It seems as though that you are implying that we should assess our options and pick the best one: I do not think this is the case. — Bob Ross
That is a choice, and one I respect. I believe there is no "correct" answer when this problem occurs, and should be left up to the individual.
On the contrary, I would argue that we suspend judgment until an adequate alternative is produced (in other words: I am perfectly fine stating that I simply do not know enough to make a meaningful conclusion). — Bob Ross
I have situations like that well. For example, if prior to the moon landing someone said, "The moon is made of green cheese, or blueberries, no alternatives", I would definitely suspend judgement until we arrived at the moon. Such inductions do not use tested reality as any basis. But, when we are living life, and questions about what the life means come up, I find I have to pick something. For example, morality. Lots of people have different inductions as to what they believe morality is. Some people choose to dispense with all of them, stating we cannot know. But some choose to pick one. In the second situation, I am the personality type that is the later. But in no way is the former personality type incorrect or inferior. I believe that is part of human variety, and essentially a way of humanity rolling the dice on different inductions to hedge our bets.
:)
To keep this brief, consider the process of perception, which I would argue one witnesses: I would argue one utilizes their built in “rudimentary reason”, which is essentially the most basic derived faculty of their existence, to “induce”, technically speaking, that they are indeed perceiving. However (and, again, I am keeping this extremely brief), this is very distinct from your OP, which I would characterize as mediate knowledge: the use of immediate knowledge that is extended (in this case via induction) to derive a principle from which to deduce. You see, if one were to remove a mediate form of knowledge, there immediate forms stay intact (left unaffected) because (I would argue) mediate forms of knowledge should never be prioritized above the immediate forms. Therefore, if all the options regarding a topic (that, most importantly, pertains to mediate knowledge claims) are unreasonable, then they should be removed even in the case that there is no alternative provided. — Bob Ross
Fantastic point, and I am in agreement. I believe I understand the general meaning you wanted to convey with mediate and immediate. Because I do not know all the subtleties behind the definitions, let me list out the concepts that were pertinent from them.
If I understand correctly, there are conclusions from experience, and conclusions from our minds. Ideally, we want conclusions from experience and conclusions from our minds to match up. But in the heirarchy, conclusion of experience are more reasonable to pursue then conclusions of the mind which are contradicted by experience.
The difference in the OP is that there is a situation in which we cannot discover by experience, because arguably we may never be able to confirm an alpha through experimentation. If we did posit an existence as an alpha, one could always state, "Perhaps we do not have the tools at this time to discover the prior cause." Even further, since an alpha has its own effects it creates once it has been incepted, we could simply work backwards and reasonably conclude that there must have been something prior, despite the reality it just formed in a particular state.
For myself, when left with a situation that cannot be confirmed through experience, I like to cobble together logic of the mind that is confirmed by experience, and see where that takes us. Perhaps I could "logically" conclude the moon is made of green cheese, despite no experience that would lead to this conclusion. This would be an irrational induction that I would throw away like yourself.
But, I know that causality is both confirmed by experience, and the mind. I can take that, and predict a logical conclusion. Is this logical conclusion's final steps purely from the mind? Absolutely. But do they have an underlying basis that is based on conclusions of experience and the mind? Absolutely. As such, I take this as the most reasonable induction to use when faced with a situation that may never be able to be confirmed by experience.
However, mathematical induction (as far I as I understand it) attempts to induce that P(n) will be true for all natural numbers, which therefore is perfectly within its own scope and not over-extending, but it does not, most importantly, attempt to say that P(n) fundamentally works outside of a space/time fabric. — Bob Ross
To this, I would translate and state, "Just because we can create a system of infinite numbers in our mind, it does not mean there actually exists an infinite amount of numbers in reality. If this is what you are implying, then yes, we are in complete agreement.
one can’t assume that causality would be behave (even if they had extraordinary inductive evidence of causality’s uniformity in our universe) even remotely similar outside of the very two (conjoined) concepts: space and time. — Bob Ross
True. But isn't the idea of something being outside of space and time an induction that cannot be confirmed by experience? If so, in your case it shouldn't be a consideration. In my case, I have an experience of space and time. If I compare the two theories, that there may be situations that do not have space or time, versus the reality of space and time that is also logically confirmed, I'm going to take the more viable induction that uses space and time. If you disagree with this, I see nothing wrong with that. But on the flip side, I don't think you could state there is anything wrong with what I am doing either.
Now, this gets contradictory (on my part) very quickly because of my next issue: the seemingly semantic basis for this OP—that to ask for a sufficient reason for a self-explained first cause makes no sense! — Bob Ross
That is the conclusion of the OP. What I show is if you take the idea that everything must have a prior cause for its existence, it cannot withstand its own logical conclusion when examined fully. The principle of sufficient reason in other words, has a glaring flaw, and logically, cannot be true. The POSR is an induction as well correct? And an induction that cannot be confirmed by experience, just like the conclusion of the OP. As such, the POSR is a conclusion of the mind alone. Yet, if taken to its end, we find the POSR breaks down. My conclusion does not break down. Therefore, if we have two conflicting inductions that can only be created within the mind, if one logically breaks down when fully examined, while the other does not, I am going to take the conclusion that does not logically break down.
To sum it up, the POSR states that everything has a reason, cause, or ground. But if we take it to its logical conclusion, we realize that does not mean that the reason, cause, or ground, is always due to something prior to that state of existence. Even if we envision the idea of an infinite regress, we still come to some conclusion that has no prior reason for its existence, besides that fact that it is. To preserve the POSR, we must add an addendum. "One reason for a things existence that has no prior cause, is the fact that it exists."
The OP points out the only logical conclusion that can be made while still preserving the POSR. To deny that there must be at least one alpha, points out a flaw in the POSR that cannot be answered, and it is refuted.
I do not deny that it may be impossible for true nothingness to exist, but I find it also impossible to deny that it might. The fact that we can doubt one, does not eliminate the possibility of the other.
I 100% agree here, but to be able to doubt something is distinctly different from doubting something on reasonable grounds. I am not advocating that we should disband notions because it is possible (or room to) doubt it, but, rather, it should be disbanded if the doubt introduces reasonable justification to disband it. — Bob Ross
True. But can you point to a situation in reality in which there is literally no space between anything? At this point, that is and induction, but not observed reality. In all cases in which we have observed reality, we have found space between objects, and also in between the smaller objects we discover. So for my case, I believe it is much more reasonable to conclude that there is "nothing" between things. This is not an affirmation that I am correct. I am just trying to point out my induction is not less reasonable then the idea that "nothingness" doesn't exist.
You have done a marvelous job at addressing my questions! And thank you for that! But I would say that I am still having a hard time understanding how a “self-explained first cause” isn’t solely a semantical distinction? And even if I were to grant that it is perfectly valid to simply define PSR out of the concept, I would still have to confess that PSR (having such a strong will to live, metaphorically speaking) will wiggle itself back into existence! For I could then ask for a sufficient reason for why PSR is defined out of the concept. Hopefully you see my confusion. — Bob Ross
And you have done a magnificent job of questioning and providing alternatives to think on. I do not believe anyone else has grasped the argument to your extent, nor provided such detailed and insightful criticism such as yourself. I think we are reaching a conclusion with the points I made about the POSR. I look forward to your response!