It cannot be caused, or uncaused
— Philosophim

:chin: — TheMadFool

Was the use of "it" the source of confusion? Nothingness cannot be caused or uncaused, because nothingness is not a thing. If its not an effect, it cannot be caused correct?

1. The first cause has to be uncaused.

2. Only nothing has no cause. — TheMadFool

Can you prove that nothing has no cause though?

Nothing isn't anything. It cannot be caused, or uncaused. It is the absence of both cause and effect. Nothingness is outside of causality. The only thing that can be uncaused, is something that exists.

Humans have the ability to give identity to things. Imagine a field of grass. That's one "thing". Now imagine a blade of grass. That's another "thing". Now imagine a cell in the grass. You get it.

While I demonstrated applying identities to things that are smaller, we can also apply them to things that are larger. The monism of "everything" is simply a logical limit of this identification process. Can we truly comprehend everything by experience? No. But we can comprehend everything as a logical consequence.

Is this useful? Consider that at one time in math, the number 0, did not exist. Zero symbolizes nothing after all. Nothing isn't something you can touch or feel. And yet, the number zero is incredibly useful in describing the other numbers. The state of "An absence of any identity" helps us come to conclusions about identities. Can the same be said about "An inclusion of all identities" help us in the same way? Perhaps.

To add to the great contributions in this thread, I think one of philosophy's tasks is to examine assumptions we take for granted and see if they hold under scrutiny. Liar's paradoxes show us that certain assumptions we make lead to illogical conclusions. That's incredibly important, because what if you are making those assumptions in arguments that are not liar's paradoxes? That means you are holding faulty assumptions that are not clear in another argument. Can we learn from the liar's paradox? I think we can.

"“This sentence is not true.” I'll just change it to "This sentence is false" for less typing.

Lets look at this from a logic perspective. We could say, "If this sentence is true, then its false"

A -> ~A
If A is true, then we get A is not true.

A = (A -> ~A)

Now negate the formula, and assume the sentence if false.
~A = (A or A)

~A = A
(If I did my logic right, its been a while)

So if the sentence is false, its true, and if its true, its false. We definitely have a contradiction.

As we can see, there's something weird going on. But why? Our intuitions feel like the sentence makes sense, but logically, it doesn't. Because we're being too general. We realize we've said nonsense by being too implicit. That's the lesson we can glean. Just because we can say or posit an idea in language, doesn't mean it makes sense. You've previously posted the question, "What is metaphysics?" Many times people use metaphysics to disguise liars paradoxes. Terms that are ambiguous are great ways to hide nonsense terms and conclusions within them. If you can pick them out, you can ask for clarification.

Solving the liar's paradox can give us a tool to solve other nonsense points while keeping within the spirit of the discussion. Nonsense arguments are often unintentional, and often times hide an underlying meaning that wasn't quite nailed with the language. So I could propose this to someone instead:

"I don't think we're being specific enough with our words. Do you mean perhaps, "This sentence is a false sentence"? Because at that point, we can look at the sentence and see, "No, that is a viable and correct sentence. It is false that that is a false sentence.

Or

Proposal:
A = a sentence
~A = not a sentence

A therefore
A = ~ A

And we can see that its a contradiction right off the bat, and that A must be a sentence.

Liar's paradoxes are a great teaching tool about the ambiguity of language, but also about seeing through the intentionality of a person's argument. When discussing philosophy with others, we should be generous towards the other person's argument. Sometime we're not just trying to show that a person's argument is viable, we're also trying to see if we can use language correctly to better cast what they are intending to argue as well.

So, there is a “first cause” (not necessarily unique) for an F, but that first cause has no set position in an infinite span of past time and is only completely reliable in a limiting sense. (this has nothing to do with a “point in time at negative infinity” that set theorists might consider) — jgill

I believe what you are talking about are limits like in calculus? Or are you talking about the limits of precision? For example, .1 becomes .11, becomes .111, etc?

Well stated again Bob. I agreed with your points, and wanted to also specifically point to this one.

if you think that I am arguing that there is no first explanation and, thereby, that there being a first explanation is the unicorn, then I would say that that is not my position. I am arguing that both of those propositions collapse on one another (in terms of explanations) and that is why, although I don't think I have elaborated much further beyond this criticism, I would conclude that no matter how one contemplates it, it will inevitably collapse. — Bob Ross

Yes, even though you or I may personally agree with the OP to an extent, without a better framework of epistemology, it collapses into a messy paradox. Like you stated about logic being extended to Logic, I feel the OP extends to the limit of what we can know by today's standards, and finds itself in a strange situation when we are faced with the limits of the unknown.

At this point, I would be repeating myself if I mentioned anymore. What a fantastically thorough examination! If you are interested in continuing a discussion of epistemology, here is the link I spoke about earlier. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/9015/a-methodology-of-knowledge I do not intend this to pressure you, it is only if you enjoyed the conversation, and would like more like this on another topic. It is one of my older works, and it is broken into four parts of about 20 pages total, so I understand if that is a bit much to take on. If you do read it, I recommend reading it all at once however. In the past people stop after the first part, and ask questions that are all answered in the later parts. The payoff for it is I can viably establish not only an epistemology that crosses cultures and contexts, but contains a means of establishing a hierarchy of inductions, something that I think the study of epistemology lacks.

And if it doesn't interest you, not a worry at all. I am grateful for the great conversation here, and hope to see you again in other conversations on the boards!

So, let's start by assuming that (something cannot be the cause of itself. — Alkis Piskas

Agreed.

Now, if the infinity of cause and effect is impossible, there must be a "first cause" from which all starts, right? However, since we said that nothing can be the cause of itself in the physical universe, that cause must necessarily be non-physical, right? — Alkis Piskas

Not quite. Physical or non-physical, that would be a prior cause. If you posit a non-physical cause, its still a cause right? Which means the same question applies to it. What caused the non-physical state which caused the physical state?

The real answer is, "There is no prior cause." Meaning nothing created it, and it is not the cause of itself. It simply exists, because it does. So if a non-physical thing had no prior cause, it would be by its virtue of being. If a physical thing had no prior cause, it would be by its virtue of being.

The problem with positing a God as "The" solution, is it doesn't logically follow. A God does not escape the problem of the first cause, nor offers a solution. If there is a first cause, then it has no prior reason for its existence, and no rules or limitations of why it should, or should not exist. Meaning the first cause could be the big bang, or particles just entering into existence at any time. Is a God also probable? Yes. But that's only one out of an incredible number of other options.

To prove one or many first causes is a monumental task that might be impossible. If anything, we would need to work our way backwards through causality and hope we arrive at conclusive proof at a start. If a person is going to prove a God is a first cause, they will need to do it separately from the conclusion that there is a first cause. The necessity of a first cause does not necessitate that a first cause be God.

Its been years since I've read logic, but that's a good approach. Lets make sure we're setting up the premises fairly.

A = !∃X -> Y
An alpha is when there does not exist some prior cause, X, for an examined state, Y.

C = ∃X -> Y
A cause is where there exists some prior cause, X, for an examined state, Y.

Onto the premises!

Q (For Question) = Y -> (A or C)
(I'm going to use "or" and "and" because I don't want to copy and paste the symbols repeatedly. :D)
The first premise is the question. For a state of existence, there exists a first cause, or a prior cause for its existence.

Y -> (!∃X -> Y) OR (∃X -> Y)
Translates to
Y -> (!∃X or ∃X) -> Y
Translates to
Y <-> (!∃X or ∃X)
All Y's lead to some prior explanation, or lead to no prior explanation. There is some prior explanation lead to Y, or there is not some prior explanation that leads to Y.

Lets start with our second premise:

For all Q's about Y states, the answer is a cause.
(Translating C)
(∀(Q) = ∀Y <-> ∀(∃X))

Now lets see what we can conclude.

∃Y= (∀Y <-> ∀(∃X))
First, this is a state, which then has a question. This is looking awkward, so lets change it to a set.

∀Q( y ∈ Y <-> x ∈ X )
For the set of all Q's, there exists some prior cause. But, because the set it itself a Y, we have a situation in which there is something outside of a set, that should be in the set.

y = ∀Q( y ∈ Y <-> x ∈ Q )
So what if we said that the set of all Y's also includes the set itself? Because if there exists a y outside of the set, then there exists an x outside of the set. This would be called a Universal set. However, Russel's paradox shows this is impossible. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_set#Russell's_paradox So we can't do that.

But if that is the case, then all this leaves us with a Y outside the set of all Y's. Which means there is a question outside of the set. But if there is a question outside of the set, then our set is contradicted.

But if we instead state:

A = ∀Q( y ∈ Y <-> (x ∈ Q or (!x ∈ Q))
There does not exist any Q's outside of the set with an answer that does not lead to a contradiction. If the answer is A, then there is no Y or X outside of the set that leads to Russel's paradox.

Feel free to check my logic, I'm pretty rusty on it, and not sure if this is the best representation. Great discussion so far!

I have a forum post here that goes over your subject matter. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/12098/a-first-cause-is-logically-necessary

I agree with you that there must be a primary cause in any chain of causality, I think you might like to read it because it is similar to what you are doing here. The argument also clearly shows that what that primary cause, has no prior cause for its existence.

If that is the case, then a primary cause could be anything. Let me explain. When we say something "must" be a certain way, it is because there are causes/reasons why it must be constrained. If something has no prior reason for its existence, then there is no reason why it should, or should not exist. If we said, "It should be God," we have to ask, "Why?" We can't use prior causality to explain it, so we just say, "Because God does."

Now that's not entirely wrong. If God existed, and it was a primary cause, this reasoning would be true. What is wrong is to assume that what cannot have prior causality, is only God. If it is the case that there must be something without prior causality, it could be anything. A big bang. A quantum field. A random alignment of several particles appearing over billions of years. You can't say, "God is the only thing that could," because then I would ask, "Why?" There would need to be prior causality involved that necessitated God be the Primary cause. Because we cannot constrain a primary cause with prior reasonings, we can only conclude there is no constraints on what could be a primary cause.
In short, while God is not implausible, God is also not necessary or even necessarily probable.

I have another post where I explore this idea in depth, in which I attempt to deduce a probability of God if it is the case that anything could have been the primary cause. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/8924/a-fun-puzzle-for-the-forums-the-probability-of-god

As you can tell, I love thinking about the puzzle of the "First cause". Ultimately while I do agree with your outcome that a first cause is likely the way the universe works, even if there is a first cause, in no way can we conclude that it must be a God. Also, do not take this as an attack on your attempt to think! In philosophy we should not be theists or anti-theists, but thinkers. That involves taking any subject matter, and trying to see if we can come to logical conclusions. You have done a fine job here in proposing some thoughts. I will let others critique your specifics, as I do agree with your logic of a primary cause being the most logical conclusion. Don't stop thinking!

Okay, then causes are not logically necessary. — InPitzotl

The premises of the OP are not logically necessary. It is the conclusion that is logically necessary if the premises are true. It is either the case that there are things that have no prior cause for their existence, or things that have prior cause for their existence. This is an assumption. If you can show that the assumption is incorrect, then the conclusion is not logically necessary.

If you can provide an alternative, that there is something which does not have a prior cause, and is something which has no prior cause for its existence, then the assumption is false. The BT argument only applies to the first premise, not the conclusion. I do not see you presenting a viably third option with the BT argument as I've noted prior.

In the end, I think Bob Ross successfully countered the notion that the argument is logically necessary. I would read our discussion to see the results.
— Philosophim
I'm not quite sure I have to read it... it seems apparent to me. — InPitzotl

Well of course it does to you, otherwise we wouldn't be going back and forth. But Bob really nailed the essence of the argument, and I think you'll really get to understand the conclusion. I feel like I've been explaining the OP to you for a while, and either you don't quite understand it, or I don't quite understand your criticism. Maybe you're right, but I'm just not seeing it. Its not that I'm stubborn, I clearly say Bob nailed it. If you read it, you might see another view point, and tie it into your own argument so that I might see it better.

For the fourth time, you are (or at least were) claiming that it is logically necessary that there be at least one. That's vastly different than claiming that it is merely necessary. — InPitzotl

To me, "logically possible" means that if you assume something to be true, you do not get a contradiction. "Logically necessary" means that if you assume something to be false, you do get a contradiction (e.g., it contradicts the argument for it being logically necessary). Logical possibility doesn't mean something is the case; it could be wrong, but still be logically consistent. So you don't need to test if something is true to demonstrate it's logically possible. — InPitzotl

Ok. If we look at the conclusion of the OP, it fits logical necessity under your definition. If I assume everything has a prior cause for its existence, I run into a contradiction. If infinite regress exists, what caused there to be infinite regressive causality in existence? You can't say, "Something else", because the question continues. It only ends with, "It must not have a prior cause for its existence."

This is why I also keep saying BT does not contradict the conclusion. If there is something in BT that is discovered to have no prior reason for its existence, we have the logical necessity becoming a reality. Here we have the existence of something which has no prior cause for its existence, an alpha.

But for re-emphasis, regarding the claim that it is logically necessary, BT demonstrates how it is logically possible that there cannot be any explanation for the results. — InPitzotl

Again, this does not counter my conclusion.

I don't understand how you get from my asking you a question about whether a 217Bi atom (as a decay product of 217Pb) is or isn't an alpha to my confusing you as saying there's only one specific alpha. — InPitzotl

What I'm saying is I don't see any evidence of it being something which has no prior explanation for its being. That has nothing to do with the OP. If you believe the rate of decay we have calculated from an atom has no prior cause, you agree with my OP. I'm not here to decide whether BT theories are correct, or make any assertions as to what specifically is confirmed in existence as an alpha. That is out of the wheelhouse of the discussion. I'm here to show the conclusion to the OP is correct.

That's not your stated premise. This is your stated premise:
1. Either all things have a prior cause for their existence, or there is at least one first cause of existence from which a chain of events follows. — InPitzotl

Yes, and a cause is an explanation for an effect. Bob Ross and I had a fantastic discussion on this. In the end, I think Bob Ross successfully countered the notion that the argument is logically necessary. I would read our discussion to see the results.

So the question I ask you, yet again, is which is it? Is 217Bi an alpha? Or a result of a causal chain? — InPitzotl

We don't know. Remember, I'm not claiming the existence of any one alpha. All I'm claiming is that it is necessary that there be at least one. To know that specifically, we have to prove it. Lets assume that BT is correct as a theory. As I noted earlier, BT does not claim that there cannot be any explanation for its results. This is very different from stating, "We don't yet have an explanation for its results". I've also mentioned how difficult it is to confirm that we have actually found an alpha. You can't just find something you don't understand, throw your hands in the air and say it has to be an alpha. That's no better than ascribing God as the cause for rain.

However, there exists one fairly popular interpretation of quantum theory that does deny that one has (after the experiments are concluded) a well-defined physically real ±1-valued outcome on each side: the many-worlds interpretation.

Alright, so we are citing a popular off branch of BT. But is BT provable epistemically? No. Its just a theory that could be cool, as there's no evidence that multi-verse theory exists. Now what IS interesting, is if my theory is true, multiverse theory has another leg to stand on, as there doesn't seem to be a reason why a multiverse couldn't happen, opposed to it just being guess work.

So I think the confusion you have with the OP is you think its trying to posit a specific first cause. It is not, and I even claim its ridiculously difficult to do so, and for some alphas, might be impossible. The point is that even though we haven't discovered or realized alphas, at least one must exist following the chain of prior causality.

To mention again, Bob Ross and I came to a satisfactory conclusion. I would give it a read if you want to understand the theory and the conclusions I agreed with him on.

You absolutely nailed the "reassessment". So why have I been using causality and not explanations? Because I run into another problem. What is an explanation? You understand what an explanation is clearly, but how do I define it? How do I put it into a definition that everyone can agree with? If I claim something is an explanation, then it seems like I'm really talking about "knowledge". And at that point, this becomes an exploration into epistemology that few would accept.

Despite people trying to reject cause and effect, and despite their counterpoints not actually challenging the OP, but missing the mark (as you clearly noted), cause and effect are something fairly stable that people can understand, that is essentially an explanation. Why is this thing the way it is? Because of these things being the way they are. Why does this effect occur? Because this cause occurs.

Is a cause and effect always an explanation? Is an explanation always a cause and effect?
The first question seems true, but the second leaves doubts. I believe an explanation can be translated into a cause and effect, though it may not be the simplest, clearest, or most direct way of communicating that explanation. But, there is a stable defined means of communicating that explanation.

My label of a "first explanation" as a "first cause", is not inaccurate. It is simply a more complex translation than I would like, because it serves the purpose of being simple to understand, difficult to counter, and stable. A first explanation is the first in a chain of explanations. A first cause is the first in a chain of causes. That which has no prior explanation for its existence, can be explained by its existence in reality. That which has no prior cause for its existence, can be explained by its existence in reality.

If I had a better means of language that could preserve what was needed for the argument, and not diverge into the tempest of epistemology, I would. But you are right. It is not ideal, and perhaps it would have been better to use the term "explanation", then explain what an explanation is through cause and effect. So thank you, your point is well taken!

I was implying that the function P(n) only operates within a space/time fabric. It does not attempt to induce any “numbers” outside of that framework: that is why it isn’t an inductive over-extension. — Bob Ross

While I do agree there are formula's that assume space and time, many formula's do not. For example, a formula may extend for infinity, but infinity may not exist. An electron is considered to have zero mass for many formula's, though the reality is that it does have mass once you use formula's that have a meaningful digit small enough for them to matter at that scale. That being said, your criticism would apply to them as well, and you are correct.

The dilemma I was trying to put forth is that one cannot fundamentally utilize a “before” or “outside” when contemplating something sans space/time fabric. The same issue is true, I would say, of causality (it doesn’t extend past space and time) and if causality did, then it would be a different causality altogether (which existed in a space and time framework sans our space and time framework)! I don’t think we really have any good evidence to conclude anything beyond space and time. — Bob Ross

True. This to me, a first cause is something outside of space and time. There is no space or time which forces a first cause to exist, it simply does. Once it exists, it is within the realm of space and time. But prior to that? I cannot say. Perhaps there is something beyond space and time which creates that first cause. But it is meaningless to speak on it. And if something outside of space and time could create something within space and time? The question would still exist, "What caused THAT?" :)

I understand your specific use of "sans" time and space within language, and respect it. I think its largely semantics at this point, and we're essentially saying the same underlying meaning. That being said, refinement is NOT my best quality as a philosopher. If the argument would be served using other syntax, you again may be correct. Feel free to use such terms until we run into a place where there is more than semantic difference.

The difference, fundamentally, between me and you (I would say) is the fact that, for the very same reason you are abandoning PSR, I would abandon an arbitrary stopping of PSR somewhere along the line of derivation. — Bob Ross

Here again I think we have a semantics difference. I don't believe I'm abandoning the PSR, I'm refining it to fix a hole. I can understand how you think it is arbitrary, but that is where the conclusion in the OP comes in. If I cannot comprehend of a situation where there is no first explanation, (understanding this can be backed in an underlying manner by cause and effect) is it unreasonable to conclude the alternative, that there must inevitably be a first explanation?

Like we have both concluded, neither can be confirmed by experience. So we are arguing between two inductions. To liken the argument to something more common, let us propose someone states the reason why it rains is a magical unicorn. Since it cannot be confirmed by experience, we must think about it logically. The problem is, no one has seen any evidence of a magical unicorn, and within the proposal, there is still the question of what caused the magical unicorn to be. It doesn't really answer the ultimate question, and there is no evidence it exists. Would it be more logical to drop the unicorn entirely, even though the rain remains unexplained, or to keep it? In exploring reality, it may be that a unicorn in fact DOES exist. But that still doesn't answer the question of what caused the unicorn, and I still think most of us feel it is unreasonable to believe in the unicorn when we lack evidence that it exists.

Is the proposal that there can be no first explanation the unicorn, or the proposal that there must be a first explanation the unicorn? This is where a hierarchy of induction is needed. At this point, I am inclined to state the proposal of there being no first cause is the unicorn. But because we have no meaningful way to conclude which inductions are stronger than others, I have no means to back this opinion, besides opinion. This is where the knowledge paper I wrote comes in. In it, I break down a hierarchy of inductions as the end. Because despite my best efforts at using cause and effect to represent an explanation, it always boils down to epistemology in the end.

To your point, I believe practically every criticism you mentioned has merit, and you have successfully defended your view point logically within the framework of thought that we have. On the flip side, I believe I have also defended my line of reasoning as well. It is the fact that both of our conclusions necessarily rely on inductions about the nature of reality, and that we have no means within our framework of concluding if one induction is more viable than the other, that we can both make our choices without contradiction. And, if I cannot argue beyond an appeal that my induction is more viable than the opposite induction, I cannot argue that a first cause is logically necessary. If we had a viable framework which allowed us to logically determine which inductions are more reasonable to hold, perhaps my claim of logical necessity would be true. But without that framework, I cannot claim it. Well done!

To rap this up, I wanted to, again, thank you for such a wonderful conversation — Bob Ross

Agreed! It is a joy to discuss with someone who puts the theory through its paces! I hope my response was adequate to your points and critique. You are a fantastic philosopher, and I looked forward to every response you made. Thank you as well!

↪Philosophim

Deleted. — ToothyMaw

Not a worry. I wanted to point out to anyone else watching that you did not delete it because it was offensive or embarrassing. I saw briefly it was an attempt to define justice. Its not easy to do. When you're ready, feel free to post it.

For the third time in a row, I'm reminding you that you are not meeting the burden of logical necessity. BT is logically consistent with the premise that there is no explanation. — InPitzotl

If my premises are all correct, I am meeting the burden of logical necessity. Either everything has a prior explanation, or there are things that do not have a prior explanation. The second is logically proven at the conclusion of the argument. If BT allows that there are things that have no prior explanation, then that is consistent with the OP, and its conclusions.

It replaces it with the idea of action at a distance, like gravity.
— Philosophim
No it doesn't. — InPitzotl

Yes it does. If you are not going to explain why it doesn't, I'm not going to continue explaining why it does.

Outdated; there are local theories of MWI that do not violate BT. Instead of giving up locality, they give up realism. None of your quotes address this. Your quotes seem generically to treat QM via a Copenhagen view. — InPitzotl

I quoted a reference to Bell himself, because that is the theory you cited. If you have a different version of the theory you would like to propose, feel free. But I am not incorrect of my assessment of Bell's original theory.

To point out about countering realism, another citation from the links:

One currently popular account of Bell's theorem has it showing that "local realism" is incompatible with the quantum predictions, so that one has to choose between abandoning locality or abandoning realism. Those who talk about "local realism" rarely explain what they mean by "realism". (Is "realism" related to "hidden variables" of some sort? What exactly is meant by "hidden variables"? Is "realism" related to determinism?) And when they do, it often becomes clear that the "realism" under consideration isn't among the actual assumptions of Bell's theorem, so that abandoning that kind of realism isn't a viable strategy for saving locality.

Finally, if it appears that I am, incorrect in my assessment of Bell's Theorem, you don't think Bell's original theory doesn't apply anymore. So either way, Bell's original theory is not a viable critique against the OP.

Aspects of quantum theory are definitely counter-intuitive, you could interpret them as being also illogical, in the same sense. — Pantagruel

Being counter intuitive does not mean they aren't logical.

↪Philosophim Meaning you can't contradict one metaphysical position with another one.

Of course, the scientific method itself is fundamentally a methodology which doesn't necessarily have metaphysical implications. ie. Science openly admits its status as provisional and approximate. Science is consistent with material reductionism, but it doesn't imply it...... — Pantagruel

Metaphysical is such a broad term, I don't use it. If you mean science is a model that attempts to propose solutions that are not contradicted by reality, I'm all for it. Same with logic. If reality contradicts logic, then its not really logic right?

↪Philosophim

To be fair, we proceeded to have a discussion and I think we reached a kind of agreement. Which I'm forgetting now. :sweat: — Manuel

Ha ha! All good!

A first cause has no prior explanation for its existence. If you posit that there are known entities that have no prior explanation for your existence, you're not countering the OP, you are affirming its logical necessity with its existence in reality.
— Philosophim

Okay, but that still does not answer the question. Does the atomic decay in time span 2 as opposed to the atomic decay in time span 1 have an explanation for its existence?

In order for that atom to decay, there must be a prior... the atom must exist. — InPitzotl

Ok, I see what you're asking now. Lets address your reasoning.

At the same time, there is no explanation for why it decayed versus did not decay; any explanation given for why it decayed in time span 2 would have to describe why it didn't decay in time span 1. — InPitzotl

You are incorrect here. BT does not posit that there is no explanation. It posits that one explanation cannot be addition of a hidden variable. But that's it. It replaces it with the idea of action at a distance, like gravity.

Here are a few links to back my claims:
http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Bell%27s_theorem#Controversy_and_common_misunderstandings
From this link here is a deeper link about Bells Take on his own theorem.
http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Bell%27s_theorem#The_EPR_argument_for_pre-existing_values

I will quote a few points of the article for guidance.

"Whatever the historical explanation for the misunderstanding might be, it turns out that the general understanding within the physics community regarding Bell's theorem was that it established the impossibility of "hidden variables" (or, for those a little better informed, of "local hidden variables") and the role of the EPR argument (i.e., the fact that the non-locality problem arises anyway if we regard quantum theory as complete) was missed entirely. Moreover, many authors took Bell's theorem to be a proof that, with regard to the EPR argument, Einstein was wrong and Bohr was right. While it is indeed true that Bell's theorem shows that Einstein was wrong, in that the assumption of the EPR argument (locality) turned out to be incorrect, it is not at all true that Bell's theorem shows that the EPR argument itself is not valid. In fact the EPR argument is correct and plays a crucial role in establishing that its main assumption is wrong."

"Already at the time Bell wrote this, there was a tendency for critics to miss the crucial role of the EPR argument here. The conclusion is not just that some special class of local theories (namely, those which explain the measurement outcomes in terms of pre-existing values) are incompatible with the predictions of quantum theory (which is what follows from Bell's inequality theorem alone), but that local theories as such (whether deterministic or not, whether positing hidden variables or not, etc.) are incompatible with the predictions of quantum theory. This confusion has persisted in more recent decades, so perhaps it is worth emphasizing the point by (again) quoting from Bell's pointed footnote from the same 1980 paper quoted just above: "My own first paper on this subject ... starts with a summary of the EPR argument from locality to deterministic hidden variables. But the commentators have almost universally reported that it begins with deterministic hidden variables." "

And what is the EPR?

"In a celebrated 1935 paper11, however, Albert Einstein, Boris Podolsky, and Nathan Rosen pointed out that, in situations involving specially-prepared pairs of particles, this orthodox principle conflicted with locality. Unfortunately, the role of locality in the discussion is often misunderstood — or missed entirely. One thus often hears that the EPR paper is essentially just an expression of (in particular) Einstein's philosophical discontent with quantum theory. This is quite wrong: what the paper actually contains is an argument showing that, if non-local influences are forbidden, and if certain quantum theoretical predictions are correct, then the measurements (whose outcomes are correlated) must be revealing pre-existing values. It is on this basis — in particular, on the assumption of locality — that EPR claimed to have established the "incompleteness" of orthodox quantum theory (which denies the existence of any such pre-existing values)."

To sum this all up, the EPR assumed locality and hidden variables. BT pointed out that locality and hidden variables were not compatible in regards to quantum entanglement and spins. To bring the relevant quotes out of the above quotes:

" in that the assumption of the EPR argument (locality) turned out to be incorrect, it is not at all true that Bell's theorem shows that the EPR argument itself is not valid. In fact the EPR argument is correct and plays a crucial role in establishing that its main assumption is wrong."

and:

""My own first paper on this subject ... starts with a summary of the EPR argument from locality to deterministic hidden variables. But the commentators have almost universally reported that it begins with deterministic hidden variables." "

So again, BT is not claiming that cause and effect is destroyed, or that there aren't potentially other variables we don't know about. His claim was to show that locality could not work while there were hidden variables. This is not the destruction of cause and effect, or spooky science with out comes that have no possible explanation.

Call this first cause w. It's obvious that w too underwent a transformation from possible to actual. Hence, another cause is necessary that effected this. Reiterate this line of reasoning ad infinitum, ad nauseum and we're quickly face to face with another thorn in our side viz. infinity. — TheMadFool

That's what the OP does. I examine the idea of a universe with infinite regress, and finite regress. In examining the idea of an infinite regress of causality, I find it cannot escape the question of, "Why is there an infinite regress of causality opposed to a finite regression of causality?" The answer is, "It simply is". Thus, even an infinite regress of explanations still has a first cause for its existence.

Also, this is not a theist argument. It seems to be making people think the argument is trying to argue something that it is not. If anything, this is a hard counter to theistic arguments.

However, something which has always been, in one form or another, does not have a beginning. Without a beginning, there would not be a first cause, only a continuously changing cause. — Present awareness

"First cause" does not designate a beginning, it designates the first state of causality chain. If it is the case that everything has always existed, the reason for that, is evidenced by the fact that it has always existed. There is no prior reason why something has always existed correct?

The universe doesn't give a damn if it follows our logic or not. — Manuel

Of course. But that can be said about anything, and isn't an argument. The entirety of physics could be wrong. We could all be brains in vats. Doubting something because you can think, "Of course our logic could be wrong," doesn't make the logic wrong.

quote="Banno;620484"]↪Philosophim It's plain that the leap from "this has a cause" to "everything has a cause" is unjustified.[/quote]

But that's not what I assume at all Banno. The first very first statement is:

Banno, does a first cause have a cause? Of course not.

1. Either all things have a prior cause for their existence, or there is at least one first cause of existence from which a chain of events follows. — Philosophim

Would it help if I reshaped it to say:

Either everything has a prior cause for existence, or there are things that have no prior cause for existence. A thing which has no prior cause for existence will be a "first cause". It is called a first cause, because it is within existence, and part of causality. But as for why it exists in particular is not because of some prior cause, but by the fact of its existence.

People are continuing to straw man the argument and see something that isn't there. The only thing I think could have been said against it is, "There is no cause to anything," which of course you agree is bunk. If I can show that even one cause exists, the proposition stands within reason.

In thinking on causality, I have concluded that the nature of existence necessitates a "first cause".
— Philosophim

Causation is eternal. It never began. — Miller

See a few posts up above. I'm thinking of putting this mention in the OP because I've seen it a few times now.

There's a prediction before the observation though. — InPitzotl

But that doesn't negate cause and effect. That's the only thing that matters right now. I'm not here to argue whether BT is correct or not. I'm here to see if BT negates cause and effect. A prediction before an observation does not.

Bell's Theorem lent credence to a theory that the idea of locality did not apply to entangled electrons.
— Philosophim
...this is too restricted. Bell's Theorem is an argument against Hidden Variable Theories under certain assumptions (locality, realism, etc). — InPitzotl

Stating that hidden variables cannot exist as the cause of an effect is not a refutation of cause and effect.

We don't have to use any math to understand it.
— Philosophim
I blatantly disagree. If you don't understand the math, you have no clue what I'm talking about. — InPitzotl

I have all I need to know for the purposes of this argument. I'm not interested in debating BT. I'm interested in knowing whether it violates cause and effect. A science experiment that had odds one way under assumptions, but found the odds to be different means the assumptions were wrong. That's not complicated, nor does it violate C&E. If results of your experiment result in different odds then you were expecting, then that means you lack a full understanding of the causes underlying the reality of the experiment. You predicted causes would result in the effect of a particular odds. When they do not, you need to re-evaluate that the effect you predicted was wrong. That means something is wrong with what you think is causing the effect.

That resulted in removing the cause of locality.

But you're arguing for logical necessity, so you cannot add assumptions. If therefore you are to propose something, to meet your burden, you must derive your proposition. — InPitzotl

I'm not arguing for logical necessity that any one cause and effect must be true. I'm arguing that in any chain of causality, it is logically necessary that it results in a first cause.

What I'm asking about is how you account for a state that cannot be fully accounted for from priors. I can logically entertain theories of physics that have such states. If your analysis holds under such theories, it should describe them. If it does not hold, you should explain why it's logically impossible to hold such theories; otherwise, you did not demonstrate logical necessity. — InPitzotl

I think you might have forgotten the original argument. (Its been a while, no worry!) The first statement of the above quote is the conclusion of the OP. It is logically necessary that first causes exist. A first cause has no prior explanation for its existence. If you posit that there are known entities that have no prior explanation for your existence, you're not countering the OP, you are affirming its logical necessity with its existence in reality.

What I would question though is whether your theory really is a first cause. it is not any one theory in particular, it is any theory that assumes it has found a first cause. Proving a first cause an be extremely difficult to do. First, there is the question of whether you've found a first cause, or whether we don't have the tools or understanding yet to observe or understand a prior cause that we don't know about yet.

Second, when a first cause incepts into reality, everything that follows from it is within causality. Meaning after its here, everything after is part of cause and effect. Thus, we could develop rules up to its cause and effect chain, and conclude there must be something prior. For example, an alpha could appear spinning in place at 3 rotations a second. We could establish the rules of this alpha, then predict something must have set it into motion. Of course, it just appeared that way, but our rules would imply there is something prior that set it into motion.

While a first cause is logically necessary, I cannot honestly say that even if we found it, proving it is a first cause would be easy, or even possible.

The answers to these questions are just points of view, not facts by any means. Without any proof, I choose to believe that existence has always existed, but I don’t know how or why. — Present awareness

I understand your joy of philosophy! You may hold that without debate. What I'm asking is can your view point avoid what the OP is stating? If its always existed, then there is no prior reason for its existence. Thus the reason things have always existed is the fact of its existence. That's the first cause. I'm stating that no matter what we can envision in a chain of causality, it will always logically end up to end at a first cause.

Since there was no first cause, a first cause is not necessary, so I disagree that a first cause is logically necessary. — Present awareness

Why has existence always existed? What caused it to be that way?

I would contend that a determined motion can cause a random effect — Gregory

While I have my own opinions on this, your viewpoint does not negate cause and effect, so to avoid going on a tangetnt, its fine if you hold it for the purposes of the OP. If you believe this somehow violates cause and effect, please show me why with a real world example, and I will address it.

quote="Gregory;620410"]Yes, but there may be true randomness and it would still remain casual.[/quote]

No. True randomness has no prior cause. The result of that randomness will be causal, but the production of the random result is completely unpredictable and without cause. Anything which has prior causality is not truly random, but caused by something else.

Hume didn't prove that there is no causes. All he seemed to prove is that that we don't know where the cause can be. — Gregory

For me, Hume's true genius was in realizing that our belief that cause and effect will be repeated in the future, or occurred in the distant past before humanity was around to observe, was an induction, and not a knowable fact. We take it on a matter of faith, and so far, it has held up. I cannot for the life of me refute Hume on this.

There was no cause. If something has always been, then it was not caused to be. The idea that there MUST be a beginning seems logical but not necessarily true. — Present awareness

Then you agree with the OP.

I'm glad you came back InPitzotl! I knew you were going somewhere with BT, but I needed to learn where so I could figure out how this applied to the argument.

First, Bell's Theorem does not violate causality. Bell's Theorem lent credence to a theory that the idea of locality did not apply to entangled electrons. The experiment for BT demonstrates causality is alive and well. We don't have to use any math to understand it.

The observation was that if you entangled two electrons, then separated them at a distance, you could predict the spin of another electron with a certain accuracy by spinning the other electron, even at a large distance. The question was, "What causes this to happen?" There is an effect, and one cause was proposed. Assuming that locality was true, one proposal was to place an unknown variable within consideration. I'm no advanced physicist, but I don't have to understand the equation completely. I only have to understand one thing, this was an attempt to provide a cause for a consistent, and repeatable observed effect.

Now that particular proposal for a cause failed. But why it failed is when the experiment was repeated, the outcome which was expected with the introduction of the third variable did not occur. So we know (If Bell's Theorem holds) that the cause of the effect was not a third variable. Bell's conclusion then is that locality does not apply to entangled electrons. So what causes the electrons to respond over large distances? The cause that is proposed is that it is a non-local influence.

Action at a distance is not new in physics. Newton proposed that gravity violated locality as well. His idea was that everything in the universe, no matter the distance, was always exerting gravitational forces on one another. Action at a distance is the cause for the effect.

Of course you can ask, "Well why can action at a distance occur?" You are back in the OP once again. Either there is a prior cause for this, or it simply happens without prior cause, and is evidenced by its own existence.

Proposing a cause to an effect, and having that proposed cause fail as an explanation for that effect, does not show that cause and effect does not exist. That's like saying, "Because a unicorn cannot be used as a cause for why it rains, we can conclude that rain destroys our notion of cause and effect".

Your argument therefore has a hole in it. You need to explain how your argument addresses the notion that there can be states which are not fully explained by priors — InPitzotl

As we can tell, my argument doesn't have a hole in this by your point. The conclusion points out it is logically necessary that such alphas must exist along the chain of causality.

My thought is this, if humanity could deal with the obvious meaninglessness of life, and realize that all we have is each other, could we not move on to a higher level than to dwell in delusions and denial. — boagie

No. This is because people are not rational beings. People are rationalizing beings. A rational being will come to a conclusion that is logic, and act on it despite their emotional and personal misgivings or dislike of the solution. A rationalizing being will attempt to present arguments and logic that rationalize their view on life. Most people will reject logical and rational arguments in favor of what they want to believe.

And I'm not talking about others. I'm talking about both you and me. The best we can do is attempt to minimize our propensity to rationalize, and actually attempt to use reason and logic. It requires humbleness, strength of character, an inquisitive mind, and a willingness to admit when one is wrong, even when it hurts or shames. This takes training, effort, and a will to do. Most people will never do this.

Suspend disbelief for a moment and imagine that everything that is here, now, has always been here, now. No beginning and no ending, just continuous change. The changes that flow out of what is here, now, make logical sense and are predictable but there is no beginning or end to it. — Present awareness

Certainly. What caused reality to be that way? If you answer, "Something else", then I'm going to ask the same question. If you answer, "It simply is", then you have provided a first cause. My statement is that it is logically necessary that a first cause will happen in the chain of cause and effect. Am I wrong?

↪Philosophim I make it a rule not to argue with idiots. Maybe study some actual cosmology. — Benkei

A person who only insults an intellect then runs away from a request to viably back that insult. I suppose you think everything you believe is right, and never argue with yourself.

What is the purpose of justice? I think its key to your argument, and needs to be clarified.

Jesus fuck. 11 pages of scientific illiteracy despite having been pointed out that fact on almost every page. :roll: — Benkei

And 11 pages of myself pointing out why these proposals of scientific illiteracy are incorrect. Feel free to take a stab at it yourself Benkei.

It seems as though that you are implying that we should assess our options and pick the best one: I do not think this is the case. — Bob Ross

That is a choice, and one I respect. I believe there is no "correct" answer when this problem occurs, and should be left up to the individual.

On the contrary, I would argue that we suspend judgment until an adequate alternative is produced (in other words: I am perfectly fine stating that I simply do not know enough to make a meaningful conclusion). — Bob Ross

I have situations like that well. For example, if prior to the moon landing someone said, "The moon is made of green cheese, or blueberries, no alternatives", I would definitely suspend judgement until we arrived at the moon. Such inductions do not use tested reality as any basis. But, when we are living life, and questions about what the life means come up, I find I have to pick something. For example, morality. Lots of people have different inductions as to what they believe morality is. Some people choose to dispense with all of them, stating we cannot know. But some choose to pick one. In the second situation, I am the personality type that is the later. But in no way is the former personality type incorrect or inferior. I believe that is part of human variety, and essentially a way of humanity rolling the dice on different inductions to hedge our bets. :)

To keep this brief, consider the process of perception, which I would argue one witnesses: I would argue one utilizes their built in “rudimentary reason”, which is essentially the most basic derived faculty of their existence, to “induce”, technically speaking, that they are indeed perceiving. However (and, again, I am keeping this extremely brief), this is very distinct from your OP, which I would characterize as mediate knowledge: the use of immediate knowledge that is extended (in this case via induction) to derive a principle from which to deduce. You see, if one were to remove a mediate form of knowledge, there immediate forms stay intact (left unaffected) because (I would argue) mediate forms of knowledge should never be prioritized above the immediate forms. Therefore, if all the options regarding a topic (that, most importantly, pertains to mediate knowledge claims) are unreasonable, then they should be removed even in the case that there is no alternative provided. — Bob Ross

Fantastic point, and I am in agreement. I believe I understand the general meaning you wanted to convey with mediate and immediate. Because I do not know all the subtleties behind the definitions, let me list out the concepts that were pertinent from them.

If I understand correctly, there are conclusions from experience, and conclusions from our minds. Ideally, we want conclusions from experience and conclusions from our minds to match up. But in the heirarchy, conclusion of experience are more reasonable to pursue then conclusions of the mind which are contradicted by experience.

The difference in the OP is that there is a situation in which we cannot discover by experience, because arguably we may never be able to confirm an alpha through experimentation. If we did posit an existence as an alpha, one could always state, "Perhaps we do not have the tools at this time to discover the prior cause." Even further, since an alpha has its own effects it creates once it has been incepted, we could simply work backwards and reasonably conclude that there must have been something prior, despite the reality it just formed in a particular state.

For myself, when left with a situation that cannot be confirmed through experience, I like to cobble together logic of the mind that is confirmed by experience, and see where that takes us. Perhaps I could "logically" conclude the moon is made of green cheese, despite no experience that would lead to this conclusion. This would be an irrational induction that I would throw away like yourself.

But, I know that causality is both confirmed by experience, and the mind. I can take that, and predict a logical conclusion. Is this logical conclusion's final steps purely from the mind? Absolutely. But do they have an underlying basis that is based on conclusions of experience and the mind? Absolutely. As such, I take this as the most reasonable induction to use when faced with a situation that may never be able to be confirmed by experience.

However, mathematical induction (as far I as I understand it) attempts to induce that P(n) will be true for all natural numbers, which therefore is perfectly within its own scope and not over-extending, but it does not, most importantly, attempt to say that P(n) fundamentally works outside of a space/time fabric. — Bob Ross

To this, I would translate and state, "Just because we can create a system of infinite numbers in our mind, it does not mean there actually exists an infinite amount of numbers in reality. If this is what you are implying, then yes, we are in complete agreement.

one can’t assume that causality would be behave (even if they had extraordinary inductive evidence of causality’s uniformity in our universe) even remotely similar outside of the very two (conjoined) concepts: space and time. — Bob Ross

True. But isn't the idea of something being outside of space and time an induction that cannot be confirmed by experience? If so, in your case it shouldn't be a consideration. In my case, I have an experience of space and time. If I compare the two theories, that there may be situations that do not have space or time, versus the reality of space and time that is also logically confirmed, I'm going to take the more viable induction that uses space and time. If you disagree with this, I see nothing wrong with that. But on the flip side, I don't think you could state there is anything wrong with what I am doing either.

Now, this gets contradictory (on my part) very quickly because of my next issue: the seemingly semantic basis for this OP—that to ask for a sufficient reason for a self-explained first cause makes no sense! — Bob Ross

That is the conclusion of the OP. What I show is if you take the idea that everything must have a prior cause for its existence, it cannot withstand its own logical conclusion when examined fully. The principle of sufficient reason in other words, has a glaring flaw, and logically, cannot be true. The POSR is an induction as well correct? And an induction that cannot be confirmed by experience, just like the conclusion of the OP. As such, the POSR is a conclusion of the mind alone. Yet, if taken to its end, we find the POSR breaks down. My conclusion does not break down. Therefore, if we have two conflicting inductions that can only be created within the mind, if one logically breaks down when fully examined, while the other does not, I am going to take the conclusion that does not logically break down.

To sum it up, the POSR states that everything has a reason, cause, or ground. But if we take it to its logical conclusion, we realize that does not mean that the reason, cause, or ground, is always due to something prior to that state of existence. Even if we envision the idea of an infinite regress, we still come to some conclusion that has no prior reason for its existence, besides that fact that it is. To preserve the POSR, we must add an addendum. "One reason for a things existence that has no prior cause, is the fact that it exists."

The OP points out the only logical conclusion that can be made while still preserving the POSR. To deny that there must be at least one alpha, points out a flaw in the POSR that cannot be answered, and it is refuted.

I do not deny that it may be impossible for true nothingness to exist, but I find it also impossible to deny that it might. The fact that we can doubt one, does not eliminate the possibility of the other.

I 100% agree here, but to be able to doubt something is distinctly different from doubting something on reasonable grounds. I am not advocating that we should disband notions because it is possible (or room to) doubt it, but, rather, it should be disbanded if the doubt introduces reasonable justification to disband it. — Bob Ross

True. But can you point to a situation in reality in which there is literally no space between anything? At this point, that is and induction, but not observed reality. In all cases in which we have observed reality, we have found space between objects, and also in between the smaller objects we discover. So for my case, I believe it is much more reasonable to conclude that there is "nothing" between things. This is not an affirmation that I am correct. I am just trying to point out my induction is not less reasonable then the idea that "nothingness" doesn't exist.

You have done a marvelous job at addressing my questions! And thank you for that! But I would say that I am still having a hard time understanding how a “self-explained first cause” isn’t solely a semantical distinction? And even if I were to grant that it is perfectly valid to simply define PSR out of the concept, I would still have to confess that PSR (having such a strong will to live, metaphorically speaking) will wiggle itself back into existence! For I could then ask for a sufficient reason for why PSR is defined out of the concept. Hopefully you see my confusion. — Bob Ross

And you have done a magnificent job of questioning and providing alternatives to think on. I do not believe anyone else has grasped the argument to your extent, nor provided such detailed and insightful criticism such as yourself. I think we are reaching a conclusion with the points I made about the POSR. I look forward to your response!

I think that the truth-status of such conjectures is undecidable; that is I can't decide whether we should say they could be true or false, or that they cannot be true or false. — Janus

Technically I would say "It may be true or false, but it is extremely likely that it is unknowable." It may just happen that the first planet you look at contains the penny. Extremely unlikely, but not implausible. But that is the way I see truth and falsity. They are independent of our knowledge.

At that point, we make a judgement call. Do we potentially spend countless time and money on something that is likely outside of our reach? I believe a large part of philosophy is figuring out what we should spend our efforts on pursuing in reality. If someone tells you to live a certain life, is that reasonable to do so? Should we fear death? How do we know things? Is it reasonable to search for that unicorn?

Randomness doesn't mean "without a cause" but instead "not perfectly predictable" — Gregory

I am trying not to interfere in your discussion with Banno, but I thought it would be useful to point this out for others. True randomness has no prior cause. A coin flip is not truly random. We say its random because the ability to measure it exactly is outside of our capability. Physics does not vanish on a coin flip, only our ability to measure it. If there is any confirmed limitation on randomness, then there is a cause for that. Which means, its not truly random. I hope this helps others understand the argument better.

A first cause would be an alpha. .....What I conclude is that an alpha must logically exist.
— Philosophim
No it doesn't need to logically exist. That's what I'm saying. You call it a given. — Caldwell

What? How? That's the conclusion of the argument. I do not say anywhere in the initial set up that an alpha necessarily exists. I am setting the stage to show what the idea of an entity without prior cause would entail. No where in the premises am I stating that an alpha is a given. A given is something that does not need to be logically proven. I am logically pointing out that if the given premises are true, the conclusion is true.

If you look at the threads, everyone here gets that the argument is sound and valid. The only way to attack it, is to attack one of the initial premises by showing it is false. Check out Banno's critique. What I have been defending this entire time isn't the argument, because everyone knows its sound. I've been defending the idea of cause and effect. So far, I have not heard one valid argument against the existence of cause and effect. Check the example I gave Banno. That is how you can attack the argument.

Your assumption cannot be your conclusion. This is a fallacy. Therefore, I disagree. — Caldwell

Of course that would be a fallacy. The argument does not do that. Read it again please.

I just don’t get how a thesis of a lousy couple hundred words, that’s been around in its various iterations for millennia, and argued to death, can be misunderstood, but apparently half of us, have. — Mww

Apparently. A few people in this discussion have gotten the argument after discussion and clarification. Straw men attacks, or attacks on my character, are not counters to it. You stopped addressing the arguments and counter points, and have devolved your character. You can do better than that.