The Wikipedia link I provided is a list of paradoxes (which logical people hold as true). — Agent Smith

I'll try one more time in case you aren't understanding my request. I know those are paradoxes that people have come up with. What logical thinker holds onto something that leads into a paradox, agrees that the paradox is sound, but still insists on holding onto logic that leads to that specific paradox?

You're noting that people sweep paradoxes under the bridge to hold certain logical arguments. Which arguments? Which logical argument are people holding onto despite it leading directly into a paradox?

If I had to guess, its a need for people to think they're better than the physical animals they are.
— Philosophim

That humans are different to animals is not a matter of opinion. We show capabilities and attributes that no animal can come close to, I don't see how this can be glossed over or ignored. — Wayfarer

Certainly, we are the smartest animals we know of. But we share many traits with animals as well, and I don't see how this can be glossed over or ignored. There is nothing beyond your brain and body. It is a wish and desire that we are more than that, nothing more.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/9015/a-methodology-of-knowledge/p1 if you are interested in a serious but not technically difficult approach.

I might have a unique take on the subject if you're interested. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/12098/a-first-cause-is-logically-necessary/p1

If I had to guess, its a need for people to think they're better than the physical animals they are. People want to feel special, immortal, and see their dead friends and loved ones again. If we're all physical, all that goes away. We're just here, then we're not. A lot of people don't want to believe that, so they seek for outlooks on humanity that allow us to surpass the material world.

The reason why people hate one another are myriad. One I've witnessed first hand is envy. To some men, women coast through life. They don't appear to have to handle real hardship. Courtship seems easy when men approach them all the time. Women are allowed to act a certain way that men cannot.

Of course, this is usually a narrow view based more on the man themselves than the women. This hate and anger can also easily manifest itself with other men. If I had to guess why women are abused more, it is because they are physically weaker, and hormonally less prone to direct confrontation. Women are unable to win, or let men win more in direct conflicts. I don't think its necessarily that men don't get into as many direct conflicts, its that most men are unwilling to let the other side win. Because victories are not easy, and defeat stings much more in a hard fought loss, men are less willing to directly confront other men who show they would not be easy.

Lets use your own conclusions.

My attitude is this - God can stuff it if he thinks that I am going to worship him simply on the basis that if I don't, I will go to hell. — RolandTyme

There you go, you've made your decision. Perhaps you just haven't accepted it yet. If the only reason you are contemplating religion is because you think you are going to die, and are concerned about the consequences, then you've just told yourself you shouldn't do that.

Ignore religion and do good not because of an uncertain reward you will receive one day by an uncertain being, but for the reward of bettering humanity and the world.

I don't think I was clear. It wasn't a list of paradoxes I was looking for. I was looking for paradoxes that logical people hold as true, or thoughts that logical people still hold despite it falling into a paradox. Most paradoxes are fun accidents that I know of, and no serious logical thinker that I am aware of, entertains a thread of logic that necessarily leads into a paradox.

Isn't this just a way to justify snobbery and reinforcing intellectual separation?

The goal must be far above all of this. — Rafaella Leon

You use the word "must" when you should replace it with, "in my opinion". Status is a survival need as well in a species with a strong society. The need for status at the cost of disparaging your fellow man, is a misuse of a basic survival need.

Healthy status is supposed to be a way to determine who should be in charge of particular jobs for the benefit of society, not to be consumed and spat out on others for our own gratification and sense of superiority.

Anyone who uses status as their single drive and motivator for life, would be a primitive failure under your essay, and should be shunned from society. And yet, I didn't do that did I? I spoke with you. I gave you another perspective. I did not consider you an inferior, just your argument and view point in how to live life. And if you rejected my argument? I still would associate with you. Maybe you would be inspired by future conversations. Maybe I would learn something else from you, instead of judging you based on one interaction.

Between that attitude and yours, what do you think is better for the rise of humanity? Shouldn't our different skills and attributes mix together to create something more than our isolated selves? Or should we separate from the rest, self-confident and smug in our ability to go forth alone in the world, and do nothing but gratify our own selves?

Mind giving an example of a paradox that exists, and logical people still hold as true?

I'm not sure if we'd not notice it. Forces stay the same if all particles and processes reverse direction. — EugeneW

Correct. If we are part of time that is being changed to a prior state, it is impossible to notice. The only way we would notice is if we continued forward, while everything else continued backwards.

A good question. First, we have to understand what time is. Time is a concept. Imagine yourself at this moment. You are a combination of matter and energy at that snapshot with particular forces applying on them. One second later, you are the result of those forces. That is all time is. You have memory of the previous second, but the previous "second" isn't a real tangible time force unit, but simply an realization that the matter and force combination of now, is not what it was a second ago.

There is nothing mechanistically from us recreating the first snapshot after one second. If something had the power to reorganize the matter and forces of the universe to what it was one second prior, then we would be "back in time". But really, we wouldn't. Because the reorganization happened at the second second if we're an outside observer.

A -> B -> A. From the inside observer, time travelled backwards, and none were aware of it. Did A still come before B, which then came before A again? Yes, but that is only because we are recording state changes. We cannot erase the state change. We can't reverse everything so that the state change was never made. Time is just that, states of change compared to a memory of a prior state.

But think about internally once again. If it is the case that time is merely the state of change from one moment to the next, then if reality reorganized itself to A -> B -> A, the second A would never be aware that B ever happened. They would be sitting there asking themselves, "Why does time always move forward?" or, "Why do the states of change never go back to the way they were prior?"

Basically, if time did move backwards, you would never know it, because backwards time is merely a change to a previous state. And in a change to a previous state, you saw time as moving forward. It is absolutely impossible to be aware of the state of the universe being reorganized to a previous state, unless you are an outside observer. As we are not outside observers of time, we have our answer. Time always moves forward, because it is impossible for us to be aware if a state returned to a previous set up.

First of all, an apology is due: I misunderstood (slash completely forgot) that you are claiming that abstract reasoning is knowledge (as you define it, “distinctive knowledge”). — Bob Ross

No apology needed! We've been discussing this some time, and have not addressed the beginning in a while. I'll re-explain if something is forgotten without any issue or negative viewpoint on my part.

Our dispute actually lies, contrary to what I previously claimed, in whether both types of knowledge are applied. — Bob Ross

They are both obtained in the same way. Knowledge in both cases boils down to "Deductions that are not contradicted by reality." Distinctive knowledge is just an incredibly quick test, because we can instantly know that we discretely experience, so what we discretely experience is known. Applicable knowledge is distinctive knowledge that claims knowledge of something that is apart from immediate discrete experience. Perhaps the word choice of "Application" is poor or confusing, because we are applying to reality in either case. Your discrete experience is just as much a reality as its attempts to claim something beyond them.

It is why I avoided the inevitable comparison to apriori and aposteriori. Apriori claims there are innate things we know that are formed without analysis. This is incorrect. All knowledge requires analysis. You can have beliefs that are concurrent with what could be known, but it doesn't mean you actually know them until you reason through them. Perhaps there is a better word phrase then "applicable knowledge" that describes the concept. Feel free to suggest one!

As I've noted many times, there is nothing wrong with digging in and refining the words or definitions. Its not the words that matter, its the ideas behind those words. I feel that it might be helpful to break down distinctive knowledge further so I can effectively communicate what concepts are, abstractions, and how knowing them distinctively does not mean you know them applicably.

Distinctive awareness - Our discrete experiences themselves are things we know.

Contextual logical awareness - The construction of our discrete experiences into a logical set of rules and regulations.

A contextual logical viewpoint holds onto discrete experiences that are non-contradictory with each other. When thinking in a logical context, to hold things which would contradictory, we invent different contexts. For example, "Gandolf is a good person, therefore he would fight to save a hobbit's life if it were easy for him to win." Perfectly logical within his character, because we've made a fictional character. But we could create another context. "Gandolf is sometimes not a good person, therefore we can't know if he would fight to save a hobbit's life if it would be easy for him to win."

We distinctively know both of these contexts. Within our specially made contexts, if Gandolf is a good person, he WILL do X. The only reason Gandolf would not save the hobbit if it was an easy victory for him, is if he wasn't a good person. Here I have a perfectly logical and irrefutable context in my head. And yet, I can change the definitions, and a different logic will form. I can hold two different contexts of Gandolf, two sets of contextual logic, and distinctively know them both with contextual awareness.

Of course, I could create something illogical as well. "Gandolf is a good person, therefore he would kill all good hobbits in the world." Do I distinctively know this? Yes. But I really don't have contextual logical awareness. I am not using the "context of logic". I could think this way if I really wanted to. Perhaps we would say such a person is insane, especially if such contextual thinking was applied to reality, and not a fantasy of the mind.

The rational behind thinking logically, is when you apply logical thinking to reality, it has a better chance of your surviving. Of course, this does mean in situations in which harm to ourselves is not an immediately known outcome, we can entertain illogical contexts instead. Philosophy is arguably an exercise of trying to see if the logical contexts we've created in our head actually hold up when discussing with another person.

You can see plenty of people who hold contexts that do not follow logic, and when they are shown it is not illogical, they insist on believing that context regardless. This is the context they distinctively know. It doesn't work in application to reality, but that is not as important to them as holding the context for their own personal emotional gratification. I do not mean to imply it is "others" that do this. I am willing to bet almost every human in the world does this, and it is only with vigilance, training, and practice that people can minimize holding the emotional value of a context over its rational value.

So to clarify again, one can hold a distinctive logical or illogical context in their head. They distinctively know whatever those contexts are. It does not mean that those contexts can be applied beyond what is in their mind to reality without contradiction. We can strongly convince ourselves that it "must" be so, but we will never applicably know, until we apply it.

With that, let me address your points.

In simpler terms, math applies before any application to the empirical world because it is what the external world is contingent on: differentiation. — Bob Ross

No, that is what our context of the world depends on. The world does not differentiate like we do. The world does not discretely experience. Matter and energy are all composed of electrons, which are composed of things we can break down further. Reality is not aware of this. This is a context of distinctive knowledge that we have applied to reality without contradiction. It is not the reverse.

I've noted before that math is the logical consequence of being able to discretely experience. 1, is the concept of "a discrete experience." That is entirely of our own making. It is not that the external world is contingent on math, it is that our ability to understand the world, is contingent on our ability to discretely experience, and logically think about what that entails.

Does this mean that reality is contingent on our observation? Not at all. It means our understanding of the world, our application of our distinctive knowledge to reality, is contingent on our distinctive knowledge.

Therefore, if I distinctively define a potato in a particular way where it implies “multiplicity” and “quantity”, then the operation of addition must follow. The only way I can fathom that this could be negated is if the universality of mathematics is denied: which would entail the rejection of differentiation (“discrete experience” itself). — Bob Ross

Exactly. If you use a logical context that you distinctively know, there are certain results that must follow from it. But just because it fits in your head, does not mean you can applicably know that your logical context can be known in application to reality, until you apply it to reality by adding two potatoes together. To clarify, I mean the totality of the act, not an abstract.

When I add these two potatoes together, what happens if one breaks in half? Do I have two potatoes at that point? No, so it turns out I wasn't able to add "these" two potatoes. Since I have added two potatoes in reality before, I know it is possible that two identities I know as potatoes, can be added again. But do I applicably know I can add those other two potatoes before I add them together? No.
Can I add two potatoes abstractly in my head, and the result will always logically equal two? Yes. Can I imagine that adding "those" two potatoes in my head, and they will not break and everything will perfectly equal two? Yes. Does that mean I applicably know this? No. I hope this clarifies what I'm trying to say.

I can know, in the abstract, that a circle can fit in a square. I do not need to physically see (empirically observe) a circle inscribed in a square to know this. — Bob Ross

Yes, you can distinctively know this, which is what abstract logical contexts are. But do you applicably know that you can fit this square and circle I give you in that way before you attempt it? No. You measure the square, you measure the circle. Everything points that it should fit perfectly. But applicably unknown to you, I made them magnetized to where they will always repel. As such, they will never actually fit due to the repulsion that you would not applicably know about, until you tried to put them together.

I am not referring to what we induce is under our inevitable spatial references (such as the makeup of “outer space” or the mereological composition of the space), but, rather, the holistic, unescapable, spatial captivity we are both subjected to: we cannot conceive of anything else. — Bob Ross

I understand. But your inability to conceive of anything else is because that is the distinctive context you have chosen. There are people who conceive of different things. I can make a context of space where gravity does not apply. I can conceive of space as something that can allow warp travel or teleportation. What I cannot do, is applicably know a conception of space that I have never applied without contradiction. That part which is inescapable, is the application of our concepts to reality. Reality does not care about our logical constructs and rational thinking, aka, our distinctive knowledge. If we are unable to create a distinctive context of logical thinking that fits in reality without contradiction, then we lack any applicable knowledge of that reality.

Although this is slightly off topic, this is why I reject the notion of non-spatial claims: it is merely the fusion of absence (as noted under the spatial reference), linguistic capability (we can combine the words together to make the claim), and the holistic spatial reference (i.e. “non-” + “spatial”). This is, in my eyes, no different than saying “square circle”. — Bob Ross

To hammer home, that is because of our application. When you define a logical context of space that cannot be applied and contradicts the very moment of your occupation of space, it is immediately contradicted by reality. A distinctively known logical context that is rationally perfect in our heads cannot be claimed to be an accurate representation of reality, until it is applied to reality.

Whether either of us like it, we do not claim “theory”, scientifically, to the most cogent induction out of what we know: that is a hypothesis at best. — Bob Ross

I think you misunderstood what I was trying to state. I was not stating a scientific theory. I was stating a theory. A scientific theory is combination of applicable knowledge for the parts of the theory that have been tested. Any "theories" on scientific theories are speculations based on a hierarchy of logic and inductions.

As another example, historians do not deem what is historically known based off of what is the most cogent induction (currently), it has to pass a threshold. — Bob Ross

If they are using knowledge correctly, then yes. But with this epistemology, we can re-examine certain knowledge claims about history and determine if they are applicably known, or if they are simply the most cogent inductions we can conclude. Sometimes there are things outside of what can be applicably known. In that case, we only have the best cogent inductions to go on. We may not like that there are things outside of applicable knowledge, or like the idea that many of our constructions of the past are cogent inductions, but our like or dislike of that has nothing to do with the soundness of this epistemological theory.

In other words, my epistemology is not "not taking into account" these situations. It does. The question is, does the application of the epistemology continue to be the best tool currently available to assess reality rationally?

Completely understandable. I would also like to add that even “truth” in terms of distinctively known is merely in relation to the subject: it is still not absolute “truth”--only absolute, paradoxically, relative to the subject. — Bob Ross

No, that is not "truth" as I defined it. That is simply applicable knowledge. And applicable knowledge, is not truth. Truth is an inapplicable plausibility. It is the combination of all possible contexts applied to all of reality without a contradiction. It is an impossibility to obtain. It is an extremely common mistake to equate knowledge with truth; as I've noted, I've done it myself.

To explain, I am limited by my distinctive context. I can take all the possible distinctive contexts I have, and apply them to reality. Whatever is left without contradiction is what I applicably know. But because my distinctive contexts are limited, it cannot encompass all possible distinctive contexts that could be. Not to mention I'm limited in my applicable context as well. I will never applicably know the world as a massive Tyrannosaurus Rex. I will never applicably know the world as someone who is incapable of visualizing in their mind. As such, truth is an applicably unobtainable definition.

In my scenario with Smith, he isn’t speculating that Jones has 5 coins in his pocket: he is claiming it has the potential to occur. — Bob Ross

If he claims that he speculates it could be the case that Jones has 5 coins in his pocket, then he is literally claiming the colloquial use of the term possibility. I am salvaging this with “could” referring to potentiality. — Bob Ross

The problem here is in your sentence, "he speculates it could be the case". This is just redundancy. "Speculation" means "I believe X to be the case despite not having any experience of applicable knowledge prior". "It could be the case" means, "I believe it to be the case", but you haven't added any reasoning why it could be the case. Is it the case because of applicable knowledge, probability, possiblity, etc? I could just as easily state, "He speculates that its probable", or "He speculates that its possible".

And this is what I mean by asking for a clear definition of "potential" that serves an indicator of something that cannot be described by the hierarchy. If potential simply means, "it could be the case", its just a generic and unspecified induction. It is a claim of belief, without the clarification of what leads to holding that belief. I don't think this is what you want. I felt I did use your example and successfully point out times we can claim probability and speculation, but that's because I fleshed out the scenario to clarify the specifics. If you do not give the specifics of what the underlying induction is based on, then it is simply an unexamined induction, and at best, a guess.

This is feels like “context” is truly ambiguous. The term context needs to have some sort of reasoning behind it that people abide by: otherwise it is pure chaos. I think the main focus of epistemology is to provide a clear derivation of what “knowledge” is and how to obtain it (in our case, including inductive beliefs). Therefore, I don’t think we can, without contradiction, define things purposely ambiguously. — Bob Ross

I'm hoping that at this point I've laid out what context is. The term distinctive context is clearly defined as a set of distinctive identities that are held together in the mind. Distinctive contexts can include other contexts, like logic, and we generally consider those more valuable. Rational people ensure that their contexts include the "logical context" which allows us to make rational abstractions.
Applicable context is the ability of a person to apply their distinctive context to reality. If I have a context of metric measurement, but I do not have a ruler with centimeters, it is outside of my applicable context. If I later go blind in life, I may have visions of what the world looks like in my head, but I can no longer applicably know the world with sight.

What can be ambiguous, is the context another person holds. Our own conversation is a fine example! We are discussing not only to see if the application of this epistemology context can be applied to reality without contradiction, but to also to convey and see if the distinctive context of our words is understood by each other as we intended, and to see if it fits within a rational and logical context as well.

Whew! This has already gone on long enough, so let me shorten the rest. I believe I've added enough to address the points on calculating the Earth distinctively versus applicably knowing what the Earth's circumference is, as well as noting what cannot be applicably known. If you still feel my points have not adequately addressed those, let me know.

A very quick article on science. https://www.forbes.com/sites/paulmsutter/2019/10/27/science-does-not-reveal-truth/?sh=431c861c38c3

If you still want me to address my claims of science, I will as well next post.

So I think I have identified our fundamental difference: you seem to be only allowing what is empirically known to be what can be "known", whereas I am allowing for knowledge that can, along with what is empirical, arise from the mind. — Bob Ross

No, not at all! There are two types of knowledge. Applicable knowledge, and distinctive knowledge. What you have been trying to do, is state that distinctive knowledge can be applicable knowledge without the act of application. This is understandable, as "knowledge" in general use does not have this distinction. But here, it does. And in the study of epistemology, I have found it to be absolutely necessary.

For example, try applying without contradiction (in the sense that you seem to be using it--empirically) the principle of noncontradiction. I don't think you can: it is apodictically true by means of reason alone. — Bob Ross

As an abstract, you can distinctively know the principle of non-contradiction. To apply it, you must create a specific example. For example, if I stated, this color red, is both the color red, and blue at the same time, I can test it. I look at the color, find it is red, and that it is not blue. Therefore that color right there, cannot be both red and blue at the same time.

Distinctively, I can imagine the color red, then the color blue, and determine that the color I am envisioning in my head cannot both be the color red I am envisioning, and the color blue I am envisioning. This is known to me, as I am contradicted by my inability to do it.

But, what if I smell a color? For example, I smell a flower whenever I envision purple in my head. I distinctively know this. However, if I point out a purple object and I don't smell flowers, then I cannot say I applicably know that the color purple in reality smells like flowers. Does this make sense? I can distinctively know that when I envision a color, I also imagine a smell. But that doesn't mean that happens if I apply that to reality.

Furthermore, try proving space empirically: I don't think you can. Space, in one unison, is proven apodictically (by means of the principle of noncontradiction) with reason alone. — Bob Ross

No, space in application, is not proven by distinctive knowledge alone. I can imagine a whole set of rules and regulations about something called space in my head, that within this abstract context, are perfectly rational and valid. But, when I take my theory and apply it to a square inch cube of reality, I find a contradiction. I can distinctively have a theory in my head that I know, but one that I cannot apply to reality.

The notions of space that we use in application today, such as the idea of an "inch", have all been applied to reality without contradiction. There are many distinctively known ideas of space that have not been applied. String theory, field theory, and multiverse theory are all theories of space you can distinctively know in the abstract. But they cannot be currently known in application.

Recall that I can distinctively know 1 and 1 are two. But what is that in application? 1 what? 1 potato and 1 potato can be applicably known as two potatoes. That is the key I think you are missing.

If we have a mathematical formula, we can "know" it will work in relation to the "external" world regardless of whether it actually is instantiated in it. — Bob Ross

What I am saying is you can distinctively know that if you have an identity of 1, and an identity of 1, that it will make an identity of two. But if you've never added two potatos before, you don't applicably know if you can. While this may seem silly, lets take it to something less silly now. I have two Hydrogen atoms and 1 Oxygen atom together. What do I mean by this in application? Are they in orbit to make a molecule of water? Are the electrons orbiting slowly to be ice? Are they simply in a certain proximity? It it just Hydrogen and Oxygen in the air together? We can imagine all of these abstractly and know in our context of logic and the rules of chemistry the answers. But when we test actual Hydrogen and oxygen, our abstract rules must be applied to applicably know the answers for those specific atoms in reality.

I was inclined to adamantly claim it(inductions are knowledge) is, but upon further contemplation I actually really enjoy the idea of degrading inductions to beliefs with different credence levels (and not knowledge). — Bob Ross

Understandable! Yes, inductions are essentially beliefs of different credence levels.

However, I think there may be dangers in this kind of approach, without some means of determining something "known" — Bob Ross

And that is why there must be a declaration of what can be known first. I establish distinctive and applicable knowledge, and only after those are concluded, can we use the rules learned to establish the cogency of inductions. Without distinctive and applicable knowledge first, the hierarchy of inductions has no legs to stand on.

I am not sure how practical this will be for the laymen--I can envision everyone shouting "everything is just a belief!". — Bob Ross

The layman already misuses the idea of knowledge, and there is no rational or objective measure to counter them. But I can. I can teach a layperson. I can have a consistent and logical foundation that can be shown to be useful. People's decision to misuse or reject something simply because they can, is not an argument against the functionality and usefulness of the tool. A person can use a hammer for a screw, and that's their choice, not an argument for the ineffectiveness of a hammer as a tool for a nail!

Likewise, it isn't just about what is more cogent, it is about what we claim to have passed a threshold to be considered "true". — Bob Ross

I want to emphasize again, the epistemology I am proposing is not saying knowledge is truth. That is very important. A common mistake people make in approaching epistemology (I have done the same) is conflating truth with knowledge. I have defined earlier what "truth" would be in this epistemology, and it is outside of being able to be applicably known. I can distinctively know it, but I cannot applicably know it.

To note it again, distinctive and applicable truth would be the application of all possible contexts to a situation, and what would remain without contradiction after it was over. Considering one human being, or even all human beings could experience all possible contexts and apply them, it is outside of our capability. But what we can do is take as many contexts as we can, apply them to reality, and run with what hasn't been contradicted yet. While what is conclude may not be true, it is the closest we can rationally get.

I find myself in the same dilemma where the theory of evolution and there being a teapot floating around Jupiter are both speculations. What bothers me about this is not that they both are speculations, but, rather, that there is no distinction made between them: this is what I mean by the epistemology isn't quite addressing the most pressing matters (most people will agree that which they immediately see--even in the case that they don't even know what a deduction is--but the real disputes arise around inductions). This isn't meant as a devastating blow to your epistemology, it is just an observation that much needs to be addressed before I can confidently state that it is a functional theory (no offense meant). I think we agree on this, in terms of the underlying meaning we are both trying to convey. — Bob Ross

I fully understand and respect this! I believe this is because you may not have understood or forgotten a couple of tenants.

1. Inductions are evaluated by hierarchies.
2. Inductions also have a chain of reasoning, and that chain also follows the hierarchy.
3. Hierarchies can only be related to by the conclusions they reach about a subject. Comparing the inductions about two completely different subjects is useless.

To simplify, if I have a possibility vs a plausibility when I am rationally considering what to pursue, I can conclude it is more rational to pursue what I already know is possible. That doesn't mean being rational results in asserting what is true. Inductions are, by definition, uncertainties. The conclusion does not necessarily follow from the premises. Sometimes people defy what is possible, pursue what is plausible, and result in a new discovery which erases what was previously applicably known.

Of course, when the person decided to pursue what was only seen as plausible, and against what was possible, society would quite rightly claim that the pursuit of what is plausible is not rational. Rationality is incredibly powerful. But depending on a person's context, and the limits of what they already known, it is not the only tool a person needs. Sometimes, it is important to defy and test what is rational. Sometimes, in fact, many times, we are simply in a position where we are certain that the outcome is uncertain, and must sometimes make that leap into the next second of life.

But, making that leap without some type of guideline, would be chaos and randomness. So we can use the hierarchy and the chain of reasoning to give us some type of guide that more often than not, might result in less chaos and more order.

So, I can first know that the hierarchy is used in one subject. For example, we take the subject of evolution. We do not compare inductions about evolution, to the inductions about Saturn. That would be like comparing our knowledge of an apple to the knowledge of a horse, and saying that the knowledge of a horse should have any impact on the knowledge of this apple we are currently eating.

So we pick evolution. I speculate that because certain dinosaurs had a particular bone structure, had feathers, and DNA structure, that birds evolved from those dinosaurs. This is based on our previously known possibilities in how DNA evolves, and how bone structure relates to other creatures. To make this simple, this plausibility is based on other possibilities.

I have another theory. Space aliens zapped a plants with a ray gun that evolved certain plants into birds. The problem is, this is not based on any applicable knowledge, much less possibilities. It is also a speculation, but its chain of reasoning is far less cogent than the first theory, so it is more rational to pursue the first.

When plausibilities are extremely close in hierarchy through their chain of reasoning, it is more palatable to take the less rational gamble. So for example, lets say we take the first theory, and change it to, "Perhaps our current understanding of how bones evolve among species is false." And the reason we say this, is because we found a new mammal, and it might contradict our previous findings.

This plausibility is essentially only one step away from the the first theory, and most would say it is viable to pursue. However, if a person did not have the time or interest to pursue this speculation, it would still be rational to hold onto the possibilities that our current understanding of bone structure until the speculation is fully explored.

Your coins problem is extremely good!

He could abstractly reason that if he experienced 5 coins in a pocket of some size, that, considering mathematics in the abstract, it is possible for 5 coins to fit in a pocket that is greater than that size (assuming the pocket is empty): but he didn't experience it for the greater sized pocket. — Bob Ross

You have it correct. He can distinctively know that five coins should be able to fit into a pocket of LWD. He can measure the pocket from the outside and see that it is greater than LWD. But until he applies and attempts to put the five coins into that specific pocket, Smith doesn't applicably know if they can fit. Why? What if there is something in the pocket Smith wasn't aware of? What if part of it is sewn shut, or caught?

To sum it up, application is when we apply to a specific situation that is outside of our distinctive knowledge. We can make a thought experiment, but that is not an application experiment. Smith can have abstract distinctive knowledge about coins, pocket, dimenstions, and even Jones. Smith could conclude its probable, possible, speculate, or even irrationally believe that Jones has five coins in that specific pocket. But none of those are applicable knowledge. He can only applicably know, if he's confirmed that there are five coins in Jones pocket without contradiction from reality.

But notice that, within your terminology, Smith cannot claim it is "possible", "probable", or "irrational". Therefore, by process of elimination he is forced to use "speculation" — Bob Ross

Within the context you set up, you may be correct. But in another context, he can claim it is possible or probable. For example, Smith sees Jones slip five coins into his pocket. Smith leaves the room for five minutes and comes back. Is it possible Jones could fit five coins in his pocket? Yes. Is it possible that Jones did not remove those five coins in the five minutes he was gone? Yes. We know Jones left those coins in his pocket for a while, therefore it is possible that Jones could continue to leave those coins in his pocket.

The epistemology is not telling Smith to do what he wants. The epistemology recognizes the reality that Smith can do whatever he wants.

He can only do whatever he wants in so far as he doesn't contradict himself. If I can provide an argument that leads Smith realize he is holding a contradiction, then he will not be able to do it unless he uncontradicts it with some other reasoning. — Bob Ross

I really wish this was the case. People do things while contradicting their own rationality all the time. People do not have to be rational, or respect rationality in any way. You can conclude he Smith would be irrational using rationality. You could even explain it to Smith. Smith could decide not to care at all. There is absolutely nothing anyone can do about it.

We can somewhat resolve this if we consider "possibility", in the sense of "experiencing it once before", as "a deductively defined concept, with consideration to solely its essential properties, that has been experienced at least once before". That way, it is logically pinned to the essential properties of that concept. I may have the choice of deductively deciding concepts (terms), but I will not have as much free reign to choose what I've experienced before. To counter this would require the subject to come up with an alternative method that identifies equivalent objects in time (which cannot be logically done unless they consider the essential properties). — Bob Ross

Correct. But this is only if a person chooses to think and act logically. So to clarify, I can convince someone to do something rational, if they are using rationality (and of course, I'm actually being rational as well). But my being rational does not preclude they must be rational. And if they decide to not be rational, no amount of rationality will persuade them.

In summary, I can claim that contradictions do not arise in terms of time as well as structural levels. These are the only two aspects of contexts and, therefore, as of now, this is what I consider "context" to be. It is important to emphasize that I am not just merely trying to advocate for my own interpretation of "context": I am trying to derive that which can not be contradicted in terms of "context"--that which all subjects would be obliged to (in terms of underlying meaning, of course they could semantically refurbish it). — Bob Ross

I think you're getting the idea of contexts now. The next step is to realize that your contexts that you defined are abstractions, or distinctive knowledge rules in your own head. If we can apply those contexts to reality without contradiction, then they can be applicably known, and useful to us. But there is no one "Temporal context". There is your personal context of "Temporal". I could make my own. We could agree on a context together. In another society, perhaps they have no idea of time, just change.

To answer your next question, "What is useful", is when we create a context that can be applied to reality, and it helps us live, be healthy, or live an optimal life. Of course, that's what I consider useful. Perhaps someone considers what is useful is, "What makes me feel like I'm correct in what I believe." Religions for example. There are people who will sacrifice their life, health, etc for a particular context.

Convincing others to change their contexts was not part of the original paper. That is a daunting enough challenge as its own topic. In passing, as a very loose starting point, I believe we must appeal to what a person feels adds value to their lives, and demonstrate how an alternative context serves that better than their current context. This of course changes for every individual. A context of extreme rationality may appeal to certain people, but if it does not serve other people's values, they will reject it for others.

I think they can do whatever they want as long as they are not aware of a contradiction. Therefore, if I propose "context" as relating to temporal and mereological contexts, then they either are obliged to it or must be able to contradict my notion. My goal is to make it incredibly hard, assuming they grasp the argument, to deny it (if not impossible). Obviously they could simply not grasp it properly, but that doesn't negate the strength of the argument itself. — Bob Ross

I think you're getting it. Others decision to accept or reject your context has no bearing on whether that context serves yourself optimally for your own life. (Unless of course that rejection results in potential harm to yourself!) Further, a person's rejection of your context, is not a rejection of the rationality of the context. That stands on its own regardless of others input. Others input can introduce you to distinctive and applicable knowledge you may not have known prior, which can cause you to question and expand what you know. But there may be people who do not care, who are happy with their own little world as it gets them through their day. Perhaps they would be happier or more successful if they embraced a more rational or worldly context, but plenty of people are willing to embrace the devil they know instead of the angels they don't.

But with this, I also defend my epistemology. People's decisions not to use it, does not make it irrational or useless to other people who would like a rational approach to knowledge. For the epistemology to not be rational, it must contradict itself in application. So far, I don't think it has. But that doesn't mean we shouldn't keep trying to!

When you think of something in your head that you distinctively know is not able to be applied. For example, if I invent a unicorn that is not a material being. The definition has been formulated in such a manner that it can never be applied, because we can never interact with it.

But you can apply the fact that you distinctively know that it cannot be applied without ever empirically applying it (nor could you). So you aren't wrong here, but that's not holistically what I mean by "apply to reality". — Bob Ross

My inability to apply something, is the application to reality. When I try to apply what I distinctively know cannot be applied to reality, reality contradicts my attempt at application. If I were to apply what I distinctively know cannot be applied to reality, and yet reality showed I could apply it to reality, then my distinctive knowledge would be wrong in application. But when you lack any distinctive knowledge of how to apply it to reality, there is nothing you can, or cannot apply to reality. So by default, it is inapplicable, and therefore cannot be applicably known.

I think you are conflated two completely separate claims: the spherical nature of the earth and the size of the earth. The stick and shadow experiment does not prove the size of the earth, it proves the spherical shape of the earth. — Bob Ross

No, it at best proves the possibility that the Earth is round. If you take small spherical objects and show that shadows will function a particular way, then demonstrate the Earth's shadows also function that way, then it is possible the Earth is spherical. But until you actually measure the Earth, you cannot applicably know if it is spherical. Again, perhaps there was some other shape in reality that had its shadows function like a sphere? For example, a sphere cut in half. Wouldn't the shadows on a very small portion of the rounded sphere act the same as a full sphere? If you are to state reality is a particular way, it must be applied without contradiction to applicably know it.

It only undermines them if there are other alternatives in the hierarchy. If for example a scientific experiment speculates something that is not possible, it is more rational to continue to hold what is possible. That doesn't mean you can't explore the speculation to see if it does revoke what is currently known to be possible. It just means until you've seen the speculation through to its end, holding to the inductions of what is possible is more rational.

I sort of agree, but am hesitant to say the least. Scientific theories are not simply that which is the most cogent, it is that which has been vigorously tested and thereby passed a certain threshold to be considered "true". I think there is a difference (a vital one). — Bob Ross

Science does not deal in truth. Science deals in falsification. When a theory is proposed, its affirmation is not what is tested. It is the attempt at its negation that is tested. Once it withstands all attempts at its negation, then it is considered viable to use for now. But nothing is science is ever considered as certain and is always open to be challenged.

I think the rest of your post has been covered, and I would be repeating what has already been stated. Fantastic post again! Keen questions and great insights. I hope I'm adequately answering your points, and what I'm trying to point out is starting to come into view.

I’ve seen people knocked out, but never a brain knocked out. People are far more than brains. — NOS4A2

When a person is knocked out, its due to brain trauma. No, you are not more than your brain.

When speaking of qualities or states of a human being, such as consciousness, happiness, sleepiness, etc. we are discussing qualities and states of the organism in its entirety, such as it exists. Since disembodied brains can neither function nor exist on their own—without blood, oxygen, the skeleton, flesh—it’s silly to say a brain can produce a quality that only an entire organism can display. — NOS4A2

I mean this with all seriousness, you need to look up some biology. Nerves are extensions of the brain through which information of the body travels. If you chop a finger off, you lose the ability to sense a finger, but you don't lose your brain or consciousness. Needing nutrients to function does not deny the brain is your source of consciousness.

You also have not provided me an alternative to your brain being your source of consciousness, backed by facts that could negate the numerous facts that point to the brain being the source of consciousness. If you can't then you stand in the position of fantasy, while I stand on solid facts.

Anyone with physicalist presuppositions will say that of course it comes from the brain: where else? On the other side those who think consciousness or mind is ontologically fundamental will say that the brain is like a radio receiver; that it in some sense receives consciousness, doesn't produce it. Who's right? Who knows and how could the 'fact of the matter' ever be demonstrated? — Janus

I know. Nerurologists know. We're right. If someone states, "We need Oxygen to breath, but maybe its invisible magical unicorns that use Oxygen as a medium," They're wrong. An opinion or an introduction of something you can imagine never trumps facts.

Nothing called “consciousness” comes from the brain. — NOS4A2

Of course it comes from the brain. Ever seen a person get knocked out by hitting their head? How do you think that happens? Barring all the massive evidence at this point in scientific discovery, where does it come from then? I have a claim of where consciousness comes from, and have the entirety of neuroscience to back me up. What's your alternative?

I completed a reliable method of knowledge here that I use in my day to day life. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/9015/a-methodology-of-knowledge

Just wanted to chime in and say "Well done". I believe people who still think consciousness does not come from the brain are like flat earthers. People need to understand this is not up for rational debate anymore.

Like it does today. There is no question that the mind is physical. Everything else is just wishful imagination. Look at all the medicines we use to alter the mind. Depression medication, anti-psychotics, not to mention drugs like alcohol and cocaine.

Surgery and brain damage have shown that the mind is activated by the physical brain. Stimulate a certain area of the brain during surgery and a flash of mind appears to the user. Carve out chunks and a part of a person's mind is gone. There are examples of people who have lost their short term memory due to brain damage and have their mind forever changed. There is an example of a person who had brain damage, and can no longer see colors, though there is nothing wrong with their eyes.

The evidence for a material mind isn't controversial, its an overwhelming deluge of reality. You brain is damaged or dies, your mind is damaged or dies. There is absolutely no viable alternative view point.

Good discussion Bob, lets see if we can come to common ground here.

First off, potentiality is an abstract consideration. You seemed to be trying to apply potentiality distinctively and applicably (and finding issues with it): abstract considerations are always applications to reality. I don't think that "application to reality" is limited to empirical verifications: abstract considerations are perfectly reasonable (I think) — Bob Ross

I think the notion of something abstract is it is a concept of the mind. Math is abstract thinking, and we discussed earlier how "1" represents "an identity". We really can't apply an abstract to reality without greater specifics. I need to apply 1 brick, or 1 stone. The idea of applying 1 is simply discretely experiencing a one.

Anything that "isn't contradicted in the abstract" (assuming it isn't directly experienced as the contrary) is something that got applied to reality without contradiction. I might just be misremembering what "distinctive knowledge" is, but I am thinking of the differentiation within my head (my thoughts which haven't been applied yet to see if the contents hold). If that is the case, then potentiality can never be distinctive knowledge, it is the application of that distinctive knowledge in the abstract. — Bob Ross

I am not sure what you mean by applying distinctive knowledge in the abstract. All this seems to be doing is sorting out the different ideas within my head to be consistent with what I know. Math again is the perfect example. I know that 1 + 1 make 2. Could I add another 1 to that 2 and get 3? Yes. But when its time to apply that to reality, what specifically is the 1, the 1, and the 2?

I've realized that, although your epistemology is great so far, it doesn't really address the bulk of what epistemologies address. This is because your epistemology, thus far, has addressed some glasses of water (possibility, probability, and irrational inductions), but yet simply defined the whole ocean as "plausibility". Even with a separation of "inapplicable" and "applicable", I find that this still doesn't address a vast majority of "knowledge". — Bob Ross

Plausibilities are not deductions though. They are inductions. And inductions, are not knowledge. Now can we further study inductions now that we have a basis of knowledge to work with, and possibly refine and come up with new outlooks? Sure! You have to realize, that without a solid foundation of what knowledge is, the study and breakdown of inductions has been largely a failure. I wouldn't say that not yet going into a deep dive of a particular induction is a weakness of the epistemology, it just hasn't gotten there yet.

Now, let's dive into your example you gave about the coins:

"Smith thinks Jones potentially has 5 coins in his pocket, but we the audience knows, that he does not (thus this is not an applicable potential). — Bob Ross

But at a deeper level, imagine Smith has never experienced 5 coins in a pocket, but he's experienced coins before. Therefore, Smith cannot claim that it is "possible" for there to be 5 coins in Jones' pocket. — Bob Ross

Correct. And I see nothing wrong with that. Once he slides the coins into a pocket, then he'll know its possible for 5 coins to fit in a pocket of that size.

He can claim "it is potentially the case that Jones' has 5 coins in his pocket". — Bob Ross

Again, I'm not seeing how we need the word potential when stating, "Smith speculates that Jones has 5 coins in his pocket."

But this can get weirder. Imagine Smith has experienced 5 coins in his own pocket, but not 5 coins in Jones' pocket: then he hasn't experienced it before. Therefore, it is still not a possibility, it just has the potential to occur. — Bob Ross

We have to clarify the claim a bit. Does Smith know that Jones' pocket is the correct size to fit five coins? Further, Smith knows it is possible if Jones' pocket is that big that 5 coins could fit into that pocket. But as to whether there are five coins in there at this time? Smith has never seen Jones put the five coins in his pocket. Its plausible, not possible.

So Smith can know that its possible five coins can fit into a pocket of X size.
What is it Smith is saying is possible vs his speculation?
Is he saying he knows Jones' pocket is big enough to where it is possible to fit 5 coins? Is he speculating that there are 5 coins in Jones' pocket right now, even though there is no evidence? Is he trying to claim it is possible that Jones' slipped five coins into his pocket earlier when Smith wasn't looking?

Again, the term possible vs. speculation/plausible all results in the specific claims of what are being stated. I see nothing wrong with noting very clear states of Smith's limited knowledge and inductions.

If we allow Smith to decide what a context is, then it seems as though the epistemology is simply telling him to do whatever he wants (as long as he doesn't contradict himself). — Bob Ross

The epistemology is not telling Smith to do what he wants. The epistemology recognizes the reality that Smith can do whatever he wants. Of course if Smith does whatever he wants, he'll likely end up doing the wrong thing, and we can give a host of reasons to Smith to use certain contexts over others.

Imagine Smith has experienced 5 coins in Jones' pocket yesterday, but he hasn't today. Well, if the context revolves around time, then Smith still can't claim it is possible. — Bob Ross

Correct. What you're running into is what happens if you consider every context that a person could be in. The problem isn't the reality that anyone can choose any context they want. The problem is that certain contexts aren't very helpful. Thus I think the problem is demonstrating how certain contexts aren't very useful.

Also, I would like to point out, it wouldn't really make sense for Smith, although it is a speculation, to just merely answer the question with "I speculate he has 5 coins in his pocket", because Smith isn't necessarily claiming that Jones does have 5 coins, he is merely assessing the potentiality. Again, at a bare minimum, he would have to had experienced 5 coins in Jones' pocket before in order to claim it is possible. — Bob Ross

If Smith isn't claiming that Jones has 5 coins in his pocket, then he's speculating Jones could, or could not have 5 coins in his pocket. And if Smith had experienced that Jones had 5 coins in his pocket at least once, depending on the context, Smith could say it was possible that Jones had 5 coins, or did not have 5 coins in his pocket.

Most of the time we don't have that kind of oddly specific knowledge, therefore potentiality was born: it is a less strong form of possibility. — Bob Ross

Once again, this is describing speculation/plausibility. I'm still not seeing "potentiality" used any differently.

To sum it up, I think we need to clearly and concisely define "context", "possibility", "impossibility", and "potentiality". If I can make up whatever I want for "context", I could be so literally specific that there is no such thing as a repetitive context, or I could be so ambiguous that everything is possible. Then we are relying on "meaningfulness", or some other principle not described in your epistemology, to deter them from this. If so, then why not include it clearly in the epistemology? — Bob Ross

No disagreement in formulating what contexts would be useful, and not be useful to individuals and societies. The purpose of the original paper was simply to establish how knowledge worked. Now that we have this, we can definitely refine it. Since you have your own ideas on proposals for contexts that work, lets start with that.

Which leads me to my next question: when you say "unable to apply", what do you mean? — Bob Ross

When you think of something in your head that you distinctively know is not able to be applied. For example, if I invent a unicorn that is not a material being. The definition has been formulated in such a manner that it can never be applied, because we can never interact with it.

For example, let us say that a man uses a stick and shadows to determine the Earth is round, and calculate the approximate circumference. The only way to applicably know, is to travel the world and measure your journey.

I disagree. — Bob Ross

In your opinion you do, but can you disagree in application? Based purely on this experiment, its plausible that the Earth is round, and its plausible that the distance calculated is the size of the Earth. The actual reality of the diameter of the Earth must be measured to applicably know it. You have to applicably show how the experiment shows the Earth is round and that exact size. The experiment was close, but it was not the actual size of the Earth once it was measured.

I think one of the issues you might have with speculations, is that they are less cogent than the other inductions. That does not make them useless, or irrational. Recall that it is a hierarchy of induction. In the case of measuring the Earth with the experiment, at that that time, that was all they had to work with. While it was a speculation, it was the most reasonable induction that a person could work with at the time.

Perhaps one issue you have with the epistemology, is it puts humans into situations where they are powerless to know. That is an uncomfortable reality, but one that I cannot mitigate if I am to be consistent. We like to imagine we have a reasonable assessment of reality, and that we are reasonable people. We really aren't unless we train to be. Even then, there are limits.

However, I do have my worries, like you, about even calling them "speculations": a lot of enormously backed scientific theories would be a "credible speculative potential", which seems to undermine it quite significantly. — Bob Ross

It only undermines them if there are other alternatives in the hierarchy. If for example a scientific experiment speculates something that is not possible, it is more rational to continue to hold what is possible. That doesn't mean you can't explore the speculation to see if it does revoke what is currently known to be possible. It just means until you've seen the speculation through to its end, holding to the inductions of what is possible is more rational.

I believe irrational inductions should remain a contradiction with what is applicably known

I disagree, if what you mean by "application" is empirical evidence. I am claiming potentiality is applicably known (always). I can applicably know, in the abstract, that a logically unobtainable idea is irrational to hold. For example, take an undetectable unicorn: — Bob Ross

No, you can distinctively know that a logically unobtainable idea is irrational to hold. A logic puzzle must be reasoned before it can be distinctively known. Only applying the rules in a logical manner gets you a result. While we could invent a result in our heads to be anything, it fails when the rules of the logic puzzle are applied. Perhaps we're missing an identity, and this is where abstraction comes in. You'll recall that context was defined both distinctively, and applicably. Distinctive contexts could be called abstractions. To have distinctive knowledge, one must hold ideas that are non-contradictory within a particular context. Logic, is a context. So within the abstraction (distinctive context) of logic, we can conclude a correct and incorrect solution to a puzzle.

For a color blind person, I think they will be more than happy to accept that what is objective for them, isn't objective for other people. — Bob Ross

On the notion of objective, a color blind person would hold it to be objective would also be consistent within another color blind person. The subjective difference would be seeing the world color blind, versus with color. This is applicable context. What one can applicably know is based off of what one is applicably capable of. Applicable context can be subjective, or by a group of people. While I agree we cannot define "objective" as "true", I think it needs to remain in the realm of "Remaining uncontradicted by most contexts".

For me, "rationality" is a inter-subjectively defined concept. Therefore, we are not all rational beings (like Kant thought), but we are all reasoning beings. My goal, in terms of epistemology, is to attempt to make the arguments based off of reasoning, so as to make it virtually impossible for someone to deny it (if they have the capacity to understand the arguments). I agree that people don't have to be rational, but they are "reasonable" (just meaning "reasoning"). — Bob Ross

Can I clarify that I agree, but people have the capacity to reason with varying levels? Some people aren't very good at reasoning. Some people can reason, but follow emotions or whims more. The epistemology I've presented here is formed with reason. It can convince a person who uses reason. But it cannot convince a person who does not want to reason, or is swayed by emotion. All I am stating is you can't force a person to use reason, or be persuaded by reason if they don't want to be. I think on this you and I might agree.

Another good round of conversation! I will try to respond again this Saturday morning, but I will be gone for the rest of the weekend after.

The proposition is not a categorical one regarding behavior, there is no argument being made that humans always use their reason. — Garrett Travers

Then you agree with my point, and I've said nothing wrong.

The proposition is that humans survive using the application of reason, and reason is that means of survival.

but they also don't have to.
— Philosophim

In what way can you use anything else for survival? Keep the argument here, this is what you need to demonstrate. — Garrett Travers

Here you are now recanting what you just said earlier. You are saying humans MUST use reason to survive. But we've already both agreed that humans don't always have to be reasonable, and you can survive when you don't make reasonable choices.

We've already mentioned a few. I can overeat and be a few pounds overweight, even though I know its not reasonable to do so. It won't kill me. Lets go from the aspect of ignorance as well. Lets say I really like eating vegetables, but I don't know that they're healthy for me. It wasn't reason that makes me eat vegetables, its that they taste good.

I can have a hammer, yet use a screwdriver to bang on a nail.
— Philosophim

You just used reason to determine those tools could be used in a like manner, that's conceptualization. This is not a case of not employing reason. — Garrett Travers

You're arguing that if I have a hammer in front of me, using a screwdriver to beat a nail into the wall is reasonable? There is nothing reasonable about it. That's just an emotional whim. If you think that picking a screwdriver over a hammer is reasonable, please clarify how. Are you saying that reason is just creating concepts, but not their effective use?

Wrong. A grenade lands at your feet with 20 good people nearby. You have just enough time to cover your body over it and save the 19 other people around you.
— Philosophim

Non sequitur. This has nothing to do with the human's basic tool for survival. The introduction of force against reason is a violator of reason. This is irrelevant. — Garrett Travers

What? If reason cannot withstand force, then how do we survive when faced with force? If reason must be used to survive, then whenever someone uses force on a human being, do they just die? You are avoiding the point, and it is silly.

You aren't using reason correctly, this is making a bit more sense. Here's what reason is: think, understand, and form judgments by a process of logic.

None of this faculty is afforded to people who have grendades thrown at them, one will be forced to make a snap decision, reason has nothing to do with the equation, nor does this scenario address the proposition. — Garrett Travers

You are changing what reason is on a whim. First, my using a screwdriver instead of a hammer is somehow reasonable. You're saying I concluded I could use a screwdriver over the hammer by thinking, understanding, and forming judgements by logic. Yet there is no one reasonable in the world would think it is reasonable to use a screwdriver over a hammer.

I'm not asking you to make a snap decision. We're considering this now, so that when a time of judgement is needed, they've already used reason to determine what they will do. Soldiers consider this in places across the world. It is more reasonable in this situation to save the lives of 20 others. That means it is reasonable for you to lose your life.

And yet, that results in the loss of your basic survival. Meaning we have a very clear case of a situation in which we can reasonable conclude something that results in our death. We cease to survive, which has everything to do with the premise. Reason can lead to our survival, but does not necessarily lead to our survival.

Do animals need reason to survive?
— Philosophim

Animals have other evolutionary advantages for survival. We have evolved our reason. We do not have speed, senses, fangs, venom, claws, wings, talons, or any other advantage they have that has allowed them to survive in their respective environments. We only have reason as a means of survival. We barely have instinctual inclinations in any comparable way because of this evolutionary adaptation. — Garrett Travers

Again, if you're stating that we only have reason for survival, then we MUST use reason for survival. We have many instinctual inclinations, watch a few babies. Blow on their face and they hold their breath. Put something to suckle when they're hungry, and they do. It is not reason that makes a baby survive, it is the care and sacrifice of the involved parents. They put their own survival at risk for the child. But so do many other animals that lack reason.

If reason is: "

Here's what reason is: think, understand, and form judgments by a process of logic. — Garrett Travers

", and also implying that animals lack reason, then you need to show human actions apart from basic functions that animals do to survive, like eat, hunt, and defend themselves, are absolutely necessary.

It is not that reason is not invaluable, but it is a cherry on the cake. Survival does not require reason, if we are equating reason as something that other animals do not have.

Hey man, if you're not going to address the proposition, then take a hike. I'm not going around with you. This is not a categorical proposition describing behavior. That's the last time I'm addressing this before dismissing your arguments entirel. Either address the truth values of the propositions, or find another thing to discuss.[/quote]

I addressed your proposition clearly. Show me how I am wrong. Have you read your proposition clearly? Don't get mad at me. If I'm wrong, easily point out where I am misunderstanding the first proposition. You said humans use reason for their survival. I clearly pointed out they do not always use reason for their survival. They can use reason for survival, but they also don't have to. Where am I wrong? I can have a hammer, yet use a screwdriver to bang on a nail. Its not very effective, but I can. Do you understand?

If your first premise is simply, "Humans can reason," then my same arguments apply. This isn't hard to understand. I'm clearly addressing your points, stop avoiding them.

No, no it is not. Plenty of people are not reasonable in many day to day actions of their lives.
— Philosophim

Nobody performs actions that extenuate their lives that are unreasonable at base value. You'll actually have to provide an example of one for this assertion to be true. — Garrett Travers

Wrong. A grenade lands at your feet with 20 good people nearby. You have just enough time to cover your body over it and save the 19 other people around you. Or, you could quickly jump behind another person who is close by that did not notice the grenade, save yourself, and the grenade goes off killing almost everyone else. Isn't it reasonable to save the other 19 people? Saving my life would be unreasonable in this situation would it not? If it is not, then what value am I holding? That the deaths of 19 other people are worth my life?

Don't get vaccinated.
— Philosophim

That's a conclusion drawn through the application of reason. — Garrett Travers

While it could be, it can be made through ignorance and fear. My point again, not every decision is made through reason.

People overeat
— Philosophim

Eating is reasonable, overeating is damaging. The proposition is about how people survive. You're making my case for me. — Garrett Travers

No, I used this as an example to show you that people do not always make reasonable choices. You can have the capability to reason, but not use it.

React in anger or other emotions.
— Philosophim

This is not reason, this is the opposite. — Garrett Travers

That is my point. I think you understand my point now.

Reason, or rational thinking, is one aspect of humanity that it does not use exclusively.
— Philosophim

Humans must use it to survive. Again, not a categorical proposition. — Garrett Travers

100% incorrect. Do animals need reason to survive? Of course not. We are animals. We can survive through unreasonable, less effective, and sometimes outright dumb means. My point has been "we MUST reason" is incorrect. Demonstrate to me how we cannot survive in any way shape or form if we do not use reason.

Everything exists through natural processes, that's irrelevant. We have reason that we can use to survive, but we don't always use reason.
— Philosophim

Truth is the only thing that is relevant to any proposition, and whether or not one chooses to not use reason is itself a non sequitur. The premise must be addressed from the point of truth, or non-truth. You are choosing to not do so. — Garrett Travers

This told me nothing. Is it true that we don't always use reason in our day to day actions? Of course it is.

The premise states that humans developed reason through natural processes, and that reason is the human's means of survival. It is not a categorical proposition that describes what some, or all humans do with that reason. — Garrett Travers

Remove natural processes, because its irrelevant, and you have, "Reason is the human's means of survival." No, no it is not. Plenty of people are not reasonable in many day to day actions of their lives. People overeat. Don't get vaccinated. React in anger or other emotions. Rationalize behavior. Reason, or rational thinking, is one aspect of humanity that it does not use exclusively.

And no, she is not saying what people who use reason, necessarily do with it. That's fine. I'm simply pointing out that because she does not say what people must necessarily conclude with reason, that I can see situations in which reason would conclude in evil being committed against another person.

So again:

A. People do not use reason in all of their decisions.
B. Even if people use reason in a decision, the conclusion of that reason may result in evil.

Therefore the final premise: The only moral system of society is one in which each human is free to pursue their own values to live and achieve their own goals,

fails because people will often times do irrational things, which can result in immoral actions, or conclude values that are immoral to others in society. You're going to really have to rebuff what is stated here. No more statements about "What I'm not doing". If you want to play, its time to get in there and demonstrate why the above reasoning is wrong.

This first premise is simply untrue. Humans have the capability of using logic and rationality, but often times choose not to do so, or simply make logical and rational mistakes.
— Philosophim

So, what part is untrue? Not employing reason, does not negate the fact that we exist through natural processes, and have developed reason, as opposed to fangs, to survive. — Garrett Travers

Everything exists through natural processes, that's irrelevant. We have reason that we can use to survive, but we don't always use reason. Her other premises are built on the idea that we are all reasonable human being who will always do what is reasonable. We're not. Not everyone uses reason to survive in every day to day case.

P2. and if it is only through this conceptual faculty of reason that humans are capable of living a life according to the values he/she develops with said faculty

Simplifying this, you've stated, "It is only through reason that we can live our lives with values we have developed through reason."

Meaning if you don't act reasonably, you cannot obtain those values you've concluded with reason. Since many people are not reasonable, or do not always reason on every decision, many decisions by people do not meet these values. Further, I will note again, that someone can conclude values with reason that would require the murder, theft, or other harmful things to other people.

C. then the only moral system of society is one in which each human is free to pursue their own values to live and achieve their own goals[/quote]

1. If people do not always act reasonably, then the free pursuit of what they want (not necessarily values) will not be rational, and not be able to meet their values. Should people be free to do irrational things, like murder someone in anger?

2. If we go by the fact that we assume everyone is free to rationally pursue the values they have concluded from their rationality, it still leaves the problem that I can define my own values, and I can create values that are immoral and harmful to other people.

I'll play Garrett.

P1. if humans are generated by natural processes with reason (logic, rationality, conceptual faculty) being their means of survival. — Garrett Travers

This first premise is simply untrue. Humans have the capability of using logic and rationality, but often times choose not to do so, or simply make logical and rational mistakes.

Barring that, one can come to the logical conclusion that eliminating their neighbors would result in a boost in wealth or power.

With premise one invalidated, 2 and 3 fall.

You're doing that Internet trolling thing. — Joe Mello

No, I'm not, I'm trying to be kind and invite you to discuss.

Since you are not accepting the invitation today, we'll leave it for another time.

Perhaps you don't understand what the philosophy boards are about, which is fine. We're here to discuss claims beyond the general, beyond our every day experience. We ask each other to examine our assumptions and logic closely, trying to find flaws as well as new insights.

The person who has figured everything out, cannot do philosophy. No one can grant them greater insight, and no one can learn from them. That is because to communicate with another person, you must be willing to learn how another person thinks and see the world. It is letting a window into another aspect of the world, something only that person can provide. Sometimes seeing into that window provides nothing, but many times, in places you wouldn't expect, you find something new you've never seen before. Only a mind that realizes they have not figured everything out can do that.

If you want praise for your accomplishments as a painter, I will grant it! It is wonderful that you have worked hard on something your entire life and mastered it. But painting in itself is not philosophy. Many of the people you are reading from have accomplished great things elsewhere in their lives. It is irrelevant. Their background does not matter, only their logic and arguments.

If you would like to start a thread commenting on your life in a monastery, feel free. People here would not ask about you in your thread about your philosophical claim, because that would be considered rude. We are not here to talk about your background, we are here to talk about your philosophical claims.

There are a few masters on here who have devoted their lives to philosophy and discussion. Surely you as a painter understand that the mastery of one painting technique does not make you a master at one you've never done before? Your background with a religious view of philosophy might be well learned, but there are many aspects you have not likely encountered.

Come with humbleness, and listen as well as contribute. There is much to learn from others, as well as I'm sure much to learn from you.

And atoms and molecules are made of the same stuff. There is nothing in a molecule that is an extra element from an atom, like ice cubes are not greater than water, just frozen water.

But the first ancient bacteria was greater than the dead primordial soup it was swimming in because it possessed the quality of being a living being, which is not simply a more complex dead object. — Joe Mello

Aren't these two statements contradictory? Living things are made out of atoms and molecules. We are made up out of a complex interaction of "dead" objects. Atoms, molecules, cells, etc.

First, one must have in his or her mind an integral understanding of what makes up a thing -- its elements. And I don't mean its atomic number.

A living thing and a material object both have matter and take up space. But a living thing has an extra element, and not simply a quantitatively extra element but a qualitatively extra element. A living thing is alive. So, when we place a living thing and a material object before us, and as the only spokespersons for reality, we can proclaim with absolute certitude that a living thing is greater than a material object. — Joe Mello

All you've provided for the definition of elements is a descriptor. Elements are often thought to be fundamentals. But according to your original statement:

No combination of lesser things can create a greater thing without something greater than the greater thing added to the lesser things. — Joe Mello

So my guess is that life is the greater thing, but needs to be added to the lesser elements to create itself? I'm not stating that life is not greater than non-life, but how do you know this? This is important, because this will, I assume, take the premise that God is greater than life, and life needs God to exist. But how do we know God is greater? And is there something that is greater than God that is needed to create God?

I apologize for being "vague" about lesser and greater things. But I was so because I took for granted that people on a philosophy forum had learned and incorporated into his or her thinking this basic tenet of philosophy. — Joe Mello

I would work to avoid such language. It is tempting to believe we are intellectually superior to others for our own satisfaction. But that is all it is for, our own satisfaction. If that becomes the goal instead of a conversation about truth and discovery, truth and discovery will always take a back seat.

You have to put yourself in people's shoes. There are hundreds of people who post ideas monthly. Each has their own background and meaning for words. We need you to define what you personally mean before we can properly assess. In your case, you're going for a "classical" sense of greatness, but in many other posts, it could mean many different things.

People here will not rag on you if you keep an open mind, listen to their thoughts, and address them politely. Well, some people still will, but they aren't worth spending any time on. :D

Hello Joe, and welcome to the forums!

No combination of lesser things can create a greater thing without something greater than the greater thing added to the lesser things. — Joe Mello

This is a conclusion, but where are your premises? I don't think you have to write a massively long text, but how can we conclude this ourselves? What are lesser things? What is a greater thing?

Off the top of my head, I have a few counters to that counters to that conclusion. Isn't a molecule made up of atoms? But molecules do not make up atoms. Isn't a society made up of people? But a society does not create people.

Likewise, I thoroughly enjoy our conversations! I have a lot of respect for how well thought out your positions are! I don't think enough people on this forum give you enough credit where it is due! I just wanted to make sure that you are just as intrigued by this conversation as me (: — Bob Ross

Thank you! And yes, I am enjoying the conversation greatly.

Just as a quick example, in the abstract, I can legitimately determine essential properties X, Y, Z and (distinctly different) essential properties A and B to the same term. So when I refer to that term, it could be in relation to either one of those two essential property sets (so to speak), and there is no contradiction here to be found: ambiguity is not a contradiction (in the form of A is A and not A). — Bob Ross

The solution to this is to use contexts. If you recall my example of the word tree. One of my friends views a bush as a tree, while the other who has some knowledge of botany, considers that the essential properties of the "tree" do not match what he defines as a "bush". Yet, if the friend does not want to use the context of botany, there is nothing in reality that forces them to do so besides possible social ostracization and shame.

Although I think we both agree that the definitions that provide the most clarity should prevail, my dilemma is: "what justification do I have for that?". What in the epistemology restricts the other person from simply disagreeing? I found nothing stopping them from doing so. That is a worry for me, as it seems like, if I follow the trajectory of the epistemology in this manner, we end up with incomprehensible amounts of deadlocks (stalemates). — Bob Ross

I think your proof is great, I really have no disagreements with it. But there is a core assumption that we're making. That the person decides to be rational. You can never force a person to be rational. You can persuade them, pressure them, and give them the opportunity to be, but you can never force them to be. Knowledge is a tool. Someone can always decide not to use a tool. I could tell a person why they should use a screw driver to take the screws out instead of using pliers. But if someone wants to use pliers, even though its more difficult and less rational, that is their choice.

Likewise, I was wondering: "couldn't the other person just reject possibility (or some other induction hierarchy) as more cogent than plausibility (or some other induction)?". I think, as is, although you argue just fine for it, they could. They could utilize the most basic discrete and applicable knowledge principles in your epistemology to reject the hierarchy without contradiction. — Bob Ross

Again, this is true. I don't think its a problem for the epistemology, that a person can choose not to use it. I think the problem with the epistemology, is that it reveals that humans do not have to be rational. That is an uncomfortable notion. It not only reveals that about others, but about ourselves as well. How often have we rejected rationality in the pursuit of our own desires and biases? The idea of knowledge as some type of objective truth that forces us to follow reality is appealing. But at the end of the day, there is nothing that forces us to do so.

That being said, I wanted to point out a slight issue with your proof for the hierarchy. If you recall, I use math based on the distance from deductive certainty. Knowledge is 1, and any induction based off of that is less than one. Something like speculation is a culmination of knowledge and possibilities. So 1 * x (probability) * y (created speculation. I don't use the term "immediateness" because it isn't a clear and provable term. One could "immediately" conclude a speculation, but that doesn't make it more cogent then a long ago concluded probability.

The second idea I have been thinking of, to state it briefly, is what I can "axiomatic contracts". What I mean is that, in the case that something isn't strictly (rigidly) pon anchored, two subjects could still anchor it to pon with respect to an agreed upon axiom. For example, although my previous argument is much stronger (I would say), we could also legitimately ban ambiguity IFF the other subject agrees to the axiom that they want to convey their meaning to me. With that axiom in mind, thereby signing an "axiomatic contract", they would be obligated to provide as much clarity as possible, otherwise they would be violating that "axiomatic contract" by means of violating the pon. — Bob Ross

Nothing wrong with this either. The issue once again is, "its their choice". Its so nice to think that we could find an epistemology that is irrefutably rational, and everyone would line up to use it. The reality is, people are not motivated entirely by rationality. Even with the perfect epistemology, not everyone would be capable of, or willing to use it. But is this a problem with the epistemology I've proposed? No, I think this is just a reality of human kind, and a problem that any epistemology will run into.

Good morning Bob! My week was busy, but now I have time to reply with a cup of coffee in my hand. :)

Let me address your second post first. Your example in how to view essential and non-essential properties is 100% spot on.

I can understand your dislike with the term "plausibility". I came up with the term when I was first trying to separate that which had been applicably known, versus what was not applicably known. one of the considerations was tone. The initial inclination can be to dismiss plausibilities as lower level thinking. But the reality is, it is how we are able to discover anything new. I didn't want there to be an implicit suggestion that thinking in terms of plausibilities was innately wrong, its just when a person has a better alternative, it might be wiser to use a possibility or probability instead. And of course, any induction has an air of uncertainty until its applied to reality. Holding and using a possibility does not mean you are correct, even if it is more rational to do so.

The second point of using the word was to find something more fundamental. One word descriptions are easier to think on, and if you have to add qualifiers to it later, you only have to qualify one word. But, I can agree after our conversation that the word doesn't accurately convey what was intended in a simple or fundamental way. The idea of a something being plausible is purely in our minds; an abstract wish that we can seek out in reality.

So you are right. But with the above considerations, let me suggest some slight adjustments. I think the fundamental concept of 'speculation' is extremely good. A speculation conveys that it is an invention of the mind that you would seek to discover in application. I would not necessarily use the word "potential". Potential seems to me something reserved for probability and possibility, because we've applicably known them to exist at least once. If something is unknown to exist, does that mean it has potential? It seems too strong for speculation.

Speculation though seems to convey the attitude of what I was trying to define with "applicable plausibility". Sherlock Holmes speculates, and his reason is to find out the reality to the mystery. Speculation seems to confer the intelligence behind "applicable plausibilities", and that when other modes of reasoning are exhausted, we sally forth into the unknown seeking reality.

But of course, that leaves the lovely and incredibly useful word "potential" out in the cold again. I understand your draw to it, it defines many concepts conveniently. The problem is, "potential" is a word defined before I defined a split in knowledge between distinctive and applicable. While it is convenient, it has the same problem the old "knowledge" did. It is being implicitly used differently in many situations, and opens it up to confusing misuse and misinterpretation.

It is annoying to me that I can't find a good fit for the word, as it is to you. Its a perfectly darn good word, but how to fit it in without leaving ambiguity or confusion? The best I can think of right now is the use of the word to separate cogent inductions versus non-cogent inductions. As we've noted, probabilities, possibilities, and speculations all have potential, by the fact that they aren't contradicted in the mind. But is that enough? I don't think so. That is because potential is also used to convey what is applicable. For example, if it is possible that a person who wakes up every day at 8 am could potentially wake up tomorrow at 8 am, that's a distinctive potential. But if unknown to us, they died five minutes prior to our prediction, there is no applicable potential anymore.

Of course, that doesn't seem to make things any clearer. In the later case of applicable potential, I am addressing a reality that I have no knowledge of. Aren't all inductions prior to application in the same situation? Applicable potential seems to be a term when there is another party with knowledge, or in reference to the past. "I thought he would potentially wake up at 8 am today, but it turns out they had died last night". Or referencing the Gettier problem. "Smith thinks Jones potentially has 5 coins in his pocket, but we the audience knows, that he does not (thus this is not an applicable potential).

So does potentiality describe cogent inductions within one's context? Because in one context, its a plausibility might have distinctive potential, while in another, it does not. In a way, the word potential has been subsumed into cogency. Any speculation has distinctive potential, as if it did not, it would be an irrational induction then.

And that is my problem with the word potential. It seems to have been swallowed up by other terms. I can't find a unique and distinctive use of the word that serves a clear purpose anymore. Not that you should stop trying. I am merely conveying the difficulties using the word carries.

I still think "inapplicable plausibilities" is useful, but should take a refinement from my original declaration as you have noted. I had inapplicable plausibility defined as "that which we are unable to apply to reality at this time." For example, let us say that a man uses a stick and shadows to determine the Earth is round, and calculate the approximate circumference. The only way to applicably know, is to travel the world and measure your journey. But at the time you do this in ancient Greece, it is outside of you or societies capability to test such a claim.

Labeling such a speculation as irrational seems incorrect here. Think of many inventions such as the submarine thought of long before the technology was available to make it happen. I believe irrational inductions should remain a contradiction with what is applicably known. It serves a clear and distinct purpose with less ambiguity.

But, what of inapplicable plausibilities that can never be applied? For example, a unicorn that cannot be sensed? This does seem irrational. Or perhaps, lacks potential? Have we finally stumbled up on a use for the word? A speculation with potential, versus a speculation without potential? This seems to fit in with your subcategories earlier. If so, then perhaps we can state that what is potential is distinctive knowledge which is constructed in such a way as it has a clear of measure of how it can be applied to reality. Perhaps this is what you were trying to say, and I think this could "potentially" be useful.

I am still not sure if I am right in trying to logically tie the subject down to avoid deadlocks (as discussed in the previous post), but I have thought a starter point. Firstly, in order to be a "societal context", there must be some sort of inter-subjective or inter-objective agreement. If not, then it is not a "societal context"--and thereby is a "personal context". This cannot be contradicted as it is a deduced term. Secondly, the subject can hold a subjective claim and it's inter-subjective converse without contradiction. Likewise, the subject can hold an objective claim and it's inter-objective converse without contradiction. — Bob Ross

100% correct.

In regards to inter-objectivity and objectivity, this is what I tried to communicate with distinctive and applicable contexts. An applicable context refers to what someone can applicably discover. A blind person will never applicably know what it is like to see, and thus in communicating with someone who can see, there is this applicable context to consider. Distinctive context is when we essentially have different applied knowledge and inductions based on what we've formed in our own heads.

One great example is our discussion of the word "potential". You have a view of the word, and I have a view of the word. We are trying to discuss a use of the word that can satisfy both of our world outlooks. The issue is not that we are unable to attempt to apply the word as discussed, but what the meaning of the word should be between us and any others who would come along.

I have tried to avoid using the word "objective" within contextual differences, because I think there is something core to the idea of "objective" being something apart from the subject, or in this case, subjects. As you have noticed, there is a dissatisfaction if a person re-appropriates a word that is too far from our common vernacular. I believe a way to avoid this is to try to find the essential properties of the word that society has, and avoid adjusting those too much. In this case, I think objective should avoid anything that deals with the subject, as I believe that counters one of the essential properties that society considers in its current use of the word.

Fantastic thoughts, and please continue at it. I will address your first post shortly.

Ok, I am glad we've figured out each other's points! I have no objection to you noting the order in which we assessed the theory. Yes, thoughts were used to create the pon, to create the term discrete experience. My point, is that out of all the things I could know first, and build all other knowledge off of, discrete experience was fit the fundamental I needed.

From there, I can then then show that the logic of discrete experience justified pon. That is because I cannot discretely experience something that is both 100% one thing, and 100% a different thing. I can then use discrete experience as a base to know thoughts. And so on.

But at this point, this may just be a matter of difference that we understand, and have to accept with each other. There is nothing wrong with that. I have the highest respect for your thinking, and it is the different outlook of every person that sees the world in their own viewpoint that adds our understanding. We also may be cutting hairs as well. I've already noted that you absolutely must be able to think to figure out that you discretely experience. I think we're just having a disagreement over "fundamental", and that's pretty insignificant at this juncture.

I do want you to address your other problems with the theory. How do you define meaningfulness? To your point, you can define anything however you want within distinctive knowledge. But when you apply that to reality, it must be able to persist without reality contradicting it. So, there is that limiting factor.

And yes, you can create the same word and apply two separate concepts to it. There is nothing in reality that prevents you from doing so. Here is an example of a famous Chinese poem that has 94 characters that all sound the same. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lion-Eating_Poet_in_the_Stone_Den#:~:text=%22Lion%2DEating%20Poet%20in%20the,Standard%20Mandarin%2C%20with%20only%20the

However, I would argue this isn't the best practice in most cases, and should be minimized. That is because the only way to tell the difference between the identical symbols, is the context that they are used in. Contextual word choice is already slippery enough within cultural context, so having formal definitions that should hold within most contexts can help with consistency of thought and application.

So these are things I've thought about, and there is a strength to them that you might not be aware of. As such, I want to hear from your thoughts first. Taking the theory as I've noted it, please note your issues. Don't worry, I am enjoying myself in these conversations. That being said, if you tire of them, feel free to let me know without any guilt or worry. I would like you to enjoy them as well, and not feel forced or pressured to continue.

I think this helps a little. Here is what I am saying.

A subject is a discrete experiencer. I am a discrete experiencer. They are one and the same for the most primitive of knowledge. You cannot ask the question, what am "I" without realizing there is a separation of "yourself" from "something else". You cannot discretely experience, if you do not exist. You cannot exist, if you do not discretely experience. You are not a lens, you are a discrete experiencer.

When breaking down the fundamentals of knowledge, what is it that must be known first? An I? Or discrete experience? The answer is discrete experience. While you cannot discretely experience if you are not first an "I", you cannot even comprehend what an "I" is, without discretely experiencing. To have the most primitive notion of "I", you must divide your experience into "I", and "Not I". "This" and "that".

I can doubt what "I" am without the knowledge of discrete experience. I could say I was a conscious being that transcends physical existence. Or a brain. Or "I" am someone one second, and a few seconds later, "I" am someone else. It is nebulous and unknowable.

If I realize I discretely experience, that is the one thing I can claim clearly, and without contradiction. "I" am a discrete experiencer. From that, "I" have a foundation to build knowledge from. If I am a discrete experiencer, then logically, what is the best way to discretely experience? And thus the theory goes.

The question is, "Can you come up with something more fundamental that you can distinctively and applicably know, prior to being able to discretely experience?"

I think this is missing my point, as it is framed in a way where it is impossible for me to do so: "distinctively and applicably know" is within the discrete experience "framework", so to speak. And, as far as I am understanding you, this coincides quite nicely with your view of discrete experience being something of which I cannot possibly counter with a more fundamental. — Bob Ross

If that is the case, then that means I have created a fundamenal claim for the theory. Of course, my logic from that fundamental may be flawed. It has seemed to me you are questioning that fundamental, which is what I've been trying to defend. But if this fundamental is not being challenged, where and what does the theory fail at obtaining?

This is why I think we are deriving in two completely different senses of the term. This is the challenge: you are not starting with a "discrete experience", you are starting with a "thought". The "thought" which states that thoughts itself are "discrete experiences", etc. — Bob Ross

How do I know what a thought is, if I do not first discretely experience? Using a higher level concept to discover a lower level concept does not mean the higher level concept is more fundamental than the lower level concept. We only discovered atoms because of science that was not based upon upon understanding atoms. Does that mean that the science that discovered atoms, is more fundamental than the atoms themselves? No.

If I had to guess, because you've been noting chronological use and chicken and egg scenarios, I think you are going in another direction from what I mean by fundamental. I do not mean a fundamental as a means of chronological use. I mean its smallest constituent parts. When I break down what I can know without challenge or contradiction, I find nebulous and unprovable assertions. But there is one assertion which cannot be countered. There is discrete experience. I am a discrete experiencer. Come all the details of an "I", or the types of discrete experiences, this is a fundamental which I know.

It doesn't matter why I discretely experience. It doesn't matter that I used thoughts, language, and my brain to discover that I discretely experience. That doesn't change the fact is a fundamental of knowledge that I discovered. Is this what you've been trying to tell me? That if I use language to put discrete experience as a comprehensible sign, that language is more fundamental than the ability to discretely experience?

I'll take your thoughts from here Bob.

Thanks for your reply Bob! Lets see if we can get this figured out between us.

Now imagine that everything you do, thoughts, feelings, light, sound, etc, are the light that streams in from a lens. You don't comprehend anything but the light. The sea of existence. But then, you do. You are able to separate that "light" into sound and sight.

I am understanding this as what is scientifically typically considered "sensations". Am I correct? — Bob Ross

I don't want to use the term sensations, as its not a very clear term. Some people think it means "from the senses". Some people think it means thoughts. I want you to imagine a camera taking in light. Then I want you to imagine the first step that you do with that light. Why are you able to see color differences? Why are you able to see a sheep in a field? When you hear a breeze, why is it that the color and sound don't blend together? How can you see something within everything you're experiencing, when an inanimate object does not. How we do, is for science to understand. But for knowledge, all we need to know, is that we do.

You live in a sea of existence, and you can part and parcel it. That's anything you do. Anything. Any "thing" you do. Does this make sense now? You are a "thing" that can experience other "things" instead of an amorphous wave of existence within the sea that does not know where it is, what it is, what things are, simply subsumed by the sea it will never realize it is part of.

I am going to short circuit your mail analogy here to show you what I am saying. Imagine there is nothing (which is really everything, but you can't discretely experience). Now you have an envelope in your hand. Suddenly, there is some "thing". That's all a basic discrete experience is.

Anything that comes after that is subsumed in the theory I've put forward. That's manifestation, differentiation, and conceptualization, as I defined it previously. The envelope manifests. You differentiate its parts. You conceptualize the letter inside as you read it.

You don't have to read the envelope. You don't have to have certainty. But you experience the envelope appearing in your hand. You could be certain about it, or doubt it, that's your choice. The point I'm trying to make, is that you aren't going prior, or deeper than where I've started. Whatever you're envisioning beyond the point of the envelope appearing in your hand, requires you to have discretely experienced the envelope in the first place. That is the thing you have no choice in. If you start with any "thing", then you are starting with a discrete experience, and you cannot escape it. As for "certainty", what is certainty in your mind? Does that mean I know? That I believe strongly? It seems the word "certainty" cannot exist without belief or knowledge, in which case we are entering the step of deciding whether I have a belief, or distinctive knowledge. But this does not negate the fact that you could not have certainty about any thing, without having the ability to discretely experience.

Regardless, the envelope is the start, not the reading or the the feeling of certainty. To counter that discrete experience is the first fundamental that I can know, you must show something that comes prior to discrete experience that I can know as a fundamental. And Bob, you can't, because it requires that you have discrete experience as a fundamental, to debate that discrete experience is a fundamental. There is the ability to not have discrete experience, in which you are merely a lens, an object. Then there is the ability to have discrete experience. There is nothing in my mind more fundamental to know, then discrete experience.

My point is that, although you are right in everything you have said, this is all obtained knowledge pertaining to how you derived yourself (or how you, thereafter, derived someone else in relation to themselves). — Bob Ross

Yes! If we understand each other correctly, knowledge is derived from our base ability to discretely experience. I've never stated anything else.

This is contrary to “just chronological precedence”, which maybe we could call this simply "that which is deriving or that which is required for the consideration in the first place". The chicken derives that it came from an egg: that derivation requires it in the first place. It could very well be, even given that it makes the most logical sense (or may even be considered necessary) that the chicken came from the egg, this is all formulations of that chicken. What if this "truth", that it must come from the egg, is simply that which is a product of cognition? — Bob Ross

If you want to use chronological precedence, that is fine. But I'm not using that term. I'm not sure why chronological precedence is important here. You need atoms to exist, but you don't have to talk about atoms to look at your watch and tell time. You just need to know the signs of time, and then see if your watch matches those signs. If the watch existed before you learned about it, I don't see that being important to whether you applicably know watches exist later on, unless I'm missing something you're trying to convey.

I've noticed you've been using the word truth. I've never claimed knowledge is truth. Its merely a rational means of applying our discrete experience in such a way, that we are the least likely to be in contradiction with reality. "Truth" is defined within my theory of knowledge as being the combination of all possible contexts, and their applications to reality without contradiction. It is something plausibly unobtainable.

I want to be clear, you can applicably know things in one context, that would not be knowledge in another context. I might look at a pear and an apple, and define them both as an apple in my context without contradiction from reality. However, someone with the distinctive knowledge of both a pear and an apple could come along and state that I'm ignorant, and one is a pear, while the other is an apple. Both of us applicably know different things within our contexts.

Just look at science over the years. It is recorded with instances of people that applicably knew things that today, with our expanded distinctive knowledge and expanded tool set, applicably know as false. It doesn't mean that the scientists back then did not applicably know their own theories. They did within their context.

When we analyze a brain, it is an interpretation of a brain via a brain. Therefore, you will only know as much as is allowed via your brain's interpretation of that brain it is analyzing. — Bob Ross

Yes, you have it! Did you know there are certain people who cannot visualize within their mind? They can never applicably know what it is like to visualize in their mind. The limits of what we can applicably know are limited by our distinctive context. If you want, skim through part 3 again for a reminder. That which cannot be discretely experienced can never be applicably known.

Do you think it must necessarily be the case that it comes from the brain, or that it must necessarily be the case in relation to itself? — Bob Ross

No. All that I am stating that cannot logically or applicably be contradicted by reality, is that I discretely experience. Everything else is the act of logically applying that discrete experience in a way that gives me the best chance of not being contradicted by reality. If current science concludes that the brain is the physical source of our "being", then that is the applicable knowledge we have within our current context of history. But, its plausible we're wrong. Still, we'll take what we applicably know today and work with that, than what could plausibly be known tomorrow.

Back to your envelope argument. I found it mostly confusing and away from the point. I wanted to address certain points of the argument, but realized that as it was intertwined with a lot of premises that do not make sense, or have missed the point of what discrete experience is, that it would be best to reorient to the fundamental premise, and drop most of the envelope argument entirely.

The point I want to make, is at the part where you say "an envelope appears in my hand," then you've described a discrete experience. Anything else is simply details about discrete experience, like thoughts, concepts, etc. And at that point, you've accepted my initial premise of the knowledge theory. If you have, then the rest follows as its unfolded. Anything after the envelope is simply a refinement or debate about the details of how thoughts form, concepts interact, etc. But none of that counters the origin and logic of the theory I've put forward.

The question is, "Can you come up with something more fundamental that you can distinctively and applicably know, prior to being able to discretely experience?" If you can, then yes, you've challenged the theory. But if not, the theories initial premise from which everything is built off of, stands. Of course perhaps there is a problem in the next step of the theory. But to counter the initial premise of the theory, you have an incredibly high, and in my mind, impossible bar to challenge.

Regarding implicit knowledge:

So there's two aspects needing to be addressed here. One aspect, which was my initial intention for the term “implicit”, is simply the acknowledgment that we, once we say we "know" something, may induce that that thing we know now was occurring the whole time prior to us knowing it (in light of us knowing it). — Bob Ross

This is an induction. An induction, is not knowledge. An induction is a belief with a degree of cogency. Your second aspect used the envelope analogy again, which I believe accidently wandered away from what was being discussed. Perhaps what would help, is if you use the analogies I've already provided, so that way we're using a similar base. The analogies I provide come from my understanding of the theory, so you can be confident I will understand what you are trying to convey if you use them.

At this point, I am still not seeing that we can have implicit knowledge, as it seems you are describing either

1. Having discrete experience, which is something that we can ascertain with knowledge, is known in the act of experiencing it.
2. Beliefs, which are inductions of varying cogency.
3. Accidental knowledge, or conclusions that we have arrived at using the process of knowledge, without knowing that we actively used the process of knowledge.

I hope this focusses the points, and that I'm accurately pointing out the main contentions so far. Please let me know if I've missed anything. I am also sorry that I did not tackle a few of your points within the envelope arguments that I think had merit. It is just that in doing so, I think it would have presented confusion because of the flawed premises within the envelope argument they were tied with. Thanks again Bob, great discussion as always!

"Cancel Culture" is a term invented by people who don't want society to ever give them negative consequences for saying or doing certain things. In this instance, it is from a group that likes being selfish and self-centered. You can't justify being selfish and self-centered, so the strategy is to make people feel bad for being against their selfishness and self-centeredness.

One common thread through the history of philosophy will always reveal a trend for humanity to attempt to justify selfishness and self-centeredness in some way.

Thank you Bob. I think we are both struggling here to convey each other's intentions. I'm going to take another stab at describing discrete experiences once again, because I believe you are making it more complicated then I ever intended. On the flip side, it could be that what I am saying is too simple for your liking, and perhaps you understand it, but disagree that is what it could be because it does not cover certain complexities you see that I do not.

First, what do I mean by the sea of existence? Think of a camera lens. All a lens does, is take in light. It cannot section the light into different wavelengths. It cannot detail or zoom in on one part of the light over the other. It is the receiver.

Now imagine that everything you do, thoughts, feelings, light, sound, etc, are the light that streams in from a lens. You don't comprehend anything but the light. The sea of existence. But then, you do. You are able to separate that "light" into sound and sight. Technically, this is the brain. If you had no brain, all the pulses from your eardrums and the light hitting the back of your eyes would mean nothing. The brain takes that mess of light, and creates difference within it. Manifestation, differentiation, conceptualization, whatever you want. There is nothing more complicated to discrete experience, then the act of there being light through a lens, and then that something that can take it apart into individual identity. It is as basic as a camera sending a picture to an AI, and an AI can identify different parts of the picture.

With this, lets address your idea of manifestation. I realize I did not understand what you meant by it, and maybe still don't. Lets try using the theory. What are the essential properties of a manifestation? If its not a discrete experience, can you explain what makes it different?

For my part, I will attempt to convey how I have interpreted it. It seems when you speak of manifestation, it seems to be the act of awareness of an identity. Now when I say identity, I don't mean words that describe that identity. I mean the act of experiencing a "thing". If I saw a red squirrel, its not the identification of a red squirrel, or the comparison of that squirrel to other things. It is the blob of color, movement and action that makes it a "that".

To me, this is just the most basic form of discrete experience. It is the fact that I am currently discretely experiencing "that". The way I've been interpreting the rest is as such.

Differentiation - The discrete experience of comparison between two or more identities.
Conceptualization - The act of analysis on a discrete experience that defines it as something memorable (possibly the addition of a defintion or descriptive word)

So from my understanding, you are simply adding different degrees of discrete experience. But none of this changes the logic or the outcome of the theory. It only refines with additional identities, the levels of discrete experience that one can have. This is no different from my fundamental of identifying thoughts and sensations. Both are discrete experiences, just different identities.

You first have a manifestation, an interpretation, and then, only after, can it be concluded that one necessarily discretely experiences. — Bob Ross

If I my definitions are correct, then this makes sense to me. No quibbles at all! What I think you have been confused on, is that they are all discrete experiences, and are simply different identities that do not counter what I'm stating, but are refinements of what I'm stating. I'm stating A -> B. You're stating A -> a.1 -> a.2 -> B.

I don't think you can apply a tool of knowledge to that which is immediately known. I think you are attempting to acquire, holistically, all the knowledge you can claim to have via a tool: I don't think it makes sense to claim you can "know" something via a tool, yet you "do not know" the manifestations that were required for the tool of knowledge in the first place. — Bob Ross

What I am claiming is that knowledge is a process that we can use to logically determine that which is most likely to not be contradicted by reality. You can use the process without being aware of it. If you are aware of the process of knowledge, and you use that process of knowledge, you can determine what you know. If my definition of your three definitions works for you, I conclude that these types of discrete experiences are all distinctive knowledge. That is because when we apply the process of knowledge to them, we realize they are simply part of our ability to discretely experience, and are of our own design.

If I manifest a pink elephant (using my example with discrete experience), then there is nothing which contradicts the fact that I do in fact, manifest a pink elephant. With the process of knowledge, I can conclude this manifestation is something I know. Without understanding the process of knowledge, I could of course doubt that what I am manifesting, is what I am manifesting. And without the understanding the process of knowledge, I could also NOT doubt that what I am manifesting, is what I am manifesting. But I need a logical process to make this more than a belief. One can believe in something that is not contradicted by reality. But what makes it knowledge, is the process one follows to arrive at that conclusion.

Looking at a manifestation, a basic discrete experience, we can logically conclude that what we manifest, is something we know we manifest. The manifestation itself is not contradicted by reality. Thus this is part of distinctive knowledge. I can also differentiate the pink elephant manifestation from a grey elephant manifestation. "This" is not "that". Finally, I can start conceptualizing that I will call both "elephants" and one is "pink" while the other is "grey".

All of this is what my theory covers. This is not a counter to what I'm stating, it is in fact, what I am stating. I just never subdivided the process of discrete experience to your level, which I think is well done! But your introduction of more identities does not introduce the idea of "implicit knowledge". One cannot have knowledge, without following the process of knowledge. If one follows the process of knowledge without knowing they are, that is accidental knowledge, not implicit.

I'll define what I see "implicit" as meaning. "Implicit" seems to me that it is implied or natural. Knowledge can never be implied or natural, because it is a clearly defined process. It doesn't mean we can't conclude that others accidently know things. I can conclude that an ant knows the manifestation of dirt and sugar, and also claim that it does not know the words "dirt" and "sugar" that could be conceptualized about that manifestation. Perhaps the ant follows a process with its manifestations to know that sugar is edible, while dirt is not. And perhaps that process, is the process of knowledge put forth. But can the ant "know that it has knowledge"? With our current understanding of ant intellect, no.

How do you know its knowledge?

My point is that you are immediately given, granted, the knowledge that you "know" that you are questioning how you know its knowledge. I am in agreement with you that a tool would be required to evaluate the truth of the content, so to speak, of the question itself, but not the question as immediately manifested. — Bob Ross

How do you know that what is manifested is knowledge? Without a process of knowledge, you don't. Without knowing what the process of knowledge is, you cannot know that you know anything. A manifestation is nothing but a discrete experience. How we evaluate that logically is either a belief, or knowledge. Again, you could use the process of knowledge to know it, without knowing the process of knowledge. You would know it, from our outside perspective, but you yourself would not know that you know it. Again, this is accidental knowledge, not implicit. We are not born with an innate understanding of knowledge, most of us are born with the capability to use the process of knowledge.

Again, to determine the truth in terms of the content, or proposition, of a belief, it requires a tool. But you immediately know that you are having a belief as it was immediately manifested as such. In other words, the belief that there is a red squirrel in my room would require a tool of knowledge to obtain whether it is true or false, but the belief itself (as a belief) is necessarily known immediately — Bob Ross

To clarify. I do not immediately know I am having a belief. I have to determine that. And yes, with the process of knowledge, I can determine that what I manifest, what I differentiate, and what I conceptualize are all forms of distinctive knowledge.

I believe this is essentially what you are trying to say. You believe that manifestations are implicitly known, while I am stating manifestations are the act of discrete experience, and by using the logical process of knowledge proposed here, we can determine that manifestations, differentiations, and conceptualizations, are all acts of discrete experience. And the act of discretely experiencing "I discretely experience" is something which cannot be contradicted by reality. As such, we know that we discretely experience, and we can label what we discretely experience as "distinctive knowledge".

My challenge to you, is for you to demonstrate how you implicitly know that you manifest without first showing the process of what knowledge is. Clearly define the word, and apply it to reality without contradiction. As it is now, I cannot agree that there is innate knowledge within humanity. We are innately capable of knowing, but we are not innately capable of knowing what knowledge is, and thus are incapable of innately claiming we know things without the knowledge of that process.

One final mention, as I believe the rest is just repetition over this subject.

As I mentioned before, we cannot discretely experience a contradiction. Because experiencing a contradiction, in the very real sense of experiencing something as 100% identical and both 100% not identical to another concept is something we cannot experience.

Again, this isn't because we applied the principle of noncontradiction and found it not to contradict, therefore we obtained such knowledge, we simply "know" it because it is manifested necessarily that way. — Bob Ross

I am quite certain that someone out there could claim "I know the principle of noncontradiction is wrong innately". You would then ask, "How do you know"? And they would ask you, "How do YOU know the principle of noncontradiction is real?" Someone could very well believe and live with the idea that contradictory things exist. What about a God that is all good, all powerful, and all knowing? Or a being that exists outside of time? These are all contradictions that some people swear they know is true. It is not that people cannot follow the process of knowledge, it is that people do not innately know what knowledge is. Only after discovering what knowledge is, can a person identify what they know, versus what they do not know.

Has this clarified what each of us is trying to communicate to the other? I must also add that I think your division of manifestation, diffentiation, and concpetualization are fantastic, and wonderful additions to the theory (if I have the proper understanding of your intentions)!

There simply needs to be some logic that implies what that first and last character is.
— Philosophim
Re-read the questions. There are 3 questions, in order of appearance:

What is the third character (number, letter, or symbol) you will type to solve this?

How many different characters will you type to solve this?

What is the first character you will type to solve this? — L'éléphant

Later he posted the original question off of the website, and it was found to have some different wording. Also, the answer to all three were to be combined to be placed into a URL. Meaning there was only one answer. He was communicative up until the point we started questioning if the answer had anything to do with url functionality, like /2/ or #2# (as part of the question was how to get to the next page from the current page).

I think he took a look again at it, and realized he missed something important, because the questions as they are have no logic which shows what the first and last letter must be. I believe he was embarrassed and pulled the questions.

the middle number is 2, and the first and last must be the same character
— Philosophim

The puzzle doesn't stipulate that "how many" must be answered with a numeral. — TonesInDeepFreeze

I was going to double check the OP, but noticed he's removed it entirely. DavidJohnson, if there was an issue or a mistake in the post, no worry, it happens.

Thanks for the clarification. I'm going to assume it has nothing to do with url logic then. I think its pretty obvious at this point the middle number is 2, and the first and last must be the same character. There simply needs to be some logic that implies what that first and last character is.

If there is nothing dealing with the url, my final stab is that its some ambiguity with the phrase itself, such as "you will type to go to <3> from here" meaning litterally typing 'to go to <3> from here". Which I hope not, because that wouldn't be logical, just ambiguous. I really hope you're sitting on an answer that will be clear as the sun once its revealed, with no ambiguity or phrase interpretation needed.