The forward slash is already there so there's no reason to delete it and then re-type it. The previous answer wasn't "/r17h". It's just "r17h". — DavidJohnson

Just to be clear, I'm not stating to delete and retype the /. The .com/ is still there, as well as the r17h. Because it states "from here", I'm assuming nothing is deleted. Thus r17h/2/. But, you've noted there is no / in the answer, so that eliminates that.

That does mean that it will be r17hsomethingElseHere without a /. I'll think on it some more.

It can't have anything to do with URLs, because the original post, before it was edited, described the puzzle without mentioning URLs. — TonesInDeepFreeze

Unless of course the OP missed that point. They'll let me know soon enough.

Ok, I'll take a stab at it now. Knowing a little bit about how urls work, I would make this guess.

/2/

Why?

The previous url is still in there. It specifically states, "to go to <3> from HERE. The way a url structure works is every page has an address, and because this is an old website, we can conclude it is not a single page application. As such, each / divides the location.

So taking the previous answer of /r17h, your first character would need to be a /. Questions 1 and 3 necessitate they are the same character. That leaves 2 as the only answer for the number of distinct characters. The final url would then be /r17h/2/

Is this correct?

The website's no longer up but I've saved the original pages and translated these three questions as best as I can to work in a stand-alone setting. Maybe I should upload the previous pages/puzzles so people have more context and are better able to lock-in a solution. I doubt it will help but who knows. — DavidJohnson

It might. Its really appreciated that you want to give us a nice logic puzzle, I just think something is missing.

OP, a logic puzzle should only have one solution. The way you've typed this, there is more than one solution, period. This means it is not a logic puzzle. Go back and carefully re-read your problem. If you got it from somewhere else, then make sure its accurately reposted. If you made this up yourself, it is either not conveying accurately what is intended, or you made a mistake in your formulation.

Let me point out a few flawed specifics.

First, there are only 3 questions, not four. You say "the answer" would be abc. The answer to what? Clearly state what the fourth question is for this answer. Is the fourth question, "What is the non-spaced answer to all three questions?"

Next, the other three questions need clearer reference. What is "this"? Is this intended to be the answer to the fourth question? So if I typed 1 for the first question, its the first number I will type to answer question four? Or is "this" in refence to the question itself, in which case it would be any number I chose.

Please look at this again and amend it to be clear, and ensure there can only be one solution.

Absolutely spot on post Bob. I think we're on the same page here, and I have to compliment you greatly for trying to refine what I am stating.

My theory is what we'll call, elementary, and general. The point is to widely capture certain broad concepts, and show how they interact with each other. Discrete experience could be noted as a general word with very clear, but basic essential properties. Its as if I'm using the word "tree" to describe all plants that are made up of wood. You are coming along and noting, "Aren't trees tall and have on e trunk? What about this bush has a couple of trunks and is short?" You and I are not in any disagreement.

Essentially I am in an incredibly broad context, while you are trying to narrow and detail it. It is excellent. Let me address you're points and see if I can show how we're on the same page.

As you seem to be using "discrete experience" as something more fundamental than "differentiation", but, where the confusion lies, at the same time, you seem to be also attempting to use them synonymously. — Bob Ross

A pine tree and an oak tree are different trees. But they are still trees. Discrete experience is a tree. Differentiation an oak tree. Conceptualization is a pine tree. At the end of the day, they are both trees. For a certain context, identifying types of trees is not important. For example, when first introducing what a tree is. But then, a curious mind might say, "But isn't there a difference between an oak and a pine tree?" Yes. Yet both are still trees. And this is what I'm noting with differentiation and conceptualization. They are both still at their core, discrete experiences.

The reason I chose "concept" is that it is a purposely vague manifestation of an idea, which is (I think) the best term I could come up with for conveying a fundamental, rudimentary point of manifestation. It is like a "thought", but not completely analogous: it isn't truly thinking of itself, for that is a recursively obtained concept that one thinks--which is not necessary for a concept to manifest. Likewise, it isn't thinking in itself, because thinking of itself is required for such. Therefore, I call it "conceptualization": the act of manifesting a concept (or concepts). When I use the term "concept", I don't mean high-level discernment of things: all of it is a concept and concepts can be built off of one another. Everything is manifested as a concept, including "differentiation" itself. This may just be me using the term wrong, but I wanted to clarify my use of the term. — Bob Ross

If conceptualization is useful as a word, then simply follow the process. Discretely experience the word in your mind. Make it have essential properties that are non-synonymous, or distinct enough from another word as to be useful so that it is distinctive knowledge. Then, apply it to reality without contradiction. If you can do it once, then you have applicable knowledge that such a word is useful in reality.

It is not that I disagree with your attempt at proposing conceptualization. For my purposes, I have clear and broadly defined words that follow the process of knowledge. From discrete experience, I define thoughts, sensations, and memory. Then I apply them to reality. The issue with your current definition of conceptualization, is it isn't clear enough to show how it is separate enough from other useful words that can be applied to reality, and I'm not sure you've successfully applied it to reality yet without contradiction.

But, I understand the intuition. There does seem to be something different from the act of first identifying "this" from "that", then adding a concept to it. For my purposes, its just a definition. But perhaps "conceptualization" covers that which is not yet clear enough from the definitions used so far. In a way, it is not a discrete experience, but a fuzzy experience. It is not clearly cut out of the sea of existence, but a murky pair of binoculars that you are trying to focus into view. For my initial purposes, I did not dwell on this concept, because it did not help me get to the end. This was the refinement I thought others would introduce. So please do not take my notes as discouragement. Continue please. I just think the clarity isn't quite there yet on the definition, so lets keep trying!

I am fine with your definition of "discrete"; however, when you say "I was looking for a fundamental", are you implying a fundamental that we must conceptualize to deem it so, or the point of manifestation required for that conceptualization in the first place? — Bob Ross

No. I was looking for a fundamental to describe the reason why we are not like an eyeball or a camera. "Fundamental" in this case is trying to come up with a concept that does not depend or minimizes anything within its constituent parts to understand it. It is why I note we do not need to know why we discretely experience, it is simply an undeniable fundamental that we do. We are not beings that simply take in all existence at once without the capability of creating distinction within it. We are able to take that mess of sensation and thoughts, and create distinction. That is what I call discrete experience. Perhaps the word "discrete" is too strong to describe the different levels of distinction we can create. It is more like a fuzzy separation that we can continue to focus until we are at a comfortable enough level that it is useful to us. The attempt to describe this level of acceptable focus to an individual is "context".

I think this is a perfect segue into "knowledge". I don't think there are only either induced or deduced (or distinctive and applicable) knowledge: there is immediately acquired knowledge, mediated deductive knowledge, and mediated inductive knowledge. — Bob Ross

Immediately acquired knowledge - that which is directly manifested (as a concept, I would argue) and, thereby, is immediately known. — Bob Ross

This is simply a discrete experience as I describe it. "This" is not "that" is known by fact, because it is not contradicted. Of course, how do we know that a contradiction means it cannot be known? Because "This" cannot be separate from "That" if "This" is also identical to "That". It is a fundamental of discrete experience. To have a blend of something that you cannot discretely experience, means it is part of the sea of existence. Are the desk and keyboard in front of you both 100% separate and 100% not separate? If this were the case, you could not discretely experience them. At best, you can make a new word that describes both concepts together.

As I've noted earlier, math is the logic of discrete experience, which all starts with the identification of a "this" (1) the ability to group more than one "this" together (2), equality of discrete experience, and inequality of discrete experience.

(Immediately acquired knowledge continued) perception, thought, and emotion of manifestations of themselves — Bob Ross

All are discrete experiences. Or as mentioned earlier, "fuzzy experiences" that we can focus into greater clarity. We can create definitions to bring focus to those concepts, but the act of those concepts themselves does not require a definition to occur. If I am experiencing the emotion of happiness, one may question the degree or where it fits into my greater outlook on the world, but may not question the fact that currently, that is what I'm discretely experiencing itself.

and, more importantly, any conceptualizations of manifestations of themselves that may stem from any of the aforementioned. — Bob Ross

If you mean, "I experience "happiness" and now I'm going to create a new term called "happiness" to describe it," then yes.

Mediated deductive knowledge - that which is deduced based of off immediately acquired knowledge. — Bob Ross

For example, I have an immediately acquired knowledge of "emotion" in terms of manifestation of itself, but the conclusion of the concept of "emotion", holistically, required the use of the individual concepts of feeling (such as pain and pleasure) to deduce it (this is "emotion" from manifestation of itself--it is the deduced knowledge which was deduced by the of manifestations of itself). I call it mediated, because, although "emotion" of manifestation and from manifestation of itself are both conceptualized (manifested as a concept), one concept is clearly mediated by the immediate forms of knowledge while the other is, well, immediately known. — Bob Ross

I believe you've blended implicity knowledge and mediated knowledge here. I noted that I can create "distinctions about distinctions". I can see a sea of grass, a blade of grass, and a piece of grass. I can see happiness as great, average, and little. But let me see if I can address what you were intending to say. I can define and refine happiness in relation to other emotions. Lets say I have defined three emotions, pain, excitement, and happiness. I feel an emotion. It does not meet the standard for pain or excitement. If I am non-inventive and do not feel like creating another identity, it must logically be happiness. Of course, if it is nothing like any happiness I've experienced before, I must adjust my definition of happiness to now accommodate this state.

This level of thinking is distinctive knowledge. The question after you realize you discretely experience is, "How do I know I discretely experience?" You try to contradict it. And as I've noted before, you cannot. With this, you can discretely experience whatever you like as long as it follows a few rules. It must be a distinct discrete experience that is in some way different from other discrete experiences in your head to avoid being a synonym, and it must not be contradicted by other discrete experiences you hold in your head.

Applicable knowledge is merely an application of this rule. In essence, you can applicably know the distinctive knowledge in your head. The reason I've made a distinction, is applicable knowledge as a concept is useful in regards to reality, or "that which does not necessarily correlate with my discrete experiences". Distinctive knowledge is the world entirely in your own head. You can do whatever you want. But there is this situation of having things happen that are outside of the control or opinion of your head. Define a rotten apple as healthy, but you will still grow sick and possibly die.

And of course we've covered inductions in depth. The reason why I wanted to go over your definitions, is underlying those concepts, are my concepts. Lets not even say underlying. Concurrently is probably better. My context and definitions serve a particular purpose, while yours serve another. The question is, while your definitions can be distinctively know, can they be applicably known? I am not saying they cannot, they just haven't really been put to the test yet.

I think the question between us, and why you've proposed a different set of definitions is because you want something that the current definitions I've used, does not give you. It is not that the context I've provided is logically incorrect, it is I believe in your mind, logically inadequate. You want greater refinement and clarity to fuzzy distinctions you feel intuitively. And that is wonderful.

If I had to sum up what you are looking for, I think the real difference in our outlooks is that fundamental start. I don't think we disagree broadly, only in clarity and the necessity of new words in the specifics. As such, I will present some challenges to your terms that are not negations, but considerations.

Why did I separate the act of discrete experience from knowledge? Because as you agree, knowledge is a tool. A tool is an invention that we build from other things that allows us to manipulate and reason about the world in a better way. Discrete experience is a natural part of our existence. Knowledge is a tool built from that natural part of our existence. It is the fundamental which helps to explain what knowledge is.

When you use the term, "implicit knowledge", this overlaps with having discrete experiences. But this leaves you open to a question. How do you know its knowledge? Knowledge is now integrated into the description of a natural experience. It is no longer a tool, but the source itself. How then do I separate knowledge from a belief? If I can have knowledge that is a tool, and knowledge that is not a tool, isn't that an essential enough property for separating the concepts into two different concepts? Does the definition you use increase clarity, or cause confusion?

This of course, is a critique which can be applied to my own concepts. Is discrete experience as a broadly defined word a good term that has clear essential properties and does not muddle the water? Can we break it down into greater distinctions that will capture the overall goal of the knowledge theory, but makes it easy to comprehend and accessible to others? But I have to be careful. Too detailed, and it can quickly address unimportant details that aren't important to the overall concept. Too broad and it can be misapplied.

The goal here is to apply just the correct amount of logically consistent terms that are not too separate from our current way of speaking and understanding. It must have the right amount of detail to be applicable in daily life, but also open to refinement for deeper questions. What you are doing right now is seeking that refinement. But I do not think at this point that there is any disagreement with the overall structure. The basic methodology is still applied to the terms you propose. With that, continue to refine.

But the knowledge of atoms is entirely irrelevant to the invention and use of a ruler. So with knowledge.

This is true. But I would like to emphasize that even if it is necessarily the case that it is made up of atoms, this is all apart of extrapolated chronological precedence and not just chronological precedence. — Bob Ross

If I am understanding your terms of chronology correctly, I would argue that it is both. It is necessary that atoms exist for the ruler to exist, whether you know it or not. You can also extrapolate that atoms are necessary for the ruler to exist later. But does the existence of atoms, or the knowledge of atoms have any import into how you use a ruler? No.

So I would state that with respect to conceptualization, it necessarily follows that I am preceded by atoms. — Bob Ross

I believe this is a conclusion of applicable knowledge, not simply distinctive knowledge or merely discrete experience.

Basically, you are claiming (I think) that discrete experience cannot be contradicted because that contradiction also requires discrete experience. — Bob Ross

Yes! I think you have it.

If you agree with me here, then I would like to ask you how you or I derived this? I would say from a manifestation of a concept that is immediately known and is revealed, so to speak, as necessarily true absolutely. To be clear, I'm not asking you to explain why we discretely experience, only how you or I came up with that very claim. Did we just discretely experience it? — Bob Ross

A great question. Short answer? Yes. Long answer? It is the logic we derive from the ability to discretely experience. As I mentioned before, we cannot discretely experience a contradiction. Because experiencing a contradiction, in the very real sense of experiencing something as 100% identical and both 100% not identical to another concept is something we cannot experience. But lets say we could experience it. It would not be applicably known. It would not be distinctively known. It is beyond our ability to comprehend or experience as something knowable. It cannot be discretely experienced, but would be some other type of experience. Therefore it would be outside of the realm of comprehension and knowledge.

If you conceptualized (discretely experienced) a blue ball within your mind that had clear essential properties to you, then you would distinctively know the blue ball.

The essential properties themselves are concepts. When you have the belief that there is a blue ball, regardless of whether it is true or not, you know you have that belief. Moreover, if you want to take it a step deeper, if I want to determine whether I still hold a belief, then it will have to applied without contradiction; However, the concept of manifestation of the consideration of whether I still hold a particular belief is not induced nor deduced nor applied: it is immediately acquired. No process or tool of knowledge is required to know that. Likewise, if you are seeing a ball right in front of you, the belief aspect is the mediated deductive knowledge that it is a "blue ball" or mediated inductive knowledge of anything pertaining to the "blue ball", but the immediately acquired knowledge of the perception of the "blue ball" of manifestation of itself is not a belief (nor deduced nor induced). — Bob Ross

This touches on the issue I noted earlier with the idea of "implicit knowledge". You can discretely experience whatever you want. You know you can, because you have deduced it logically without contradiction. The tool of knowledge is the logic of concluding our distinctions are not contradicted by reality. We do not have to have knowledge to have distinctions that are not contradicted by reality. We do not have to know why we do what we do. But when we attempt to describe why, knowledge is the tool that gives us the best chance of determining whether our distinctions are not contradicted by reality. When you state that the act of having discrete experiences is the act of knowledge itself, the word knowledge becomes muddled and runs into issues.

Another thing to consider is your terms are causing you to construct sentences that are difficult to grasp their meaning (not that I am not guilty of this too!) "The concept of the manifestation of the consideration". This seems verbose and I'm having difficulty seeing the words as clearly defined identities that help me understand what is trying to be stated here. I can replace that entire sentence with, "However, the discrete experience of whether I hold a particular belief is not induced, nor deduced, nor applied, it is immediately acquired." It is something we simply do.

"You can't even claim to know something if you haven't, to some degree or another, conceptualized (my adjustment: discretely experienced) that something."

Yes, this is exactly the point I've been making.

If you are claiming "discrete experience" is the point of manifestation--not directly differentiation, then we agree. If not, then I don't think you can perform that substitution there. — Bob Ross

No, I am not using the terms manifestation or conceptualization. I'm not saying you can't. Those are your terms, and if you have contradictions or issues with them, it is for you to sort out. All I am saying is if a being can't part and parcel the sea of existence, it lacks a fundamental capability required to form knowledge.

Finally, let me address the proofs.

The bible proof doesn't quite capture circular logic. It is not 1 -> 1 Symbols in logic are meant to be 100% separate from other symbols conceptually. 1 is not the same as .999999 The bible and God are clearly distinct entities, and not equivalent.

So, we propose A
We say, If and only if A -> B
Then we say, If and only if B -> A.

So our only proof for God's existence is that the bible tells us, and the only proof for the bible's truth, is that God tells us. That is circular.

My argument is not a circular logic, but fundamental.

Lets compare this to a simple proof, the logic of a bachelor.

1. A bachelor is an unmarried man.
2. The possible contradiction to a person being a bachelor, is if they are not a man, or are not married.
3. Joe is both unmarried and a man.
4. Therefore he is a bachelor.

The above is not circular, it is a logical conclusion from the definitions proposed. Lets look at mine again.

1. Discrete experience is the ability to have distinct differences within the totality of your experience.
2. The contradiction to this, is if you cannot comprehend distinctions within the totality of your experience.
3. To read and comprehend these words, you must be able to comprehend distinctions within existence.
4. If you are reading and comprehending these words, then you have the ability to comprehend distinctions within existence.
4. Therefore you discretely experience.

Thanks again Bob, let me know what you think as always.

Great, I think I see where your issue is now, and perhaps I can address is properly.

Now, I think this leads me to a good point you made: the distinction between knowing something inherently and conceptualizing it. In other words, you don't need to conclude you discretely experience to discretely experience. — Bob Ross

I want to be careful with my words here to communicate this properly. There is no inherent knowledge. You can practice knowledge without knowing that you are doing it. You can have distinctive knowledge. You can even have applicable knowledge. But it is obtained because you are following the steps outlined in the epistemology. You can be blissfully unaware that it is what you are doing, and still have distinctive and applicable knowledge.

I think there are two different kinds of knowledge that need to be addressed here: implicit and explicit. For example, I can implicitly know that food is necessary for me to survive without explicitly knowing it at all. But once I conceptualize it to whatever degree, then it necessarily becomes explicit knowledge. — Bob Ross

I'm not sure there is implicit knowledge. Knowledge is a process that must be followed to have it. It is a tool. We can measure things as being centimeters long in our minds, but we need an actual measuring stick to say we've measured it. We might get very close with our estimates, but they are not the same as using the tool itself. The same with knowledge.

Its more like accidental vs explicit. I could find a ruler on the street and not know what cm means. But I do notice there are some lines. I measure something and say its 4 ruler lines. I can safely say within that context, that I have measured length with a ruler. But I don't know its a ruler, or how it was made, or what any of the other symbols and lines mean like inch. Within your first few paragraphs, if you replace "implicit" with "accidental" I think you'll see what I'm trying to point out.

Knowledge is like the process of measuring. If I am taught how to measure with a ruler, what the lines and symbols mean, and am trained how to line it up properly, or tips of mathematics, then I can explicitly measure with a ruler. The same with knowledge.

The reason I think this to be incredibly important is that I think you are arguing for discrete experience, at its most fundamental state, as implicit knowledge (that can or cannot be made explicit)(aka discrete experience in itself and not of itself, although the latter is a possibility, the former is a necessity). — Bob Ross

No, I am not. I am not even referring to discrete experience as accidental. You can discretely experience without a theory of knowledge. I am noting that to explicitly know what knowledge is, the first thing you must come to know, is discrete experience. With this, you can build a theory of knowledge. You don't have to know why you discretely experience. Just as I don't have to know the atomic make up of the ruler I am using. I just have to know what consistent spacing is. Of course, that doesn't mean there aren't atoms that make up that ruler. It also doesn't negate the fact that without atoms, there could be no ruler. But the knowledge of atoms is entirely irrelevant to the invention and use of a ruler. So with knowledge.

Basically, you are claiming (I think) that discrete experience cannot be contradicted because that contradiction also requires discrete experience. — Bob Ross

Yes! I think you have it.

— Bob Ross

I am claiming, although that is fine, it is an extrapolation that first had to be conceptualized (explicitly) to then, only thereafter, be considered implicitly true prior to its conceptualization. — Bob Ross

Absolutely correct. Except replace "implicitly" true with "accidently" true.

Therefore, the conceptualization is required first and foremost in order to ever claim anything ever was implicit previous to something explicitly being known. To know that you think requires that you conceptualized, to some degree, thought itself and then, therefrom, extrapolated you must have been thinking prior to this realization (i.e. implicitly)--my point is that without that explicit conceptualization, you would have never known that you think. — Bob Ross

Correct. (With implicit to accidental conversion). Think of a runner with natural form who has never been taught how to run properly. One day they are taught how to run properly, and it so happens, their natural form is exactly the optimal from needed to run quickly. They did not know what a form was prior to learning this, but once they did, they now realize it was something they did all along without realizing it.

However, you may still, even though you don't know you discretely experience, know things that stem from discrete experience. For example, if you conclude that you are seeing a blue ball, even if you don't know you discretely experience, you still know of the blue ball because you have conceptualized the blue ball. Moreover, you could then extrapolate that the blue ball was there prior to you conceptualizing it, but my point is that you wouldn't know that it was there unless you extrapolated it from your conceptualization of the blue ball. If you never would have explicitly known the blue ball, then you would never have known it in the first place. You can't even claim to know something if you haven't, to some degree or another, conceptualized that something. — Bob Ross

If you follow the steps of knowledge, it doesn't matter if you know that's what you did. If you conceptualized (discretely experienced) a blue ball within your mind that had clear essential properties to you, then you would distinctively know the blue ball. And I want to reemphases this:

"You can't even claim to know something if you haven't, to some degree or another, conceptualized (my adjustment: discretely experienced) that something."

Yes, this is exactly the point I've been making.

I agree, but in a slightly different way: the most fundamental in the sense of conceptualized to be the most fundamental is differentiation. — Bob Ross

Differentiation, is the act of discretely experiencing. Within the sea of your experience, you are able to say, "This" is not "that".

To even try to prove anything, including discrete experience, you must conceptualize it first (to some degree or another). I am trying to state that knowledge doesn't begin its manifestation with differentiation, it begins when it is conceptualized (made explicit). — Bob Ross

Once I am able to see "this" is different from "that", I can detail it. What is "this"? Maybe, I can make a word. I can use my memory. I can remember this state, and if I find a state that matches what I remember, I'll say its the same state. "This" is a "ball".

Once again, I cannot conceptualize without first being able to tell a difference. Or maybe, they are one and the same. Perhaps differentiation at even the lowest level is some type of conceptualization. The point is, these are words that describe acts of discrete experience. Conceptualization about a discrete experience, is a discrete experience that describes another discrete experience. Discrete experience is a fundamental that underlies all of our capabilities to believe and know. Perhaps the use of conceptualization fleshed out will add greater detail and clarity. That is fine. I just wanted to point out that what you are describing, differentiation and conceptualization, are acts of discrete experience.

I think when you say something along the lines of "try to disprove your discrete experiences without using your discrete experiences", I would like to agree (firstly) and (secondly) append "try to disprove or prove discrete experience without ever first conceptualizing it". — Bob Ross

To me, this is still, "try to disprove or prove discrete experience without ever first conceptualizing it". Discrete experience is a cat. Conceptualization may be a tiger, but its still a cat.

I want to point out the definition of discrete, and why I chose it. "discrete - individually separate and distinct." I was looking for a fundamental. Something that could describe a situation as a base. I first thought of an eye. An eye does not discretely experience. Its iris opens, and light flood through. The eye cannot tell it sees. It is a tunnel, that has the total experience of its being, but never discerning anything.

The human brain has many tunnels to it. Eyes, ears, nose, etc. This is the sea of existence, the sea of experience. And yet, it is somehow able to find "things" in the light. It can see things as individually separate and distinct, where an eye cannot. It can distinctly experience sound as separate from light. How? Who knows? It is unimportant for what we are trying to do.

Let me leave it at this for now. I will come back to the viewpoint of knowledge being applied to non-humans after this part is digested.

An ant can discretely experience. Does it know what an "I" is? Does it know it can discretely experience? No, but it can know things, because it discretely experiences.

No, within reference to itself, it knows nothing. With reference to you, it knows things. This is because, it isn't about whether it knows it discretely experiences, it is about whether it conceptualizes to any degree. If it does, to contradict what I previously stated, then it knows. It if doesn't, then it doesn't know. But its knowledge has no direct relation to your knowledge of its knowledge. — Bob Ross

Yes, I have to be careful here. The only thing I can truly say is the ant has the "potential" for knowledge if it can discretely experience. It can know things, though it may not process it with intent. Further, its context will never be elevated to that of a human being. The point is, it applicably "knows" dirt shouldn't be eaten, while sugar should. If it did not, it would be constantly testing the dirt if it was hungry. Yet, it doesn't.

Eating dirt would be contradicted by its death, or its taste buds rejection. It is incredibly primitive, at the core of emotion/sensation, but there is something within the ant that can differentiate between dirt and sugar, and something that prevents it from continually testing dirt to see if it is edible.

Again, you conceptualized this and, therefrom, deemed that ant to know. This doesn't mean that it actually knows anything (maybe it does, maybe it doesn't). Just because it is the most rational position for you, as a being capable of conceptualizing, to hold with reference to the ant, namely that it knows to some degree or another, doesn't mean that in reference to itself that it knows anything at all. — Bob Ross

This is true. You are correct that I don't really applicably know this. I am making an induction based off of the possibility of my own experience. But is it cogent? I believe it is, and further, in relation to other inductions I can make, I believe it is the most cogent in the hierarchy. I would be in favor of exploring this scientifically, in an attempt to find applicable knowledge from this belief. But I do propose that this is a cogent and worthwhile belief to explore.

I think that the most rational conclusion is that there are other beings like me with reference my conceptualization of them, but that doesn't mean I've proved that they can conceptualize. — Bob Ross

This could also be true. First, lets try to nail down what conceptualization is at both a distinctive, and applicable level. For my part, if we're talking about the results of something which can discretely experience, have beliefs, and then have knowledge, I believe it is possible. Is there an alternative? We can invent plausibilities on how other creatures use discrete experience, but they are lower on the hierarchy. As such I believe it is more rational to examine the possibilities of how other creatures can know, opposed to the plausibilities of how they could know. Its not that I applicably know other creatures can have knowledge, its just that if they can discretely experience, its possible they could.

The simple proof I put forward is that to present any counter argument to discretely experiencing, to even understand what it is you are trying to counter, you must discretely experience

I think I can use that same argument to prove you are right and that that doesn't mean it is the point at which knowledge manifests. In order to even claim that I can't postulate a counter argument without differentiation, you must have a conceptualization (and same for me). I think that they are both deeply integrated into our existence, but one is the point of manifestation (conceptualization), the other is a product of that manifestation that is manifested as a necessity to all else (differentiation). However, although I think you are using A -> A still, I think that you are actually right: there is a point at which it is circular, and that is fine as long as it is the point of all other manifestation. I think that you think that point is differentiation, I think it is conceptualization. — Bob Ross

To sum up I think you are under the impression that differentiation and conceptualization are separate identities. I am not disagreeing that you can propose such differentiation. What I am noting is that they are subsumed by both being discrete experiences, and I am unsure where differentiation leaves off and conceptualization begins. Even if it is the case, you still need differentiation before conceptualization. One cannot conceptualize before one can differentiate.

As such, I still do not believe there is anything circular here. Differentiation does not lead to conceptualization, which leads to differentiation. The order of which we learn about things is also not circular. Saying that examining a ruler leads you to realize you need atoms for a ruler, is not a circular argument. A circular argument is A -> B -> A. What you are arguing with explicit, and what I think more accurately should be called accidental, is not a circular argument. Knowing knowledge is not required to accidentally practice knowledge. If you could try to present your argument that my proposal is circular with an A -> B -> A format, I think I could understand better where you're coming from, and we could settle that issue once and for all.

As always, fantastic writing. Thanks again and I look forward to hearing your responses!

Did you really need to use the slur "Jesus Freaks"? What if someone came along and used the slur "Atheist Freaks". I think you could have gotten the point across without the slur, and it will would have been an interesting topic.

My point is that your argument has a fundamental flaw: you are arguing that discrete experience is the most fundamental, but yet you are using thinking in itself to do that in the first place. — Bob Ross

I'm going to start here and work my way around the post. First, I do not think that discrete experience is the most fundamental thing that explains our existence. I think discrete experience is the most fundamental thing an existence must be able to do to know, and it is a fundamental that can first be defined clearly, and without contradiction. Remember that knowledge is essentially having a clear definition with essential properties that does not compete with any other. Second, when we apply that definition, it must not be contradicted.

I want to be very clear, I do not think there is nothing prior to discrete experience. I also do not think that something that is not a "being" can discretely experience. I believe it is fundamental that there be a "self". One cannot discretely experience without being something. But I find that I cannot define the "self" as a fundamental, without first defining discrete experience.

Now, I could be wrong. Perhaps you can prove this. Can you know something prior to discrete experience? Can you know what an "I" is before you are able to differentiate between the totality of experience? I know that you can believe such, but can you know it? Can you know what eyes are? A mind? The difference between your body and another thing? Conscious and unconscious? I can't reasonably see how this is possible without the ability to discretely experience, and further, without he understanding of discrete experience. Again, I do believe there is a "self", but I cannot define or even conceive of a self without first discretely experiencing.

I think that if you are trying to find one thing that you can "know", that this, in terms of derivation, it should be you. — Bob Ross

In a way, I do. "I" am the discrete experiencer. That is how I know what "I" am. But, the "I" is not necessary. I could not have a notion of "I" in my head, but still note there is the totality of experience, and there are different things within experience.

If you recall, I never identity an "I" beyond that. Because it is not necessary for the epistemology to occur. One thing we have not covered yet, is that my epistemology is not human centric. It can be applied to insects, plants, animals, and AI. Imagine a simple ant. An ant can discretely experience. Does it know what an "I" is? Does it know it can discretely experience? No, but it can know things, because it discretely experiences. It knows the sugar in front of it is good compared to the dirt that surrounds it. It is of course an extremely limited context, but it knows by taste that some things should be eaten, while others should not.

Can an AI know things? If it can discretely experience, yes. It is a limited context, but a roomba can map out my floor over time, and applicably know where to clean after several cycles. A roomba will never discretely experience the notion of an "I". Can a computer know things without fundamental building blocks that allow it to discretely experience? Of course not. But even if we wanted it to realize it had as self, it would be impossible for it to know it had a self without being able to discretely experience that "it" was different than "the world".

Discrete experience does not require language. It merely requires that you are able to discern separation within existence. That is the fundamental needed to start having knowledge. Then I can discretely experience that "I" am separate from "that other stuff". Can I realize that I am an "I" before I can discretely experience? No, its not possible. Therefore in my view, the most fundamental aspect that we can know, is discrete experience.

If you still have some doubts, think on the philosophy of solipsism. It is the idea that "I" is everything. I am the only consciousness in the world, and everything that happens, is due to the invention of my existence. There are people who consider and debate such a theory. Meaning that the "I" is not as fundamental as you think to knowledge. Further, without being able to discretely experience, one cannot have a debate about what I is. Did we not go back and forth in the beginning? What "I" is is not a fundamental, unquestionably proved thing.

If you can prove that the "I" is necessary to have knowledge, then feel free. Create the definition with essential properties, and apply it to reality without contradiction. That being, that an "I" is more fundamentally known then discrete experience. I am saying you must be able to discretely experience before there is the concept of an "I". You are saying there must be a concept of an "I" before I can have the concept of discrete experience. While "You" must exist to discretely experience, "You" existing does not give you the fundamentals of an epistemology, it is "You" that can discretely experience that does.

causes your argument to really be "I think (in itself), therefore I discrete experience. I discretely experience, therefore I think (in itself)" (this is no different than A -> B, B -> A, which really is A -> A, so I do think you are essentially saying "I discretely experience because I discretely experience--hence #1). — Bob Ross

I want to be very clear on the proof, because I believe there is still a fundamental misunderstanding of what is being proposed. I discretely experience, because any proposal that I do not discretely experience, is contradicted. The simple proof I put forward is that to present any counter argument to discretely experiencing, to even understand what it is you are trying to counter, you must discretely experience. This is not A -> A.

1. There is experience.
2. Knowledge is a deduction without contradiction.
3. Discrete experience is known = A.
4. A because !A is a contradiction.
5. A allows the description to divide all experience into different aspects and definitions.
6. A allows the idea of a "self/I". The most basic definition being, "I" am what discretely experiences.
7. A allows the idea of "thoughts".
8. 3 and 4 can can be applicably known if they are applied to reality without contradiction.

Understand that I agree there must be an "I" before "it" can discretely experience, but that I cannot define and know what an "I" is, unless I know something first. And the first thing I can truly know, and must know, is there is discrete experience. How am I to differentiate among existence what an "I" is without the ability to discretely experience first? I hope this cleared up what I'm trying to prove.

We don't know what the physical or mental are, so saying we're "physical" is a moot point. You can't possibly know what you mean by that, as you lack global perspective. — theRiddler

I'm pretty sure I do, but more importantly, what do you think they are?

There are a myriad of ways of survival of consciousness after death, but not if you're so myopic you can only see the small picture. — theRiddler

Feel free to list some. We're here to discuss and hear other's view points. If you can ease my ignorance, I'll have not issue with that.

Most probably you are talking about your experience and also the experence of millions of people. But, as I said, there is an equal --or maybe greater, if you consider the East too, but I'm not sure-- amount of people with a different experience on the subject. You just can't ignore it. — Alkis Piskas

True. My experience is from a Western bias.

Also, if Science has not proved it, it doesn't mean that life after death exists. Science has not proved anything about consciousness either. But most of us know that consciousness exists. (Some deny it ...) — Alkis Piskas

Science does not attempt to prove that life after death exists. Science is about falsification, about setting up a hypotheses, and trying to knock it down. Only if it withstands every attack, can we be confident we have something reasonable.

The evidence is as solid as the sun shines.
— Philosophim
What is this evidence? — Alkis Piskas

Your brain is you. This has been proven time and time again over decades. Damage the brain, you damage the person. Change the chemical balance of the brain, you change the person. Depression medication and anti-psychotics prove this. Alcoholism and drug use eat the brain like an evil smiling parasite, and the effects are plain for everyone to see.

You can read about all sorts of brain damage example. One man was brain damaged to no longer be able to process colors. His eyes were fine, but his brain interpreted everything in black and white. Why when he died would he suddenly see colors again? How could he process colors without light and eyes? Why would a brain, which is geared towards processing the physical world, suddenly "be" again after it is gone?

We are physical beings. Its like a modern day engine. I can't tell you exactly how it works, but if I take a hammer to it, it stops working correctly. There is absolutely zero evidence of some form of life and consciousness existing apart from the brain. Anyone who sees the evidence, cannot reasonably conclude otherwise. It is a belief in Santa despite seeing your parents put the presents out themselves.

That's very nice. I also say that if the belief in God make someone more ethical, or just more happy, then let him believe in God. I will support him. But unfortunately, there are innumerable atrocities that have happened in the histery and are still happening in the name of God! And this makes me angry too! Because it's not anymore about beliefs but about hypocrisy. — Alkis Piskas

Funny enough, religion does not make me angry. I believe that for many majority of cases, people live their lives in a better way because of it. And I am with you that if the belief in God makes a person happy and more ethical, yes, let them continue that belief.

Religion fills a need in humanity for a community that pushes them to be better people. Sometimes this is misguided and abused, no question. But if they did not belong to a religion, they would likely belong to something else that would be misguided and abused, like politics for example. :)

What's "actual reality"? I don't think it exists such a thing. There's only personal reality (as you say) and "common reality", i.e, the reality of two or more persons. Reality has to do with agreement. If we agree on something, we can say that we have the same reality regarding that thing. — Alkis Piskas

Right now, I want you to try using the power of your mind to float 3 feet off the ground. Can't do it right? That is actual reality. The idea that your view of reality somehow shapes reality is an appeal to our vanity. Your view of reality does nothing to alter what is. The idea that two people can somehow shape reality from their viewpoints is also absurd. All we can do is recognize how reality works, then see if we can alter it to what we want within the limitations of what we have.

But much appreciated Tim!
— Philosophim
My name is Alkis. But thank you anyway! — Alkis Piskas

My apologies! Much appreciated again.

So the anger is about the people who put up with suffering and lower states of being, isn't it? — pfirefry

Can you offer a reason why anyone should care about how they live their life if nothing matters after they die? — pfirefry

Yes.

What about them makes you angry? Is it that they don't try hard enough? Yes

Do you despise people stuck in lower states of being? Yes.

What are the example of the "lower states of being" that make you angry?
Procrastination. Dismissal of other's suffering. Dismissal of your own suffering. It is a pretend solution to problems in life, so that one does not have to work on fixing the actual problems.

Are there examples of people who believe in life after death but don't use this as an excuse to put up with lower states of being?

I'm sure there are. But I have not found this to be the majority of cases. I was open to learning from others if they had the opposite experience.

Do these people make you angry? — pfirefry

No. I honestly have no opinion on the means someone uses to get to a better place in life, as long as it doesn't unnecessarily hurt themselves or others.

Why would people stop putting up with suffering and lower states of being if they didn't believe in life after death? Wouldn't it become another excuse? "I'll be dead anyways. Nothing that I do now will matter when I'm gone. I'll just do whatever feels good." Wouldn't you feel angry about the people that say this? — pfirefry

Yes, I would feel angry with people who say this, but I think there is an easier time convincing someone to not feel this way. Such a person is motivated by the here and now, and works to solve the problems that they encounter in life. Teaching a person that life can be richer than just pleasure is not a promise down the road, but something that can also be realized "today".

Can you offer a reason why anyone should care about how they live their life if nothing matters after they die? — pfirefry

Yes. Because such a person is motivated by their own life today. And caring about more than your own life, matters to their life today.

Further, I find the idea of life after death the ultimate in arrogance and hubris.
— Philosophim

I agree, it does seem uninformed and unsupported by evidence. But why being mad about it? — pfirefry

I don't get to choose my emotions. Emotions are usually the first thing we rely on when we have not thought about a subject in depth. Its our gut reaction. What I can choose is what I'll do with that emotion. I chose to come to these boards and share that with other people. Not as a rant, not as a claim that I am the arbiter of truth, but as someone who is expressing nascent thoughts, and wants to hear other view points and thoughts on the matter.

I appreciate your input.

It's interesting when you work alongside palliative care services, where people are dying, how many religious people no longer believe in anything at the end. — Tom Storm

Interesting experience, thanks for sharing.

I'm not sure I can see hubris or pride in this. Fear and denial, yes. People don't want the show to end and they hate the thought of those they love no longer being extant. An afterlife, reinforced by society and culture, is an effective way to manage grief and dread. But I agree with you that supernatural beliefs like this often cause great harm. — Tom Storm

Yes, I agree fear and denial can play a part just as equally.

What if mass shooters really believed that they would suffer in the afterlife as a consequence of their actions? As it is, I'm sure most of them believe that when they die there are no consequences. — Wayfarer

This is my problem. Studies show that the strength of the penalty passed a certain point does not deter crime. The death penalty for example, actually doesn't deter crime any more than locking up a person. This can indicate to us that broadly, people are not motivated by the degree of long term rewards or punishments for what they do. It may be that most people don't think about it.

Even then, another study shows that most people believe themselves to be better than average. Why would a person who believes they are better than average feel like they wouldn't get a nice afterlife? So even when people do think about it, I believe its mostly assumed they will live forever, and it will be nice.

Thanks for your input Wayfarer.

Therefore, i consider the statement "I discretely experience" an extrapolation which utilizes this fundamental motive, and subsequently the outlined rules that constraint it, to determine that that is true in the first place. I am trying to convey that it starts, at the most fundamental aspect, with motive, and consequently a set of rules, and not discrete experience. — Bob Ross

I read the entirety of your post, but I feel this sums it up nicely. The goal of the knowledge theory was to find just one thing that I could "know", and use that to go from there. I can know that I discretely experience, but I explicitly did not try to determine "why" I discretely experience. The reasons being was it was something I could not "know" as a foundation, and also that it wasn't important for what I was trying to accomplish.

That being said, do I believe that there is something which causes us to discretely experience? Absolutely. But I believe this is something beyond the conscious mind. This is neuroscience, the mechanisms by which we think. Do I think its fun to explore in a philosophical manner what it is that causes us to discretely experience? Yes! Philosophy is about trying to get answers to questions that give us new questions to explore.

For my part, I have no skin in that game, and have not considered it beyond a passing thought. Is it something we can applicably know? Maybe. But do I think its needed for the theory to be viable? At this point, no. My question for you is, is there something you feel 'motive' brings to the table that challenges or puts to question the formulation of the epistemology I've put forth so far? If yes, then we'll have to explore it in earnest. If not, then feel free to continue putting forth your idea, I would still like to see what you've come up with. For my part, I feel you are noting something which I feel has promise, and have no disagreements with on first thought.

Of course, so, in a nutshell, "chronological viability" is the attempt of the subject to derive the chronological order of what must come first before another thing. I call it "viability" because I see the derivation of things in terms of which order produces the necessary viability that I experience. — Bob Ross

So this is sort of a descriptive order of causality, or why we arrive at the point that we are in our thinking?

But once the motive is, whatever that may be, and consequently its rules, then it necessarily follows that anything I can possibly imagine requires discrete experience--including the attempted derivation of the motive itself and its rules. Does that make sense — Bob Ross

I believe so. It is not that discrete experience causes the motive to be, but we do need to discretely experience to know what the motive is. If I have that wrong, let me know! Thank you for fleshing that out.

It's not going to make a better or worse person of me. Is it that what makes you angry? That people believing in reincarnation forget to think about fellow people? Then you could transpone life every time to the next. Same as prolonging everything to tomorrow. I don't like that either. It's no excuse. — Dijkgraf

Yes, that is what makes me angry. I see it as rarely, if ever helping people to be a better person, and more often than not, an implicit excuse to settle for one's or other's unfortunate lot in life.

I haven't come across anyone who has said that they feel angry about people believing in life after death — Jack Cummins

Its why I made this post. It is an odd thing. I wanted to know why. I wanted to know if I was jutified, or (more likely) not justified. Hearing other people's input on the matter gives that view point to either ease the anger, or redirect it towards something better than an emotional discomfort.

Personally, I like the idea of rebirth because one life and one body seems a bit limiting and some have better circumstances than others. However, I try to not simply convince myself that reincarnation exists on that basis because it would seem like philosophical dishonesty. — Jack Cummins

I think you have it right. Wanting life after death is motivated by a sense of unfairness or disappointment of our limitations, and I'm sure other emotions. To me, those emotions are not meant to be buried with the "liquor of immortality", but should be used to motivate and direct us to go past our limitations, and work on fixing the world's unfairness. It is the only way the world improves for ourselves and others, Getting drunk on thoughts of a better life beyond this one is no better than getting drunk every evening after work.

Does the existence of God or a Supreme Being make you also angry?
Does the existence of ghosts make you also angry? — Alkis Piskas

Oddly, no. I think this is because they are concepts divorced enough from reality that I can understand why someone would believe them. When people are in the realm of no evidence, people will invent a reason or explanation to understand a mystery in some way. Life after death just seems counter to every single basic learned experience of life. The evidence is as solid as the sun shines. It seems immature to me to hold it, if of course you've looked at it reasonably.

Perhaps too if I saw more people motivated to be better people or do greater things in the world with a belief in their eternal existence, then I would be less angry. Honestly I'm not much against how someone reaches a point in the road, as long as they get there without harming themselves and others too much.

Most people's belief in life after death is real. It is their reality. — Alkis Piskas

All of our beliefs are our personal reality. It doesn't mean they match actual reality. And that's my point. This type of belief, in my eyes, does nothing to address or handle reality in a better way, but is most often used to avoid it. That to me is something that destroys a person's potential, and I do not like to see people's potential ruined.

But much appreciated Tim! I can definitely say YOU do not make me angry, and am glad for your presence on these boards. :smile:

Took me 15 years to come up with. It fits my belief exactly. It even inspired it. — Dijkgraf

And this is my point. Coming up with something that satisfies our emotional desires is stunting growth. It is imaginary. Does it help you be a better person to others? Does it help you make the world a better place? I just don't see it.

No worries! I always appreciate your responses because they are so well thought out! — Bob Ross

The same Bob!

Forgive me, but I am still contemplating it and, consequently refurbishing my ideas on the subject as I go on, so the terminology is not what I would prefer you to focus on (as I try to explicate it hereafter): it is the underlying meaning (because I freely admit that these terms I am about to use may not be the best ones, but, unfortunately, they are the best ones I can think of right now). — Bob Ross

I fully understand! It is a constant struggle for me as well. One of the reasons I respect you is you are a participant trying to understand what the underlying meaning of what I am saying is as well. I hope I have been as open and understanding back.

This is where, as you also rightly pointed out, a distinction needs to be made: thinking in itself and its own extrapolation of itself into a characterized process. The latter is not required, the former is. Furthermore, this is why I will be disregarding the latter, the characterized process, for now and focusing on the former because I am attempting the derivation of chronological viability of the subject (myself). — Bob Ross

Yes, I agree with this.

Now, in terms of the aforementioned question, I could legitimately answer myself with "differentiation must occur for my thoughts". This is 100% valid. However, now I can ask a further question: "how am I able to be convinced and why am I convinced that my answer satisfied it?". I think this reveals to the subject that the most fundamental thing, in terms of just chronological viability, is the fact that they are a motive. They are a perpetual motive towards logic, which any answer (any conclusion) that satisfies logic satisfies the subject. Now I think we are getting more fundamental than simply differentiation. — Bob Ross

I think you have something very clear with motive. Motive can be used to describe "Why I discretely experience" There is something that compels the mind to do so. What is that compulsion?

The issue I have is that this motive is logic. While a motive can be logic, it is unfortunately not the motive of everyone, nor necessarily a basic function of thought. Many thinking things are not motivated by logic. Survival and emotions seem to be the most basic of motives that compel us to discretely experience, and identify the world a particular way.

Logic can be done without training or thought, but it is often something learned. It is a higher order of thinking that one must learn by experience or be taught to consistently think and be motivated in such a manner. That is what the quest for knowledge is. How do I take the fact that I discretely experience, and use it in a logical way? For one's distinctive knowledge, it must not be contradicted. In application to reality, it must not be contradicted. And from there, the rest of the logic can build.

There is nothing to compel us to think logically, but a logical conclusion itself. A person who rejects logic entirely in favor of survival or emotions will not be able to discretely experience in terms of knowable outcomes, but in more of a selfish and basic survival satisfaction. This is part of "context". A person who does not think within the context of logic, cannot really know the world, they just react to it. How do you convince a person to think logically? How do you convince a person to reject their personal emotions, and sometimes "survival of self/personality" in favor of higher order thinking?

That is each person's choice. I do believe that thinking logically will benefit a person more in the long term. But my epistemology cannot convince a person to think logically. It can only convince a person that thinks logically, that it is a logical way to think.

You've used a term a couple of times here, "chronological viability". What does that mean to you? You've noted two types. Could you flesh them out for me? Thanks for the great input!

Before I continue, you want me to continue? — Dijkgraf

No. This is all made up in your head. The more important question is, why did you make it up? Why do you insist on believing something you know you just came up with?

You can deduce the proof from cosmology. — Dijkgraf

Please provide that proof then.

I can cite myself. — Dijkgraf

All right. At this point I know you're just trolling. No further responses from me.

I see you started a new discussion on this topic! I'm not sure why it makes you mad. It's not like believing in God. It's hard scientific reality. — Dijkgraf

Mind citing what that hard scientific reality is?

No, rebirth is no excuse, it's a fact. — Dijkgraf

A fact is something provable. Rebirth is no fact.

That's my point. It's not the same as in this universe. All material particles will disappear in time in this universe. New appear in a new bang. A new you and me appear. Why
shouldn't
they be me or you? — Dijkgraf

If its not the same as in this universe, then its not you. Beyond the fantastical idea that this will even happen, at best its a clone. Are you your clone? It is identical to you in every way, even with your memories. It is still not "you". When "you" die, you are dead. There is no coming back. Any clone will not be "you".

You can't be reborn in this universe. The clone is not you. It's impossible you are reborn in this universe, as the particles you are made of have a unique history. If all particles here will be gone in the future, new particles appear in a new big bang, leading to a new you. — Dijkgraf

Explain to me why you think that person born in a different universe is you? Its the same as if there was a clone in this universe. It is not you.

The clone argument doesn't hold for serial big bangs. I have good theoretical arguments for them to occur. You can get born like you in an infinite variety of planets and situations on them. We will come back... — Dijkgraf

Yes it does. If you are cloned after a big bang, that is not you. You will not come back. You will never come back. I don't say this to hurt you. I say this so you recognize reality, and are able to live your life free from a fantasy otherwise.

Who says our state doesn't appear again in a follow up big bang? All material particles in the present universe will be annihilated in the far future. All that will be left is a diluting photon gass sending fleeting remembrances of all happy happenings into oblivion at infinity. This state can induce a new bang and fresh particles can condense on a new planet around a new star into new you's, me's and everyone's. Just a thought. — Dijkgraf

Who says it would? Lets see what we know. First, we do not know if there will be a follow up big bang. That is as much heaven or hell as anything else.

Second, you are who you are because of yourself, and the circumstances you are in. If you were cloned today, you would not be your clone. You would be in one location, while they would be in another. You would not share consciousness. On the second of creation, your paths would diverge. In the incredibly unlikely scenario of an exact repeat of existence trillions of years later, it would not be you, just someone very like you. You will be dead and gone. You will never come back.

Non-existence is not a state, it is an absence of a state. You will get so many years of existence, then you will cease to be. That is it. Your brain and body die, and because you are 100% your brain and body, you die as well. Do not live with the idea that there will be something after, live with the idea that what you have is a precious moment in all of existence that will never be repeated again.

Sorry for the wait Bob, busy week, and I wanted to have time to focus and make sure I really covered the answers here.

If we define inapplicable plausibilities in the manner of the latter, then I would advocate that all inapplicable plausibilities are actually irrational inductions. However, if the former is also utilized to a certain degree, then further consideration is required. — Bob Ross

Yes, this is the distinction I am going for. Perhaps I need another name for a belief in something that is counter to what is applicably known. Perhaps that should be classified as an impossibility. Belief in inapplicable plausibilities or impossibilities would be considered irrational inductions. But, I do want to note irrational inductions have their uses. If there are no rational inductions, it is our only option. Further, there are times when the more rational conclusion may be based off an odd context or faulty premises, and irrational inductions are needed to push past those boundaries.

Stating "there is a smallest particle that can exist" is no different than stating "there is an undetectable unicorn". — Bob Ross

I don't think these are equivalent. The first is a logical conclusion based on our distinctive knowledge. "Smallness" is a state of relativity. Meaning that if two particles are compared, we can observe if one is smaller than the other. This can be applicably known, therefore it is possible that one particle can be smaller than another. We can then construct a formula stating, "If particles can be compared, and we know it is possible for particles to be smaller than another, if we take all of the particles in the universe, there will be a smallest particle."

This formula would be formal logic of possibility. The problem is when the formula is applied. If we are to state, "That particle is the smallest", we would need to gather all of the particles of the universe to know this. The problem is, we cannot gather all of the particles in the universe, and at that point, our claim is now an inapplicable plausibility.

Compare this to an undetectable unicorn. We don't even know if a unicorn is possible. This is constructed on a possibility of a horse with a horn, and the plausibility of something that can exist in the universe, but not be detected. Unlike the former formula which is based directly off of a possibility, we have a plausibility mixed into the chain of rationality to arrive at this conclusion.

Turning particle comparison into a similar cogency of an undetectable unicorn would be something like, "There exists the groggiest particle in the universe." A groggy particle is something that is both larger, and smaller than the particles around it. But a groggy particle is a plausibility based off the possibility of a particle being smaller, and a particle being bigger. We don't know if groggy particles are possible, let alone whether any one particle is the groggiest. Honestly, its a very slight difference in cogency revealed by the chain of reasoning.

I have no problem with #1, but #2 is where the ambiguity is introduced: you are clumping "trees" together as if that is a universal, it is a particular. To "experience something, and state "that is X"", is something someone can do with virtually anything. To say that the only requirement in #2 is that the essential properties are not contradicted is like using potentiality is if it is possibility. Just because the essential properties don't contradict doesn't mean I am justified in claiming X and Y are similar enough for me to constitute it as the same experience on two different occasions. — Bob Ross

But in the case of the use of tree here, I am not defining it as, "This tree here, is the same as that tree here." I am defining it as a universal. "All things that are wooden and taller than myself are trees." That's all that's required for me to applicably know something as a tree. Every other property would be non-essential to matching that definition.

Plato once postulated that everything had an ideal form. There was an ideal Tree, that our formulation of trees was based on. Epistemology studied variations of platonic forms for many years, and concluded that there was no ideal form of anything. There is no arbiter of reality that declares what a tree is. That is all based on our distinctive knowledge. If I decide to define "tree" as a universal, I can. As long as its useful in application, I should.

The point of epistemology, is to figure out how we can claim knowledge of the world. That requires a method of ordering our ability to discretely experience in a way that is rational. Of course someone within their own context can define anything as they like. The point of introducing the logical constraints of the theory is to give a tool to do it in such a way that uses rational outcomes that are consistently useful and have the highest chance of being accurate in their assessment of the world.

I think you're also using the term potentiality incorrectly. Potentiality has nothing to do with the act of application. It is simply whether we've created distinctive knowledge that is not contradicted by other distinctive knowledge in our head. If I said a tree an essential property of a tree was that it must be taller than myself, but then also said an essential property of a tree is that it must be shorter than myself, this is a contradiction, and inapplicable. Potentiality is a general description of whether something is rational in the hierarchy of inductions, but it does not introduce anything new, or contradict the rules of the hierarchy. When applying the distinctive knowledge you have created, if it is similar enough that it does not contradict the essential properties of your definition, then you applicably know it. When formulating distinctive knowledge in your head, if it is non-contradictory to other distinctive knowledge, then it has potential.

Sure, we could say that it (gravity) has the same essential property that it falls both times, but that does not mean they are identical enough to constitute it as the same experience: experiencing it on a mountain isn't the same as in a valley. Can I say, after experiencing it in a valley, that it is possible on a mountain? — Bob Ross

It depends on the context, and the definition of the word. If the only essential property of gravity as a definition is, "That which pulls me to the ground," then yes, you experience gravity in both places. If you have only experienced gravity in a valley, and have not yet gone to a mountain or know what it is composed of, this is an applicable plausibility that gravity will also exist on a mountain. If you say, I have experienced gravity on the planet Earth, then it is possible that when you go to anywhere on Earth, you will experience gravity.

It is all about the context and degree of specificity. The more specific and exacting you are in the requirements to applicably know something, the more difficult it becomes to applicably know it, and the more you have to rely on inductions. Of course, define something too broadly and generally, and it isn't very useful. Define something to narrow and exacting, and it generally won't be useful in most cases either.

1. I think, therefore I discretely experience — Bob Ross

This is incorrect. Thoughts have nothing to do with the ability to discretely experience. I never say, "First I think, then I discretely experience." I eliminate thoughts, and arrive at the idea that discrete experience is the one thing I cannot eliminate. There is nothing to necessitate that I define thoughts in a particular way. I could never define thoughts if I wanted to.

For centuries the number zero did not exist. Nothing in math necessitated that we define zero, but defining zero turned out to be incredibly useful. I only defined thoughts in such a way that was useful and relatable to other people. But I could easily see another person never defining thoughts at all. They could define thoughts as part of the senses that are unceasing. As long as it was defined in such a way as to have potential, and it could be applied without contradiction, then that is what they would distinctively and applicably know thoughts as.

Thoughts, as defined here, are simply my ability to continue to discretely experience when I stop sensing. I can choose that definition, because I can choose how to discretely experience.

Again, you are concluding this, which is a thought, so you are using thought to prove discrete experiences, and then vice-versa. — Bob Ross

No, I am taking certain discrete experiences, and labeling them as thoughts. Thoughts are a subset of discrete experiences, they do not define discrete experiences. I do not consider "sensing" as thoughts within that context, but they are also discrete experiences.

Could you define it differently? I'm sure you could. Maybe you think everything is a thought, in which case, then thoughts would be a synonym for discrete experiences. If so, you would need to come up with a new word for the sub-thought that happens when you no longer sense. Or maybe that's not an essential property for you. Define it as you will, that fits within the theory. It is only when you apply it that it must not be contradicted by reality for you to applicably know it.

If you think I do not know that within my self-context, can you disprove it? Can you demonstrate that I do not discretely experience?

I think this is an appeal to ignorance fallacy, I don't have to disprove it. — Bob Ross

Let me rephrase this to what it should have been. Can you disprove that you discretely experience? Recall this is not merely "thinking" as I've defined it in the paper. It is the ability to take the entirety of your experience, and divide it into parts. The question of course is, can you even make an argument against discretely experiencing, if you didn't discretely experience? If you can counter the idea that you discretely experience, then yes, the entire theory fails. But if you can't, then I see nothing against it.

Thanks again Bob, I will be answering more quickly this week.

Thank you for sticking with it TootheyMaw, I think I understand your stance better now. I do agree in the context of a survey, people have bipartisan support for health care, but like SSU noted, in the context of political moments that drive people to vote, a Trumpian view captures the attention more than healthcare. Is this the way we should operate? Ideally, no. But is it the way a lot of us operate? I think so.

I really agree with SSU's last post, so nothing else to add here.

I think the comparison is more relevant when you actually have to choose between the two. As a radical example, imagine someone puts a gun up to your head and tells you to bet your life on either plausibility A or B (where both are completely unrelated): I don't think you would just flip a coin, or answer with indifference. I think you would analyze which you are more sure of. — Bob Ross

I would argue in that case that analyzing the plausibilities is relevant to that situation. :grin: I think we understand the points here.

I think you were right in wanting to move inapplicable plausibilities to irrational inductions, because they lack potential. I can never apply the belief that any given infinite, within a limit, is actually infinite. — Bob Ross

The reason why I haven't yet lumped it into an irrational induction, is there is an essential difference between the two. An inapplicable plausibility is unable to be applied, while an irrational induction is a belief in something, despite the application contradicting the belief. But as you've noted, niether have potential, so I think they can be lumped together into a category.

However, claiming their is a first cause would be the same as claiming this particle is actually the smallest particle that can exist: — Bob Ross

I think a more accurate comparison would be "Claiming there is a first cause is the same as claiming there is a smallest particle that can exist." Comparitively, claiming, "This thing is a first cause, is the same as claiming this particle is the smallest particle." Each have different claims of existence and logic behind it. While I believe the most cogent belief is that there is at least one first cause, I find the bar to prove that any one thing is a first cause, may be extremely difficult to claim.

The reason is simple. A first cause has no prior reason for its existence. But there is nothing to prevent it from appearing in such a way, that a person could still interpret that something caused it to exist. If a particle appeared with a velocity, how could we tell the difference between it, and a particle who's velocity was caused by another? We would have to witness the inception of the self-caused particle at the time of its formation. But a historical analysis would make the revelation of certain types of self-caused things impossible.

It is when you have concluded applicable knowledge within your context.

I consider this completely ambiguous. Although I understand what you are trying to say. I think, as of now, your epistemology is just leaving it up to the subject to decide what is or isn't possible (because they can make, in the absence on any clear definition, "experienced before" mean anything they want). — Bob Ross

Not quite. Recall what is required for applicable knowledge from the self-context.

1. One must have distinctive knowledge first. Distinctive knowledge is the essential properties you have decided something should be. I can define a "tree" as being a wooden plant that is taller than myself.

2. Experience something, and state, "That is a tree." To applicably know it is a tree, your essential properties must not be contradicted. Turns out the plant I'm looking at it wooden, and taller than myself. I applicably know it as a tree. Therefore I know it is possible that there are wooden plants taller than myself.

The "experience" is to have applicably known something before. To applicably know something, the individual must meet these minimum specific standards. They can make distinctive knowledge whatever they want, but the application of that distinctive knowledge must follow the process.

My point is that it isn't a proof: it is vicious circle. As far as I understand it, you are stating that "I think, therefore I think", "I perceive, therefore I perceive", and "I feel, therefore I feel". These are not proofs, these are the definition of circular logic. — Bob Ross

I don't believe this is the case. Circular logic is when a reason, B, is formed from A, and A can only be formed from B. Thus the simple example of, "The bible states God exists. How do we know the bible is true? God says it is."

But the foundation of discretely experiencing does not rely on the definition of thoughts or perceptions. They do not prove that we discretely experience. Discrete experience is simply the ability to essentially form identities within the wash of experience. A camera can take a picture, but it cannot discretely experience beyond the colors of light it receives. We can. We can focus on certain portions, lump them together as identities, see sheep in fields of grass.

My definition of "thoughts" does not prove discrete experience. My definition of thoughts comes from discrete experience. Thoughts, as defined here, are simply my ability to continue to discretely experience when I stop sensing. I can choose that definition, because I can choose how to discretely experience. I can then apply it without contradiction. If I stop sensing, and still discretely experience, then I am thinking without contradiction.

Where is this circular? I see this as a logical consequence, not a conclusion that is the only source that proving that I discretely experience.

I am having a hard time of understanding how this isn't "I discretely experience because I discretely experience". — Bob Ross

It is, "I discretely experience, therefore I can define a portion of my experience as "thoughts". When do this without contradiction within a particular context (Saying thoughts != thoughts is a contradiction), then I say I know it.

If you think I do not know that within my self-context, can you disprove it? Can you demonstrate that I do not discretely experience? You cannot, because the act of coming up with an argument alone, and me understanding the counter argument, requires that I discretely experience. Discretely experiencing is a law of a communicable being, built on the principal of non-contradiction. As far as assumptions go, I believe the law of non-contradiction is the one assumption I need to form the theory.

Of course, maybe I've missed something. If you truly believe it is circular, can you demonstrate it? I look forward to your reply.

my point is indeed obvious. Thanks. — ToothyMaw

No, it wasn't. L'elephant is a person who is within more of the far right culture, so he's probably heard something similar to what you were stating. For a person who is unfamiliar with that culture, it was hard to decipher. When we speak within a culture, we can say much while saying little. When outside of that culture, we have to say much to say little.

He is talking about how the government tries to stir the public's attention to the domestic (internal) problems, while talking about going to war on the global scale. Internal affairs as diversion, so the government could focus on going to a massive war with another country. — L'éléphant

Sometimes government do this, but I don't see any evidence of this within the last 15 years. Trump, Obama, and Biden despite what you personally think of them, were not war mongers.

Or talking about domestic culture conflicts while dodging the scrutiny on the lack of socialized medicine. ETC — L'éléphant

This is more accurate. I believe this is mostly because its what people care about more. When people vote, you need them impassioned and willing to come to the booth. Not enough people are excited over socialized medicine. Look at Bernie Sanders. He didn't quite win the Democratic nomination. Its not that government seems to actively be keeping it down, its that people are not actively interested enough, or demanding enough for it. If anything, I would say its the wealthy who would have to pay for it, who have spent a lot of time and effort convincing the culture that it would be wrong for them.

I didn't even say that, you didn't even quote me, you just made that up. — ToothyMaw

I'm just trying to piece together what you were trying to say. Relax. I'm not here to hurt you, honestly. If I was wrong, please correct me. Try taking one idea per sentence. When you blend a bunch together, its difficult for other people reading to understand what you're saying. Often when we write, its clear as day in our heads. But, when we type it out, sometimes it doesn't come out as we wanted. Its something we all learn from each other. Just try again.

I am against the people using the term "neo-marxist" to tar other people in the military, and that attempting to appease the kind of people that push for the more radical leftist social ideas, such as that the January 6th Insurrection was caused by white rage, give people like Gorka ammunition - because the right has an inherent advantage when it comes to the culture war. — ToothyMaw

This was one sentence that had a lot of ideas. Lets break this up a bit.

"I am against the people using the term "neo-marxist" to tar other people in the military".

Who are these people that are using such a term? What do they mean by that term?

"I am also against attempting to appease the kind of people that push for the more radical leftist social ideas. One of these ideas is that the January 6th Insurrection was caused by white rage. When people go along with these claims, they give ammunition to people like Gorka. I think we need to fight
them brutally (violence?) and that social wins will just come elsewhere."

Who are the kind of people that are appeasing? Are the people we appeasing those that accuse people in the military of being neo-Marxist? Why are some people appeasing them? Are all the people who are saying "white rage" was a factor of the January 6th insurrection all "leftists"? Because I believe its a discussion between many people, not just "leftists".

Do people like Gorka really need ammunition, or will they just be contrary and make up accusations for money regardless? Does the fact that someone will use your words against you, mean you should speak what you consider true or right? Just some questions to consider.

Sorry for that response. Can I help you understand better what I wrote? — ToothyMaw

Its ok, we all blow some steam sometime. Yes, I didn't see precisely where you were going. Try to give me a main idea, and focus on that. You wrote more like a steam of consciousness, which is normal for many people. Try to take a step back and tell me:

What is going on in the military that you find wrong? What is the evidence for this? Why do you think this attempt in the military will fail?

In general, and this is my personal preference, I try to avoid phrases like "the left" or "the right". They're generally nebulous and open to individual interpretation. Focus on ideas. People will make their own judgement if this is leaning a political way, but on the philosophy forums, our focus should be on the ideas themselves.

Lets disregard the fact that the studies you cited do not back your claim. What would it take to show your claim has any merit?

First, we would need a controlled study over those decades. Consistent measures of what it is to be intelligent, and ensuring that such a measure of intelligence is not culturally or socially biased.

Second, we would likely need detailed brain scans to compare brain development.

Neither of these things is available. Therefore any claim that we are less intelligent than our ancestors is purely speculative, and cannot be based on any serious study or science.

ToothyMaw, this was kind of a rant. Your video is a link to a one sided and positively biased interview to Dr. Gorka, who was appointed as Deputy Assistant to the President and Strategist to Trump from January 2017 to August 2017. After these nine months, he resigned, and was a Fox News contributer from 2017-2019.

According to wikipedia: "In April 2021, Gorka was permanently banned from YouTube for repeatedly violating the company's policy on spreading misinformation related to the 2020 presidential election.[53][54] Gorka's America First radio show had previously been banned from the site in 2019 for copyright violations, specifically due to Gorka's refusal to stop playing the Imagine Dragons song "Radioactive" in his intro segment."

So we have a topic from a man who barely worked in the White House for 9 months, then did nothing besides be a political commentator, who ultimately was banned from Youtube for lying.

I'm not sure anything this man has to say can be considered trust worthy or notable. If you believe that neo-Marxists are invading the millitary, can you find some better citations? For example, someone who did a study on the millitary, or internal millitary reports. Otherwise, this isn't really anything worthy of discussion.

But I suspect that you are only referring to the comparison of plausibilities that relate to one another, so I would like to explicitly state that I am claiming that one can compare all plausibilities to one another in this manner. — Bob Ross

Yes, if you're just comparing the fundamental building blocks of different plausibilities, you can determine plausibility A is more cogent than plausibility B. The problem is, if they aren't within the same context, how useful is that analysis?

Recall that inductions are made because we have limitations in what we applicably know. Further, less cogent inductions are used to compare what belief you should make about a particular situation. Its about comparing your options. If I'm talking about subject X, and I have two plausibilities, going through the chain of rationality to discover which plausibility is more rational, is useful. If I have a plausibility about subject X, and a plausibility about subject A, what does comparing the cogency get me?

It may be that the plausibility about subject X is more rational than the plausibility about subject A, but when considering subject A, I have no alternative belief about A, but that plausibility. In that case, the most cogent thing is to choose to act, or not act on that one plausibility I have. This is the point I wanted to emphasize first, though I'm thinking I should have emphasized the technical comparison, then explained when and what context you should compare.

I think that, in light of us agreement on potentiality, we can finally prove that actual infinites are irrational inductions. — Bob Ross

Your two examples are great. Unlimited infinities are irrational. But some limited infinities may be inapplicable plausibilities. Perhaps there is no limit to space for example. Its plausible. But it is currently inapplicable. When considering the limits of space, we have no viable inductions we can make, so we must remain in the realm of inapplicable plausibility.

I think, as you may already be inferring, that this actually have heavy implications with respect to your idea of a "first cause" — Bob Ross

Yes. Stating that everything which has a cause, must have a cause, is an unlimited infinity. It breaks down if you examine it in the argument. All that is left, is that there must be a first cause. BUT, this is still either an applicable or inapplicable plausibility at best. It is simply more cogent to believe that there is a first cause, then not. Since we do not have any higher induction we can make in regards to the a first cause within the context of that argument, it is more cogent to conclude there is a first cause.

I know we had a lot of disputes about mathematical inductions, and so I wanted to briefly continue that conversation with the idea that mathematical inductions do not require another term, contrary to what I was claiming, because they are possibilities. — Bob Ross

Yes, this seems correct. There is a fine dividing line between possibility and applicable knowledge. To say something is possible, is to say the applicable knowledge you just obtained, will be able to be applied again. But this is if we apply that math to reality by actively putting a number within the equation. The logic of the equation itself, is distinctive knowledge based on the rules we have constructed.

I think that it would be beneficial to really hone in on what it means to have "experienced something before". Where are we drawing the line? Is there a rational line to be drawn? — Bob Ross

It is when you have concluded applicable knowledge within your context. You can experience something, but not have applicable knowledge of it. Lets say you're in a field with a horned goat and ram. When gazing with the animals behind your back, you get head butted from behind. When you gather yourself off the ground and look behind you, you realize the horns are very similar, and you can't tell which one head butt you.

The thing you can applicably know by going through your distinctive knowledge, is that you were hit by something. There is a bruise on your back in the imprint of a horn, and it is not possible that you could fall down from an impact that bruises you without that being "something". But was it the ram or the goat? Its plausible it was something you weren't aware of at all, but you believe its possible both goats and rams can head butt a person, and it seems more cogent to believe one of them did it.

But will you ever applicably know which one head butt you? No. Its plausible to believe it was only the sheep, or only the ram. But couldn't we say it was possible that it was either the sheep or the ram because we know it is possible for sheep and rams to head butt people? The care is in the intent of the induction. If I say, "I believe it was the sheep, and not the ram," that is the plausibility. If I say, "I believe it was either the sheep or the ram", this is a possibility.

I'm not sure if that answered the question, but I felt this was a good example to show the fine line between what can be applicably known, possibility, and plausibility. Feel free to dig in deeper.

I think that your epistemology, at its core, rests on assumptions. Now, I don't mean this is a severe blow to the your views: I agree with them. What I mean is that, as far as I am understanding, your epistemology really "kicks in" after the subject assumes that perception, thought, and emotion are valid sources of knowledge. — Bob Ross

I don't believe I make those assumptions at all. Its been a while since we visited the building blocks of the paper on page one to determine the difference between distinctive knowledge, and applicable knowledge. I do not claim that perception, thoughts, and emotions are valid sources of knowledge. I claim they are things we know, due to the basis of proving, and thus knowing, that I can discretely experience.

The discrete experience you have, the separation of the sea of existence into parts and parcels, is not an assumption, or a belief. It is your direct experience, your distinctive knowledge. I form the discrete experience of thoughts as a very low set of essential properties in the beginning, so that I can get to the basic idea of the theory. But now that you have it, go back to the beginning. Use the theory on the formulation of the theory itself. Does it still hold? I think you'll find it will.

You create an idea of a thought, and you confirm it without contradiction immediately, because it is a discrete experience. Later, you can go back and ask, "Can I refine what a thought is? Could I redefine it? What is the difference between a thought and an emotion? Can I find essential properties that differ, and apply this to myself?"

Or back to your original issue, "What is an "I"? Can I define it as more than simply that which discretely experiences? Perhaps other creatures discretely experience, but they obviously do it differently from humans?" The doors are open now that you understand the theory. Tackle mind, tackle ethics, tackle God itself. The system of distinctive knowledge, applicable knowledge, and the inductive hierarchy can be applied to it all.

Will this refine the system itself? Almost certainly. I am under no illusions it is complete, because the reality is, as contexts change, and as more people use it, there are bound to be refinements, and even different contexts of applying the theory itself. But is it a fundamental base that you can retreat to? A base that is consistently logical in its own formation, as well as its application? I believe so. I use it in my own life, which I think adds to the strength of its use as a tool.

If only I could ever get the idea out there in the philosophical community at large. I have tried publication to no avail. Honestly, I don't even care about credit. Perhaps someone on these forums will read it, understand it, and be able to do what I was unable to. Or perhaps someone will come along and finally disprove it. Either way, it would make me happy to have some resolution for it.

But back to your questions and detailed drilling. I feel we are coming to an end of the questions about understanding the theory itself, but let us resolve any remaining ones. If you are satisfied, feel free to test the theory in action. We can use it to address epistemology issues or questions you may have had, like thoughts or "I". Since we understand the theory, honestly the best critique of it is to use it. And what better test of a theory of knowledge then to see if it can know itself?

Thanks again Bob. It has been very gratifying to have someone seriously read and understand the theory up to this point. Whether the theory continues to hold, or crashes and burns, this has been enough.