So, you are saying that (don't mind my rewording of the 2 premises)...

1. All things have a prior cause.
2. There is one or more first causes from which a chain of events follows.

Or more precisely...

1. All things have a prior cause.
2. There is a first cause from which a chain of events follows. — chiknsld

No. I am stating any one thing either has a prior cause for its existence, or it does not. Let me simplify it further.

Premise:

A. Every piece of existence can be explained by prior causality OR (Don't forget the or!)
B. There is at least one existence that has no prior causality for its existence, it simply is.

Sorry it's just a very strange way of saying that there simply is no beginning :snicker: (please correct me if I am wrong). — chiknsld

I think the problem is you are taking an 'or' premise as a conclusion. Did you read the rest of the steps and the actual conclusion? If you're just reading the first premise, you're not going to understand anything.

I missed the universal quantifier at the beginning. I think it's better written with an existential quantifier to be an actual "or".

Edit: you postulate variables it looks like but you can't check them with "1." because it uses a universal quantifier. To be able to check them with "1." you need it to be able to take in "X", "Y", "Z". — Shwah

Could you clarify this please? I don't understand what you're saying here.

The creation of eternal space and time requires a different kicker which must be divine in nature. An unknowable causal power. — EugeneW

No, the OP makes no claims to this. If anything is definitely negates the necessity of a divine being.

Let's take out the fluff...

1. All things have...prior cause.
2. There is...first cause of existence. — chiknsld

Don't forget the "or". Its one of two outcomes. Either infinite regression, or finite regression. In that first premise I am simply proposing there are only two outcomes of causality that can be concluded. This premise in no way indicates an assertion or conclusion as to which is true. If you're simply reading the first premise and judging the entire argument, you don't understand the argument.

The "or" logical connective is meant to make sure that only one condition has to be met for anything. It's to prevent infinite regression. — Shwah

No, this is not meant to prevent infinite regression. It is stating infinite regression is one possibility. Finite regression is another possibility. The "or", is the connector demonstrating that one or the other must exist.

"It just is."
— Philosophim

That's what a certain subgroup of scientists would say. Those who're in the business of description of nature. However, I believe there are some who aren't happy just reporting on how nature behaves. They wanna explain, answer why questions and for them the statement "It just is" is a beginning, not the end of science. — Agent Smith

Understandable. I note in later discussions that actually showing that a specific existence is self-explained would be nearly impossible. A self-explained entity has no rules for its existence, so there is nothing preventing a self-explained existence from appearing, that our physics or notion of causality would imply there was something prior. For example, the universe could have snapped into existence 5 seconds ago, but its organization and structure would lead us to believe it had existed for a vastly longer time.

So what is its use and application then? For one, it may be helpful to understand self-explained existences are logically necessary. There may come a time in exploration where there is no prior causality. And that's ok. There's no need to continue to invent something that caused what appears to be the limits of our understanding within causality.

This is also a replacement for any Kalem type arguments for the existence of God. While technically a God would be logically possible, it is no longer logically necessary to understand origins in existential causality. It can also just as logically be that "the big bang" had no prior explanation for its being besides that it just happened.

Existence on the other hand typically refers to ‘all of reality’. I’m not sure how you distinguish ‘existence’ and ‘universe’ from each other. Maybe you have totally different definitions of these things than what I’m guessing. — noAxioms

So "existence" is generally seen as "everything". "An" existence is a snapshot identity within. An atom is "an existence", but is part of "all existence". In the OP I am referencing Y as "an existence".

Y: represents an existence that may or may not have prior causality. — Philosophim

Is the above quote what you were asking to define existence for? In the future, try to cite your questions of vocabulary using the OP. This will help me ensure I understand where you are coming from.

Your statement above (coupled with others) seems to imply that ‘existence’, reality, or something at least, suddenly was, uncaused, when before that there wasn’t existence, reality, or anything. — noAxioms

Can you coach this in terms of points 1, 2 and 3 in the OP? Where is this implication coming from in those steps? Or is it elsewhere in the OP?

You say ‘there is an existence’, like this first cause thing still is around, and didn’t disappear like all the other causes. — noAxioms

Where do I say that in the OP? I'm just looking at the chain of causality. I don't believe I ever insinuated the first cause needed to continue to exist.

You seem to define ‘first cause’ as any event lacking a direct cause, and not ‘comes earlier than the others’. — noAxioms

Correct.

Also, don't forget the very important part, "at least one".
A bunch happen at the same time, or a bunch of them happen after a while, but with only one earliest one? — noAxioms

Could be any of them. I don't claim any one limitation in the OP.

Further, this is not an argument about "the formation of the universe". The argument is that in any chain of causality, a first cause is logically necessary.
There are circular solutions, so this logic doesn’t follow. The infinite regress is also a valid solution, but you conclude otherwise. — noAxioms

Please point out where in the OP the there is a circular solution. I'm not sure what you mean by the infinite regress was a valid solution, but I conclude otherwise. Where in the OP did I do that? Please site the specific sentences.

Hence 180’s trivial retort (first reply) about the first integer. Yes, they can be counted, but they can’t be counted in order. — noAxioms

I love 180 as a poster. I find him generally witty, knowledgeable, and was thrilled to have him in my thread. He also stuck to a straw man despite my repeated attempts to get him to cite the actual argument instead of what he had invented in his own mind. I only note this, because a person of his learning and intellect should have known better, and I have rarely been more disappointed in a person. Not a good reference to use in this thread.

The problem is, I have a lot of people who come in here thinking they know the argument by glancing at it, but don't actually understand it. I don't mind that as long as they are willing to look at it again, ask follow ups, and try to understand it once I point out they don't have it quite right. If you're curious about a good poster to cite, look up Bob Ross's responses and my conversation with him in this thread. If I remember correctly, I conceded to him on his points. It might give you a better understanding of the OP.

Either all things have a prior cause for their existence, or there is at least one first cause of existence from which a chain of events follows.
This seem to allow only infinite regress, causal-turtles all the way down. There cannot be a first cause of existence (your definition) since existence would be the effect, meaning that which caused it was something that didn’t exist, being prior to existence. And the eternal (cyclic say) models of the universe make different empirical predictions than those we see. — noAxioms

Ok, this is good. But what about the second part of the sentence, "Or there is at least one first cause of existence from which a chain of events follows". We had this exchange here:

I do not state the universe needs to be caused.
But that’s how I read the above quote. Either the universe has a prior cause for its existence, or there is one first cause of existence, which sounds like the same thing: existence being caused, but perhaps that cause is not ‘prior’. — noAxioms

I think you misunderstand. A first cause means there is an existence which can cause others, but has no cause itself. That is why it is a "first cause". Also, don't forget the very important part, "at least one". Not "only one". I've had quite a few people miss that.

Further, this is not an argument about "the formation of the universe". The argument is that in any chain of causality, a first cause is logically necessary. For all I know, the formation of the universe happened over several first causes. I have no clue. I don't pretend to even make a claim. If anything, this is just a claim of what ultimately results if we are to examine the principal of sufficient reason.

In the end, I basically conclude that there cannot logically be an infinite regress of causality. That's really it.

Re-read the argument in its entirety again please.

They might both describe causality to your satisfaction, but that isn’t sufficient for the two interpretations to not be mutually exclusive. — noAxioms

I don't see how they are mutually exclusive based on how I describe state relations in the OP. Feel free to point out where this exclusion exists.

B theory indeed does not eliminate time, since it is essentially a dimension in that view. It does explicitly deny past, present and future state, so that assertion about it is wrong. — noAxioms

If I understand correctly, its the elimination of past, present, and future as a non-relative view point. If you have time, you have a prior state, a current state, and a potential future state, which is in line with the OP. Time as relativity does not counter the state relation. If I'm using the words, past, present, and future, note it is for ease of understanding in a state relation argument on a forum, not a science article. If I posted a B series interpretation, this topic wouldn't have reached many people. That's not the goal here.

If you see me use past, present, and future, just replace it in your head with prior, current, and post in a relative sense. This shouldn't be difficult. And if you insist on removing past, present, and future, or time itself, then just state "X" is the immediate influence or cause on "Y". Again, this doesn't affect the OP. If it does, please specifically point out using citation, where it does.

There is only the relation of one event being prior to another, or ambiguously ordered. If two events are ambiguously ordered (frame dependent ordering), then the principle of locality says that neither event can be the cause of the other. — noAxioms

I'm replying to you today because of something you posted earlier. There is no ambiguity here. Same with you. You replied to one of my prior responses. We don't have any ambiguity here. We're not describing two states that aren't in contact with one another.

I'm not talking about a butterfly flapping its wings in Africa is the cause of our conversation today. I've mentioned in the OP "causal chains". Meaning more than one. Meaning, different chains of causality. There is no claim that everything interacts with everything and everything is the cause of everything else. You need to directly show how your argument applies to the OP.

If you set up two separate causal chains and state, "They don't have any relation to each other," its irrelevant to the OP. "I have a state Y. Does it have an X, or not? What is the logical result in any chain of causality?" Again, I'm not seeing the connection between the OP and your arguments.

The scenario shows how two events, say months apart but in the same approximate location, are nevertheless both simultaneous to this one event on Earth (the event of my greeting my friend in passing). There cannot be two present moments a month apart in Andromeda, so it is contradictory if both my friend and I are correct about what’s going on over there currently. — noAxioms

In the OP I would simply take the entire state of Andromeda and Earth and ask, "What caused this?" Again, I'm failing to see how these criticisms apply to the OP. What would help is if you use the OP's argument, and show how it cannot apply with these interpretations. That's the main problem with your criticisms. I'm trying to show you why they don't apply to the OP, but you're not using the logic of the OP to explain why they do. I'm not saying you're wrong, I'm just saying you need to use examples that apply, not vague assertions.

It was brought up to a different post of yours in this topic. It is relevant to the OP, because according to A theory, the universe itself, or at least the initial state, needs to be caused, which is the something-from-nothing connundrum. What caused the rules by which uncaused events are legal in the first place? — noAxioms

You need to re-read the OP then. I do not state the universe needs to be caused. Please cite in the OP the point you are criticizing. I'm getting more and more in our conversation that you don't understand the argument. Prior to doing more criticism, perhaps seek clarification as to what the argument is stating first. I believe you're using a straw man here without realizing it.

— noAxioms
Reading up on B theory again, I did not see how B theory ignored parts of spacetime.
— Philosophim
It doesn’t. It’s A theory that cannot handle this problem. That’s why I posted it when you asked me why B is better.[/quote]

Ok, how does this apply to the OP? And this time, please cite the OP itself. More and more as we're chatting, I'm realizing you don't understand the OP. I keep trying to bring you back to making the point about the OP. At this point, please explicitly cite the sections, or I think we're going to keep talking past each other.

It doesn’t. It’s A theory that cannot handle this problem. That’s why I posted it when you asked me why B is better. — noAxioms

Again, where in my OP am I explicitly demanding A theory? This is the unintentional straw man. I've already told you several times I don't care if you use A or B theory, because it doesn't matter. If it does matter, you need to show me how with citations at this point.

All the prior cause did was change the arrangement of the coins over time. I don’t consider that a change to anything’s existence
— noAxioms
I do. That is a change in spatial location. When one state is different from the next, that is change.
— Philosophim
I’d have said change over time, but that’s not the point. — noAxioms

Its not important what you would have said, its important what I've said right? You have to first understand the OP before you can criticize it.

If you read the comment, it was non-existence to existence that I was discussing. Then again, it very much depends on one’s definition of ‘exists’, which in turn is dependent on ones interpretation of time. So the time discussion really turns out to be relevant.

B-theory says the coin-smiley exists. The rearrangement of the coins over time doesn’t affect that at all since all events (coins in smiley pattern, coins in different pattern) all exist equally. So the change over time was caused, but the existence wasn’t affected. And that’s not even using my relational definition of ‘exists’. — noAxioms

This was mostly nonsense to me and shows no understanding of the OP. Look, there's a difference between presenting alternative definitions and view points to the OP, and just presenting alternative view points that don't clearly show how they criticize the OP, and yet you use them to criticize what you think the OP is saying. I think at this point we've gone back and forth enough, that you don't understand the OP. I'm the guy who wrote it, so I'm a fairly good authority on it. :)

Please use the OP to cite your issues directly. No more abstracts, because you either don't understand the OP, or I don't understand the criticism against the OP, because you're not being specific. Once you do that, I think we'll be able to get a resolution on this discussion.

That sounds pretty contradictory to me, despite the lack of an empirical test to directly falsify either. — noAxioms

It doesn't to me. Neither eliminates causality, which is all I care about. B theory also does not eliminate time. There is still clearly a past state, present state, and future state. The past state causes the present state, and the present state causes the future state. To counter the argument you have to eliminate causality, and I don't see B theory doing that. If you think it does, please point out how.

There’s no time dilation in the Andromda example. It is an example of relativity of simultaneity. — noAxioms

Sorry, its been a while since I've read the specific vocabulary of relativity. I generally remember relativity from years ago and many of the consequences of it. But I did not see how it countered the OP's points.

The Andromeda argument has nothing to do with Y, or anything measured or caused for that matter. Do you understand what is being illustrated by the example? — noAxioms

No. If it doesn't have anything to do with the OP, I'm not concerned. That's been my point. I don't see how it counters the arguments of the OP.

My argument against that is that there is no coordinate system that meets the requirements, forcing the interpretation to deny the existence of parts of spacetime. — noAxioms

Reading up on B theory again, I did not see how B theory ignored parts of spacetime.

All the prior cause did was change the arrangement of the coins over time. I don’t consider that a change to anything’s existence — noAxioms

I do. That is a change in spatial location. When one state is different from the next, that is change. And a change in state either has a prior cause, or does not. Regardless, even if there was not a change over time, there is still a cause of why the state did not change either. Again, it is about states. Why does Y state exist?

Either an infinite number of events has occurred or there's a first cause.

An infinite number of events hasn't occured (proof?) — Agent Smith

I never claimed that in the OP. Please re-read again, or check some of the better follow up comments. I stated even if an infinite number of prior events occur, that there is still the question of, "Why is the universe set up in a way to have infinite regress? The answer is, "It just is."

Good responses! Let me follow up.

These are not claims in a vacuum, they are claims that are a counter to my claims.
Are you claiming that your premises are in fact correct or at least better? — noAxioms

Lets say, "Yes". I believe they are correct. Better? Maybe not. If you're claiming your premises contradict mine, I don't think they do. Meaning, they might be able to co-exist without issue. When you first introduced it, I was trying to figure this out. Typically in a reply to the OP, an alternative is mentioned as a challenge, or direct conflict to the initial argument. If that was the intention, its why I've asked for clarification on why you believe this to be more valid than mine. Lets go over that.

I greet Bob as we walk past each other. Relative to me, the Andromeda generals have currently (as of the present) not yet decided to launch a war fleet. Relative to Bob, the war fleet is currently in flight, having already been launched. If there is a current moment over there at Andromeda, then the fleet cannot be in a current state of having been launched and not launched. — noAxioms

Basically Einstein's time dilation. No, I don't think this counters the OP. Y is simply the current state we are looking at. Perhaps current is a poor choice of words. Y is the state we are looking at relative to a prior and post state. Lets call it the 0,0 on an x, y axis, what is called the origin. Origins give us a baseline for measurements and comprehending concepts. A starting point helps us think about relations in a coherent manner.

So, relative to a Z, a Y is an X. Relative to an X, a Y is a Z. We are simply using a Y as what we are currently looking at, even if that was 1000 years in the past. Taking your time dilation example, we just have to examine the state properly. In isolation to each other, each state does not consider the other state. Which is perfectly fine if the other state is unimportant to what we are considering. If however, we took the state of both together in relation to each other, then the state must be described as such. Meaning we would say on Earth, the time is 2 hours behind the time on Andromeda. No contradiction there, just a measurement of state that notes the relative time difference.

That doesn't seem to contradict the OP. I could still ask, "What caused this current state to be?" Does it have an "X", a prior explanation, or is it a "first cause", or explained without an X, and simply exists because it does?

There is no coordinate system that foliates all events in all of spacetime, which means that there are events that are not ordered (are neither past, present nor future) relative to any time say here on Earth. — noAxioms

Fortunately, I'm not using a coordinate system. I'm using a state system in a set model. Describe the state however you want. The question still remains, "What caused the current state to be what it is?"

Thirdly, and most importantly, how did time get going, and if it was always going, how did the universe suddenly ‘happen’ when there wasn’t anything before it. How does one explain the reality of whatever one asserts to be real? — noAxioms

That would be subsumed in the OP. Lets call the existence of time Y. If there was something that caused Y, that answer would be X. And of course we could examine that X, make it a Y, and repeat the question. An alternative to the original Y of time, is that it has no X. It is a first cause, or a self-explained entity by its own existence.

Why can self-explained states exist? There is no answer, because they have no reason to exist. If there is no reason why they should, or should not exist, then there is no explanation for why they should, or should not exist. They just do. The OP concludes that inevitably in any chain of state causality, there will come a time when you find a Y that has no X. This is the "first cause" within the chain of causality you are looking at.

Lets minimize what is extra, and only focus on what is necessary for the discussion please.
But you asked quite a few questions in your last post that are a response to my comments, and not directly related to the OP, such as why I suspect the A interpretation of time is questionably valid. — noAxioms

Understandable. I didn't fully understand the points you were trying to make. I assumed it was against the OP, and so I ask questions and make points to see if I understand, or to seek clarification in a counter response. Generally it is safe to assume that another person, even very intelligent and rational ones, are not going to fully understand your meaning and intentions on a complex reply. That applies to me as well. In my head, the OP is clear as day, but I understand that's because I've thought about it a long time, and I have implicit biases and knowledge that I may not have conveyed to another person accurately.

Every person reads and can interpret writing differently as well. But generally it is safe to assume that if there is writing that implies some contradiction to the OP, the OP is going to assume that route first when trying to understand a response. This doesn't mean the OP is correct of course, but when trying to understand and figure out where another person is coming from, guidelines like this are often followed.

I said pretty early on that I have no problem with uncaused events. You speak of chains like a given occurrence has but a single linear set of causes before it, when in actuality there are probably countless factors that came together to cause the occurrence in question. — noAxioms

Let me quote a line another poster missed the first time around as well.

1. Either all things have a prior cause for their existence, or there is at least one first cause of existence from which a chain of events follows. — Philosophim

Notice I say, "At least one". No, the OP in no way implies it is only one. I've followed up with a few people who have thought the same and pointed out that it would seem by odds to be much more likely that there are several "first causes" that might interact through causal chains. People I think have a bias that they bring to the argument as well. Several people have thought this was a "God" argument, which its clearly not. Its normal for things like this to happen, which is why we discuss, ask each other what we meant, and have follow ups.

I feel like I understood your points much more this time, and I hope I followed up adequately in my answers.

That's what I'm saying -- my justification for the truth of my dream is your own experience, and vice versa. Are you not seeing the issue with this? There is no group of anti-dreams who calls us out on our bullshit dreams. No one. — L'éléphant

Probably because whether you dream or not has very little impact on yours and other's lives. I stir my coffee clockwise with a spoon. There aren't any "anti-clockwise" people at my door asking me to stop because it affects no one.

Why can't belief in god work the same way? Many people claim they have experienced the divinity or holy ghost. But we do not readily accept their account. — L'éléphant

Because such a belief has a fundamental way of altering that person, and other people's lives. Internally, we feel a lot of things as human beings that cause us to make mistakes and do actions that are harmful to us and other people. While belief in a God has caused people to do great things, it has also caused people to live irrationally, and justify some terrible decisions.

When you believe God told you to do something, there is no possibility of you being wrong anymore. Every action should always be open to being "wrong" in hindsight. Its the only way we learn and grow as people. When you have divine guidance, there is no possibility of thinking, amending, or improving. If "Gays are evil" for example, you can't have a rational discussion with that person, as they feel like they are divinely correct, thus your mortal arguments are against God, ignorant, and sinful. This stunts people's growth and makes them emotional animals. Satisfying for the person, but can potentially be terrible for themselves and society.

But lets get out of that for a second. If you notice, I've mentioned evidence of such things existing beyond the experience of the personal account. In other words, there is more than just the personal experience, there are physical and external results of such experiences.

Communication with God should light up the brain, which it does by the way. Here's a great study on the neuroscience of it, which every believer should read. https://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/322539#:~:text=The%20researcher%2C%20who%20literally%20%E2%80%9Cwrote,frontal%20lobes%20of%20the%20brain.

I myself am not anti-God or anti-religion. The only thing I honestly am completely against, is the belief in immortality or life after death. That to me, is complete and utter evil.

This is not a proof. Doctors could only infer from our reports of pain -- but there's no thing that is called pain. It's not like a tumor, where there is concrete evidence of it. Medications work on pain, through trials and studies of subjects who report which pain medication eases their pain the best. Evidence is what you're thinking of. Trial and error is not proof. And so on. — L'éléphant

I'm going to disagree with you here. Trial and error to figure out what works is also evidence, its just evidence and proof obtained the hard way. If you don't agree that's fine, we'll just have to accept each other's view points here.

"The thing is, we both reference the same color, and don't have a debate as to whether it is labeled "red"

Again - I agree with you. But this go against Wittgenstein's notion that there is NO WAY of knowing what colour different minds are seeing. — GLEN willows

You don't need Wittgenstein, any first year philosophy student knows this! If you read again, I'm agreeing with you to a point. We can know certain things like whether a person consistently sees a wavelength as a certain color. Do you see red for what I call blue? Very possibly. Do you see a new and different color every time I see what I call blue? No.

Finally, there's likely a limit to the color spectrum as well. A bright color is likely not seen as a dark color. So if I saw a light blue, you might see red, but it would also be a light red.

The standard philosophical agreement is that it's impossible to say that the colour red that I see isn't the colour blue to you. Yet doesn't this clash with the descriptors we use for different colours? — GLEN willows

There is not necessarily a clash here. We know the wavelength of light is how colors are seen. We know the eye takes in colors and the brain interprets them. So there is some objective measurable qualities.

Further, most people seem to internally experience the wavelengths consistently. So lets say for example that when I saw what you consider red, I would see it as what you would consider blue. The thing is, we both reference the same color, and don't have a debate as to whether it is labeled "red". Meaning we're consistently seeing our same internal color for the same wavelength, and can both apply the external label of "red" to it.

Perhaps this is why we have different "favorite colors". Who knows, maybe we all like similar colors internally, and its the external names that differ. As long as we can both identify a color as "red", it doesn't matter if we internally see it as a different color, like blue or green. When there is an issue, we usually call this "color blindness". Color blind people internally see colors in such a way as to not distinctively see certain wavelengths like the rest of the population. Red and green for example can blend internally. But for the rest of us, as long as we consistently see X wavelength a particular way, and can tell the difference between the different wavelengths, how we internally see colors isn't all that important to function in society without disruption.

1. Dreams – Almost everyone, if not all, claims that they dream. We accept this claim without requiring proof. We use our own experience of dreaming to validate the other person’s claim of dream. — L'éléphant

How is this not proof? If I stated, "When I sleep, I have experiences", then if I others say, "Oh yeah, I have that too", that's proof/evidence. If not one but one person in the world had experiences when they slept, then I think you would be right. Even then, brains have been scanned during sleep, and a lot of activity is found in there.

To be fair to your argument, perhaps what you meant was more along the lines of "What we specifically dreamed of". To narrow this down further to keep it simple, "How do you know that the color red you see, is the same hue and look as what someone else sees when they also see "red"? This we currently have no proof for, and indeed, color blindness suggests it is very possible that the colors your mind visualizes for you, are not necessarily the same as another person's.

2. Pain – We do not have proof of pain except our own complaint and expression of pain. Doctors have to ask where it hurts because there isn’t a proof that they could point to. — L'éléphant

We do actually. https://www.mydr.com.au/pain-and-how-you-sense-it/#:~:text=When%20we%20feel%20pain%2C%20such,and%20the%20pain%20is%20perceived.
Further, we have medication that eases pain. If we didn't have evidence or proof of pain, then pain medication would be no better than a placebo.

Perhaps again, we don't have proof of your personal experience of what pain feels like. But that doesn't negate the proof that pain exists in people, and has very real physical impact on the brain and body.

3. Fear –It’s a very subjective feeling that has side effects such as sweating, fast heart-beat, sweaty palms, but fear cannot be proven by pointing to these outward signs because these signs can also be present for reasons other than fear. — L'éléphant

What you might be thinking is that some of those side affects can indicate other things. But taken together, including an analysis of hormones circulating throughout the body, we can positively identify fear. Can I know what the personal, conscious experience of feeling fear is like in another body besides myself? No, I can give you that.

4. Floaters—these are what you see in front of you when you experience “floaters” small dark shapes that float across your vision. There is no proof of their existence except for what you report to other people. — L'éléphant

https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/eye-floaters/symptoms-causes/syc-20372346#:~:text=Eye%20floaters%20are%20spots%20in,to%20look%20at%20them%20directly . We know what these are. Can science currently pinpoint where the floater exists in your personal vision? No if its based on something like a detatched retina. But people have the experience of floaters, and treatment can assist in removing them. Once again, I think you're conflating the idea that because we can't experience what a person's personal conscious experience is, that we can't know that the experience exists in reality.

It is appealing to define the world in such a way that all definitions and assumptions are valid, because then you feel like you can never be wrong.
— Philosophim
Assumptions are not right just because they’re valid. — noAxioms

No, my point is that just because you make an assumption, it doesn't make them valid or right. If you target the OP by saying, "Well I could have made other assumptions and the argument wouldn't stand", then you are implying that my assumptions are not good enough, and that these others might be better. These are not claims in a vacuum, they are claims that are a counter to my claims. If you think other assumptions are better than the OP's, then you need to show why. If you think that all assumptions are equally valid and logically and factually correct, then I already mentioned that leaves my viewpoint standing.

That sounds hokey. Assumptions are valid or they are not. There’s not much more-or-less to it. You might make an argument about more or less likely to be true. Apparently the flying spaghetti monster is a valid argument, but not likely a true one. — noAxioms

If one assumes that X is true, and one assumes that X is false, only one can hold. If you are holding assumptions contrary to the OP's, then only one of us can be right. Again, if you believe it is perfectly fine for a person to hold X as true and X as false can coexist without a contradiction, that's fine by me.
Also, you did note here,

I’m just saying it isn’t knowledge because there’s an equally valid (and likely more valid) alternative view. — noAxioms

so you have the concept in your head about something "likely more valid".

just because you can propose an alternative definition or assumption, it in no way means its existence challenges or defeats another definition or assumption.
I would say that the existence of a valid alternate view very much poses a challenge to what might otherwise be an unchallenged view. — noAxioms

And here you agree with me. To challenge, it must contradict the other. My point has been that my "assumptions" are solid, well known, and generally accepted. Your assumptions are currently not. Meaning you need to raise the bar by showing why your claims, which challenge mine, are superior. You assume they are valid and right, but you must demonstrate they are valid and right.

If not, mine stand. If you're ok with mine standing, then there is no issue.

You need to re-read the OP. The entire OP is about relational existence.
Funny, because the word ‘relation’ or ‘relative’ does not appear anywhere in the OP. It seems instead to be about first cause. — noAxioms

We have a different view of definitions here. To me, the entire abstract is about selecting a state, and noting that a prior state could exist for the current state to be. In my view, this is a relative state comparison of causality. Why does state Y exist? Because of a prior state X, or Y has no prior state X and exists without any prior explanation. A state, relative to others in a chain of causality, which has no X to explain it, is labeled a "first cause".

If this does not fit relational to you, please clarify

Sorry, but I only remember one sentence, which was:
If you don't exist, you won't type a reply. — noAxioms

True, my mistake, that was one sentence, not two. Despite this, I made no logical fallacies in concluding you, who has typed a reply, exist. I'm of course using the "street term" as it is assumed so until someone specifically wants to redefine it in a special way. If you are going to type, "I don't exist", that's a contradiction because a non-existent being cannot type, "I don't exist".

If we're to discuss and have a good conversation, its important that you just say, "Ok", on something very basic like this that honestly has little to do with the OP, which is the focus on the discussion. It shows me our debate isn't an ego thing, and isn't going to stray too far from the topic. I won't think any less of you for just conceding this basic point.

… I don't understand how the B series revokes the OP
It wasn’t a comment about the OP, something to which I agreed if you remember. — noAxioms

If you agree with the OP, great. If you don't agree with the OP, please only introduce criticisms that directly deal with the OP. When I am trying to understand your meaning and intentions, I am going to assume your points are to the OP, and not extra asides. Lets minimize what is extra, and only focus on what is necessary for the discussion please.

I think a softer version of Wayfarer's point would be something like: our world is intelligible. We can talk about stuff. — lll

Which is fine, I have no issue with that. My point is matter and energy is able to interplay in such a way as to create a thinking human being. Its incredible honestly. If he wants to think its something else, that's fine. But when I ask for evidence, the honest thing to reply is, "I don't have any, its just a belief of mine," I would accept that. It is when he refuses to answer or divert, which is lying by omission, I see a problem.

Not a paradox at all. I go over this here. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/12098/a-first-cause-is-logically-necessary/p1

Yes, it is logically the case that there is a "first cause" or something that has no reason for its existence, besides the fact that it exists. That doesn't mean everything else can't exist. The problem he doesn't realize is that a self-explained existence's reason for existing, is simply the fact that it exists.

Bob, I admit, this tripped me up at first. I had to think a while on your post, to try to get to what felt like was missing. Maybe I'm generalizing too broadly the difference between distinctive and applicable, and need to narrow down more. Lets see if we can figure this out.

I was never under the impression anything was related to a "will" in your epistemology, albeit I understand the general relation to the principle of noncontradiction. — Bob Ross

Not a worry! Its in the first paragraph of the entire paper which you read one time many months ago at this point.

I think I would need a bit more explication into your idea of "will" to properly address it.

The only reason we have a definition of reality, is that there are some things that go against our will.

Reality is the totality of existence that is in accordance with our will, and contrary to our will.

I think you aren't using "reality" synonymously throughout your post. The first statement seems to contradict the second. You first claim that we only can define "reality" as that which goes against our "will", yet then, in the second, claim that "reality" is both what goes against and what aligns with our "will"--I don't see how these are reconcilable statements — Bob Ross

Certainly, that was poor language on my part. What I meant to convey was the only reason we can have a concept of reality as something separate from ourselves, is because there are things that go against our will. If everything went in accordance to our will, there would be no need for the term "reality". There would just be whatever we willed would happen.

So no, I am not saying reality is what contradicts our will. Just noting that because everything we will does not come to pass, we realize there is something besides our will. No, I define reality as what is. Sometimes "what is" is when our will happens. Sometimes "what is" is when it does not happen.

A "will", in my head, has a motive, which is not implied at all (to me) with "discrete experience" — Bob Ross

A "will" like everything really, is a discrete experience. At a very basic level, I think we would both agree it is an intent of action. I will to wave my hand, and reality does not contradict that will. I will to fly by my mind alone, and reality contradicts this.

I was misunderstanding you: distinctive knowledge is what you are claiming is given because it is simply discrete experience, whereas applicable could be within the mind or the external world — Bob Ross

Yes, this is it. To clarify, distinctive knowledge is the knowledge of the discrete experience itself. Applicable knowledge is when we claim the distinctive knowledge we have applies to something besides its immediate self, and its immediate self is not enough to state with rational certainty that it is not contradicted by reality

"Reason" is simply that ever continuing process of conclusions, which is the bedrock of all derivation. 1 + 1 = 3 (without refurbishing the underlying meaning) is an exposition of "reason", albeit not determined to be "rational". If, in that moment, the subject legitimately concluded 1 + 1 = 3, then thereby "reason" was invoked. — Bob Ross

I believe I understand a bit. In that case, would every living thing reason? At the most fundamental level, an organism must decide whether X is food, or not food. I'm not saying its advanced reason, but reason at its most fundamental?

(Philosophim) "Distinctive knowledge comes about by the realization that what we discretely experience, the act itself, is known."

I think this is false. The act itself is not just known (as in given), it is determined by means of recursive analysis of reason. You and I determined that we discretely experience. — Bob Ross

Correct in a way. When I introduced the idea of discrete experience to you, you had to distinctively know what I meant first. Then, you tried to show it could be contradicted through application. I created the abstract with the conclusion that it could not be contradicted. But if it is ever contradicted in application, while we will still have the distinctive knowledge of "distinctive knowledge", we would applicably know that it was contradicted in its application to reality, not contradicted distinctively.

The line however, is incredibly fine between distinctive, and applicable. More on this later.

And, if I may be so bold, the act of discretely experiencing does not precede reason: it becomes a logical necessity of reason (i.e. reason determines it must be discretely experiencing multiplicity to even determine in the first place--but this is all dependent on reason). — Bob Ross

Agreed based on my understanding of your definition of reason. I think this is semantical however. By being a logical necessity for reason to exist, this is similar to what I meant by, "Before reason can form".

Anything we ever do is concluded, to some degree or another, which utilizes reason, and any conclusion pertaining to reason or discrete experience is application. — Bob Ross

If you mean "conclusion pertaining to application" as "application", yes, I think this fits. Do we need application to distinctively know things? No, distinctive knowledge it what we use to find if we can applicably know it. We can reason using distinctive knowledge to create a set of concepts. But distinctively knowing concepts does not mean we can know them in application.

The only reason this is true is because you have realized that it would be a contradiction to hold that the contents of the thoughts of a mind can suffice pertaining to what the mind deems objects. This is all from reason and, depending on what is considered rationality, rational. — Bob Ross

No disagreement here either. But it is an abstract invention. I have simply shown that to claim I know I do not discretely experience is irrational. That does not mean I could suddenly lose the capability to discretely experience 2 years from now for some time due to something like a disease or death. In such a case, the application that I discretely experience, would be contradicted by reality.

We can define a meaningful distinction between "distinctive" (that which is discrete experience) and "applicable" (that which isn't), — Bob Ross

Almost, but not quite. A discrete experience is anything that is separate from something else in your viewpoint. That is any identity, and essentially every "thing" that you experience. Distinctive knowledge and applicable knowledge are both discrete experiences as is any "thing". It is the type of knowledge that we are discretely experiencing where the difference comes in.

No matter how swift, I conclude that I just imagined an elephant--I am not synonymous with the discrete experience of an elephant (I am the reason). — Bob Ross

Considering you have stated that discrete experience is a logically necessary part of reason, I think this follows. I stated "I am the discrete experiencer," and you have stated, "I am the reasoner". If my understanding of reason is something that every being would have, then I can agree.

We know we discretely experience because it is a deduction that is not contradicted by reality.

Your using reason here. You applied this to then claim we have distinctive knowledge that is not applied, but there was never anything that wasn't applied. In other words, you, by application, determined some concepts to be unapplied: given. That which you determined was given, was not given to you, it was obtained by you via application. Nothing is given to you without reason. — Bob Ross

Yes, I think you have it! But to clarify again, there is a separation between the distinctive obtainment of knowledge, and the applicable obtainment of knowledge. One if the abstract concept and logical rules. The other is the application of those rules to something without contradiction.

However, I've noted that "reason" is an option. It is not a necessary condition of being human.

For me, reason is a necessary condition of being human. Not "rationality", but reason. — Bob Ross

Yes, with your definition as I understand it, I agree. But, I will add again based on your definition that reason at its most fundamental is a necessary condition for any living being, not confined to humanity.

I think we applicably know math. Reason derives what is mathematical and what doesn't abide by it. Solving x = y + 1 for y is application, not distinction. Even the understanding that there's one distinct thing and another one is application (of pon). What exactly is purely distinctive about this? Of course, we can applicably know that there's discrete experience and that we could label discrete experience as "distinctive knowledge", but all that is application. There's never a point at which we rest and just simply know something without application. Is there? — Bob Ross

There is never a point that you applicably know math without application. Distinctive and applicable knowledge are simply subdivisions of "Deductions that do not lead to contradiction by reality. We can applicably know math, and distinctively know math. Keeping it simple, I can distinctively know that 1 is an identity. Then I encounter an identity, and say, "that is 1 identity". But I could just distinctively know that 1+1=2 purely as a set of symbols. If later I see that set of symbols and state, "Ah yes, that is 1+1=2", then I applicably know that math if my claim is not contradicted.

Perhaps a better way to break down the distinction is by what is implied by our discrete experiences. Distinctive is simply knowing we have every logical reason to believe that we are experiencing the discrete experience itself. If however, the discrete experience implies something beyond the act of having the experience itself, this is when application occurs.

Of course, how do we have the knowledge that what we are discretely experiencing, is what we are discretely experiencing? At first, it is because we claim it is a contradiction. So is this an application? Or is this what is needed before one can apply? Essentially, distinctive knowledge is the rational conclusion that what we experience, is what we experience. And we conclude that because logically, any other alternative is inapplicable. It is when we apply this distinctive knowledge to something else, for example "I distinctively know 1 banana +1 banana =2 bananas, and I'm going to apply it to those two bananas over there," you can see this dividing line.

when do I ever not apply anything? — Bob Ross

If I conclude that I discretely experience, it is not by application to something beyond itself. Because it is not a question that it can be contradicted by reality. It is a logical conclusion. And logic on its own, is a set of rules we construct. If we apply it and its not contradicted, then we applicably know it. But that doesn't deny the distinctive knowledge of it before the application. So we are not applying discrete experiences, when we are recognizing that we know we have discrete experiences in themselves. When we are trying to assert more than the experience itself, such as applying the experience to another that we say results in X, we are applying.

A question for you Bob, is can you see this dividing line? Do you think there are better words for it?
Do you think there is a better way to explain it?

My question essentially pertained to when something is considered a "historical fact", considering most historical facts are speculations, when we are simply determining which induction is most cogent. I think you answer it here: seems that you think that it isn't a base concern of the epistemology. I think this is a major concern people will have with it. Everyone is so used to our current scientific, historic, etc institutions with their thresholds of when something is validated that I envision this eroding pretty much society's fundamental of how knowledge works. It isn't an issue that it erodes the fundamentals of "knowledge" hitherto, but not addressing it is. You don't have to address it now if you don't want to, but feel free to if you want. — Bob Ross

People used to think the Earth was the center of the universe. From their perspective, it was understandable. Some people didn't like it when it was pointed out that the Sun was the center. "How could that be possible? Its obvious the Sun circles us!" People's uncomfortableness with something new isn't an argument against proposing something new.

I think the emotional problem you are noting, is that people will be uncomfortable with the idea that many of the things we purport to know are inductions. Given the idea that inductions have been seen as "irrational", I can see this dislike. But what I am trying to show is that certain inductions are more rational than others. Inductions can be a rational tool of the mind when it reaches limitations. I originally had a few pages added to the induction hierarchy demonstrating when each type of induction was actually very invaluable, even irrational inductions. I can go into that, but I feel like I should address these other points first.

Explicitly, what you are stating is, "I believe Jones could have 5 coins in his pocket." But what is the reasoning of "could have" based on? A probability, possibility, speculation, or irrational induction?

The point is that it isn't based off of any of them. And it isn't simply using a different epistemology, it is that your epistemology completely lacks the category. — Bob Ross

I believe it does. What you term the "colloquial" use of possible is what I divided into possible and plausible(speculation as we've been calling it now).

However, I think I may be understanding what you are saying now: potentiality isn't really inducing an affirmation. It is more like "I cannot contradict the idea, therefore it may be possible". — Bob Ross

What I'm claiming is that potentiality is simply an induction without the distinction of the hierarchy. An induction is not inducing affirmation. An induction is always a prediction, and we can never know if a prediction is correct until we apply that prediction. The hierarchy recognizes this, but also recognizes that some inductions are more rational than others. Without the hierarchy, how could you tell which induction is more useful Bob? How can we tell if something has actual potential if there is no subdivision of inductions? Perhaps this will help us resolve the issue of potentiality, and why you believe it to be more useful.

"There's a difference between claiming there is colloquially a possibility that something can occur and that you actually believe that it occurred." -- Bob

Just to ensure the point is clear, both situations exist in the epistemology.

I'm not sure if they both do. You do have "something can occur" in the sense of experienced before, but is "something can occur due to no contradictions" simply a speculation without affirmation? — Bob Ross

Lets really break down what you mean by this sentence. "Something can occur due to no contradictions". I think this lacks clarity, and a lack of clarity is not something we should consider. What type of contradictions is this referencing? Is it referencing contradictions of an abstract logic? Or is it the contradiction of reality against my will?

For example, I can construct a set of abstract rules that work by allowing an object to appear at two places at once. I distinctively know this. In my set of rules of the discrete experiences themselves, there is no contradiction if a thing can be in two places at once. In your terms, this would be potential. In my terms, this would be an abstraction, or a context of distinctive knowledge.

Now, if we apply that set to reality, we find that an object cannot be in two places at once, no matter how much we try. This is a contradiction of the context when applied to reality, but not a contradiction within the context itself. Just because the person cannot prove that two things can exist in one spot, it does not mean their entire system of logic based on two things existing at once suddenly had contradictions within it. If his assumption was true, the logic would hold. But something being logical within the abstract does not necessarily hold true when applied.

To put it in terms of logic
A -> B
A exists.
Therefore B

But what if A does not exist? A -> B is a distinctive knowledge, a logic. But it is not applied to anything in particular. If I say, "If Santa exists, it will rain" for A and B, I have to apply this logic and show that Santa exists for the logic to be true in application. If I find there is no Santa, I can still distinctively know the logical statement I just made, I just cannot know that it applies without contradiction.

As I have proposed it, inapplicable speculations do not exist: they have been transformed into irrational inductions. Speculations entail that it is applicable. Therefore, this is not an appropriate antonym to potentiality. The antonym is "that which is contradicted". — Bob Ross

Again, contradicted based on one's own distinctive context, or contradicted based on application? It seemed to me potentiality was an induction. Is that induction free of contradictions distinctively, or applicably. An irrational induction in this case, is a distinctive contradiction, not an applicable contradiction. An induction is not an assertion of certainty. Even irrational inductions have the potential of being contradicted in application. They are simply the least rational induction a person can make distinctively, not an assertion of applicable knowledge.

Exactly. So Jones is claiming, "I have an induction but I'm not going to use the hierarchy to break down what type of induction I'm using".

Leaving the individual voiceless in a perfectly valid context is not purposely not using the epistemology: it is the absence of a meaningful distinction that is causing the issue. — Bob Ross

You can have a perfectly valid context that does not use the epistemology. If you don't want to use the hierarchy in your distinctive context, you don't have to. I'm just trying to point out it is more beneficial to.

There is a meaningful distinction, as you noted, between asserting affirmation, and simply asserting that it isn't contradicted. — Bob Ross

I think this is where you've missed what I've been stating. There are distinctive and applicable views. You can be contradicted distinctively, and you can be contradicted applicably. They aren't the same thing. When you use "contradiction" without clarifying what type of contradiction, distinctive or applicable, then you aren't using the epistemology.

That was one heck of a write up! Fantastic points which made me really dig deep and make sure I was being consistent, and conveying my intentions correctly. Let me know what you think Bob.

I've never implied that potential to be false is the same as falsity and I've clarified this an awful amount of times in my earlier post once again... you're beating the same strawman that I clarified isn't my position. — Kuro

I think we might be talking past one another unintentionally. I think you misunderstand that I am not referring to falsification as a logic chart. You're missing what I'm trying to communicate.

And by the way, it is very lovely and a massive credit to you for spending the time to clearly write those logic charts. I did read all the information, and was not dismissive of it. Lets use your chart as an example.

In the case that p -> p, the result is always true. Yes, I understand this. This isn't targeting what I'm trying to tell you however. I can falsify that by positing that p -> ~p. If p -> ~p exists, then p->p is false. It doesn't mean p->~p exists. It means it a clear counter condition that would show p->p doesn't exist. The topic we are talking about is whether non-physicalism exists. The falsification of that ideal, is that non-physicalism does not exist.

I am talking about falsification for evidence. The only pre-requisite for something that is falsifiable is that it has a clear and distinct definition. That's really it. Because if you claim "x exists" then the alternative, "x doesn't exist" is always a falsification that can be considered.

It would be a counterexample to the proposition "God exists and made the world" because that proposition is not a tautology. But "God is God" or "Making the world is making the world" is a tautology that is always true regardless of whether God existed or not. In the same fashion that "Santa is Santa" is a tautology with no falsity conditions. — Kuro

Santa doesn't exist. I'm asking for evidence that Santa exists. We are not talking about tautologies. And to do that, I need something falsifiable. What is Santa? What are the traits? How can I tell Santa exists? There needs to be something that would indicate a reality in which Santa did not exist.

So for example, "Santa exists in the North pole in a factory where he makes toys all day". So all I have to do is go up to the North pole and look for a factory where some guy is making toys all day. If I go up to the North pole and don't find any factories, then I know Santa doesn't exist.

Now, lets apply this to non-physicalism. I've asked Wayfarer to give me evidence of non-physicalism, and he has tried in every conceivable way to avoid doing this. That is because he knows he doesn't have any. And he knows if he admits that, his entire world view crumbles. Non-physicalism only works as something you can possible consider if it has no traits one could look for.

I've even made it easy for him. Physicalism is simply the analysis of the rules of matter and energy. I've asked him to show me one instance in which matter and energy wasn't involved in consciousness. He can't do it. That's because he can't assert non-physicalism as anything, because then people could actually look for it, and find that it isn't there. That's the whole goal of holding non-falsifiable ideals. Its a self-gratifying ideal that people hold precious to their chest, terrified that others might point out its flaws. If you can avoid having to think about it too much, or present it in a way that makes it real, then you can lie to yourself and tell yourself you're holding to something that is true. I am very familiar with this myself, and see it clear as day in other people.

Wayfarer is literally telling me Santa exists, and when I persist on a definition of who Santa is and how I can know he exists, he can't. That's non-falsifiable, and I am valid in asking for falsifiable evidence. It is also quite telling that when I asked for evidence that could be falsified, I've spent more time explaining falsification then hearing evidence. Now perhaps Kuro that's because you're more interested in the perceived logic. And that's fine, but its distracted from the point long enough. People don't have to do large debates about falsification for things that are easy to show are real.

Suffice to say, I am completely unconvinced that I am wrong to ask for evidence that is falsifiable, so I will. If you don't understand that, so be it. If you can give me evidence that the non-physical exists, feel free to reply. I don't want to hear anything more about falsification, as this distraction has gone on long enough. Give me your evidence, and I'll be the judge.

I agree. I'm personally interested in celebrating how 'miraculous' the so-called ordinary already is. — lll

Sometimes I think on the fact that I exist at all, and am filled with absolute wonder. It is truly astounding that existence "is", and that I am one of the lucky few bits of material existence to realize it all.

I'm a longtime atheist, and it'd be quite an inconvenience for me if I had to rewire myself to take god chatter seriously again (as I did when exposed as a child to it.) — lll

I would not have a problem with it. I did not leave Christianity in anger, I simply left because I couldn't rationally accept it anymore. As such, my actions honestly haven't changed very much from where I was a Christian except for going to Church.

Again - the reason that Popper devised the falsification criterion, was to differentiate scientific from non-scientific theories. So, what you're asking for is a scientific theory. — Wayfarer

Wayfarer, I'm not Karl Popper. I don't care why he wanted to use falsification. I'm not asking you for the standard of a scientific theory, which is MUCH more than falsification.

If you think you can explain maths in a couple of paragraphs, that it's 'obvious' and 'natural' what maths is, what numbers are, then you need to do more reading. — Wayfarer

Irrelevant as I already noted. I showed you where falsification can be applied to Platonism. Ignore my points on math if you like, that was an aside. Stop saying I'm asking for a scientific theory, and please explain to me why I can't use falsification as a requirement for viable evidence.

Wayfarer, this is the problem when you debate other people, and not the people you are talking to. I'm not asking you to use the scientific method. I'm asking you to provide something that has falsification.
You said I shouldn't use falsification. None of what you wrote, shows me that I shouldn't use falsification as my criterion for evidence.

Look, math is real easy. Its about our ability to identify. I can look at "1" field of grass, and "1" blade of grass, and "1" piece of grass. 1 identity and another 1 identity together are the identity we call 2. As we observe the world with identities, or discrete experiences, it follows the logic of our capability to do so.

Notice how we say 1 blade of grass and 1 blade of grass are two? That's because its how we make sense of the world. Is 1 blade of grass exactly the same as the other? No. Its the notion of combining 2 things together for us to convey an idea.

If humanity did not exist, it doesn't mean the world would go away. It doesn't mean that something else that could create identities, couldn't create an identity that would work out for them in the same way. But does the concept of "1" exist apart from our invention of that identity? Of course not. There's no evidence of that at all. Just like the concept of "embigination" doesn't exist without me in the world. It doesn't mean that what I am describing as "embigination" doesn't exist, it means my concept of it would not exist.

But regardless of all that, we're looking for a reason why I can't use falsification right? If you want to discuss what I just mentioned we can, but I don't want to get off topic.

Lets see, for the Platonic theory. If they propose that numbers exist apart from human concepts, lets first get them to clearly define that. Do they mean a floating symbol? Probably not, but feel free to interject. They probably mean that "oneness" itself would still exist. In other words, if we didn't know what the symbology of "1" is, what the symbology of 1 describes would1 still exist even apart from our ability to understand this. So, its falsification would be if we should show that oneness did not exist apart from our ability to conceive of the concept.

So all we would need then is a rational agent that did not understand or know about numbers, and then see if they acted as if "oneness" existed right? Turns out, you take kids and even animals, and they can construct and understand "whole identities" (What 1 is). Now perhaps you would like another go at the definition of what they mean by math existing apart from human understanding. That's fine. But this number concept of Platonism can clearly be falsified.

As such, I'm not seeing why this article implies I cannot use falsification as a criterion. And the point is not whether I'm correct or not about Platonism. The entire true point, the heart of it, is that I can create a claim using Platonism that can be falsified.

The argument is, on the one side, that numbers are real, independently of anyone who is aware of them - which is generally known as mathematical realism or mathematical platonism. It grants mathematical objects reality, albeit of a different order to empirical objects. — Wayfarer

I thought we had already resolved falsifiability and were simply talking about evidence of something non-physical at this point. But ok, if that is your problem, I read it. Its a debate I'm well aware of. Where is the evidence against falsifiability? I have no idea what you're trying to show with this article on an age old problem.

If you believe falsifiability is not a criterian I should hold, please explain to me what in this article backs that.

You need to understand why mathematical Pplatonism is incompatible with materialism. That article spells it out in two different quotes. — Wayfarer

How about you just tell me and link those quotes? I'm not going to do your work for you Wayfarer. I didn't ask you to do my work for me.

Since you did not reply with any evidence of the non-physical, then we both know you don't have any at this point.

At least that was a start - but it doesn't develop. The expression 'a setting devoid of anything conscious but an observer' is very confusing, indicating you hadn't really come to terms with the basic problem. — Wayfarer

Then why didn't you engage with me then? Why didn't you point out where I was wrong? I'm not here to read other theories. I'm here to get evidence from you about non-physical reality. You can type all of these other replies avoiding the issue, but you can't type out showing where in this theory there is proof of the non-physical?

Again indicating you have no grasp of the philosophical issue. — Wayfarer

That is on you. If you expect to throw a linked set of debates that would require me hours of reading without any guidance or lead on your part, then its just a convenient excuse for you to run away from the issue. I've clearly addressed everything straight with you. I haven't asked you to read the entirety of neuroscience. That's dishonest. I've held you to everything I've written here, not vague theories and debates.

You also avoided the greater point I made. I stated, "

Demonstrate to me these things are non-physical, and I will agree. You noted there are some suppositions and debates about this. This means there are people who think these things are material. That isn't evidence. That's just indicating what we don't understand. — Philosophim

I asked you to point out where the non-physical was noted. You did not. I noted that because there was no conclusion, it was a debate, and that would mean that there are also people in this debate who think things are material. If it is inconclusive, then that means neither side knows. You did not say I was wrong here either. And if I was not wrong here, then I was surely right in not spending hours reading up on what amounts to an inconclusive debate.

You're lying to yourself Wayfarer. Do you think a good God would want such a thing? Do you think you have to deceive yourself and others because your personal emotional feelings are more important than integrity? I'm a former Christian Wayfarer. I'm not saying you shouldn't be a Christian. But I am noting you aren't acting like one now.

You said nothing about mathematical platonism. — Wayfarer

I said plenty. And I said why it wasn't evidence. And you didn't refute this.

You simply dismiss the idea of psychosomatic effects on the basis that thoughts are physical. — Wayfarer

Lets define "psychosomatic effects". Any result pertaining to the influence of the mind or higher functions of the brain upon the operations of the body, particularly bodily disorders or diseases.

I didn't deny that. What I said was that this doesn't show that thoughts aren't matter and energy. No, I am not saying there is a difference between an imagined piano and a physical one in terms of thoughts. Wayfarer, your mind doesn't touch a real piano. Your nerves interpret that touch, then travel to the brain where the brain makes some sense out of it. Your brain doesn't need nerves, or a piano, to have thoughts about a piano, and practice strengthening neural pathways. Nothing in that article claims that consciousness isn't physical, or that the brain and thoughts are not physical.

If thoughts aren't composed of matter and energy, what are they composed of Wayfarer?
— Philosophim

They're composed of ideas. Your dogma is that ideas are brain-functions. — Wayfarer

What are ideas composed of Wayfarer? Its not dogma for me to claim that thoughts and ideas are composed of matter and energy, its a conclusion based on the evidence I know.

[quote="Wayfarer;668534"it's the only claim you make - 'everything is physical'.[/quote]

Don't be dishonest now. I clearly stated that what is physical, is matter and energy. If you find something that isn't matter and energy, you've found something non-physical. I've asked you to provide me an example of something that is not matter and energy. You claim ideas aren't made of matter and energy, give me evidence. If its not matter and energy, what is it? If you don't answer in the next reply, then you and I will both have clearly determined that you don't know. Be honest and address the request.

We're making clear points with each other.
— Philosophim

You're not showing any sign of understanding any of the points that I've made, even in principle. — Wayfarer

Upon reviewing, I have. Maybe you haven't understood mine?

We already know thoughts are composed of matter and energy.
— Philosophim

Your commitment to that falsehood colors everything you say about it. Thoughts are composed of the relationship between ideas, and ideas are not physical. — Wayfarer

I've been asking you repeatedly to show me evidence of what non-physical is, and you haven't. If thoughts aren't composed of matter and energy, what are they composed of Wayfarer? We have evidence through physical manipulation of the brain that thoughts can be triggered and changed. Give me evidence that thoughts are composed of something besides matter and energy, or I'm right, and not holding a falsehood. You want to demonstrate that what I hold is a falsehood, prove it.

Its just that you need to demonstrate why they have merit, and why the show the OP to be wrong.
But I didn’t assert that the OP was wrong. I just pointed out that it made various assumptions, and thus the conclusions might not follow if different assumptions are made. — noAxioms

NoAxioms, isn't that true about anything? I mean, I can just come back and state if you had made different assumptions and conclusions, then you could be wrong as well. Well, yeah. There's nothing meaningful or useful in such a statement.

It is appealing to define the world in such a way that all definitions and assumptions are valid, because then you feel like you can never be wrong. The problem is, it breaks down because you arrive at a glaring contradiction. I can claim, "No, some definitions/assumpsions are more valid than others," which is a direct challenge to your viewpoint. If you persist in your viewpoint as more valid than mine, I win, because I've shown you hold a contradiction. But if you say my viewpoint is just as valid as yours, then I've claimed your viewpoint is invalidand you accept this. So again, you run into a contradiction.

So logically, if we are to think in a process that does not result in a contradiction, we must hold that some definitions are more valid than others. And that means, just because you can propose an alternative definition or assumption, it in no way means its existence challenges or defeats another definition or assumption. You must, to have a logical argument, demonstrate why the assumption I'm claiming is inferior to an alternative assumption that would break the argument.

You’re invoking the premise “Something must exist to type a reply” to demonstrate the premise. The statement is a positive example, which falsifies nothing. To do the latter, one must posit the negation:
P1: Property of existence is not necessary for the interaction between entities.
P2: Two entities X and Y interact.

Now prove that X and Y necessarily have the property of existence without begging your premise. Then you’ve falsified it. — noAxioms

That did not show how my two sentences begged the question. Stating what a definition entails is not begging the question. To do anything, you must exist. That's part of the definition. If you do something, then you exist. We're not proving the definition of existence. We're proving you exist. Did I beg the question that you existed? No.

According to your logic, you proposed a definition for existence which does not follow English. To exist, is to have the property of interacting between other existences/entities. To be an entity, is to exist. You essentially stated, A = ~A then in premise two you stated nothing that had anything to do with A. The example is nonsense, because whether or not X and Y interact has nothing to do with the definition of existence you've proposed.

I drive at this point because there are valid interpretations of the world that don’t give any meaning to ‘property of existence’ since ‘exists’ is not defined as a property but rather as a relation. You’re asserting that such an interpretation is necessarily wrong, despite the growing support. — noAxioms

You need to re-read the OP. The entire OP is about relational existence.

I didn’t make any mention of ‘current’, so I stated neither thing. — noAxioms

Yes, you mentioned that I was assuming "current" was real. Its been a focal point of the discussion. If you assume that "current" is not anything more than an assumption, then you'll need to demonstrate why your assumption that this is the case, is real.

I took a look at your A and B series, and it doesn't revoke what I'm stating at all. If you're going to present a different series of time against an argument, it must be used to show where the argument falters. If I don't understand how the B series revokes the OP, that's because you didn't demonstrate that clear. I've been addressing your argument in relation to the OP, and what "current" means. So far, I'm not seeing how it revokes this. If you think it does, please try again, and I will see if I missed something in your explanation.

We bury or burn the corpses of the same loved ones we nurture when alive, so clearly the fine details or the structure of brains/bodies is important to us. The structure the sound waves we bark at one another is also crucial. I suppose it's plausible to stop at these patterns and say (speculatively or economically) that we are only such patterns. And perhaps you include all this implicitly in your 'we are only bodies and brains' position. — lll

Yes. This doesn't make human interactions any less meaningful. How we function does not change the reality of our function.

But there are also philosophical reasons to argue for 'something more' that do not include any such comforts and only seek a more comprehensive and consistent account. — lll

I agree. I was just answering why in particular this topic tends to pop up more than others. In my discussions on this topic over time I simply find a pattern that you find a lot more people of a religious and spiritual nature in the camp of the non-physical, then you do in the camp of the physical. Further, generally these arguments are ill-defined, and will not actually provide what they mean by non-physical. You can find genuine people who are willing to engage the subject rationally, but I would say a lot of the motivation is not rational curiosity, but a desire for a particular emotional outcome. This is of course an opinion, and should not be taken as fact.

You don't find some empirical evidence for why things aren't themselves. You're just forcing a proposition that's already taken to have no truth-conditions in FOL to somehow be true. It's incoherent. — Kuro

When did I say empirical evidence? All I'm noting for the condition of falsification, is that we have a clear postulate we can put forward that would show when the proposition was false. If A=~A, then A=A would be false right? Take the simple note above and try to explain to me why A=~A is not a negation of A=A.

~A is considered in A=A. But A=A returns true even granting ~A. ~A is literally just a negative truth valuation for A. — Kuro

Then you agree with me. The potential for something to be proven false, does not mean it can be proven false. Falsification does not mean, "It is false". It means there is a condition we can propose in which our claim would be false. If A=~A was true, then A=A would be false. If you agree with this, then you understand. If you don't, please explain how if A=~A were true, then A=A would not be false.

Like I've shown you earlier in the truth table, you can value A with any combination of truth and false and it'll always be equivalent to itself. There's no way out of it. — Kuro

And again, if something is provably true, it doesn't mean we can't invent a scenario in which it would not be true. The invention of the scenario in which it is not true, also does not mean it can be concluded that it is not true. You seem to be under the impression that falsification means "likelihood or chance" that it can be proven false. That's not what it is. Its just the presentation of the condition in which a claim would be false. And A=~A is that falsification presentation. It is of course, NOT true, which means that A=A is not false. But it can still be falsified. Does that clear it up?

"When" 6=5? There is no time where 6 is equal to 5. I'm actually appalled that we're debating such a simple notion. — Kuro

That is because you are not understanding what I am saying. I am not saying 6=5. I'm just noting a case that IF 6=5 was true, then 5=5 would be false. Thus 5=5 can be falsified. It doesn't mean that 5=5 is false.

This is not the same as me taking offense. Generally, assume that I take no offense unless I indicate otherwise :). — Kuro

Same here! Without non-verbal, it can be difficult to understand what another person is feeling, thanks for clearing that up.

If a proposition is impossible, it is necessarily false, whereas if a proposition is false it is not necessarily impossible. — Kuro

Correct. But in both cases, there is a possible negation to consider. We may conclude that negation is impossible, but we can conceive of its negation, and what it would entail.

So tautologies return true having exhausted all possible truth values of false or true to all the propositions embedded within it. So there are no conditions where they're false. — Kuro

Correct, there are no conditions in which they are found to be false. This does not mean there is not a potential condition in which we could consider it being false.

Can you address the point in which I provided an example of God vs. Jesus when it was not possible for there to be falsification? In the God example, there is not a consideration of anything which could be considered falsifiable. Let us not forget this debate is about providing evidence that is falsifiable for or against consciousness being physical vs non-physical.

Not at all what I said. If you're going to paraphrase something, you need to understand it. The statement I made was supported with a reference to the Stanford Encyclopedia entry on Platonism in the Philosophy of Maths. The topic is 'the ontological status of math.' It is a debate with a long history, and you haven't shown the least evidence that you understand it. — Wayfarer

My point is a debate is not evidence to understand. The conclusion of a debate is evidence to understand. I see evidence that there is a debate. And if there is a debate, the outcome is not known. Stating, "We don't know the outcome on something" again, is not evidence.

My job is not to understand a debate. I am not going to read a long storied history to prove your point for you. Your supposed to convince me right? Your job is to clearly present evidence of the non-physical as a cause of consciousness that is something you and I could debate. To show that I am holding the same standard towards you, I'm not saying, "Well there are debates that show there is no non-physical. There's a long storied debate of only the physical being true. You haven't demonstrated to me you've understood the entire history of this, go read it, you're ignoring, etc."

We're making clear points with each other. If I want to cite evidence in neuroscience, I will show evidence of things which are conclusive, not under debate. I will also cite specific outcomes, and not debates themselves as evidence. I ask the same in return.

I'm saying that to show that consciousness is non-physical, you need to show it interacting with the brain in some manner. It must not be matter or energy. You are proposing, that something that is not matter or energy exists.
— Philosophim

Yes. That would be judgement. — Wayfarer

No, that would be an opinion. If you want to say you've judged your opinion to be true, then you need to supply some evidence. Otherwise, I could come back with my opinion without evidence that there is no non-physical with the same response, "Yes. That would be judgement". No, that would be silly.

This is evidence! Its falsifiable with clear claims. Lets examine your evidence to see if it demonstrates there is clearly something non-physical going on.

So, if the brains reduction was not correlated with the reduction of consciousness, we would find that the man was just as intelligent as a person with an average brain. Except in the article we see, "Intelligence tests showed the man had an IQ of 75, below the average score of 100 but not considered mentally retarded or disabled."

Further, the article notes, "The findings reveal “the brain is very plastic and can adapt to some brain damage occurring in the pre- and postnatal period when treated appropriately,” he says.

“What I find amazing to this day is how the brain can deal with something which you think should not be compatible with life,” comments Max Muenke, a paediatric brain defect specialist at the National Human Genome Research Institute in Bethesda, Maryland, US.

“If something happens very slowly over quite some time, maybe over decades, the different parts of the brain take up functions that would normally be done by the part that is pushed to the side,” adds Muenke, who was not involved in the case."

So it doesn't appear that researchers and scientists are seeing something at odds with matter and energy in the brain. Everything still seems explainable with a matter and energy model. And again, if they didn't understand why this was possible, that just opens it up to debate. An opinion of a solution to a debate, is not evidence that the solution exists, even if it is a satisfying opinion or "seems perfect".

Your second reference notes that thought can rewire the brain.

"When the scientists compared the TMS data on the two groups--those who actually tickled the ivories and those who only imagined doing so--they glimpsed a revolutionary idea about the brain: the ability of mere thought to alter the physical structure and function of our gray matter. For what the TMS revealed was that the region of motor cortex that controls the piano-playing fingers also expanded in the brains of volunteers who imagined playing the music--just as it had in those who actually played it."

But this is not evidence of the non-physical. We already know thoughts are composed of matter and energy. Just like when you use your muscles, the brain rewires itself to compensate. The brain itself is adapting based on what is happening up there. Nowhere in the article does it claim that there is something outside of the brain, or outside of matter and energy causing the brain to change. I suppose Wayfarer you must find it odd that thoughts are essentially a combination of matter and energy. But that is what the current physical model of the brain presents. Thoughts are physical. its your job to give evidence that they are not.

Metaphysical as a word basically means self reference to the physical.
— Philosophim

That's not the definition of metaphysical. You don't get to make it up. — Wayfarer

You are correct. I noted a branch of metaphysics, and applied that to all metaphysics. I want you to see I can admit freely when I am wrong. Its very important that both of us take this mindset, or emotional and personal feelings get in the way. My real point again is that debates are not evidence. Now, if you would like to explain to me why debates are evidence, we can consider this. But so far, you have not.

The silence of nothing is deafening.
— Philosophim

'Those who have ears, let them hear' — Wayfarer

Lets keep it to debating the claims eh? Otherwise I would come back with something like "Remove the plank from your own eye before pointing out the splinter in your neighbors," That back and forth gets us nowhere.

Ok, but imagine if all that existed was an infinite spiral water slide going vertically down forever. The water that has always traveled on it has the slide as their alpha or reason for moving. But the slide is eternal so there is actually an alpha supporting an infinite series. — Gregory

That's correct. If we ask, "What is the cause for the slide?" and there is no prior causality, it is an alpha.

A physical Alpha? — Gregory

Sure. I'm dealing in what exists. There's plenty of physical causality to go around, so that's what I work with.

There doesn't have to be a loop or an infinite past. The first motion is the first motion and there is nothing prior. In physics this is the big bang. There is no past for the big bang. But I think your correct that a first act is needed — Gregory

That's definitely an opinion many people hold. The OP is arguing that it is logically necessary that there is a first cause, that it is actually impossible for infinite regression to exist. What that first cause is could be anything, because a first cause doesn't have a reason for its existence, so there would be nothing to limit what it could be. Is the big bang the first cause? Very well could be. I argue a bit later that a problem with a first cause, is that its likely almost impossible to prove any one thing is a first cause, thought it is logically necessary there be one.

While someone could argue that a first cause "could be a God", what fails is the claim that a first cause, "must be a God". When something has no prior explanation for its being, it doesn't need any rules, such as conscious creation, for its existence. So while the argument doesn't rule out the potential of a God, it mostly certainly ends any arguments about the necessity of a God when considering any first cause arguments. In short, this defeats all current cosmological arguments for God for God's necessary existence.

I have, and that is what I've concluded. Its your job to show me why my conclusion is wrong. "I don't think so," is not philosophy.
— Philosophim

Well, the law of noncontradiction seems to imply idealism. Are you an idealist? — Agent Smith

Could you please show how this references my original statement? Here, I'll reference it again.

The problem of evil reveals to us that we cannot label a God as limited to acting a certain way, when that God is without limits. That's just logically inconsistent, and impossible. — Philosophim

Where am I wrong in these two statements?

logically inconsistent, and impossible
— Philosophim

You might wanna reconsider that. — Agent Smith

I have, and that is what I've concluded. Its your job to show me why my conclusion is wrong. "I don't think so," is not philosophy.

Yes, you've understood the nature of "The problem of evil". The problem of evil reveals to us that we cannot label a God as limited to acting a certain way, when that God is without limits. That's just logically inconsistent, and impossible. If you reduce even one of the omni's to "The most X that is possible", then the problem of evil is solved.

If the first cause is material than we are on the same page. If it is spiritual than we are not — Gregory

You shouldn't have to ask if you read and comprehended the OP.

Lets get to your argument.

"1. Either all things have a prior cause for their existence or there is at least one first cause of existence from which a chain of events follows."

So there is either 1,2,3,4 or infinite,1,2,3,3 — Gregory

Sure, just don't forget that its causality. 1 causes 2, causes 3 etc. Its not just counting.

Y: represents an existence that may or may not have prior causality."

So everything — Gregory

No, its a representation of any identity. One of which, may be everything. Think in terms of sets.

"X: represents an existent prior causality to Y."

First cause — Gregory

No, that's just a prior cause for any Y.
A ball is falling = Y
It is at its velocity now because of one second of gravities application = X.

Z: Represent an existence caused by Y."

World — Gregory

You lost me here. Y (the falling ball) hits the ground 1 second later. = Z Why is Z on the ground one second later? Because gravity acted on the ball for one second at Y. X -> Y -> Z.

"Alpha: A Y existence that is identified as having no prior causality."

Alpha is X — Gregory

No, Alpha would describe a Y with no X. If Y existed, but one second prior there was no ball, no falling, and nothing to make that ball then that particular Y is an Alpha.

a. There is always a X for every Y. (infinite prior causality)."

So a first cause for every series — Gregory

No, this is describing the entire chain of causality is infinitely regressive.

"b. The X/Y causal chain eventually wraps back to Y/X (infinitely looped causality)"

Making the loop based on the first cause — Gregory

No, there would be no first cause within the set loop itself. This is an infinite causal loop.

"c. There comes a time within a causal chain when there is only Y, and nothing prior to Y. This Y is Alpha. (first cause)"

There can still be a world. Begging the question — Gregory

No, this is just explaining one of the 3 possibilities, not asserting anything. This is just that there is the possible consideration of an Alpha.

I hope that cleared up the first part. Take the premises here and go with the rest of the argument. Also, again, its not a proof for God argument. Relax.

Kuro, I think you might have missed my point. If A is not A, then it can't equal A right? So if I said, "A" exists, and someone demonstrated to me that "A" did not exist, then A would be proven false. That's all I expect. There needs to be a situation in which the proposition COULD be false. In other words, lose the logic charts, you're missing the point.

An example of a non-falsifiable argument would be, "A = A" and someone made it impossible for ~A to be a consideration. So lets put some examples instead of letters here.
"God exists and made the world" = A. If I said, "Could I attempt to show that something else created the world?" I would receive a response. If the person said, "Well yeah, I guess that's fine," I would then ask, "So what would be enough to show that God did not make the world?" Here they need to give me an answer.

If they say, "God is beyond our understanding and definition," then there's really nothing to falsify. There's no definition or understanding of God to claim, so there is nothing to refute either. In short, non-falsifiable." If they say, "Why yes, there was this fine fellow name Jesus, and he said this, and did this, and that's God," then we have something that could be false. It could be that Jesus did not exist. That he wasn't sane or trustworthy. That the book that tells his stories isn't verifiably correct. That sort of stuff.

Now it very well could be that God exists and created the world. It could be that the bible is completely accurate, Jesus did come and do some things, and that's why we know God exists. It being true does not mean it is not falsifiable. Being falsifiable does not mean it is false. It just means we have something that could potentially be refuted, because that is naturally what happens with anything that exists.

Back to your example.

For example, 5=5 or 6=6 are still unfalsifiable truths. — Kuro

No, they are very falsifiable. When would 6 not be 6? When 6=5 is one example. Basically if 6 = ~ 6, then 6=6 is false. We can test this. It turns out that ~6=6 isn't true, but a contradiction. Therefore while we have a means of falsifying, we cannot show that 6=6 is false. Therefore, it must be true.

I recommend this introductory course on logic from Stanford. In supplement, I'll also link this article explaining mathematical equality. I suggest that you familiarize yourself with these on your own freetime going onward with this conversation so that we have an easier time communicating. — Kuro

Much appreciated, but we don't need it for what we're talking about as I think you can see from my examples above.

I'm aware that falsifiability is not the same as impossibility, rather it is simply possible falsity. I'm not sure why you felt the need to tell me this. Clearly, some propositions like a=a or some mathematical formulae like 5=5 have no falsifiability conditions and simply cannot be impossible. — Kuro

I felt the need to tell you this, because I felt you did not understand falsifiability. I didn't take offense to your recommendation to read up on logic, don't take offense on me telling you things I don't think you understand either.

So I think you understand now. Physicalism is falsifiable by stating it could be the case that physicalism is false.
— Philosophim

In the case of my example, the opponent of physicalism does not simply falsify physicalism but allow for its logical possibility, rather find an internal contradiction in physicalism. All contradictory sets of facts are logically impossible in any consistent modal logic, i.e. they simply could not be true. There isn't a world with square circles, or vice versa. — Kuro

Recall you just mentioned that you understood falsifiability was not the same as "impossibility". If physicalism is contradictory, then its false. That is a clear and identifiable way it can be false. Therefore it is falsifiable. Now is it actually false? That's a different debate.

I think falsifiability as a philosophical or mathematical requirement is an incoherent position because both philosophy and mathematics have some facts that are given the status of being necessarily true and also unfalsifiable, like a=a or 5+5 and what not. — Kuro

Again, those are both falsifiable statements. But, we cannot meet the requirements to show they are false. Therefore they are proven to be true.

You haven't addressed the argument concerning the sense in which mathematical objects, numbers, and by extension also, scientific laws and physical principles, are real, but are not material. You haven't responded to that at all. You might look at that again. — Wayfarer

I noted earlier that stating, "We don't understand this, so I get to propose whatever I want" is not viable evidence. Demonstrate to me these things are non-physical, and I will agree. You noted there are some suppositions and debates about this. This means there are people who think these things are material. That isn't evidence. That's just indicating what we don't understand.

Are there things we don't fully understand? 100%. At one time we did not understand how rain formed. Did that mean if someone stated, "Its obviously mystical power of the Earth," that this is evidence? No. Could we sit and debate it back then? Sure. But for it to be viable, for it to be considered something real, it needed evidence.

I really can see why you're saying this, but again, what I'm trying to point out is that you're thinking of what the non-physical must be in terms of 'non-physical things'. You're saying if 'we found something that was obviously interacting...' You're trying to imagine a non-physical or immaterial thing, or substance, that acts as a cause. — Wayfarer

No, I'm not. Can there be something non-physical Wayfarer? I'm not stating it has to be a thing in the sense of what's physical. I'm saying "thing" as "what exists". If you're saying something non-physical can't exist, then the conversation is over. Now, I'm not doing that to you because I want you to know I'm being charitable to your argument. I know you believe something non-physical exists. If it exists, what is it? In this case, it is consciousness. And in this case, we know it must interact with the brain. And if it can interact with the physical world, we can detect something non-physical, in the physical world.

But we need to go back and examine what the basis is for those criteria. The fact that only what is measurable and objective is to be considered by scientific analysis is an assumption - the naturalist assumption. — Wayfarer

No assumption, just logic. If the brain can interact with the non-physical, then we can detect it. It doesn't even have to be fully known. It just has to be something we detect that is not matter or energy. If you deny that the brain can interact with the non-physical, then you lose. You've just cut the non-physical from ever being experienced by the physical. It then, does not exist. No assumptions. No bias. No "the physicalists will say." Ignore that crap. Talk to me, not them.

So, you're saying, if you want to show something non-material, you have to demonstrate its existence, like it's lava core, or a bitter apple, or some other sense-able object of experience that you've referred to in this discussion. Some thing. — Wayfarer

I'll clarify again. I'm saying that to show that consciousness is non-physical, you need to show it interacting with the brain in some manner. It must not be matter or energy. You are proposing, that something that is not matter or energy exists. You state you have evidence of this as consciousness. Our current understanding, manipulation, healing, and destruction of the brain is built upon our understanding of matter and energy. Is there something that we can detect interacting with the brain that is not matter or energy? Yes or no?

But the cause of these maladies is not physical but affective or emotional - you've interpreted something in a way that causes these effects. — Wayfarer

But we already know that's not true. Depression is something that can be fixed with medication. Emotions are tied to brain states that can be altered by changing your physical interactions. You can watch a movie, eat good food, get good sleep, etc. These cause changes in the communication of your brain. Emotions are physical expressions. They are physical reality. Reduce a man's testosterone and you'll see him feel powerless. Increase it and he'll feel powerful and aggressive. Again, we can manipulate this physically.

But as rational sentient beings, we're also constantly judging, reacting, supposing, surmising, and so on. The intellect, the seat of judgement, is constantly weighing up, judging, and reasoning. Those are the faculties that I say are not meaningfully physical. — Wayfarer

But Wayfarer, they are. We see the brain react to stimulous. We know certain areas of the brain are needed for sight. We know that you can become brain damaged and no longer see or imagine color, even though your eyes work perfectly. Here's just one example from 2013. https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/brain-researchers-can-detect-who-we-are-thinking-about/
Take a brain damaged patient Wayfarer, and their capacity to judge and reason diminishes substantially. That's a physical result from a physical change.

Now again, if there are gaps in places that we don't understand about the brain, that doesn't mean there is evidence for something we can make up. If there is a gap in understanding about how the brain works, and we can find something interacting with the brain that is not matter or energy, then we can say, "There is evidence of something non-physical in our brain, this might be consciousness." But absence of understanding, is not evidence for anything. It just means we can say, "We don't understand what is going on."

And I question whether anything is completely physical, because 'the physical' is not, as yet, fully defineable. — Wayfarer

I've clearly defined it here. Matter and energy are physical. Again, talk to me, not to "the physicalists".

From debating with you at some length my observation is that you're committed to the framework of physicalism or scientific materialism. — Wayfarer

I'm actually not. I'm committed to what is most logical. Wayfarer, I have argued against a LOT of assumed theories and questioned and changed many assumptions about myself in life. That's what being intelligent is. Those who cannot consider alternatives and are set in their ways, are not rational people. They are emotional animals who crave the satisfaction of feeling right more than the cold and sometimes emotionally devastating act of learning what is right.

But I'm arguing that the physicalist outlook is grounded in a methodological assumption about what ought to be considered as evidence in a scientific sense. But that methodological assumption is not really a metaphysic of what is and what is not real. — Wayfarer

Which is fine. But we can invent whatever we want in our heads and be emotionally attached to it. Does that make it real? No. Evidence of its existence and use in the world makes it real. And if you have no evidence when someone asks? Just say you don't have it. Nothing wrong with that either. If you feel you have to do word puzzles and jumbles to avoid saying those words, then realize you're more interested in lying about something for other to accept your idea, then telling the truth and letting them decide on their own. I haven't had to use fancy words, concepts, or complex ideas to convey my point, because I'm more concerned about clarity and seeing a correct outcome then emotional gratification.

Furthermore, there are real metaphysical debates, such as the nature of mathematical objects, or the nature of the wavefunction — Wayfarer

Meta means "self reference" Metaphysical as a word basically means self reference to the physical. Another way to view it is meta means "Talking about", so basically talking about the nature of the physical. And again, debates are fine. Ideas are wonderful! But claiming ideas are reality, when there is no evidence for it, is not.