"The thing is, we both reference the same color, and don't have a debate as to whether it is labeled "red"

Again - I agree with you. But this go against Wittgenstein's notion that there is NO WAY of knowing what colour different minds are seeing. — GLEN willows

You don't need Wittgenstein, any first year philosophy student knows this! If you read again, I'm agreeing with you to a point. We can know certain things like whether a person consistently sees a wavelength as a certain color. Do you see red for what I call blue? Very possibly. Do you see a new and different color every time I see what I call blue? No.

Finally, there's likely a limit to the color spectrum as well. A bright color is likely not seen as a dark color. So if I saw a light blue, you might see red, but it would also be a light red.

The standard philosophical agreement is that it's impossible to say that the colour red that I see isn't the colour blue to you. Yet doesn't this clash with the descriptors we use for different colours? — GLEN willows

There is not necessarily a clash here. We know the wavelength of light is how colors are seen. We know the eye takes in colors and the brain interprets them. So there is some objective measurable qualities.

Further, most people seem to internally experience the wavelengths consistently. So lets say for example that when I saw what you consider red, I would see it as what you would consider blue. The thing is, we both reference the same color, and don't have a debate as to whether it is labeled "red". Meaning we're consistently seeing our same internal color for the same wavelength, and can both apply the external label of "red" to it.

Perhaps this is why we have different "favorite colors". Who knows, maybe we all like similar colors internally, and its the external names that differ. As long as we can both identify a color as "red", it doesn't matter if we internally see it as a different color, like blue or green. When there is an issue, we usually call this "color blindness". Color blind people internally see colors in such a way as to not distinctively see certain wavelengths like the rest of the population. Red and green for example can blend internally. But for the rest of us, as long as we consistently see X wavelength a particular way, and can tell the difference between the different wavelengths, how we internally see colors isn't all that important to function in society without disruption.

1. Dreams – Almost everyone, if not all, claims that they dream. We accept this claim without requiring proof. We use our own experience of dreaming to validate the other person’s claim of dream. — L'éléphant

How is this not proof? If I stated, "When I sleep, I have experiences", then if I others say, "Oh yeah, I have that too", that's proof/evidence. If not one but one person in the world had experiences when they slept, then I think you would be right. Even then, brains have been scanned during sleep, and a lot of activity is found in there.

To be fair to your argument, perhaps what you meant was more along the lines of "What we specifically dreamed of". To narrow this down further to keep it simple, "How do you know that the color red you see, is the same hue and look as what someone else sees when they also see "red"? This we currently have no proof for, and indeed, color blindness suggests it is very possible that the colors your mind visualizes for you, are not necessarily the same as another person's.

2. Pain – We do not have proof of pain except our own complaint and expression of pain. Doctors have to ask where it hurts because there isn’t a proof that they could point to. — L'éléphant

We do actually. https://www.mydr.com.au/pain-and-how-you-sense-it/#:~:text=When%20we%20feel%20pain%2C%20such,and%20the%20pain%20is%20perceived.
Further, we have medication that eases pain. If we didn't have evidence or proof of pain, then pain medication would be no better than a placebo.

Perhaps again, we don't have proof of your personal experience of what pain feels like. But that doesn't negate the proof that pain exists in people, and has very real physical impact on the brain and body.

3. Fear –It’s a very subjective feeling that has side effects such as sweating, fast heart-beat, sweaty palms, but fear cannot be proven by pointing to these outward signs because these signs can also be present for reasons other than fear. — L'éléphant

What you might be thinking is that some of those side affects can indicate other things. But taken together, including an analysis of hormones circulating throughout the body, we can positively identify fear. Can I know what the personal, conscious experience of feeling fear is like in another body besides myself? No, I can give you that.

4. Floaters—these are what you see in front of you when you experience “floaters” small dark shapes that float across your vision. There is no proof of their existence except for what you report to other people. — L'éléphant

https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/eye-floaters/symptoms-causes/syc-20372346#:~:text=Eye%20floaters%20are%20spots%20in,to%20look%20at%20them%20directly . We know what these are. Can science currently pinpoint where the floater exists in your personal vision? No if its based on something like a detatched retina. But people have the experience of floaters, and treatment can assist in removing them. Once again, I think you're conflating the idea that because we can't experience what a person's personal conscious experience is, that we can't know that the experience exists in reality.

It is appealing to define the world in such a way that all definitions and assumptions are valid, because then you feel like you can never be wrong.
— Philosophim
Assumptions are not right just because they’re valid. — noAxioms

No, my point is that just because you make an assumption, it doesn't make them valid or right. If you target the OP by saying, "Well I could have made other assumptions and the argument wouldn't stand", then you are implying that my assumptions are not good enough, and that these others might be better. These are not claims in a vacuum, they are claims that are a counter to my claims. If you think other assumptions are better than the OP's, then you need to show why. If you think that all assumptions are equally valid and logically and factually correct, then I already mentioned that leaves my viewpoint standing.

That sounds hokey. Assumptions are valid or they are not. There’s not much more-or-less to it. You might make an argument about more or less likely to be true. Apparently the flying spaghetti monster is a valid argument, but not likely a true one. — noAxioms

If one assumes that X is true, and one assumes that X is false, only one can hold. If you are holding assumptions contrary to the OP's, then only one of us can be right. Again, if you believe it is perfectly fine for a person to hold X as true and X as false can coexist without a contradiction, that's fine by me.
Also, you did note here,

I’m just saying it isn’t knowledge because there’s an equally valid (and likely more valid) alternative view. — noAxioms

so you have the concept in your head about something "likely more valid".

just because you can propose an alternative definition or assumption, it in no way means its existence challenges or defeats another definition or assumption.
I would say that the existence of a valid alternate view very much poses a challenge to what might otherwise be an unchallenged view. — noAxioms

And here you agree with me. To challenge, it must contradict the other. My point has been that my "assumptions" are solid, well known, and generally accepted. Your assumptions are currently not. Meaning you need to raise the bar by showing why your claims, which challenge mine, are superior. You assume they are valid and right, but you must demonstrate they are valid and right.

If not, mine stand. If you're ok with mine standing, then there is no issue.

You need to re-read the OP. The entire OP is about relational existence.
Funny, because the word ‘relation’ or ‘relative’ does not appear anywhere in the OP. It seems instead to be about first cause. — noAxioms

We have a different view of definitions here. To me, the entire abstract is about selecting a state, and noting that a prior state could exist for the current state to be. In my view, this is a relative state comparison of causality. Why does state Y exist? Because of a prior state X, or Y has no prior state X and exists without any prior explanation. A state, relative to others in a chain of causality, which has no X to explain it, is labeled a "first cause".

If this does not fit relational to you, please clarify

Sorry, but I only remember one sentence, which was:
If you don't exist, you won't type a reply. — noAxioms

True, my mistake, that was one sentence, not two. Despite this, I made no logical fallacies in concluding you, who has typed a reply, exist. I'm of course using the "street term" as it is assumed so until someone specifically wants to redefine it in a special way. If you are going to type, "I don't exist", that's a contradiction because a non-existent being cannot type, "I don't exist".

If we're to discuss and have a good conversation, its important that you just say, "Ok", on something very basic like this that honestly has little to do with the OP, which is the focus on the discussion. It shows me our debate isn't an ego thing, and isn't going to stray too far from the topic. I won't think any less of you for just conceding this basic point.

… I don't understand how the B series revokes the OP
It wasn’t a comment about the OP, something to which I agreed if you remember. — noAxioms

If you agree with the OP, great. If you don't agree with the OP, please only introduce criticisms that directly deal with the OP. When I am trying to understand your meaning and intentions, I am going to assume your points are to the OP, and not extra asides. Lets minimize what is extra, and only focus on what is necessary for the discussion please.

I think a softer version of Wayfarer's point would be something like: our world is intelligible. We can talk about stuff. — lll

Which is fine, I have no issue with that. My point is matter and energy is able to interplay in such a way as to create a thinking human being. Its incredible honestly. If he wants to think its something else, that's fine. But when I ask for evidence, the honest thing to reply is, "I don't have any, its just a belief of mine," I would accept that. It is when he refuses to answer or divert, which is lying by omission, I see a problem.

Not a paradox at all. I go over this here. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/12098/a-first-cause-is-logically-necessary/p1

Yes, it is logically the case that there is a "first cause" or something that has no reason for its existence, besides the fact that it exists. That doesn't mean everything else can't exist. The problem he doesn't realize is that a self-explained existence's reason for existing, is simply the fact that it exists.

Bob, I admit, this tripped me up at first. I had to think a while on your post, to try to get to what felt like was missing. Maybe I'm generalizing too broadly the difference between distinctive and applicable, and need to narrow down more. Lets see if we can figure this out.

I was never under the impression anything was related to a "will" in your epistemology, albeit I understand the general relation to the principle of noncontradiction. — Bob Ross

Not a worry! Its in the first paragraph of the entire paper which you read one time many months ago at this point.

I think I would need a bit more explication into your idea of "will" to properly address it.

The only reason we have a definition of reality, is that there are some things that go against our will.

Reality is the totality of existence that is in accordance with our will, and contrary to our will.

I think you aren't using "reality" synonymously throughout your post. The first statement seems to contradict the second. You first claim that we only can define "reality" as that which goes against our "will", yet then, in the second, claim that "reality" is both what goes against and what aligns with our "will"--I don't see how these are reconcilable statements — Bob Ross

Certainly, that was poor language on my part. What I meant to convey was the only reason we can have a concept of reality as something separate from ourselves, is because there are things that go against our will. If everything went in accordance to our will, there would be no need for the term "reality". There would just be whatever we willed would happen.

So no, I am not saying reality is what contradicts our will. Just noting that because everything we will does not come to pass, we realize there is something besides our will. No, I define reality as what is. Sometimes "what is" is when our will happens. Sometimes "what is" is when it does not happen.

A "will", in my head, has a motive, which is not implied at all (to me) with "discrete experience" — Bob Ross

A "will" like everything really, is a discrete experience. At a very basic level, I think we would both agree it is an intent of action. I will to wave my hand, and reality does not contradict that will. I will to fly by my mind alone, and reality contradicts this.

I was misunderstanding you: distinctive knowledge is what you are claiming is given because it is simply discrete experience, whereas applicable could be within the mind or the external world — Bob Ross

Yes, this is it. To clarify, distinctive knowledge is the knowledge of the discrete experience itself. Applicable knowledge is when we claim the distinctive knowledge we have applies to something besides its immediate self, and its immediate self is not enough to state with rational certainty that it is not contradicted by reality

"Reason" is simply that ever continuing process of conclusions, which is the bedrock of all derivation. 1 + 1 = 3 (without refurbishing the underlying meaning) is an exposition of "reason", albeit not determined to be "rational". If, in that moment, the subject legitimately concluded 1 + 1 = 3, then thereby "reason" was invoked. — Bob Ross

I believe I understand a bit. In that case, would every living thing reason? At the most fundamental level, an organism must decide whether X is food, or not food. I'm not saying its advanced reason, but reason at its most fundamental?

(Philosophim) "Distinctive knowledge comes about by the realization that what we discretely experience, the act itself, is known."

I think this is false. The act itself is not just known (as in given), it is determined by means of recursive analysis of reason. You and I determined that we discretely experience. — Bob Ross

Correct in a way. When I introduced the idea of discrete experience to you, you had to distinctively know what I meant first. Then, you tried to show it could be contradicted through application. I created the abstract with the conclusion that it could not be contradicted. But if it is ever contradicted in application, while we will still have the distinctive knowledge of "distinctive knowledge", we would applicably know that it was contradicted in its application to reality, not contradicted distinctively.

The line however, is incredibly fine between distinctive, and applicable. More on this later.

And, if I may be so bold, the act of discretely experiencing does not precede reason: it becomes a logical necessity of reason (i.e. reason determines it must be discretely experiencing multiplicity to even determine in the first place--but this is all dependent on reason). — Bob Ross

Agreed based on my understanding of your definition of reason. I think this is semantical however. By being a logical necessity for reason to exist, this is similar to what I meant by, "Before reason can form".

Anything we ever do is concluded, to some degree or another, which utilizes reason, and any conclusion pertaining to reason or discrete experience is application. — Bob Ross

If you mean "conclusion pertaining to application" as "application", yes, I think this fits. Do we need application to distinctively know things? No, distinctive knowledge it what we use to find if we can applicably know it. We can reason using distinctive knowledge to create a set of concepts. But distinctively knowing concepts does not mean we can know them in application.

The only reason this is true is because you have realized that it would be a contradiction to hold that the contents of the thoughts of a mind can suffice pertaining to what the mind deems objects. This is all from reason and, depending on what is considered rationality, rational. — Bob Ross

No disagreement here either. But it is an abstract invention. I have simply shown that to claim I know I do not discretely experience is irrational. That does not mean I could suddenly lose the capability to discretely experience 2 years from now for some time due to something like a disease or death. In such a case, the application that I discretely experience, would be contradicted by reality.

We can define a meaningful distinction between "distinctive" (that which is discrete experience) and "applicable" (that which isn't), — Bob Ross

Almost, but not quite. A discrete experience is anything that is separate from something else in your viewpoint. That is any identity, and essentially every "thing" that you experience. Distinctive knowledge and applicable knowledge are both discrete experiences as is any "thing". It is the type of knowledge that we are discretely experiencing where the difference comes in.

No matter how swift, I conclude that I just imagined an elephant--I am not synonymous with the discrete experience of an elephant (I am the reason). — Bob Ross

Considering you have stated that discrete experience is a logically necessary part of reason, I think this follows. I stated "I am the discrete experiencer," and you have stated, "I am the reasoner". If my understanding of reason is something that every being would have, then I can agree.

We know we discretely experience because it is a deduction that is not contradicted by reality.

Your using reason here. You applied this to then claim we have distinctive knowledge that is not applied, but there was never anything that wasn't applied. In other words, you, by application, determined some concepts to be unapplied: given. That which you determined was given, was not given to you, it was obtained by you via application. Nothing is given to you without reason. — Bob Ross

Yes, I think you have it! But to clarify again, there is a separation between the distinctive obtainment of knowledge, and the applicable obtainment of knowledge. One if the abstract concept and logical rules. The other is the application of those rules to something without contradiction.

However, I've noted that "reason" is an option. It is not a necessary condition of being human.

For me, reason is a necessary condition of being human. Not "rationality", but reason. — Bob Ross

Yes, with your definition as I understand it, I agree. But, I will add again based on your definition that reason at its most fundamental is a necessary condition for any living being, not confined to humanity.

I think we applicably know math. Reason derives what is mathematical and what doesn't abide by it. Solving x = y + 1 for y is application, not distinction. Even the understanding that there's one distinct thing and another one is application (of pon). What exactly is purely distinctive about this? Of course, we can applicably know that there's discrete experience and that we could label discrete experience as "distinctive knowledge", but all that is application. There's never a point at which we rest and just simply know something without application. Is there? — Bob Ross

There is never a point that you applicably know math without application. Distinctive and applicable knowledge are simply subdivisions of "Deductions that do not lead to contradiction by reality. We can applicably know math, and distinctively know math. Keeping it simple, I can distinctively know that 1 is an identity. Then I encounter an identity, and say, "that is 1 identity". But I could just distinctively know that 1+1=2 purely as a set of symbols. If later I see that set of symbols and state, "Ah yes, that is 1+1=2", then I applicably know that math if my claim is not contradicted.

Perhaps a better way to break down the distinction is by what is implied by our discrete experiences. Distinctive is simply knowing we have every logical reason to believe that we are experiencing the discrete experience itself. If however, the discrete experience implies something beyond the act of having the experience itself, this is when application occurs.

Of course, how do we have the knowledge that what we are discretely experiencing, is what we are discretely experiencing? At first, it is because we claim it is a contradiction. So is this an application? Or is this what is needed before one can apply? Essentially, distinctive knowledge is the rational conclusion that what we experience, is what we experience. And we conclude that because logically, any other alternative is inapplicable. It is when we apply this distinctive knowledge to something else, for example "I distinctively know 1 banana +1 banana =2 bananas, and I'm going to apply it to those two bananas over there," you can see this dividing line.

when do I ever not apply anything? — Bob Ross

If I conclude that I discretely experience, it is not by application to something beyond itself. Because it is not a question that it can be contradicted by reality. It is a logical conclusion. And logic on its own, is a set of rules we construct. If we apply it and its not contradicted, then we applicably know it. But that doesn't deny the distinctive knowledge of it before the application. So we are not applying discrete experiences, when we are recognizing that we know we have discrete experiences in themselves. When we are trying to assert more than the experience itself, such as applying the experience to another that we say results in X, we are applying.

A question for you Bob, is can you see this dividing line? Do you think there are better words for it?
Do you think there is a better way to explain it?

My question essentially pertained to when something is considered a "historical fact", considering most historical facts are speculations, when we are simply determining which induction is most cogent. I think you answer it here: seems that you think that it isn't a base concern of the epistemology. I think this is a major concern people will have with it. Everyone is so used to our current scientific, historic, etc institutions with their thresholds of when something is validated that I envision this eroding pretty much society's fundamental of how knowledge works. It isn't an issue that it erodes the fundamentals of "knowledge" hitherto, but not addressing it is. You don't have to address it now if you don't want to, but feel free to if you want. — Bob Ross

People used to think the Earth was the center of the universe. From their perspective, it was understandable. Some people didn't like it when it was pointed out that the Sun was the center. "How could that be possible? Its obvious the Sun circles us!" People's uncomfortableness with something new isn't an argument against proposing something new.

I think the emotional problem you are noting, is that people will be uncomfortable with the idea that many of the things we purport to know are inductions. Given the idea that inductions have been seen as "irrational", I can see this dislike. But what I am trying to show is that certain inductions are more rational than others. Inductions can be a rational tool of the mind when it reaches limitations. I originally had a few pages added to the induction hierarchy demonstrating when each type of induction was actually very invaluable, even irrational inductions. I can go into that, but I feel like I should address these other points first.

Explicitly, what you are stating is, "I believe Jones could have 5 coins in his pocket." But what is the reasoning of "could have" based on? A probability, possibility, speculation, or irrational induction?

The point is that it isn't based off of any of them. And it isn't simply using a different epistemology, it is that your epistemology completely lacks the category. — Bob Ross

I believe it does. What you term the "colloquial" use of possible is what I divided into possible and plausible(speculation as we've been calling it now).

However, I think I may be understanding what you are saying now: potentiality isn't really inducing an affirmation. It is more like "I cannot contradict the idea, therefore it may be possible". — Bob Ross

What I'm claiming is that potentiality is simply an induction without the distinction of the hierarchy. An induction is not inducing affirmation. An induction is always a prediction, and we can never know if a prediction is correct until we apply that prediction. The hierarchy recognizes this, but also recognizes that some inductions are more rational than others. Without the hierarchy, how could you tell which induction is more useful Bob? How can we tell if something has actual potential if there is no subdivision of inductions? Perhaps this will help us resolve the issue of potentiality, and why you believe it to be more useful.

"There's a difference between claiming there is colloquially a possibility that something can occur and that you actually believe that it occurred." -- Bob

Just to ensure the point is clear, both situations exist in the epistemology.

I'm not sure if they both do. You do have "something can occur" in the sense of experienced before, but is "something can occur due to no contradictions" simply a speculation without affirmation? — Bob Ross

Lets really break down what you mean by this sentence. "Something can occur due to no contradictions". I think this lacks clarity, and a lack of clarity is not something we should consider. What type of contradictions is this referencing? Is it referencing contradictions of an abstract logic? Or is it the contradiction of reality against my will?

For example, I can construct a set of abstract rules that work by allowing an object to appear at two places at once. I distinctively know this. In my set of rules of the discrete experiences themselves, there is no contradiction if a thing can be in two places at once. In your terms, this would be potential. In my terms, this would be an abstraction, or a context of distinctive knowledge.

Now, if we apply that set to reality, we find that an object cannot be in two places at once, no matter how much we try. This is a contradiction of the context when applied to reality, but not a contradiction within the context itself. Just because the person cannot prove that two things can exist in one spot, it does not mean their entire system of logic based on two things existing at once suddenly had contradictions within it. If his assumption was true, the logic would hold. But something being logical within the abstract does not necessarily hold true when applied.

To put it in terms of logic
A -> B
A exists.
Therefore B

But what if A does not exist? A -> B is a distinctive knowledge, a logic. But it is not applied to anything in particular. If I say, "If Santa exists, it will rain" for A and B, I have to apply this logic and show that Santa exists for the logic to be true in application. If I find there is no Santa, I can still distinctively know the logical statement I just made, I just cannot know that it applies without contradiction.

As I have proposed it, inapplicable speculations do not exist: they have been transformed into irrational inductions. Speculations entail that it is applicable. Therefore, this is not an appropriate antonym to potentiality. The antonym is "that which is contradicted". — Bob Ross

Again, contradicted based on one's own distinctive context, or contradicted based on application? It seemed to me potentiality was an induction. Is that induction free of contradictions distinctively, or applicably. An irrational induction in this case, is a distinctive contradiction, not an applicable contradiction. An induction is not an assertion of certainty. Even irrational inductions have the potential of being contradicted in application. They are simply the least rational induction a person can make distinctively, not an assertion of applicable knowledge.

Exactly. So Jones is claiming, "I have an induction but I'm not going to use the hierarchy to break down what type of induction I'm using".

Leaving the individual voiceless in a perfectly valid context is not purposely not using the epistemology: it is the absence of a meaningful distinction that is causing the issue. — Bob Ross

You can have a perfectly valid context that does not use the epistemology. If you don't want to use the hierarchy in your distinctive context, you don't have to. I'm just trying to point out it is more beneficial to.

There is a meaningful distinction, as you noted, between asserting affirmation, and simply asserting that it isn't contradicted. — Bob Ross

I think this is where you've missed what I've been stating. There are distinctive and applicable views. You can be contradicted distinctively, and you can be contradicted applicably. They aren't the same thing. When you use "contradiction" without clarifying what type of contradiction, distinctive or applicable, then you aren't using the epistemology.

That was one heck of a write up! Fantastic points which made me really dig deep and make sure I was being consistent, and conveying my intentions correctly. Let me know what you think Bob.

I've never implied that potential to be false is the same as falsity and I've clarified this an awful amount of times in my earlier post once again... you're beating the same strawman that I clarified isn't my position. — Kuro

I think we might be talking past one another unintentionally. I think you misunderstand that I am not referring to falsification as a logic chart. You're missing what I'm trying to communicate.

And by the way, it is very lovely and a massive credit to you for spending the time to clearly write those logic charts. I did read all the information, and was not dismissive of it. Lets use your chart as an example.

In the case that p -> p, the result is always true. Yes, I understand this. This isn't targeting what I'm trying to tell you however. I can falsify that by positing that p -> ~p. If p -> ~p exists, then p->p is false. It doesn't mean p->~p exists. It means it a clear counter condition that would show p->p doesn't exist. The topic we are talking about is whether non-physicalism exists. The falsification of that ideal, is that non-physicalism does not exist.

I am talking about falsification for evidence. The only pre-requisite for something that is falsifiable is that it has a clear and distinct definition. That's really it. Because if you claim "x exists" then the alternative, "x doesn't exist" is always a falsification that can be considered.

It would be a counterexample to the proposition "God exists and made the world" because that proposition is not a tautology. But "God is God" or "Making the world is making the world" is a tautology that is always true regardless of whether God existed or not. In the same fashion that "Santa is Santa" is a tautology with no falsity conditions. — Kuro

Santa doesn't exist. I'm asking for evidence that Santa exists. We are not talking about tautologies. And to do that, I need something falsifiable. What is Santa? What are the traits? How can I tell Santa exists? There needs to be something that would indicate a reality in which Santa did not exist.

So for example, "Santa exists in the North pole in a factory where he makes toys all day". So all I have to do is go up to the North pole and look for a factory where some guy is making toys all day. If I go up to the North pole and don't find any factories, then I know Santa doesn't exist.

Now, lets apply this to non-physicalism. I've asked Wayfarer to give me evidence of non-physicalism, and he has tried in every conceivable way to avoid doing this. That is because he knows he doesn't have any. And he knows if he admits that, his entire world view crumbles. Non-physicalism only works as something you can possible consider if it has no traits one could look for.

I've even made it easy for him. Physicalism is simply the analysis of the rules of matter and energy. I've asked him to show me one instance in which matter and energy wasn't involved in consciousness. He can't do it. That's because he can't assert non-physicalism as anything, because then people could actually look for it, and find that it isn't there. That's the whole goal of holding non-falsifiable ideals. Its a self-gratifying ideal that people hold precious to their chest, terrified that others might point out its flaws. If you can avoid having to think about it too much, or present it in a way that makes it real, then you can lie to yourself and tell yourself you're holding to something that is true. I am very familiar with this myself, and see it clear as day in other people.

Wayfarer is literally telling me Santa exists, and when I persist on a definition of who Santa is and how I can know he exists, he can't. That's non-falsifiable, and I am valid in asking for falsifiable evidence. It is also quite telling that when I asked for evidence that could be falsified, I've spent more time explaining falsification then hearing evidence. Now perhaps Kuro that's because you're more interested in the perceived logic. And that's fine, but its distracted from the point long enough. People don't have to do large debates about falsification for things that are easy to show are real.

Suffice to say, I am completely unconvinced that I am wrong to ask for evidence that is falsifiable, so I will. If you don't understand that, so be it. If you can give me evidence that the non-physical exists, feel free to reply. I don't want to hear anything more about falsification, as this distraction has gone on long enough. Give me your evidence, and I'll be the judge.

I agree. I'm personally interested in celebrating how 'miraculous' the so-called ordinary already is. — lll

Sometimes I think on the fact that I exist at all, and am filled with absolute wonder. It is truly astounding that existence "is", and that I am one of the lucky few bits of material existence to realize it all.

I'm a longtime atheist, and it'd be quite an inconvenience for me if I had to rewire myself to take god chatter seriously again (as I did when exposed as a child to it.) — lll

I would not have a problem with it. I did not leave Christianity in anger, I simply left because I couldn't rationally accept it anymore. As such, my actions honestly haven't changed very much from where I was a Christian except for going to Church.

Again - the reason that Popper devised the falsification criterion, was to differentiate scientific from non-scientific theories. So, what you're asking for is a scientific theory. — Wayfarer

Wayfarer, I'm not Karl Popper. I don't care why he wanted to use falsification. I'm not asking you for the standard of a scientific theory, which is MUCH more than falsification.

If you think you can explain maths in a couple of paragraphs, that it's 'obvious' and 'natural' what maths is, what numbers are, then you need to do more reading. — Wayfarer

Irrelevant as I already noted. I showed you where falsification can be applied to Platonism. Ignore my points on math if you like, that was an aside. Stop saying I'm asking for a scientific theory, and please explain to me why I can't use falsification as a requirement for viable evidence.

Wayfarer, this is the problem when you debate other people, and not the people you are talking to. I'm not asking you to use the scientific method. I'm asking you to provide something that has falsification.
You said I shouldn't use falsification. None of what you wrote, shows me that I shouldn't use falsification as my criterion for evidence.

Look, math is real easy. Its about our ability to identify. I can look at "1" field of grass, and "1" blade of grass, and "1" piece of grass. 1 identity and another 1 identity together are the identity we call 2. As we observe the world with identities, or discrete experiences, it follows the logic of our capability to do so.

Notice how we say 1 blade of grass and 1 blade of grass are two? That's because its how we make sense of the world. Is 1 blade of grass exactly the same as the other? No. Its the notion of combining 2 things together for us to convey an idea.

If humanity did not exist, it doesn't mean the world would go away. It doesn't mean that something else that could create identities, couldn't create an identity that would work out for them in the same way. But does the concept of "1" exist apart from our invention of that identity? Of course not. There's no evidence of that at all. Just like the concept of "embigination" doesn't exist without me in the world. It doesn't mean that what I am describing as "embigination" doesn't exist, it means my concept of it would not exist.

But regardless of all that, we're looking for a reason why I can't use falsification right? If you want to discuss what I just mentioned we can, but I don't want to get off topic.

Lets see, for the Platonic theory. If they propose that numbers exist apart from human concepts, lets first get them to clearly define that. Do they mean a floating symbol? Probably not, but feel free to interject. They probably mean that "oneness" itself would still exist. In other words, if we didn't know what the symbology of "1" is, what the symbology of 1 describes would1 still exist even apart from our ability to understand this. So, its falsification would be if we should show that oneness did not exist apart from our ability to conceive of the concept.

So all we would need then is a rational agent that did not understand or know about numbers, and then see if they acted as if "oneness" existed right? Turns out, you take kids and even animals, and they can construct and understand "whole identities" (What 1 is). Now perhaps you would like another go at the definition of what they mean by math existing apart from human understanding. That's fine. But this number concept of Platonism can clearly be falsified.

As such, I'm not seeing why this article implies I cannot use falsification as a criterion. And the point is not whether I'm correct or not about Platonism. The entire true point, the heart of it, is that I can create a claim using Platonism that can be falsified.

The argument is, on the one side, that numbers are real, independently of anyone who is aware of them - which is generally known as mathematical realism or mathematical platonism. It grants mathematical objects reality, albeit of a different order to empirical objects. — Wayfarer

I thought we had already resolved falsifiability and were simply talking about evidence of something non-physical at this point. But ok, if that is your problem, I read it. Its a debate I'm well aware of. Where is the evidence against falsifiability? I have no idea what you're trying to show with this article on an age old problem.

If you believe falsifiability is not a criterian I should hold, please explain to me what in this article backs that.

You need to understand why mathematical Pplatonism is incompatible with materialism. That article spells it out in two different quotes. — Wayfarer

How about you just tell me and link those quotes? I'm not going to do your work for you Wayfarer. I didn't ask you to do my work for me.

Since you did not reply with any evidence of the non-physical, then we both know you don't have any at this point.

At least that was a start - but it doesn't develop. The expression 'a setting devoid of anything conscious but an observer' is very confusing, indicating you hadn't really come to terms with the basic problem. — Wayfarer

Then why didn't you engage with me then? Why didn't you point out where I was wrong? I'm not here to read other theories. I'm here to get evidence from you about non-physical reality. You can type all of these other replies avoiding the issue, but you can't type out showing where in this theory there is proof of the non-physical?

Again indicating you have no grasp of the philosophical issue. — Wayfarer

That is on you. If you expect to throw a linked set of debates that would require me hours of reading without any guidance or lead on your part, then its just a convenient excuse for you to run away from the issue. I've clearly addressed everything straight with you. I haven't asked you to read the entirety of neuroscience. That's dishonest. I've held you to everything I've written here, not vague theories and debates.

You also avoided the greater point I made. I stated, "

Demonstrate to me these things are non-physical, and I will agree. You noted there are some suppositions and debates about this. This means there are people who think these things are material. That isn't evidence. That's just indicating what we don't understand. — Philosophim

I asked you to point out where the non-physical was noted. You did not. I noted that because there was no conclusion, it was a debate, and that would mean that there are also people in this debate who think things are material. If it is inconclusive, then that means neither side knows. You did not say I was wrong here either. And if I was not wrong here, then I was surely right in not spending hours reading up on what amounts to an inconclusive debate.

You're lying to yourself Wayfarer. Do you think a good God would want such a thing? Do you think you have to deceive yourself and others because your personal emotional feelings are more important than integrity? I'm a former Christian Wayfarer. I'm not saying you shouldn't be a Christian. But I am noting you aren't acting like one now.

You said nothing about mathematical platonism. — Wayfarer

I said plenty. And I said why it wasn't evidence. And you didn't refute this.

You simply dismiss the idea of psychosomatic effects on the basis that thoughts are physical. — Wayfarer

Lets define "psychosomatic effects". Any result pertaining to the influence of the mind or higher functions of the brain upon the operations of the body, particularly bodily disorders or diseases.

I didn't deny that. What I said was that this doesn't show that thoughts aren't matter and energy. No, I am not saying there is a difference between an imagined piano and a physical one in terms of thoughts. Wayfarer, your mind doesn't touch a real piano. Your nerves interpret that touch, then travel to the brain where the brain makes some sense out of it. Your brain doesn't need nerves, or a piano, to have thoughts about a piano, and practice strengthening neural pathways. Nothing in that article claims that consciousness isn't physical, or that the brain and thoughts are not physical.

If thoughts aren't composed of matter and energy, what are they composed of Wayfarer?
— Philosophim

They're composed of ideas. Your dogma is that ideas are brain-functions. — Wayfarer

What are ideas composed of Wayfarer? Its not dogma for me to claim that thoughts and ideas are composed of matter and energy, its a conclusion based on the evidence I know.

[quote="Wayfarer;668534"it's the only claim you make - 'everything is physical'.[/quote]

Don't be dishonest now. I clearly stated that what is physical, is matter and energy. If you find something that isn't matter and energy, you've found something non-physical. I've asked you to provide me an example of something that is not matter and energy. You claim ideas aren't made of matter and energy, give me evidence. If its not matter and energy, what is it? If you don't answer in the next reply, then you and I will both have clearly determined that you don't know. Be honest and address the request.

We're making clear points with each other.
— Philosophim

You're not showing any sign of understanding any of the points that I've made, even in principle. — Wayfarer

Upon reviewing, I have. Maybe you haven't understood mine?

We already know thoughts are composed of matter and energy.
— Philosophim

Your commitment to that falsehood colors everything you say about it. Thoughts are composed of the relationship between ideas, and ideas are not physical. — Wayfarer

I've been asking you repeatedly to show me evidence of what non-physical is, and you haven't. If thoughts aren't composed of matter and energy, what are they composed of Wayfarer? We have evidence through physical manipulation of the brain that thoughts can be triggered and changed. Give me evidence that thoughts are composed of something besides matter and energy, or I'm right, and not holding a falsehood. You want to demonstrate that what I hold is a falsehood, prove it.

Its just that you need to demonstrate why they have merit, and why the show the OP to be wrong.
But I didn’t assert that the OP was wrong. I just pointed out that it made various assumptions, and thus the conclusions might not follow if different assumptions are made. — noAxioms

NoAxioms, isn't that true about anything? I mean, I can just come back and state if you had made different assumptions and conclusions, then you could be wrong as well. Well, yeah. There's nothing meaningful or useful in such a statement.

It is appealing to define the world in such a way that all definitions and assumptions are valid, because then you feel like you can never be wrong. The problem is, it breaks down because you arrive at a glaring contradiction. I can claim, "No, some definitions/assumpsions are more valid than others," which is a direct challenge to your viewpoint. If you persist in your viewpoint as more valid than mine, I win, because I've shown you hold a contradiction. But if you say my viewpoint is just as valid as yours, then I've claimed your viewpoint is invalidand you accept this. So again, you run into a contradiction.

So logically, if we are to think in a process that does not result in a contradiction, we must hold that some definitions are more valid than others. And that means, just because you can propose an alternative definition or assumption, it in no way means its existence challenges or defeats another definition or assumption. You must, to have a logical argument, demonstrate why the assumption I'm claiming is inferior to an alternative assumption that would break the argument.

You’re invoking the premise “Something must exist to type a reply” to demonstrate the premise. The statement is a positive example, which falsifies nothing. To do the latter, one must posit the negation:
P1: Property of existence is not necessary for the interaction between entities.
P2: Two entities X and Y interact.

Now prove that X and Y necessarily have the property of existence without begging your premise. Then you’ve falsified it. — noAxioms

That did not show how my two sentences begged the question. Stating what a definition entails is not begging the question. To do anything, you must exist. That's part of the definition. If you do something, then you exist. We're not proving the definition of existence. We're proving you exist. Did I beg the question that you existed? No.

According to your logic, you proposed a definition for existence which does not follow English. To exist, is to have the property of interacting between other existences/entities. To be an entity, is to exist. You essentially stated, A = ~A then in premise two you stated nothing that had anything to do with A. The example is nonsense, because whether or not X and Y interact has nothing to do with the definition of existence you've proposed.

I drive at this point because there are valid interpretations of the world that don’t give any meaning to ‘property of existence’ since ‘exists’ is not defined as a property but rather as a relation. You’re asserting that such an interpretation is necessarily wrong, despite the growing support. — noAxioms

You need to re-read the OP. The entire OP is about relational existence.

I didn’t make any mention of ‘current’, so I stated neither thing. — noAxioms

Yes, you mentioned that I was assuming "current" was real. Its been a focal point of the discussion. If you assume that "current" is not anything more than an assumption, then you'll need to demonstrate why your assumption that this is the case, is real.

I took a look at your A and B series, and it doesn't revoke what I'm stating at all. If you're going to present a different series of time against an argument, it must be used to show where the argument falters. If I don't understand how the B series revokes the OP, that's because you didn't demonstrate that clear. I've been addressing your argument in relation to the OP, and what "current" means. So far, I'm not seeing how it revokes this. If you think it does, please try again, and I will see if I missed something in your explanation.

We bury or burn the corpses of the same loved ones we nurture when alive, so clearly the fine details or the structure of brains/bodies is important to us. The structure the sound waves we bark at one another is also crucial. I suppose it's plausible to stop at these patterns and say (speculatively or economically) that we are only such patterns. And perhaps you include all this implicitly in your 'we are only bodies and brains' position. — lll

Yes. This doesn't make human interactions any less meaningful. How we function does not change the reality of our function.

But there are also philosophical reasons to argue for 'something more' that do not include any such comforts and only seek a more comprehensive and consistent account. — lll

I agree. I was just answering why in particular this topic tends to pop up more than others. In my discussions on this topic over time I simply find a pattern that you find a lot more people of a religious and spiritual nature in the camp of the non-physical, then you do in the camp of the physical. Further, generally these arguments are ill-defined, and will not actually provide what they mean by non-physical. You can find genuine people who are willing to engage the subject rationally, but I would say a lot of the motivation is not rational curiosity, but a desire for a particular emotional outcome. This is of course an opinion, and should not be taken as fact.

You don't find some empirical evidence for why things aren't themselves. You're just forcing a proposition that's already taken to have no truth-conditions in FOL to somehow be true. It's incoherent. — Kuro

When did I say empirical evidence? All I'm noting for the condition of falsification, is that we have a clear postulate we can put forward that would show when the proposition was false. If A=~A, then A=A would be false right? Take the simple note above and try to explain to me why A=~A is not a negation of A=A.

~A is considered in A=A. But A=A returns true even granting ~A. ~A is literally just a negative truth valuation for A. — Kuro

Then you agree with me. The potential for something to be proven false, does not mean it can be proven false. Falsification does not mean, "It is false". It means there is a condition we can propose in which our claim would be false. If A=~A was true, then A=A would be false. If you agree with this, then you understand. If you don't, please explain how if A=~A were true, then A=A would not be false.

Like I've shown you earlier in the truth table, you can value A with any combination of truth and false and it'll always be equivalent to itself. There's no way out of it. — Kuro

And again, if something is provably true, it doesn't mean we can't invent a scenario in which it would not be true. The invention of the scenario in which it is not true, also does not mean it can be concluded that it is not true. You seem to be under the impression that falsification means "likelihood or chance" that it can be proven false. That's not what it is. Its just the presentation of the condition in which a claim would be false. And A=~A is that falsification presentation. It is of course, NOT true, which means that A=A is not false. But it can still be falsified. Does that clear it up?

"When" 6=5? There is no time where 6 is equal to 5. I'm actually appalled that we're debating such a simple notion. — Kuro

That is because you are not understanding what I am saying. I am not saying 6=5. I'm just noting a case that IF 6=5 was true, then 5=5 would be false. Thus 5=5 can be falsified. It doesn't mean that 5=5 is false.

This is not the same as me taking offense. Generally, assume that I take no offense unless I indicate otherwise :). — Kuro

Same here! Without non-verbal, it can be difficult to understand what another person is feeling, thanks for clearing that up.

If a proposition is impossible, it is necessarily false, whereas if a proposition is false it is not necessarily impossible. — Kuro

Correct. But in both cases, there is a possible negation to consider. We may conclude that negation is impossible, but we can conceive of its negation, and what it would entail.

So tautologies return true having exhausted all possible truth values of false or true to all the propositions embedded within it. So there are no conditions where they're false. — Kuro

Correct, there are no conditions in which they are found to be false. This does not mean there is not a potential condition in which we could consider it being false.

Can you address the point in which I provided an example of God vs. Jesus when it was not possible for there to be falsification? In the God example, there is not a consideration of anything which could be considered falsifiable. Let us not forget this debate is about providing evidence that is falsifiable for or against consciousness being physical vs non-physical.

Not at all what I said. If you're going to paraphrase something, you need to understand it. The statement I made was supported with a reference to the Stanford Encyclopedia entry on Platonism in the Philosophy of Maths. The topic is 'the ontological status of math.' It is a debate with a long history, and you haven't shown the least evidence that you understand it. — Wayfarer

My point is a debate is not evidence to understand. The conclusion of a debate is evidence to understand. I see evidence that there is a debate. And if there is a debate, the outcome is not known. Stating, "We don't know the outcome on something" again, is not evidence.

My job is not to understand a debate. I am not going to read a long storied history to prove your point for you. Your supposed to convince me right? Your job is to clearly present evidence of the non-physical as a cause of consciousness that is something you and I could debate. To show that I am holding the same standard towards you, I'm not saying, "Well there are debates that show there is no non-physical. There's a long storied debate of only the physical being true. You haven't demonstrated to me you've understood the entire history of this, go read it, you're ignoring, etc."

We're making clear points with each other. If I want to cite evidence in neuroscience, I will show evidence of things which are conclusive, not under debate. I will also cite specific outcomes, and not debates themselves as evidence. I ask the same in return.

I'm saying that to show that consciousness is non-physical, you need to show it interacting with the brain in some manner. It must not be matter or energy. You are proposing, that something that is not matter or energy exists.
— Philosophim

Yes. That would be judgement. — Wayfarer

No, that would be an opinion. If you want to say you've judged your opinion to be true, then you need to supply some evidence. Otherwise, I could come back with my opinion without evidence that there is no non-physical with the same response, "Yes. That would be judgement". No, that would be silly.

This is evidence! Its falsifiable with clear claims. Lets examine your evidence to see if it demonstrates there is clearly something non-physical going on.

So, if the brains reduction was not correlated with the reduction of consciousness, we would find that the man was just as intelligent as a person with an average brain. Except in the article we see, "Intelligence tests showed the man had an IQ of 75, below the average score of 100 but not considered mentally retarded or disabled."

Further, the article notes, "The findings reveal “the brain is very plastic and can adapt to some brain damage occurring in the pre- and postnatal period when treated appropriately,” he says.

“What I find amazing to this day is how the brain can deal with something which you think should not be compatible with life,” comments Max Muenke, a paediatric brain defect specialist at the National Human Genome Research Institute in Bethesda, Maryland, US.

“If something happens very slowly over quite some time, maybe over decades, the different parts of the brain take up functions that would normally be done by the part that is pushed to the side,” adds Muenke, who was not involved in the case."

So it doesn't appear that researchers and scientists are seeing something at odds with matter and energy in the brain. Everything still seems explainable with a matter and energy model. And again, if they didn't understand why this was possible, that just opens it up to debate. An opinion of a solution to a debate, is not evidence that the solution exists, even if it is a satisfying opinion or "seems perfect".

Your second reference notes that thought can rewire the brain.

"When the scientists compared the TMS data on the two groups--those who actually tickled the ivories and those who only imagined doing so--they glimpsed a revolutionary idea about the brain: the ability of mere thought to alter the physical structure and function of our gray matter. For what the TMS revealed was that the region of motor cortex that controls the piano-playing fingers also expanded in the brains of volunteers who imagined playing the music--just as it had in those who actually played it."

But this is not evidence of the non-physical. We already know thoughts are composed of matter and energy. Just like when you use your muscles, the brain rewires itself to compensate. The brain itself is adapting based on what is happening up there. Nowhere in the article does it claim that there is something outside of the brain, or outside of matter and energy causing the brain to change. I suppose Wayfarer you must find it odd that thoughts are essentially a combination of matter and energy. But that is what the current physical model of the brain presents. Thoughts are physical. its your job to give evidence that they are not.

Metaphysical as a word basically means self reference to the physical.
— Philosophim

That's not the definition of metaphysical. You don't get to make it up. — Wayfarer

You are correct. I noted a branch of metaphysics, and applied that to all metaphysics. I want you to see I can admit freely when I am wrong. Its very important that both of us take this mindset, or emotional and personal feelings get in the way. My real point again is that debates are not evidence. Now, if you would like to explain to me why debates are evidence, we can consider this. But so far, you have not.

The silence of nothing is deafening.
— Philosophim

'Those who have ears, let them hear' — Wayfarer

Lets keep it to debating the claims eh? Otherwise I would come back with something like "Remove the plank from your own eye before pointing out the splinter in your neighbors," That back and forth gets us nowhere.

Ok, but imagine if all that existed was an infinite spiral water slide going vertically down forever. The water that has always traveled on it has the slide as their alpha or reason for moving. But the slide is eternal so there is actually an alpha supporting an infinite series. — Gregory

That's correct. If we ask, "What is the cause for the slide?" and there is no prior causality, it is an alpha.

A physical Alpha? — Gregory

Sure. I'm dealing in what exists. There's plenty of physical causality to go around, so that's what I work with.

There doesn't have to be a loop or an infinite past. The first motion is the first motion and there is nothing prior. In physics this is the big bang. There is no past for the big bang. But I think your correct that a first act is needed — Gregory

That's definitely an opinion many people hold. The OP is arguing that it is logically necessary that there is a first cause, that it is actually impossible for infinite regression to exist. What that first cause is could be anything, because a first cause doesn't have a reason for its existence, so there would be nothing to limit what it could be. Is the big bang the first cause? Very well could be. I argue a bit later that a problem with a first cause, is that its likely almost impossible to prove any one thing is a first cause, thought it is logically necessary there be one.

While someone could argue that a first cause "could be a God", what fails is the claim that a first cause, "must be a God". When something has no prior explanation for its being, it doesn't need any rules, such as conscious creation, for its existence. So while the argument doesn't rule out the potential of a God, it mostly certainly ends any arguments about the necessity of a God when considering any first cause arguments. In short, this defeats all current cosmological arguments for God for God's necessary existence.

I have, and that is what I've concluded. Its your job to show me why my conclusion is wrong. "I don't think so," is not philosophy.
— Philosophim

Well, the law of noncontradiction seems to imply idealism. Are you an idealist? — Agent Smith

Could you please show how this references my original statement? Here, I'll reference it again.

The problem of evil reveals to us that we cannot label a God as limited to acting a certain way, when that God is without limits. That's just logically inconsistent, and impossible. — Philosophim

Where am I wrong in these two statements?

logically inconsistent, and impossible
— Philosophim

You might wanna reconsider that. — Agent Smith

I have, and that is what I've concluded. Its your job to show me why my conclusion is wrong. "I don't think so," is not philosophy.

Yes, you've understood the nature of "The problem of evil". The problem of evil reveals to us that we cannot label a God as limited to acting a certain way, when that God is without limits. That's just logically inconsistent, and impossible. If you reduce even one of the omni's to "The most X that is possible", then the problem of evil is solved.

If the first cause is material than we are on the same page. If it is spiritual than we are not — Gregory

You shouldn't have to ask if you read and comprehended the OP.

Lets get to your argument.

"1. Either all things have a prior cause for their existence or there is at least one first cause of existence from which a chain of events follows."

So there is either 1,2,3,4 or infinite,1,2,3,3 — Gregory

Sure, just don't forget that its causality. 1 causes 2, causes 3 etc. Its not just counting.

Y: represents an existence that may or may not have prior causality."

So everything — Gregory

No, its a representation of any identity. One of which, may be everything. Think in terms of sets.

"X: represents an existent prior causality to Y."

First cause — Gregory

No, that's just a prior cause for any Y.
A ball is falling = Y
It is at its velocity now because of one second of gravities application = X.

Z: Represent an existence caused by Y."

World — Gregory

You lost me here. Y (the falling ball) hits the ground 1 second later. = Z Why is Z on the ground one second later? Because gravity acted on the ball for one second at Y. X -> Y -> Z.

"Alpha: A Y existence that is identified as having no prior causality."

Alpha is X — Gregory

No, Alpha would describe a Y with no X. If Y existed, but one second prior there was no ball, no falling, and nothing to make that ball then that particular Y is an Alpha.

a. There is always a X for every Y. (infinite prior causality)."

So a first cause for every series — Gregory

No, this is describing the entire chain of causality is infinitely regressive.

"b. The X/Y causal chain eventually wraps back to Y/X (infinitely looped causality)"

Making the loop based on the first cause — Gregory

No, there would be no first cause within the set loop itself. This is an infinite causal loop.

"c. There comes a time within a causal chain when there is only Y, and nothing prior to Y. This Y is Alpha. (first cause)"

There can still be a world. Begging the question — Gregory

No, this is just explaining one of the 3 possibilities, not asserting anything. This is just that there is the possible consideration of an Alpha.

I hope that cleared up the first part. Take the premises here and go with the rest of the argument. Also, again, its not a proof for God argument. Relax.

Kuro, I think you might have missed my point. If A is not A, then it can't equal A right? So if I said, "A" exists, and someone demonstrated to me that "A" did not exist, then A would be proven false. That's all I expect. There needs to be a situation in which the proposition COULD be false. In other words, lose the logic charts, you're missing the point.

An example of a non-falsifiable argument would be, "A = A" and someone made it impossible for ~A to be a consideration. So lets put some examples instead of letters here.
"God exists and made the world" = A. If I said, "Could I attempt to show that something else created the world?" I would receive a response. If the person said, "Well yeah, I guess that's fine," I would then ask, "So what would be enough to show that God did not make the world?" Here they need to give me an answer.

If they say, "God is beyond our understanding and definition," then there's really nothing to falsify. There's no definition or understanding of God to claim, so there is nothing to refute either. In short, non-falsifiable." If they say, "Why yes, there was this fine fellow name Jesus, and he said this, and did this, and that's God," then we have something that could be false. It could be that Jesus did not exist. That he wasn't sane or trustworthy. That the book that tells his stories isn't verifiably correct. That sort of stuff.

Now it very well could be that God exists and created the world. It could be that the bible is completely accurate, Jesus did come and do some things, and that's why we know God exists. It being true does not mean it is not falsifiable. Being falsifiable does not mean it is false. It just means we have something that could potentially be refuted, because that is naturally what happens with anything that exists.

Back to your example.

For example, 5=5 or 6=6 are still unfalsifiable truths. — Kuro

No, they are very falsifiable. When would 6 not be 6? When 6=5 is one example. Basically if 6 = ~ 6, then 6=6 is false. We can test this. It turns out that ~6=6 isn't true, but a contradiction. Therefore while we have a means of falsifying, we cannot show that 6=6 is false. Therefore, it must be true.

I recommend this introductory course on logic from Stanford. In supplement, I'll also link this article explaining mathematical equality. I suggest that you familiarize yourself with these on your own freetime going onward with this conversation so that we have an easier time communicating. — Kuro

Much appreciated, but we don't need it for what we're talking about as I think you can see from my examples above.

I'm aware that falsifiability is not the same as impossibility, rather it is simply possible falsity. I'm not sure why you felt the need to tell me this. Clearly, some propositions like a=a or some mathematical formulae like 5=5 have no falsifiability conditions and simply cannot be impossible. — Kuro

I felt the need to tell you this, because I felt you did not understand falsifiability. I didn't take offense to your recommendation to read up on logic, don't take offense on me telling you things I don't think you understand either.

So I think you understand now. Physicalism is falsifiable by stating it could be the case that physicalism is false.
— Philosophim

In the case of my example, the opponent of physicalism does not simply falsify physicalism but allow for its logical possibility, rather find an internal contradiction in physicalism. All contradictory sets of facts are logically impossible in any consistent modal logic, i.e. they simply could not be true. There isn't a world with square circles, or vice versa. — Kuro

Recall you just mentioned that you understood falsifiability was not the same as "impossibility". If physicalism is contradictory, then its false. That is a clear and identifiable way it can be false. Therefore it is falsifiable. Now is it actually false? That's a different debate.

I think falsifiability as a philosophical or mathematical requirement is an incoherent position because both philosophy and mathematics have some facts that are given the status of being necessarily true and also unfalsifiable, like a=a or 5+5 and what not. — Kuro

Again, those are both falsifiable statements. But, we cannot meet the requirements to show they are false. Therefore they are proven to be true.

You haven't addressed the argument concerning the sense in which mathematical objects, numbers, and by extension also, scientific laws and physical principles, are real, but are not material. You haven't responded to that at all. You might look at that again. — Wayfarer

I noted earlier that stating, "We don't understand this, so I get to propose whatever I want" is not viable evidence. Demonstrate to me these things are non-physical, and I will agree. You noted there are some suppositions and debates about this. This means there are people who think these things are material. That isn't evidence. That's just indicating what we don't understand.

Are there things we don't fully understand? 100%. At one time we did not understand how rain formed. Did that mean if someone stated, "Its obviously mystical power of the Earth," that this is evidence? No. Could we sit and debate it back then? Sure. But for it to be viable, for it to be considered something real, it needed evidence.

I really can see why you're saying this, but again, what I'm trying to point out is that you're thinking of what the non-physical must be in terms of 'non-physical things'. You're saying if 'we found something that was obviously interacting...' You're trying to imagine a non-physical or immaterial thing, or substance, that acts as a cause. — Wayfarer

No, I'm not. Can there be something non-physical Wayfarer? I'm not stating it has to be a thing in the sense of what's physical. I'm saying "thing" as "what exists". If you're saying something non-physical can't exist, then the conversation is over. Now, I'm not doing that to you because I want you to know I'm being charitable to your argument. I know you believe something non-physical exists. If it exists, what is it? In this case, it is consciousness. And in this case, we know it must interact with the brain. And if it can interact with the physical world, we can detect something non-physical, in the physical world.

But we need to go back and examine what the basis is for those criteria. The fact that only what is measurable and objective is to be considered by scientific analysis is an assumption - the naturalist assumption. — Wayfarer

No assumption, just logic. If the brain can interact with the non-physical, then we can detect it. It doesn't even have to be fully known. It just has to be something we detect that is not matter or energy. If you deny that the brain can interact with the non-physical, then you lose. You've just cut the non-physical from ever being experienced by the physical. It then, does not exist. No assumptions. No bias. No "the physicalists will say." Ignore that crap. Talk to me, not them.

So, you're saying, if you want to show something non-material, you have to demonstrate its existence, like it's lava core, or a bitter apple, or some other sense-able object of experience that you've referred to in this discussion. Some thing. — Wayfarer

I'll clarify again. I'm saying that to show that consciousness is non-physical, you need to show it interacting with the brain in some manner. It must not be matter or energy. You are proposing, that something that is not matter or energy exists. You state you have evidence of this as consciousness. Our current understanding, manipulation, healing, and destruction of the brain is built upon our understanding of matter and energy. Is there something that we can detect interacting with the brain that is not matter or energy? Yes or no?

But the cause of these maladies is not physical but affective or emotional - you've interpreted something in a way that causes these effects. — Wayfarer

But we already know that's not true. Depression is something that can be fixed with medication. Emotions are tied to brain states that can be altered by changing your physical interactions. You can watch a movie, eat good food, get good sleep, etc. These cause changes in the communication of your brain. Emotions are physical expressions. They are physical reality. Reduce a man's testosterone and you'll see him feel powerless. Increase it and he'll feel powerful and aggressive. Again, we can manipulate this physically.

But as rational sentient beings, we're also constantly judging, reacting, supposing, surmising, and so on. The intellect, the seat of judgement, is constantly weighing up, judging, and reasoning. Those are the faculties that I say are not meaningfully physical. — Wayfarer

But Wayfarer, they are. We see the brain react to stimulous. We know certain areas of the brain are needed for sight. We know that you can become brain damaged and no longer see or imagine color, even though your eyes work perfectly. Here's just one example from 2013. https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/brain-researchers-can-detect-who-we-are-thinking-about/
Take a brain damaged patient Wayfarer, and their capacity to judge and reason diminishes substantially. That's a physical result from a physical change.

Now again, if there are gaps in places that we don't understand about the brain, that doesn't mean there is evidence for something we can make up. If there is a gap in understanding about how the brain works, and we can find something interacting with the brain that is not matter or energy, then we can say, "There is evidence of something non-physical in our brain, this might be consciousness." But absence of understanding, is not evidence for anything. It just means we can say, "We don't understand what is going on."

And I question whether anything is completely physical, because 'the physical' is not, as yet, fully defineable. — Wayfarer

I've clearly defined it here. Matter and energy are physical. Again, talk to me, not to "the physicalists".

From debating with you at some length my observation is that you're committed to the framework of physicalism or scientific materialism. — Wayfarer

I'm actually not. I'm committed to what is most logical. Wayfarer, I have argued against a LOT of assumed theories and questioned and changed many assumptions about myself in life. That's what being intelligent is. Those who cannot consider alternatives and are set in their ways, are not rational people. They are emotional animals who crave the satisfaction of feeling right more than the cold and sometimes emotionally devastating act of learning what is right.

But I'm arguing that the physicalist outlook is grounded in a methodological assumption about what ought to be considered as evidence in a scientific sense. But that methodological assumption is not really a metaphysic of what is and what is not real. — Wayfarer

Which is fine. But we can invent whatever we want in our heads and be emotionally attached to it. Does that make it real? No. Evidence of its existence and use in the world makes it real. And if you have no evidence when someone asks? Just say you don't have it. Nothing wrong with that either. If you feel you have to do word puzzles and jumbles to avoid saying those words, then realize you're more interested in lying about something for other to accept your idea, then telling the truth and letting them decide on their own. I haven't had to use fancy words, concepts, or complex ideas to convey my point, because I'm more concerned about clarity and seeing a correct outcome then emotional gratification.

Furthermore, there are real metaphysical debates, such as the nature of mathematical objects, or the nature of the wavefunction — Wayfarer

Meta means "self reference" Metaphysical as a word basically means self reference to the physical. Another way to view it is meta means "Talking about", so basically talking about the nature of the physical. And again, debates are fine. Ideas are wonderful! But claiming ideas are reality, when there is no evidence for it, is not.

It's the same argument. You can't imagine an infinite series going into the past without a God? — Gregory

Ok, if you did actually read it, you need to work on your reading comprehension. Again, as I posted last time, I am not following Aristotle's argument. If you comprehend this, and think I'm wrong, then go to the argument and point out where I do that.

Instead, what you're doing is called a "straw man" fallacy. Its where you prop something I'm not saying, then beat that while saying my argument is wrong.

It also has NOTHING to do with a God. I've also stated that once before, so it appears you can't comprehend my responses either. Go ahead, find the part of my OP where I talk about God. Or continue to construct and beat your little straw man in the corner while I look on in amusement at your lack of comprehension.

I don't know your background very well, so I'm having patience. Please read the argument, and cite parts of the argument where you believe it to be wrong.

Aristotle argues that infinities on their own are unstable and a past infinity needs a root in a first cause, just as you say a first member as a cause is needed — Gregory

But I don't say what Aristotle is saying at all. Mine deals with sets, not the instability of infinities.

Your OP, which I read months ago — Gregory

You should probably read it again before commenting on it. I believe you've misremembered what it says.

I do not know Hawking's, Krauss's or Aristotle's argument. Mind pointing out where my argument coincides with Aristotle's? Mind pointing out where Hawking's or Krauss's theory would have a problem with my model?

But that does not establish 'a' first cause. Why would you posit just one? — Bartricks

1. Either all things have a prior cause for their existence, or there is at least one first cause of existence from which a chain of events follows. — Philosophim

"at least one". Where am I claiming I'm only positing one?

That's like if I said 1+1 = 2, and you came back with, "You assume 1 exists".
— Philosophim
That's funny. I had pretty much had that line thrown at me (by an actual physicist) and I was arguing the opposite, that the numbers need not exist for the sum of 1 and 1 to be 2. — noAxioms

Ha ha! Well done! I mean this genuinely and not sarcastically. Always question and poke at "generally accepted knowledge". My point was that we can't take the standpoint that they're merely assuming what is generally known. We can give credit that theirs is the societally reasonable stance, and if we are to challenge it, we must given evidence that it is wrong.

My name implies that I assume nothing. So I'd say that it depends on the definitions of those words. I often take the relational view where the phrase "X exists' is meaningless since it is not expressed as relation. — noAxioms

Also very reasonable. In my experience unclear definitions in discussions are one of the biggest problems in philosophical discussion. And I include myself in those who give unclear definitions. Feel free to always ask what I mean, or point out inconsistencies.

Of course, you can take the intuitive view and not explore the alternate ideas, but then you're just rationalizing answers that you've already decided on. In other words, feel free to bid me a good day if I'm not helping. — noAxioms

I am more than willing to explore alternative ideas. Its just that you need to demonstrate why they have merit, and why the show the OP to be wrong. If I've constructed an OP about a specific set of rules and conclusions, if you want me to consider I'm wrong, you need to demonstrate why those set of rules and conclusions fail. I'm not rationalizing my assumptions here, I'm using common vocabulary to communicate ideas that most people understand to exist.

Let me help you out. If you don't exist, you won't type a reply.
No, I don't buy that. It begs its conclusion. — noAxioms

It really doesn't. Begging the question is often misapplied. Its most associated with circular reasoning. "God states that God is good, therefore God is good" is begging the question. The statement itself has the assumption that the conclusion is right. We can trust God if God is good, therefore if God says God is good, well, God must be good right?

Let me rephrase what I noted.

Something must exist to type a reply.
If something types a reply, it exists.

Can it be falsified? Yes. If something does not exist, then it cannot type a reply. Since you typed a reply, we've concluded you exist. Now, I'm quite sure you're mind might be racing to think, "Well what if I'm a bot, etc." I don't care. Your existence is based on whether there is a reply given. Something had to type a reply. I don't care what it is. But based on the falsifiable premises, it exists.

Also, one more thing, when you accuse a person of a logical fallacy, it is best to show them why in an honest conversation. Fallacies are a placeholder to summarize an issue, but they shouldn't take the place of good arguments.

The unicorn has a horn, which by the above logic it cannot because the horn doesn't exist. I told you the unicorn would come into play. — noAxioms

It is how you define it. If you mean exist objectively as an animal independent of our creativity? No. Does a unicorn exist in our minds, and can I draw one on a piece of paper and tell a fantasy story about it? Yes.

The alternate view might say that on Feb 5, 2022 we all observe the state of the world of Feb 5, 2022 (at least the nearby stuff), and not some other state. That date is no more or less 'the past', 'the present', or 'the future' than any other date. They all have equal ontology. — noAxioms

No, that's incorrect. By using dates, you are stating that there are states that are not "current", and states that are "prior to the current state". Can I experience the date of Feb 5, 2022 currently? No, because that's not today's date. I also cannot experience the prediction of tomorrow's date. These are pretty clear and undebatable notions of time. Stating, "The past present and future all all the same" doesn't hold up in any meaningful sense. I mean, you typed your previous reply earlier right? That's not now. How do you get around that?

Also, I am not stating there is a current moment "elsewhere". I'm talking about right here. Basic stuff, don't overcomplicate it or add things in that I'm not claiming.

So you're assuming an unproven suggestion.
I assume nothing as any kind of asserted truth. — noAxioms

If you're just throwing out "Maybe its this," without any type of assertion to its validity, then its worthless. Maybe cookie monster is behind the government machinations of China. Can't assume he isn't after all. Don't make the mistake that just because you can come up with an idea it means it has any worth in application to reality. An active imagination is not what is clever, its proving what we imagine exists.

There is no working theory of the universe that assumes a current moment — noAxioms

If there was no current moment, we wouldn't be able to think of any theories. That's just silly. If everything was stuck in the past, there would be no now or progress. If there was no potential for the future, there would be no past, and no progress. The current time is the transition from the potential future to the factual past. All of this you can experience right now in your brain. If you can experience it, its real.

There is no device that measures the rate of advancement of the current time. Clocks measure proper time along a worldline through spacetime. — noAxioms

No, they just measure the rate of time from future potential to relative past. A second for example is X number of electronic cycles, quatz vibrations or what have you. Just like an inch measures the start and end of distance. If it bothers you so much that we can't get a number to represent an infintismal point called "current awareness", fine. It doesn't matter to the argument. Take a state Y, then note a prior state X. We don't even need the definition of "current" to understand this. All you need to understand is "prior state".

And even beyond that, I just have one question. Why is reality 4D spacetime?
We don't know that it is for one. Physics doesn't answer 'why' questions too well. Philosophy does sometimes.
If you're asking the purpose of the universe being the way it is, it doesn't seem to have a purpose. — noAxioms

Well my point is, there either is a reason for why it exists, or not a reason. What state caused the universe to be 4D instead of just 3D? There is either a reason for this, or there is not. Time or purpose really has nothing to do with it.

Why do people try to prove there is a God unless they are trying to convince themselves or can't handle people having different beliefs? — Gregory

Why do people not read an OP, and assume the writer is trying to argue for something they are clearly not? Please actually read the OP before commenting on it, as you are out in space while I am planet Earth.

m saying that our understanding of cause is not as clear as we assume. When we talk about events that cause events, we’re referring to agents. When we talk about the cause for an event, we’re referring to a principle, on whose behalf an agent acts. The primary principle is potential, which is not a ‘first cause’ in a temporal sense, but in a value sense. The qualitative and structural distinction is important. — Possibility

I think you do not understand what I mean by cause, and that is fair. It is very simple. A state exists in moment B. Now it exists in moment C. Now, if the forces etc. of B lead to the moment of C, then B caused C. If C does not have any prior cause, or reason for its being, then it is a first cause.

I simply take it to the extreme and get a result. Even in the case of an infinitely regressive system, versus a system that could have starts and stops along the way, there is always the question, "What caused the system?" There eventually comes the answer, "It just is, it has no prior explanation".

Your post misses the understanding of the OP, which is fine. The definition of causality I put forth should be easy to understand. If not, please ask me where there is confusion.

I see, the way it was presented, I thought it was an aside puzzle. That being said, an unsolved thought puzzle that might be true or false is not evidence. If I said, "It might be true that lava core is black at the center of the Earth," unless I show that is true, my supposition in no way challenges or presents evidence that the lava core at the center of the Earth is not black (currently we know it as yellow).

It is true that this indirectly equates 'the empirical' with 'the physical', but I think that is a fair assumption. What is generally accepted as empirical evidence, is something that can be detected physically. Is that not so? — Wayfarer

No, I don't think that. I've noted that physical reality is matter and energy. If you can show something beyond matter and energy as existent, than that would be evidence of of something non-physical. I suppose what is laced into the assumption, is that what is non-physical must interact with the physical. And this is not a dogmatic assertion, but a logical consequence. Regardless of your opinion on consciousness, I think we can all agree that every sense that we have is physical, and that we are made up of physical bodies. And since consciousness is contained in our bodies, and not outside of our bodies, if consciousness is non-physical, it interacts with us in particular, and not in some random location apart from our bodies.

So an example in terms of consciousness, lets say a person was thinking, and we found something that was obviously interacting with the matter/energy in the brain, but could not be classified as matter and energy. At that point, I believe it would be safe to call that non-physical. But if we cannot detect anything that can interact with the brain, when obviously our consciousness must be interacting with the brain, we're inventing something that isn't there.

I don't think that's an unfair requirement for the concept of something that is non-physical. I'm not going for a "got ya" or rigging the game to where you can't win. But if the non-physical is impossible for the physical to detect, then its an imaginary idea because then it couldn't interact with the brain. That's a lack of evidence. Its fine if you want to play a game with it, and imagine if it was true, what it would entail. But if you're going to claim it exists, you need evidence. Again, this is not unfair or overly demanding.

Please clarify. Are you implying there is no "now"?
— Philosophim
No, I said that you're making the assumption that there is one. — noAxioms

No, I am not making an assumption, I am noting a basic given definition. That's like if I said 1+1 = 2, and you came back with, "You assume 1 exists". If you want to counter what is assumed, that's fine. But that's on you, not me. Anyone with basic education knows what "current" and "1" mean. Its up to you to demonstrate why the regular and assumed use is broken.

We clearly exist currently don't we?
I can think of no empirical test that falsifies the alternative, so no, it isn't clear. — noAxioms

Let me help you out. If you don't exist, you won't type a reply. Let see if you type a reply. If you don't, I'll assume you don't exist, and this was all a fever dream. :)

If we observe something currently, then that state is current as well correct?
That statement also assumes (begs) it. — noAxioms

No, that's just basic consequential logic.

Physics suggests (doesn't prove) that the universe is 4D spacetime, and is not something contained in time, but rather something that contains it. — noAxioms

So you're assuming an unproven suggestion. I thought you didn't want to use assumptions? Also, if 4D spacetime contains time, then we as as 3D objects would be able to measure it. And if we're able to measure it, we can say, "This moment now is current". Imagine an X Y graph. I can measure the X, the Y, etc. Just because that 2D plane is on my 3D desk, doesn't mean I can't use the X Y graph. Same with time.

So your assumption, which isn't a given, doesn't really refute the idea of "currently existing", causality, or time. And even beyond that, I just have one question. What caused 4D spacetime to exist?

Vague references and a lack of evidence will convince no one.
— Philosophim

Well, clearly that's inaccurate. The world is made up of beliefs without evidence. — Tom Storm

Ha! And I almost edited that out when I initially typed. I should know better on the philosophy boards. What I should have said was vague references and lack of evidence are not convincing arguments to a rational person.

Did you see how your language shifted? Now you’re referring to cause as a principle, which is structurally different to an agent. — Possibility

My language didn't shift. Are you saying there is no cause for why it is, thus an alpha, or are you stating there is a cause for why this is?

Causality is also an explanation for why there is a current state.
— Philosophim
This makes the presumption that there is a current state. — noAxioms

Please clarify. Are you implying there is no "now"? Do you not exist at this time? We clearly exist currently don't we? If we observe something currently, then that state is current as well correct?