidental or secondary to the induction, then they are not needed for the formation of the induction. If you cannot, then we both agree that this is the conclusion going forward. If you then wish to add a claim that we should consider a new term called "relevant properties", please break down exactly what that is, and show why it is different from the argument which uses essential and non-essential properties. But prior to this, this one major point must be decided one way or another.

One last note:

We decide what rationality means and it is contingent on what we think we ought to be doing epistmically which, in turn, doesn’t exist in reality apart from our wills/minds. — Bob Ross

If this statement is correct, then the discussion is over. I believe my point is more rational, you believe your point is more rational, and there's nothing that either can ever do. Therefore its pointless to even discuss it. Its the ultimate, get out of argument card Bob. :) If you insist this point is true, then its been a good discussion, and we'll have to chat another time. If however you want to discuss within the confines of the theory, I've proposed what is rational within the theory, and you'll have to provide more than you have so far for your justifications.

You are saying that, as far as I am understanding, the hierarchy which is more cogent is dependent on what essential properties the person uses; so you are indirectly speaking to which is more or less cogent in that sense. — Bob Ross

No, I am not. You keep inserting these words in my claims, and I'm not doing that. To be clear, we're talking about hierarchy sets, H1, and H2. We are not talking about the hierarchy itself. Why do H1 and H2 come about? Because of the distinctive knowledge held to create those sets of inductions. The question is not about comparing the H1 and H2 set then, its about deciding what essential properties you're going to use in your inductions. So we don't compare hierarchy sets. We decide what essential properties we're going to use, then that leads to us into a place where we can make comparisons of our inductions. You've just got the emphasis on the wrong place. The emphasis is not on the inductions, its on the distinctive knowledge.

I just want to clarify that the determination of which relevant factors to use in the context is a comparison of the hierarchies. — Bob Ross

No. This is wrong. You're not comparing the hierarchies to determine which essential properties to use. You determine the essential properties you will use, then create inductions. You can't make inductions without first having distinctive knowledge to justify them. What distinctive knowledge should we choose when we have a question of the properties involved? As noted, I listed several considerations that lead to useful distinctive knowledge. It depends on a great many contextual factors, so its not a blanket, "This is always better" situation.

Now, and hopefully this doesn't confuse you, you could decide to take H1 and H2, compare them, and then use that as a factor in deciding what essential properties you use. There's nothing preventing that. But this is not a hierarchy decision, this is a decision in what essential properties to use after you've established two sets of distinctive knowledge, and inductions relative to each set.

Basically:

Distinctive1 => inductions 1
Distinctive2 => inductions 2

1 or 2? You pick 1 because you like that pattern in set 2. You like set 2 because of the confirmation bias of the pattern, and perhaps because you believe considering the X/Y distinction is smarter. This isn't really rational justification, its just your justification for picking Distinctive set 2.

But as I've noted, we can consider much more than the inductions. As I've mentioned, we can consider the personal or social benefit of a proper guess, time, effort, etc. And of course, you could disregard all of this and just decide to use a set of essential properties without any rationale at all. Its your choice. What you seem to imply is that there is something in the hierarchy that is the end all be all of rationality that shows one set to be more rational than another. There is not.

Your question seems to be, "Which identity set should I use?"

My question, is which induction do you think, in totality of your analysis of the situation, is most cogent to hold in the box scenario?

Your answer seems to be contingent on the relevant factors used in the situation, and it seems as though you may have a criteria for deciphering which is more cogent to include (in terms of relevant factors). Perhaps now you can answer the original question (above)? — Bob Ross

So again, we're not comparing the induction sets. We're comparing what essential properties we wish to use in our distinctive knowledge application. Its all about what you decide are the essential properties involved in your induction.

quote="Bob Ross;819588"]My point is that you don’t get to choose what is relevant to determining what induction to use in this scenario apart from what essential properties you use to determine what the things are within it[/quote]

That's the exact point I've been making all along.

That is fine; my original question seems to boil down to what makes a factor relevant; but I want to clarify that I am not talking about properties but, rather, relevant factors. — Bob Ross

I already addressed this in an earlier post. I do not have a term "relevant factors" in my theory. I noted the term was ok as long as you understood it was a synonym for "essential properties in consideration of the induction". If you use it in any other way, that's not anything I'm claiming in my theory.

I will say it again: an accidental property of an entity within a context can be a relevant factor: not just essential properties. — Bob Ross

This translates to, "An accidental property of an entity within a context can be an essential property involved in forming an induction."

Thus in the first case of only considering A/B on the box, the X and Y properties are accidental, but also non-essential for the formation of the inductions we compare. In the second case, you've elevated X and Y as essential to the formation of the inductions we compare. X and Y have become essential to the identity of whether the box has air or not in your mind by the inductions you've created. As these are two sets of essential properties for the formation of these inductions, we cannot compare the two sets using the hierarchy.

The essence of a thing is just the properties that it cannot exist without; in the box scenario, the designs are not essential properties but are relevant factors to the scenario nonetheless. — Bob Ross

So translating this then "The identity we create is just the properties that it cannot exist without. In the first box scenario, the designs of X and Y are not essential properties to a box existing. In the second scenario, they are also non-essential properties to the box simply existing. But in the second scenario, they become essential properties in determining inductions for whether that box also has air inside it or not."

I think we may have veered off from the original scenario and I think it is time we revisited it: I am not asking how one should determine the essential properties of an entity—I am asking how you are determining, in the scenario, which factors are relevant. — Bob Ross

Translating this again: "I am asking how you are determining, in the scenario, which essential properties are necessary for the set of inductions". Hopefully this is clear by now. Whatever you involve in creating your inductions, are essential properties for that formation of that induction. If you include X/Y, it doesn't matter if it is an accidental property that a box can have regardless of whether it has air in it or not. It becomes an essential property in an induction about whether that X/Y pattern determines whether the box has air in it or not.

At that point you are claiming X/Y is involved with not just a box, but whether a box has air in it or not. Thus you have changed the distinctive knowledge of, "A box with air" being essentially tied to the design on the box. The X/Y are accidental on just a box. But when you now tie them in with the identity of having air or not, they are now an essential property of whether the box has air or not. Its an entirely different identity set to just looking at a box to see if it has air, then looking at a box and including its design as a consideration of whether it has air.

"Usefulness" of distinctive knowledge can be broken down into a few categories (and I'm sure you can think of more):

I would like you to, in light of these criteria you gave, tell me which induction within the box scenario is more cogent to use; and no I am not asking you to compare them within your induction hierarchy criteria because we already agreed that they are in two separate hierarchies and cannot be compared in that manner. — Bob Ross

I already did, but if it was misunderstood I'll state it again. In this very specific scenario you originally mentioned, overlapping the two is ideal. As I noted earlier, I even changed the odds to avoid bias. Lets say its 25/75 for air no air, and X is always air, Y is always no air. I can both hold that there is a 25% chance of getting an A box, and observe the pattern that A boxes so far have always had an X design. I could consider the X design relevant to whether the box has air with this pattern, but I don't have a probability that includes the X/Y design. So the most cogent induction I have when including the X/Y designs as essential to my inductions is the pattern.

What I don't have an answer for you, is whether you should use a distinctive knowledge set where X/Y is irrelevant to whether the box has air or not, vs where it is. There's not enough information on that alone in this limited thought experiment to determine an answer as more than an opinion. Change the set and context and we have to re-evaluate which distinctive knowledge set would be more rationale to take, or if there is no answer for that specific scenario.

Sorry Bob, but I'm not going to accept any idea that our feelings or desires are the underpinnings of rationality, at least without a deeper argument into why.

For now this is really an offshoot of our conversation, so I will refrain from going too deep into it for now. — Bob Ross

I agree! We have enough to talk about right now. Lets focus on this part first and if we need to revisit rationality, we will. What I will note is that your claim that H2 is more rational to choose than H1 has only provided a confirmation bias justification. Until more is given, that tells me that you do not have a rationale that H2 is more cogent to pick then H1.

The fourth is coming up btw! I don't know if you're American, but happy 4th regardless!

Fantastic Bob! I feel we're back to discussing the situation properly now and can continue.

You are claiming that the two sets, H1 and H2, can only be evaluated as more or less cogent than one another insofar as you know which factors are being considered relevant — Bob Ross

I am not saying that, but this is close. I am not saying that H1 or H2 is more cogent. I am not applying the hierarchy to whether I should chose H1 or H2. I am saying that we use H1 or H2 based on the properties we are evaluating as essential within the justification of our inductions.

Your question seems to be, "Which identity set should I use?" This question is important, but I needed you to understand that it is not a hierarchy question. The hierarchy does not care why you picked H1 or H2. All it notes is that when you are within H1 or H2, you can compare inductions as I've noted. This is not a flaw or a lack of the hierarchy. This is just a logically concluded set of rules.

but, most importantly, the person can decide which factors are relevant, being distinctive knowledge, and thusly it is not more or less rational (i.e., cogent) to use factors X/Y and A/B (or to just use A/B, or just X/Y). Is this correct? — Bob Ross

I am saying the hierarchy does not involve making any claim to the rationality of the distinctive properties a person chooses. Once you are deciding to use the hierarchy, you have already decided on the distinctive properties you are applying in the induction. Now, that doesn't mean that we cannot have a separate discussion about which properties should be essential. It also doesn't mean that we cannot come to a rational conclusion about what properties would be best. But it is not something that the hierarchy itself cares about.

Second, I think the other confusion you have is you keep crossing applicable knowledge with inductions. Inductions can always be wrong. Always. They are at best rational, at worst, irrational. There is the decision as to which induction is best before application. To test an induction, it must be applied. This is why your distinctive knowledge set is prioritized over your applicable knowledge in choosing a set to apply the hierarchy. Within the hierarchy, we use our applicable knowledge of that distinctive knowledge set to determine the most cogent induction. Let me give you an example.

Distinctively, I consider A/B, air box and no air box, to be the only essential properties I care about. I applicably know the probability is 49/51%. I applicably know I have a pattern of 50%. Then I invent a plausibility that there is a box that breaks physics, and has half air, and not half air.

Recall that the hierarchy is based on its distance from applicable knowledge within the distinctions chosen. I applicably know the probability. I don't distinctively know the probability. I applicably know the pattern. I don't distinctively know the pattern. Finally, I don't applicably know that I can get a box that has half air, and not half air. So if I choose an induction, whether I'm going to get an A or B box next, I have to choose an induction that strays away the least from the applicable knowledge that I have. In this case, its the probability.

I think I have finally pinned down my disagreement here (assuming my above summary is accurate): the relevant factors of the actual situation are not themselves distinctive knowledge but, rather, are applicable knowledge. — Bob Ross

So then, the relevant factors of the identity set are the distinctive knowledge that you see as essential. The relevant factors within the hierarchy are your applicable knowledge involving those distinctions. And the closer your inductions to the applicable knowledge that you have, the higher up the hierarchy those inductions are.

My distinctive knowledge of what the relevant factors are, which is just my ability to cognitively enumerate different options and single out different entities, is really an asserted hypothesis of what they actually are; and I can only confirm this by application of a test. — Bob Ross

Yes.

Take Set 1 when X and Y are not considered. Take Set 2 when X and Y are considered

The problem is that you don’t get to decide what to consider in the context: the relevant factors are there in reality within that context. In the box example, the designs and the probability are relevant factors. All you are noting is the enumeration of which are more cogent depending on what they consider as relevant, but I am saying they don’t get to choose that part. — Bob Ross

You'll need to prove that you cannot choose your essential properties. Bob, hypothetically what if there was a color difference of red and green on A and B boxes, but the person having to make the induction is color blind? Or, lets say the person just doesn't put it together that there's a design pattern correlation between A and B? Can they consider those properties?

Further, what if there are an essential set of properties that could tell whether a box was an air box or not without opening the box, but it took 2 hours of examination to figure it out? If I only had 3 hours to sort ten boxes, and being slightly off was ok, wouldn't it be smarter to use the probability instead?

And here we can finally ramp off of inductions, and go back to the real question that you're asking: "If I have an option to make a property essential to an identity, when should I?" This is not a hierarchy question. I repeat, this is not a hierarchy question. At this point, we must leave inductions behind and focus on this question alone. If you finally realize these are two separate questions, then we can drop the hierarchy at this point and focus on this major question.

If you recall, I only briefly touched upon this in the original paper. There was enough to cover as it was, and I had to cut considerations somewhere. I'll start now.

First, we need to revisit a point you made earlier that I agreed with. Distinctive knowledge must be applied to make any real assertions about reality. We'll go back to the sheep and goat example. If I say that a sheep has magical powers as an essential property, until I can actually applicably know a creature that has magical powers, my distinctive knowledge does not apply to reality.

Second, useful distinctive knowledge allows us applicable knowledge of reality that gives us what we need to survive. If your distinctive knowledge set leads to death or unnecessary harm to yourself or others, then we can rationally conclude this is not a great distinctive knowledge set. If you are dead or harmed, you are unable to exist, or diminished. I think we can both agree this is a rationale pretty much everyone in society would agree with.

Third, useful personal distinctive knowledge is that which makes our life better in having it as an option for application. Lets say there's an herb in the wild that tastes wonderful. By sight alone, its indistinguishable from an herb that tastes bitter. However, a person with a keen sense of smell can note that the tasty herb smells pleasant, while the bitter herbs smell acrid. Having and using these properties is more beneficial to a person trying to get rid of a tasty meal then not having them.

"Usefulness" of distinctive knowledge can be broken down into a few categories (and I'm sure you can think of more):

a. Reward for being correct in the application.
b. Time/effort invested in the application (aka. Ease of use)

Fourth, useful distinctive knowledge is based on our ability to apply it. If I cannot see but only hear something, the distinctive knowledge of sight cannot be used. If I require a tool to apply distinctive knowledge, like a scale for pounds for example, but I don't have a scale, its not useful at that time.

I'll leave those as a start. Let me quickly address your last points on rationality.

To be rational, is to be parsimonious, logically consistent, to assess the reliability of the evidence, to be internally + externally coherent, and empirically adequate—all to the best of one’s ability. — Bob Ross

But you didn't demonstrate logical consistency. If you want to equate parsimonious with rationality, you have to demonstrate that rationality. As it was, your claim is its rational because its "rational".

Desires, ultimately, are what define what “being rational” is. There’s no way around that. That I am irrational for violating the law of noncontradiction is grounded in my desire that I ought to define “being rational” as including “abiding by the LNC”. That doesn’t make my argument irrational. — Bob Ross

Your desire has nothing to do with it. The law of non-contradiction is a distinctive bit of knowledge that when applied to reality, has always been confirmed. What is rational is to create applicable identities which assess reality correctly. We know this if reality does not contradict these applications. Our desires to not change this. Sorry Bob, but I'm not going to accept any idea that our feelings or desires are the underpinnings of rationality, at least without a deeper argument into why.

We both agreed that it is more cogent to pick H2 over H1 in S, so I was asking you why it would be more cogent under your view. — Bob Ross

Oh, I think this was lost in communication then. I did not intend to say this. I noted in the circumstance where you take in A/B and X/Y then you should pick H2, as H1 does not have X/Y considerations. In the circumstances where you do not have the X/Y additional consideration, then H1. You have been claiming that H2 is more rational than H1, not myself.

The most rational is to take both into account and assume that 49% of the boxes we find will be with air, and we believe that all of these boxes will have the X pattern.

If you think it is more rational, then I can ask “why under your view is it more rational?”. — Bob Ross

As you can see here I did not claim that H2 was more rational than H1, I noted we could simply overlap them. This is rational because in the case of A/B without an X/Y consideration, we do have knowledge that overall its a 49/51 split. That does no go away if we add the X/Y consideration and have no induction. If we add a X/Y consideration, we can then also consider that.

I think its the pattern that's made it confusing. Lets look at different probabilities instead.

H1 49/51% A or B
H2 A is 98 % X, B is 98% Y

In this case we have no pattern. We know both probabilities. These now overlap. If I pull a Box with an X, its likely an A, or air box. Further, if I did not know the next box I was going to pull, I would guess it was B, and also guess that it would be a Y box.

Now go back to our original example and you should see what I'm talking about. We simply overlap the inductions we do have depending on what properties we're considering for the outcome. In the case of H2, we don't have a probability, we only have a pattern.

Correct me if I am wrong, but we have discussed well enough for me to get an answer to those: we both agree that the cogency criteria within the hierarchies (H2 and H1) work perfectly fine, but is there any criteria in place to compare those hierarchies themselves?

I think the aspect of the papers you are saying I am forgetting pertains to the claims I made about distinctive knowledge, but that is irrelevant to whether you can briefly answer those questions. — Bob Ross

I keep telling you its not irrelevant, because I've already answered the question, told you it has to deal with distinctive knowledge, and you still seem to insist it doesn't. :) This is why I suggested you read the paper again, because you seemed to gloss right over this.

Right now, I am asking you why you think it is more cogent to pick H2 (which you said, and I quoted above, in a previous message) if you can’t compare the hierarchies themselves (which is what you were also claiming). — Bob Ross

I've already mentioned above that this is not the case.

But since you asked, I will tell you why I think H2 is better than H1 in the box example: I think that, in that situation, in a nutshell, that the overwhelming experiential correlation of the BWA with design X and design X exclusively on BWAs outweighs the 1% increased probability that it is a BWOA; and so I go with it being a BWA (and thusly not with the probability). Why do I think it outweighs the other? Just because, in this situation, because to go with the other option is to have to makeup unparsimoneous explanations of the situation: it is more parsimonious, all else being equal, to say “yeah, that’s probably a BWA”. — Bob Ross

Thank you, this is what I was trying to understand. My overlap explanation and an understanding that we compare hierarchies within the same identity set should also be quite parsimonious. But regardless, parsimoneous is just something we want, it doesn't make it rational. There are plenty of unparsimoneous but highly rational things in this world. A desire is not a rational argument. If this is your only reasoning, then its really just an opinion. Lets examine my point about taking the identity sets into consideration, as well as cases of overlap, and you can see the rationale of the hierarchy, as well as the rationale of overlap.

Sorry, I am not trying to give you an ultimatum; but I feel as though you are avoiding the question (perhaps unintentionally or I am misunderstanding your response): I’ve asked the same question now four or so times and you haven't answered nor have you demonstrated why my question is currently unanswerable. You say we need to clarify some things about how the methodology works (as I am misremembering), but you can still answer the question with the terms from your methodology and then note if my response confuses the terms. You haven’t even responded. — Bob Ross

I have responded, I just think we both didn't quite understand that each had responded. Hopefully this answers your question now. If not, I'll follow up.

I am not saying what a person should do, you are. You are saying they are acting irrationally, and I'm still waiting for why from you.

Are you not saying that the hierarchy is the most cogent means of determining which induction to hold when they have the same identity sets? If so, then you are telling them what they should do. — Bob Ross

No, I am not saying which identity sets a person should choose. You keep accidently blending what one distinctively knows vs the hierarchy, which relies on what distinctive knowledge one knows and uses. The hierarchy at its base is say claiming that one set of distinctive knowledge identities is more rational to hold then another. That is a separate question that must be asked of the distinctive knowledge sets themselves. Which if you understand this part, we can go into next.

To sum:

1. You create an identity set with distinctive knowledge and its applications.

Set 1 A/B box
Set 2 A/B Box and X/Y design

Your choice of set, is not the hierarchy. I'm going to repeat this again, because its been missed several times. Your choice of set, is not the hierarchy.

You then create inductions considering that distinctive knowledge and applications. You can compare though a hierarchy of inductions created from that set.

If you combine two sets together and their hierarchies, you cannot use the hierarchy betwixt the two sets, but you can overlap, or switch between the sets as the set you use changes based on your circumstances.

Example:

Take Set 1 when X and Y are not considered. Take Set 2 when X and Y are considered. Thus if I'm asked to guess which air box will come out next, I only need set one. If I'm asked to guess which air and design box will come out next, I can overlap the two.

I hope this clears it up.

Happy Saturday Bob! After looking over your last few responses, you keep saying things that show you don't understand the paper. Its been quite a while, and I think you dove into inductions and have forgotten the points that lead up to inductions in the first place. I think it would help you greatly to re-read the paper first, building up how I got to proposing how to handle inductions in the first place, then come back. Its just an observation from my end and I don't want to have to retype the entire paper from beginning to end so you understand again. :) Please re-read.

Its been logically concluded that a person can create whatever distinctive knowledge they want.

You are confusing what a person can do with what they should do epistemically. It doesn’t matter if a person can act irrationally: it is still irrational because it isn’t what they should be doing. — Bob Ross

I am not confusing that. I am not saying what a person should do, you are. You are saying they are acting irrationally, and I'm still waiting for why from you. The conclusion that we can create whatever distinctive knowledge we want within our personal subjective context does not make any claims to what distinctive knowledge is more rational than another.

Now, I welcome a discussion about rational choices in distinctive knowledge. I've dabbled in a few non-hierarchy reasons why we should consider having certain distinctive knowledge over others that don't involve the hierarchy. If you want to involve the hierarchy, you can apply it to the question of when you make a distinctive induction. But, you must first understand the core tenants of distinctive knowledge.

You are confusing what is most cogent to do with our expounding of it (to ourselves). Distinctive knowledge us just out ability to discretely parcel reality: it doesn’t tell us in itself what is most cogent to hold nor what is even most cogent to parcel. — Bob Ross

I am not confusing anything here. I've been trying to tell you you're barking up the wrong tree! Yes, you are correct that distinctive knowledge alone does not tell us what is more cogent to hold or parcel. I've been noting this the entire time.

The epistemic theory is supposed to attempt to get at what in reality, beyond our mere distinctive knowledge, is most cogent to do. — Bob Ross

Correct. With distinctive knowledge, we apply that to the world. When we reach the limits of applicable knowledge, we use the hierarchy. Recall that the hierarchy is based off of how far away our inductions are from applicable knowledge.

Philosophim, conceptualizing and abstracting what one thinks is most cogent to do is useless if it is not closely married to reality, which is what furnishes us with what actually is most cogent to do. — Bob Ross

Correct, that's what the hierarchy does.

If I want to survive and there’s a bear coming at me, then there is actually a best sequence of counter moves to maximize my chances of getting out alive—and my decisions in terms of what to distinctively classify and parcel could go against that most cogent sequence of events. — Bob Ross

I think you're confusing inductions with knowledge. I generally use cogency as a means of evaluating inductions. Knowledge is a rationally deduced match of our identities with reality. If we know the best sequence of counter moves, we're not talking about induction anymore. Induction happens when we lack the full knowledge of a situation and must make a guess at outcomes. At that point, we can evaluate our inductive choices and pick the one that is most cogent using the hierarchy.

I am allowed to, after the coin flipping and placing of the dog (or not placing of the dog) is finished, stand outside of the room with the door closed. I clearly hear a dog barking in that room and, to put the icing on the cake, my dog’s bark matches that bark exactly (as I have experienced it for 60 years). This is another situation where the probability and possibility do not use the same relevant factors and, consequently, your epistemology is useless for figuring out what the most cogent thing is to do (regardless of the fact that it can calculate what is most cogent within the two hierarchies). — Bob Ross

First, you didn't use the same properties in each case. Did we evaluate the coin flip if the dog barked in the first probability? No. So you can't compare the probability to the second situation where we ARE considering the dog barking for our belief.

This part alone should have been obvious to you if you've been listening to me, and you should have easily predicted how I would respond. You're smart as a whip Bob, but I think you're still in attack mode, not discussion mode, and you're not thinking through it correctly here. Relax and try to understand first. You don't have a need for this theory to be wrong right? We have a need to get to the truth of the matter, whether the theory is wrong or right.

First, because this argument isn't really any different than the box argument, what do you think is more rational to choose here? Then, why?

Just like how I don’t get to distinctively say “well, I just don’t find the probability of flipping the coin relevant, so I am going to say it will be heads because that is what it was last time” — Bob Ross

The reason why you don't get to do this is if you also add, "When I'm using the hierarchy of induction."

This is irrelevant to what I was saying: just because I can decide to not use the hierarchy that does not entail that I am determining the most cogent solution. — Bob Ross

Its completely relevant to what you were initially saying. You said you were able to just decide willy nilly what distinctive knowledge you held. Which is fine. But you can't if you hold that you are applying to a particular distinctive knowledge, that of the heirarchy. While you can choose what personal distinctive knowledge you hold, if you agree to accept someone else's distinctive knowledge, you're stuck. That has nothing to do with the most cogent solution.

For the record, I actually do think that comparing hierarchies is within the over-arching hierarchy of the entirety of the inductions and, thusly, is a critique of your hierarchy; — Bob Ross

But you're not arguing for it. You're not showing or proving it Bob. That's just a statement. Its why I asked you

I was just clarifying the record: I am not going to derail into that right now. I would much rather you just answer the question. My statement here is irrelevant to the question: — Bob Ross

I did answer the question. The answer is, please justify your statement by showing me why you think that, not simply stating that you think that. Asking you to provide a reason for your statement when asked is a sensible and standard response. Let me understand your reasoning so I can answer your question. I can take a stab at trying to figure out your reasoning, but if I miss it, we'll be right back here again.

Why do you think its more reasonable to choose H2 than H1?

I am asking that within the context that we have two hierarchies, H2 and H1, in context S and that is it: there is no over-arching hierarchy at play here. I think I made the question very clear. So, does your epistemology account for a method of determining the cogency of the hierarchies or not? — Bob Ross

Again, you did not make that clear. You claim that it is more rational to pick H2. It seems to be a crux of your argument against the hierarchies inadequacy, so I want to know what justification you have for making that claim. Give me justification so that I understand where you are coming from. Only then can I adequately understand your claim and answer it.

I definitely have an answer for you, but I feel that too much of these discussions has been going back to whether you understand the actual theory as defined instead of whether the theory is flawed or illogical.

I think my question is very clear, and I am not going to speculate at trying to provide potential solutions to your theory if you already have a solution. The critique is of your theory, now it is time for you to rebut it or concede it. — Bob Ross

No, its not clear, that's why I'm asking you to give your rationale! Also, lets not put ultimatums like "rebut or concede". Lets not make the discussion one sided, please address my points so that I can better address yours.

I already stated in the context of the question that the hierarchies are legitimate: it’s the comparison of hierarchies I am asking about. — Bob Ross

If you agree with me, then you understand that the hierarchy is a rational comparison of inductions over the same identity set. You are claiming that because it does not claim to have a rational comparison between identity sets, that its somehow broken. That's a straw man. You're saying because the hierarchy is not claiming to be something it isn't, that its wrong. That's just not logical Bob. We can of course question what identity set would be more rational to choose, but that does not invalidate what the hierarchy does.

I don't find this to be a very good experiment. Broadly defining people as "conservative" and then zeroing in on that as the only possible cause seems like a very biased study looking for a very particular outcome. Including the idea that they believe in karma as a reasoning is also absurd. I'm not a conservative either, so this isn't me trying to defend myself.

I think you are understanding where my problem with your methodology lies (and what it is); and I think you are conceding that it doesn’t give an actually account of which hierarchy is most cogent—which, to me, is a major problem. — Bob Ross

The theory is a foundation. Does it work consistently and logically for what it does? Yes. The fact that its a screwdriver and not a hammer isn't really a critique of the theory.

rarely does the possible inductions use the same exact relevant factors (i.e., essential properties); and, consequently, your hierarchy, and methodology in general (since it doesn’t account for a viable solution comparing them), is only applicable to one piece of sand in an entire beach. — Bob Ross

That's just an opinion and not really an argument Bob. No one has ever used the hierarchy before, so they haven't had to think in terms of it. Its not difficult to start thinking using the hierarchy to compare different inductions. Just as a start, it solves many problems in epistemology that have to do with induction.

I wouldn’t count it is valid to shift the determination of cogency to distinctive knowledge; — Bob Ross

But you should. The hierarchy is built off of the consequences of distinctive and applicable knowledge, not the other way around. If A => B => C, you shouldn't criticize that C doesn't lead to A. I'm letting you know that your critique is a misunderstanding of what relies on what. Distinctive knowledge does not rely on the hierarchy. The hierarchy relies on distinctive knowledge.

Just like how I don’t get to distinctively say “well, I just don’t find the probability of flipping the coin relevant, so I am going to say it will be heads because that is what it was last time” — Bob Ross

The reason why you don't get to do this is if you also add, "When I'm using the hierarchy of induction." If you're not using the hierarchy of induction you get to do this as there is no other objective measurement to decide what induction is more cogent than another.

I don’t get to distinctively say “well, I just don’t find the designs relevant in this case, so I am going to go with the probability of 51% that it is a BWOA”. Epistemology doesn’t leave these kinds of cogency decisions up to the user to arbitrarily decide. — Bob Ross

Why not Bob? Its been logically concluded that a person can create whatever distinctive knowledge they want. There is no rule within nature that necessitates what a person must consider distinctive. Now there are arguments and situations that we can break down to try to convince a person to take on certain properties.

In fact, I've been trying to do that during our conversation. Notice how I stated earlier that you weren't addressing the hierarchy correctly. You had a different distinctive notion than I did. If you don't want to accept the distinctive notion that I'm putting forward, what can I do about it? Nothing. I can show you why its rational and consistent to do so. I can note that if you don't accept the definition I'm putting forward, not because its a contradiction, but because you don't like what it entails, that your critiques will be straw men arguments and we'll go nowhere. But ultimately, that decision is on you right?

To clarify, this means that the crux of the cogency determination in the vast majority of cases is left up the person to arbitrarily decide for themselves; which renders the scope of your methodology to only oddly specific examples. — Bob Ross

No, I've noted that with individuals, they are free to choose whatever distinctive knowledge they like. But there are risks and consequences for doing so as I mentioned in my last post.

If a bear is rushing quickly towards you in the woods, you don't have a lot of time to test to see if the bear is rushing towards you or something behind you. Another thing is to consider failure. Perhaps there's a lot pointing towards the bear not rushing towards you. But if you're wrong, you're going to be bear food. So maybe you climb a tree despite your initial beliefs that its probably not going after you.

You aren’t giving a general account of what is most cogent: you are just saying that the person can do whatever they want, and that’s what is most cogent. — Bob Ross

No, I'm not saying that at all. I'm noting that there are reasons why we limit the distinctive considerations in our choices. This wasn't a hierarchy point about cogency, just a discussion about why we find certain things distinctive. If I was unclear about that, my apologies.

For the record, I actually do think that comparing hierarchies is within the over-arching hierarchy of the entirety of the inductions and, thusly, is a critique of your hierarchy; — Bob Ross

But you're not arguing for it. You're not showing or proving it Bob. That's just a statement. Its why I asked you

Why do you think its more reasonable to choose H2 than H1?

I get the feeling that you're more interested in simply not accepting the hierarchy then you are in demonstrating why. That's why I asked you. I'm trying to get some reasoning from you, as well as get you back into thinking about the theory instead of insisting things about the theory. As of now, I'm not seeing anything but critiques on the idea that it doesn't do more than it does, that it should do more than it does, or that it does more than it does. I'm asking you to understand the actual theory, and critique the theory from within that understanding. So try to answer the question first. I'm not trying to trap you, I'm trying to see if you understand all of the terms correctly, and also get a better insight into why you're making the claims that you are.

I definitely have an answer for you, but I feel that too much of these discussions has been going back to whether you understand the actual theory as defined instead of whether the theory is flawed or illogical. Hope the week is going well for you Bob, I'll catch your reply later!

↪Ludwig V well if we are using two definitions then we’ll be arguing past each other. I would argue it is necessary because there are slippery folks out there who don’t clarify their position to hide behind the shield of being “taken of of context” or “misinterpreted” — Darkneos

I would argue one of the fundamentals of proper philosophical discussion is clear and unambiguous definitions. Clear definitions lead to clear arguments, and clear points of contention and debate.

Why would anyone get huffy over that? Makes perfect sense.

In the scenario, there are no other inductions that use the same essential properties (i.e., relevant factors) and since there are only two given the two hierarchies only contain one induction; which entails that within each hierarchy each induction is by default the most cogent to hold. — Bob Ross

Yes, that's right.

In the scenario, which let’s say is context S, there are two hierarchies, H1 and H2. Although you can’t compare the inductions, you have to compare the hierarchies to decide which is most cogent to go with (because it is a dilemma: either use the probability or the pattern—there’s no other option). Now, if we are to claim that in S H2 is more cogent than H1 (and thusly go with the pattern), then there must be some sort of criteria we used to compare H2 to H1 in S. If not, then we cannot claim either is more or less cogent to each other and, consequently, cannot claim that using the pattern is more or less cogent than the probability and if that is the case, then it is an arbitrary decision between using H2 over H1. — Bob Ross

Ok, I think I see your issue now. Your issue is not with the hierarchy. Your issue is you are attributing what people decide as distinctive knowledge, and questioning what level of detail people should choose. The hierarchy does not make any such claims. It does not say, "Taking only A/B is more cogent then considering A/B and X/Y." As I thought, you're lumping too much together instead of seeing all the parts as separate first. The solution to understand this is to first stop looking at the hierarchy entirely and go back to our understanding of distinctive knowledge.

If you recall, there is no limit to what we can distinctively know, or how we choose to identify existences. If I want, I can say a tree is a plant made of wood and leaves. Or I could say a tree is what fits to the level of detail that a botanist would consider. Of course the question we can ask next is, "What should I use?"

The answer I gave in the paper was, "Whatever outcomes would best fit your context." The more detailed the identity, the more time and effort it takes to verify that what you are looking at is applicably known as that identity. If a bear is rushing quickly towards you in the woods, you don't have a lot of time to test to see if the bear is rushing towards you or something behind you. Another thing is to consider failure. Perhaps there's a lot pointing towards the bear not rushing towards you. But if you're wrong, you're going to be bear food. So maybe you climb a tree despite your initial beliefs that its probably not going after you.

In less risky circumstances, you may not care about there being further details to a tree then leaves and wood. Its not like a more detailed botanical explanation is going to affect your life in any way. Why waste time using such an identity when it benefits you in no way?

Notice how none of these questions have anything to do with the hierarchy. If you go back to the hierarchy now, you'll understand that your question is not about the hierarchy, its about determining what would be best, to include more or less details in your assessment of the situation. The hierarchy of inductions in and of itself does not evaluate the effort or risk to yourself in deciding how many attributes you should or should not include in your identity. What it can do however, is help you determine the most rational course of action if you limit the question appropriately.

If that is the case, then the hierarchy analysis that you keep giving, which would apply to H2 and H1, isn't doing any actual work in evaluating in S what is the most cogent decision to make. Do you see what I mean? — Bob Ross

If you mean the hierarchy isn't doing the work in telling you whether H1 or H2 is more cogent to pick, you're right. The hierarchy rules do not tell you what set of distinctive properties you should pick without context. That's an entirely separate discussion, which of course we can have.

So I'm going to put the issue back to you. Why do you think its more reasonable to choose H2 than H1? Can you do so within the understanding of distinctive and applicable knowledge? Can you use the hierarchy of inductions correctly to do so? And if not, that's ok, Its more of a check to see if you understand. I'll add my own agreements or critiques after I see yours.

Philosophim so if it just stays in this obscure realm of “what if”? — Darkneos

Yes, philosophy that stays in the realm of "What if" without any way to test it or apply it is ultimately useless beyond entertainment.

2. If we do define our terms, by making distinctions between the two, then we still end in absurdity as belief and style contradict and anything can go from that conversation.

This only occurs if we do not then try to apply those beliefs to reality. Philosophy does indeed end up pointless if we make up a bunch of definitions then logic those made up definitions into made up conclusions. The best philosophers in history understood this, as they were usually mathematicians or scientists as well. Philosophy must be married to reality if it is to be useful.

This is a major point I make here if people are interested. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14044/knowledge-and-induction-within-your-self-context

After pulling literally two billion boxes and noticing there was a 100% match of design to air or not air, it seems silly not to consider it.

According to the entirety of your methodology (and not just the hierarchy), there is no justification for this claim you have made here. You can’t say it is less cogent, even when it seems obvious that it is, for a person to say “no it doesn’t seem silly to just go off of the probability”. Without a clear criteria in your view, the vast majority of scenarios end up bottoming out at this kind of stalemate (because the hierarchy is unapplicable to the situation). — Bob Ross

Well, no, there's a clear criteria. You go for what is most cogent in the property situation you have. Taken another way Bob, if you know the probability of the boxes for X/Y was 25/75, but you've also randomly pulled 50/50 on your boxes so far, its more cogent to go with the probability. Again, the issue is you're taking two different inductions with two different identities when the hierarchy is used for two different inductions with the same identities.

I totally am (; I mean:

The most rational is to take both into account and assume that 49% of the boxes we find will be with air, and we believe that all of these boxes will have the X pattern.

You can’t say this if you generated two separate, uncomparable hierarchies and there is nothing else in the methodology that determines cogency of inductions! Philosophim, you are admitting it is more cogent and that there’s absolutely no justification in your methodology for knowing that! — Bob Ross

I think you missed what I did then. I didn't compare the two different property setups, I simply overlapped them. I've said it several times now, but its worth repeating. The probability in the first case is regarding an identity with less essential properties than the second case. So I can very easily say, "All boxes have a 49/51% chance for air/not air". Since the probability does not consider X/Y pattern, it does not tell us the probability of air/not air for an X/Y pattern. So if we disregard the X/Y, we hold that probability. To help me to see if I'm communicating this correctly, what is the problem with this notion alone? Isolate this point from all other points and tell me where you think this is flawed.

Take the above, and just realize that when you include the X/Y properties, the highest induction you can make is a pattern. You don't have a known probability on the X/Y properties. So when you refer to the boxes as "just boxes", the most cogent thing is to take the 49/51 split. When you refer to the boxes as having a X/Y distinction, you take the pattern as you have no known probability with the X/Y distinction.

You seem very hung up on this idea that a probability is always more cogent then a lower portion of the hierarchy no matter the circumstance of context. To my mind, I've never intended to imply that. Its always been within contextual identities. I don't know how else to communicate this to you. But any claim to the contrary is again, a straw man.

I 100% agree with you that it is most rational, but the problem in your view is you cannot justify it.

Let’s make the danger in having no means of determining cogency of the inductions more clear in this scenario: imagine that if you guess incorrectly they kill you. Now, we both agree that the obviously more cogent and rational move is to bet it is a BWA; but imagine there’s a third participant, Jimmy, who isn’t too bright. He goes off of the probability. Now, he isn’t misapplying your methodology by choosing to go off of the probability: he carefully and meticulously outlines the hierarchies involved in the context just like you, and realized (just like you) that he cannot compare them and is at a stalemate. He decides that he will use the probability. — Bob Ross

First, the risk of outcome does not change what is more cogent within the hierarchy. Second, I'm going to change the odds for a bit because we need to get you off this idea that the odds being miniscule make a difference. We'll make them miniscule when its all over, but for now, we'll say a air/no air is 25/75. What is rational is always rational. We simply decide to go with the less rational alternative sometimes due to how much it might cost us to be rational such as time/effort, and risk of reward/punishment, but this does not change what is rational in the hierarchy.

If Jimmy did a meticulous comparison, he would have a choice not in going against the hierarchy, but in determining the essential properties he considers in regards to the box. Does he include the X/Y design as part of his potential identification of whether the box has air or not? Let say Jimmy's not very smart and doesn't see a correlation of the X/Y pattern with air/not air. Jimmy has two options then.

1. Don't use the hierarchy

So Jimmy just guesses. Is that more rational than using the 25/75? No, I think we both agree on this.

2. Use the hierarchy

Jimmy guesses "not air". He may be wrong, but it was the most rational choice.

Ok, now lets do the miniscule odds. Its not much more rational in this case, but its still the most rational to use the hierarchy. The difference in odds, no matter how miniscule, does not change the outcome. if X > Y, its always greater than Y and therefore the most rational choice. This is proven and really not debatable.

Now Jimmy includes the X/Y pattern. He knows both the probability without the X/Y, but also the pattern with the X/Y. He pulls an X. Since he does not have a probability which concerns am X/Y correlation, the most cogent induction he has when including the X/Y is the pattern. Therefore, according to the hierarchy, he would choose that the X had air.

We're going to change this example up a bit more however to make things more clear. Now we're going to include two new pieces of information. First, we have the total number of boxes at 100. Second, Jimmy has pulled 10 boxes. Third, Jimmy has pulled 3 X's, and 7 Y's. Fourth, the question is now, "Will Jimmy's next box he pull have air or not?"

While the pattern for X/Y's still holds, in this question, Jimmy can't see the pattern ahead of time. The X/Y consideration has been removed. So what's the most cogent thing for him to do? Take the probability without considering the X/Y pattern. So the most rational choice would be "air". And if Jimmy were then also asked, "What pattern do you think the box is going to be?" he would reply, "X", because now the X/Y pattern is pertinent and he still doesn't have the odds for what the X/Y air/no air outcome would be.

I'm not sure I can make it more clear at this point. Just to let you know, I do not need the hierarchy to be right. I've worked on this for years, and have many, many times realized I was wrong or illogical in my claims here, so being wrong again is simply an opportunity for me to refine it better, or try a new approach. What I need is something logical, of which I have failed at countless times before. :) So trust me, I'm as interested in thinking about this critically as you are.

But try as well to be as critical to your own argument too. You keep misunderstanding the hierarchy. If you need a refresher, just post what you believe the hierarchy entails and I can agree/correct points so that way we're on the same page. I want to find whether the hierarchy holds, not keep clarifying what the hierarchy is. I think a major problem is you're taking a more complex problem without understanding the fundamentals of a basic problem. The complex problem is simply the application of the basics to a reasonable conclusion. Try to take your critiques of the complex problem and apply them to a simple problem first and maybe that will bring clarity in either understanding the hierarchy, or showing me if there is a flaw.

I look forward to hearing your replies Bob.

Correct me if I am wrong, but you seem to be admitting that these two inductions (which pertain to answering the same question in the same context) cannot be evaluated with respect to each other to decipher which is more cogent because you are generating two different hierarchies for them; and you are expressing this in the form of saying that it is up to the person to define what they think is essential. — Bob Ross

Yes, this is correct.

Firstly, unless there is some sort of separate criteria in your methodology for what one should consider essential, then it seems like, according to your methodology, a truly arbitrary decision of what is essential. I am ok with the idea of letting distinctive knowledge be ultimately definitional: but now you are extending it to applicable knowledge. — Bob Ross

I'm not quite sure what you mean by extending it to applicable knowledge, but I'll state what I see. We know that definitions are fully within our own choice. Of course, once we accept those definitions, then we must apply them. But the standard for applied knowledge does not change. You are simply using a definition in one scenario, then a different definition in another. Also understand that we're talking about inductions here. You won't know the outcome until you apply the induction itself. After you establish the identities in front of you, the hierarchy helps you organize your beliefs that you could apply, and which belief out of those inductions seems most rational to take.

Secondly, because it is an arbitrary decision whether one wants to include the X and Y designs into their consideration, the crux of the cogency of their induction is not furnished nor helped by your induction hierarchy and, thusly, your methodology provides no use in this scenario. — Bob Ross

First, the arbitrary decision of how you define identities is not a rule of the hierarchy, that's simply our capability as identifying minds that can discretely experience. The hierarchy arises from this knowledge, not the other way around.

If you think about it carefully, you'll realize the hierarchy is a stable way to evaluate the immense freedom of the human minds ability to identify. Recall that one such action that shapes the identities we choose is how useful they are to us. Same with things such as avoiding death or harm. Identities that have too few properties, or evaluate something as non-essential when it is essential to a person's benefit will not be very good identities to have.

The hierarchy's rules apply no matter what identities you ultimately decide on in the end. Further, understanding that the hierarchy means you need to consider all of the properties, may allow you to catch that you haven't fully explored an induction. If I start looking for a pattern of X, Y, and Z, then realize my probability I was holding only involved X and Y, I can then consciously realize that I should be looking for a probability of X, Y, and Z if I can.

This is immensely useful. Again, to my mind there is no other method in philosophy that can measure inductions in such a way.

Thirdly, I find that it would actually be less cogent to go with the probability (in that scenario) and somehow merely saying they don’t want to include the designs as essential doesn’t seem like a rational counter. The strong pattern, in this case, clearly outweighs using the miniscule probability. So I think that, as far as I am understanding it, using this methodology in this scenario can lead people to making an irrational decision (in the case that they arbitrarily exclude their knowledge of the patterns). — Bob Ross

And yet did you not come to a rational conclusion? Using less essential properties in you inductions results in broader outcomes. If I go through a forest and say, "All wood like plants with leaves are trees," its going to be very easy to point out trees. If I introduce other properties that divide trees into types, or bushes and other plants, its going to be much more difficult for me to point out specific trees, but I will be more discerning in my findings.

Taking the probability in the first case ignores every single other property of the box besides the fact its a box and has air or not. After pulling literally two billion boxes and noticing there was a 100% match of design to air or not air, it seems silly not to consider it. You're still hung up on comparing that pattern to the probability though. You can't because you're not considering the same properties in both instances. It doesn't work that way. Stop it Bob. :D

The two can coexist as separate sets in your mind. We do this every day. Genuinely, what is wrong with holding the probability of 49/51 for boxes with air and out air, then also considering there is a pattern where X and Y are considered? The most rational is to take both into account and assume that 49% of the boxes we find will be with air, and we believe that all of these boxes will have the X pattern.

The fact that people can misunderstand, misuse, or make mistakes in applying a methodology is not a critique on the methodology. Do we discount algebra because it takes some time to learn or master? No.

Would you at least agree that this scenario demonstrates how your methodology affords no help in some scenarios? — Bob Ross

No. The scenario was fine, you just misunderstood and misapplied the hierarchy. It had been a while for both of us, so no worry! The puzzle for me was in explaining the answer in a way that was clear. The example allowed me to show you how to apply the hierarchy, demonstrate to you the decisions you have available to you, and come to a rational outcome. That's pretty useful. Now is the hierarchy useful in places its not meant to apply to? Of course. Its a tool, and like any tool it has its places where its shines the best and places where it reaches its limitations. But I see nothing here which show a contradiction within the hierarchies claims, or has broken it in any way.

I understand what you are conveying — Bob Ross

Great! This absolutely had to be understood before I addressed your questions. Now let me get to them! If I miss any of your questions or points in this answer, please redirect me and I will address them.

1. In the scenario I gave, is the possibility or the probability what you would go with (or perhaps neither)? — Bob Ross

Lets use the hierarchy to answer the question. First, it is understood that within the hierarchy, we choose the most cogent induction within a comparable set. But what if we're missing a higher level of cogency? For example, what if I only have a pattern and no odds to consider? At that point, the pattern is the most cogent to choose from.

Hierarchy 1 Just A and B
Probability 49/51% of getting either A or B.
Pattern (Not available)

Hierarchy 2: A and B and X or Y
Probability (Not available)
Pattern I always pull an A with X, and always pull a B with Y

As you can see, in the first example, we have a probability and no pattern established yet. Even if we had a pattern, we would choose the probability.

In the second example, we do not yet have a probability involving A and B and X or Y.

So which do we rationally choose if we have two hierarchies? That depends on what you find essential in pulling the boxes. If you consider the X/Y distinction irrelevant, then you would choose the probability in example one. If you find the the X/Y distinction relevant, then you would choose the pattern in example two because you do not have a probability to compare in the hierarchy. You can compare hierarchies depending on what properties you find essential to your induction, but you cannot cross parts within hierarchy 1 and 2 together to compare.

2. Do you agree with me that if you decide one over the other that you are thereby comparing them? — Bob Ross

No. You may be comparing the properties, but you are not comparing the h1's probability with h2's pattern.

3. Do you agree that all the possible inductions for a question within a context are thereby within the same context as each other? — Bob Ross

I'll need more details in what you mean by this. If you mean considering all the relevant properties to that hierarchy, yes. If you mean comparing hierarchies with different relevant properties, no.

by my lights, it is useless (since it cannot be applied) for practical examples. — Bob Ross

I hope this shows that it is not. You still have to evaluate your inductions and make sure they are accurately evaluated and compared. If you cannot cross hierarchies, you still have a rational conclusion based on the highest tier of inductive argument you have within that hierarchy comparison. To my mind, there is also no rational argument for handling inductions in any way in philosophy. I would say what I have is a pretty good foundation to start.

Take the situation with X and Y properties, then come up with a probability, a possibility/pattern, and a plausibility. Add no other properties, and remove none. Then show if a lower hierarchy results in a more cogent decision.

Sorry, I meant air and no air situation first without the X/Y's. Missed it on the phone, but I have access to a computer again. I wanted you to walk through it yourself as I thought it would help you understand. I'll just do it here however. I will answer your questions btw, I just understand that they are directly related to mine, and we cannot discuss them until this one point is understood. Lets slowly build this up so we have solid footing each step of the way.

An example of the hierarchy
Probability 49/51% of getting either A or B.
Pattern I pull 1 billion A's and 1 billion Bs.

We can compare them because all the properties considered for the induction are the same.

Another example of the hierarchy:
Probability of getting either A or B with design X is 75% or Y at 25%
Pattern I always pull an A with X, and always pull a B with Y

Again, we can compare them because we're involving the same properties in both inductions.

An example that is NOT the hierarchy:
Probability 49/51% of getting either A or B.
Pattern I always pull an A with X, and always pull a B with Y

We cannot compare them using the hierarchy, because while some of the properties are shared, not all of them are in regards to the inductions that are made.

Its that simple Bob. Your example does not address the hierarchy. The second induction involves X and Y where the first induction does not. You are trying to compare apples to oranges when the hierarchy only allows you to compare apples with apples, and oranges with oranges. You cannot use this as an example to show that the hierarchy is wrong, because its not addressing the hierarchy. There is no debate on this. This is what the hierarchy is.

If you understand this, we can move on. Understanding this does not mean that you believe the hierarchy is adequate, useful, etc. It does not mean your example cannot be discussed as its own situation. But you must understand this definition and its application before we move onto any more questions. If you don't, we're not talking about the hierarchy. If you understand this, then I will address your previous questions.

Not a problem Bob! My smiley face did not go through on that statement. My internet is down so I'm having to type these on the phone for now. Again, I will gladly answer your questions and points, but to make sure we're on the same page, first answer with the exercise I posted earlier. Here is is again.

Take the situation with X and Y properties, then come up with a probability, a possibility/pattern, and a plausibility. Add no other properties, and remove none. Then show if a lower hierarchy results in a more cogent decision.

After, do the same as above, but this time add in the X/Y consideration for all the inductions. All the inductions must now include the X/Y. Then try to demonstrate why a lower hierarchy is more cogent than the higher one.

Once we have those examples, we can use those as a base of discussion, as that will accurately represent the hierarchy of inductions.

Suppose I sit down with a bunch of strangers at a poker game. The dealer deals himself a full house. Then he deals himself four of a kind. Then a royal flush. Then another royal flush. What does your theory say about when I should leave the table?
9h — RogueAI

A good question! Before I answer, I want to make sure you've read the theory first. To do so, use the terms for knowledge and inductions in the paper and tell me from your viewpoint what the theory would conclude. At that point I will either agree with or correct you. But if you haven't read the paper and understand the ponts first, you won't have the ability to understand the answer. Don't be lazy or insist that you have, prove that you have and we'll discuss

You can have two induction which use different relevant factors to infer a solution to the same question in the same context. The use of different relevant factors does not change the context — Bob Ross

No, you cant in the instance I noted. You usually do fair readings, but this time you're not. I've told you how the theory works, you don't get to say my own theory doesn't work the way I told you!

You know I have no problem admitting when I'm wrong or you've made a good point. In this case, you're telling me the theory I made should be something different. That's a straw man. If you don't like the theory that's fine. But insisting it is something it is not is wrong.

I've asked you to do the induction breakdown in my last post so you would understand. Until you do so, you won't have understood the hierarchy theory. Your reticence to do so indicates to me you're more in attack mode than discussion mode. It's ok, I've done that myself. On the next post do the breakdown I asked and then I know your criticisms will come from an understanding. As it is, this is all a strawman, intentional or no. List those first, then see if your criticisms still hold.

It sounds like you are in agreement with me that the best choice in the scenario is to use the pattern, but you disagree that it is an example of a possibility outweighing a probability: is that correct? — Bob Ross

Correct! This is what I've been trying to get across all along, so I'm happy to see this is cleared up.

Which indicates to me you are agreeing with me that the pattern is the most cogent choice in the scenario, but you are disagreeing whether that conflicts with the probability. Is that right? — Bob Ross

Also correct!

I honestly don’t understand how I could be misusing the hierarchy if the two options are a probability or possibility (fundamentally).

The probability and the possibility are both being used to infer the same thing — Bob Ross

quote="Bob Ross;817572"]The implication with your example is that they are completely unrelated, but the probability and possibility in my example are both related insofar as they are being used to induce a conclusion about the same question. That’s why you have to compare them.[/quote]

Because for one, it has never been that fundamentally the hierarchy is applied without context. If you introduce new properties which are of consideration within the probability, that is a new context. You are not asking the same question. You're not using the hierarchy if you introduce properties in one induction that are not considered in another.

To prove that the hierarchy breaks, you need to show me a comparison of two inductions which both consider all the same properties. Otherwise its just a strawman argument.

We don't compare the two because they don't apply to the same situation, or the same essential properties.

Just to hone in on this: they absolutely do!!! The question is “does the box have air?” — Bob Ross

No, they absolutely don't because you include an X/Y design consideration in your second induction, where this is not considered in the first induction. The first is, "Does the box have air?" While the second question is, "Does the box have air based on its design being either X or Y?"

A^B != A^B & X^Y

That's hard proof Bob. You'll need to disprove the above, and we both know that's not possible.

The point was to demonstrate that patterns are less cogent than probabilities. We both agree on this then

We don’t agree on this. All your example demonstrated was that patterns extrapolated from random pulls from a sample are not more cogent than probabilities pertaining to that sample. That is not the same thing as proving that patterns are less cogent than probabilities. — Bob Ross

Simply prove the coin flip example wrong, and then you'll be able to back that its not proven. Until then, it holds. And again, the hierarchy is when we have competing inductions within the same context. You have not demonstrated that you understand this yet. Please work to understand that first. As a challenge to you to help you do so, take the situation with X and Y properties, then come up with a probability, a possibility/pattern, and a plausibility. Add no other properties, and remove none. Then show if a lower hierarchy results in a more cogent decision.

After, do the same as above, but this time add in the X/Y consideration for all the inductions. All the inductions must now include the X/Y. Then try to demonstrate why a lower hierarchy is more cogent than the higher one. Do this, and you'll have an argument. Don't, and you're not arguing against the hierarchy, but against something else different to the discussion entirely.

I don’t have a problem with this: you seem to just be noting that I wouldn’t have made that exact inductive inference without the pattern which, to me, is a trivial fact. — Bob Ross

but, my question for you is, why explicate this? What relevance does this have to the scenario I gave you? — Bob Ross

Your point has been that the hierarchy does not hold and that there are certain instances in which a lower level of the hierarchy is more cogent to hold than a higher one. My point is that you are incorrectly using the hierarchy.

I agree that the calculated probability (which is not an inductive inference) is not considering Y and X while the inductive inference about X and Y is; but this doesn’t make it an unfair comparison; — Bob Ross

Also, a real example, like my scenario, can’t be negated by saying it is an “unfair comparison” because, in reality, you would have to compare them and choose (as described above). In the scenario, you wouldn’t just throw your hands up and say “UNFAIR COMPARISON!” (: — Bob Ross

Ha ha! No, I'm not saying its unfair as in, "I don't like it." I'm saying its not how the hierarchy works. Its been a while since we covered it, but we covered a similar situation a while back.

Probability: A coin has a 50/50 chance of landing heads or tails.
Possibility: The sun will rise tomorrow

We don't compare the two because they don't apply to the same situation, or the same essential properties. We compare coin flip with coin flip with what we know, and sunrise to sunrise to sunrise with what we know. The hierarchy doesn't work otherwise. You're simply doing it wrong by comparing two different identities Boxes without X and Y, and boxes with X and Y, then saying you broke the hierarchy.

there is a probability you are given and there is an inductive inference you could make either (1) based off of that probability or (2) off of the experiential pattern. In this scenario, they are at odds with each other, so you can’t induce based off of both (as they have contradictory conclusions): so you have to compare them and determine which is more cogent to use. — Bob Ross

Sure, and I already pointed out the solution, but I'll be more clear.

If you do not consider the X and Y properties as relevant, you choose the probability. If you consider the X and Y properties as relevant, you do not have a probability that considers the X and Y properties. Therefore you choose the pattern. You're comparing an apple to an orange and trying to say an orange is more rational. You need to compare two apples and two oranges together.

Why would it be more cogent to predict the next coin is heads rather then saying it could be either on the next flip?

It wouldn’t. If all you know is that you are performing a 50/50 random coin flip, it doesn’t matter how many times you get heads: it’s the same probability. This is disanalogous to the scenario because your knowledge of the design correlations is not derived from the sample size. — Bob Ross

The point was to demonstrate that patterns are less cogent than probabilities. We both agree on this then. If that is the case, then if you use the hierarchy correctly by comparing the types of inductions we can make from all the essential properties considered among the inductions, you still choose a probability over a pattern.

I hope your Saturday is going well Bob! I think I've been able to pare down our discussion in a more intelligible way this time. Read everything once over and I think it will all come together.

Secondly, I am also not even claiming that the designs are essential to inducing what box it is (which would be the latter thing in your quote), because that would imply that if I didn’t know the design then I couldn’t induce at all what box it is—which is clearly wrong. I am saying that it is a relevant factor. — Bob Ross

Disregarding your first point for a minute, this is what I'm trying to inform you of. A relevant factor is an essential property. A non-relevant factor is a non-essential property in regards to the induction. Anytime you make the design relevant to an induction, a pattern in your case, it is now a relevant, or essential property of that induction. Again, can you make the pattern induction if you ignore the design? No. Therefore it is an essential property of that pattern. .

f by “essential property of the induction” you just mean that I am using designs to make my induction, then I have no problem with that; but that has nothing to do with the substance of the scenario nor does that entail that it is essential to the induction. The point is that the colossally observed pattern of design → box, in this particular context, outweighs going off of the minuscule probability. — Bob Ross

It is what I'm saying. But your claim is not proven. You can include the pattern design in your thinking, but it does not outweigh the known probability. And to this, it must be re-iterated again. This probability is applicably known without the X Y consideration. When you include a new property, then you create a new induction that takes that property into consideration.

We then evaluate that induction. In this case its a pattern. A pattern is less cogent then a probability. This pattern also includes certain properties than the original probability. It is not more cogent than the original probability. However, it is also not fully comparable either. The initial probability does not include the design of X or Y in its consideration. Meaning once we include the X/Y as an essential property in our pattern, we don't have a probability to compare to. We could take the pattern as the most cogent decision if X and Y are essential properties, because there is no probability considered for the X and Y properties. But it does not negate a probability as being more cogent.

So once again, we do not have a lower hierarchy being more rational to pick then a higher hierarchy. What you've attempted to do is make X and Y irrelevant in a probability, say they are then also irrelevant in a pattern, despite them being absolutely necessary to the pattern's conclusion. I'm going to condense the points I made above below in some simple logic.

This is a fair comparable probability and pattern in the hierarchy:

Probability 49/51% of getting either A or B.
Pattern I pull 1 billion A's and 1 billion Bs.

A pattern is not as cogent as a known probability (The probability is not wrong, this would of course be a different discussion)

The more rational belief is that I will pull a ratio of A to B at 49/51%, despite the patterned solution I've seen.

This is another fair comparable probability and pattern in the hierarchy:

Probability of getting either A or B with design X is 75% or Y at 25%
Pattern I always pull an A with X, and always pull a B with Y

In this case, the probability is still more cogent than the pattern. This is because all relevant properties to the conclusion of each induction is being considered.

An incorrect comparable probability and pattern (What your example is doing):

Probability 49/51% of getting either A or B, (X and Y not considered).
Pattern I always pull an A with X, and always pull a B with Y (X and Y considered)

Then you're claiming the pattern is somehow more cogent than the probability.

1. You have not shown that a pattern is more cogent than a probability. To do so, you must resolve a very simple problem.

The probability of a random coin flip is 50/50.
Someone flips a coin ten times randomly and it turns up heads all ten times.
"Randomly" is proven and not doubted.

Why would it be more cogent to predict the next coin is heads rather then saying it could be either on the next flip? Give a reason there, and we can start to question whether a pattern is more cogent than a probability.

2. You are not comparing inductions properly. The first induction does not consider X and Y. You cannot say a later induction that does consider X and Y is more cogent than the first, because the first is a different scenario of considerations. You need to have a probability that does consider X and Y to compare fairly.

I hope this finally clears up the issue! This has forced me to be clearer with my examples and arguments, and I think the entire paper is better for it.

I can experience design X with BWAs my whole life and never refurbish its definition to include design X as an essential property: and that is how the scenario is setup. — Bob Ross

True. But if you're going to later include, "I believe property X is a property that indicates it has air," then you've made it an essential property to identifying whether it has air. Basically you're saying its not an essential property, but then in your application, it is. You can claim its a non-essential property within the induction, but then in your application you must show it is. If it was non-essential, then it would have nothing to do with your induction of whether the box has air or not. Once you believe the design pattern does, its now essential to the predictive outcome of the identity despite any belief otherwise.

I can say the designs are not essential properties of the identity of a BWA and BWOA while holding that the designs, given the inductive evidence and super low probability given of pulling BWOA, are relevant to inferring (guessing) what it is (even though it isn’t an essential property of it). — Bob Ross

Introducing different words does not change the outcome. "infer" is "a guess" which is "an induction". So we're right back to the hierarchy again. If you include the "non-essential" property as essential for your induction to the outcome of the box, then it is no longer non-essential to your belief in the outcome of the box's air or not air identity. Again, it does not matter if its non-essential in your original probability identification. You've made it essential in your new one.

Let me clarify something though: what is essential to the inductive inference is not the same thing as what is essential to the identity of a thing. I think you may be conflating those two here. — Bob Ross

It is correct that the essential properties of a known identity, and the essential property of an induction about that identity are not the same. I've said that already by noting that we can hold the original probability while considering this new pattern. Regardless of the pattern of design, we still know that any box has a 51/49 probability in regards to its air. But if we later consider the design in believing whether the box will have air or not, its now essential in that belief. You don't get to decide what's essential or non-essential in application. In application, the design is now essential in your belief on whether it holds air or not. You can deny it, but you haven't proven it yet.

Non essential properties never weigh in or outweigh the probability of something occurring. If they do, they are now essential to that probability

Correct. You keep focusing too much on the probability. The idea is that there is a probability which is calculated independently of the designs, but it is a miniscule difference. — Bob Ross

And the miniscule difference is irrelevant. Its still 1% more rational. Or .0005% more rational. If X > Y, and no other considerations are made, its always more rational to choose X. It does not matter how small the difference is. Your original claim is that the hierarchy breaks. I'm not seeing how there being a miniscule differences breaks the logic of the hierarchy. That's a personal reason to not want to choose the more rational induction. That's not an argument for saying the probability is less rational.

I feel we're just repeating ourselves on this point. You know I'm very open to conceding whenever I see the logic, but in this case, I do not see a logical point that breaks the hierarchy. If you're going to use a property as a basis for an induction, its essential to the reasoning behind the belief. If you removed the design of X and Y from your second inference, do you have a second inference anymore? No, that inference is based on there being a X and Y design. If you can't remove the property and still hold the induction Bob, its essential to the induction. Unless a new point is made, I don't really see anything to add to this at this point.

I want to get to another point which you made which I think is valid and worth discussing over instead.

There’s no probability afforded to you of whether has a design X or Y. So correct. But that was never the claim I was making. The billion experiences of X → BWA and Y → BWOA is inductive evidence: it doesn’t give you a probability and that is the whole point. — Bob Ross

So here, you are correct. A probability is based off of our knowledge of limits. I've been using it in the generic sense, but depending on the context, the repeated occurrence of X and Y is not one. Here, we do not know the actual limit. You may not remember from the original paper, but I noted that the hierarchy is a basic identifier of inductions that almost certainly could be broken down further.

What we're faced with here is something that is a repeated possibility pattern. Lets say there's a mole in a hole. It comes out of the hole every other day for four days. Does that mean it will do so for the next four? The next forty? We don't know, its only an induction. But the longer the pattern repeats, the more cogent it seems to believe the pattern will continue.

We hold patterns as more persuasive than mere possibilities. If I only observed the mole for two days, I would see it is possible that the mole comes out of the hole, and also possible that it does not for the day. But that's not a probability. Its not a 50% chance that the mole emerges. Its a pattern. Its an observed repetition of possibilities. In other words, its something we applicably know of again and again. Applicably knowing a thing 20 times seems more solid to cogent to believe in it happening again opposed to only seeing its possible one time.

Patterns are a more detailed identity of a cogent argument than possibility alone, yet still less cogent than probabilities. Lets view our cards as an example. We know a jack has a 4/52 chance of randomly being drawn if there is no pattern in how the cards are shuffled. This is the only logical solution. Even if we observe a pattern within the draws, for example, over 10 decks our chance of pulling a jack is 10/52, we still haven't broken the odds if we still applicably know the card shuffling is random. Its like flipping a coin and getting heads 10 times in a row. Its a pattern of success, but not more cogent than the known probability.

The sun rising in the East and setting in the West is not a probability, its a pattern. An extremely long pattern that has remained unbroken. If we consider the box design in relation to whether its an indicator to its identity being an air box or not, this is also a pattern. But a pattern is not more rational than a probability due to the fact that a probability has more applicably known quantities like limitations. That being said, in absence of their being a probability, a pattern is the most cogent inference.

To clarify, I am saying that the odds of any box being without are is 51% and the only thing that matters to the identity of the box is that it (1) is a box and (2) has or does not have air in it. — Bob Ross

Here is where you also have to clarify. Does the design of X or Y have anything to do with the probability? For example, if the ration of X airs to Y airs was 3/4, then X and Y are essential properties to the probability. Both of these can co-exist.

So on one hand we could say overall, there's a 51% chance of no airs vs airs, not considering X or Y. Then we can drill down further, make X and Y a part of our observations, and note that X has a 75% chance of being no air, while Y has a 25% chance of being air. These are two different probabilities, and we could even math them together for an overall probability if we wanted to.

Once you start including an attribute in your probability, it is now essential to that probability. While you are considering X and Y, you're not considering the how heavy they are right? Anything you don't include in the probability is non-essential. Since you don't care about the weight of each box, it doesn't matter. Once you notice X and Y designs, and start actively noting, "Hey, X's so far have all been with air," then you've created a new probability, and X is essential to that probability.

No they don’t. The probability of one having design X or Y is completely unknown to you. The probability of picking a BWOA or BWA is irrelevant to the probability of it having a particular design. — Bob Ross

If it is known information that the X or Y is irrelevant to the design, then you cannot make a probability based off of it when referring to the boxes in general. If it is unknown whether the X or Y is relevant to the air inside of the box, then you could start to note a probability that is again, separate from the box disregarding the design.

I think the part of confusion Bob is you keep making non-essential properties essential to an induction, but think because its non-essential in another induction, its non-essential in your new induction. That's simply not the case. Once you start including the X or Y as a consideration, it is now an essential consideration for your new induction. That's your contradiction.

If you flip a coin ten times and it comes up heads ten times, does the non-essential property of you being in your living room change the odds of the coin's outcome? Of course not

That’s disanalogous: I am not saying that non-essential properties always weigh in or outweigh the probability of something occuring. — Bob Ross

Its completely analogous. Non essential properties never weigh in or outweigh the probability of something occurring. If they do, they are now essential to that probability. That's why the living room is non-essential to the probability.

Also, you being in your living room wouldn’t be a non-essential property because it isn’t a property of the probability. Is an unessential reason or factor: not a property. — Bob Ross

A reason or a factor is a property of something. If you wish to interchange it, its fine. The point still stands.

I am saying it is less rational to go with the 1% chance or 0.00000001% chance that it is a BWOA as opposed to a BWA in this specific scenario. — Bob Ross

Only if you consider the X, Y design of the box. In which case, it is now an essential property of your induction, and you've made the separate probability as I noted earlier.

Now lets include some non-essential properties. What they are is irrelevant. Lets call them properties X and Y.

They are not irrelevant: they are irrelevant to the identity of the thing. That is not the same thing as them being irrelevant flat out. — Bob Ross

It is not provably possible under your terms that a BWA could have a design of Y because you haven’t experienced it before. Just to clarify. — Bob Ross

Ok, I think we've narrowed down the point of contention. I think we're seeing two different contexts here. When you say, "The odds of any box being without air are 51%, and the only thing that matters to the identify of the box, is that its a box," then the non-essential properties of the box do not matter to the probability. If X and Y are non-essential, they don't matter to the probability then. I think that's a straight forward conclusion right?

Your context doesn't quite seem to fit this though, and that's what I'm trying to piece together here. Are you saying that the probability of 51% is only a guess? Or that we only think that the design of the box is irrelevant? In other words, is our 51% open to change, and do we not know if it depends on X or Y?

This is where I'm having trouble seeing your argument. You may have a good argument, but I'm just not understanding it yet. From my point, if X and Y are unessential to the probability, then they are unessential to the probability. Any results from experience, if we know the probability is correct, would not change the probability. Therefore no matter if we simply pulled 99/1 airs to no airs, that doesn't change the probability. The outcome of the probability does not change the probability.

I don't consider confirmation bias irrational by the way, I think that's a bit harsh. Its simply less rational then relying on knowledge we know. If we know the odds, its more rational to play the odds over the long term then not right? Even if we're currently beating the odds, it won't last over long term if the odds are correct.

Back to your point where I feel you changed the context a bit. You noted that it wasn't possible for you to have experienced a Box with Y that did not have air. I had assumed you had. That's true, you don't know if its possible for you to pull that box. Despite the odds, you never have. And yet you know its probable that you will, and its only incredible luck that you haven't so far. If the odds for the air or not air do not depend on X or Y, then each X and Y has a respective 49/51 split as well. This is just a logical fact. Results defying the odds do not negate the odds if the odds are known.

Now you have really good reasons to believe that when you see a box presented to you with design X, although designs aren’t essential properties, that it is a BWA. — Bob Ross

No, you don't. Because it is more rational to stick with the odds that you do then the possibilities that you don't. If you flip a coin ten times and it comes up heads ten times, does the non-essential property of you being in your living room change the odds of the coin's outcome? Of course not. If you start saying, "Every time I flip a coin in the living room, it changes the odds to where I always flip heads," then the living room is no longer a non-essential property to the coin flip, but has now become, in your head, an essential property of the coin flip.

Same as if after you count all the X and Y boxes that have ever been made, and sure enough, it turns out that all X's are airs, while all Y's are not airs. The odds didn't change, that's just one extremely unlikely outcome out of many possible outcomes. At that point since you know all of the boxes, and you've noted something special with the property of X and Y with the box, you could say that all boxes with X have air, while all boxes with Y's don't, and applicably know this. It just so happens that there are 49 billion X's, and 51 billion Y's.

In all of this, you have not shown a case in which it is more rational to not go with the odds beyond confirmation bias. But feel free to try again, as perhaps I'm missing something that you're seeing.

Secondly, if you would like to call what I just clarified as irrational, then you would have to say all inductions and abductions are irrational because that is how they work. Take Hume’s problem of induction, which you mentioned in your OP: you would have to say it is equally irrational to hold that the future will resemble the past. But this is nonsense: it isn’t irrational to induce or abduce: it can be quite rational. — Bob Ross

No, I don't. I simply rely again on the hierarchy of inductions, which rests on applicable knowledge as noted. All inductions ARE inductions, but it simply notes which inductions are more rational to believe in when compared to each other. It is more rational to believe that known rules and laws will remain as they are until we first experience them breaking. Then we will know its possible for a rule or law to break. The sun has always risen in the East and set in the West. It is in induction to believe it will do so tomorrow, but it is the only possible outcome which has ever happened. As such, it is more rational that we believe the possibility over the plausibility that it will rise in the West and set in the East.
My counter to you is to note that the hierarchy holds, so it does not destroy it.

You are basically hedging your bets on a minuscule 1% difference and expecting, given the contextual background knowledge you would have, that this next one will be the only one out of a billion and out of every single one that you have seen that will break the correlation. — Bob Ross

This is isn't hedging a bet. This is simply taking the most rational induction I know of, a probability, and holding it over my confirmation bias of the results I've obtained. My desire has nothing to do with what is more rational. However, being less rational could be less stressful for me right? Perhaps the issue you're really holding here is that you want to make decisions that are less rational sometimes. That's fine. There can be a host of reasons to be less rational in one's inductions. Perhaps you're just tired of examining the boxes and want to get through them faster. Perhaps the penalty for guessing wrong is irrelevant. What you really seem to be saying is that the 1% doesn't matter to you. Which is fine. But it is still 1% more likely, and therefore the more rational choice.

Hi Bob, I think a little too much is being thrown around by both of us, so I'm going to narrow the scope to your exact example.

1. Probability is 51% that the box does not have air.

To be clear, this means that any box given has a 51% change that it does not have air in it. So regardless of box design, its a 51% chance that it does not have air.

I'm going to simplify the others.

The only essential property for a box is that it is a six sided box. If it has air, its a box with air. If it doesn't, its a box without air. Anything else is non-essential.

We'll call call a box with air a BWA, and a box without air a BWOA because I'm tired of typing those phrases. :)

Any box you pick has a 49% chance of being a BWA, while it has a 51% chance of being a BWOA.

Now lets include some non-essential properties. What they are is irrelevant. Lets call them properties X and Y.

So I can have a BWA with a X, and a BWA with a Y. Does this change the probability of the BWA being picked? No. Its still a 49% chance. What about a BWOA with a X and a BWOA with a Y? No, still a 51% chance of being picked. This is because we know that X and Y are non-essential the the probability.

Lets say that I pull any number of boxes. It turns out that I only pull BWAs with X's and WBOAs with Y's. I've never pulled a BWA with a Y or a BWOA with a X, but its still within the odds that I can.

Is is possible that I could? Of course. But does that change the probability? No, non-essential properties don't affect the probability. If they did, they would be essential properties of the probability. Therefore it is still more rational to assume over the course of picking more boxes that I should always guess that I'll pull a BWOA, whether that's a X or a Y.

If you believe that because every BWA you've pulled so far is a X, therefore its more reasonable that a box with a X is going to be a BWA, that's not rational, its just confirmation bias. Your biased results don't make something more or less cogent. It is always more rational to believe that the box will be a BWOA whether its an X or a Y.

Confirmation bias isn't new either. https://www.verywellmind.com/what-is-a-confirmation-bias-2795024#:~:text=For%20example%2C%20imagine%20that%20a,supports%20what%20they%20already%20believe . Its an easy trap for all of us to fall into.

With that simplified, does that answer your question?

But maybe you're right and there will be a breakthrough soon. Then you can resurrect this and laugh at me, but I don't think that's going to happen. — RogueAI

No, I wouldn't laugh at you RogueAI. Just want to clarify this isn't a ego thing or jeering in any way. Please continue to have a fascination for alternatives than the status quo!

That's not the only viable problem. How does consciousness arise from matter? Why is consciousness present at all? Why are only certain arrangements of matter conscious?

If these questions are still unanswered after 1,000 years, no will believe in materialism. Why would they? It will have failed to answer some of the most basic questions. — RogueAI

Those are easy problems, not hard problems. Easy and hard do not denote their difficulty in finding a solution, but their difficulty in finding a path to a solution at all. The hard problem I noted has no pathway to a solution. Your questions have clear pathways of investigation and testability. Considering the amount of progress we've made in just the last 30 years, there seems to be no reason to alter course for the next 30, let alone 1000.

Something else to think about, but your questions can equally be applied to almost any other state of matter. How does water arise from H20? Why is water a possible existence at all? Why are only certain arrangements of atoms water while others are not? We know that water is made out of molecules, and consciousness comes from the brain, but there are still deeper questions that we continue to look into.

Still a lot to discover!

If the Hard Problem is still around 1,000 years from now, it will be devastating for materialism/physicalism. — RogueAI

Not at all. The only viable version of the hard problem is it stands today is that we cannot know what another subject is experiencing from that subjects viewpoint. We could take two subjects and stimulate identical brain states to where they both said, "I see a green tree." We could never independently verify what that green tree looked like specifically to subject 1 or 2. No one can. To my mind, there's no theory that ever could either. This in no way invalidates the fact that brain causes the mind.

If these are truly accidental properties, then they are not in consideration

Why would resemblance and inductive association to the accidental properties in relation to the essential thing not be a consideration? — Bob Ross

Because they are accidental. You're just not properly identifying the situation.

Lets simplify this. Why are the boxes accidental? Lets not just say they are. Lets prove they are. You know that the manufacturer does not care about whether X or Y design has air or not. It is known that they randomly switch between box designs for air and not air, and it turns out the box design X and Y have exactly 50% change of having air or not air.

Thus whether the box is design X or Y is accidental to whether it has air inside. This is a proven accidental property.

Now, lets say that I receive a billion boxes of X, and a billion boxes of Y. low and behold, it turns out all the X's have air, while all the Y's don't. Its an incredibly improbable scenario, but it can be independently verified that yes, its completely a 50/50 chance that either box has air or not.

It doesn't matter the result of the odds, they don't change the odds. Remember that a probability is based off of knowledge, not other inductions.

Here is another way the properties can be accidental. Lets say that X always has air, and Y does not. X is red, and Y is green. You are color blind and can't tell the difference. Within your context, whether its box Y or X is irrelevant to you. It is outside of your distinctive knowledge to know there is a color difference, and outside of your applicable context to tell the colors apart.

Lets take your accidental property that no longer remains accidental.

I am saying that, in this hypothetical consideration, the designs are accidental: it isn’t a question of whether people are implicitly claiming them as essential properties (in this scenario). — Bob Ross

The designs are accidental, not an accidental property then. If you have no foreknowledge of whether box X or Y should or should not have air, then you have not yet decided whether X or Y design are essential or accidental to the identity.

Also, we have to clarify what we're referring to here. If we're referring to the core identity of the box itself as a particular type of measuring tool where air doesn't matter, X and Y are accidental. If we're referring to the probability of whether a X or Y box has air or not, then the box design is no longer accidental to our point!

Taken another way, a type of dog can be green or blue. Whether its blue or green is irrelevant to knowing the identification of the dog. However, you later discover that 74% of these dogs are green, while 25% are blue, and 1% could be any other color. When you are asking, "Is this dog that I cannot see behind a screen green or blue," at that point the probability of the color becomes an essential set or properties in knowing the outcome. At that point, because the point is directly about the color, it is pertinent to the guess at hand. These odds also do not retroactively make the color a primary attribute in identifying this type of dog? No.

To sum up an accidental property - A property which is completely irrelevant to one's assertation or denial of the identity. Meaning that you cannot make an accidental identity suddenly be relevant to the assertation or denial of the identity. As soon as it is relevant, it is no longer accidental.

In the scenario, as I hold the possibility is more cogent than the probability, — Bob Ross

You can decide that you would rather explore the possibility than the probability, but you did not prove that a possibility is more cogent than a probability. Again, all the examples are going to boil down to needing to prove that what one is examining is a known probability, possibility, or plausibility. All that's been done so far is a misunderstanding of the terms.

To see if you understand, take your example again and try breaking it down into clear and provable accidental or primary properties for the context. Second, clearly demonstrate what is a possibility, probability, and plausibility. Only after that careful dismantling, try to prove that you can make a plausibility more cogent than a possibility.

OK, so all the neuroscience that's been done is consistent with an idealistic reality. Why should I then believe that the prima facie neural causation model that you champion is actual causation? — RogueAI

Some of neuroscience is almost certainly idealistic, in which case idealistic philosophy has free reign. But the fact that the mind comes from the brain is not idealistic, it is decades of research and experiments that continue to confirm this as a fact. From brain surgery, anesthesia, brain damage research, psychadelics, and psychiatric medicine there are a host of things to choose from. If the brain did not cause the mind, then all of these fields which rely on this fact, would have catastrophic failure rates and be no more than charlatans.

You can even test it on yourself. Go get drunk tonight and see how it affects your mind. That is due to the alcohol impacting your brain. Its an extremely simple test to confirm for yourself while having a little fun.

I would if the model you describe could actually explain how things are conscious and why consciousness is present at all, but materialism/physicalism/naturalism has utterly failed to solve the mind-body problem. — RogueAI

If you are talking about certain details of consciousness, of course we don't understand everything yet. For example, we'll never know what its like to exist as a brain from the subjective viewpoint of the brain. That's outside of our measurement. But we can most certainly impact consciousness by manipulating the brain. Anesthesia knocks you unconscious for surgerys. You think that's all just a happy accident? That's all based on the fact that brain affects the mind, and anesthesia affects the brain in a particular manner.

Don't confuse not fully mapping out the brain with being unable to make certain conclusions about the brain. We're trying to reverse engineer the brain's specifics, but we have overall conclusions about how it works that have continually held up to tests and critiques. If you reversed engineered a car, you might not understand how magnetism works, but you could understand the parts of the car and how they interact. The car does not run if the engine is not active, despite not knowing all the details on how gas combustion causes the engine to run.

How long are going to put up with that failure before we start to explore new theories? What if the mind-body problem is still around 1,000 years from now? At what point do you start to question your metaphysical assumptions? — RogueAI

You misunderstand. You can always question and wonder at alternatives. I can sit and ponder that all of physics is somehow a big misunderstanding. I can have a lot of fun coming up with other theories. But those are all suppositions, untested, and non-factual. None of those override facts themselves. If I said my crazy physics alternative fixed everything with physics, but I could not adequately demonstrate this, I would be a fraud.

So have fun with idealism. Say, "What if...?" Explore and think on alternatives. But until there is something factually substantial behind those musings, it is entirely inappropriate to say they counter known facts.

I can't prove it's all a dream. I'm simply asking you if all the science that's been done would necessarily be any different if all this was a dream. Would it? — RogueAI

I don't know. You're asking about a fictional reality. We can't make judgements about fictional realities, because they're fictional. Can we create a fictional reality where we decide science is different? Sure. Can we create a fictional reality where we decide science is the same? Sure. Its fiction, so there are no limits on what we can do.

That's an appeal to authority, not an argument.
— Philosophim

That's a copout. We cite books and philosophers in discussions here constantly. It's not a fallacy in informal discussions if the authority is a valid one. — RogueAI

No, citing a book without any specific arguments from the book is an appeal to authority. If an argument from the book had been presented to counter my point, that would have been fine.

Of course they entail what they entail. All you have to do is show that brain death and a lack of mind are not a correlate. All you have to do is demonstrate how when neuroscientists analyze the brain, they can predict accurately what a person will think or say next up to 10 seconds before they say it. If my points are so easy to counter, then you should be able to easily give a counter to them.
— Philosophim

Would any of that be different if this were all a dream? — RogueAI

Can you prove that this is all a dream? That's like saying "Would it all be different if we were all made out of cotton candy?" Its a fun thing to explore, but without providing an argument that we are in fact, made out of cotton candy, its not an argument worth considering in a discussion of facts. It is not a correlation or supposition that the mind comes from the brain. It is a scientific fact. Not that a fact cannot be overturned, or we can't suppose there's more out there than we currently know. If you're going to say a fact is wrong, you need to prove it.

Every part of the design is an accidental property except for it being a box and having air (as defined above). You have never experienced a design X which was not a box-with-air. — Bob Ross

If these are truly accidental properties, then they are not in consideration. As a reminder of an accidental property, these are properties that are variable to the essential. So a "tree without branches" would have no bearing on its identity as a tree. So we can eliminate the variables X and Y from our consideration.

As it is irrelevant whether the design matches X or Y, if I am given a box and I know that probability is 51/49%, then the more reasonable guess is to guess that the box I am given is the 51% chance that it does not have air.

The problem is that in your example, it is unlikely someone would consider box X to be an accidental property. We can't just say its accidental, it has to match accurately to the definition of an accidental property. Implicitly, what most people would think in this context is, "Box X is designed to have air, Box Y is designed not to have air." These would become essential properties for most people in their context of encountering billions of each kind and having the same outcome in regards to air. If its truly accidental, then the person would not even consider Box X or Box Y as being associated with having air, because it doesn't matter.

You don't have to have an example at all to question my conclusions Bob, its like an equation. The examples so far are doing nothing to counter the underlying claims about essential and non-essential properties, they're really examples in which you need to correctly identify if a property is essential or non-essential based on the person's context. Once that identity is complete, everything falls into place.

Are the countless neuroscience discoveries, medicine, psychiatrics, etc. all just correlations? Of course not.
— Philosophim

But they don't entail what you say they entail. Have you ever encountered the book The Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience, by Hacker and Bennett? — Wayfarer

Of course they entail what they entail. All you have to do is show that brain death and a lack of mind are not a correlate. All you have to do is demonstrate how when neuroscientists analyze the brain, they can predict accurately what a person will think or say next up to 10 seconds before they say it. If my points are so easy to counter, then you should be able to easily give a counter to them. Citing a book vaguely does nothing. That's an appeal to authority, not an argument.

From my perspective, everything you write on the forum comprises wholly and solely what Philosophim thinks is obvious, accompanied by a strong sense of indignation that someone else can question what, to you, are obvious facts. This is your response to everything I address to you. — Wayfarer

And yet if they were not obvious facts, you would be able to counter them easily wouldn't you? Instead you retreat and answer with things like:

Have you ever written a term paper in philosophy? Ever actually studied it? Because I can see no indication of that. — Wayfarer

This is someone who is insecure about their own intelligence. Don't be Wayfarer. You're a smart person. But a smart person should not be so easily caught up in their own ego. Its a poison trap of smart people to think that "If I just read a bunch of papers and cite them, people will think I'm smart." You have knowledge, but you seem unable to critically think about that knowledge when its challenged from a new perspective. Thus you retreat. I call this out so that you'll attempt to improve Wayfarer instead of getting haughty and making poor appeals to authority.

Here's the truth. It doesn't matter what the background of someone is in philosophy. It matters if you can think logically, critically, and honestly. You attempting to put up barriers when you're countered is unbecoming. If you must know, am I formally educated? Yes. Am I intelligent? Objectively yes. I do not post my background as a "flex" because I don't want people to just agree with me for the wrong reason. The arguments I give should stand on their own, as should yours. Eliminating such inconsequential considerations such as "status" lets us get right to the arguments instead of our egos.

But while there may be correlations between mental states and brain states, this doesn't necessarily imply a strict identity between them. — Wayfarer

You know this is a completely false statement. You can't just claim they are correlations, you have to prove it. To prove a correlation, you need to remove the brain and still have a mind. Does anyone with brain death have a mind? Are the countless neuroscience discoveries, medicine, psychiatrics, etc. all just correlations? Of course not. You're too well versed to make a claim like that.

This is a rationalization. Despite knowing this isn't true, you believe this regardless. Why? What do you gain out of it Wayfarer? That's the only reason why people hold things they know are false to be true. Do you do it because you fear you'll lose something? Maybe I can help you hold onto what you want without you having to hold to this false notion. We're in philosophy. The point is to be razor sharp with are arguments and suppositions as we cut down our rationalizations and false beliefs.

Logical propositions and their truth values are abstract entities that exist independently of any specific physical realization, such as brain states. — Wayfarer

No, they aren't. There always has to be something to process those logical proposition and truth values. It doesn't exist in a vacuum. If there is nothing, there is no logic Wayfarer. We are the brains abstracting these identities. No brains, no abstract identity of logic. Apart from brains, does such logic just float out there? Where is it if it is not in the brains of logically capable thinking beings?

I could choose to represent it and any number of different propositions in different symbolic systems and different media, whilst still preserving the logic. — Wayfarer

And what is doing this thinking? Your brain.

You seem to take the argument like this: "My brain's physical capabilities let me think of abstracts and logic and rationality. Therefore such things exist apart from the physical capabilities that my brain produces. Its a contradiction Wayfarer. Go get drunk and watch logic disappear. Look at a brain damaged individual and see how they process.

I think consideration of the role of networks of neurons, and disregarding the molecular details on which the neurons supervene, is an appropriate level of looking at things for the purpose of this discussion
— wonderer1

It might be, were this a computer science or neuroscience forum. — Wayfarer

Here you are also mistaken. The best philosophers of history were often times mathematicians and scientists as well. Philosophy has to discuss the material that we know of today, or it is an exercise in futility. You cannot discuss the philosophy of mind without neuroscience. That is a person who is in the dark ages and will be left behind. Why isn't neuroscience looking to arguments such as your Wayfarer? Because they offer nothing. They're wrong. Its not that neuroscience is full of itself and can't comprehend what you're saying. They do. And its so off base as to be brushed aside without a second thought.

I've said this before, and I'll say it again. Poor philosophy wonders at what could be. Great philosophy wonders at what is, and attempts to solve it. But we have to address what we know, not ignore it for our ideology.

Good post Wayfarer, the time and detail that went into this is appreciated.

I'm ok with point 1 at the moment, so lets go into the proposed contradiction.

As a matter of definition physicalists claim that all events must have physical causes, and that therefore human thoughts can ultimately be explained in terms of material causes or physical events (such as neurochemical events in the brain) that are nonrational. In Lewis' terms, this would entail that our beliefs are a result of a physical chain of causes, not held as a result of insight into a ground-consequence relationship. — Wayfarer

A process of reasoning (P therefore Q) is rational only if the reasoner sees that Q follows from P, and accepts Q on that basis. Thus, reasoning is veridical only if it involves a specific kind of causality, namely, rational insight. — Wayfarer

If this is the case, how is it not rational to conclude that the physical brain causes the mind? Its not an irrational argument. In simple terms, if brain state = X, then mind state = Y is the claim right? If this can be confirmed through testing, then I would say this is a completely rational argument. If you lacked rational insight, then yes, you would not see it as rational. But you have rational insight. How is this not rational then?

Are you saying that underlying physical process don't process the term rationality like we do in our mind? Because that's not what naturalism is stating. Its perfectly rational to observe that gravity pulls something down at a steady acceleration. Are we to say that gravity is irrational because it doesn't realize or think that it should accelerate at a steady pace? Of course not. That's not a counter of naturalism, that's just a misapplication of the term "rational".

I wanted to get your take on this: am I misunderstanding or misremembering the view here? By point here is that, upon further reflection, it is insufficient to use the inductive hierarchy you have proposed because they do not supersede each other absolutely in the manner you have proposed. The context and circumstances matter — Bob Ross

Yes, you are misremembering, but I believe its because I don't go into significant detail about context here. Upon re-evaluating the original paper, I found I could pare down explorations into context to lessen the size of the paper which seemed to be intimidating to people.

Context and circumstances matter greatly. These determine both what distinctive and applicable knowledge you have available to you. So lets break down your examples one by one.

First case: Air box, no air box. No probability, both are possible. No other context.

Hierarchy results: Both are possible. Therefore one is as likely as the other.

Second case: Air box most probable on earth, no air box most probable on moon.

Hierarchy results: While both are possible, its more probable for an air box to be on Earth and a no air box to be on the moon.

Third case: Air box, no air box. It is known that air boxes look like X, it is known that non-air boxes look like Y. You are provided a box that looks like Y. Is it an air or non-air box?

Hierarchy results: Depends on how you've personally defined non-air boxes. If the look and feel is an essential property for you, then you know its a non-air box. In fact if you later found out it had air, you could easily say "Its a defective non-air box". If of course the look and feel are irrelevant, and the only thing that matters is that it does, or does not have air in it, then you could say its probably an air box. Remember, your distinctive knowledge is created at your particular context. So based on how you structure that context, it would be probability or possibility comparison.

Fourth case: Chains of sub-knowledge and beliefs about whether its an air box or not.

Hierarchy results: Find the chains of reasoning, and compare them through the children up to the parent.

The flaw is here:

let’s prove a plausibility is more cogent than a possibility and probability under certain conditions. — Bob Ross

A plausibility is never more cogent then a possibility due to the logic and reasoning involved. You have to break the actual logic and reasoning behind each induction. Making a complex example without carefully and correctly identifying the chain of reasoning, and when it relies on sub-inductions, is not a counter.

First, if you've never experienced a "Box without air", then its not a probability. You simply know that people make boxes with air, and you don't yet know that people make boxes without air. The number of times this has been experienced is irrelevant.

Now lets shorten your example down to a context in which you think of a plausibility that a box could be made without air. You're comparing applicable knowledge to a plausibility. Remove the wording that notes it is a box without air. Its more reasonable to assume its a box with air.

Now lets add in the writing. Depending on context, this is a plausible truth, or a possible truth. Is it possible that when someone labels a box that it does not contain air, that it might not contain air? Or is it only plausible in your world? This is also inconsequential to your point. The real question is, once you've correctly established whether its knowledge or a type of induction, then you compare.

Perhaps an underlying point to your critique is, "Do I always have to choose the most cogent answer and not attempt to explore lesser cogent inductions?" No. The cogency is about making the most efficient and rational choice when presented with two alternatives. But, one may wish to be inefficient because they believe there is a greater payoff in the long run.

For example, its highly unlikely you will ever win the lottery. But its possible. You may be willing to forgo your time and money to buy a lottery ticket, even if you never win. In general its not the most rational or efficient use of your money, but if you DO win, it will be. Same with plausibilities. Perhaps there is a plausible challenge to something you know. It might take a week to fully explore that plausiblity to see if it is correct or not. Is that worth your time and energy? If not, it is perfectly rational and efficient to choose not to explore it. But of course, if the plausibility were correct, it very well might lead to knew knowledge which saves you two weeks of time and energy down the road. Is it worth it? That's for you to decide.