I am simply explaining the empirical fact that your definition is inconsistent with how English speakers actually use the words. — Michael

No, it is not an empirical fact that when people generally use the word man, that they are thinking it is equally as likely that it is an adult human female behaving like a man. When you read about a man in the paper, do you think they are male, or do you think they could be male or female? You have also not given me your definition of what a man is and what a trans man is. Nor have you answered what word we would use to replace 'man' for 'adult human male'. You are not discussing, you are insisting. Meaning, you are wrong.

You can argue that one word or another shouldn't mean something, but that's not the same s arguing that it doesn't mean that thing. — Michael

I have argued both for why it is, and why it should be. All you have done is insist that it is without any reason. Maybe you do have one, but you have to bring it forward.

Because those questions have subjective answers and argumentative grounds. Biological issues are subject to experimental and empirical truths. — Copernicus

In regards to sex, yes. In regards to gender, no.

What is this question doing on a philosophy platform? It warrants a biological truth, not argumentative conclusions. — Copernicus

I disagree. Philosophy is often about unraveling statements and terms to get better clarity of definitions and what we can draw from them. "What is mind?" "What is good?" "What is knowledge?" "What is a man?" I do not see any reason why this is not a philosophical topic.

Correct, but good vocabulary should be clear, unambiguous, and logical.
— Philosophim

No natural language is clear, unambiguous, and logical. Certainly not English. Maybe check out Loglan. — Michael

I said 'good' language. Of course we can have poor and confusing language. Are you advocating that's a good thing? Might as well throw away the field of philosophy then, as one of its primary purposes is to reason through clear and logical terms and ideas.

There's nothing about language that we should do; there's just what we actually do. — Michael

We should have clear language if we want clear communication between people. If I say, "Hops congaro wit nonk tugor", that is what I spoke. But can you understand me? Did it convey the idea accurately? That's the point of language. If you cannot convey a clear idea to another person that they can logically see, your language is poor.

And what we actually[/i] do is use the word "man" to refer also to transmen. — Michael

This is a nonsense statement. This ignores the definitions I've given above and does not try to give a reason why your use of terms is logical or unambiguous. What does 'trans' refer to then? What does 'man' without the modifier refer to? A statement of insistence is not a statement of argument.

No problem. I really wasn't sure what you were after. Sorry about that — Patterner

Not a problem,

A word's meaning is determined by how its users use it. If a sufficient number of English speakers use the word "man" to refer to both trans men and cis men, fully recognising biological differences between the two, then the word "man" refers to both sex and gender. — Michael

Correct. But does it make sense to do so? First, we would still need a term that denotes that a person is male and adult. It makes more sense to create a new word to indicate a gendered adult male then repurpose a term that is used without issue.

The modifiers for cis and trans take the familiar term that refers to sex, but modify it to refer to gender. And I don't think anyone has a problem with that. We have clear vocabulary that everyone understands, and we have terms that are useful.

My question to you then is, "Why should we change the term man to mean gender instead of sex by default?"

There's no divine dictionary that dictates what words mean. — Michael

Correct, but good vocabulary should be clear, unambiguous, and logical. It seems to me that changing the term man from a sex and age reference into a gender and age reference is not necessary as we have clear vocabulary that denotes gender and sex references already, and we would then need to come up with another word to reference the age and sex of a male.

But you defined gender as a cultural expectation. This means that for gender to change, the cultural expectation needs to change, not a person's personal feelings. — Harry Hindu

Correct, gender is a culturally subjective expectation of the behavior that a person should do in regards to their sex. This differentiates from objective behavior in regards to one sex such as bodily functions. The subjective notion may be within an individual, a small group, a city, a country, or world context if possible.

For example, wearing a skirt in America is expected to be worn by females, not males. If a male wears a skirt, they are acting in a transgendered way. They understand the culture views this as clothing that is expected to be worn only by females, and as a man they actively choose to wear a skirt despite knowing this.

Contrast this with Scottland where men are expected to wear kilts, which is basically a skirt. Wearing one fits the cultural expectation of a man, and if a woman actively wore a kilt prior to the 1800's where it was only men, this would be seen as trasngendered within Scottland.

Words can mean more than one thing. — Michael

Of course, and this depends on context. I am noting that in the general context in regards to sex and gender, 'man' refers to a person's age and sex, not gender.

Sex as a species expressed reproductive role means that terms like "man" and "woman" are sexes, not genders. — Harry Hindu

Correct.

So then what would be the labels we place on different genders? — Harry Hindu

We use the modifiers trans and cis to denote gender. You can be a man, and also be a cisman or transman. "Man" denotes your sex, the modifiers denote you are talking about male gender.

I really appreciate you as a poster Patterner, but if you don't mind, I don't want to make this political or judgmental. This is about taking the terms as they are and seeing if the conclusion above is logical or illogical.

My moral value seems to be supervening on the fact I am a bearer of conscious states. — Clarendon

So I do believe that everything has inherent moral value, but some hold more value than others based on the context of the situation. A germ or bacteria can be very helpful if it cleans up toxic waste, allowing more life to live overall.

In general, its a hierarchy. Non-life, life, conscious life. This is because there is a higher amount of actual and potential existence within more life and intelligent life. Rocks simply sit there. Chemical reactions eventually burn out. But life actively attempts to extend itself beyond a base chemical interaction. Intelligent life is able to alter the world in unique and amazing ways. This is what is good.

Thus I can conclude that I am essentially a bearer of conscious states - something no physical thing seems to be. — Clarendon

This is the mistake of hubris. You are a physical being. You are one aspect of a moral universe. The most moral in most contexts, but moral within the universe as part of the universe, not as something without.

↪Philosophim Although we are essentially objects, I don't think that fact about us can be what our intrinsic moral value supervenes on, for that would then mean that every object is intrinsically morally valuable (yet our reason does not represent this to be the case). — Clarendon

Every object has inherent value in comparison to there being nothing. Meaning the core of morality is that existence is better than nothing. I argue from here that more existence is better than less existence. Existence is not only action, but potential.

Imagine that only sheep and grass existed. Eventually the sheep would breed to eat all the grass. All the sheep and grass would die. Introduce some wolves however, and the existence of sheep, grass, and wolves will go on forever.

Morality in human is about creating the most existence from our actions. Do we commit actions that build up the world, or tear it down? Do we create an environment of safety, free thought, creativity, and joy? Or do we create an environment of danger, restriction, mundanity, and fear?

Objectively, we are objects so that can't be the reason. Have you ever considered that we are inherently valuable because we are objects instead of nothing?

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/15203/in-any-objective-morality-existence-is-inherently-good/p1

No, I don't see this either.
— Philosophim

Well, you could just move forward and say why you don't see this. — Constance

My point is I don't understand how you conclude this if you read the whole thing. Again, your comment doesn't point to what I argued in the paper, so I'm not sure how you concluded what you did.

I don't read the entirety of the pages of this other thread. I never do that. I just say what I think and be done with it. — Constance

Sure, I'm not asking you to read all the other replies in that thread, just the full argument. You can understand why making a conclusion about the argument based on the intro alone would be shallow right?

Sorry, I'm not going to read all of that. I read through some, and it occurred to me that it was excessive. — Constance

Then I'm going to take your disagreements with a bit less value. If you didn't read it, you probably don't understand it.

But existence qua existence syas nothing about this. OTOH, there IS no existence qua existence; this is just an abstraction from what there, in the givenness of the world. — Constance

Correct. But it is a reasonable foundation based on the logic of the argument. If you wish to point out why the argument doesn't work, I would be happy to discuss.

one has to move toward inclusiveness, that is, including everything that IS, and this means all of what is usually excluded, human subjectivity. — Constance

Then you do not understand the argument. Existence is everything that is, including subjectivity.

constitutes a view of existence which has no place for your thesis. — Constance

I'm not sure it does. If existence is everything, including subjective thought, how does my argument not work specifically? If you're not addressing the terms and argument used, then this is a 'straw man' fallacy. In other words you've built up and assumed I am claiming one thing that I am not, then saying its wrong.

You thesis amounts to a world where divinity subsumes existence. — Constance

No, I don't see this either.

One final point, if you can't take the time to read and understand the whole argument, but instead make a snap judgement based on the intro, why would I think you have the capability to be a proper critic of it? Something to consider with other posters going forward.

In this thread, I argue that mental to mental causation is not possible if mental events are related* — MoK

I'm sure you'll get plenty of pushback on limiting causality, I'm going to take another approach for you to consider.

Lets say you're right. Where does the thought come from? Does something cause that thought?

Now, someone like Mackie (see his Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong) will call this "queer"--for what kind of ontology IS this to rule over all existence? — Constance

It is the ontology of consequence. Essentially I'm noting that an essential property of existence is that it 'should be'. This is a fundamental. Fundamentals should be proven as necessary, for what exists to be, but themselves need no prior proof or explanation for their being. It is not, "This is what I propose, just trust me," but "The only logical conclusion that can be reached with what we know of existence."

If you're truly interested in the discussion, please check out the argument in addition to the definitions to see why this ends up being a fundamental. As well, it would probably be better if you post there to not distract from this person's post, as well as have easy quoting access to the argument and responses.

I don't think we disagree on the fundamentals here:

"an Is that entails what one Ought Not to do." is what you noted, which of course logically leaves us with 'what should be' vs 'what should not be'.

I agree that unnecessary suffering 'should not be', my point is that this can only be objectively true if good is objectively what 'should be'. The moral fundamental that 'existence is better than non-existence' is required for us to at any point claim 'X should exist". Because all questions of morality chain down to this fundamental question.

Why should suffering not exist? Because it overall lowers the quality of a living being's life. But why should there be a living being at all? Because its an increased concentration and complexity of existence that produces far outcomes than the material alone. Why should there exist anything at all? Because existence is better than non-existence.

The point of a fundamental is you can get to a point upon which you can build from. It also acts as a floor when working backwards. There comes a point where we have an answer, and there are no more questions. The answer is the reason, the fundamental that logically must be.

I've argued that my usage is objectively true. — 180 Proof

Oh, fantastic! I'll have to read it and reply later.

Existence is good? — Constance

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/15203/in-any-objective-morality-existence-is-inherently-good/p1

The above is the full argument so you can understand where I'm coming from.

... so it would never be good to eliminate good, and thus have complete non-existence.
Well, I think "complete non-existence" (i.e. nothing-ness) is impossible ... and who said anything about "eliminating" existence? Non-existence is an ideal state of maximal non-suffering in contrast to existence (of sufferers) itself. — 180 Proof

The only way to reason to come necessary baseline of an objective good (if it exists) is take the ultimate question of "should there be any existence at all vs nothing" and find what must be the answer. If an objective good exists, logically the answer must be yes. That was the original paper if you want to dive into it again.

Good by definition is what should exist ...
I don't see any reason to accept this "definition". "Should exist" implies a contradiction from the negation of a state of affairs, yet I cannot think of such an actual/non-abstract negation. — 180 Proof

When faced with a competing possible state of existence, what is good is the one that 'should be'. Without any means to quantify good this of course becomes an impossible comparison in many situations, and it may very well be that several competing states of existence would be just as good as another with this definition and evaluation. The original paper attempt was to see if a base good that could be established and built on from there. In such a way I could actually quantify that some states of existence were better than others, and build that up to see how that also applies to human morality.

A more apt, concrete use for "good" is to indicate that which prevents, reduces or eliminates harm (i.e. suffering or injustice). — 180 Proof

So what you're saying is the definition of good 'should be' something different? :)

I agree that what 'should be' is a state of existence where the least unnecessary harm and suffering occurs. The difference is the paper I wrote tried to prove it as objectively true, not a subjective assertion. To do that, it requires a base proof of good to build off of, and I believe using the definition of good as 'should be' fits within our general cultural understanding of good, and can be 'proven' by abducto ad absurdum (IF there is an objective morality). As I see no better competing proposal of good which can be defined as necessary within any objective moral system, I don't see a better alternative at this time.

[T]he one thing we can consider is that existence vs non-existence is good.
— Philosophim
Well I agree, more or less, with Thomas Ligotti (Cioran, Buddha et al): "nonexistence never hurt anyone and existence hurts everyone." — 180 Proof

And yet non-existence means that if good exists, that would mean the destruction of good. Good by definition is what should exist, so it would never be good to eliminate good, and thus have complete non-existence.

Certainly. Existence is good, and it can be measured by actual and potential over time. Morality in human terms is simply an expression of morality that that exists though all existence. At a very basic level, imagine if there were sheep and no wolves. Eventually the sheep would multiply, eat all the grass, then die out. But if there are wolves and sheep, the wolves make sure the sheep don't get out of hand. So instead of sheep alone living 100 years then dying out, you create a cycle that allows sheep and wolves to live for hundreds of years.

How can you know whether morality is objective or subjective? We know things from subjective sensory perceptions, e.g. I see these words on my computer screen. — Truth Seeker

A subjective morality devolves into opinion, which means there is no morality that anyone should reasonably listen to. When you state morality is subjective, its the equivalent to me saying, "Blue is the best color". If that is the case then we cannot reasonably make any enforcement of prevention or allowance of morality. A society which said murder is wrong would be just as reasonably justified as a society which actively encouraged murder and celebrated it. Subjective morality simply does not work as a rational system, and the only reason why anyone holds onto it is because they want to justify doing the things they like, or because there has been no proven objective morality thus far and people just want to hold onto something like "God makes it rain."

The proof does not prove that there is an objective morality, but it does show that IF morality is objective, the tenant of existence is good vs non-existence must be held as a foundational premise.

I believe that if one is to believe that there is an objective morality, the one thing we can consider is that existence vs non-existence is good. Proof here. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/15203/in-any-objective-morality-existence-is-inherently-good/p1

Although I can't prove anything beyond that, and the discussion is purely philosophical beyond that point, I think that any assertion of morality should not violate this core tenant.

Calling this “fancy wordplay” misunderstands what I’m doing. — Sam26

I didn't mean you, I was commenting on Wittgenstein.

The problem with JTB boils down to the definitions.

True - What is truth? If knowledge requires truth, then don't we run into a problem that we also have to know if something is true?

Justification - What is justification? Is it proof that something is true? Do we know what is justified? In which case, how do we justify our justification?

Belief is at least straight forward. "A claim that X is a real state." We can of course add "possibly real", but the "possibly" must be believed to be a real state vs "impossibly".

So how did Wittenstein tackle this? "Knowledge is a web of beliefs."

Justification - A whole bunch of people hold this web of beliefs.
Truth - Its true that this web of beliefs exists.
Belief - The web. And yes technically we've just create a whole other belief that's not really proven but it WORKS. And that's the key. As long as it works like science giving us thing we can use correctly in reality, we're all good.

Honestly...kind of a dodge around the issue with fancy wordplay as a lot of philosophers attempt to do. Wittenstein abandoned any formal analysis of knowledge and tried a descriptive approach. The problem with a descriptive approach is that it describes how we get along, and that getting along works, but avoids the larger question about why it works. Wittenstien wouldn't have an answer to a society that based their entire culture around a sky God that made it rain. This society would be largely functional and have enough common predictability with a scientific culture, so people would get what they needed out of it. Wittenstein wouldn't be able to answer why this culture was inferior to another if the outcomes were the same or even better, even though its clear this system lacks real 'true' knowledge by relying on a belief system of a sky God.

Its a very, "Live and let live" approach to knowledge and demands further questions and follow ups. I have my own theory of knowledge if you're interested Sam. Its basically a break down of knowledge into contextual deduction, and from there a way to rationally analyze induction through a hierarchy. I know I've critiqued your works in the past, feel free to do so in return if you're interested. Its intended to be approachable to even people without a philosophy background, but there is a summary below from the first poster that I approved if you need to organize your thoughts. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14044/knowledge-and-induction-within-your-self-context/p1

By definition, hallucinations are sensory perceptions that occur without external stimulus — Sam26

Incorrect. Hallucinations can also involve external stimulus.

"Hallucinations are false perceptions of sensory experiences. Some hallucinations are normal, such as those caused by falling asleep or waking up. But others may be a sign of a more serious condition like schizophrenia or dementia."
-https://my.clevelandclinic.org/health/symptoms/23350-hallucinations

If Reynolds were hallucinating, we would not expect such precise correspondence between her subjective experience and objective events witnessed by others. Hallucinations, by their very nature, do not provide accurate information about external reality. — Sam26

Incorrect. A hallucination can involve accurate information. For example, if their eyes or ears registered a bone-saw that could become part of a hallucination.

Further, the example you're citing about Reynalds isn't a great example, because critics of Reynolds note that its more likely they were unconsciously observing at moments of the surgery as consciousness can surge in and out. The problem is that we can't tie the remembering of the observation to the time of brain activity on the table. This is a MAJOR issue with testimony. For there to be any hope of a non-physical observation of the area, the object in question that must be accurately described cannot have crossed the vision of the patient, nor any other physically recognizable sensations like hearing. In tests where such objects have been hidden from the physical senses in a room, NO NDE patient has ever accurately reported them, even when these were very huge and easy to miss things in the room if you were in an out of body perspective.

So be careful with this one, as it borders on a straw man argument.

Perhaps most significantly, the hallucination hypothesis cannot account for veridical perception during periods of documented unconsciousness. Hallucinations do not provide accurate information about distant events, yet NDErs sometimes report observations of activities occurring in other parts of hospitals, conversations among family members miles away, or encounters with deceased individuals whose deaths they couldn't have known about through normal means. — Sam26

This is a good argument. Of course it must be verified that while the person was unconscious that nobody mentioned any of this information that the patient's hearing could pick up. We know for a fact that unconsciousness does not mean senses are turned off. As this cannot often be verified, these examples are worth setting up for careful testing, but cannot be taken outside of a testing environment as true due to this very important fact.

Your entire scientism section is going to instantly be destroyed by anyone who isn't a conspiracy theorist. You have a fundamental misunderstanding of the proper scientific method. Science does not seek to prove, it seeks to disprove. A hypothesis is created, and testing is done to destroy that hypothesis. If you cannot prove the hypothesis false, then it stands. Of course, peer review happens, other people test, and they too try to prove the hypothesis wrong.

So, science LOVES NDEs as something to test. Many experiments have been done on NDEs. To show NDEs must be true, you come up with an idea that can't be proven false. Unfortunately, they're always proven false. Its not that we can't try coming up with new hypotheses and experiments and test them. Science is great with that. Its that so far, no hypothesis that has been tested with the goal to prove it false, has not always proven NDEs as a conscious survival outside of the body as false. My advice is to remove the idea that science is not what we should be using. It would be much better to note that science needs to get more creative in its hypotheses, test more, etc. But if you can't do that, better to remove the entire section or anyone worth their intellectual salt is going to dismiss you right out of hand as a conspiracy theorist.

These explanations typically invoke correlations between brain states and conscious experiences, arguing that consciousness must be produced by brain activity since changes in the brain consistently affect mental states.

This argument involves a common logical confusion: mistaking correlation for causation. — Sam26

No, you are making the mistake in thinking this argument applies to brain states in modern day neuroscience. Maybe 20 years ago this argument had a tooth or two. Now it doesn't. The evidence for consciousness and brain activity is far beyond correlation at this point. You need to actively demonstrate a situation in which conscious brain activity does not meet expected outcomes. Which you do here, but you should change your argument to reflect that.

Consider this analogy carefully. When we examine a radio, we find consistent correlations between its components and the programs we hear. Damage the antenna, and reception suffers. Adjust the tuner, and different stations become available. Replace the speaker, and the audio quality changes. These correlations are real and predictable, yet no one concludes that radios generate the electromagnetic signals they recieve. — Sam26

No, because we see they receive signals. This is a poor analogy. Even if we didn't know about signal waves, we would be able to observe the antennae vibrations from the wave receipt. We would have evidence that there was some unseen force affecting the antennae. We have no example of this in the brain. While we haven't discovered the full inner workings yet, we have no evidence of outside interference affecting the brain.

Dr. Eben Alexander's case provides another compelling example. During his week-long coma from bacterial meningitis, his neocortex was essentially non-functional, "mush," as he described it based on his brain scans. According to materialist theories, this should have eliminated higher-order consciousness. Instead, Alexander reported the most profound conscious experience of his life, complete with detailed memories that persisted after recovery. — Sam26

Interesting, but there was no brain death. Low functionality on the neo-cortex specifically shouldn't limit consciousness as less intelligent animals have much smaller neocortexes and still conscious thought. I would not cite materialists here, I would cite scientists carefully to back your point.

Critics sometimes suggest that NDE memories form during brief moments of recovered brain function, either just before clinical death or during resuscitation. This explanation faces several difficulties. — Sam26

This is only pertinent in reports that do not have any ability to objectively match the time. Any that do have the ability to track and correlate do not face this critique.

Please cite the studies that you're noting that do have accurate time measurements. You cite Dr. Dr. Michael Sabom, but he only has two books of testimonies to his name, I'm not seeing any specific scientific articles he published. If you have peer reviewed articles here, this gives a strong case for this counter argument.

For your false memory section, this is generally good. I would argue that many NDEs do not involve false memories. The argument that you'll really need to address here is the fact that under surgery the body is in high survival mode. Just like when a person nearly comes to death while conscious, highly stressful situations can become incredibly vivid and embed themselves in memories for years to come. Again, the accuracy of memories must be accurate descriptions of reality that the patient could not see or hear while unconscious to be legitimate.

Subconscious sensory leakage is a huge counter to your argument, yet you only spend one paragraph on it. Honestly, its probably the main counter to NDEs right now. You need to expand this a LOT more. A quick reference to a few studies looks like you're shying away from it when honestly, its a major stake being driven through the basis of NDEs.

That's enough for now, I might come back later and critique the rest.

Because you are obsessed with not being labelled a Physicalist when I am not labeling you as a physicalist. Every post you seem to do this. — I like sushi

Just ensuring the accuracy of terms as you mentioned.

I am labelling the arguments put forward in this particular area of philosophy of mind as physicalist because they are. — I like sushi

Just because a physicalist can hold these arguments, this doesn't make someone who holds an argument that consciousness is physical as physicalist.

I can't imagine there will ever be a consensus on the exact meaning of these words, and anything less than exact can only lead to discussions of definitions. Which takes away from the more important discussion. I think the best solution is probably to not use any of them, and just spell out what you mean every time. — Patterner

Agreed. Patterner. At least for me I feel I've reached the end of any important discussion points. You all have a nice day.

And this is often a problem I have with broad generalized terms. The general definition of a physicalist is "One who thinks everything is physical." But I don't.
— Philosophim

Misrepresetnation of what is being said. — I like sushi

How so?

"Physicalism is, in slogan form, the thesis that everything is physical. The thesis is usually intended as a metaphysical thesis, parallel to the thesis attributed to the ancient Greek philosopher Thales, that everything is water, or the idealism of the 18th Century philosopher Berkeley, that everything is mental. The general idea is that the nature of the actual world (i.e. the universe and everything in it) conforms to a certain condition, the condition of being physical."
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/#ReduNonReduPhys
-Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

I clearly pointed to you that I do not believe all of existence is physical. If you read my paper on the Logic of Universal Origin and Meaning, you'll clearly see its a non-physicalist explanation for the universe. Further, if right, proves the very real possibility of non-physical things that could form in the universe that we are not aware of.

If I look at a block of wood and say, "That's physical." am I a physicalist? No. If I look at a brain and consciousness and say, "Consciousness seems to exhibit the signs of being physical, therefore its likely physical," am I a physicalist? No. You're making a mistake of taking my conclusion in one area and broadly attributing the moniker of physicalist to me from that alone.

So unless you are using the term physicalism in a way that is not formal, I am simply not a physicalist.

You're trying to occupy a non-physicalist position while affirming physicalist conclusions about the mind. — I like sushi

No. I'm not a physicalist, as they believe everything is physical. I simply conclude that the brain and consciousness is physical due to years of scientific results that indicate consciousness seems to be physical, while little to no evidence of it being non-physical. Concluding that consciousness is physical does not make you a physicalist. Believing that all of reality is physical and that there can be nothing non-physical does.

That does raise confusion because labels in philosophy matter, not to stifle thinking, but to track arguments, commitments, and counterarguments. — I like sushi

Yes. And you can clearly see from the above that my assertions that I am not a physicalist are true.

I've already said my piece in previous discussions, if there is something unclear or you disagree with specifically, feel free to reference it again.

The thing is this is a Philosophy forum and while it is certainly worth pushing that those partaking in discussions on Philosophy of Mind -- beyond a mere navel gazing -- have a pretty expansive understanding of the cognitive neurosciences. That said, the reverse is also true. One can have a pretty decent grasp of the neuroscientific evidence and yet be completely oblivious to what the Philosophical side of this is trying to tackle. — I like sushi

Very true.

A good number of scientists and philopshers alike point out that they are doing one or the other and that it is a category to combine the two. Physical Evidence is not an Abstract Proof and an Abstract Proof is not Physical Evidence. — I like sushi

Agreed.

The issue is you seem to have expressed quite ardently that your approach is not physicalist yet both of the above approaches ARE physicalist and you have said you dislike the reductive approach. — I like sushi

And this is often a problem I have with broad generalized terms. The general definition of a physicalist is "One who thinks everything is physical." But I don't. I simply note that the consciousness is physical because that's where the science is leading us. But its not a broad claim that 'Everything is physical and will be physical." So defacto I'm not a physicalist.

So we have to invent a new term. None of the terms really fit my conclusion, because terms rarely ever do. What I've learned in my time in philosophy is that 'ideologies' can be useful as general starting points for a discussion to get people in the ballpark. What I've found in practice is the ideologies and terminology get upheld more than the logic being discussed. Its the wrong emphasis. Every single ideology and terminology came to being due to someone's reasoning and logic. The reasoning and logic are what are important, not using the terms themselves.

This being understood, we must be very careful that we don't take ideologies and special terms as holding some special power. They do not. Their stringent and rigid adherence is only appreciated by an academic and rarely useful to creating new philosophy. My point was, "It doesn't matter what I am. It matters if what I think is the most rational approach." A 'label' is not the goal of a good philosophical discussion, only the reasoning of the discussion.

Being able to label certain positions and highlight where you do and do not agree with them helps people navigate the discussion and argumentation involved. — I like sushi

Also agreed. But they should be an assistance to understanding the argument being made, not something we try to fit the argument into. Its why when asked if I was a physicalist, I'm not. Hopefully that lets a person realize, "Oh, this person believes non-physical things are possible. Let me explore that." Instead, and I'm not saying you do this, it can become a game of, "Oh, but you said that the mind was physical, therefore you have to be a physicalist!" One is an attempt to clarify one's position and spark curiosity and understanding while the other is an attempt at closed minded idealism and used to shut down further exploration and curiosity. In most of my encounters over the years on the general forums, its the latter use that happens. Its because more people are interested in securing the 'rightness' of their position than genuinely exploring others ideas.

My exploration was an attempt to focus on the Causal nature of Substance Dualism (which we cannot say much about if anything!?) but which could help to further distinguish faults aroudn the Supervenience issue or Property Dualism. — I like sushi

Yes, and I do apologize earlier for losing track of that. That is definitely my fault. It may have been a little rough pivoting back to that, and that's where we both might have misunderstood each other. I do agree that we probably can't come up with any idea of causality with substance dualism, as the secondary substance could do anything. While the possibility is interesting, practically its a dead end for further exploration beyond its plausibility.

I can only assume you do not really know the appropriate terminology and therefore this entire miscommunication is due to you not knowing the Philosophical terms being used (not uncommon here, and I have been more than guilty of this myself over the years). — I like sushi

Yes, but not in the way you think. Often times I am aware of the terminology in a formal sense. Sometimes I am not of course, and I'll try to adapt and learn where I can. But what I am almost never aware of in a conversation is how other people define the terminology. I have learned that many people rarely use the formal definition of complex philosophical ideologies or terms. Its often subjectively bent through their own lens, and I am just as guilty of this. Its why I continually asked, "What do you define 'non-physical' as." Because there's a formal definition for non-physical, but that doesn't mean everyone views it in that formal way.

Anyway, thank you I am Sushi. I really did enjoy our discussion and can see you are a thoughtful person. A good thread. I can only hope I added to it and did not detract from your overall goal. See you in another discussion.

But what is the Hard Problem? — Patterner

From all the debates over it, apparently understanding it! I jest. The 'Easy problem" could more easily be called "The objective problem" of consciousness. How do we objectively show how consciousness works? We can solve that. We do this because we observe objective behavior along with brain states. Someone can imbibe alcohol, and we can see how this affects the brain and correlates to their behavior.

The "Hard problem" is "The subjective problem" of consciousness. I can give a person alcohol, I can observe their brain and behavior, but I can't observe their internal state of experience. I can hear from them, "I feel buzzed." But I can't objectively identify what the experience of being 'buzzed' is like. Without an objective ability to measure or understand another person's subjective experience, we're a bit stuck in figuring out how the objective states of the brain create a subjective experience.

The hard problem is often a go to for people who desire that there exists some type of mental or soul-like substance. The thinking goes, "Because we can't record it like other physical measurements, it must be something special." And indeed, I do think consciousness is special. I think some people get a little too into their imagination however, and want it to be something different so badly that they ignore the evidence that its probably not. To be clear, this is not necessarily for religious reasons. Much like people want to believe the pyramids were built by aliens, there is a fascination and draw for some people to find wonder or something exciting in exploring the unknown. I don't think this is wrong, a healthy imagination if necessary for progress and to ensure we're not stuck on the wrong path. Its only wrong if we insist it must be true simply because we want it to be.

I don't see it as "grafted", "inserted", or "added on", any more than properties like mass or electric charge are. Everything is just a part of what is. As such, consciousness is not "puzzling." — Patterner

I think exactly like you on this. The puzzle is figuring out how it works. The 'objective problem' is potentially solvable. We should be able to continue to map deeper and deeper into the brain and figure out how it works over time and careful study. The "subjective problem' is potentially not solvable. Currently the only way to seemingly solve the problem is to 'be' the actual subjective experience. As that's impossible, we're going to have to get more creative and likely find a way to translate subjective experience into some other language, likely based on brain state.

Our objective knowledge of the brain has made leaps and strides, but there's still a massive amount to learn. It may be that we do eventually learn that certain patterns of brain waves or neuronal shifting consistently result in a person's subjective outcome. It might simply be isolated to that person, and we might have to 'calibrate' the outcome to each individual brain. So the subjective problem might not be objectively solved for everyone, but we might be able to have an objective solution for each individual brain.

Should I continue to?
— Philosophim

No. I think not. — I like sushi

Well too bad, I'm going to respect you still for making a good follow up post. :)

I think there might have been a misunderstanding between us. If you recall, you wanted me to explore an IF scenario, and perhaps between me saying, "Ok, lets assume X is true" and my own viewpoints, what was thinking in your scenario vs my viewpoints may have gotten mixed up.

So, supervenience. To my understanding of the word, it is a non-causal dependency relationship. I think you misunderstood, or I did not communicate clearly enough, what was supervenient. I did not mean to imply that mental properties were supervenient to the brain. I meant that mental properties were supervenient to physical properties. In other words, subjective experience is still a physical property at the end of the day, not a brand new separate substance of existence. I say this not because I don't think that there can't exist a non-physical substance, its that I see no evidence that it could be some type of non-physical substance. Its why I've been asking for people to define exactly what they mean by 'non-physical' and present an example of something 'non-physical' existing that wasn't merely a miscategorization of something physical.

To repeat, I don't say mental properties are supervenient on the brain, but physical processes of the brain. I don't think supervenience works very well in regards to the brain because as I noted, physical processes affect other physical processes. Meaning, that IF subjective experience is a physical process, it impacts other physical processes in the brain. We see this in studies as well. The placebo affect. Creating positive subjective experiences can affect the brain's objective state in a positive manner. Supervenience as a description here does not work because these are causal dependency relationships.

If you hold to there being a difference between Properties of items under discussion AND hold that there is no Substance Dualism then it does not logically follow that you can have this both ways due to the condition of Supervenience — I like sushi

As you can see, I hold no substance dualism, there can still be a difference between subjective experience and objective observation, but we do not have supervenience between the brain's objective actions and subjective physical experiences of the brain are two separate physical processes that affect each other.

The only reason why someone can even propose that the subjective experience of the brain is 'non-physical' as something plausible, is because we cannot objectively identify subjective experience. We cannot 'be' some other thing besides ourselves. Because we cannot currently do this (and maybe never will be able to), this results in the hard problem. How do we figure out the link between our objective knowledge of the brain and the subjective experience of that brain? Currently, we can't.

Even if you sat down and mapped out your specific brain to your subjective experiences, how do you mark that down objectively? "I see green. But you might also feel happy. And might also be thinking of what you're having for dinner." You can describe all of that, but how can anyone else objectively understand that? What do you mean, "You see green?" Is it the same green that I see. What are the dimensions of green. How do you chart mental space in dimensions? What is the experience of being happy for you vs any other person? How do I objectively write down and measure a 'feeling'? Where in your mental space are you seeing green vs thinking about what you're having for dinner tonight?

In other words, we have no objective means of describing and recording subjective experience. The subjective experience of one individual is only inferred by another, never objectively known. As such, we can't even correctly map our own personal subjective experience in a way that accurately captures our own subjective experience, let alone others. That is why its impossible to link the objective mind to subjective experience in specific detail. We lack the measuring tools, concepts, and capabilities to do so.

This has caused some to think, "Does that mean that subjective experience is something non-physical?" A great idea to explore. Whenever humanity is faced with limits, we can still use logic based on what we know to come to at least some reasonable conclusions. Quantum mechanics is completely based around this idea. It is currently impossible for us to measure a quantum state without our very measuring tools affecting the outcome of the quantum state. Despite this, we've made a logical scientific theory that is often used successfully in the real world.

The brain is the same thing. We can approach the brain and ask if subjective experience is non-physical. Of course, we first have to define what physical is, then define what non-physical would be. Then in tests, we would look for results that either fit in with physical results, or outside of expected results. What neuroscience and pharmacology have consistently resulted in over decades is that subjective experience is a physical process. It follows and behaves physical laws. Its tied to a physical location in space. Physical drugs and manipulation of the brain result in rather consistent outcomes like physical laws entail. Subjective experiences affect the brain just like causal interactions between physical things do.

For subjective experience, we would need examples of outcomes which are necessarily non-physical. Thoughts not tied to the brain for example. One way causality. Physical affects on the brain, the location of subjective experience, having consistently unpredictable outcomes on subjective experience.
That, to my knowledge, simply hasn't been the results we've seen. Time and time again, despite not being able to specifically record and detail subjective experience objectively, the outcomes in which subjective experience are broadly generated implies a physical reality, not some other non-physical substance.

So, this is why I'm not a physicalist. I do not assert that everything is physical. I simply assert that subjective experience can be reasonably concluded as physical because there is no indication of subjective experience being non-physical in decades of exploring the brain. Could it be that tomorrow we do find something non-physical about subjective experience? Sure, anything is possible. But asserting that subjective experience must be non-physical does not align with our current understanding of science. It is the far less reasonable conclusion to make, and to my understanding held together by a wish and a hope that our inability to objectively record subjective experience allows that something non-physical could be hiding there. The problem of course with dreams like this, is without any evidence its simply as likely to be physical. With the fact that there is a mountain of evidence that subjective experience is physical, and almost none that it is non-physical, the rational position is to assume at this point that subjective experience is physical.

What does that make me? Just a person who believes the most rational conclusion we can make with the current scientific evidence that we have now, is that subjective experience is physical. No claims in how exactly the brain maps to it. No claims that the hard problem doesn't exist. No claims that we can objectively map subjective experience down. Just noting that when we define physical vs non-physical and look at the tests over the years, the evidence for subjective experience being physical is overwhelming while the evidence for it being non-physical is almost null.

I suggest you not pull a fast one and try to label a poster as holding a position they clearly do not hold without explaining why.
— Philosophim

Look it up. I am not stating you hold this rigidly (at least I hope not). The point is you need to understand the counter arguments involved. — I like sushi

No, it is not my responsibility to hear a claim from you and do all the work. You provide a claim, you explain with evidence why that claim fits, and then I'll answer your point. You are begging the question by assuming its simply true without a reason.

If you are just going to get all defensive because you do not understand the contradictions you are articulating — I like sushi

It is your job to point out the contradictions in what I'm stating and demonstrate why. I see only accusation, no articulation why. "You're wrong because I say so," does not work.

please do leave the thread and start your own. — I like sushi

I asked you earlier if you would like me to leave the thread because I was worried I had derailed from your OP. You said it was fine. I have answered you specifically on all of your questions and tried to get back to the OP. Now suddenly you're using logical fallacies and saying I need to leave the thread when I'm on topic?

Let's be very clear, the first to use obvious logical fallacies like yourself and not recant or at least try to explain themselves when its pointed out, is the one admitting to the person they were speaking with that they made a point you couldn't counter. You misunderstand. This isn't me being defensive. This is me giving you one last out before I walk away from this discussion as the person with clearly the better points. I get to walk out with class, you don't as it is now.

You don't even have to keep going in the discussion with me. A simple, "Thanks for the discussion. You've made some good points, but I'm going to hold to my end. See you around." is all you have to do. I was holding some genuine respect for you. Should I continue to?

The label not wanting to be owned here is Physical Eliminativism. — I like sushi

Ok, you need to present why you think that. I looked it up briefly and my points don't fit what you claim. Please point out why. I'm also a bit put aback by this. The only reason I could think you would attempt to link me to a philosophy that I hold no claim to is because you are unable to address the points I've directly presented.

Philosophim does not believe there is a Hard Problem. — I like sushi

Incorrect. We cannot know what its like to have the subjective experience of another individual, and while this is the case, the hard problem will be unsolvable.

↪Philosophim I suggest you use this term (Eliminativism) to describe your position in the future and perhaps look it up and address the arguments against it. — I like sushi

I suggest you not pull a fast one and try to label a poster as holding a position they clearly do not hold without explaining why. Further, I've been speaking with you specifically to your issues, I do not think you needed to tag other people in this thread. I've been very polite with you and thought we were having a nice conversation. Want to pull back a bit and keep talking with me on the issues I've noted and make sure you understand fully before hoisting a label that doesn't fit me?

Look at my points again and address them as is. Trying to tie me to something without a good reason and ignoring my points is a straw man tactic. Don't be like Wayfarer who acts childish when he realizes he's beat.

Why do brain states have subjective experience at all? — Patterner

We might be going around a little, and that's fine. Its not been an unpleasant go-around, but we might be coming to an irreconcilable rift in the conversation.

My point is that question is not special. Its the same question you can ask of anything. Its not a question that can be answered by mechanics. "Why is water wet?" is not answered by the molecular structure of water. It answers the 'what', not 'why'. Why isn't H2O sandy for example? Why is it 'water' and not 'dirt'. Because that's how matter is when H2O happens in reality. Why? We don't know.

Why is it that atoms are two neutrons and protons with orbiting electrons? Why does an electron even exist? Why does gravity exist? Why does subjective experience exist? All are the same type of unanswerable question.

Hoffman and Greene said about the physical properties off the universe:
"is utterly different in nature than conscious experience". — Patterner

They simply don't understand the question they're asking then. Its the same question. Why is water wet when H2O happens? Because it does. Why is a brain conscious? Because it is. We can know the mechanics of H2O. We can know the mechanics of the brain that produce a person stating they have a subjective experience. But we can't know why.

Lets look at it another way. Lets say that there is a physical and a completely different substance called 'mental'. Why? We could even break it down and show the exact interactions that produce mental subjective experience. It still wouldn't answer why. Why does not change the fact of what is. And what is in consciousness is clear and undeniable. Matter and energy, when combined a certain way, at minimal with neuronal states, produce subjective experience. The only way we know this is because we ourselves have some version of subjective experience, and we assume by logical belief that everyone else does as well.

But I mean, its clear. You have subjective experience right? You're made of matter and energy. Everything about your consciousness is like the thing in the box I mentioned in a previous post. Its stuck in the box of your brain, and everything we do to it physically results in generally predictable physical outcomes. There is no actual indicator that your consciousness acts in any manner that is different from a physical process then the fact that you don't know 'why' neurons have subjective experience. The only rational conclusion is that consciousness is simply an expression of matter and energy, just like the wetness of water. It is in no way special or different. Just another form of the wonder of physical reality itself.

"there is nothing that even hints at the inner experiences those particles somehow generate." — Patterner

Here they're just wrong. Its us. We are physical things, we have subjective experience. Neuroscience has proven our physical brain are the source, physical manipulation of the brain changes subjective experience, therefore the most rational conclusion is simply that water is wet, and brains can have subjective experience.

"seem completely disconnected from anything remotely like subjective experience." — Patterner

And H2O seems completely disconnected from hydrogen alone or oxygen alone. Yet magically, actually magically, its wet. No need to posit something non-physical to explain this absolutely mind-blowing marvel. Its just one more aspect of physical reality.

If I rubbed two sticks together and a geyser of water shot out of it, you would ask how that happened. You would not be satisfied if I answered that it came from the wood — Patterner

I have never been satisifed with the answer as to why 'water is wet'. It makes no sense. Why does a thing called Oxygen even exist? Why are there electrons, protons, and neutrons? Why is there anything, and why is it 'x' instead of 'y'? There are no answers. Consciousness for me is just the same question wrapped up in different words Patterner. But I don't question that water is H2O because of the science, and I don't question that consciousness is a physical process of brains because of the science. Don't know if that explains my viewpoint, and I'll understand if you disagree. But the way I see the world, consciousness is absolutely nothing special. It all is.

For Supervenience -- focusing on the physical stuff of Brain States causing another State -- the problem is the distinction made for different States, with The Mental/Brain State (Idea to Slap) supervenes the Physical State (Motion of Hand to Slap). This means that one state changes the other but not vice versa. — I like sushi

I may not have communicated this clearly then. No, both states would affect each other. Let me be clear.

Lets say that to get vision A, we have two neurons set themselves into position 1. But then, we have neurons 3 and 4 looking at Vision A. The brain is making judgements about vision A. Now it may be that its simply looking at the state of position 1, but the vision impacts the brain as well. Only in the case of substance dualism is it possible that the vision of the brain does not impact the brain itself. All physical interactions affect one another.

So either the Brain State plays no causal role in this OR this is physical reductionism — I like sushi

I'm not a fan of 'reductionism' here, but that may be bias. The 'mental state' IS the physical process. Its not 'reduced' to a physical process. The subjective experience of 'state 1' is a physical thing with neurons actively analyzing the process and coming up with new thoughts.

Do you think there is a good reason to distinguish between me moving my hand and me thinking about moving my hand? If your answer is yes, then we have Property Dualism and it needs explaining. — I like sushi

Yes, but it doesn't require property dualism.

"State 1" is me envisioning a cat. Two other neurons analyze the message from state 1 and 'analyse it' State 2 for them is 'Continuing to think about the cat' and state 3 is "Stop thinking about the cat". So we can say that neurons 3 and 4 are analyzing the state message that's coming from neurons 1 and 2. We can come up with, the process of "the vision" and "analyzing the vision". Both are physical. The categorization is 'vision' vs 'thought about vision'. This doesn't deny that both are physical processes, but we can categorize them using different language to better understand what's going on besides "Physical thought processes another physical thought".

If we are looking at this form a phsyical reductionist perspective it looks a more like Epiphenomenalism is a reasonable explaination of such Mental States. — I like sushi

Epiphenominalism fails because it is impossible for one physical process to not impact another. Impossible.

Ok, so that leaves us with 'a different kind of causality'.
— Philosophim

Well, this is where the line of thinking takes us. — I like sushi

I hope clarifying my point means we don't have to go down this route. In fact, causality is so fully defined, I don't think there can be 'a different kind of causality', and any ideas that lead to this road should use that as an indicator that the line of thinking that lead there is a dead end.

As far as I can see, you are talking about how gravity works. Well Einstein gave an explanation, that in the fabric of spacetime there is an effect like a gradient between masses drawing them together. — Punshhh

Yes, its possibly physical. But this gradient is entirely theoretical, and to me, still has the 'pullling' problem that I spoke about. Appreciate your viewpoint on it.

I understand your thought process here, but I fall in behind Bob Ross and Timothy on that discussion. — Punshhh

More than fair. Bob Ross in particular really understood the issue well, and I can see his viewpoint.

Although personally I would say how we and the universe came into existence is a deep mystery and it’s pointless trying to work it out until someone (who knows) comes along to tell us how it works. — Punshhh

True. The attempt wasn't to show how, but establish what is most our most rational claim could be when we don't know. While I might be incorrect on the idea of an uncaused existence, at least you can see an example of something, the uncaused inception itself, as a clear example of something non-physical. Thanks for reading and I hope it was fun to think about.

Now this is cleared up, the point I am making may possibly get around taking some kind of Eliminative argument to avoid this contradiction (Possibly). So put aside any disagreement with substance dualism and put some thought into what this could mean for the problem at large in terms of different types of causality or the absense of causality. How does this strengthen or weaken more physicalist positions?How does this reframe the problem? — I like sushi

I wasn't quite clear on what you wanted, so I'll state what I thought you said.

We've seen the results from property dualism, now you want to imagine IF substance dualism exists. I already mentioned that there is absolutely nothing we could glean about causality because we don't know what the properties of something non-physical would be. Would it appear to interrupt physical causality? is it the same? We don't know.

So, lets break down further what you said. Lets first start with an absense of causality. If there is no causality between two substances, they don't have any identifiable interaction. Causality is simply that a prior state necessarily leads to another state. Causality can even be handled inductively with probability. Once we know limits and can measure several limited outcomes, we can at least find a limit and start giving the odds for a particular outcome. No causality at all would eliminate all of that. If the mental affected the physical and vice versa, it would be so random we wouldn't be able to verify whether one actually impacted the other, or it was just a random circumstance that the mental appeared to impact or be impacted, but actually wasn't. If my paper on the logical necessity of a first cause, you can see the logic of true randomness. So no causality leaves us with no objective outcomes and we would never now how the two substances interacted, if ever, at all.

Ok, so that leaves us with 'a different kind of causality'. I have no idea what that would mean. We have regular causality and probability to handle uncertain causality. What else is there? It seems we only have the options of strict causality, probable causality, and no causality. Was I in the general ballpark of what you wanted to think about?

We cannot do any of that with consciousness. Nobody has any idea how it can come about from the properties of particles. There's nothing. What does it have to do with mass, charge, the nuclear forces, gravity, or any other physical thing that can be named? There aren't even guesses. Nobody can make any connection. — Patterner

You have to be very careful here. We have tons of information about the brain and objective consciousness. We can clearly see brain states influencing behaviors and responses from individuals that demonstrate altered brain states alter the person's subjective experience. Let me give you an analogy.

We have a box, When we shake it, something rumbles inside. Can shake the box and see bumps on the outside wall, but we can't get into the box. In every way, the thing inside of the box indicates its a physical thing. Can we suddenly claim it isn't? Its not inductively reasonable to.

What do I mean by this? The close inductive reason is to things we know, the more likelihood its going to be correct. Before we landed on the moon we didn't know exactly what would happen. We had theories. And all of those theories were based on things we knew from what we could glean. There was an imagined state that when we landed, aliens would emerge from under the rocks. But that's pretty far from what we know, so was likely an unreasonable induction to make.

Back to the box. If everything about the thing inside of the box indicates its physical, what's more reasonble to induce? That the thing inside of the box is physical, or that it is some hitherto unknown substance that defies all of our notions of physics? Its the former.

The only, the ONLY thing preventing us from being able to fully understand consciousness is the fact that we don't know what its like to have the subjective experience of another thing besides ourselves. Its the thing in the box that we cannot open. But if we're logical and test everything around that we can know about and discover it continuously implies that what's inside the box is physical...its more reasonable to believe its physical.

There is no logical reason why there may not be two substances (Substance Dualism). — I like sushi

Actually, there is. We have to be careful to not confuse 'plausible' with logical reason that it exists. First, there needs to be an indication of something occurring that is in conflict with the idea of one substance. There is nothing conflicting with the proposal that the brain is the source of consciousness and that subjective experience is a physical experience of the brain.

Second, there needs to be some evidence of this supposed second substance, and a working idea of how it is different and works. People didn't understand that rain was a simple cycle of physical law. Since they didn't understand it, they proposed an indefinable non-falsifiable proposal, "God did it". We are no different from the unenlightened before us in our strategies and approaches to things we don't fully understand. The only argument for consciousness being separate from the brain as another substance is purely, "We don't understand exactly why." That's not a viable argument.

Logically, there really is no good reason to think there are two substances in the brain. Objective consciousness reflects physical brain state changes, and people usually report that they had no subjective experiences beyond dreams when this unconscious behavior is recorded. It is at best a fun, IF, and I'll happily play along there. Anything more is outside the realm of IF, and has no validity in modern day.

In terms of Property Dualism you seem okay with this as you say it makes sense to demarcate between a slap in the face and the desire to slap someone in the face as two different states. — I like sushi

To make sure there is no misunderstanding if by property dualism you mean, "Classifications and grouping an underlying identity into subidentities," yes. If you mean, "Actual classification of two entirely different comprised substances that can objectively be identified as separate," no. Both the desire and the action to slap someone in the face are physical. But it makes sense to demarcate the type of physical action into words to convey quick communication. We are constantly trying to shorten what we need to say to convey an idea, and one does not have to go through the atomic method each time they want to explain that a pencil uses graphite.

It would then follow that you are saying mental states supervene over phsyical states, meaning if the physical state changes so to must the mental state, but not vice versa. — I like sushi

No, they're both physical states. So they can affect each other. There is no logical reason they wouldn't. Now IF they are two substances, who knows? Maybe its only the mental substance affecting the physical, and its a meat puppet being strung along from something we don't fully understand. Maybe the physical has a one way influence on the mental instead. We don't know. We wouldn't be able to tell because we don't even know how these two substances would interact. We need more.

It then follows that these mental states (you refer to as physical) have no causal effect. So now we have a physical state (neural state of mentality) that is non-causal. — I like sushi

No, I don't think that's the way it works. Physical interactions always affect what is being interacted with. What you are describing could only happen if the 'mental' was a substance that violated basic physical law. Fortunately there are many cases of 'mental' imagery and subjective experiences affecting the physical body, once again lending credence to thoughts being physical, and not some other substance with completely different rules.