Maybe we're getting closer here Bob. I think you're confusing that a syllogism is itself objective when we're talking about the definitions and concepts within the syllogism. A syllogism's validity is not the focus here. It is the evidence the syllogism uses that determines whether the argument is objective or subjective. When I said it was incomplete, its incomplete to call its arguments subjective or objective.

If you'll read it again, it was not an issue with the premise, it was a request to flesh out your definitions so we could see whether they were objective or subjective. As it was initially written, it was impossible to classify the argument as objective or subjective because I simply don't understand what you mean. Its fine if you wish to write it that way, but then you can't claim its objective either. If a reader needs aspect of your syllogism fleshed out or explained, its a syllogism that needs more work to have the proper rigor. That in itself is not a claim as to whether its arguments are subjective or objective.

I made a point not to dispute your definitions, I only noted what it would take to classify them as subjective or objective. That's why I gave you examples for both sides.

My premises fit this description: they are not themselves appeals to subjective dispositions. — Bob Ross

If you use definitions, it must be known what concepts those definitions represent. Do they represent subjective definitions and concepts, or objective definitions and concepts? Its a fact of language, and not something that you appeal to. Even if they cannot be explicated, is that claim based on subjective or objective premises? It is unavoidable in any discussion, especially when you actively claim they are objective.

I am asking if this syllogism itself is objective—not whether some subsequent one is or not. P1 is a claim which is expressing something objective: it is not saying ~”Something has intrinsic value if I want it to”. — Bob Ross

P1: A thing that is not a mind and motivates a mind to avoid or acquire it (despite that mind's conative or cognitive disposition towards it) has intrinsic value. — Bob Ross

No, the argument is not objective, nor can I tell if its subjective at this point. This is an assertion. How you justify the assertion is what makes it objective or subjective. Is intrinsic value objective or subjective? Is the claim that things can motivate minds objective or subjective? Those are the questions that need answers.

If, by this, you are claiming that an argument is subjective if the fully expounded list of syllogisms (required to prove it)(which would be infinite, by the way) anywhere contains a subjective element; then, my friend, there are not objective arguments. You can’t prove ‘1+1=2’ with an ‘objective argument’ if you are that absurdly strict with your definition of ‘objective argument’. — Bob Ross

No, I'm not asking you to infinitely expand syllogisms. That's silly. Also you cannot objectively claim

"A mind is unique to every person and cannot be explicated," then we have a subjective definition of mind

Do you mean to say that, in this hypothetical, the term ‘mind’ is defined as something of which its meaning is relative to the given subject-at-hand? The fact it is inexplicable, in this scenario, has nothing to do with it being subjective. — Bob Ross

Correct. A claim that something is inexplicable can be founded on objective or subjective premises. In this example, it is a subjective premise.

In sum, I'm not questioning whether the premises are true or false, I'm demonstrating how we can determine if they are subjective or objective. Let me repost part of my conclusion in the last post once again: "A subjective argument is not necessarily wrong, nor is an objective argument necessarily correct. It is about the type of concepts presented and being analyzed." It seems my points were taken as an attack on your theories truth or falsity, when they are simply examples that point out why some of your arguments are subjective, and also examples of how you could make them objective. Address those examples specifically without regards to the truth or falsity of the premises and I think we'll be able to reconcile on subjectivity vs objectivity.

Now, I don't want you, right now, to contend with the premises in the sense of what you merely disagree with; but, rather, I want you to tell me if this syllogism meets your requirements for being an 'objective argument'. — Bob Ross

This is a good start. As written, the argument is incomplete. I'll point out why, and then point out how based on the answers, this can end up being a subjective or an objective argument.

P1: A thing that is not a mind and motivates a mind to avoid or acquire it (despite that mind's conative or cognitive disposition towards it) has intrinsic value. — Bob Ross

How do we determine that it is a thing which motivates a mind? Can it rationally compete with and invalidate the idea that a mind that is motivated towards goals simply uses things to obtain its goals? Is it that the food in front of me has an internal compulsion that expels outward towards my mind demanding that I eat it? Or is it that my mind desires food, and seeing the food triggers my mind to want it for what it wants/needs?

If the answer is, "

I believe in external motivation — Bob Ross

, then this is a subjective answer to the question because belief alone is entirely subjective. Because you have a subjective answer as part of a major foundation of your argument, any part of your argument that relies on this foundation is now a subjective argument.

If the answer is, "Here is the proof that external motivation exists, and we can see this proof holds up despite differences in our feelings or personal experiences", then you have an objective foundation, and any part of your argument that relies on this foundation without including subjectivity is now an objective argument.

As a quick aside, I like that this is a much more straight forward definition of intrinsic value. It might be incomplete from my view, but it gives a much clearer picture of the definition of intrinsic value in one sentence.

P2: The state of pain is not a mind and motivates a mind to avoid it (despite that mind's conative or cognitive disposition towards it). — Bob Ross

My second question would be, "How have you proven that a state of pain is not a mind?" I'll give you a faux example that seems reasonable. "The mind is defined as the aspect of consciousness which analyzes its own states and make decisions based on those states. Pain is a state that the mind decides to act on or react to, therefore it is not the mind itself, just a state that the mind considers."

If we both agree that this is a clear and provable definition that can be accurately applied despite differing states of human subjective experience, then we have something objective to reference. If however we defined it like, "A mind is unique to every person and cannot be explicated," then we have a subjective definition of mind, and thus a subjective argument at its foundation.

A subjective argument is not necessarily wrong, nor is an objective argument necessarily correct. It is about the type of concepts presented and being analyzed. An objective argument can have its definitions challenged as new information comes along. A subjective argument may be the best argument we can present with limited information. So having a subjective argument is not a death knell based on what we know, but it is important that it not claim to be an objective argument. In the case of moral theories, there are countless subjective moral theories out there, so another subjective argument has a high bar to reach to out compete every other theory. The problem is most subjective arguments boil down to subjective preference at their core, meaning people just do what they want and call it moral. And if that's the end case, why bother with a theory at all? Escaping that end result is incredibly difficult, but maybe you can do it.

I hope that was a clear answer to the question!

I appreciate the good question, its in reference to my Measurable Morality thread. I'm planning on rewriting it to start smaller and be tighter in its initial argument due to my discussion with Bob over it, but if you want to read it as is, its here: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14834/a-measurable-morality/p1

My fault for referencing an outside thread. This is Bob's thread and the context should be kept to it.

I don’t see any way for our conversation to progress, because we keep dead-ending at the same spots, so I will just respond to the parts where I think I am adding to the conversation (instead of reiterating). — Bob Ross

Probably true. We have some fundamental differences on certain topics, and they may be irreconsilable. No harm in noting that and agreeing to disagree after giving our sides again.

You use the term ‘objective’ in really nonsensical ways—e.g., ‘objective knowledge’, ‘objective definition’, ‘objective wavelength’, ‘objective argument’, etc. Sometimes its use is straight up incoherent, and other times it adds nothing to what you are saying. — Bob Ross

Bob, I use objective in the common sense. We've discussed this before and you have a very unique way of looking at subjective and objective. Generally this is how I use objective and subjective, so it is not incoherent:

OBJECTIVE arguments are often those that have to do with logos, that is, reason, evidence and logic, generally dealing with material questions (things that can be sensed or measured and have to do with the real outside world, outside of oneself).

SUBJECTIVE arguments are most often those dealing with the personal situation, feelings or experiences of a particular individual, family or group, and are usually arguments from ethos or pathos (though material subjective factors may involve arguments from logos as well).
https://utminers.utep.edu/omwilliamson/engl1312/subjective.htm#:~:text=SUBJECTIVE%20arguments%20are%20most%20often,arguments%20from%20logos%20as%20well).

I have already explicated clearly what objectivity is, and I think your position on it is wrong and confused. — Bob Ross

I have never once heard your explanation of objectivity and thought it made any rational sense. That is your personal definition, but the common definition which people use is as I noted above. Generally I try to avoid the subject directly because it seems to be more of an emotional spot for you. Just in this case its unavoidable.

An argument is an evidence-based proof; and can absolutely include intuitions in it. Arguments are not objective; but are hopefully rational. — Bob Ross

Arguments can be objective or subjective. Intuitions are subjective viewpoints. Objective arguments work to eliminate parts the require a subjective viewpoint. Per my example, the experience of green is subjective and the wavelength of green is objective.

Using your example of green, there is a set wavelength of light that is green. That's the objective wavelength of light for green. How we see or interpret it is subjective, but that right there, is the intrinsic color of green.

You completely missed the point of the example, and failed to explicate what green looks like. — Bob Ross

I'll be more direct in my point then. The personal subjective experience of green cannot be explicated. The objective wavelength can. The personal subjective experience of value cannot be explicated. But if there is an objective intrinsic value, it can.

No. I don't reject this notion. We're talking about value, and you keep changing the subject. Why?

You rejected it many times in our older conversations about epistemology; and it was relevant to what you said, because by saying a concept is simple (and indefinable) is NOT to say that they cannot be known. — Bob Ross

This is still not an answer. Bob, I agree that that a concept can be simple, indefinable, and known subjectively by that one person experiencing it. I'm not challenging that. I'm challenging you to demonstrate that value is simple, indefinable, and can be known objectively by people because it is intrinsic to an object. Pain is an example, but not a breakdown or system we can use.

Personally, why I think you keep going to 'being' or 'green' is because you can't do it with value. The only argument you have given is the subjective experience of pain, and whether we value it or not. I'm not disagreeing with you there that we all have our own subjective experience of pain, and value of it. I'm disagreeing that this somehow reveals objective value intrinsic to a state or object.

Finally, pain can be defined objectively. If your nerves fire with a particular signal up to the brain, that's pain.

This doesn’t completely define pain, because it does not define how it feels (phenomenologically). You can’t completely strip out the subject, Philosophim: it doesn’t work. — Bob Ross

We strip out the subject where possible when we are talking about objectivity. There is a subjective part to pain, and an objective part to pain. I am not denying the subjectivity of pain. I am denying that because you or I place a personal value on pain, that its objective proof that pain has intrinsic value. You have yet to show an objective value that all people, regardless of their subjective experience, can rationally agree represents intrinsic value.

And I did come along and give you a competing definition. So no hypotheticals are needed, why is my definition logically wrong?

I did not mean in the other thread, but in this one. I am not referencing the other thread where possible as this is a fresh take with a different context. This is what I was referring to:

"We can explicate it easily as well. "External value is the attribute a living being gives something else that confers some benefit to the living being and its wants and/or needs." But here's the thing. If "internal" value isn't real, then "external" value is redundant. Meaning that 'external value' just becomes value, and once again, we've explicated value clearly."

Why is this wrong?

Yeah, that's an odd way to remove desires from yourself and imprint them on other things. Things don't motivate us Bob

I believe in external motivation; so I deny this. I think we can have reason which motivate us without us having any desire towards it. You are clearly a Humean, and there’s no easy way to find common ground on that. — Bob Ross

As a belief, this is fine. But a belief is not an objective argument. If someone said they believed in God, therefore he's real, would you think that was objective? Also, I'm not Humean, just human. :)

You seem to confuse the idea that 'mind independent' means 'independent of minds'.

???

Cancer-independent is not identical to being independent of cancer? — Bob Ross

No, my point is that it is subjects who create subjective and objective arguments. I've said this before, and it will be one more time. Objective doesn't mean, 'an object' and subjective doesn't mean, 'a subject'. Objectivity and subjectivity are claims that subjects make. It is independent of one mind, but not independent of minds.

Or if they don't someone else creates a competing induction and we just decide to do based on which one we like more

No, it is based off of what seems more correct—which one is more convincing. Just because you are not convinced, does not make this endeavor subjective: you have a tendency to do that. — Bob Ross

It genuinely isn't because I'm not convinced of the argument. Bob, in my own moral theory, I believe everything has intrinsic value by the fact of its existence. The difference between you and I is mine has a rational foundation that can be measured against other existences. I can explain and justify what good and value are from a place of reason. Even your idea of flourishing fits in my theory nicely. You've taken this the wrong way. My point is you claim objectivity, but clearly cannot back that claim.

You're missing a fundamental step that can elevate your moral theory from, "Just another theory," into something that people can rationally hold in high regard. Don't be angry that I'm pointing out a flaw. Listen to it, give it a fair consideration in your head, and maybe you'll be able to come back with something better.

So, there's my take. This is your thread Bob, so anytime you feel the discussion has met its end or you would like the final say, I will grant it with a bow and let you continue with others.

If something has been determined, by analysis, as inexplicable (i.e., explicated as inexplicable), then one should not continue to try to explicate it — Bob Ross

No doubt, but you have not done this. And that's my issue. There's a lot of assertions and opinions, and inductions. That's not a solid analysis. If you're happy with this, that's fine, but as a philosophical proposal, its weak.

You reject the idea of implicit knowledge: I don’t. — Bob Ross

No. I don't reject this notion. We're talking about value, and you keep changing the subject. Why?

I don’t know why you would believe this. We convey concepts to each other all the time implicitly (through action, experience, and intuition) and they are clearly not subjective. A 5 year old cannot explicate clearly a definition of a triangle, but definitely knows notionally what a triangle is. — Bob Ross

No, that's not proven objective knowledge. Its assumed. You seem to be confusing assumptions, inductions, and general inclinations as proof. We can only put the 5 year old through tests to show that they can prove a triangle, because a triangle has very clearly explained rules. A triangle is 3 straight lines that connect at their ends. And if the 5 year old can't explicate it doesn't mean it can't be explicated. You seem to be saying that because you can't explicate value, it doesn't prove that others can't. That doesn't prove anything.

Claiming to invalidate all possible definitions of value is a tall order that requires some major proof

It’s inductive: I don’t have to provide a proof such that it is impossible. Inductions don’t work like that. — Bob Ross

Then the first person that shows a proof that it can be explicated wins. Or if they don't someone else creates a competing induction and we just decide to do based on which one we like more. That's again, subjective. There is no reason for anyone to accept your premises unless they feel like it.

You seem to confuse the idea that 'mind independent' means 'independent of minds'. No, it means that there is a rationality that holds true despite what other minds may feel. There is nothing rational that allows you rise above emotional feelings on this. 1+1=2 despite what we feel about it, or even if we agree with it because its a solid logical concept from beginning to end. Your whole argument feels like its a matter of faith instead of rationality.

If someone said, "Here is my definition of value that is clearly explicated," do you have a proof that this is impossible?

It isn’t going to be actually or logically impossible, and there is no definitive way to determine whether a concept is simple or simply misunderstood. Abductively, through the attempts to define it and failing to do so, one slowly understands better how primitive the concept is by way of how entrenched it is into all the other concepts one deploys to try and define it. — Bob Ross

So no. :)

There is no proof of this here, which means that someone who comes along and claims they have a definition, automatically competes with your claim at minimum, equally.

Prima facie, this is true. I would then demonstrate that either (1) they begged the question or (2) did not convey properly the concept. If you say “well, Bob, I can explicate what the color green looks like”. I would say “ok, let’s hear it”. — Bob Ross

But we're not talking about the color green. We're talking about value. And I did come along and give you a competing definition. So no hypotheticals are needed, why is my definition logically wrong?

If there is an alternative way of determining value intrinsically, we need that method for me to be able to think in those terms.

The other way, in addition to what I have already explained, is the idea that it is extrinsically motivating for subjects and does not arise out of a subject itself: — Bob Ross

Yeah, that's an odd way to remove desires from yourself and imprint them on other things. Things don't motivate us Bob. We motivate ourselves for things. Its why we all have different values for different feelings, states, and things.

I was saying that IF you think that it is possible for the person to understand that the pain has value despite having no belief or desire that it is; then we have found common ground. If you do not, then it doesn’t help our conversation. — Bob Ross

If the whole proof for intrinsic values rests on what I think, then this is not objective. This is just a conflict of opinions. I have no idea what you mean by a person valuing something and not valuing it at the same time beyond an colloquial expression. People value relief Bob. They value a life free of pain. Pain is only valuable if it helps us avoid and/or heal from injuries. A Masochist might actually value pain in itself, and purposefully injure themselves for it. The idea that we're all going to have the same outlook and value about pain doesn't work out in practice, and thus we have no common ground for intrinsic value.

Finally, pain can be defined objectively. If your nerves fire with a particular signal up to the brain, that's pain. How your brain interprets it and values it may be different. But the only thing intrinsic to pain, is the nerve interplay.

I am trying to dance our way into giving you the intuition. This is similar to debates between people about internal vs. external theories of motivation: one guy can’t see how someone can be motivated to do something without having a desire to do it, and the other can—they then spend days having the former convey the intuition to the latter, and usually to no avail. — Bob Ross

Again, this is all based on subjective experience then. An objective argument wouldn't need my understanding of the intuition. Using your example of green, there is a set wavelength of light that is green. That's the objective wavelength of light for green. How we see or interpret it is subjective, but that right there, is the intrinsic color of green. If you can put forward something similar for value, you'll have an objective argument. Until then, this is just a nice thought experiment but not a strong philosophical argument.

In light of our conversations, I have been trying to come up with different ways to express it; just to try to convey it to you, and I don’t think I have found a better way to explain it. Nevertheless, I will try again; — Bob Ross

Not a worry and I appreciate the attempt! I may also repeat myself a bit, so feel free at any of these points 'Agree to disagree".

Now, because the concept of value is primitive, it does not follow that we cannot analyze how ‘things’ can be valued and what has value—but, merely, what the concept of value means is off limits to proper explication. — Bob Ross

A job of philosophy is to take what cannot be yet explained, and put it into words that consistently make sense and can be used rationally. When we can't do so, its 'giving up'. Its no different to me then if people stated, "We can't know what knowledge is," or "We can't know morality". If value is goodness, and we can't know value, we can't know what goodness is.

Further, if a word is mostly understood in terms of "intuition, experience, and action" this is a subjective term. To be objective is to have a clear term that can be verified independently apart from personal experience. I know you claim that this idea of morality is objective, but I'm not seeing any evidence that this is the case.

Now, because the concept of value is primitive, it does not follow that we cannot analyze how ‘things’ can be valued and what has value—but, merely, what the concept of value means is off limits to proper explication. — Bob Ross

This is a claim that must be proven however. If someone said, "Here is my definition of value that is clearly explicated," do you have a proof that this is impossible? I'm not seeing your claim that value cannot be explicated as anything more than an opinion. Claiming to invalidate all possible definitions of value is a tall order that requires some major proof. There is no proof of this here, which means that someone who comes along and claims they have a definition, automatically competes with your claim at minimum, equally.

How things can be valued, in principle, is two-fold: either (1) the value of a thing is bestowed upon it by a subject or (2) it has it itself. You seem to think that only #1 is possible, but I think both are. — Bob Ross

Its not that I think only #1 is possible. Its that you have not demonstrated any way we can know that #2 is possible. We can't make the mistake that just because I can string two words together, that the concept necessarily exists. That's the unicorn problem. I take a horse, I take a horn, and combine the concepts and 'unicorn'. But does a unicorn actually exist? No. "Intrinsic value" is the combination of intrinsic, and value. We can combine the words, but there's no evidence such a thing exists. That's what you have to prove.

You are right that this is a great example of extrinsic value, and note that ‘value’ did not need to be explicated here; as one would is sufficiently experienced will know exactly what is being conveyed here with the ‘value’ of this clock. — Bob Ross

It doesn't have to be explicated because we know what external value is. We can explicate it easily as well. "External value is the attribute a living being gives something else that confers some benefit to the living being and its wants and/or needs." But here's the thing. If "internal" value isn't real, then "external" value is redundant. Meaning that 'external value' just becomes value, and once again, we've explicated value clearly.

What I think you are saying, is that when in pain the valuing of the negation of that pain is solely the subject’s cognitive or conative evaluation of it—I think this is mistaken. — Bob Ross

This is because it is a knowable example we have of determining value. If there is an alternative way of determining value intrinsically, we need that method for me to be able to think in those terms.

If a person completely believes and desires that pain has no value and you are right that value is purely subjective judgments, then even if they are in tremendous pain the pain will not be have any value; but, if you can envision a person which, in tremendous pain, still appreciates the value of avoiding pain despite not believing and desiring it to have no value, then you have contradicted your own point: the pain must have value independent of the desires and beliefs of the person. — Bob Ross

I'm going to break this down a bit.

Assume that value is subjective.
If a person thinks an emotional state does not have value, then it will not have any value no matter how strong of an emotional state it is.
If however there is a person in tremendous pain who values pain, despite not valuing pain, its a contradiction.

I don't see how the above argument revokes that its subjective. Your conclusion is not a conclusion, but a premise which contradicts itself. Now if you meant, "They value avoiding pain, but don't value pain itself," this is not a contradiction, nor does it revoke the assumption that value is subjective.

Alright Bob, I hope I was able to clearly communicate my points here as well. Feel free to answer what you wish.

Hello again Bob! Its good to see this theory put into one place. I wanted to give others a chance to reply to it before I dug in. I want to focus on what I see as the main question your theory needs to answer before anything else can be addressed.

Linking goodness with value seems straight forward. But then this leads to the question "What is value?" Normally it is living things that give 'value' to other things. For your purposes, this would be 'extrinsic' value. A great example would be the value of two diamonds. One is worth $50 while the other is worth $100 in a particular area. Of course, in a different area, they could be valued at different amounts. The way we determine value is 'evaluation'. In this case again, this is extrinsic, and clear.

But if value is determined by other living things, how do we find intrinsic value? What you're claiming is similar to the idea that that some diamond has an innate value of 25$, no matter what other people are willing to pay for it. That seems at odds with the notion of value. But you seem comfortable with the idea that people can evaluate the value of something differently from what its intrinsic value is. I'm not saying its not possible, but how can we measure intrinsic value and separate this from a measurement of extrinsic value?

You can do this with your example of a clock. Someone can value the clock because it tells time, while someone else could place zero value on the clock because its ugly, and they have a way to tell time already. Clearly this is extrinsic value. But then how do we objectively determine the intrinsic value of the clock? Finishing this example would be helpful.

to determine intrinsic value is a matter of analyzing how much, if at all, a ‘thing’ demands value. — Bob Ross

What is your meaning of 'demand'? How does a clock demand? Can this be described using a different set of words or phrases that avoids personification? I know we had these questions in another thread, and I was curious if given some time, you've been able to construct new answers or approaches. And if there is nothing new to add, I'll simply bow out and let you handle other questions. :)

From my perspective, I gave you two different ways to think about intrinsic value, you ignored both, and segued immediately into a discussion about how you will reject the whole theory if I cannot define 'value' other than as an unanalyzable, simple concept. — Bob Ross

I did not ignore both. I had to understand an objective term of 'value' before 'intrinsic value' made any sense. I also had a definition of value that was analyzable that you did not refute. So its fairly reasonable that I wouldn't consider intrinsic value if I had no reason to accept your definition of value right?

if you don't understand how it is impossible to define what it means to exist, then I am at a loss of words how to explain what a simple concept is to you. — Bob Ross

Its a hard lesson, but if a person is genuinely open to understanding what you're trying to convey, and they respond that it does not make sense and disagree with your viewpoint, that's not on the reader. That's on the writer. The reason I'm shutting this aspect of the conversation down has nothing to do with your or my points. Maybe we could have hashed out a solution with a normal approach. It has to do with the fact that you have had the attitude that it is my fault I don't understand what you're trying to explain. At that point, it is no longer a discussion but a one-sided view. It happens. Passions run high. But I've learned that that's when a discussion needs to end.

Ironically, I don't think people are going to care about that part of the analysis: when I say 'value' is 'worth', people will understand sufficiently what I mean, just like how they will understand that 'being' is 'existence'. Maybe I am wrong about that, but we will find out soon enough when I open a thread on it. — Bob Ross

A good idea! Maybe your idea as a fresh take apart from the context of this conversation I'll see what you're trying to convey more clearly.

In terms of your theory, I think I understand it more than adequately (at this point), and disagree with it. So I don't think there is much more to discuss. — Bob Ross

Not a problem, you already got a free handwave as I mentioned earlier. :) I appreciate the discussion and had a lot of fun diving into it with you. I'll catch you on another post Bob.

Honestly I'm a little peeved that you disregarded my points about values, took a complete tangent to a discussion of being, then put it on me to prove your point for you. Let me be clear. You did not make a good point about values or existence. It is sorely incomplete. This did not distract me from those points. And when I give a good faith effort to address something so far from the original subject of morality, I do not expect to be accused of evading or misunderstanding what you wanted when you never clearly defined the parameters well to begin with. A little more humbleness on your part and a little less accusations towards myself would be welcome.

My advice again is to regroup, think about your theory from the bottom up again, and see if you can address your point clearly enough that you don't need another person to define things for you. My first pass at my knowledge theory didn't quite work at points, and I had to do some revisions to find the right wording. So don't feel bad if this first go around didn't work. If that takes time its fine, I should be around. If for now you want to address other issue of the moral theory in the OP, we can continue there. You may have had some other criticisms or points that didn't involve the intrinsic values theory. But the current discussion on existence and being is unsalvageable from my viewpoint and needs to shift elsewhere.

I'm glad to see you've enjoyed it!

Or just “there is discreet experience”. This is pivotal, because it purports to unify our knowledge of experience over here in the experience of being me, with reality, over there, that any mind would have to see. Logically, this unifies the deductive with the inductive; or better said, we can induce “there is discreet experience” and we can deduce “there is discreet experience.” — Fire Ologist

A great assessment. The next step after this is to ask, "What is doing the discrete experiencing?" And the answer is, "The I".

This quote is essential. It’s why Aristotle came to the law of non-contradiction instead of “there is discreet experience” as fundamental. You are playing in the same playground here. — Fire Ologist

Interesting! I was unaware. I have found that this area of knowledge is shared by many other epistemological philosophies. There's a very similar level of conclusion which then takes off in different directions.

This argument would almost be better without premise 4, because premise 4 introduces a gap between discreet experience and reality. — Fire Ologist

It is not necessarily that there is a gap between discrete experience and reality. The discrete experience you have is real. The gap is whether your judgement that your discrete experience represents more than the experience itself. So for example, its real that if I'm hallucinating, I'm seeing a pink elephant. What's questionable is whether that discrete experience is an accurate representation of reality without contradiction. Its taking the step beyond the experience to say, "But if I fully apply the totality of what a pink elephant entails, will I find its still a pink elephant?"

This is what separates a full deduction, from a partial induction. Honestly, we make very few deductions in our day to day as doing so would be woefully inefficient. But we have to determine what a fully applied aspect of knowledge entails first before we can more accurately assess inductions.

You can unify your discreet experience to your knowledge, bridge that gap, but this diesnt necessitate (by deduction) that you’ve bridged the gap between discreet experience and reality. — Fire Ologist

Correct. And its never claimed that we do. That's why applied knowledge is not an affirmation. It is a test of avoiding contradiction. Thus if I am a person in the middle ages I can look up at the sky and I applicably know that the Sun rotates around the Earth. For me to say the Earth rotates around the sun would be a contradiction, just look at it! Later when knew information enters in, the previous deduction no longer applies. I applicably knew as a person ignorant of astronomy that the Sun rotated around the Earth. With knew information, I now applicably know the Earth rotates around the Sun.

I agree with all of the moving parts you identify. I agree with the way your are talking about them. — Fire Ologist

Thank you, I am humbled by such agreement.

Probability to possibility to plausibility - needed distinctions. — Fire Ologist

Here is a simple breakdown.

Probability - an induction based off of applied knowledge and logical limitations. I know there are 52 cards, and four of them are jacks. I do not know what the result of a random shuffle will be. Logically, its a 4/52 probability that I'll draw a jack if we keep repeating this over time. This is applicably confirmed over time.

Possibility - an induction based off of applicably knowing that 'x' at least one time. No one has ever discovered a unicorn, therefore it is not a possibility. I have applicably known a horse, therefore its possible to applicably know one again. However the likelihood and frequency of expected experience is unknown.

Plausibility - A combination of distinctive knowledge that has no outright logical denial that it could be applied. It has either not been applied yet, or cannot be applied by its definitions. For example, a unicorn as a horse with a horn on its head, no magic. It doesn't seem like there's anything which would deny that this could happen, but no one has ever applicably known such a creature to exist. So a unicorn defined in this way is not possible, only plausible.

And you are right, the gap is a little large. I'll introduce another term to see what you think.

Faith - A combination of distinctive knowledge that has no outright logical denial that it could be applied. However, upon application, it is found to be false. This is often applied to religion, but this can also be applied to faith in oneself. We can experience a moment of reality that is at odds with our own view of ourselves, yet persist in the belief that the view of ourself still stands.

Irrational - a combination of distinctive knowledge that does not make any logical sense, and once applied and found to be false. Despite this, a person still holds it to be true. For example, a mother believes her son did not commit a crime, despite her knowing her sons troubled past, they're being at the scene of the crime, and eyewitnesses. It is found undeniably that the son committed the crime. Yet the mother persists in believing he didn't commit it. This is a step beyond faith into outright delusion.

Thank you Fire Ologist, it is one of the greatest compliments you can give to tell me that my paper gave you something to think about. I appreciate your feedback and will think about it further.

"existence" here is supposed to be referring to the general and generic quality of existing; and not 'the sum of all discrete identities observed and unobserved': your definition just doesn't cover what the word refers to. — Bob Ross

You ask me to give you a definition of existence that doesn't devolve into circularity, then when I do, you're saying my definition doesn't fit what you think it means. Do you see the problem? You can't ask me to give you a definition, then say, "That's not what I wanted you to define it as."

If existence = X, then existence = plurality of X. Your use of 'existence', and its variants, betray your own meaning. — Bob Ross

No, now you're disregarding things I've written. Existence = X. Being equals "some piece of X". Existences are the reference to beings, so "pieces of X".

This completely misses the mark, and is confusing. — Bob Ross

Because its not what I stated or implied. You seem more confused that I defined it in a way you wouldn't. As you consider existence a circular definition, obviously I won't be defining it the same as yourself. That's not an argument against me when you asked me to give you definitions that were non-circular. If you want other people to define a word a certain way, its best to do it yourself instead of asking.

Correct. But do you see how the word 'exist' here isn't referring to what you have been calling 'existence' and how that is really weird? — Bob Ross

No. Because I already mentioned that 'to exist' is a synonym of being, not existence.

There's escaping that under your terminology, because that's how you defined it. Obviously, this doesn't work, as 'that exists' is referring to the quality of existing; and you haven't defined that. — Bob Ross

So every time I define words, you're not going to take a word I didn't bother defining and pull it into the conversation as if I agree to your definition of it, then say its confusing?

The quality of existing, property of existence, 'to exist', does not refer to a slice of existence: it refers to existing itself. — Bob Ross

No. You told me to define a word. I did. You don't get to then say, "No, that's not the word." I have been more than generous entertaining this, and its enough. You are not engaging with me or my definitions and seem caught up in your own understanding which you seem unable to accurately communicate. You keep making up new words I have to define as we go without first addressing what I've defined so far as I've defined it so far. I don't take it personally, as it can happen in any discussion we get passionate about. I think its time to gently cut it off now though, because it isn't going anywhere productive at this point.

The entire point was to give you a platform to come up with a moral theory that would contradict mine right? We've gotten too far away from that. If you want to continue to discuss your theory of morality in its own thread, feel free and see if you can make better headway. As it is, I think you need to think on it some more, organize your thoughts, and try again at a later time. As such, I'm not buying into an intrinsic values morality for the reasons I've stated earlier. It doesn't mean I'm correct or that you're wrong, it means that at this point in the conversation, I have not seen a substantial enough reason for me to consider it a complete enough theory, and its just time to move on.

If you would like, we can continue the conversation on the moral theory that's the topic of this thread, or take a break. I leave it to you.

To be charitable, I don’t think you even tried to define existence in the sense of ‘to exist’ but, rather, are defining ‘existence’ as the ~‘the whole’. I can demonstrate really easily how ‘to exist’ cannot be defined as what you have defined as ‘existence’: — Bob Ross

No charitableness to it, I did not bother trying to define 'to exist'. As noted earlier I wanted to cover existence and being first, as this needs to go step by step. Now that we're good there, I will.

Knocking out existence's 'as a whole' is fine. It was meant to emphasize we're talking about existence, not existences. You don't say "Existences to exist". You say, "That" exists. And when something exists, its a 'to exist'. In other words, 'to exist' is just another terminology to note that something is a slice, or discrete part of existence. To exist, is being.

No circularity. Just a few base words of existence and being, then followed by synonyms based on sentence structure.

Please go down my response where I lay out what existence is

You did not provide a definition in this response, and you gave the definition “Existence being defined as 'everything'” in this response. — Bob Ross

And I clearly stated that it was not a formal definition, just an off hand remark because I was trying to define being. So scratch it. You're supposed to analyze the formal definition I gave you as I asked you to.

Philosophim, a really easy way to help, would be if you just clarified what the definition is. — Bob Ross

Here it is again. This is what you should be analyzing.

No, that was not a formal definition. If you wish that, I will.

We observe the world in discrete identities. A discrete identity which is confirmed to match our perceptions (I claim that is an apple, and that is actually apple), is being. Existence as a whole, is the sum of all discrete identities observed and unobserved. As such, it is an abstract logical concept.

This requires me to amend being, as I had not formally defined existence. So a discrete identity is existence, but unless it is confirmed that the perceived identity is not contradicted by real application, it is not being. — Philosophim

Philosophim, I have linked TWO TIMES my demonstration; and you have ignored it TWO TIMES. — Bob Ross

And I've told you two times that it doesn't apply because you analyzed existence = everything as if that was how I was defining existence. I was not. But if you need, I'll demonstrate.

If ‘existence’ = ‘everything’, then: — Bob Ross

No. I did not say existence = a synonym as the definition. Below is the definition.

" Existence as a whole, is the sum of all discrete identities observed and unobserved."

1. ‘to be’ = ‘to exist’ = ‘to be everything’. the latter presupposes a concept of ‘to be’, ‘to exist’, which was supposed to be being defined.

I never stated these equivalencies above. I never even used the phrase 'to be'.

2. “this exists” = “this is everything”. Same problem as #1, and it makes no sense.

I never stated this either. So yes, it doesn't make any sense.

2. “that should not exist” = “that should not be everything”. this clearly makes no sense, and same problem as #1.

I agree. I have no idea where you got this.

3. “discrete existence” = “everything that exists discreetly”. Same problem as #1.

In no way did I note that an individual discrete 'existence' was the same as everything. I noted that being was a discrete slice of existence.

And that's enough. Please take what I posted above, go through that using the words I used, not phrases or words I didn't mention, and demonstrate where exactly the circularity occurs please.

Also, I am not asking for a definition of what the 'totality of existent things' is: I am asking for a definition of the concept of 'to exist'. — Bob Ross

This was not in your initial request. You just asked me to define being, then in the next request, existence. Lets go over those first instead of continuing to add new requests.

Which is the same definition you gave originally, with the addition of more clarification of what you mean by 'everything'. This has the exact same issues as my response I linked; and you still haven't addressed any of it. — Bob Ross

No it does not. Please go down my response where I lay out what existence is. I do not say, "Existence = everything. I'm trying to answer your question adequately Bob, please address the answers I give adequately as well. Your old example no longer works. If you wish to apply everything as a synonym to existence, that's fine. But that's not the concept. Please go over the concepts I put forward and demonstrate where I fall into circularity please.

So far, you have failed to do so: you saying "I can" doesn't beat the challenge: you have to provide the definition. — Bob Ross

I did. I also gave the definition of 'existence' up above. Did you read through the whole thing carefully? If you believe I've committed circularity please point out specifically where. And circular reasoning is never valid Bob. If the only way we can define the word being is with circular reasoning, then we throw it out. We don't just use a fallacious definition.

You took a jab at it here:

Existence being defined as 'everything' and being as 'a part'.

Ok, so you define ‘existence’ as ‘everything’. This doesn’t work and is circular. — Bob Ross

No, that was not a formal definition. If you wish that, I will.

We observe the world in discrete identities. A discrete identity which is confirmed to match our perceptions (I claim that is an apple, and that is actually apple), is being. Existence as a whole, is the sum of all discrete identities observed and unobserved. As such, it is an abstract logical concept.

This requires me to amend being, as I had not formally defined existence. So a discrete identity is existence, but unless it is confirmed that the perceived identity is not contradicted by real application, it is not being.

My point is I can construct being as a definition without circularity if I really want to do so. If you need circularity for your definitions, its a fallacy and an indicator that your logic isn't on the correct path. Words represent concepts, not other words. If you have a synonym, there's still an underlying concept the two words are representing. If there is no concept, the word means nothing.

That is exactly what you just did!!!! You just said “being” is “a slice of being”. Unless you are really about to tell me that “existence” is different than “being”, which is obviously isn’t, then you are using the term in its definition. — Bob Ross

No, I didn't say that being was a slice of being. I said it was a slice of existence. Existence being defined as 'everything' and being as 'a part'. Its the difference between amorphous existence, and discrete existence. Being = discrete existence. Amorphous and indiscrete existence isn't being. That's at least how I define it.

Thus it is not circular. You cannot define being as a slice of being. While being can have a further slice of being, that fact doesn't explain what being actually is. You can only use such a sentence after you understand that being = discrete existence, not before.

Alright Bob, if you genuinely think your theory has legs, keep trying. I'll give it a fair shake if you think I'm missing something.

I don't like how I've made some key points about your theory, and this seems to have been ignored and turned back around to me. This is your theory Bob. I'm not the reason why its not working.

My challenge to you is simple: (I want you to) define ‘being’ without circularly referencing it. Fair enough? — Bob Ross

I'll try, but its irrelevant to our conversation. Even if we cannot define being without circularity, that does not mean this applies to value. There are clear definitions of value that are out there, including my own. You'll need to first demonstrate why each of these clearly defined terms of value fail before you have a reason to declare its unanalyzable.

No, its not. Being is a slice of existence.

Do you see how you just circular defined ‘being’ referencing ‘existence’ in its definition? So this fails to beat my challenge. — Bob Ross

This isn't circular at all. A slice of existence is a discrete section of existence. Circular would be if I said 'being' is defined as 'narsh' and when you asked what narsh is, I replied with 'being'. That's what your definitions are coming across as right now to me. good = value = worth, with no other explanation.

There are several other philosophers who have also defined being. https://www.britannica.com/topic/Being

But once again, this is irrelevant and coming across as a dodge. You need to define value. You need to demonstrate why value is unanalyzable when other people clearly don't think this is the case. 'Being' is not going to help with that.

Are you asking for how, in my theory, we quantify value, or what value actually is itself? — Bob Ross

I'm asking you what moral value is, and how we can objectively determine it. And yes, if its an objective value, then some things are going to have more moral value than others. Murdering a baby vs saving a baby for example. This is not complicated, and I feel like you're trying to make it so because you're realizing you don't have an answer.

When you say it is ‘very different’, are you referring to that you explain how to quantify value, or that you don’t think ‘importance’ and ‘worth’ are circular references to ‘value’? — Bob Ross

Read the entire reply again please. I'm pointing out how I define value, morality, then quantify moral value. Good is 'what should be', more existence is more good, or moral value. This allows us to compare two potential states of existence, and determine which one we should pick, which is essentially a moral evaluation and value selection.

Moore held that goodness, and ‘good’, is undefinable, unanalyzable, and primitive. — Bob Ross

Well mine and several other theories of morality don't. To prove this is true, they need to explain why other moral attempts to do so are wrong. At the least, mine.

I am just noting that it is not uncommon in metaethics for moral realists to consider goodness primitive in this sense without conceding it is subjective. — Bob Ross

Its irrelevant if its common. That doesn't make it right. Your argument devolves into subjective morality because your only answer so far as to how we can objectively determine it is through majority rule, or expert rule. Arguments by majority or authority are not objective, they're just passed down from on high. We need the method. If you don't have a method, that's fine. But say so and lets be done with it.

Bob, I feel like you dodged trying to define value again, and I've felt like you've been doing this the entire time. Enough. Tell me you have a definition we can objectively verify, or that we don't. Explain to me why your definitions and moral theory demonstrate that my definitions and moral theory are wrong.

My definition of value, is Moorean—not subjective. — Bob Ross

Its not Moorean, its incomplete and ill defined. As such its left up to the subject to fill in what value means. Pointing to being does not absolve you from the fact that value is clearly defined in many theories, including in my theory.

By your reasoning, being is also subject; which is clearly false. — Bob Ross

No, its not. Being is a slice of existence. The primitiveness is in describing 'existence' vs 'non-existence'. Its an abstract of something you experience, therefore you must experience it to know it. How you experience 'being' is subjective, but the term is not.

Value: A designation of importance.

This is no different than defining it as ‘value: a designation of worth’. — Bob Ross

No, its very different. Because I proceed to explain that it can be quantified in a moral sense. Moral value is a moral designation of worth. I feel you're just being stubborn here Bob.

Likewise, value isn’t a designation: it would be, by your definition here, equal to importance. Something designates value, value is not some sort of designation itself; just like how someone can designate tasks, but a task isn’t defined as a designation <of something>. — Bob Ross

Sure, if designation bothers you, replace the word with 'attribute'. We can adjust this until we find something that objectively satisifies. Value is a way to ascribe importance to something. I demonstrate in the moral sense what is more important; more existence. And when I can measure existence, I can measure which state of existence has more value. Its a complete set of definitions all the way down. If you want to hash out word choices in the definitions, we can have that discussion. I can with my theory. We can't with yours because there's nothing but a circular reference of words without non-referenced meaning.

Irregardless, I am confused why you are insisting on disregarding the whole theory, in the sense of not even granting my definition of value for the sake of the conversation, when you clearly understand that my use of ‘value’ is ‘to have worth’; and you know darn well what ‘to have worth’ means, and that it is not itself subjective. — Bob Ross

No Bob, I don't know what it means to 'have worth' besides a reference to value and good, both of which have no other meaning then a reference back to each other. Clearly defining your term so I can understand what it is, is your job in your theory. Define an objective term that does not depend on my innately knowing its meaning. I sympathize with its difficulty greatly. I've tried to assist by giving definitions of value, and trying to ask for clarification where I see it lacking. At the end of the day, if you see something and others don't, you have to keep trying different words and definitions until it can convey an accurate and rational meaning for others to clearly understand. I will always attempt my best to give you a fair analysis and am always open to any changes needed to make it work. But you have to trust me when I say, "I don't know what it means." after all of these attempts.

Try to see it from my viewpoint. You've done this: good = value = worth. And when I've asked you to give an objective definition of any of them, you just refer to another word that has no objective definition. When I ask you to try, you tell me its unanalyzable. Meaning we're just saying noises in the air without any meaning. As such, I'm left to fit in my own subjective idea of what good, value, and worth is, because we have no objective designation.

Without a clear objective definition to value, worth, or good, there's no point moving on to the rest of the theory. Its Gandalfian philosophy at that point. We can continue to talk about what Gandalf would do in a situation, but its pointless because Gandalf at his core, is a fictional character. More importantly, because your meaning of value is so central to your theory, I can't rationally discuss anything higher that uses value. Its a key part of your theory that needs fixing.

People use the term ‘value’ exactly, by-at-large, how I am using it: I am not using it in some generic different way, so I am confused why you ignored the real content of my responses. — Bob Ross

Bob, you're using is subjectively because I still, after all we've discussed, honestly, without playing games, have no idea what it means. If you have to tell me, "I know you know it," and the other person is honestly telling you, "No I don't", then you need to clarify your definition.

There are only a few reasons why a person cannot clearly define a term. 1. They don't know how. In which case, it needs work. 2. They know that if they clearly define a term, it will expose a weakness in their overall argument. Poorly defined words are the haven of weak philosophies. Again, this means it needs work. It does not mean that the other person who is reading and asking for an objective and clear definition of your term is at fault.

Please try again Bob. And if after trying again you cannot refine your definition any further, then I have the rational justification to say its incomplete and move on.

The metaphysical point is this: motion is. Also, identity evades.

The epistemological point is this: we will never be finished coming to know, even one thing. — Fire Ologist

I actually prove we can know at least one thing, and then build up a full knowledge theory from there. You might like it as its approach is from the reader's experience like you've done here. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14044/knowledge-and-induction-within-your-self-context/p1

There's a great summary from the first response if you want to read that first.

The reason I don’t start with it, is because I don’t feel the need, when initially explaining the theory, to explain what ‘value’ is itself: I just use it. Every theory starts with something presupposed; and I find it satisfactory to start with ‘goodness is identical to “having value”’: this is generally, immediately understood by common folk. — Bob Ross

Bob, most philosophers are going to ask, "If good is what we're trying to define, and value it what is good, then what is value?" If you say you can't define it, then it means you can't define good either. Feel free to push that good is equal to value, but if you can't define value, then you have a subjective theory that depends on some amorphous poorly defined word.

I think we are referring to two different things by ‘value’ here. When I say ‘value’ is unanalyzable, I mean it is the sense of ‘what does it mean to be valued or have value?’ (i.e., what is value itself?); whereas you talking about ‘what has value, and how much?’. — Bob Ross

There are several definitions of value already in the philosophical space. If you're not going to use any of them, you'll have to explain why to your reader right? It just comes across as not having a fully fleshed out theory yet. Which its fine if its not, but its a key foundation of your theory and needs some type of explanation.

Comparing this to my own theory, I explain what morality is, and how to evaluate it. Meaning I have definitions of moral value and why there's moral value.

For example:
Value: A designation of importance. If quantified, this importance can be compared.
Moral value: A designation of moral importance. This can be quantified into existing and potential identities over time.

And when people ask, "Why are existing and potential identities valuable?" I can go back to demonstrating what rationally must be if objective good exists. Here of course is my assumption, "That objective good exists." But its clearly defined why its an assumption and why we've reached a limitation.

Since I have noted and backed definitions, and yours doesn't, why would anyone rationally choose the incomplete theory? You have too many competing definitions of value that already exist. If you state its unanalyzable, when several theories already have, its going to need to counter all those other theories that have analyzed it.

I think we can investigate intrinsic value, by means of the scientific method, as it would pertain to the study of discerning value which is derived from a person’s (conative or cognitive) dispositions vs. what mind-independently pressures, by its own nature, a person into valuing it. I think that answers your question pretty well. — Bob Ross

This means you don't currently have an answer for how we can objectively know intrinsic value. I'm not saying you're wrong, its just incomplete. If you want to use the scientific method, you'll need to generate an example of how we could go about determining the intrinsic value out of something using that method. There should be clear steps. As it is now, this is just an admittance that you don't know. Which is fine, it just needs improvement.

No. Take the same pain example, but imagine you genuinely believe, while in that state, that pain has no value — Bob Ross

Bob, one reason why you're having a hard time getting the answer you want is because you have no real definition of value. As such, mine and your definitions are personal, and thus probably don't line up. Do this with 100 people and you're going to get several different answers. Without a clear definition of value, this theory just won't work in a group setting.

I did review your second reply, but again, you're running into the same problem. Value is not objectively defined, therefore it is personally defined by whoever is using it. There's really no point in discussing value when its so subjective. Until that's fixed, this theory is dead.

Alright Bob, I've perused this whole thing. This is still one mess of a theory. If I had any suggestions it would be to go step by step in the proper order. For example you start with "goodness" before you define 'good'. Reverse that. Because if you do, you get this:

Good = value

What is value? Something primitive that cannot be analyzed.

Goodness = valuableness

What is valuableness? That which has value. So things can have goodness by having value. This order makes it much more clear what you're trying to say.

Second, you need to find and fix your contradictions.

But subjects are those that evaluate and determine value

Epistemically, of course we determine value: just like we determine truth, what exists, etc. The question is whether or not what we deem is valuable, actually is. And it only actually can be, if it is intrinsic. — Bob Ross

So value IS something that can be analyzed. It can be determined according to you in two ways:

1. By subjective human evaluation.
2. By something beyond human subjective evaluation.

And because there is a note that we can deem something valuable that actually isn't valuable, then real value is something beyond human subjective evaluation. To prove that such a thing exists, we must have an objective evaluation that proves what is valuable despite differences in subjective conclusions. Oh, and we'll make a phrase to shorten this. "Intrinsic value". So intrinsic value is objective value.

So the big question then is, "How do we objectively evaluate intrinsic value?" Your initial answer was by what the majority of us were compelled to do. But you made a clarification, which is fine, that

I am, and never was, claiming that what is intrinsically valuable—i.e., what is morally good—is contingent on our vote; I was saying that any institution we could create would preserve and gain knowledge of what is intrinsically valuable by way of convergence of experiences of states, as agreed upon by experts in the field. — Bob Ross

Ok, I can get behind this! But that leaves a massive question. How do our experts determine intrinsic value?

For example, the morality of the bible was once determined by a gathering of priests. They would hand out to the public how to interpret the bible, and what things were good and not good. The catholic church at one point sold indulgences, which let you pay money to be absolved of your sins. Now a person who studied the bible would wonder how they arrived at that conclusion when its clear that Jesus died to pay everyone's sin off. We could just go with the experts, but if we're going to be objective, we need to know how the experts arrived at their conclusion.

Philosophim, this is no different than science. Our institutions safeguard and declare scientific knowledge by way of expert consensus. As humans, we have no other way of doing it (institutionally). Does that mean what exists is subjective? Of course not! What nonsense! — Bob Ross

Yes, but we know science is objective because of the scientific method. What method are we using to find intrinsic value?

No, its pretty clear at this point that its value rests on minds and is absolutely subjective. I'm not seeing the case at all that it exists independently of people's judgements

Think of yourself in severe pain. Forget everything else.. Imagine you believe that the avoidance of pain is completely valueless: you will still behave like it has some value (in a negative sense). Why? Philosophim, if pain has no intrinsic value, then your belief or desire that it has no value should be enough to conclude it isn’t valuable; but it clearly isn’t enough, because pain, by its nature, compels you to value it. — Bob Ross

You are confusing the fact that I evaluate what to do about a state as if the state has value apart from my evaluation. Your insistence that I find value in it, is insistence that I evaluate it. That in no rational way, implies it has some innate value. If of course you're going to say that negative value exists, then everything that can be evaluated has value. This makes sense, because value is relative. But that's just noting conscious beings can evaluate any situation they're in. Of course. This isn't anything noteworthy. The question is how to objectively evaluate something and find its 'intrinsic value'. How much is it? How does it compare to other things of intrinsic value?

I think this is enough for now. Instead of going line by line I've tried to get the overall concept and issues I see.

I still think you are misunderstanding what the property of valuableness, in principle, is. It doesn’t reference how much value a thing has—only that it has value. That is the property we discussing: it is the very idea of ‘value’. — Bob Ross

Right, but value without any modifier means nothing. There's monetary value, moral value, emotional value, etc. Just saying 'value' has no reference as to what you mean.

For example:
value - the regard that something is held to deserve; the importance, worth, or usefulness of something.
"your support is of great value"

value -a person's principles or standards of behavior; one's judgment of what is important in life.
"they internalize their parents' rules and values"

My theory doesn’t have any notion or idea of ‘moral value’, because it is does not exist. — Bob Ross

Then you have no objective way of evaluating morality. If there is no moral value in anything, all is permitted.

Now, what I have not noted, is why it does not exist. If you reflect back on my definitions, you will notice that valuableness is more fundamental than goodness. — Bob Ross

According to you, there is no moral value. Meaning that goodness has no value. This, by consequence, means that value is not good either. They are two separate things here.

Where a ‘moral’ marker comes in, is when one denotes a specific type of value, that being intrinsic value, and this is called ‘good’ in a moral sense. — Bob Ross

So then there IS moral value. Intrinsic value is moral value, and moral value is good. Then we refer back to your definitions:

Goodness = ‘to have value’. So now that means that all value, is a value of goodness. Meaning that the value of a gem at $25 is more goodness than a gem valued at $30.

Moral goodness = ‘to have intrinsic value’. — Bob Ross

Here we have moral goodness, or moral 'to have value' (moral value) = intrinsic value. Except that anything which has value is goodness. So all value is goodness, but only moral value, which is moral goodness is intrinsic value. But since value is goodness, then intrinsic value is really intrinsic goodness. So somehow moral evaluation only applies to certain goodness, the intrinsic kind. Except that morality is an evaluation of what is good and not good. So how do we just dismiss some goodness, while other goodness is within morality? Your words don't fit Bob. You cannot have a segment of good that isn't within moral discussion. That's a violation of the term 'morality'.

In conclusion:
valuableness is more fundamental than goodness
Value = Goodness (What is goodness? Is value less fundamental than valuableness?)
Moral goodness = that which has intrinsic goodness.
Moral value = that which has intrinsic value.
Value = that which has extrinsic value

So extrinsic value is extrinsic goodness. Intrinsic value is intrinsic goodness. Yet moral value can only refer to intrinsic goodness, whereas references to extrinsic goodness do not involve moral valuation.
I THINK I get it. Please correct me where needed.

I think the real issue you are having, is that you don’t think intrinsic value, in the sense I am using it, exists; nor how it possibly could; nor how one could go about deciphering what has it, and to what degree. — Bob Ross

Correct.

So, let me try again. Intrinsic value is ‘value which is demanded by virtue of a thing’s nature’. — Bob Ross

This statement has unnecessary redundancy Bob. Lets simplify this to clearer language. Intrinsic value is what a thing demands. A things nature = a thing.

I blundered here before, by saying, at this point in my analysis, that only states which are associated with (sufficiently) living beings: I was confusing epistemology with ontology. — Bob Ross

No worry, you're with a friend. :) I'm not going for cheap gotchas. Feel free to correct, amend, or change anything at anytime, the issue is complicated.

A state which can demand (i.e., innately insistence on having) value is one which IF it were experienced by a subject, then it would compel that subject to value it to a degree equal to its insistence; but such a state could exist, of which no current subject has the capacity to experience it. — Bob Ross

How can a non-living state insist on having something? isn't that personification? I understand that you're talking about a state that could be experienced by a subject that subject has not yet experienced. But subjects are those that evaluate and determine value. Just because we evaluate something as positive, that does not mean the thing we are evaluating insisted on it. Our emotional initial judgement insisted on it. Same thing as if we judge something as not having value. Personifying states is just odd Bob, and I don't see the logic behind it. States simply are. At best you let living things decide their value.

So, how do we determine that a state has intrinsic value? By experience. — Bob Ross

We experience a state, such as pain, and it is clear (to any reasonably rational person with the proper capacities to produce pain [neurologically]) that it compels value in its avoidance. — Bob Ross

The state is not compelling anything. We are reacting to a state and have to make a decision. I don't understand the rationale behind the personification of states still.

Think about, Philosophim, from your own perspective: forget your parents, forget everyone else. Imagine you are in severe pain: you are seriously telling me you cannot fathom how the state of pain compels you to value its avoidance, all else being equal? — Bob Ross

First, the state of pain is a state of a living body. A living judgement allows the being to decide what to do about it. Normally, a moral decision would be, "How should I avoid the pain?" My father has constant back pain and was on opioids for pain relief for a time. He realized he was getting addicted to the pills, so stopped taking them despite having the back pain. Did my father make a moral decision? He accepted the pain despite his desire to avoid it. So in your view, it seems my Dad violated the intrinsic value of pain and committed an immoral act. And no, the 'insistence' to get off the pain pills was not stronger. He made a rational decision based on his experience with addiction to alcohol. So he worked through that stronger desire to pick the thing that 'insisted' he not pick, pain. Again, this is an odd way to speak as if states have demands. Its really just an emotional battle within an experience.

Second, "Imagine you are in severe anger: you are seriously telling me you cannot fathom how the state of anger compels you to value its acceptance, and stab that guy with a knife because he insulted you, all else being equal?" What you're doing here Bob is saying that whenever we are compelled to make a decision one way, that it is the state of the experience expressing its intrinsic value, or good. So whatever we are most compelled to do is good. Meaning if I'm strongly compelled to gas some people because I'm a Nazi and love my country, that's intrinsically good. There are some serious problems here.

Now, like all other empirical studies, our knowledge of intrinsic value as an institutionalized study would be a convergence of perspectives on empirical studies of states, such that we could sufficiently conclude that certain states do compel to be valued, and to a degree equal to its force of compelment. — Bob Ross

Yeah, that's kind of crazy Bob. You're saying that moral evaluation is to be done by majority vote of what people really want to do? We are compelled to make decisions when we are experiencing certain states of reality. Meaning that if the majority of people believe in Islam, Islam is intrinsically good while atheism is intrinsically bad. Meaning that killing the infidels is intrinsically good. Moral value is done by majority action, without question as to whether the majority is making the correct choices by rational analysis.

I don’t hold that valuableness, and subsequently goodness, is a natural property: you can’t scientifically investigate the property, because it is supervenient on the physical constitution of entities (viz., it is supervenient on the natural properties). — Bob Ross

But you basically say they're discovered by what people are most compelled to do. Isn't that in the realm of science? I can say, "70% of Americans are Christians, therefore being a Christian is intrinsic goodness while not being a Christian is intrinsic badness." Therefore science has discovered being a Christian is morally valuable while not being a Christian is not.

if it compels, simply from its own nature, to be valued (e.g., if I really like pizza being thrown across the room, that doesn’t make pizza being thrown across the room inrinsically valuable: whereas, whether I like it or not, being in pain, by its nature, compels me to avoid it — Bob Ross

But if 51% of people are really compelled to throw a pizza across the room, it is intrinsically valuable. Finally I can justify my secret urge! :D

Intrinsic value is factual, because it is value which is objective; and it is objective because its value is exists mind-independently and the truth of the matter whether it exists is stance-independent. — Bob Ross

No, its pretty clear at this point that its value rests on minds and is absolutely subjective. I'm not seeing the case at all that it exists independently of people's judgements. The matter whether moral value exists is very stance dependent. If I take 100 atheists and ask them if they are compelled not to believe in God, then not believing in God is intrinsically good. If we ask the majority of the world to prevent climate change and the majority say "No", then it is intrinsically good not to fight climate change.

Does that help? — Bob Ross

Its helped me to come to the above conclusions. Please correct me where I am wrong.

Goodness is ‘to have value’: so how can you say I haven’t answered what goodness is? You can disagree with what I claimed it was, but you certainly can’t say I didn’t answer. Likewise with valuableness: I said it is an unanalyzable property, like beingness, which is akin to beingness. That’s an answer. — Bob Ross

Because you basically said goodness is an unanalyzable property, then insisted that it could be objectively known, and as we discovered above, be analyzed. Further, you've said that some good is under moral consideration, while other good is not, which is again, a violation of the definition of morality.
I understand a bit better what you intended now, but it was was definitely confusing on a first pass.

Moral goodness? What would immoral goodness be then?

Ah, I am not intending to use ‘moral’, as the adjective here, in the sense of ‘being good’—as that is circular—but, instead, to denote a sub-type of goodness which pertains to morality. — Bob Ross

Per your defintions, moral goodness would be moral value. Goodness would be a value, just not a moral one unless its intrinsic. And again, morality is the study of what is good. What rational reason do you have to say, "Except that good over there." Generally that which is not considered in morality is neither good nor evil. So why do you construct a contradiction between your terms? If there is 'good' that cannot be discussed morally, its not really 'good', and needs another term to not be a contradiction.

Even if I didn’t, it would not follow (from what I said) that alive beings are intrinsically valuable (which is what you said here). Rather, the state, which only an alive being could experience, would be intrinsically valuable. — Bob Ross

Right, living things aren't intrinsically valuable, its living things that decide whether something has value or not when they come across an experience. And if the majority of living beings think a particular state of living/experience/state is more valuable, then it is intrinsically valuable.

No, Kant isn't confused here.

I think Kant is, but I don’t think this is very important to what I am saying. By noting that a thing has value in-itself, I am noting that it has value intrinsic to its nature. — Bob Ross

As long as you aren't saying that intrinsic value is a thing in-itself. Because that is incoherent. It has value in its representation that most people experience.

Alright, if I understand your moral theory here, this is morality through majority judgement. There are a ton of problems here. First, many of your identities for situations don't fit. Intrinsic and extrinsic value can more easily be replaced with Majority value and Minority value. This makes things much more clear. What is value? What states people decide to be in. What is moral? Majority value. Is minority value immoral? No, but it certainly not 'good' then, meaning that the majority can refer to that minority value as not being moral.

What is good? Things that people value. But somehow its only a moral consideration of goodness when the majority is involved. So, its at best a confusing descriptive sense of morality, not normative. And this descriptive morality is 100% subjective. Even if a state has not been experienced yet, its value will only be found by majority judgement. Not to mention that there's nothing which rationally compels anyone for lemming morality.

There are so many problems with this, as there are in every subjective morality. What do we do when there's a conflict of cultures? What happens when the majority changes over time? If what the majority decides is moral, then what justification is there for a minority to choose otherwise or try to change the majority? Am I evil for trying to educate an ignorant populace? If the majority of people used drugs and were addicted, that's moral? I'm not asking you to answer these, because I've had these debates before and already know potential solutions and problems. Overall, I find these theories lacking.

In addition, what you're trying to say here has been said much clearer elsewhere in philosophy. Your construction of this is confusing Bob. Its riddled with at best, odd, and at worst, contradiction or incoherent word choices for concepts. Things need to be simple and as clear as possible. In the end, this is a subjective moral majority philosophy. That's it. And that has no chance in challenging my theory in any rational sense. Your claim that it is objective does not fit. You cannot have a theory that is determined by majority subjectivism and call that rationally objective. I have no reason to buy into what the majority values as moral. That's just an insistence by the majority, and that is not considered a rational request by anyone.

Finally, the death knell of any theory is if its own theory can contradict itself. Bob, what happens if the majority of people don't choose your state of morality? As in we don't find any value in it? Doesn't that mean your moral theory, isn't really a moral theory by the arguments giving within? Since most don't value this theory, It would mean the state of your theory has no intrinsic value. So again, by your own theory, this theory has no intrinsic value or moral worth. Since it has no moral worth, we can just ignore it.

Alright, that's enough from me for now! I do appreciate the time that went into constructing this theory and attempting to clear it up, but as i currently understand it, its just not making any new claims or contributions that haven't already been long considered and disregarded by most people.

To evaluate whether something has the property of valuableness, is just to assess its worth — Bob Ross

I have no issue with this.

which is to say nothing beyond saying it has value. — Bob Ross

So then value is simply a synonym of worth. I have no issue with this. Now you have to identify worth though. None of my questions have changed, just replace my points about 'value' to 'worth' now.

How much value is not something determinable from the (general) property of valuableness itself: if that were the case, then we would have to posit an infinite amount of properties to account for each value—which is clearly misguided. — Bob Ross

This makes no sense. I have a gem worth 25$ and a gem worth 30$. We can both clearly see how much value each gem has. Is it the case that we have to put value into a phrase like 'monetary value'? If you're just saying 'value' alone has no sense of 'valuableness', sure, that's a given. We're talking about value in terms of moral value. How do we objectively determine moral value?

So, how one can determined the exact value of something, which is an ‘evaluation’ in the sense that you implied, has no bearing on whether or not the property of ‘having value’ is primitive or not because the property will necessarily, even if it could be defined, not contain a means of evaluation but rather is the mere idea of ‘worth’ in general. — Bob Ross

Its moral value or moral worth. How do you determine it? If you just say, "It intrinsically has it", then this is saying nothing Bob.

I'm skipping the "Good" analysis for now for my theory as I agree we should focus on what you mean by value first.

Goodness = ‘to have value’. — Bob Ross

This still doesn't answer what value or goodness is. This doesn't answer what good is, or how we can objectively evaluate it.

Moral goodness = ‘to have intrinsic value’. — Bob Ross

Moral goodness? What would immoral goodness be then? Again, I have no idea what value is, or how we know its intrinsic.

This is ‘to have worth’, and this is just to reiterate ‘to have value’ with a synonym. The property itself is primitive, and unanalyzable. — Bob Ross

It is when you put it into a phrase 'moral value'. If you say you can't define it Bob, then its a unicorn word and isn't real.

Likewise, why you should care about intrinsic value, is that it is morally good; and if you are a virtuous person of morally good character, then you will. — Bob Ross

Why is it morally good? Value? What is value? Morally good? Bob, you must see that you're saying a lot of nothing right now right? I feel like you're twisting yourself in avoiding the straight forward question of, "What constitutes moral value? How do we objectively determine it?"

There is nothing that forces, per se, anyone to value anything—but this does not takeaway from the fact that there are moral facts. — Bob Ross

Ok, there's no one that forces somebody to value, then how is value determined? If there are moral facts, how do we determine they are moral facts and not people just saying, "Its moral because it is."

Whether or not someone should care about what has intrinsic value, does not in takeaway from the fact that it has intrinsic value. — Bob Ross

How do I know this is a fact? If someone told me the Earth circled around the Sun, they would need to give me reasons why that is when I can look up into the sky and clearly see that it circles around us.

All you are noting, by asking why anyone should care, is that people can devalue (or not value at all) facts. — Bob Ross

That's to lead up to the question, "How do we objectively know what a thing's value is as a fact?"

I wasn’t using ‘state’ this generically, but that is fine. It is fine to think of states as ‘states of being’, for all intents and purposes, and, to that, I would then clarify that the state of being that a rock has does not have intrinsic value because that state is incapable of any innate insistence/demand (of value). — Bob Ross

Ok, so then a state that can have intrinsic value must be something that is alive.

Under your theory, its fine to destroy matter as we wish as long as it does not affect life.

Correct. This is because the states which have intrinsic value, are only possible for beings which are sufficiently alive.

If only states of life can have value, why?

No. States which are not attributable to beings that are alive can have value—it just isn’t intrinsic. — Bob Ross

There's a bit of a contradiction here. Are you trying to say, "Those with intrinsic value cannot be outright destroyed, but those with value can?" If so, once again, how do we determine value objectively?

Intrinsic value, is value which is demanded in virtue of the nature of the state: that is a very clear definition — Bob Ross

To be clearer, it is demanded in virtue of the nature of a living state. Implicit value is only in living things according to you, so could we address that explicitly so there's no confusion? How does a living thing demand implicit value? Does it ask? Does it yell? How does this word have any meaning an actual example?

The chief mistake Kant made, is thinking that because a thing-in-itself is not directly experienced that it cannot be known at all—which is clearly false. — Bob Ross

Ok, as long as you understand what Kant was stating. If you disagree with him, that's fine.

In a sentence, he is confusing absolute knowledge with things-in-themselves: no one has to concede that they have absolute knowledge of a thing-in-itself to say they have conditional knowledge of it, by way of theirs senses. — Bob Ross

No, Kant isn't confused here. Unless you're referring to something I'm not aware of in Kant elsewhere, here he introduced the concept of 'thing in-itself' to avoid an accusation of being an idealist. If all that exists is phenomenal existence, then there is nothing concrete underneath that we are representing on. The simple point he was making was that we are representers, and there is something that we are representing. As we can only express that something as a representation, it will never capture the essence of what it is in-iteself that we are representing on.

that doesn’t takeaway from the fact that we have good conditional knowledge to claim that the apple itself, which is to immediately discuss as it is in-itself, has mass. — Bob Ross

The 'itself' of the apple is not referring to the 'thing in itself' that we're looking at to represent the apple. It means the representation of the apple itself. Same with mass in itself. Or any 'representation' itself. Referring to the representation itself is not a reference to the thing in-itself that is underlying the representation.

For example, let’s take your reasoning seriously that a thing-in-itself is unknowable because we only every directly experience a representation of it. Ok. Take an apple, for example: does it have mass in-itself? It seems like it does: every bit of evidence points to that conclusion—but, Kant will insist that we can’t absolutely know it is true, because we only have representations to go off of. — Bob Ross

Kant will say it can be reasonably concluded within our representation. But despite this, we still don't know what thing in-itself that we're placing the representation of apple and mass on is. And he's right. We'll never know the truth. But you and I have had enough knowledge discussion in the past to know that what is true is outside of the grasp of humanity. All we have is knowledge.

To Kant's point, he would be ok with saying, "We know that our representation of mass fits within the rational representation of the apple, but we cannot know the truth of the thing in-itself that our representations rest on." Back to my theory of knowledge, "We can construct discrete experiences and apply them. As long as 'reality' (the thing in-itself) does not contradict this identity and its application, we can know it. But knowing it does not make it true, only just that our applied identity is not in contradiction with reality.

So, I have no problem analyzing the nature, the essences, of things—which you cannot do if you take your position seriously because the essence doesn’t pertain to mere appearances but, rather, what a thing’s actual properties are as it is in-itself—while conceding I have only conditional knowledge of it. — Bob Ross

If you want to create a definition of value and demonstrate it objectively exists, that's fine. If you want to refer to living things, as definitions, and refer to that definition by saying, "That living thing itself," that's fine. If you want to create a definition of value, then say its a 'thing in itself' that cannot be represented, then its a unicorn that cannot be sensed and outside of any rational consideration. I have an actual objective definition and application of moral value, and will rationally be able to dismiss yours outright. If you want to propose a serious position of ethics that can counter this, you must clearly define what moral value is, and how we can evaluate it. If you cannot, then by every rational measure your theory falls apart.

I am not referring to absolute knowledge of the nature of a thing, but, rather, conditional knowledge of the nature of a thing. I doubt you deny we can evaluate the natures of things. — Bob Ross

If you claim this, please show this. Define moral value. Demonstrate how we can evaluate it. I've given clear ways to do so on my end. If you put forward a definition of moral value that cannot be evaluated, while I have, then your theory fails.

Even if I were claiming that healthy and rational people always recognize intrinsic value 100% of the time (which I am not) — Bob Ross

Then how do we objectively evaluate intrinsic value? The point that people can decide to choose states that have high or low value is irrelevant if you're not going to give an objective way they can measure and decide.

99.99% of the time a rational + healthy person would behave as if it had value when put in that state—and that is what I mean by “they can only superficially deny its value”. — Bob Ross

This is not a real number. All we can really state is that you believe people usually choose better states than not. I have no problem agreeing with that. But we're discussing an objective morality. What objectively is a better state? How can a person evaluate objectively which state is better?

and that is what I mean by “they can only superficially deny its value”. — Bob Ross

Its superficial merely because they're in the minority? That's not what superficial means. It would be a superficial decision if they only glanced at it and didn't think deeper about it. If you're going to say they need to think deeper about it, how should they objectively do so?

Whether they recognize the value, cognitively their faculty of reason, is a separate question; and the answer is the vast majority probably wouldn’t conclude it has intrinsic value; because they don’t know what that means. — Bob Ross

Yes! I still don't know what intrinsic value means! :D I don't know how they could cognitively evaluate a situation and determine which situation has more intrinsic value than the other. This is a very real problem with your theory so far Bob. I've harped on it enough for now, but you'll need to give an objective definition of moral value, how we can evaluate moral value, and what intrinsic value is and how we can evaluate it objectively as well.

Not a problem Bob!

Lets start with taking your theory and addressing my criticisms with your current definition of value not quite working. Once we can establish a solution there, we can go back to your criticisms of how my theory approaches 'the Good'.

alan1000, this is the second over 6 month old necropost I've seen you resurrect. Is this accidental or on purpose? Check to see how old these are next time.

Yes. A better word then 'sense' is 'context'. This makes it fairly straight forward as we understand many words meaning change within different contexts.

Externalised expressions convey concepts as independent of the speaker, while Non-Externalised expressions rely on the speaker's personal factors. — Judaka

I would say this isn't quite right. What about this?

Externalized expressions convey concepts based on the observable actions of the speaker, while non-externalized expressions rely on the unobserved personal experience of the speaker.

I say this because I don't think actions are independent of the speaker. I may feel sad for example but force a smile and active activity to mask my internal feelings. Actions can be externally observed and interpreted while internal feelings cannot.

Externalised expression presents concepts as objective, introducing them independently of personal criteria. — Judaka

I would argue they are not objective. They are ways for the speaker to convey what they want others to believe about their feelings. "You may be smiling, but objectively you're still sad."

In contrast, Non-Externalised expression, such as "I don't like the pacing of country music because I prefer a faster tempo," removes this ambiguity. Preferences do not qualify as objective reasoning. — Judaka

Agreed.

Externalised expression inherently carries a stronger force due to its establishment of concepts as potentially objective. — Judaka

I think they carry a stronger force with other people as other people cannot see into a person's internal feelings. But we're all aware that people can lie with their external expressions. The key is that a lie of external expressions requires a lot more effort and control. Meaning that extended period of conversation will result in slip ups or inconsistencies.

Other than my slight offered tweak, I like your thoughts overall. =)

Great discussion! — Bob Ross

Absolutely! And yes, its great for us to condense these down every once in a while so they don't become reams of papyrus scrolls. :)

Valuableness in an unanalyzable, primitive property: all that can be described of it is with synonyms (e.g., ‘to be of value is to have worth’, etc.). — Bob Ross

I'm surprised you're going this route. First, I was able to point out what value meant, and a concrete example of value in my theory. I'll address it again towards the end of this post. Second, it still means you then have to point out what the synonym for value is, and then explain what that means. It just kicks the ball over a notch at best.

With respect to #1, it is obvious that valuableness is not identical to ‘to ought to be’ by way of examples (of its valid use). For example, when one says “that diamond is worth $1500”, they are not commenting on whether it should exist per se but, rather, that it has a specific, quantitative worth. In short, it is impossible to convert quantitative values to the property of ‘to ought to be’. — Bob Ross

That is because you are comparing two types of values. There's monetary value and moral value. If I state that $1500 has more value than $750, this is an example of comparative monetary value. If I say one state of existence is 20 ex(existence), and another state of existence is 25 ex, the one at 25 ex has more moral value. If existence is 'what should be' and explicated and identified good is what is how we establish moral value, then there is nothing wrong with me pointing out moral value.

With respect to #2, a great example of an unanalyzable and primitive property is ‘beingness’. It is impossible to explain ‘beingness’ without circular reference — Bob Ross

Certainly, but that doesn't mean we don't have a meaning within that circularity that we can point to. We all know what existence is as a concept. Beingness is pointing to a slice of existence and noting that it is existing. It is embodying 'being'. Its primitive because we cannot go deeper than that. The problem is I have no idea what you're pointing to by saying a thing has value within your theory. I don't know how to evaluate it. And 'value' by definition, is used for evaluation.

Value is a an implication of worth generally. Implicit in using value is the understanding that some things have more worth than others. In implicit speech, when we say, "I value that," we're also saying, "...more than these other things.". If everything has the same value, value loses meaning. Value is generally used as a relational measurement of worth. Even then, value is not a primitive because there's a question of 'evaluation'. How do we determine something has value? Why is X valued more than Y?

I absolutely agree that our moral principles cannot be absolute; but what it is a right, for it to be a right in the traditional sense, requires that it is irrevocable but does not require us to posit an absolute principle — Bob Ross

Irrevocable and absolute are the same in our analysis though. If I say, "I have the right to life," and its irrevocable, that means that in no way is it ever right for me to be killed. That's absolute. The moment we say, "Except for the case when its war," then our right is no longer irrevocable. An absolute principle is one which does not change no matter the context. Relativistic principles can. If the right has an "Except" clause, its relativistic.

Of course, I also agree that we refurbish them; but this is not because the fact of the matter about what is a right has changed but, rather, our understanding of it. — Bob Ross

Sure, I can get behind this. For example if we said, "Every life has the right to life," but then later said, "Actually, only every human has the right to life," we're still saying the right is absolute, its just we were wrong the first time around. Of course, the question then comes into play, "How do we know if our claims of an absolute right are correct?" How do we prove this absolute under your theory? I can show there are a few absolute moral guidelines that work because a violation of them always results in less existence under my theory. Its just there are fewer absolute rules that I can prove then I think you would like. Can you prove the same under your theory?

When you relativize rights, you mask mere privileges under the name of something with much more vigor to its name. — Bob Ross

I will state once more that an allowance is not the same as a self-restriction. Your real issue is that I state society determines both. But can we both agree that a privilege is an allowance by a society, while a right is a restriction on a society? I think are real argument is that I say such a restriction is established by a society, while you believe such restrictions are not established by societies. Is this fair to say?

Regardless, how do you answer questions of conflicting rights? How do we manage exceptions like stealing for food?

Thirdly, you ask for evidence of intrinsic value. I have already given it, but there are some things worth clarifying: — Bob Ross

I have not understood this evidence Bob. Please point it out again.

2. When I say a thing demands value, I mean it in the sense of innate insistence. — Bob Ross

This still doesn't mean anything. If I insist that I'm worth 10 million dollars and society should give it to me, society is not obligated to do so. Why should anyone care about what I insist my intrinsic value is? And again, how is this intrinsic value determined? This doesn't make sense.

3. One thing I have failed to mention, is that intrinsic value is only possible for states; because nothing else can provide innate insistence on value. Thusly, to take your rock example, a rock can’t have intrinsic value, simply because it cannot innately compel whatsoever. However, the state of pain can. — Bob Ross

A rock can have a state of being. I'm going to infer what you mean is intrinsic value is the state of a living being. According to your theory then, non-living things have no value. In my theory, they do. If in the future we come up with a matter destroying ray, I can argue why such a thing would be immoral, and that we should only focus on matter deconstruction rays. Under your theory, its fine to destroy matter as we wish as long as it does not affect life.

If only states of life can have value, why? What determined that? Why is life special when it is clearly made up of non-life? The state of pain is a physical process of electrical impulses traveling down nerves. If the state of pain has value, but we eliminate the non-life of those electrical impulses, it would destroy pain. But then doesn't this mean the non-life part of pain, the electrical impulse, now has value as well?

Is the state of pain only valuable if we're conscious of it? Pain inhibitors don't block the initial signals of pain being sent by areas of the body, only the end receptors to the pain message. Is the pain now valueless because the receptors don't fire? Or what if the receptors do fire, but the brain cannot interpret the message into the qualia of pain? Or is the 'state of pain' simply the conscious qualia of it to begin with?

My theory of pain looks at the entire thing. The physical and the qualia. We can evaluate moral pain blocking techniques. Lets say we had different pain blockers that affected different parts of the body. The cells firing, the receptors, and the brain's qualia. We would want to do the least amount of disruption to the system, so a targeted effort to the area that caused the least disruption would be the most moral pain blocker to use.

I answer, to your dissatisfaction, that a rational and healthy person would only be able to superficially deny its value when in that state. This does not beg the question, because I am not presupposing the truth of the conclusion in an (implicit) premise; and it is not confirmation bias because I am not saying that a person is definitely unhealthy or irrational if they deny it in a non-superficial sense: I am saying that, based off of the empirical knowledge on rational + healthy people in such states, it is sufficiently proven that they confirm the value of such states. — Bob Ross

Bob, its not sufficiently proven at all. Rational and healthy people choose lower states of being without question.

1. You have not given a way for us to evaluate the intrinsic value of a state extrinsically, yet base it off of people's extrinsic evaluations in a contradiction.

2. Your only counter thus far to people who choose states of lower value are that they are unhealthy or irrational. Which implies that healthy rational people automatically choose better states. This absolutely begs the question: "Why are healthy and rational people always able to evaluate higher value states 100% of the time?" We still haven't been given the criterion for evaluating innate value yet. What is the rational process they use? How does health contribute to this? Is an unhealthy rational person incapable of choosing a state of higher value?

Fourthly, you noted the Kantian position on things-in-themselves again; and I wanted to briefly note that I deny that altogether. I think you are conflating absolute truth with things-in-themselves: the former is what you are really arguing is unobtainable (by my lights). — Bob Ross

"In his doctrine of transcendental idealism, Kant argued the sum of all objects, the empirical world, is a complex of appearances whose existence and connection occur only in our representations.[2] Kant introduces the thing-in-itself as follows:

'And we indeed, rightly considering objects of sense as mere appearances, confess thereby that they are based upon a thing in itself, though we know not this thing as it is in itself, but only know its appearances, viz., the way in which our senses are affected by this unknown something.'"

— Prolegomena, § 32

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thing-in-itself#:~:text=In%20Kantian%20philosophy%2C%20the%20thing,independent%20of%20representation%20and%20observation.

In very simple terms, we have a 'thing in-itself' vs a 'thing as-ascribed'. If you ascribe anything to a 'thing in-itself' you are confused and actually creating a 'thing as-ascribed'. You cannot ever give any type of identity to things in themselves. It is merely a base philosophical concept to demonstrate there is something upon which we are representing, but that we can never in our representing, what that thing in itself as it is. Thus there is no 'value' as a thing in itself. That's an ascription. A representation of something which cannot be identified or known.

Fifthly:

"Goodness" is a state of reality with the embodiment of "What should be" as "What is".

“what should be” and “what is” are both not properties. — Bob Ross

I don't understand why this matters. The definitions of good and goodness are what they are. If they aren't properties to you, then they aren't properties. You'll have to explain to me the importance of this because I just don't understand.

Sixthly:

Explicated and identified Good = moral value

&

I have the answer of what a value is (what should be)

I am not following. First, I thought you were saying ‘goodness’ is ‘to ought to be’; now you seem to be agreeing with me it is ‘to have value’. You have also said — Bob Ross

You are the one who put it as 'to ought to be', not me. I'm trying to show you what value means here, but it seems I dropped the ball. Let me try again.

Moral value is the evaluation of total good in any one scenario. Just like monetary value is defined by an explicated and identified price, so moral value is defined by an explicated and identified value of goodness. The explicated and identified way we evaluate good is through the expression of identities and potential through time. Thus we can tally this up in any scenario, and that is its moral value. In scenario 1 there is a moral value of 20, and in scenario there is a moral value of 25. Thus I have clearly laid out what value means and demonstrated an example of its existence and how we use it. Can your theory do the same?

Then, to make matters more confusing, you have also said that
To know what ought to be, you have to know the value of what is
: that implies you need to determine the value of a thing before you can determine whether it ought to be, — Bob Ross

If I give you the choice of a green jewel vs a red jewel, but you don't know the monetary value of each jewel, can you make a knowledgeable decision to choose the jewel with the most value? No. You must know the value of each before you can make a correct monetary decision. The same goes with moral decisions. We need to know the value of the potential states before we can make the correct decision.

Seventhly, morality does not boil down to the question of “should there be existence?”, nor is that a moral foundation. — Bob Ross

You've said this in the past and that's fine for now. Lets see where your moral theory takes you.

A moral foundation is the core of an ethical theory, and that is going to be, in any good theory, an outline of the hierarchy (i.e., the ontology) of things with intrinsic value. — Bob Ross

And what determines intrinsic value? Alright, that's it for now Bob!

Cool discussion on rights to start with! I still feel like we're not terribly off from one another. The difference is the lens approach from our different theories. As such I'm going to start with your theory, then address rights after.

By ‘objective value’, I am assuming you mean value which is objective; and this is not synonymous with intrinsic value per se. Any value which is objective, is just any value which exists mind-independently and the truth of the matter (whether it has such value) is stance-independent. — Bob Ross

This is a description of something that is objective, but not a concrete proven example of an objective value. In other words, I'm asking for a knowable value that cannot be easily denied using rational thought. So far all you've effectively stated is that a value is a value, and its objective because its mind-independent. What is a value? What reasons, evidence, etc. point to a value being something which exists independently from an opinion or mere belief?

Where intrinsic value ties in, is that it is the only possible form of ‘objective value’ because it is the only type of value which is inscribed, so to speak, on the thing per its nature: it is the only form of value that is of the thing in-itself. — Bob Ross

This also doesn't answer anything Bob. First, what is a value? Second, how is it inscribed? There needs to be a clear definition, and then an example of clear application. Third, if value is a 'thing in-itself', then it is unknowable. As a callback to previous conversations, a thing-in itself can never be labeled or ascribed. It exists only as a reminder to us that everything we speak about is an interpretation of some 'thing'. What that thing is, we can never know.

I should be more clear as well when say 'objective morality' When we're talking about morality, we're talking really about an objective foundation. To my mind, there is not a moral theory out there besides this one that uses an objective foundation. Moral foundations vary from deism, societal stability, hierarchy dominance, and idealism. But the foundations themselves are questionable. If for example a moral theory is based on there being a God, I would ask, "Can you prove God exists? What is God?" and so on. For your value based theory, I'm asking you to objectively show what 'value' means. Can you prove values exist? What is a value?"

Its important to do so because we want to avoid what I call "Gandalfian Philosophy" (Or Phictional Philosophy for fun). Gandalf is a character in the Lord of The Rings series of books by JRR Tolkien. He has a particular personality and way of working. We can debate what he would do in a particular situation. If the Hobbits were misbehaving would he turn them into toads or berate them? "Oh, he would berate them of course, Gandalf isn't the type to use his magic to punish and intimidate friends!" And of course, we come to some lovely conclusions that make logical sense that everyone agrees with. There's just one problem. Gandalf is a fictional character. The foundation destroys any semblence of the theory meaning any more than a fictional game.

So, does intrinsic value exist, or is it a fictional invention? You get the idea.

A useful way of thinking about intrinsic value, by my lights, is that the thing which has it demands recognition as valuable; and that is how one can decipher whether or not one simply values the thing because of their own (cognitive or conative) disposition, or whether it has actual value. I do not mean ‘demands’ in a personified sense. — Bob Ross

A demand is a personified meaning. At best we can apply it to an animals stubbornness. How does a rock demand? And even if it does demand, why do I have to care? Why should I listen to its demands? "Because its innate" is not an answer. We're missing some logic here.

A great example is the pain example, but I have already explicated that one; so I will leave it there. — Bob Ross

I thought I addressed it but I'll point it out again.

I agree that pain has value in the fact that its purpose is to ensure the living being stops injuring itself and gives itself time to heal. However, pain has no intrinsic value in itself. If I'm going to get surgery, feeling the pain from the knife serves no purpose at that point. Something that has intrinsic value means that it has value in itself. But in this instance, it does not. — Philosophim

In an abstract armchair sense of 'people will always choose the more positive state', it sounds good. In reality, people aren't like that. Many people choose the state that we we would consider less valuable.

This isn’t a contention with anything I said, and I wholly agree. Some people simply lack the cognitive ability, or the wisdom, to see that the state is better; and some are so defective or damaged that they no longer can recognize it, even though they could have earlier in their life. — Bob Ross

Then I misunderstood your intention with the example. I asked for an objective example of being able to know intrinsic value. My understanding was that when faced with a choice between two value outcomes, we will always choose the higher value outcome. Because we do this, it proves one is the intrinsically higher value outcome. My problem with this was two fold:

1. This is an extrinsic judgement with no proof of intrinsic value.
2. People choose the 'wrong' value outcome.

These two points combine leave too many questions. How does an extrinsic value evaluation which can be disagreed upon by multiple people prove objective intrinsic value to a particular state? Even if the majority choose state 1, does that prove that state one is the state with more intrinsic value?

My point was that, in isolation, and reasonably healthy and intelligent person will not be able to deny the value of a state that has (negative or positive) intrinsic value if put in that state. Of course, if you put a defective person, a damaged person, a really cognitively impaired person, in such a state, then we would not expect them to fully grasp that state properly (due to their condition). — Bob Ross

This is a nice thought, but begging the question.

1. A healthy person will always choose the right value state.
Q: But what about people who don't choose the right value state?
A: Its because they aren't healthy.

The question being begged is the proof that a healthy person always chooses the right value state. You're assuming this, not proving this.

“Good” is not a property. Your definition needs to of the form “goodness is <insert-definition-here>”. Likewise, “what should be” is not a property. Thusly, you have not analyzed the property of goodness whatsoever in making this remark. — Bob Ross

Bob, I noted the word "Good" not goodness here. I wasn't trying to describe goodness with the word good. Your criticism is about goodness in regards to the word Good, when I describe goodness earlier. I think it was forgotten in the long post, all good. :) Here it is below:

I believe I've answered that question though. Good is "What should be." "Goodness" is a state of reality with the embodiment of "What should be" as "What is". — Philosophim

As for debating whether Good as a property, I'm not claiming it is or isn't a property. I'm just giving you the definition.

To know what ought to be, you have to know the value of what is

If:

1. the property of goodness is not ‘being valuable’; and
2. one needs to know the value of what is to know what to predicate as ‘”oughting” to exist’; and
3. you reject the idea of intrinsic value

Then what can be predicated as good under your view is dependent on subjective dispositions because what is valuable is always extrinsic. — Bob Ross

I've never claimed point one. Goodness is what should be. If we can determine the value of existence in two scenarios, then the scenario with the most value is what should be.

Point two, we determine value by material existence, expressions of identity, and potential expressions of identity.

Point 3, I do not reject the idea of intrinsic value. I'm asking you to demonstrate what intrinsic value is. I can clearly point out intrinsic value in my theory. Its existence. Why? Because existence is good, and we have a rationale for why its good. There is intrinsic value in a thing's existence. The question is whether that value in tandem with other values, produces greater, equivalent, or lesser value overall.

So you see, I don't disagree with an idea of intrinsic value, but I have the answer of what a value is (what should be), I explain why something should be, and build from there. You don't have an answer yet as to what a value is. You don't have an example of how we can objectively know what an intrinsic value is. I'm noting that in your theory, you need something else that explains questions in your foundation.

Then what can be predicated as good under your view is dependent on subjective dispositions because what is valuable is always extrinsic. — Bob Ross

Extrinsic evaluations can be subjective or objective. Objective evaluations of value can be determined by observations and calculations.

The second problem with this is that, on a similar note, what we determine as good is relative to what is valuable; and it seems incorrect to posit vice-versa (or something else entirely). — Bob Ross

How is it incoherent to say "What is not valuable is not good?" Because what is valuable is good. Explicated and identified Good = moral value.

The third problem is that by ‘goodness’ I am assuming you mean ‘moral goodness’ with your definition, and the property of ‘to ought to be’ is not a purely objective analysis and, consequently, your view of moral goodness is not solely about what might be objective. — Bob Ross

As a reminder (its been a while) we worked back that all moral questions will inevitably boil down to the foundation of, "Should there be existence?". Assuming there is an objective morality leads us to the conclusion "Yes." because the opposite leads to a contradiction in itself. Of course, if there is no objective morality, its moot. But if there is, this is the basic answer it must start with.

With mine, on the other hand, moral goodness is ‘to have intrinsic value’, and so it is always an objective matter of dispute what is morally good; with respect to how you defined it, that is not the case. — Bob Ross

Its not because you have no way of demonstrating what intrinsic value is besides just stating the phrase. Ironically, you need my theory to make your theory work. I'm not saying you need to make value the same definition as myself, but it still needs further explication on your end.

Disputes about what ought to be by means of subjective dispositions are still about what is morally good under your metaethical view of ‘goodness’. — Bob Ross

My moral theory can involve subjectivity and subjects. But the means of evaluation are objectively the same. What creates more overall existence over time. In cases where we do not have all the information, we can then result to the induction hierarchy based off of what can be objectively evaluated.

Ok, I think addressing anything else in this section will just be repeating myself more, so back to rights!

This gets you out of the first objection, but not the second: a right is something which cannot be violated in any circumstances. — Bob Ross

True, but that's a necessary consequence of the theory in general. I think that's a strength, not a weakness. In America, rights are regulated and negotiated all the time. One common instance is when a conflict of rights arises. The supreme court ultimately debates the resolution to these conflicts.

Rights as inalienable absolutes are fine in theory, but impractical in practice. A right being negotiable on dependent circumstances also doesn't mean those circumstances happen often, but having an objective evaluation tool when they do happen is much more useful than an insistence that they are non-negotiable. An insistence of inviolable rights when this has never existed in practice is an ideal against the real.

We don't exactly get to tell a hungry lion, "I have a right to life." No one is there to care.

That one has a right, is different than whether anyone else recognizes it. — Bob Ross

I wouldn't call that a right, just a moral outcome. It is more moral for you to continue living then not in most circumstances.

I believe your real issue is that in both cases, these things are determined by societies and not any one individual

It is more than that though: if the society needs to violate one citizen’s rights to save itself, then, unless I am misunderstanding, in your view that is morally permissible (at best) and obligatory (at worst). It is not a right if it can be taken away: that’s a privilege. — Bob Ross

Lets look at it this way. I restrict myself from eating ice cream. I remove that restriction from myself. A restriction being taken away does not make it a privilege. Again, depending on the calculus, yes, it absolutely should violate the rights of one individual to save the entire society. Depending on the calculus, no, they absolutely should not violate the rights of one individual to save the entire society. The only absolute is that the scenario which generates the most existence should be chosen. Moral precepts are digests for normative situations.

In most normal situations, a government's violation of a citizen's rights for its personal benefit will not result in greater overall existence. In extreme circumstances, things can change. But noting that in extreme circumstances things can change does not allow us to disregard the 99% of cases where we have a different answer. The fact my theory can explain extremes instead of insisting on answers that don't make sense is a strength. Absolute moral theories without a strong objective foundation always choke on exceptions. Mine has a path forward to handle the exceptions that do not invalidate normal moral circumstances.

robbing someone is generally bad because of the expected outcome.

Then, under your view, robbing someone isn’t wrong in-itself; because you are not looking at the nature of the action but, instead, looking at its consequences. — Bob Ross

Correct. Lets say a person is starving, has no means to pay anyone for food, and requests for food are refused. Should the man starve? Or are they justified in robbing someone for food in this instance?

Lets say a spy has a cypher in their pockets they use to decode messages. If the spy is in my country, is it immoral to rob the spy of their cypher?

Absolutism would always say 'no' or end up compromising on rights due to rights conflict.

My overall point is that if intentions are good in themselves regardless of the outcome, then logically we can create a situation in which an intention always has a negative outcome and yet it would be considered moral.

I didn’t understand this part. An intention can be bad, and its nuanced consequences good; and vice-versa. This makes sense to me: are you contending with that? — Bob Ross

I'm pointing out that logically, if intentions do not care about results, then in theory we can create a good intention that always ends in terrible results. How do we justify such an intention as moral?

Ok, these are getting long again! Feel free to collapse some concepts as I think there's a bit of repeat on my end.

In one of my recent classes, we discussed the famous "inverted qualia" argument against physicalism about consciousness. For those unfamiliar, it posits a scenario where two individuals (Alice and Mark) have qualitative experiences that are systematically inverted relative to each other (e.g. what feels like "red" to Alice feels like "green" to Mark), despite being physical/functional duplicates. — Matripsa

I wouldn't call it an argument against physicalism, just a fun thought experiment. Physicalism would simply point out that they see different colors by subjective experience due to physical differences in their brains. Its a much greater leap of belief to assume you can get a completely different outcome from an identical physical process.

So Alice and Mark both experience the same qualia of "green", but Alice has a different label for it, so when they look at "green", Mark says that's green, Alice says that's blue, and yet they both see the same color and are having the same qualia experience. — Matripsa

Sure, this seems very possible in theory. One thing that helps with discussions like this is to find something objective that doesn't change despite a person's experience. The color 'red' objectively is a wavelength of light. How our brains process and produce the interpretation of that wavelength could very well differ. We already know this is possible through color blindness.

So if there can be different ways people interpret the wavelength, its very plausible that some people have a different qualitative experience of your interpretation of 'red'.

Agreed. But that philosophy should be provided by the scientists. — jgill

I understand what you're stating in a general sense. I think good philosophy should use as many facts and hew as close to current scientific understanding as possible.

I still think there are some cases where we need strong philosophy and where philosophers can help science. Knowledge, morality, and 'God' (or the nature of origin) are the few that come to my mind. However, other philosophy like "Philosophy of mind" is pretty much dead as an independent philosophical field and should be kept in the realm of science as much as possible.

Basically prior to there being a science, philosophy is our necessary start. Once there is an established science, philosophy must use that science as a basis.

So, it appears that you, like me, see the two disciplines connected within a bi-conditional relationship. — ucarr

Yes, that's correct. :)

Here is how I view it in extremely simple terms Ucarr. Philosophy is a hypothesis. Science is its application.

Philosophy is concerned with constructing ideas into language that makes sense logically. You can use this logic and attempt to apply it. So for example, lets say I create a definition of good which is built up from the ground logically. It seems good right? The next step is to apply it. That's science.

In another case, science can test something and find an outcome that no one thought possible. No one knows what this outcome means. Philosophy tries to capture that outcome into a language that is consistently logical and can then be tested against again.

I do not think the complete scientific method can exist without philosophy. I do not think a completely philosophical exploration can be complete without science. But, the fields can be separated enough at times where there is viable work to be done on the hypothesis alone vs work on the application alone. Thus the division of study.

I need to define society. A society occurs when there is more than one person involved.

Ok, I was using society in the sense of an institutionalized state. — Bob Ross

That one's on me, I didn't define it ahead of time.

Rights only come about with the interplay of the individual and societies

They are only explicated in societies. You still have a right to life even if you are the only human left. — Bob Ross

I think we're more in a semantics disagreement here than an disagreement of underlying concepts. My point is that if there are no other human beings, there are no rights. We don't exactly get to tell a hungry lion, "I have a right to life." No one is there to care. Is it more moral for you to live instead of die? In almost all cases, yes. If you want to call it a right its fine. Its the right of a society of 1. I just prefer to note that a society has a minimum of 2.

If we are talking universal rights, yes. Because what we also must consider is the interplay between societies.

The interplay of societies doesn’t imply rights in the sense that you have set up: if the societies determine rights, then two societies which are not subsumed under another, larger society would have no way to resolve any disputes between society members of one vs. the other. — Bob Ross

If rights are societally subjective, then yes. But if they are societally objective, as in these rights to individuals improve and strengthen societies more than those who do not have them by fact, then there is data for one society to point to.

Privileges are permissions from society. Rights are restrictions on society.

If society is making up rights, then they are also permissions. — Bob Ross

I think my above definition gives a clear enough demarcation between the two to denote two separate words. I believe your real issue is that in both cases, these things are determined by societies and not any one individual. If it makes it easier, we can say an individual can give a permission to itself vs a restriction to itself. I think you would agree with this. As to whether a right or permission has any import in a society of 1, I leave that up to you. Its not that important as long as the difference between permission vs restriction is understood and accepted.

Correct. A ‘right’ in the traditional sense of the word does not exist in your view — Bob Ross

How would you define a right then? You have to understand that in 'the traditional sense' we have not had an objective morality. There are going to be a lot of things an objective morality challenges. The question is whether the subjective challenge holds when looked at in its reasoning.

It is bad because it violates a general moral principle that robbery is (generally) wrong. It is generally wrong, because it is morally bad, when analyzed in isolation, to rob someone. Why this is the case will depend on the ethical theory in play. — Bob Ross

Right, and according to my ethical theory which attempts to be objective, robbing someone is generally bad because of the expected outcome. A belief that the moral theory is 'wrong' only works with subjective moral theories. But with an objective basis, I am rationally permitted to dismiss such opinions if they don't clearly demonstrate why my conclusion is wrong. Objectively why is another moral theory right, and why is the one I've proposed wrong?

If robbery is bad in-itself, then an intention to do it is bad. — Bob Ross

True, but it must be objectively demonstrated why robbery is bad in itself. I haven't seen that yet in a way that isn't subjective. I can objectively conclude robbing others is generally bad due to probability.

When they get angry and explain that it is also an insult, I insist that I will continue to the use the word as my principle demands that I use 'sir' when talking to people

This is just a conflation of words, and not an absurd insistence on one’s duty to a principle. The principle would be ‘one should be polite’, not ‘one should say the word ‘sir’, specifically in English’. — Bob Ross

Fair, I used a poor example. My overall point is that if intentions are good in themselves regardless of the outcome, then logically we can create a situation in which an intention always has a negative outcome and yet it would be considered moral.

To be objective, you need a solid foundation. What is objective value? What determines value?

Not at all. To be objective, is to exist mind-independently. Goodness is identical to ‘having value’ because that is, at its core, what the ‘being good’ is about. — Bob Ross

But what is objectively 'having value'? Living things value situations. Unliving things don't have a concept of value. Why is what one person values suddenly objective? If value does not involve a living thing, what is determining value at that point?

An easy way to demonstrate this, is to think of what ethics, axiology, and pragmatism would be if it had nothing to do with value: it would be merely about what is and not what ought to be—and this is a fundamental shift from what the studies traditionally are about. — Bob Ross

To know what ought to be, you have to know the value of what is. This doesn't answer the question though. What is an objective definition of value, and why is it good beyond it being an apparent synonym?

When you say “existence is good”, you are saying “one can validly predicate ‘existence’ with the property of ‘goodness’”. It is still an entirely valid question to ask: “what is ‘goodness’?”. — Bob Ross

I believe I've answered that question though. Good is "What should be." "Goodness" is a state of reality with the embodiment of "What should be" as "What is".

“Objective value” is just intrinsic value; for it is the only type of value which a thing can have in-itself. — Bob Ross

The problem again is 'intrinsic value'. A thing without a mind cannot value itself. And you've noted that extrinsic value doesn't count either. If so, what is 'intrinsic value' then? Is this a real phrase? Is it just a combination of words that doesn't represent anything in reality?

The fact that someone can be motivated to value or not value it, is not relevant itself to whether the thing demands to be value because it has intrinsic worth. — Bob Ross

Right, so you're saying something has value for existing. Why Bob? Why is there intrinsic value in existence?

Why is flourishing valuable?

It is intrinsically valuable, because, as per its nature, it demands value. Which can be easily understood when one is in such a state. — Bob Ross

If intrinsic value doesn't care about our opinion of it, being in a state of higher value, and making a judgement about it, is irrelevant. Because one can be in an objectively higher value state, but subjectively believe they aren't. Let me explain as I've had two alcoholics in the family. My father recovered, my mother never did.

My father went to AA. He's known tons of addicts over the years. There are plenty of people who choose that lower state of existence. They know what its like to be sober, and they despise it. For the first year or two of my father quitting, he hated it. Its why so many can't quit Bob. Its why so many become alcoholics or druggies in the first place. For them, there is more value in being hopped up than not.

The way Alcoholics Anonymous works is to emphasize a higher power. The point is to get the addict thinking outside of their own state. In psychology, getting the patient to realize their choices impact more than themselves is a key of getting someone out of their addiction. Addicts are inherently selfish individuals who gain immense pleasure and satisfaction out of their state of being. My dad once told me, "You get F'd up because you don't want to feel normal."

In an abstract armchair sense of 'people will always choose the more positive state', it sounds good. In reality, people aren't like that. Many people choose the state that we we would consider less valuable. And that lends doubt to the idea of states being 'intrinsically good'. If people don't choose them when given a choice, why are they intrinsically good?

Imagine two states that your mother could be in. The first is constant pleasure obtained by being an alcoholic. The second is a persistent state of flourishing, happiness, and prosperity. — Bob Ross

My mother has repeatedly chosen the first one. She is able to hold her job, makes enough money, and is able to do what she wants with her life. And she drinks half a bottle of wine each night and becomes intolerable to talk to. She does not care. She chooses alcohol and being drunk or buzzed every time.

Intrinsic value is objective. She does not determine whether or not a state of flourishing has intrinsic value nor how much. — Bob Ross

I can agree with the second statement. But how is intrinsic value objective? But at this point I'm repeating myself.

That's a fine opinion, but not an objective argument.

I don’t see how it isn’t an objective argument; insofar as the argument demonstrates (to my satisfaction) that morality is objective, and The Good is universal flourishing. — Bob Ross

Because an objective argument does not care about our satisfaction. Objectivity persists despite our opinions or feelings about it. You have not clearly defined value in an objective manner. You've stated good = value, but without a clear definition of value, its just dodged the definition by synonym.

“Objective value” is another phrase for ‘intrinsically valuable’; and flourishing has intrinsic value because the state demands to be valued in virtue of its nature, and this is hard to demonstrate if you haven’t experienced it—this is an empirical claim, and not something abstract. — Bob Ross

A few counter points of issue to sum:

Objective value = intrinsic value is a synonym, not a demonstration of meaning. First you need to objectively define 'value'.

If intrinsic value does is not determined by extrinsic opinion, it does not demand to be valued, it just has value. There is nothing which objectively demands I care about something's intrinsic value as an extrinsic evaluator.

Intrinsic value by your definition, is an abstract value. To empirically experience it, we must know what that abstract is, and give objective examples of that abstract. For example, I have an abstract definition of the color red, then an empirical experience of the color red. How can I, and extrinsic evaluator, empirically experience the intrinsic value of something else in an objective manner? Its already been shown that sometimes people will willingly pick lower states of value when given the choice. Objectively, why are they wrong to do so? How do we prove it a lower state despite their happiness in picking it?

Your theory presupposes a property of goodness, of which your analysis (so far) is the discovery of what can be predicated to have such a property, but, interestingly, doesn't give any analysis of the property itself--it is merely a presupposed, notional, property that is utilized for the rest of the analysis. — Bob Ross

I don't see how I've done this. Let me explain why.

1. Good = "what should be" A clear definition.
2. Existence should be is logically concluded as being the most reasonable conclusion when faced with our limitations. So existence has the property of being good.
3. Existence is quantified. This lets us show how existence can express itself, and also show us there are scenarios that decrease or increase overall existence based on how it all interacts with itself.

Now, instead of meaning "more existence is good" in an analogous sense to "this car is red", you may mean it as an identity relation---that 'is good' here refers to "goodness is identical to the property of 'having more existence' [or something like that]" (i.e., goodness = having more existence). I think there are good reasons to believe that goodness cannot be reduced to such a claim. — Bob Ross

I'm just noting that if existence is good, more existence is "gooder" :D. Its just a logical step after the first claim.

Firstly, goodness, then, would not be normative; because it only refers to whether something has or does not have 'more existence' than some other possibility. — Bob Ross

Not at all. If existence is "What should be" then to determine "What should be" we should know "what it is". How can I evaluate two scenarios if I don't know what those two scenarios entail? If I can calculate one scenario results in more existence than a second scenario, only then can we know the first scenario is better right? I'm a little confused how you think being able to evaluate the goodness of a situation removes it from comparative evaluation with another potential scenario?

Secondly, it doesn't seem correct that "having more existence [than ...] is to have more existence [than ...]" is identical in meaning to "to be good is to have more existence [than ...]": the latter seems to add something extra, in meaning, by denoting what is good as opposed to expressing a tautology. — Bob Ross

I don't understand what you're trying to say here. What does [than ...] mean? I'm just noting that if we have two potential scenarios, the one with the most existence is what should be.

Great discussion, I look forward to your replies!

I've read it. I guess I was wondering if you were interested in considering a different perspective. — wonderer1

Always! I was just giving my answer in the most accurate way I could. Since you've already read it, I will answer your question with that in mind.

It's not rare for me to accept that I know things, based on my intuition having been highly trained and tested in some fairly specific areas. Is there some reason I should accept your definition? — wonderer1

Yes, because my definition allows an objective statement of knowledge. This further allows an evaluation of inductions, which we can place into a hierarchy of cogency. Probability, possibility, plausibility, and irrational. Thus we can be more confident even in the inductions we make by evaluating them against other competing inductions in that hierarchy.

If we trace your logic back to its roots, we are going to find intuitions anyway, don't you think? — wonderer1

No. At its root, "I discretely experience." is proven and not an intuition.

Under your definition, then, people who are not a part of a society do not have the right to life nor bodily autonomy. — Bob Ross

I need to define society. A society occurs when there is more than one person involved. If there is no society, there are no other people. Meaning there is nothing else outside of yourself to dictate what you can and cannot do.

I would say that rights are innate. It is a mistake to think of rights as relative to societies, because they are then subject to the whims of the society and not subject to what is good (morals). — Bob Ross

Rights only come about with the interplay of the individual and societies. While yes, it is relevant to the society, it is factual to the well being or detriment of the society. In cases where we could document that individuals having rights benefitted all societies, we could call these universal rights. In other societies and cultures, people having a 'right' may benefit that particular culture, but not others. But, a right should be based on concrete and provable benefits, not simply societal opinions. For example, some people argue that universal health care is a right, despite costs. Perhaps in a wealthy society, it can be. In a society with limited resources, it could bankrupt it.

It may be for the benefit of one society to persecute and enslave outside members, whether they be a member of another society or not, and I would say that this still violates their rights. — Bob Ross

If we are talking universal rights, yes. Because what we also must consider is the interplay between societies. If one society starts enslaving another population, that other society may ban together with others and overthrow the enslaving society. Not to mention trade and interchange of culture between the two is likely going to be stifled. Its been found slavery tends to hold societies back as well. My favorite reference to this is that the American economy improved more after slavery was eliminated. https://www.econlib.org/archives/2014/09/ending_slavery.html#:~:text=Former%20slaves%20would%20now%20be,productive%2C%20and%20hence%20richer%20country.

Also, I would consider your definition to be a form of privileges — Bob Ross

There is a very key difference though. Privileges are permissions from society. Rights are restrictions on society. Privileges can be granted or taken away without a large impact on a societies health. People generally don't foment revolution because of them. Adding or taking away rights directly benefit or hurt a society in a large way.

I think your main issue is that I've noted society is the one that grants rights, and you see that no different than granting privileges except by degree. The point I'm trying to make is a right is a restriction on society that provably benefits it overall. So even if a society does not grant free speech for example, it would be better overall if it did grant such a right. Might makes 'what is granted'. Might does not make 'right'.

I think that, still your view also agrees (along with what you said here above) that all else being equal it is better to save the 5 by sacrificing the 1. — Bob Ross

What do you mean 'all else being equal'? That doesn't convey anything to me in this sentence. If we remove society, like in the case of the lizards, then yes. But we just can't remove society from human kind. So no, generally its wrong to sacrifice someone against their will to save 1. "All else being equal" doesn't address the calculus going on.

Whether the intention is good or bad is completely despite any consequences that my be brought about.

For example, if I intend to rob someone and end up accidentally saving their life, then my intention was bad and the consequences of my actions was good. — Bob Ross

Right, but why was your intention bad? With my answer, its easy to understand. Lets say that 99% of attempted robberies result in harm. Just because this 1% resulted in something good, doesn't suddenly make attempting to rob people a good intention. This is about expected results.

To make it clearer, let us say that in a culture I call people 'sir' as I am intending to be polite. Now in another culture, the word 'sir' is actually slang for an insult. When I use the word, I'm intending to convey politeness. When they get angry and explain that it is also an insult, I insist that I will continue to the use the word as my principle demands that I use 'sir' when talking to people. I have all intention that I will change their ways, that I'm really being polite and civilized, and I must do this to stay virtuous. Yet, the reality is I'm just making a lot of people angry at me and being rude.

Without outcomes to measure intentions, there's nothing to back 'what is virtuous' besides subjective op
inion. But with an objective measurement that 'greater existence is better', we have an outcome that we can measure our intentions by. This allows us to say with objective confidence what 'virtues' are generally more good or bad within a society.

The intentions and consequences matter — Bob Ross

Correct. My only point is that to have meaningful and objectively evaluated intentions, it must be based on meaningful and objective expected outcomes.

If whether it is immoral to torture billy is undefined without explicating all possible skills Dave could be acquiring instead, then something is very wrong with your theory. — Bob Ross

Or something is wrong with your example in addressing the theory. Lets move on from this until later however. I think we're having much more productive conversations in the other areas and you're getting a better understanding of what the theory means through these more basic examples.

You conclude: “Nah, it seems like, given my experience and knowledge, I am not in a simulation, although it is actually and logically possible.”. This abduction is your reasoning, sherlock-holmes style, about the information you have that makes you conclude that your aren’t in a simulation; and the seeming is that you find the abduction valid and correct: it seems right that this abduction demonstrates that you are not in a simulation. — Bob Ross

I still see this as no different than inductive reasoning.

For example, I, with all due respect, consider your theory to be making such a mistake (of skipping #1): when you declare, even if I were to grant it as true, that “existence is good” — Bob Ross

Such a statement says nothing about what goodness actually is, but rather what can be said to ultimately be good. Yours is missing an analysis of the nature of goodness: it only covers, at best, The Good. — Bob Ross

I admit to a little confusion. How is pointing out "The Good" missing an analysis of The Good? Don't I go immediately afterward and examine how we measure existence, and how we can create states of optimal goodness? This is a little too abstract for me. Could you point out where my logic or examples miss this?

For me, I will briefly say that goodness, in my theory, is identical to ‘having value’ and moral goodness is identical to ‘having intrinsic value’. — Bob Ross

To be objective, you need a solid foundation. What is objective value? What determines value?

To keep things brief, I consider ‘intrinsic value’ to be value which is demanded by the ‘thing’ in virtue of its nature — Bob Ross

To keep things brief, I consider ‘intrinsic value’ to be value which is demanded by the ‘thing’ in virtue of its nature: it is value which can be ignored or denied, but only superficially. A great example (to initially convey the point) is pain: pain has intrinsic value (in the sense of avoiding it) insofar as one can superficially say or feel that “avoiding pain is not valuable” but when put in a state of serious pain it is undeniable that it there is value (all else being equal) in avoiding it — Bob Ross

I agree that pain has value in the fact that its purpose is to ensure the living being stops injuring itself and gives itself time to heal. However, pain has no intrinsic value in itself. If I'm going to get surgery, feeling the pain from the knife serves no purpose at that point. Something that has intrinsic value means that it has value in itself. But in this instance, it does not.

Lets compare this to my theory. I would note that as long as pain helps a living being preserve itself and ultimately live longer more intact, then it is an incentive that helps extend the existence of a life. But if we can obtain the same outcome of existent life without pain, there is no harm in using pain relief medication. Pain is good within the greater context of its impact on a life.

There are states which demand more value which, if grasped by the person, can lead one to overcome (some or even all) pain or pleasure to acquire it; and the end result is far better than mere avoidance of pain and pursuit of pleasure. — Bob Ross

But this is not intrinsic value, but extrinsic value. If something motivates you to do something that is good, it is good in virtue of its ultimate outcome, not good merely in itself.

An easy example of this is Aristotle’s eudamonia (i.e., ‘flourshing’ or ‘happiness’, as roughly translated): for one to truly flourish, they must overcome and even volunteer to be in pain or give up pleasure. — Bob Ross

Why is flourishing valuable?

Just like how it may be hard to understand how more demanding (of value) flourishing is over pursuing pleasure but, nevertheless, if one were placed in such a state their denial (of the supremacy of such a state) would be superficial — Bob Ross

I grew up with a family of alcoholics. My mother desires pleasure far more than flourishing. This is not superficial, but a real choice. Are we saying my mother determines value? Or is there a value beyond a person's personal desires? If so, what objectively determines that value?

if one who has achieved an optimal state of flourishing must relinquish or sacrifice some of it, or even most of it, to help them and another achieve mutually beneficial flourishing, then this will be an undeniably better state than the first. — Bob Ross

How is it undeniable? Where is the proof?

The Good, in my theory, is thusly universal flourishing (which relates very closely to universal harmony). — Bob Ross

That's a fine opinion, but not an objective argument. There are a lot of assumptions here that need clear answers.

This theory, since it posits the The Good as universal flourishing, is not subjective: whether or not a ‘thing’ is flourishing is not stance-dependent—it is not dependent on conative nor cognitive dispositions. — Bob Ross

Oh, I'm not arguing that your definition of flourishing and the criteria to meet flourishing are not objective. My question is what is objective value, and why is flourishing part of that objective value?

In your view, whether or not it is immoral to torture Billy to acquire the skill of torturing is undefined — Bob Ross

No, its not undefined. You simply haven't given a thought experiment which can be accurately evaluated. I've asked you to provide aspects to make it complete. Do so, and you'll have your answer.

in mine, it is immoral, because torturing a person for the sake of acquiring a skill does not uphold nor progress towards a state of mutual flourishing between them. — Bob Ross

Of course, because your criteria for goodness is mutual flourishing. But you haven't given any objective reasons why mutual flourishing is good. My criteria for goodness is relative outcomes of existence. This is objectively concluded. To evaluate a moral outcome, you need a thought experiment that compares relative outcomes of existence.

This is getting long, so I will stop here (; — Bob Ross

Honestly I was worried it was going to be a lot longer than this. :D Well done Bob, I'm enjoying digging into these ideas.

Is there some reason I should accept your definition? — wonderer1

Feel free to read my link and work. If its a little intimidating, read the summary from Cerulea Lawrence as the next post after mine.

Belief is an assertation of identity. Knowledge is an assertation of identity backed by deductive reasoning.

Here's a summary of my knowledge theory I've worked on for years. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14044/knowledge-and-induction-within-your-self-context/p1

Feel free to scroll down to the first follow up post by Cerulia Lawrence for a fantastic summary.

I would like to ask a quick question: are you a moral particularist? — Bob Ross

All I'm doing is thinking through the consequences of this theory to arrive at what seems most logical. I have no commitment to anything but that. :) Lets review:

1. We determine that if there is an objective morality the least contradictory conclusion to the base moral question of whether there should be existence, is that there should be.

2. If there should be existence, then to make a theory or morality that can be evaluated, we need a way to measure existence. Thus, material existence, its identity expression, and its potential existence all over time.

3. It is discovered that some combinations of expressed existence lower potential existence, and in the future, would destroy expressed existence as well. For example, everything joins together permanently into a ball or spreads out into the vacuum of space forever isolated. Thus we want to create states that preserve or increase existence, not diminish.

4. In any calculation, the goal is the same: Find a situation in which there is equal or more existence. From this, we can find a few patterns. First, homeostasis. 10 existence over millennia is greater than 1,000,000 existence over one second that then burns out to nothing. At this point we have proof of patterns that can help us shortcut tedious measurement and work on calculating things beyond just 'atoms'.

So what then would be a 'principle"? Calculating morality, like any science or rigorous proof, requires a lot of effort and work. There will be many times in our lives where we will not have the skill or capability to calculate out how the situation will unfold. Principles should be based on a data driven hierarchy of induction, probabilities, and possibilities.

First there are probabilities ascertained by data. For example, the majority of smokers get lung cancer, therefore it is better not to smoke. If we could calculate your DNA and body perfectly, perhaps we would see that you are one of the exceptional bodies that would not get cancer from smoking. But because we do not know this, the proper moral principle would be not to smoke to begin with. This again is not based on subjective opinion, but objective data.

Second, possibilities should be considered. Its possible that if we spy a wild bear in the woods, it won't maul us. We don't have probabilities in front of us, but we can consider the possibility that it does, vs the possibility that it doesn't. In the case that it does not, we could have a delightful interaction with a bear that could very well create more actual and potential existence then if not. But, if we're wrong, we die. That's an end to our lives, a counter to the pattern of homeostasis and a potentially tragic loss of existence compared to what little bump we would have gained by 'petting a wild bear'. Thus we should take the principle of not approaching wild bears in the woods.

Where you begin to disagree, and correct me if I am wrong, is when it comes to humans specifically because they are a part of a society and that society cannot function properly if there is no reassurance of at least basic rights. — Bob Ross

1. I don’t see how sacrificing one to save five, even if it were institutionalized, would result in overall less potential and actual concrete entities; and so I think you are miscalculating by your own theory’s standards. — Bob Ross

It would help if you could point out how it does not create less existence overall, but I also understand I did not go too far in specifics. Here are a few considerations to start. Everyone is someone's son/daughter. How many parents would want justice or revenge? Society runs on trust. If I went to the hospital for cancer treatment, and it was found my body could be harvested against my will to save 5 people, how many people would go to the hospital? How many people would simply suffer or die from lack of treatment because of this? This would cascade into an avoidance of medicine in general, destroying or diminishing an entire industry and service. At the point we say, "You can be sacrificed against your will at any time," you create far more problems in society than solutions.

If I were to grant that when one includes society into the calculations that it maximizes potential and actual concrete entities, then it does not (still) follow from that that people should be granted rights. — Bob Ross

Lets define rights first under this theory. As we know, there is an interplay between individuals and society. Societies are 'more existence' than an individual alone. But, just because something is more existence overall than something else, it doesn't meant it can go on a purely destructive rampage for its own temporary gain. Society can only function because it has the trust/compliance of individuals within it. Thus a society which has maximum trust/compliance for its goals can be the most successful.

A 'right' would be a limitation on society that has been deemed to be of greater benefit for the individual to have for the benefit of society. Looking at the writing and reasoning behind the bill of rights, this is easy to see. Free speech is important for the exchange of thought and ideas for a productive society. Rights are not 'innate'. They are limitations on society that society has put into place for its overall benefit.

So, if #2 is right, then your justification only gets us to privileges — Bob Ross

A privilege is different from a right. A right is a self-constraint on society over the individual. A privilege is a societal allowance to the individual. For example, free speech is a right, speaking at a closed venue is a privilege. Voting is a right, mail in voting is a privilege.

I completely disagree. The intention is valuable if the intention is for doing good — Bob Ross

Why is the intention, not the result, good? Can this be proven?

it does not matter if the foreseeable or actual consequences when actualizing the intention turn out to be good. — Bob Ross

How so? We have all had situations in our lives where our intentions did not align with reality through ignorance. "How is an intention good in itself?" is the key here and I won't comment more until that's explored.

the intention is good because it is meaning to perform an action which would, if it actualized correctly, produce more potential and actual concrete entities. — Bob Ross

The intention is good if it is a principle. If applied correctly through probability or possibility, then it is reasonable. For example, if I picked a result that had a 70% chance of happening, but it didn't happen, no one would fault my intention.

They have a choice to torture or not torture Billy; but the reason Dave should not torture billy is certainly should not be relative to what else they could be doing — Bob Ross

Under this theory, it certainly is. Can you explain in this moral theory why its not?

I indicated that you should exclude from consideration the other possible skill Dave could accomplish instead of the skill of torture. — Bob Ross

And I've let you know that this theory must consider the alternative. Refusal to give an alternative is an incomplete moral quandery under this theory.

I apologize, that was supposed to say “the end justifies the means”, and you are certainly affirming that. — Bob Ross

All good! Yes, this is correct.

The end is ‘maximizing potential and actual concrete entities’ and the means is whatever is needed to achieve it. — Bob Ross

Here's the difference. We do not disregard the means for the ends. The means ARE part of the ends. Every part is meaningful.

Firstly, I mention that most moral realists disagree fervently about some of your conclusions, and so does the vast majority of the west (at least), simply to demonstrate that it goes completely against the predominant moral intuitions. this does not mean that your conclusions are false. — Bob Ross

Which is fine. If these are offered as points to ask me how my theory would handle this, its a great starter.

Secondly, I say, and many others, that some of your conclusions are objectively wrong because they are incoherent with the moral facts. However, I cannot substantiate this claim without importing my own ethical (moral realist) theory—so I refrain for now, unless you want me to. — Bob Ross

Oh, please do! I understand the respect here, and yes, feel free to give your own moral conclusions and why you believe they are objectively true.

A desire, a gut-feeling, an emotion, is conative and unreliable; whereas an intellectual seeming is cognitive and reliable. — Bob Ross

The word 'seeming' implies its an inductive reason. I would rather we use that because then we can classify whether the induction is based off of probability, possibility, or plausibility.

I can feel very strongly that 1+3=1, but, upon intellectually grasping the proposition ‘1+3=1’ (which requires me to contemplate it as unbiased as possible), it does not (intellectually) seem right that 1+3=1; — Bob Ross

I don't think there's any 'seeming' to it. 1+3=1 is just objectively wrong. This phrase seems confusing at best and unnecessary at worst. Is there anything this phrase serves that cannot be conveyed using common language?