This has got me thinking: Does my individual psychology (which has accrued various arbitrary biases based on my genes, upbringing, books I've read, etc.) limit what philosophical theories I can consider to be good/true? — clemogo

If those philosophies do not have undeniably solid backing, then I would say yes. Without near solid logic, we are left with our whims. I think philosophy tries to create situations that have solid logic. Philosophy also constantly challenges us out of our comfort zone. Perhaps a person may choose philosophy A on a whim, but a good argument from philosophy B might inspire a person to think deeper about A. They still may stick with A, but might be compelled to give a greater reason then their whims. Sometimes this is enough for someone to break from their whim, and choose something that has a more logical foundation.

Certainly Bob!

Experience is your sum total of existence. At first, this is undefined. It precedes definition. It is that which definitions are made for and from. A discrete experiencer has the ability to create some type of identity, to formulate a notion that "this" is separate from "that" over there within this undefined flood.

It is irrelevant if a being that discretely experience realizes they are doing this, or not. They will do so regardless of what anyone says or believes. In questioning the idea of being able to discretely experience I wondered, are the discrete experiences we make "correct"? And by "correct" it seems, "Is an ability to discretely experience contradicted by reality?" No, because the discrete experience, is the close examination of "experience". At a primitive level it is pain or pleasure. The beating of something in your neck. Hunger, satiation. It is not contradicted by existence, because it is the existence of the being itself. As such, what we discretely experience is not a belief. It is, "correct".

If I discretely experience that I feel pain, I feel pain. Its undeniable by anything in existence, because it is existence itself. If I remember something from years past, that memory exists. If I choose to define an existence as something, I choose to do that. It is undeniable that I have chosen that. Therefore discrete experience is "known", by a discrete experiencer by the fact is it not contradicted by reality.

Again, a discrete experiencer does not have to realize that their act of discretely experiencing, is discrete experiencing. Discrete experience is not really a belief, or really knowledge in the classical sense. When I say distinctive knowledge, it is the set of discrete experiences a thing has. A discrete experiencer, has discrete experiences. But, if a bit of distinctive knowledge is used in one extra step, to assume that what one discretely experiences can be used to accurately represent something more than the discrete experience itself, then we have a situation where it is a belief, or knowledge. When one has applied their distinctive knowledge, such as adjusting it to logically apply to reality without contradiction, I call applicable knowledge.

That's basically the start, and I hope explains experience and discrete experience with greater clarity!

I will label the awareness of discrete experiences as “distinctive knowledge”. To clarify, distinctive knowledge is simply the awareness of one’s discrete experiences.

This explicitly defines distinctive knowledge as the awareness of discrete experiences. But now you seem to be in agreement with me that it can't have anything to do (within the context of your essays) with awareness. — Bob Ross

No, you are quite right Bob. I wrote this decades ago when I was much younger and not as clear with my words. I believe you are one of the few who has read this seriously. Back then, I had a greater tendency to use words more from my own context and personal meaning, then what would be proper and precise English. This is a mistake in my writing.

Yes, distinctive knowledge is the discrete experiences you have. Memory as well, is a discrete experience. If this is understood, then I think we can continue.

By your essays' definition, distinctive knowledge is the awareness of discrete experiences — Bob Ross

Ah, I see now. This is incorrect. A person's awareness of the vocabulary has nothing to do with it. Their awareness that they discretely experience, has nothing to do with it. Your discrete experiences ARE your distinctive knowledge. If you have a discrete experience meta-analyzing a discrete experience, or you don't, it isn't important.

The point was I wondered whether I could prove myself wrong that I discretely experienced. I could not. Then I asked if I could prove that the discrete experiences I had did not exist. I find that I could not. Of course they exist. I'm having them. Therefore discrete experiences are knowledge of the individual. But a particular type of knowledge. It is when one tries to apply that discrete experience as representing external reality that one needs to evaluate whether that is an applicable belief, or an applicable piece of knowledge.

That is why if you can read, I know you can discretely experience that language. Then I introduce the terms to you. Then I show you a process by which you can attempt to apply it to reality using deduction, apart from a belief. Perhaps the label of distinctive knowledge is confusing and unnecessary. All I wanted to show is that any discrete experience is something you know, whether you realize it or not. That is a type of knowledge within your personal context. This was to contrast with the application of that personal knowledge as a belief in its application to reality.

If I removed distinctive knowledge from the terminology, and just used "discrete experiences when not applying to reality" would that make more sense? Do you think there is a better word or terminology? And does that clear up what is going on now? I agree with you by the way, if I tried to assert that distinctive knowledge required a person to be aware of their discrete experiences, I would be introducing a meta analysis on discrete experiences that could never be proven. I am not doing that.

I don't think so, no. Absolute power reveals your character apart from the inhibitions and threats of society. It reveals "the real you". I believe there are plenty of people who are moral and good because they have decided to be, and not because of the threats from others if they are not.

I don't think absolute power requires knowledge at all. But absolute power without knowledge won't be wielded very well. In life, I don't think absolute power or knowledge exist. We work with the power and knowledge we have, and what we do when we find our selves free from the limits of other people, is when we truly discover who we are.

Great, I believe we've iterated through this and are closer to understanding each other.

I think what you meant (and correct me if I am wrong here) is the five senses, not all senses. If you had no senses, you wouldn't have thoughts because you would not be aware of them. — Bob Ross

I had to laugh at this one, as I've never had senses defined in such a way as sensing thoughts. We have two definitions here, so let me point out the definition the paper was trying to convey. The intention of the senses in this case is any outside input into the body. Some call them the five senses, but I wasn't necessarily stating it had to be five. Anything outside of the body is something we sense. The thing which takes the senses and interprets it into concepts, or discrete experiences, is the discrete experiencer. For the purposes here, I have noted the ability to discretely experience is one thing you can know about your "self".

Is it incorrect for me to say I have discrete experiences? I believe it is impossible to not. If I claim, "No." I must have been able to discretely experience the concept of words. As a fundamental, I believe that's as solid as can be.

But thoughts are not absent of all senses. — Bob Ross

Could you go into detail as to what you mean? I'm not stating you are wrong. Depending on how you define senses, you could be right. But I can't see how that counters the subdivision I've made either. If I ignore my senses, meaning outputs entering into the body, then what is left is "thoughts". Now again, we can subdivide it. Detail it if you want. Say, "These types of thoughts are more like senses". I'm fine with that. It does not counter the fundamental knowledge that I am a discrete experiencer. If I know that I discretely experience, then what I discretely experience, is what I know.

You are directly implying that even if you can determine another animal to be a discrete experiencer, you still have no reason to think that they have any distinctive knowledge because that doesn’t directly prove that they are aware of their discrete experiences. Am I correct in this? — Bob Ross

No. I hesitate to go into animals, because its just a side issue I threw in for an example, with the assumption that the core premises were understood. Arguing over animal knowledge is missing the point. If you accept the premises of the argument, then we can ask how we could apply these definitions to animal knowledge. If you don't accept the premises of the argument, then applying it to animals is a step too far. This is not intended to dodge a point you've made. This is intended to point out we can't go out this far without understanding the fundamanets. My apologies for jumping out here too soon! Instead, I'm going to jump to other people, which is in the paper.

As of now, the “I” defined for you has another property that you haven’t proven to exist in the other “I”s: awareness of discrete experiences—distinctive knowledge as you defined it. Just like how I can park my car with a complete lack of awareness of how I got there, I could also be reading your papers without any awareness of it. — Bob Ross

You would not be able to read without the ability to discretely experience. This was implicit but perhaps should be made explicit. If you can read the letters on the page, you can discretely experience. If you can then communicate me with those letters back in kind, then you understand that they are a form of language. If you can do this, you can read my paper, and you can enter the same context as myself if you so choose. You can realize you are a discrete experiencer, and apply the test to reality.

You cannot do that without being a discrete experiencer like me. I would have to come up with a new method of knowing if someone who could not read or communicate was an "I" as defined. But again, I am not concerned with branching out into detailing how this fundamanal process of knowledge could be used to show a person who cannot communicate is an I, but establishing the fundamental process of knowledge first, with which we can use to have that discussion.

To that end, it doesn't matter if you're "conscious". It doesn't matter if you're spaced out, in a weird mental state, etc. You're a discrete experiencer like me. You run into the very problem of denying that you are a discrete experiencer, just like myself. So the rest follows that what you discretely experience, is what you distinctely know. And for you to conclude that, you must understand deductive beliefs, and be capable of doing them.

Do you deny that you deductively think? That you can discretely experience? Of course not. So that is good enough for the purposes that I need to continue the paper into resolving how two discrete experiencers can come to discrete and applicable knowledge between them. All I need is one other discrete experiencer, and the theory can continue.

A person's genetics or past experiences may incline them to discretely experience properties different from others when experiencing the same stimulus.
This is why, I would argue, not everyone who reads your paper is going to fundamentally agree with you with respect to your sheep example. — Bob Ross

They can fundamentally disagree with me by distinctive knowledge. They cannot fundamentally disagree with me by application, unless they've shown my application was not deduced. But in doing so, they agree with the process to obtain knowledge that I've set up. The sheep examples are all intended to show we can invent whatever distinctive knowledge we want, but the only way it has use in the world, is to attempt to apply it without contradiction.

I understand you're still concerned with the specifics of distinctive knowledge claims I've made such as, "What is an "I", when the real part to question is the process itself. What I'm trying to communicate, is that there is no third party arbiter out there deciding what "I" should mean, or what any word should mean. We invent the terms and words that we use. The question is whether we can create a process out of this that is a useful tool to help us understand and make reasonable decisions about the world.

Is it incorrect that an individual can invent any words or internal knowledge that they use to apply to the world? Is it incorrect, that if I apply my distinctive knowledge to the world and the world does not contradict my application, that I can call that another form of knowledge, applicable knowledge? If you enter into the context of the words I have used, does the logic follow?

If it is initialized with a ternary distinction, then, as you hinted earlier, solipsism becomes a problem much quicker and, therefore, your ease of derivation (in terms of a binary distinction) will not be obtained by them. For example, for a person that starts their subjective endeavor with a ternary distinction, it is entirely possible that they must address the issue of “where are these processes coming from?” — Bob Ross

It is not a problem for me at all if someone introduces a ternerary distinction. The same process applies. They will create their distinctive knowledge. Then, they must apply that to reality without contradiction. If they cannot apply it to reality without contradiction, then they have invented terms that are not able to be applicably known. Distinctive knowledge that implies solipsism tends to fail when applied to the world. In my case, I have terms that can be applicably known. Therefore I have a tool of reasoning that allows me to use my distinctive knowledge to step out in the world and handle it.

My problem is that you skip ahead straight to the sheep example, which is an analysis of the products of the processes, when you haven’t addressed the more fundamental problem of whether those very processes are accurate or not — Bob Ross

I don't doubt this is a problem for a reader, so thank you for pointing this out. Your feedback tells me I need to explicitly point out how if you are reading this, you are by the definitions I stated, an "I" as well. The sheep part itself I use to give examples to how distinct knowledge can change, and that's ok. The only thing that matters is if that knowledge can be applied to reality without contradiction. So I think I can retain that, I just need to add the detail I mentioned before.

Now you could say, and I think this may be what your essays imply, that, look, we have these processes that are throwing stuff at the "I", of which it is aware of, such as perception and thought, and here's what we can do with it. If that's what your essays are trying to get at, then that is fine. — Bob Ross

Yes, this is a more accurate assessment of what I am doing. I am inventing knowledge as a tool that can be used. With this, I can say I distinctly know something, and I can applicably know something. I have a process that is proven, and the process itself can be applied to its own formulation. You can go back with the conclusions the paper makes, and apply it from the beginning. I use the process to create the process, and it does not require anything outside of the process as a basic foundation.

Thank you again for your thoughts and critiques! I hope this cleared up what the paper is trying to convey in the first two papers. If these fundamentals are understood, and can withstand your critique, then we can address context, which I feel might need some tightening up. I look forward to your next thoughts!

Hi Joshua, and welcome to the forums. You might be getting some resistance from people and scratching your head a bit. What you've brought to your post is lamentations in a poetic format. But that is not philosophy. Philosophy is when we have a problem that perplexes us that cannot currently be answered by science, or its answer seems inadequate. What is death? What is life? What are the end times?

To assist, don't assume anyone knows what you are talking about. Tell us in a straight forward manner your experiences you are having. In your case, it seems to be despair, a belief that the world is coming to an end. What does it mean to you if the world is coming to an end? Do you have specific instances you would like to discuss?

We do not discuss philosophy to nod at each other's assumptions or feelings. We come to discuss a topic, and have its assumptions challenged and questioned. I'll give you an example.

I'm middle aged, and I know, for a fact, that I'm going to die one day. I know I will age, decay, and might even meet a terrible end. I am not married, I almost certainly never will, and I have no kids. Yet I am happy. I do not feel the world is going to end, or society is collapsing. I have my own purpose in life, and I live that fulfilled.

Tell me why I'm wrong. Show me your viewpoint why I should feel like society is collapsing, or that winter is coming. Challenge me, and we shall discuss your assumptions and see if they hold up when detailed.

Likewise, thank you for your response again Bob! And no, I do not find you condescending. I would much rather the point was over explained then not enough. Feel free to always point out where I'm wrong, its the only way to put the theory through its paces.

If there is a disagreement with the foundation, lets focus on that first. The rest is irrelevant if that is wrong.

First, lets focus on definitions. To clarify, a discrete experience is the ability to part and parcel what we "experience". A lens focusses light into a camera, but the lens does not discriminate or filter the light into parts. We do. Discrete experiences include observations, and our consciousness. Discrete experience is the "now", our memory, and anytime you think. As you note, we could split up discrete experience into different categories. I could include consciousness, but consciousness is still a discrete experience.

So what is distinctive knowledge? The awareness of any discrete experience. I discretely know when I sense. When I have a memory. What I define my own consciousness to be. Since I can know that I discretely experience, I know whatever it is that I discretely experience. That is discrete knowledge.

I read your essays as directly implying (by examples such as the sheep) that a specific instance of "I am a discrete experiencer" was "I am a discrete perceiver and thinker"--and I believe this to be false — Bob Ross

No, the only thing I am claiming is, "I am a discrete experiencer". Perception is a discrete experience, as well as thinking, consciousness, and whatever other definitions and words you want to divide up the notion of what we can discretely experience. Being a discrete experiencer does not requires consciousness, or even any notion of an "I". For beings like us, we can divide what we discretely experience into several definitions. I can create sub-conscious, meta-conscious, meta-meta-conscious, and conscious-unconscious. I can write books, and essays, and have debates about metaphysical meta-conscious-unconsciousness.

Yes, these words are not real words within the context of society, but there is nothing to prevent a person from making up these words, and attributing it to some part of their "self" or a portion that they discretely experience. The subdivisions are unimportant at a base claim of knowledge, as they are all discrete experiences, and all of them if created by an individual, are distinctly known to that individual.

In other words, one who does begin with a binary distinction can by use of those very discrete experiences determine that there original assertion was wrong and, in fact, it is ternary. — Bob Ross

What I am saying is, someone can subdivide the notion of an "I" even further if they like. They can even change the entire definition of "I", and state it requires consciousness, thus excluding certain creatures. There's nothing against that. The definition of "I" am using is based upon the fact I can discretely experience. Me changing the definition of an "I" does not negate that underlying fact. What is ultimately important when one decides on a bit of distinctive knowledge, is to see if they can apply it to reality without contradiction.

So, if I define "I" as simply a discrete experiencer, then I could apply this to reality and state that things which are deemed to discretely experience are "I"'s.

If you define "I" as needing consciousness, then when you applied to reality, any thing that discretely experienced that did not have consciousness would not be an "I". Yours would add in the complication of needing to clearly define consciousness, then show that application in reality.

Both of us are correct in our definitions, and both of us are correct in our application. I would discretely and applicably know an "I" in my context, while you would have both knowledges in your context. It is just like the sheep and goat example in part 3. Someone could define a "goat" to encompass both a sheep and a goat. Or they could create "sheep" and "goat" as being separate. Or they could go even further, and state that a goat of 20 years of age is now, "The goat". It doesn't matter what we create for our definitions for individual use. We distinctly know them all. The question is whether we can apply them to reality without contradiction, so then we can claim we can applicably know them as well.

The only way to prove that someone's definitions are not going to be useful on the applicable level, is to demonstrate two definitions that they hold contradict each other. For example, using the context of regular English, if I said, "Up is down" in a literal sense, we could know that describes an application of reality that is a contradiction. But I could be an illogical being that uses two contradictory definitions in my head. That is what I distinctively know.

The question of "correctness" comes in when two contexts encounter one another.
The keys when discussing the two parts of knowledge come down to whether the distinctive knowledge proposed can be applied to reality without contradiction, and whether the distinctive knowledge that can be applied, is specific and useful enough for our own desired purposes.

In your case, you are dissatisfied with my definition of an "I", because you want some extra sub distinctions for your own personal view of what "I" is. But "I" is merely a placeholder for me at this time for the most basic description of, "that which discretely experiences". Why am I so basic here? Because it avoids leading the discussion where it does not need to go at this time. Further, it serves to avoid the issue of solipsism. Finally, it avoids the discussion of knowledge from focusing squarely on human beings, or particular types of human beings. Notice that your addition of consciousness adds a whole extra addition to the discussion. A new word that needs to be defined, and applied to reality without contradiction. But I am not trying to get the specifics of what we can derive from the our ability to discretely experience as human beings. I am just trying to get the most fundamental aspects of knowledge as a tool.

We could of course conflict further on the notion of what we discretely experience, going round and round as to what consciousness entails, what what all sorts of sub-assessments entail. But it is a fruitless discussion for the purposes of what I'm using the definitions for. I am not wrong, and you are not wrong in our own contexts. We must come to an agreed upon context of distinctive knowledge, and the way to do that for the most number of people, is to get the concepts as basic as possible. The symbol of "I" is unimportant, as long as you understand the concept underneath the "I" that I made from my own personal context. You are entering into "I" as the context developed by myself, while you can hold the "I" as the context on your end. The final "I" is the agreement of compromise between the context of you and I together. We can hold all three in our head without contradiction. It is not the word or symbol that matters. It is again, the underlying concept.

So with this, before you build upon it, before you subdivide it, I ask you to think about the exact definitions of discrete experience, distinctive knowledge, and applicable knowledge. Have I contradicted myself? Have I applied these basic definitions to reality without contradiction? If I have done so, then I have shown a system of knowledge that I can use in my personal context. After that, we can address the notion of cross context further. Thanks again!

Thank you for the wait Bob. I wanted to make sure I answered you fully and fairly.

you stated (in, I believe, your first essay): “In recognizing a self,, I am able to create two “experiences”.  That is the self-recognized thinker, and everything else.” I think that this is the intuitive thing to do, but it is only an incredibly general description and, therefore, doesn’t go deep enough for me. — Bob Ross

It is fine if you believe this is too basic, but that is because I must start basic to build fundamentals. At this point in the argument, I am a person who knows of no other yet.

There are three distinctions to be made, not simply “I” and “everything else”: the interpreter, the interpretations (representations), and self-consciousness. — Bob Ross

I have no objection with discussing this sub divisions of the "I" later. At the beginning though, it is important to examine this from the perspective of a person who is coming into knowledge of themselves for the first time. A "rough draft" if you will. Can we say this person has knowledge in accordance to the definitions and the logic shown here, not the defintions another human being could create. I needed to show you the discrete knowledge of what an "I" was, which is essentialy a discrete experiencer. Then I needed to show you how I could applicably know what an "I" was, which I was able to do.

To this end, we can say that a discrete experiencer does not need the addition of other definitions like consciousness for the theory to prove itself through its own proposals.

it would translate (I think) into a discrete experiencer (self-consciousness and the interpreter joined into to one concept) — Bob Ross

I think this is a fine assessment. We can make whatever definitions and concepts we want. That is our own personal knowledge. I am looking at a blade of grass, while you are creating two other identities within the blade of grass. There is nothing wrong with either of us creating these identities. The question is, can we apply them to reality without contradiction? What can be discretely known is not up for debate. What can be applicably known is.

That is why I define an “experience” as a witnessing of immediate knowledge (the process of thinking, perception, and emotion) by means of rudimentary reason, and a “remembrance” (or memory as you put it in subsequent essays) as seemingly stored experiences. — Bob Ross

This is a great example of when two people with different contexts share their discrete knowledge. I go over that in part 3 if you want a quick review. We have several options. We could accept, amend, reinterpret, or reject each other's definitions. I point this out for the purposes of understanding the theory, because I will be using the theory, to prove the theory.

What I will propose at this point is your definition additions are a fine discussion to have after the theory is understood. The question is, within the definitions I have laid out, can I show that I can discretely know? Can I show that I can applicably know this? You want to discuss the concept of the square root of four, while I want to first focus on the number 2. You are correct in wanting to discuss the square root of four, but we really can't fully understand that until we understand the number 2.

Back to context. If you reject, amend, or disagree with my definitions, we cannot come to an agreement of definitive knowledge within our contexts. This would not deny the theory, but show credence to at least is proposals about distinctive knowledge conflicts within context. But, because I know you're a great philosopher, for now, please accept the definitions I'm using, and the way I apply it. Please feel free to point out contradictions in my discrete knowledge, or misapplications of it. I promise this is not some lame attempt to avoid the discussion or your points. This is to make sure we are at the core of the theory.

To recap: An "I" is defined as a discrete experiencer. That is it. You can add more, that's fine. But the definition I'm using, the distinctive knowledge I'm using, is merely that. Can I apply that discrete knowledge to reality without contradiction? Yes. In fact, it would be a contradiction for me to say I am not a discrete experiencer. As such I applicably know "I" am a discrete experiencer. Feel free to try to take the set up above, and using the definitions provided, point out where I am wrong. And at risk of over repeating myself, the forbiddance of introducing new discrete knowlege at this point is not meant to avoid conversation, it is meant to discover fundamentals.

It’s kind of like how some animals can’t even recognize themselves in a mirror: I would argue that they do not have any knowledge if (and its a big if in this case) they are not self-conscious. Yes they have knowledge in the sense that their body will react to external stimuli, but that isn’t really knowledge (in my opinion) as removing self-consciousness directly removes “me” (or “I”) from the equation and that is all that is relevant to "me" — Bob Ross

Would an animal be an "I" under the primitive fundamental I've proposed and applicably know? If an "I" is a discrete experiencer, then I have to show an animal is a discrete experiencer without contradiction in reality. If an animal can discern between two separate things, then it is an "I" as well. Now I understand that doesn't match your definition for your "I". Which is fine. We could add in the defintion of "consciousness" as a later debate. The point is, I've created a defintion, and I've applied it to reality to applicably know it.

Thus as a fundamental, this stands within my personal context. I note in part 3 how limitations on discrete knowledge can result in broad applications for certain contexts that ignore detail in other contexts. It is not the application of this distinctive context to reality that is wrong, it is a debate as to whether the discrete knowledge is detailed enough, or defined the way we wish. But for the single person without context, if they have defined "I" in this way, this is the only thing they could deduce in their application of that definition to reality.

As an example, let's take your sheep example: what if that entire concept that you derived a deductive principle from (namely tenants that constitute a sheep) were all apart of a hallucination. — Bob Ross

I'll repost a section in part 2 where I cover this:

"What if the 'shep' is a perfectly convincing hologram? My distinction of a sheep up to this point has been purely visual. The only thing which would separate a perfectly convincing hologram from a physical sheep would be other sensory interactions. If I have no distinctive knowledge of alternative sensory attributes of a sheep, such as touch, I cannot use those in my application. As my distinctive knowledge is purely visual, I would still applicably know the “hologram” as a sheep. There is no other deductive belief I could make."

So for your example, the first thing we must establish is, "How does the hallucinator distinctly know a sheep?" The second is, "Can they apply that distinctive knowledge to reality without contradiction?" When you say a deductive principle, we must be careful. I can form deductions about distinctive knowledge. That does not mean those deductions will be applicably known once applied to reality. Distinctive knowledge can use deduction to predict what can be applicably known. Applicable knowledge itself, cannot be predicted. We can deduce that our distinctive knowledge can be applied to reality without contradiction, when we apply it to reality. But those deductions are based on the distinctive knowledge we personally have, and the deductions we conclude when we apply them to reality.

To simplify once again, distinctive knowledge are the conceptualizations we make without applying them to reality. This involves predictions about reality and imagination. Applicable knowldge is when we attempt to use our conceptualizations in reality without reality contradicting them. With that in mind, come back to the hallucination problem and identify the distinctive knowledge the person has, and then applicably what they are trying to prove.

Once this fundamental is understood and explored, then I believe you'll see the heirarchy of inductions makes more sense. First we must understand what a deduction is within the system. Within distinctive knowledge, I can deduce that 1+1 = 2. When I apply that to reality, by taking one thing, and combining it with another thing, I can deduce that it is indeed 2 things.

The most fundamental aspect of our lives (I would argue) is rudimentary reason, which is the most basic (rudimentary) method by which we can derive all other things. — Bob Ross

True. But I have attempted to define and apply rudimentary reason as a fundamental, and the above paper is what I have concluded. Again, I am not trying to be dismissive of your creativity or your world view in any way! I would love to circle back to those points later. I am purely trying to guide you to the notion that we do not need these extra additions of definitions to learn these fundamentals, nor could we discuss them without first understanding the fundamentals proposed here.
I also wanted to leave you with one of your points on the table.

What if you really snorted a highly potent hallucinogen in the real world and it is so potent that you will never wake up in the real world but, rather, you will die in your hallucinated world once your body dies in the real one. Do you truly have knowledge of the sheep (in the hallucinated world) now, given that the world isn't real? — Bob Ross

This is one of the best critiques I've seen about the theory. Yes, I have an answer for this, but until the fundamentals are truly understood, I fear this would be confusing. if you understand what I've been trying to say in this response, feel free to go over this proposal again. We are at the point where we are going over addition and subtraction, and here you went into calculus with binary! I will definitely respond to this point once I feel the basics are understood.

Thank you again Bob, I will be able to answer much quicker now that it is the weekend!

Thank you for reading this Bob! This might be a long reply, and I will likely need time to go over it adequately, so sorry in advance if this takes some time for a reply. I've already spent an hour tonight going over it, and my time tonight is spent. I just wanted to acknowledge and express gratitude for taking the time to read it. I will have your answers in the coming days!

I see...And you suggest that hidden placeholders and variable realties in our formulas result in leaky abstractions, because they fail to assess the reality beneath? — john27

Yes, I believe that's what I was trying to put into words. I appreciate everyone's contribution. I feel like leaky abstraction should be a logical fallacy as I see it so often in philosophy. Thanks again!

What exactly do you see as the problem? Abstract thought? — SophistiCat

I was looking for a term, or others experience and view point of what I'm trying to put into words. If you don't get it, that's fine. Its a discussion to explore these types of encounters other people have had to see if it can be put into better words. I think I may have found what I'm looking for with the phrase "leaky abstraction" I noted in my reply to John.

use knowledge in a negative or positive extremity (i.e all the time or none of the time) and it's distasteful, but apply a nugget of wisdom moderately, and it can help clarify a lot of things. — john27

I think the term I've been looking for is "leaky abstraction". Its a term in computer science. In a language, often times extremely detailed sets of functions will be cobbled together into a higher abstraction like, "RunPrintProgram()". You run the print program thinking that it will do so, and 99% of the time, it does. But 1% of the time when interacting with another program, something unexpected ands strange happens. This is because the underlying code doesn't fully function like you think the abstraction would. Thus the underlying reality 'leaks' out into the application, and you get unexpected things happening.

It's a pretty common misconception that the fourth dimension is time. — john27

Yes! What I did is exactly what I'm talking about.

So the fact that string theory uses placeholders for spatially relevant dimensions isn't wrong at all I dont think, its kind of like saying "we know it's out there, we just dont know what it looks like." — john27

But do we know its out there? All that a dimension is, is a variable. We don't really know what the variable represents in reality, because we can't observe it in reality. The fact that we abstract it out to spatial dimensions is the problem.

↪Philosophim First, I am a bit puzzled by your choice of words "identity" and "placeholder": I don't think I've seen them used like this before. From the context, you seem to be referring to models, concepts, representations, abstractions, maps (as in "the map is not the territory"). Is that what you mean? — SophistiCat

Yes, this post isn't intended to be a solution, but a puzzle for us to discuss. Its a situation I've seen before that I'm not accurately able to describe, and was wondering what others thought. I believe you have the gist of what I'm going for.

Second, I am struggling to discern your point here. The most specific example that you give concerning the use of extra dimensions in string theories is poorly chosen, since neither you nor most of the readers understand the background enough to have a reasonable discussion about it. That these dimensions are "not representations of reality or dimensions as we believe them to be" is obviously true in one sense: we the common people are used to thinking about space as three-dimensional (and that only because Descartes' invention has been drilled into us from an early age). But what of it? — SophistiCat

I think that is the point. String theory is a detailed idea that is abstracted away into the general populace, and we make improper conclusions based on that abstraction. So here I am doing the same thing. Is there a term for it? Is there a way to spot it easier? What do you do when you find it in an argument? These are the questions I'm looking to see people answer.

Could you give one or two examples from a philosophical perspective. Something mundane and fairly easy to understand. — T Clark

Certainly. In philosophy I've seen people take certain identities and believe because such an identity can be claimed, it must be "real" in some way. The most famous I can think of is probably "This sentence is false". There is an initial assumption that a sentence can be true or false, and people spend hours thinking about it.

The reality is, the sentence is rubbish. It doesn't actually claim anything. A better sentence would be, "This is a false sentence". I believe this issue is we abstract away certain details for general communication and believe that the abstraction holds true when we return to detailed communication.

For me, eternity is more of an experience, hence why I “know” it to be true (by “know I simply mean for me, obviously not everyone else will have that experience). It’s almost like I can see it and feel it in every passing moment. At least, that’s the best I can try to explain it. If I were to humbly suggest a lowly excuse for a logical argument for it (which some of you may rip to shreds for all I know), I’d probably say that the fact that the present moment was able to manifest (self evident present experience), no matter what form that present moment may be, is an indication that it must therefore manifest infinitely. — Mp202020

What you are describing is a very confident belief. But there are lots of things that we confidently believe that aren't true. And that's fine! It should not be embarrassing that you feel that way, we all have confident beliefs in our way.

One point of philosophy is to examine those confident beliefs and ask, "Am I interpreting this feeling logically? Is my belief real or knowable?" My question to you is, "Are you interpreting your feeling correctly?"

When I think eternity, I think forever. Never ending. Never beginning either. When you examine and think of the present moment, you are feeling what is now. There was a man who lost the ability to make long term memories after a viral infection. One thing I remember from the documentary on him was that he was told to write in a book a diary entry and mark that he consciously had written it. It was filled with pages of him Xing out the previous entry, then one with a check that noted "This is the first entry I've consciously made".

I mention this, because what you are experiencing isn't eternity, it is "the now". "The now" is our current awareness at any moment. It contains our memories of the past, but it does not need them. It can predict the future, but it cannot know it until the next second comes. The past and the future are constantly outside of "The now".

Is this eternity? I suppose it can feel like it is. That man with memory loss felt the now, but his past was gone from his understanding. To me, this indicates feeling the now, is not feeling eternity. It is feeling the moment as we pass through seconds of our life. By fact, we also know we're all going to die one day. We might feel like we aren't, like that man felt he had never made a previous conscious entry in the diary. But he did. And we all will.

So thinking about it, your feeling cannot describe eternity. Perhaps the wonderment of existence. A question of what it would be like to not exist, when you cannot remember what life was like before you were born. Regardless of the conclusion, the feeling you have is not any self-evidence for eternity, just self-evidence that you exist in that moment.

This is something I feel strongly about. Women who say they want to be respected but then blame the problems of our society on men rather than taking their share of the responsibility are hard to take seriously. — T Clark

Whenever I see a broad sentence that signifies a specific group, I get rid of the specific group.

"This is something I feel strongly about. People who say they want to be respected but then blame the problems of our society on other people, rather than taking their share of the responsibility are hard to take seriously.

Removing the specific allows us to also remove bias. Removing bias is key to thinking more rationally about something.

First, its still a broad sentence that can be taken different ways depending on how you read it. If I read it as:

People who are an equal part of society, and say they want to be respected but then blame the problems of our society on other people, rather than taking their share of the responsibility are hard to take seriously.

I can agree here. If you are a wealthy land owner who has the power to not do something wrong, but you do something wrong and blame it on society, its hard to respect that person.

But lets change it up.

People who are oppressed, threatened, and marginalized by society, and say they want to be respected but then blame the problems of our society on other people, rather than taking their share of the responsibility are hard to take seriously.

Now I would agree with this sentence too. If society will not respect you, threatens you, and basically ostracizes you from society, I think the blame lays with those who have power in society, not yourself.

Divisive sentences like T-Clark's are divisive because they let you two diametrically opposed contexts into it. One person could be angry at T-Clark, while a defender of T-Clark would roll their eyes at the person in anger. Both have merit in their context of the sentence, but are actually concluding entirely different meanings from that sentence.

True woman's liberation is about equality of opportunity, and respect in the law. We can eliminate the word woman as well, and realize that true liberation in society is about equality of opportunity, and respect in the law. Beware those who would taint liberation with bias, for their intent is often not about liberation, but an agenda.

Society might change, but people really don't. People are not rational. And I don't mean, "them". I mean you, me, and everyone on this board. Rational people take the time to examine data that contradicts their beliefs, and without letting passion get in the way, change their belief when clearly contradicted.

Rationalizing people have a belief, and seek to justify it. When contradictory evidence comes their way, they insist its wrong. They stamp their feet. Insult the other person. Rationality is just another tool, like lying, intimidation, expression of status, and all of the other ways we can "throw our weight around". We have to have some modicum of reason for our beliefs, so we can even fool ourselves so that we are in our happy emotional belief spot.

Being rational takes education, dedication, and ironically, an emotional belief that is the correct way of thinking. It is difficult, takes extra work, and requires a person who can handle the negative emotions of being proven wrong. Rational people lose all the time, have to keep adjusting their world view, tempering their emotions against people who are clearly rationalizing, and generally must accept they are a mortal and not some intellectual God. Many people are unable or unwilling to try doing this.

This human condition has never changed, and it NEVER will change. Despite this, we've done pretty well. Objectively, times are better than they've ever been. Hunger, disease, and poverty throughout the world are all down. Less wars, more education, and greater communication through the internet. We even found a vaccine for a pandemic in about a year.

But of course, your rationalizing brain will dismiss the positives if you don't want to believe that it addresses your emotional negativity about humanity. Those who are looking for positive beliefs about humanity will immediately accept the positives as if they are a given, and dismiss the considerations of the negative about humanity. And we'll all be fine for it, just like we have for thousands of years.

So here's a question for ya. Assume for the moment that everything you say is correct. Does this have any bearing or influence on how I should live my life? — EricH

Not at all. Why would it?

I'm not trying to interrupt both your discussions, but I wanted to quote this again because its an important concept to grasp.

Are you saying that there could be more than 1 first cause? Care to share why exactly?
— TheMadFool
If there can be one, why can't there be more than one?
A team of gods?
— TheMadFool
Must a first cause be a god?
It seems a bit too extravagant; it's more than some of us can handle.
— TheMadFool
If you can handle one first cause, what's the problem with handling any arbitrary number? Is there some rule you're applying where you'll "allow" one first cause "but no more"? — InPitzotl

A first cause by nature cannot have a prior cause for its existence, which means there are no rules. You cannot say, "There can only be one," or, "It must be God", because then I would ask you, "What causes this?" Since nothing can cause a first cause, you cannot claim there "must" be a first cause with particular rules by looking at something prior.

Now, if we worked back up the chain of causation, we might find there are some necessary rules, or even discover some first causes (though it would be extremely difficult, and impossible in some cases).

I want everyone to understand, this argument is not about God. If you think it is, I think you're missing the real picture.

The First Cause has to be the the simplest partless state. If it has parts, then the parts were there before it. — PoeticUniverse

Yes, I think this is undeniable.

When you say life has no meaning, implicitly what you're saying is, "Life has no meaning to something else besides myself".

Likely you were raised by parents who told you to accomplish things for some grand goal. You might have been in a religion that told you to give your life meaning. Or your culture told you to do something for some meaning. What you are realizing, is that was all for them, not yourself.

No, there is no emotion of meaning in what you do for others innately. Yes, in the end everything will be destroyed. But do you care for yourself, or do you care because others won't be around to remember your greatness?

True meaning is what gives YOUR life meaning. It doesn't matter if your life won't extend to tomorrow, you're alive today right? You want to do something at the end of the day, fulfills you. To feel like you enjoyed existing that day. To feel like you could enjoy existing tomorrow if it comes.

What you found when you stopped studying engineering was you didn't want to actually do that job. That was what other people told you what you would likely enjoy, benefit you, or benefit their own social standing or structure.

You are learning that you don't have to do what society wants. You are learning that you will never have meaning in what society wants. That is the existential crisis, as you have been raised to think that way for societies benefit. You're free. You can do what you want. If you do not want anything apart from what you have, there is nothing wrong with that. If you want more than what you have, there is nothing wrong with that. Enjoy your freedom, and when you learn to let go of what society expects or thinks, you'll find happiness and peace.

So causal chains don't really trace back along lines, but rather along branches.

And that's where the possibilities diverge. We can have an event partially have a cause and partially be uncaused. So there's your other possibility. — InPitzotl

I agree 100% with causal chains, but I'm not sure how something can have some causes, but then also not have causes. If something is uncaused with in a chain that intersects with another causal chain, that's fine. But if there is something uncaused at the top of one of the chains, nothing caused that uncaused thing to be.

It cannot be caused, or uncaused
— Philosophim

:chin: — TheMadFool

Was the use of "it" the source of confusion? Nothingness cannot be caused or uncaused, because nothingness is not a thing. If its not an effect, it cannot be caused correct?

1. The first cause has to be uncaused.

2. Only nothing has no cause. — TheMadFool

Can you prove that nothing has no cause though?

Nothing isn't anything. It cannot be caused, or uncaused. It is the absence of both cause and effect. Nothingness is outside of causality. The only thing that can be uncaused, is something that exists.

Humans have the ability to give identity to things. Imagine a field of grass. That's one "thing". Now imagine a blade of grass. That's another "thing". Now imagine a cell in the grass. You get it.

While I demonstrated applying identities to things that are smaller, we can also apply them to things that are larger. The monism of "everything" is simply a logical limit of this identification process. Can we truly comprehend everything by experience? No. But we can comprehend everything as a logical consequence.

Is this useful? Consider that at one time in math, the number 0, did not exist. Zero symbolizes nothing after all. Nothing isn't something you can touch or feel. And yet, the number zero is incredibly useful in describing the other numbers. The state of "An absence of any identity" helps us come to conclusions about identities. Can the same be said about "An inclusion of all identities" help us in the same way? Perhaps.

To add to the great contributions in this thread, I think one of philosophy's tasks is to examine assumptions we take for granted and see if they hold under scrutiny. Liar's paradoxes show us that certain assumptions we make lead to illogical conclusions. That's incredibly important, because what if you are making those assumptions in arguments that are not liar's paradoxes? That means you are holding faulty assumptions that are not clear in another argument. Can we learn from the liar's paradox? I think we can.

"“This sentence is not true.” I'll just change it to "This sentence is false" for less typing.

Lets look at this from a logic perspective. We could say, "If this sentence is true, then its false"

A -> ~A
If A is true, then we get A is not true.

A = (A -> ~A)

Now negate the formula, and assume the sentence if false.
~A = (A or A)

~A = A
(If I did my logic right, its been a while)

So if the sentence is false, its true, and if its true, its false. We definitely have a contradiction.

As we can see, there's something weird going on. But why? Our intuitions feel like the sentence makes sense, but logically, it doesn't. Because we're being too general. We realize we've said nonsense by being too implicit. That's the lesson we can glean. Just because we can say or posit an idea in language, doesn't mean it makes sense. You've previously posted the question, "What is metaphysics?" Many times people use metaphysics to disguise liars paradoxes. Terms that are ambiguous are great ways to hide nonsense terms and conclusions within them. If you can pick them out, you can ask for clarification.

Solving the liar's paradox can give us a tool to solve other nonsense points while keeping within the spirit of the discussion. Nonsense arguments are often unintentional, and often times hide an underlying meaning that wasn't quite nailed with the language. So I could propose this to someone instead:

"I don't think we're being specific enough with our words. Do you mean perhaps, "This sentence is a false sentence"? Because at that point, we can look at the sentence and see, "No, that is a viable and correct sentence. It is false that that is a false sentence.

Or

Proposal:
A = a sentence
~A = not a sentence

A therefore
A = ~ A

And we can see that its a contradiction right off the bat, and that A must be a sentence.

Liar's paradoxes are a great teaching tool about the ambiguity of language, but also about seeing through the intentionality of a person's argument. When discussing philosophy with others, we should be generous towards the other person's argument. Sometime we're not just trying to show that a person's argument is viable, we're also trying to see if we can use language correctly to better cast what they are intending to argue as well.

So, there is a “first cause” (not necessarily unique) for an F, but that first cause has no set position in an infinite span of past time and is only completely reliable in a limiting sense. (this has nothing to do with a “point in time at negative infinity” that set theorists might consider) — jgill

I believe what you are talking about are limits like in calculus? Or are you talking about the limits of precision? For example, .1 becomes .11, becomes .111, etc?

Well stated again Bob. I agreed with your points, and wanted to also specifically point to this one.

if you think that I am arguing that there is no first explanation and, thereby, that there being a first explanation is the unicorn, then I would say that that is not my position. I am arguing that both of those propositions collapse on one another (in terms of explanations) and that is why, although I don't think I have elaborated much further beyond this criticism, I would conclude that no matter how one contemplates it, it will inevitably collapse. — Bob Ross

Yes, even though you or I may personally agree with the OP to an extent, without a better framework of epistemology, it collapses into a messy paradox. Like you stated about logic being extended to Logic, I feel the OP extends to the limit of what we can know by today's standards, and finds itself in a strange situation when we are faced with the limits of the unknown.

At this point, I would be repeating myself if I mentioned anymore. What a fantastically thorough examination! If you are interested in continuing a discussion of epistemology, here is the link I spoke about earlier. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/9015/a-methodology-of-knowledge I do not intend this to pressure you, it is only if you enjoyed the conversation, and would like more like this on another topic. It is one of my older works, and it is broken into four parts of about 20 pages total, so I understand if that is a bit much to take on. If you do read it, I recommend reading it all at once however. In the past people stop after the first part, and ask questions that are all answered in the later parts. The payoff for it is I can viably establish not only an epistemology that crosses cultures and contexts, but contains a means of establishing a hierarchy of inductions, something that I think the study of epistemology lacks.

And if it doesn't interest you, not a worry at all. I am grateful for the great conversation here, and hope to see you again in other conversations on the boards!

So, let's start by assuming that (something cannot be the cause of itself. — Alkis Piskas

Agreed.

Now, if the infinity of cause and effect is impossible, there must be a "first cause" from which all starts, right? However, since we said that nothing can be the cause of itself in the physical universe, that cause must necessarily be non-physical, right? — Alkis Piskas

Not quite. Physical or non-physical, that would be a prior cause. If you posit a non-physical cause, its still a cause right? Which means the same question applies to it. What caused the non-physical state which caused the physical state?

The real answer is, "There is no prior cause." Meaning nothing created it, and it is not the cause of itself. It simply exists, because it does. So if a non-physical thing had no prior cause, it would be by its virtue of being. If a physical thing had no prior cause, it would be by its virtue of being.

The problem with positing a God as "The" solution, is it doesn't logically follow. A God does not escape the problem of the first cause, nor offers a solution. If there is a first cause, then it has no prior reason for its existence, and no rules or limitations of why it should, or should not exist. Meaning the first cause could be the big bang, or particles just entering into existence at any time. Is a God also probable? Yes. But that's only one out of an incredible number of other options.

To prove one or many first causes is a monumental task that might be impossible. If anything, we would need to work our way backwards through causality and hope we arrive at conclusive proof at a start. If a person is going to prove a God is a first cause, they will need to do it separately from the conclusion that there is a first cause. The necessity of a first cause does not necessitate that a first cause be God.

Its been years since I've read logic, but that's a good approach. Lets make sure we're setting up the premises fairly.

A = !∃X -> Y
An alpha is when there does not exist some prior cause, X, for an examined state, Y.

C = ∃X -> Y
A cause is where there exists some prior cause, X, for an examined state, Y.

Onto the premises!

Q (For Question) = Y -> (A or C)
(I'm going to use "or" and "and" because I don't want to copy and paste the symbols repeatedly. :D)
The first premise is the question. For a state of existence, there exists a first cause, or a prior cause for its existence.

Y -> (!∃X -> Y) OR (∃X -> Y)
Translates to
Y -> (!∃X or ∃X) -> Y
Translates to
Y <-> (!∃X or ∃X)
All Y's lead to some prior explanation, or lead to no prior explanation. There is some prior explanation lead to Y, or there is not some prior explanation that leads to Y.

Lets start with our second premise:

For all Q's about Y states, the answer is a cause.
(Translating C)
(∀(Q) = ∀Y <-> ∀(∃X))

Now lets see what we can conclude.

∃Y= (∀Y <-> ∀(∃X))
First, this is a state, which then has a question. This is looking awkward, so lets change it to a set.

∀Q( y ∈ Y <-> x ∈ X )
For the set of all Q's, there exists some prior cause. But, because the set it itself a Y, we have a situation in which there is something outside of a set, that should be in the set.

y = ∀Q( y ∈ Y <-> x ∈ Q )
So what if we said that the set of all Y's also includes the set itself? Because if there exists a y outside of the set, then there exists an x outside of the set. This would be called a Universal set. However, Russel's paradox shows this is impossible. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_set#Russell's_paradox So we can't do that.

But if that is the case, then all this leaves us with a Y outside the set of all Y's. Which means there is a question outside of the set. But if there is a question outside of the set, then our set is contradicted.

But if we instead state:

A = ∀Q( y ∈ Y <-> (x ∈ Q or (!x ∈ Q))
There does not exist any Q's outside of the set with an answer that does not lead to a contradiction. If the answer is A, then there is no Y or X outside of the set that leads to Russel's paradox.

Feel free to check my logic, I'm pretty rusty on it, and not sure if this is the best representation. Great discussion so far!

I have a forum post here that goes over your subject matter. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/12098/a-first-cause-is-logically-necessary

I agree with you that there must be a primary cause in any chain of causality, I think you might like to read it because it is similar to what you are doing here. The argument also clearly shows that what that primary cause, has no prior cause for its existence.

If that is the case, then a primary cause could be anything. Let me explain. When we say something "must" be a certain way, it is because there are causes/reasons why it must be constrained. If something has no prior reason for its existence, then there is no reason why it should, or should not exist. If we said, "It should be God," we have to ask, "Why?" We can't use prior causality to explain it, so we just say, "Because God does."

Now that's not entirely wrong. If God existed, and it was a primary cause, this reasoning would be true. What is wrong is to assume that what cannot have prior causality, is only God. If it is the case that there must be something without prior causality, it could be anything. A big bang. A quantum field. A random alignment of several particles appearing over billions of years. You can't say, "God is the only thing that could," because then I would ask, "Why?" There would need to be prior causality involved that necessitated God be the Primary cause. Because we cannot constrain a primary cause with prior reasonings, we can only conclude there is no constraints on what could be a primary cause.
In short, while God is not implausible, God is also not necessary or even necessarily probable.

I have another post where I explore this idea in depth, in which I attempt to deduce a probability of God if it is the case that anything could have been the primary cause. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/8924/a-fun-puzzle-for-the-forums-the-probability-of-god

As you can tell, I love thinking about the puzzle of the "First cause". Ultimately while I do agree with your outcome that a first cause is likely the way the universe works, even if there is a first cause, in no way can we conclude that it must be a God. Also, do not take this as an attack on your attempt to think! In philosophy we should not be theists or anti-theists, but thinkers. That involves taking any subject matter, and trying to see if we can come to logical conclusions. You have done a fine job here in proposing some thoughts. I will let others critique your specifics, as I do agree with your logic of a primary cause being the most logical conclusion. Don't stop thinking!

Okay, then causes are not logically necessary. — InPitzotl

The premises of the OP are not logically necessary. It is the conclusion that is logically necessary if the premises are true. It is either the case that there are things that have no prior cause for their existence, or things that have prior cause for their existence. This is an assumption. If you can show that the assumption is incorrect, then the conclusion is not logically necessary.

If you can provide an alternative, that there is something which does not have a prior cause, and is something which has no prior cause for its existence, then the assumption is false. The BT argument only applies to the first premise, not the conclusion. I do not see you presenting a viably third option with the BT argument as I've noted prior.

In the end, I think Bob Ross successfully countered the notion that the argument is logically necessary. I would read our discussion to see the results.
— Philosophim
I'm not quite sure I have to read it... it seems apparent to me. — InPitzotl

Well of course it does to you, otherwise we wouldn't be going back and forth. But Bob really nailed the essence of the argument, and I think you'll really get to understand the conclusion. I feel like I've been explaining the OP to you for a while, and either you don't quite understand it, or I don't quite understand your criticism. Maybe you're right, but I'm just not seeing it. Its not that I'm stubborn, I clearly say Bob nailed it. If you read it, you might see another view point, and tie it into your own argument so that I might see it better.

For the fourth time, you are (or at least were) claiming that it is logically necessary that there be at least one. That's vastly different than claiming that it is merely necessary. — InPitzotl

To me, "logically possible" means that if you assume something to be true, you do not get a contradiction. "Logically necessary" means that if you assume something to be false, you do get a contradiction (e.g., it contradicts the argument for it being logically necessary). Logical possibility doesn't mean something is the case; it could be wrong, but still be logically consistent. So you don't need to test if something is true to demonstrate it's logically possible. — InPitzotl

Ok. If we look at the conclusion of the OP, it fits logical necessity under your definition. If I assume everything has a prior cause for its existence, I run into a contradiction. If infinite regress exists, what caused there to be infinite regressive causality in existence? You can't say, "Something else", because the question continues. It only ends with, "It must not have a prior cause for its existence."

This is why I also keep saying BT does not contradict the conclusion. If there is something in BT that is discovered to have no prior reason for its existence, we have the logical necessity becoming a reality. Here we have the existence of something which has no prior cause for its existence, an alpha.

But for re-emphasis, regarding the claim that it is logically necessary, BT demonstrates how it is logically possible that there cannot be any explanation for the results. — InPitzotl

Again, this does not counter my conclusion.

I don't understand how you get from my asking you a question about whether a 217Bi atom (as a decay product of 217Pb) is or isn't an alpha to my confusing you as saying there's only one specific alpha. — InPitzotl

What I'm saying is I don't see any evidence of it being something which has no prior explanation for its being. That has nothing to do with the OP. If you believe the rate of decay we have calculated from an atom has no prior cause, you agree with my OP. I'm not here to decide whether BT theories are correct, or make any assertions as to what specifically is confirmed in existence as an alpha. That is out of the wheelhouse of the discussion. I'm here to show the conclusion to the OP is correct.

That's not your stated premise. This is your stated premise:
1. Either all things have a prior cause for their existence, or there is at least one first cause of existence from which a chain of events follows. — InPitzotl

Yes, and a cause is an explanation for an effect. Bob Ross and I had a fantastic discussion on this. In the end, I think Bob Ross successfully countered the notion that the argument is logically necessary. I would read our discussion to see the results.

So the question I ask you, yet again, is which is it? Is 217Bi an alpha? Or a result of a causal chain? — InPitzotl

We don't know. Remember, I'm not claiming the existence of any one alpha. All I'm claiming is that it is necessary that there be at least one. To know that specifically, we have to prove it. Lets assume that BT is correct as a theory. As I noted earlier, BT does not claim that there cannot be any explanation for its results. This is very different from stating, "We don't yet have an explanation for its results". I've also mentioned how difficult it is to confirm that we have actually found an alpha. You can't just find something you don't understand, throw your hands in the air and say it has to be an alpha. That's no better than ascribing God as the cause for rain.

However, there exists one fairly popular interpretation of quantum theory that does deny that one has (after the experiments are concluded) a well-defined physically real ±1-valued outcome on each side: the many-worlds interpretation.

Alright, so we are citing a popular off branch of BT. But is BT provable epistemically? No. Its just a theory that could be cool, as there's no evidence that multi-verse theory exists. Now what IS interesting, is if my theory is true, multiverse theory has another leg to stand on, as there doesn't seem to be a reason why a multiverse couldn't happen, opposed to it just being guess work.

So I think the confusion you have with the OP is you think its trying to posit a specific first cause. It is not, and I even claim its ridiculously difficult to do so, and for some alphas, might be impossible. The point is that even though we haven't discovered or realized alphas, at least one must exist following the chain of prior causality.

To mention again, Bob Ross and I came to a satisfactory conclusion. I would give it a read if you want to understand the theory and the conclusions I agreed with him on.

You absolutely nailed the "reassessment". So why have I been using causality and not explanations? Because I run into another problem. What is an explanation? You understand what an explanation is clearly, but how do I define it? How do I put it into a definition that everyone can agree with? If I claim something is an explanation, then it seems like I'm really talking about "knowledge". And at that point, this becomes an exploration into epistemology that few would accept.

Despite people trying to reject cause and effect, and despite their counterpoints not actually challenging the OP, but missing the mark (as you clearly noted), cause and effect are something fairly stable that people can understand, that is essentially an explanation. Why is this thing the way it is? Because of these things being the way they are. Why does this effect occur? Because this cause occurs.

Is a cause and effect always an explanation? Is an explanation always a cause and effect?
The first question seems true, but the second leaves doubts. I believe an explanation can be translated into a cause and effect, though it may not be the simplest, clearest, or most direct way of communicating that explanation. But, there is a stable defined means of communicating that explanation.

My label of a "first explanation" as a "first cause", is not inaccurate. It is simply a more complex translation than I would like, because it serves the purpose of being simple to understand, difficult to counter, and stable. A first explanation is the first in a chain of explanations. A first cause is the first in a chain of causes. That which has no prior explanation for its existence, can be explained by its existence in reality. That which has no prior cause for its existence, can be explained by its existence in reality.

If I had a better means of language that could preserve what was needed for the argument, and not diverge into the tempest of epistemology, I would. But you are right. It is not ideal, and perhaps it would have been better to use the term "explanation", then explain what an explanation is through cause and effect. So thank you, your point is well taken!

I was implying that the function P(n) only operates within a space/time fabric. It does not attempt to induce any “numbers” outside of that framework: that is why it isn’t an inductive over-extension. — Bob Ross

While I do agree there are formula's that assume space and time, many formula's do not. For example, a formula may extend for infinity, but infinity may not exist. An electron is considered to have zero mass for many formula's, though the reality is that it does have mass once you use formula's that have a meaningful digit small enough for them to matter at that scale. That being said, your criticism would apply to them as well, and you are correct.

The dilemma I was trying to put forth is that one cannot fundamentally utilize a “before” or “outside” when contemplating something sans space/time fabric. The same issue is true, I would say, of causality (it doesn’t extend past space and time) and if causality did, then it would be a different causality altogether (which existed in a space and time framework sans our space and time framework)! I don’t think we really have any good evidence to conclude anything beyond space and time. — Bob Ross

True. This to me, a first cause is something outside of space and time. There is no space or time which forces a first cause to exist, it simply does. Once it exists, it is within the realm of space and time. But prior to that? I cannot say. Perhaps there is something beyond space and time which creates that first cause. But it is meaningless to speak on it. And if something outside of space and time could create something within space and time? The question would still exist, "What caused THAT?" :)

I understand your specific use of "sans" time and space within language, and respect it. I think its largely semantics at this point, and we're essentially saying the same underlying meaning. That being said, refinement is NOT my best quality as a philosopher. If the argument would be served using other syntax, you again may be correct. Feel free to use such terms until we run into a place where there is more than semantic difference.

The difference, fundamentally, between me and you (I would say) is the fact that, for the very same reason you are abandoning PSR, I would abandon an arbitrary stopping of PSR somewhere along the line of derivation. — Bob Ross

Here again I think we have a semantics difference. I don't believe I'm abandoning the PSR, I'm refining it to fix a hole. I can understand how you think it is arbitrary, but that is where the conclusion in the OP comes in. If I cannot comprehend of a situation where there is no first explanation, (understanding this can be backed in an underlying manner by cause and effect) is it unreasonable to conclude the alternative, that there must inevitably be a first explanation?

Like we have both concluded, neither can be confirmed by experience. So we are arguing between two inductions. To liken the argument to something more common, let us propose someone states the reason why it rains is a magical unicorn. Since it cannot be confirmed by experience, we must think about it logically. The problem is, no one has seen any evidence of a magical unicorn, and within the proposal, there is still the question of what caused the magical unicorn to be. It doesn't really answer the ultimate question, and there is no evidence it exists. Would it be more logical to drop the unicorn entirely, even though the rain remains unexplained, or to keep it? In exploring reality, it may be that a unicorn in fact DOES exist. But that still doesn't answer the question of what caused the unicorn, and I still think most of us feel it is unreasonable to believe in the unicorn when we lack evidence that it exists.

Is the proposal that there can be no first explanation the unicorn, or the proposal that there must be a first explanation the unicorn? This is where a hierarchy of induction is needed. At this point, I am inclined to state the proposal of there being no first cause is the unicorn. But because we have no meaningful way to conclude which inductions are stronger than others, I have no means to back this opinion, besides opinion. This is where the knowledge paper I wrote comes in. In it, I break down a hierarchy of inductions as the end. Because despite my best efforts at using cause and effect to represent an explanation, it always boils down to epistemology in the end.

To your point, I believe practically every criticism you mentioned has merit, and you have successfully defended your view point logically within the framework of thought that we have. On the flip side, I believe I have also defended my line of reasoning as well. It is the fact that both of our conclusions necessarily rely on inductions about the nature of reality, and that we have no means within our framework of concluding if one induction is more viable than the other, that we can both make our choices without contradiction. And, if I cannot argue beyond an appeal that my induction is more viable than the opposite induction, I cannot argue that a first cause is logically necessary. If we had a viable framework which allowed us to logically determine which inductions are more reasonable to hold, perhaps my claim of logical necessity would be true. But without that framework, I cannot claim it. Well done!

To rap this up, I wanted to, again, thank you for such a wonderful conversation — Bob Ross

Agreed! It is a joy to discuss with someone who puts the theory through its paces! I hope my response was adequate to your points and critique. You are a fantastic philosopher, and I looked forward to every response you made. Thank you as well!

↪Philosophim

Deleted. — ToothyMaw

Not a worry. I wanted to point out to anyone else watching that you did not delete it because it was offensive or embarrassing. I saw briefly it was an attempt to define justice. Its not easy to do. When you're ready, feel free to post it.

For the third time in a row, I'm reminding you that you are not meeting the burden of logical necessity. BT is logically consistent with the premise that there is no explanation. — InPitzotl

If my premises are all correct, I am meeting the burden of logical necessity. Either everything has a prior explanation, or there are things that do not have a prior explanation. The second is logically proven at the conclusion of the argument. If BT allows that there are things that have no prior explanation, then that is consistent with the OP, and its conclusions.

It replaces it with the idea of action at a distance, like gravity.
— Philosophim
No it doesn't. — InPitzotl

Yes it does. If you are not going to explain why it doesn't, I'm not going to continue explaining why it does.

Outdated; there are local theories of MWI that do not violate BT. Instead of giving up locality, they give up realism. None of your quotes address this. Your quotes seem generically to treat QM via a Copenhagen view. — InPitzotl

I quoted a reference to Bell himself, because that is the theory you cited. If you have a different version of the theory you would like to propose, feel free. But I am not incorrect of my assessment of Bell's original theory.

To point out about countering realism, another citation from the links:

One currently popular account of Bell's theorem has it showing that "local realism" is incompatible with the quantum predictions, so that one has to choose between abandoning locality or abandoning realism. Those who talk about "local realism" rarely explain what they mean by "realism". (Is "realism" related to "hidden variables" of some sort? What exactly is meant by "hidden variables"? Is "realism" related to determinism?) And when they do, it often becomes clear that the "realism" under consideration isn't among the actual assumptions of Bell's theorem, so that abandoning that kind of realism isn't a viable strategy for saving locality.

Finally, if it appears that I am, incorrect in my assessment of Bell's Theorem, you don't think Bell's original theory doesn't apply anymore. So either way, Bell's original theory is not a viable critique against the OP.

Aspects of quantum theory are definitely counter-intuitive, you could interpret them as being also illogical, in the same sense. — Pantagruel

Being counter intuitive does not mean they aren't logical.

↪Philosophim Meaning you can't contradict one metaphysical position with another one.

Of course, the scientific method itself is fundamentally a methodology which doesn't necessarily have metaphysical implications. ie. Science openly admits its status as provisional and approximate. Science is consistent with material reductionism, but it doesn't imply it...... — Pantagruel

Metaphysical is such a broad term, I don't use it. If you mean science is a model that attempts to propose solutions that are not contradicted by reality, I'm all for it. Same with logic. If reality contradicts logic, then its not really logic right?