The wording about physics is a little to vague for me
— Philosophim

You've been saying a principal first cause, although it can incept as anything, cannot violate the physical laws of the thing it incepts as, right? If I'm correct in thinking this, it seems to me also correct a principal first cause is constrained by the definition of the particular things it incepts as. — ucarr

If you're saying, "Once a first cause has incepted, it cannot be anything other than what it is," you are correct.

Again, lets change this to be a little more to the point. "However, if it is found logically that all instantiations of causation entail externals, logical antecedents and contemporaries, then its a correct inference there are no first causes."

This is a logical argument, so of course is there is a logical counter it fails.
— Philosophim

Do you agree making this determination is the heart and soul of our work in this discussion? — ucarr

I would say yes. This conclusion arises because of a logical argument which I have yet to see anyone disprove. It doesn't mean the argument can't be disproven, it just means no one has done it yet if this is the case. That's why I'm presenting it here. Let people stab at it, shake a stick at it, throw a pitchfork, anything to see if there's a weakness I'm not seeing.

Thank you for clarifying what was important to mereological to you.

According to mereological essentialism, objects have their parts necessarily. If an object were to lose or gain a part, it would cease to exist; it would no longer be the original object but a new and different one.

Wikipedia - Mereological essentialism

The last two sentences of the definition are especially important. If a first cause is a system, as is the case in your example of a first-cause hydrogen atom, then, as you've been saying, it cannot be a hydrogen atom if one of its necessary parts is missing. — ucarr

This is very similar, if not identical to what I've been saying. Though in hindsight I've phrased this differently depending on the context, so I'll be clear here. A first cause is at the moment of inception. The next tick of time is not the first cause. That is the first result of a first cause. In the past I've stated that a first cause could incept, then disappear moments later. This is taking the context of the first cause as the thing that forms and continues. While convenient to type a general idea more efficiently, this is not accurate in detail.

What I should have said is that the existence that proceeds from a first cause does not need to persist forever. As an example again, if what appears to be a photon appeared as a first cause, then disappeared five seconds later from existence, due to the rules and consequences of the first cause, that's possible. Technically a photon doesn't vanish in five seconds due to the consequence of its own existence. My apologies is my lack of specificity in this has caused any confusion, that would be on me. :)

So, if an electron is a thing-in-itself and its a necessary part of a hydrogen atom, then a hydrogen atom, even the first one, in order to exist, must contain an electron, another thing-in-itself like the hydrogen atom. Therefore, logically, we must conclude the electron is a contemporary of the hydrogen atom it inhabits, and thus the hydrogen atom cannot be itself and at the same time be a first cause. — ucarr

Correct. I stated this earlier in our discussion, though it would not be surprising if it was forgotten. Since a hydrogen atom is composed of other elements, the only way we could generalize the atom as a first cause if is all the elements of the hydrogen atom incepted in such a way as it would continue in the next moment like a regular hydrogen atom. It is the fundamental aspect which is a first cause. Only if several fundamentals incepted simultaneously and in a particular order could such a miracle occur. This is of course possible, but once again, must be proven that this occurred. I believe if such a rare instance were to happen, this is an instance in which it would likely be impossible to scientifically determine that it happened.

Maybe the question remains: Does a postulated realm of reality without physics and its laws violate the laws of physics? — ucarr

This is a broader question about understanding what the laws of physics are. They are tested aspects about known reality that so far, have not been disproven. If one day multi-verse theory was found to be real, it would be a part of physics. If we proved that a first cause existed, that would be part of physics. Physics is not an innate truth of reality, it is a discovered knowledge about reality that we have determined through careful testing, logic, and application.

You seem to be saying discovery of a first cause is unlikely. The unlikeliness of its discovery has no bearing on the radical impact of such a discovery. — ucarr

True.

Some might think I'm playing a language game when I reflect on a first cause that has no cause being illogical. I defend raising this question because the gist of your argument is that first causation is logically necessary. — ucarr

I think its reasonable for people to resist such a claim. Indeed, I want to hear people's arguments against it to see if they're right.

It's perhaps a weird argument, but I'm driving towards saying inception of first cause cancels definition of first cause as causeless. This in part is a denial that inception as a starting point can be causeless. — ucarr

One thing I point out is a first cause is that which exists without prior cause. Self identities or constituent parts are fine as long as they are not prior to what is incepted like the hydrogen atom I just covered a few paragraphs ago.

Trying to partition an interval of time to a nearly infinitesimally small duration such that there's a moment after inception wherein cause is first established doesn't work because in that short interval of time you're implying first cause is not really itself, a paradox. If that's not the case, then there can be no positive time interval during which incepted first cause isn't itself establishing causation. So, no temporal creation without causation. — ucarr

This is more of a problem with time partitioning than a first cause. This is exemplified by this problem. "I have to walk a distance of 10 feet. To walk a distance of ten feet, I must walk halfway there first. Then to walk a distance of 5 feet, I must walk halfway there first. This goes on for as long as we can invent halves of numbers, which is of course infinite. If this is the case, how do I ever arrive at the end of the initial ten feet?" The solution is that though our numbers can be reduced infinitely, there must be a fundamental minimum scale of distance. Same with time. Otherwise every second of time that has passed will have also crossed an infinity of halves.

Ha! But no. The logical argument has always been there ucarr. Try to show it to be wrong anytime.
— Philosophim

You're referring to your alpha logic in your OP? — ucarr

I have since summarized it for you better in a previous post. Hopefully that makes it easier to digest.

Please try to address the argument as I do specifically and counter what it and I have been saying, not what you believe I'm implying.
— Philosophim

You're saying I should only draw inferences strictly adherent to the precise sense in which you word your statements? — ucarr

Where possible, yes. Then if my vocabulary is incomplete or unclear, you can ask me to clarify or call me out on it. That puts the responsibility on me to clearly articulate my point instead of on you.

True randomness is merely a description to grasp potential.
— Philosophim

Must you exclude potential from the neighborhood of first cause? — ucarr

I'm not sure what you meant by this, could you clarify please ucarr?

Please take the argument I've presented for why a first cause is logically necessary and point out where it falls into ad absurdum reductio.
— Philosophim

You're saying you have reason to doubt your alpha logic can be reduced to ad absurdum reductio and, given this doubt, you want me to demonstrate such a reduction? — ucarr

Yes, please.

"Are you saying that a first cause is self-evident?" Because my answer is "No".
— Philosophim

You're saying "First causes simply are." is not a self-evident truth? — ucarr

No, they are a conclusion reasoned through by logic. If it was self-evident, there could be no discussion or debate. To my mind, nothing is self-evident. Feel free to argue against this, it only supports my point. :D

As to reality, if reality refers to everything, there isn't something that exists outside of that set. That's logical.
— Philosophim

You're speculating about reality having no boundary? — ucarr

I'm just saying that the word 'reality' is really a word that represents all of 'what is'.

As for my getting stuck at the outer boundary of causation and thereafter being unable to enter into examination of causeless things, I put my best spin on what I've been doing by thinking I've been running through my inventory of commitments to causation en route to deepening my understanding of what you're trying to communicate with respect to your posited causeless realm of first cause. I don't want to further aggravate your annoyance with fruitless repetitions. With that goal in mind, I'm ready to withdraw from our dialog in favor of study suggested by what I've been learning from it. — ucarr

Not a worry at all. You are not aggravating or annoying ucarr! I appreciate your thoroughness, curiosity, and respectful critiques and attacks on the theory. Ask as long as you have questions that need answering, its not a problem.

We need one thing in here, nothing to spacetime needs spacetime. We start from nothing and ask ourselves how we could have spacetime (let's call this spacetime ST1). This requires the existence of another spacetime (let's call this spacetime ST2) since we agreed that nothing to spacetime requires spacetime. So we cannot have ST1 without having ST2. In the same manner, we cannot have ST2 if we don't have ST3, etc. — MoK

Ah, ok. I think you missed this point I made before, so I'll point it out again.

You never said we need spacetime BEFORE a change can occur.
You said we need spacetime FOR a change to occur.

Nothing, then a change to space time, has spacetime.

Saying you need something before you have it is a contradiction. Cake must exist before cake can happen for example. :) I wish I could have my breakfast before I make it, but sadly, that is not life.

And if this is the case, then what was around if spacetime did not exist? Nothing.
— Philosophim
Yes, if we don't have spacetime we simply have nothing. Why? Because physical entities or things occupy space. — MoK

Then we've invalidated the conclusion that a change cannot happen from nothing. Let me break it down.

A. Spacetime has a beginning.
B. Spacetime is required for change
C. Since no change can happen if spacetime is not involved, there was nothing before spacetime.
Conclusion: A change in which there was nothing, then spacetime, had to have happened.

Right. I never agreed that we need spacetime before a change can happen. I agreed that we need spacetime for a change to happen.
— Philosophim
Correct. But the only thing that I need to show that nothing to spacetime is an infinite regress is that we need spacetime for any change to happen. — MoK

Where is the infinite regress? If we don't need spacetime before spacetime (as this sentence doesn't make any sense), and go from nothing to spacetime, how is that infinitely regressive?

Mok, go over the sentence again carefully. You're saying it cannot begin to exist, but it has a beginning. That doesn't make any sense. Can you get what you intend without making a contradiction like this?
— Philosophim
Well, I have to elaborate on what I mean by begin to exist then. By this, I mean that spacetime didn't exist and then exists. — MoK

And if this is the case, then what was around if spacetime did not exist? Nothing. Since you stated that you have to have spacetime for change to happen, there must have been nothing before spacetime.

Exactly, well said Ludwig!
— Philosophim
It's nice to agree on something, isn't it? I wasn't sure whether you would welcome the agreement or criticize the way I undermined it. — Ludwig V

I don't think an accurate assessment is undermining. Out of the people recently posting in this thread, I think you grasp the argument the best.

You agreed that nothing to spacetime is a change. Don't we need spacetime for this change? If yes, then we need spacetime for nothing to spacetime. This leads to infinite regress though. — MoK

Right. I never agreed that we need spacetime before a change can happen. I agreed that we need spacetime for a change to happen. The start of spacetime is a change because it involves spacetime.

Sure there is spacetime. Spacetime cannot begin to exist though. Spacetime simply exists, in this sense is fundamental, and has a beginning. — MoK

Mok, go over the sentence again carefully. You're saying it cannot begin to exist, but it has a beginning. That doesn't make any sense. Can you get what you intend without making a contradiction like this?

Anytime we try to define a 'thing in itself" beyond the barest logical necessity of its existence, we have to remember that we can't.

I think that our experience is an indirect window into reality and, as such, is indirect knowledge of the things in themselves; so we can say things about them beyond assigning them a giant question mark. — Bob Ross

Then you're ascribing an identity to a thing in itself. There is no indirect or direct knowledge of anything about a thing in itself besides the fact that it is logically necessary that there be something for us base our conceptions off of. Anything more is using our conceptions.

The objects, as they are in themselves, would exist without any literal motion, extension, or temporality; but, each object would be related to the other in such a way that they have temporal ordering, and spatial properties. — Bob Ross

Once again you're ascribing something to a thing in itself that is unknowable. Motion, extension, and temporality are all our personal conceptions we ascribe to things in themselves, but they are never knowledge of the thing in itself. The thing in itself is outside of knowledge. Using the term objects is fine. Ascribing anything to a thing in itself is impossible.

The game analogy doesn't work here either. There is no 3D in a video game. Its math combined with a spatial illusion.

Ah, that's your target. I don't think you need "a thing in itself" to prove this. All you have to note is that objects represent things in themselves, and that space is a property of objects

If space is only a property of objects, then space is not a substance and is not real; but, rather, the pure form of one’s experience. — Bob Ross

Its real because it affects us despite our perceptions. That's the 'drop a rock game' :D I can perceive all I want how things will be or turn out, but the result will happen anyway. That undeniable effect is caused by 'the thing in itself'. How we describe and see that thing in itself is everything Bob. The thing in itself is beyond human knowledge. Everything is our attempts at describing what is real, even the description of, "the thing in itself". That's why you only use the thing in itself as a logical necessary footnote. Anything else is overstepping what the concept is meant to be.

That's just silly then. A good ol' rousing game of "Drop the rock" will cure that.

Not at all. Neither nihilists nor transcendentalists deny that we experience objects in space and time. That’s not what is under contention here. — Bob Ross

We experience everything. If they mean the pure form of experience is something that does not represent reality, that's what empirical testing is for. They can claim space does not represent reality, but then we can test it and show that it is. If they're talking about something else, it sounds like its gobbledygook.

We can't know because we cannot identify or know a thing in itself beyond it correlation or violations of our perceptions and judgements.

We can nevertheless use our experience to ground sufficient justification for believing that space is a substance or not. Just because our knowledge is not 100% certain nor that it is contingent on our representative faculty, does not entail it is not knowledge. — Bob Ross

Absolutely, but knowledge is never about the thing in itself. Knowledge is our conception of reality that tries to not contradict whatever the thing in itself is. We can never know in any way, shape, or form, what a thing in itself is besides the fact that something must exist for us to perceive and make concepts about.

We can't ascribe properties to things in themselves. We can represent thing as having properties, and that may, or may not match a thing in itself

If we consistently and collectively experience an object with a property and we have no good reasons to doubt that object has the said property, then we are justified in believing the object in-itself has that property. — Bob Ross

No, we are not justified in believing a thing in itself has that property. Properties are our perception of a thing in itself. A thing in itself is what it is, regardless of our perception of it. Does our perception of the thing in itself align without being contradicted? Then it means, at the time, its viable to use as a concept without contradiction. That is all. A concept not being contradicted by the thing in itself does not mean that it in any way captures what the thing in itself, as the thing in itself is that which concepts are laid upon, but not what it is in itself.

↪Philosophim This question cannot be solved without first defining what an existence would be — LFranc

Sure. Lets go with, "That which has an identity. An identity is how it interacts with what is around itself" Basically anything that isn't nothing, as nothing as a concept is the absence of identity.

1. We have nothing, then spacetime.
— Philosophim
Yes, but you have to wait for it. I am trying to counter this simply by saying that nothing to spacetime is a change. — MoK

There is no waiting for it, as there is nothing doing the waiting.

Change happened with spacetime.
— Philosophim
Sure, but there is no spacetime in nothing therefore change from nothing is not possible. — MoK

No, but spacetime happened after there being nothing, so we have a change, and we have spacetime. In your case we have the start of spacetime.

2. There is nothing in your argument that proves nothing cannot come before spacetime.
— Philosophim
Sure there is. Nothing to spacetime is a change (you agree with this). Any change requires spacetime (you agree with this too). Therefore, we need spacetime to have nothing to spacetime. — MoK

But there is spacetime. Nothing, then spacetime. A change has occurred and it involves the start of spacetime. Unless you're saying spacetime cannot start? If spacetime cannot start, then it has always existed. But that contradicts your previous statement that an infinite amount of spacetime cannot have existed previously to our own time. How should we resolve this?

That point is a point in spacetime for two reasons: It is a point (point in a variable) and it is before the beginning of time. — MoK

Isn't this another contradiction? First, I've noticed a pattern. You keep using time independently of space. But very early on you noted that time could not be independent of space, that it was a property of a combination called spacetime. One thing we shouldn't do in a discussion is ascertain that a property cannot exist independently, then use it as if it is independent. Are you sure you want to keep time and space together? If so, lets stop using time independently.

Currently what should be said is: "That point is a point in spacetime for two reasons: It is a point (point in a variable) and it is before the beginning of spacetime."

As you can see, the above contradicts itself. I cannot be both a point in spacetime, and before spacetime.

This means what we call the beginning of time is not really the beginning of time but the point that we agree on its existence is the beginning of time. — MoK

This is a contradiction. Something cannot both be a beginning and not a beginning.

Keep trying! Lets see if these contradictions can be resolved.

I had to think about this one a while, as part of this conversation with you is learning what needs to be said and what is irrelevant in a discussion about this.

No worries: I can relate to having an idea and finding that it is harder to convey to the audience (or a specific audience or individual) than (originally) expected. — Bob Ross

Yes, this idea is in its exploratory phase, so these discussions are very helpful to see if there is any merit to the ideas here.

Also, I apologize for my belated response: I have been busy and am trying to catch up on my responses. — Bob Ross

Not a worry! Time is of no consideration to the argument. This is a hobby for us after all.

Productivity is being used in the sense of ‘having the quality or power of producing especially in abundance’; and the hypothetical is that IF a person is being more productive at creating model airplanes than finding a cure to cancer AND they can only do one or the other AND one is analyzing what is good in terms of the production of concrete entities in reality (such that more is better), then that person should (in a moral sense) choose to create model airplanes over finding a cure for cancer. — Bob Ross

That's fine then, yes. But as I've noted, make sure you make explicit the other outcomes as well. For example, if the person works on cancer and saves billions of lives, but is more productive working on model planes and saves no lives, this is not all else being equal.

All I am including is what I included. IF ‘more existence is better’ THEN it is better to have two pieces of paper rather than one. That’s it. In isolation, is two pieces of paper better than one in your view? — Bob Ross

Not necessarily. Its because we're tearing a piece of paper into two, not creating two equal sizes of paper.

You cannot think top down. You need to build up to complicated examples because it just causes confusion and a misunderstanding of how everything builds up otherwise.

I honestly can’t think of a simpler example than whether or not two pieces of paper is better than one, all else being equal. It cannot get simpler than that. — Bob Ross

Paper is made up of matter. So when tearing the paper in two, you are tearing its matter in half.

One pattern I see that I need to point out is the pattern of exploding complexity. when we upgrade to chemical reactions, then life, then people, then society. One point that might help you is you can think of each as a factorial explosion in math. An atom is 1X1. Multiple atoms are 2X1. A molecule is 3X2X1. By the time we get to something like life, molecular existence is such an irrelevant factor compared to factor results at the conscious level. When you're talking about a human decision being something like 20X19X18...including atoms as a consideration is insignificant.

This just entails that it is impossible to actually calculate what is better or worse in any practical sense; but I digress. — Bob Ross

I have not made this explicit enough. Working out the math from an atomic level all the way up to humanity is outside of my purview. I do not have the time, interest, or mathematical skill to calculate things to precision. But I do have enough skill to calculate things to general patterns of observation.

One of the key patterns is existential homeostasis, or the preservation of higher levels of existence over long term. This is why life in general is far more valuable than non-living chemical reactions. Homeostasis explodes past a limited quantity or event. And when we're up to the level of life, each moment of life is such a highly concentrated form of existence that when comparing something as simple as tearing a piece of paper in half, how it affects that life is going to generally be far more existentially impactful then whatever relatively minute existential difference results from tearing the paper in half.

Back to the cancer/plane example, or tearing a piece of paper, when you set up a situation in which we're talking about being 'productive' in general what we should be looking for is significant relative existential results. The new existence if a torn piece of paper is irrelevant compared to what tearing that piece of paper does in a human's life. Productivity in what one does is insignificant to the results that it has on that human's life and society. If a human's actions produce no less than 10,000,000 existence as long as they continue to live, we're much more concerned about the impact changing 1 existence elsewhere is going to have on that 10,000,000 result.

I think this is a good time to go into my views on the morality of art. I've often wondered why I've felt that art is generally good. The reason is that art bring an object which normally would only be of a minor existential consideration in its own hierarchy of existence, and elevates it to impact the hierarchy of intelligent life.

Take mount Rushmore for example. Before it was just a mountain. While now yes, it is not as mountainous as before, this is easily surpassed by the impact it has on human and societal thought. People gather from all over the world to see it and ponder it. Art has the ability to elevate human thought and emotion to higher levels, as well as convey messages that can impact a person's future decisions. This is why the base material of matter is mostly inconsequential compared to what it does to a person and society.

It is not molecular separation: it is one piece of paper vs. two. If you insist in that we must analyze it in terms of molecules, then I will insist that we must analyze it in the smallest possible ‘particle’, which is a ‘fundamental entity’ (i.e., material existence), — Bob Ross

Recall I noted that when thinking about existential value, generally we want to only go one factor up or down as any higher makes the base example a relatively insignificant digit, and any any lower is also relatively insignificant. In some cases, yes, it may be significant. But we do not have the math available to use to find those exceptions, so we must talk in general for now. So we could generally discuss multiple sheets of the same volume of paper up, a single sheet, or the components of a single sheet.

I used molecules because when you tear a sheet of paper in half, you're separating the molecules from being grouped together. You have to talk about this, because you're not creating two equal sizes of paper. You're taking one piece of paper, which is a conglomeration of molecules, and separating some. So the point is relevant.

Everything that we know of is expressed existence then, correct?

1. The foundation. This is the base thing in itself.

This is impossible for us to know. — Bob Ross

Correct, but it is not impossible to represent abstractly. This is why I started with "atoms". It represents the abstract fundamental. What we do know is that things combine together to create new identities. That pattern is repeated both up and down complexity. We're assuming that fundamental existence works like this, as there's really no other known alternative at this point. The "atoms" simply give focus and more relatability than complete abstraction.

2. The expression. This is how the foundation exhibits itself within reality at any one snapshot of time.

This is all of known reality, and always will be. — Bob Ross

Yes, but just like a hydrogen atom has a particular and limited number of ways of expressing itself, so does a fundamental. I don't believe you or I would say that any fundamental essence of existence can express itself without limitation, including being identical to another fundamental. There are limits by the fact that one fundamental of existence is in a different location than another fundamental of existence. And considering regular existence seems to have set patterns of expression and existence as well, we can assume the underlying fundamentals are also limited and pattern themselves too.

3. The potential. This is the combination of what types of expression are possible within the next shapshot of time.

How are you anchoring this part of the calculation though? Is it the very next snapshot, the foreseeable farthest snapshot, the total net, etc.? — Bob Ross

This is a good question. In abstraction, barring the existence of intelligent life, this would be the next time tick. As we work up the hierarchy, the question of time becomes more relevant to the level of existence we're working with, as well as the level of immediate impact. Will smoking a cigarette one time matter? Likely not. Will smoking a cigarette every day and getting cancer in your 40's matter? Absolutely.

If in the next second a life will end based on a decision, we need to act now on the general assumption that saving a life is good because we have no time to consider further ramifications. If we have a year to consider the long term ramifications of whether ending that life is good for society, we can take the time to consider if we should do so, as well as the long term affects.

Here's an example. Lets say that a suicide bomber is going to blow up in a store. One person has a split second to react. If they tackle the man, they can minimize the casualties to themself. There is no further time to think. In this moment the general rule of morality is that they should tackle the man to save everyone else. They do so. They are lauded on the news as a hero. They inspire people to be better. They discourage suicide bombers because they think their plan can easily be stopped by one person. Everything is good.

But lets say we have a crystal ball. We can predict the future and know everyone there. It turns out that everyone else in that store besides the savior themself are all horrible people who actively cause despair, misery, and bring down society. The savior is an upstanding person who brings goodness to the world wherever they go. Should the person save everyone else? In this case, objectively they should not.

Morality is contextual. However, calculating it, especially the future, is an exercise in probability, possibility, plausibility, and thus uncertainty. Remember this? :D Once again we're back to knowledge. We should decide to do what is moral based on what we can know with the time and resources we have at the moment. Are we deciding to open up a new factory? Spend some time studying what the effects of pollution on the populace would be over 20 years. Deciding to save some people in a spur of the moment decision? Best to go with the generality that saving more than one life is worth the expense of your own.

So, for the very simple answer Bob, when making day to day decisions, we should look at the general patterns of morality and act accordingly. Act with others in a way that preserves who they are, and potentially elevates their existence. Act in ways that preserve and elevate society without personal sacrifice where possible. Only sacrifice if there is absolutely no other choice.

When we have time to objectively study specific situations, and feel the energy and effort spent will be worth the opportunity cost elsewhere, then do so. Studying how the speed limit impacts fatalities over the lifetime of that road? A good use of time. Studying the impact of whether you should tear a piece of paper in half or quarters instead of what you are going to do with those pieces of paper? Not a good use of time. :D

I hope that answers some of your points and makes things clearer. Let me know Bob! Thank you again for staying with what I am sure is a difficult discussion to understand. There is nothing else like it, and such things are the most difficult subjects to think through.

This thread is like a causal chain. What would you say about its first cause(s)? — jgill

Good to see a little levity here! It all started when I read the Kalem cosmological argument long ago. Of course it was easy to see that the idea that a God had to be the start of the universe had no backing. But one thing I did think about was the idea of an origin. So I thought about it, figured others had come to the same conclusion but then realized they hadn't. Turns out people were so obsessed with proving or disproving a God that they missed the logic that remained in front of them.

It is my firm opinion after speaking with many people, that a major and fatal error many people do in discussions is view the end as the means, and the argument as the secondary. It should be switched. People shouldn't give a crap about the end. They should care about the argument and where it logically ends. Not where they want it to end.

Is the following rephrasing acceptable: At least one cause and its causal chain are necessary. — ucarr

No, it is specifically a first cause, not just any cause.

Is this interpretation correct: The definition of a first cause and whatever that entails is an acceptable object of examination within this conversation. — ucarr

Perfect!

Is this a reasonable conclusion: A self-organizing, complex system is an acceptable object of examination within this conversation if it is not logically excluded from the definition of first cause. — ucarr

Correct.

Is this interpretation correct: A principal first cause constrained by the laws of physics cannot imply anything external, antecedent or contemporary with itself. — ucarr

The wording about physics is a little to vague for me. "A principal first cause cannot imply anything external, antecedent or contemporary with itself." Is simple and clear.

However, if the laws of physics logically necessitate all instantiations of causation entail externals, logical antecedents and contemporaries, then its a correct inference there are no first causes. — ucarr

Again, lets change this to be a little more to the point. "However, if it is found logically that all instantiations of causation entail externals, logical antecedents and contemporaries, then its a correct inference there are no first causes."

This is a logical argument, so of course is there is a logical counter it fails.

Is this interpretation correct: The above claim ignores mereological issues associated with the work of defining a first cause. — ucarr

Too vague. What do you specifically mean by mereological. The flat definition doesn't mean that that is how you understand the definition. Since I'm talking to you, I want to hear how you view this specifically.

First causes inhabit the phenomenal universe and create consequential phenomena in the form of causal chains, and yet the examination of causation as a whole comes to a dead end at its phenomenal starting point. — ucarr

Add, "It is possible" to the start of the above sentence and its good.

The implication is that either within or beyond the phenomenal universe lies something extant but unexplainable.* Is this a case of finding the boundary of scientific investigation, or is it a case of halting scientific investigation and philosophical rumination by decree. — ucarr

A logical boundary of scientific investigation. In no way should we stop science or philosophy.

The notion of total randomness causing something-from-nothing-creations suggests a partitioned and dual reality. The attribution of dualism to this concept rests upon the premise that total randomness cannot share space with an ordered universe without fatally infecting it. — ucarr

No dualism. Dualism implies the presence of two separate things. There is not a separate thing. There is simply a first cause's inception. Let me give you an example of total randomness that you may not be realizing. It can be completely random that the universe has one first cause, the big bang, and never has one again. There are an infinite number of possible universes where there is only one first cause. There are an infinite number of universes with 2 first causes. And so on.

Given QM entanglement, it may be the case that what can incept is limited by what exists. An everyday parallel is the fact that certain microbes don't spawn and proliferate in liquid solutions with a pH above a certain level. — ucarr

Ah, now this is interesting! There is nothing to prevent a first cause from happening, but if a first cause occurs in an already existent universe, it is possible that the first cause cannot coexist with what already exists and breaks down. Of course, its equally likely that it can coexist.

Something-from-spontaneously-occurring-self-organization preserves the laws of physics; something from nothing seems to violate physical laws — ucarr

If a first cause can be anything, and it is found to be true, that would not violate physical laws, that would simply become part of them.

...a small adjustment to physics is not a reason to deny a logical conclusion
— Philosophim

You think it reasonable to characterize something-from-nothing as "... a small adjustment to physics..."? — ucarr

Yes because like Newton's laws to Einstein's relativity, most of the time Newton's laws is good enough. Most of the time in physics a first cause would never be considered as a case would have to factually present a case in which there could be no prior causality. That's a ridiculously high bar to clear.

And again, the impact to physics is irrelevant to the logical argument itself. We don't argue against a logical argument because we like or don't like where it leads. This is a mistake theists and atheists have been doing for centuries or they would have figured out what I did long ago. We argue against a logical argument based on its logical premises and conclusion.

I've been examining your definition of first cause as something-from-nothing within a closed system wherein matter-mass-energy are conserved. Again, I ask if you think it reasonable to characterize something-from-nothing as a small adjustment. — ucarr

No, because I have had to repeatedly and tirelessly explain to people that there is nothing prior that is 'making' something. Its nothing, then something. Inception works much better. "nothing to something' will make me have to write 50 more responses to people explaining that no, nothing is not some thing that causes something. :)

It's your job to explain logically how something-from-nothing happens. — ucarr

See? You think there's a cause that explains how it happens. There IS NO CAUSE ucarr. =D Do I need to type this 50 more times? I do say this with a smile on my face, but please, understand this basic point.

Merely stating that inception of a first cause is a case of: "It is what it is." amounts to a case of you dodging behind axiomatic jargon amounts to a case of you dodging behind axiomatic jargon that's first cousin to street vernacular: "Hey, man. I don't know what else I can tell ya. It is what it is." — ucarr

Ha! But no. The logical argument has always been there ucarr. Try to show it to be wrong anytime.

Here's the dodge: You claim a priori knowledge of the reality of first causes, then evade the work of empirical investigation by claiming the just-ising of first causes into our phenomenal universe. — ucarr

1. I already told you I don't believe in a priori knowledge.
2. I note that at least one first cause is logically necessary wherever causality exists.
3. I have never claimed this was an empirical conclusion, and have constantly stated that if one is to claim any one thing in this universe is a first cause, they must prove it.

So the rest of your argument is moot. Please try to address the argument as I do specifically and counter what it and I have been saying, not what you believe I'm implying.

You can't establish it as a logical consequence if you can't show and explain how randomness morphs into a dynamic organizer of something. You're hiding another homunculus. It's the homunculus that confers onto randomness organizational powers. — ucarr

No, you are attributing there being something else behind the first cause. You can't help it. =) There is nothing Ucarr. Nothing. There is no organizer. There is no existent 'randomness' behind the scenes that's shuffling through like a slot machine. True randomness is merely a description to grasp potential. That is all.

Also, you need to argue why something-from-nothing as a logical consequence is not an ad absurdum reductio. If you can't defend against such a conclusion, then first cause is non-existent. — ucarr

Please take the argument I've presented for why a first cause is logically necessary and point out where it falls into ad absurdum reductio.

Your conclusion is not a self-evident truth -- since you claim to disavow self-evident truths, why are you claiming one here? Also, don't jump to the conclusion something outside of reality is self-evidently absurd: √−1=i — ucarr

I am not claiming a self-evident truth. Ucarr, you have a bad habit of using terminology that I don't use as if I am using that terminology. I don't use that terminology intentionally. If you're going to introduce something, ask me like you've been doing, "Are you saying that a first cause is self-evident?" Because my answer is "No".

As to reality, if reality refers to everything, there isn't something that exists outside of that set. That's logical.

It seems likely your use of randomness facilitates circular reasoning within your head.
— ucarr

I don't see how this is circular. Please explain.
— Philosophim

There's no organized run-up to the just-ising of first causes, so they are because they are. Your tautology is your shield. — ucarr

1. This is not circular.
2. I have a clear argument that leads to the conclusion. I'm not saying, "There is at least one first cause because I say so." I gave you a summary of the argument already if you need to reference it.

Ucarr, something I've noticed is you say I'm implying or asserting things that I have not implied or asserted.
— Philosophim

It's your job to refute my interpretations of what you write with cogent arguments. — ucarr

Ok, and one of the ways I do so is by asking you to focus on what's actually being stated instead of what you imagine is being stated. That's a fair request for a good discussion right? I don't want to continue to address straw man's. Please ask if you believe I'm intending something first before accusing me of it.

Can you explain how first cause -- sourced in nothing -- and causing subsequent causal chain which cannot exist without its sourced-in-nothing first cause, can spawn anything other than nothingness?
— ucarr

Sure. Because there is no constraint as to what a first cause can be.
— Philosophim

So, first cause, like a deity, can create anything. Also, first cause, like a deity, cannot be explained causally. Instead, first causes and deities just are. — ucarr

I've already explained this several times, so please listen. It is possible. Possible. Not certain. Not is. Not necessarily. It is possible, that a first cause could create anything. However, it would cause what it created, those things would not be first causes themselves.

Sure, a deity is possible, but so is anything else. Meaning a deity is not necessary to explain anything. A deity could exist for five minutes and vanish. A deity could be good, bad, sad, mad, rad, etc. Or it could be some rocks appeared. Or a demonic unicorn. Or simply a photon. You are still narrowing your scope of true randomness, which is to be expected. All of our notions of randomness are really limits on what we can measure. In this case, its truly unlimited randomness.

If the source of something is nothing, how can it cause anything other than what caused it, nothingness?
— ucarr

Because that's what it is.
— Philosophim

You don't need an argument to support this because its nature is by definition, right? — ucarr

Correct. This is required for the definition of a 'first cause' to be logically consistent.

A first cause is simply the start of all other causation in that chain. You're over complicating it again. A -> B -> C Nothing caused A. Keep it simple Ucarr.
— Philosophim

You're the one suggesting randomness caused first cause. You're the one suggesting the questionable equation between randomness and nothingness. — ucarr

You are the one overcomplicating it. :)

This again doesn't explain anything to me. What specifically in Wittgenstein's silent vigil is being evoked as you see it? Lots of people have very different opinions on what Wittgenstein was referring to. So I'll need your particular take to understand what you mean.
— Philosophim

I'm speculating about your first causes just-ising into being as examples of ineffable creation. — ucarr

Inception, not creation.

Ok, all done replying! Ucarr, we're sort of narrowing down the point to one major thing I see now. You're having a difficult time letting go of there being something that causes a first cause. Be it implicit, its still there. I am trying to be clear with my language, so please use the arguments and language that I give instead of attributing ideas that I am not intending, as If I'm intending them. Just check with me first if you think I'm implying more than I've written.

And thank you for being very discerning and thinking about this at length. I don't want to come across as if I think you're not doing a fantastic job. You are. I'm enjoying the discussion.

I already argue that spacetime is needed for any change and you agreed with it. — MoK

Yes, and I made two points you'll have to consider.

1. We have nothing, then spacetime. Change happened with spacetime.
2. There is nothing in your argument that proves nothing cannot come before spacetime.

Could we agree that there is no point before the beginning of time? Yes or no. — MoK

Before the beginning of spacetime? Lets assume yes for the argument. In which case, nothing came before spacetime. Its either nothing, or something. There are no other options.

In the case of first causes, the evidential bar is so high, that it is more plausible by far to believe that it will never be met, except in the context of a specific theory, which is far from conclusive. — Ludwig V

Exactly, well said Ludwig!

You're saying the domain of this conversation is a logical examination of what follows within a causal chain in the wake of its first cause? — ucarr

I'm saying at least one first cause is logically necessary, and the consequences of that being so.

There is no prior or external cause. Typically saying, "self-cause" implies that there is first a self, then a cause. That's not what I'm intending. There is no conscious or outside intent.
— Philosophim

I'm guessing you're excluding consideration of self-organizing, complex systems that are not conscious. — ucarr

I'm not including or excluding anything but defining what a first cause is, and what that means for us.

I'm guessing you're saying first causes can only be interacted with as givens. There's no way to approach a first cause mentally. The only mental reaction possible to the existence of a first cause is acceptance of it as a given, as an unsearchable fact. — ucarr

If you have discovered and proven something is a first cause, then yes. There's nothing else to consider about what caused it to exist.

Its illogical to claim that something which has nothing prior that caused its existence, has nothing prior that caused its existence.
— Philosophim

Is this your description of circular reasoning? — ucarr

No. If there is a first X in a causal chain, there cannot be something prior which causes that first X.
A -> B -> C A is the first. You can't then say 1 -> A because then A was never the first, 1 was. This is about discovery, this is about what actually is first, whether we know that its first or not.

If just-ising is the dead-end of physics and its examinations, then, yes, the domain of causality post-first-cause suspports science. However, the fundamentals as first causes are beyond reach of science. This renders post-causality science permanently incomplete. — ucarr

Correct on the first part, but it doesn't render it permanently incomplete. Finding limits is part of completeness. Science is just as often about asserting what we cannot know as much as what we can know.

Are you sure an unsearchable beginning doesn't dovetail with eternal existence? — ucarr

Positive. Our ability to know it is irrelevant to what it is. Its entirely possible a first cause could start to exist at any time. That would be its beginning. If one does, has, or will, whether we discover it or not does not deny its logical possibility and then existent reality.

Something happening by just-ising from nothing seems to preclude energy, animation, forces and material, not to mention an environment of similar composition. — ucarr

Correct. Its not that all of these things can't incept, its just that nothing else causes them to incept.

When you exhort the reader to instantaneously accept the just-ising into being as a something divorced from everything save nothing, you're cryptically doing away with physics-yet-magically-assuming-it because you present without explanation some means of a human perceiving this change out of nothingness with his/her powers of perception intact, or is QM entanglement of observer/object not in effect with observation of a first cause aborning? — ucarr

In my many replies I've been very consistent about this. Remember when you asked me, "Can there be a hydrogen atom that can do things that a hydrogen atom can't?" Recall what I said. I noted that a hydrogen atom is defined as having particular properties. If it doesn't have those properties, its not a hydrogen atom, its something else by our definitions.

Physics is a tool of definitions and measurements that are consistently applied to the world. The possibility of first causes does not destroy what physics is. It may amend it, as all discoveries do. Yes, a first cause is a logical consideration. But it must be proven. We can't just go about saying, "That's a first cause because we don't understand it." Not understanding it means it might be a first cause, but only after exhausting all possible causal influences which could have caused that thing to exist.

Regardless, a small adjustment to physics is not a reason to deny a logical conclusion. A logical conclusion is what it is. We don't deny it simply because we don't like what results from it. We have to deny it by showing there's a flaw in the logic, or accepting it and adapting.

You seem to be implying a priori knowledge permanently partitioned from empirical experience of ultimate causes and therefore uncorroborated independently are sufficient for belief in unsearchable first causes. — ucarr

Can you break this up a bit so I can understand this better? I'm not quite sure what you're saying here.

It sounds like a hypothetical conjecture that excludes physics. If true randomness has no relationship with first causes, why do you even mention it? — ucarr

Because its the logical consequence of nothing coming from something. There is nothing to push, or restrict anything which is not caused by anything else. A restriction is an outside cause. Same with a push. Lets look at it this way. If a first cause was 60% likely to be an atom, and 40% likely to be a photon, there would be the question, "What causes these odds?" Meaning we're not really looking at a first cause.

Since a first cause has no prior cause, there is no outside cause that states, "This is more likely/less likely to appear. This must exist at this time." There are not outside causes, so no outside rules that shape or limit what a first cause can be.

Think about it another way Ucarr. Why does reality exist at all? Was there anything outside of reality which caused reality? Of course not. Meaning there was nothing that ruled that it had to be this way.

It seems likely your use of randomness facilitates circular reasoning within your head. — ucarr

I don't see how this is circular. Please explain.

Now, you're going to say first causes might govern our lives through the causal chains they author. — ucarr

Ucarr, something I've noticed is you say I'm implying or asserting things that I have not implied or asserted. Try to avoid this in the future please. If you believe my logic leads somewhere, just point out how you think it leads there.

Since first causes just-is their way into our world, there's no physics -- time, matter or vectors -- attached to their arrival. Sounds like a priori speculation without possibility of corroboration. — ucarr

Its just a logical conclusion, not an empirical assertion. Just like Einstein hypothesized the theory of relativity and his math checked out, it wasn't until they could test it that it could be considered empirically verified. I have never claimed this has been empirically verified, only logically necessary.

Now, if a first cause is ever empirically verified, it would then be a theory in physics. Right now its just a logical assertion. That's pretty much what philosophy does.

Can you explain how first cause -- sourced in nothing -- and causing subsequent causal chain which cannot exist without its sourced-in-nothing first cause, can spawn anything other than nothingness? — ucarr

Sure. Because there is no constraint as to what a first cause can be.

If the source of something is nothing, how can it cause anything other than what caused it, nothingness? — ucarr

Because that's what it is.

To continue, if nothing becomes something and causes subsequent somethings, how can you claim causal supervenience across a causal chain? Don't you have to maintain that original nothingness in order to claim supervenience? If so, then causal chains are really nothing — ucarr

A first cause is simply the start of all other causation in that chain. You're over complicating it again. A -> B -> C Nothing caused A. Keep it simple Ucarr. :)

I'm not sure what you're trying to say here either, could you go into more detail ucarr? Thanks.
— Philosophim

Your first causes from nothing might be invoking Wittgenstein's silent vigil over what cannot be spoken of. — ucarr

This again doesn't explain anything to me. What specifically in Wittgenstein's silent vigil is being evoked as you see it? Lots of people have very different opinions on what Wittgenstein was referring to. So I'll need your particular take to understand what you mean.

On the contrary, I'm suggesting true randomness cannot be contemplated because it deranges the foundational order of thinking. — ucarr

It simply causes us to consider something we have not considered before. This does not disrupt thinking or logic. Its merely a continuation and updating of what we can consider.

...there is something prior that exists within the causal chain of the first cause up to the first cause itself.
— ucarr

Okay, for the record, this isn't you intending to say something exists prior to the first cause? Can you restate your intended meaning; I don't know how to read your above quote except as you saying something exists prior to the first cause. — ucarr

Ucarr, the context of the statement is implying the first cause of that specific chain. Not the 'first' first cause ever. Let me be clear and unambiguous. A first cause cannot be caused by something prior. So if you ever think I'm saying that, know that I'm not and you've misread the intent.

A causes B causes C is a causal chain. Every point within that chain has a prior point except the first cause.
— Philosophim

I don't know how to read this except as a contradiction to the statement I addressed directly above. — ucarr

If the start of a causal chain is a first cause A, the following results are caused by the previous set of existence. Potentially we could have many first causes, chain 1, 2, 3, etc. and they would all follow this pattern.

The logical conclusion is that there must be at least one first cause.
— Philosophim

How can you justify logically the existence of a first cause that simply is? — ucarr

That's the entire point of the post. :D I thought you assumed the logic leading to this conclusion was correct, then asking about the consequences of it. I'll summarize it again.

If we don't know whether our universe has finite or infinite chains of causality A -> B -> C etc...

Lets say there's a finite chain of causality. What caused a finite causal chain to exist instead of something else? There is no prior reason, it simply is.

Lets say there's an infinite chain of causality. What caused an infinite causal chain to exist instead of something else? There is no prior reason, it simply is.

It is impossible for there to not be at least one first cause. Therefore we know that first causes are possible, and have no reason for their existence besides the fact they exist.

I think you imply self-causation in the case of a first cause. Since, by definition, nothing causal leads to a first cause, it follows implicitly that a first cause, if not eternal and uncaused, causes the inception of itself. — ucarr

This may just be a language issue. There is no prior or external cause. Typically saying, "self-cause" implies that there is first a self, then a cause. That's not what I'm intending. There is no conscious or outside intent. It just is. That is the answer. Nothing more.

What about a first-cause hydrogen atom? Doesn't it have to incept ex nihilo? — ucarr

Yes.

Let me repeat my earlier question in a different way: Doesn't every first-cause entity have to self-incept ex nihilo? — ucarr

Yes.

a) not self-caused; b) not caused by anything else; c) possibly extant, it follows logically that your first-cause entities, if they exist, have always existed. — ucarr

It is possible that a first cause has always existed, yes.

Given your limitations, can you name any other possibilities? — ucarr

Yes. A first cause may have existed for five minutes and vanished, however its causal influence persists to today. Perhaps a first cause appeared as a big bang, and the result is a universe. Perhaps a first cause will appear for a nanosecond then disappear. There are no limitations.

Let's look at your first-cause entities from a slightly different angle: with your description, they're not eternal, and thus they must begin. — ucarr

No. They can be eternal. Nothing external caused their existence.

If there's a point where something doesn't exist, and then a later point when it does exist, its logically necessary that this something began to exist by some means. How else can we understand the transition from nothing to something? — ucarr

Its illogical to claim that something which has nothing prior that caused its existence, has nothing prior that caused its existence. Only the minds rebellion based on previous experience thinks otherwise. You understand the transition because it happened. That's it. That's the start of causality and the end of our questions up the causal chain.

If you say first-cause entities have no causation whatsoever, and yet are not eternal, then you're positing a universe wherein science is not possible. — ucarr

Incorrect. We just have to keep open that possibility that a first cause could happen. As I've mentioned, proving that any particular one thing is a first cause is a very high bar to reach. As soon as one proven element of external causality comes into play, what we're looking at can't be a first cause.

We both know that's not our universe. — ucarr

No we don't.

Finally, by the two previous arguments, first cause as you define it is self-contradictory: not caused means no beginning; no beginning but not always existing means not beginning to exist, so existing means not not beginning to exist, which means not not caused... — ucarr

Not caused doesn't mean a first cause doesn't have a beginning. The beginning is the first cause itself. Two seconds from now a first cause atom could potentially appear then disappear. It had a beginning, a middle, and an end.

Why is true randomness -- completely unpredictable and unlimited, but active -- not the cause of what you call first cause? — ucarr

True randomness is a description to understand the possibilities of a first cause. It is not a thing that exists that causes first causes. Just like saying a dice has a 1/6 chance of landing on one side, does not mean our created odds caused it to land on that side.

How can you perceive nothing then something with nothing temporal or existential or directional? If time is not essential then: Nothing then something is the cheating liar homunculus in the randomness. — ucarr

I did not understand this question, could you clarify please?

Since every link in a causal chain is sourced in nothing, there's ultimately no distinction between first cause and links in a causal chain. — ucarr

I don't see how you conclude this. If a causal chain is A -> B -> C, B causes C, A causes B, but nothing causes A. That's a clear distinction.

There are no constraints in nothing, so constraint and causality cannot erase the signature of nothing stamped upon them.

Randomness won't countenance links in a causal chain, so talk of links in causal chains is distraction which cannot distract from Wittegenstein's silence. — ucarr

I'm not sure what you're trying to say here either, could you go into more detail ucarr? Thanks.

Seems like we're going round and round here at this point. Which is fine, it just means its likely time to end it.

Well, if nothing to spacetime is a change then we need spacetime for it! That is true since spacetime is necessary for any change. — MoK

But if spacetime appears, we have spacetime. If you're saying we need spacetime before spacetime, that doesn't make any sense. The only thing you've noted is that we need spacetime for other changes besides spacetime itself. You have not proven, only asserted, that spacetime cannot come from nothing. That doesn't work. Prove it, and you have an argument. If not, you're stuck.

But spacetime is a substance, and has the property of time. You can't say spacetime existed before time.
— Philosophim
True, and that is the problem. Saying that nothing exists before the beginning of time assumes that there is a point at which nothing exists at that point. — MoK

Its not an assumption, its a logical conclusion based on your point. If you say spacetime has a beginning, and spacetime is the only way for other things to change, there can only have been nothing before spacetime. You can't win on this one Mok. If you say, "Begin" that implies there was something before. If there was not something before, then nothing was before. And if you say something was before, then it looks like something can cause spacetime to appear. And if that's the case, what is that something? So either way, you cannot prove that something cannot come from nothing with your current set up.

We have to agree whether nothing to spacetime is a change or not. Yes or no? — MoK

Yes. :) And the above still applies.

(1) There is no point before the beginning of time. — MoK

If there is no point prior to spacetime (remember, you noted earlier time cannot exist alone, its a property of spacetime) then there is nothing.

If there was such a point then it means that spacetime exists before the beginning of time so what we assume as the beginning of time is not the beginning of time — MoK

But spacetime is a substance, and has the property of time. You can't say spacetime existed before time. That would be like saying my red hat existed before red. Its not about what we assume to be the beginning of time, its about if there is something before time.

(2) Nothing to something is impossible which is the subject of discussion. — MoK

Right, but as its been noted, that's your conclusion. If you assume the conclusion is true, you haven't proven the conclusion is true. Its just a belief at that point.

With how you've defined everything, you've worked yourself into a corner. You can't have something before spacetime, which means that nothing was before spacetime. And you can't have infinite amount of time that has passed prior to now, which means spacetime couldn't have always existed. But keep trying!

Ok, I can simplify this even further. I think we can agree that spacetime is necessary for change. I think we can agree that nothing to spacetime is a change as well. This means that we need spacetime for this change, nothing to spacetime. — MoK

No, I don't think so because what you've concluded is that we need spacetime for other changes besides spacetime. You haven't proven that spacetime itself cannot come from nothing. We could also say change must involve spacetime. Nothing to something is a change, and it involves spacetime.

So if we agree that nothing to something is not possible then it follows that it is improper to say that there was nothing before the beginning of time. — MoK

This is assuming the conclusion is assuming the conclusion is true. This is classical logical fallacy called "Begging the question". If the only way your premises work is if you assume the conclusion is true, then nothing has been proven.

I think it was a good start, but you've reached the logical end with the premises and definitions you've put forth. I'm not saying you shouldn't keep trying, but at this point you'll need a new tact. Either new definitions, or a revision of premises is required.

I could easily deal with 3. as well, but that takes the thread away from the spectacular leap from a first cause being something imaginable to an existential realm. — jgill

Does it? What caused 3? What caused the line to be drawn that particular way instead of any other way? And if there is nothing that caused it to be drawn that particular way, then what prevents another line from being drawn a different way?

At any moment in time, there is something prior that exists within the causal chain of the first cause up to the first cause itself.
— Philosophim

With this claim how are you not deconstructing the central premise of your thesis? — ucarr

A causes B causes C is a causal chain. Every point within that chain has a prior point except the first cause.

To specifically state, "This first cause must have happened" requires us to prove it exists/existed.
— Philosophim

Are you saying knowledge of a first cause can only be empirical, not a priori? So, this gives your claim the status of a proposition made as a basis for reasoning, without any assumption of truth? — ucarr

The logical conclusion is that there must be at least one first cause. But if I'm going to claim, "This X is a first cause", it must be proven empirically, or with unwavering evidence. Meaning if I claimed "This atom is a first cause", I would need to prove it.

This is correct reasoning, but it suggests your claim needs to be altered to: Any logical first cause is possible — ucarr

A fine suggestion, but I'm not going to change it to that because I don't think its necessary and it would confuse other people. Sometimes you can't win with phrasing alone, you just have to walk through what things mean.

A first cause does not need to have any imposition, consciousness, or awareness of itself. It simply is.
— Philosophim

Again, this is either self-causation or eternal existence without creation. — ucarr

I don't use the term self-causation because that can convey the intent that the first cause actively caused itself. That's not what I'm saying here. Second, a first cause does not need to be eternal. As I mentioned before, a first cause could appear and dissipate later. Its best to keep it simple. It just is. It exists without prior cause.

.we do not identify a hydrogen atom as being able to create ex nihilo.
— ucarr

You're not talking about causation of something within an established causal chain, such as our sun assembling hydrogen atoms within its elements-generating furnace. If you were, you wouldn't have used the verb: create. — ucarr

I am talking about causation of something within an established causal chain. If I recall you were using the word create, so I followed suit. Creation is one form of causation. Just use causation if you don't like creation.

The first cause is not free of causal logic either, it is the start.
— Philosophim

This is more evidence you imply first causes are self-caused. — ucarr

Again, this is not what is intended. A first cause does not cause itself. A first cause is not caused by anything. Its just there. Its extremely simple, don't overcomplicate it by adding in the term 'self'. :)

A first cause does not necessitate that it be able to do anything.
— Philosophim

No, can you add a little more to what you mean here?
— Philosophim

You've saying a cause, first or otherwise, must act causally. So why do you also say (per the above quote) that it isn't necessary that a cause be able to to anything, which is a way of saying it's not compelled to act causally. — ucarr

Ucarr, you keep pulling this sentence out of context. Let me clarify the context so you understand what this is referring to.

You said: "Why do you say above statement is not knowledge of the identity of the first cause? I ask this question because you identify first cause as what acts without limitation in causing the inception of creation."

You were implying that a first cause had to be the inception of all creation. You were implying to me that it had to be a particular way.

I replied with:
"No, I did not claim a first cause is the inception of all creation. A first cause is the inception of a causality chain. The entirety of our universe may very well be explained by several first causes over time culminating in today. A first cause does not necessitate that it be able to do anything."

The "anything" just meant that it did not have to be anything in particular like the inception of all creation.

So no, I'm not saying that its not compelled to act causally or anything else outside of the context of the above subject.

When describing these phenomena, you say vague things such as: a hydrogen atom forms ex nihilo, or you say even vaguer things such as: a hydrogen atom as first cause simply is, or There is no prior imposition. — ucarr

This is not vague. This is what it is. Nothing then something. There's nothing else. Vagueness would assume I'm implying something else right? I'm not.

Does an atom will itself to exist? It is by the forces outside of its control. — ucarr

No. No will. No self. No other. Nothing then something. That's it.

This is axiomatic jargon, not science. — ucarr

This is a logical conclusion, not jargon. Jargon would imply I'm just throwing words together without thought care, or definitions. There may be a little language barrier between us that we're working out Ucarr, so don't get frustrated yet. :)

Its also never purported to be science. Its logically necessary there be at least one first cause. I'm not claiming any empirical fact of "X (Insert whatever variable you want) is the/a first cause". I'm not saying the big bang is or isn't a first cause for example. I'm just noting what a first cause is, that one is logically necessary, and what we can conclude from that being true.

I believe it may be possible in some instances for us to find a first cause scientifically.
— Philosophim

Can you elaborate some specific details pertaining to how cosmologists can go about finding a first cause? — ucarr

Certainly.

1. All forms of prior causality must be ruled out. This is extremely demanding.
2. To rule out all forms of prior causality, all prior events to the first cause should indicate that X should not happen, and yet it does.

Can you provide a proof for:
truth is what it is
— Philosophim — ucarr

Sure. A man believes to the point that he knows he can fly if he jumps off a 50 story building. He jumps. The truth is, he cannot. To not detract from what we're doing here however, you may want to visit my other work on knowledge. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14044/knowledge-and-induction-within-your-self-context/p1

As for axioms, I believe axioms must be proven, not 'given'.
— Philosophim

You should consult your dictionary, unless you want to start a conversation explaining how you're redefining "axiom." — ucarr

I did not introduce the word axiom in the discussion. You brought it up and I was just noting I believe that nothing is self-evident but must be worked through. I'm not sure this line of thinking is anything more important than an aside, though, so may be an irrelevant to the scope of the discussion.

Since you think first causes are logically necessary, why do you say they're possible instead of saying they're necessary? — ucarr

No, I think it is necessary there is at least one first cause. Its possible that there are more. I think your confusion is you think I'm ascribing something like a self, or a will, or something else that causes the first cause to first be. There is nothing prior. Without any prior cause for a first cause to exist, there can be no predetermination or influence. It is the definition of real chaos. Not limited randomness. Absolute, unpredictable, anything goes randomness.

To clarify, "randomness" is just a mathematical approach we take when we are limited in our ability to measure or observe all the causes that go into an outcome until after the outcome is finished. A die roll is not 'truly random'. It has sides and obeys the physics and forces upon it. If we could dissect and observe every bit of force that would impact the object ahead of time, we would always know the outcome of the die. We say "1 in six" chance of any side popping up only because we can't know ahead of time what will pop up. But its all causal.

True randomness has nothing to measure. There are no prior constraints. There's no set up. There's nothing, then something. That's a first cause. Completely unpredictable and unlimited as what it could be before it happens.

Thank you for posting Brenden, I will try to address your points the best I can.

I typically think of values as being arbitrarily asserted, so, it is more natural for me to make the claim, "It is possible to claim that existence is net good without contradiction," than to prove, like you appear to have done, that existence must be good if morality exists at all. — Brendan Golledge

Those two statements don't appear to be that far off. If existence is good, it must exist without contradiction. A contradictory existence is an existence which eliminates itself.

I have 2 more similar arguments: It appears that only living beings have the experience of "good" and "bad" (this observation is so fundamental, you might actually define life as being those things which have preferences). — Brendan Golledge

The middle part that you skipped covers this. I'll summarize it here. What we find is the math results in a hierarchy of existence pound for pound. First there is non-living matter. Than chemical reactions. Then self-sustaining chemical reactions (life), then intelligent life, then societies of intelligent lives. So while we will generally do more good in helping people, we should be conscious about the actions we do to unintelligent life as well. They matter as well.

The hierarchy also reveals one more thing. Its more existence for all levels to be able to co-exist in harmony then one of those hierarchies to simply destroy the lesser. If there comes a case in which there is an either or, one man or a society, one goat or a man, we choose the hire level of existence to save. But optimally we remove the either or. Both living is optimal.

The second argument comes from evolution/game theory. It seems to be necessarily true that those moralities which are good at propagating themselves will become more common, and those that are less good will not propagate themselves. I like to call this "God's morality", because assuming that God made the world the way he likes, then God likes moral beings to try to propagate themselves and their morality. This is the morality that WILL BE. — Brendan Golledge

Interesting take! I would simply add those that propagate themselves without unnecessarily destroying everything around it. I give an example later on that sheep, if left unchecked, would eat all the the grass killing all the plants. This would then make all the sheep starve and die. But wolves check sheep to ensure they don't grow out of control. We achieve environmental homeostasis, which is the highest possible level of existence over time.

The second argument leads me to the idea that morality is enlightened self-interest. I am composed of several parts, including a body, mind, and "heart". I am also a cell within a social body, and I am incapable of propagating myself into the distant future by myself. So, it makes sense that I ought to take care of each of my parts: take care of my bodily health, educate my mind, try to find (or assert) the good, try to do good to my social unit, etc. This train of thought leads roughly to the standard morality that most people would recognize. — Brendan Golledge

The comprehension of morality would be enlightenment. Not only for our self-interest, but for the interest of every thing that exists.

I appreciate your comments! Let me know if you have questions.

So, the universe is still growing? — ucarr

I'm not sure what you mean. Does time continue? Yes. Is it necessarily the case that more first causes will happen? No. Is it necessarily the case that first causes won't happen? No.

So, a first cause may not trigger a causal chain? Should it instead be called a birth? — ucarr

It will always be part of a causal chain the moment after it exists. Just thing of time. At any moment in time, there is something prior that exists within the causal chain of the first cause up to the first cause itself.

do you acknowledge you also imply anything is possible? — ucarr

I imply that any first cause is plausible. It doesn't mean that any one specific first cause can imagine has actually happened or will actually happen. To specifically state, "This first cause must have happened" requires us to prove it exists/existed.

Do you acknowledge all possible inceptions implies contradictory inceptions can coexist, and thus the universe allows existence of paradoxes? — ucarr

Lets carefully define what we mean by a contradiction. A contradiction is often defined as "Two things that cannot coexist". So can two things that cannot coexist co-exist? No. Because that's what they are. Would there be things that might seem contrary to us? Yes. But if they both co-exist, they are not contradictions.

If you mean two things that cancel each other out, sure. Matter and anti-matter for example.

These two claims, taken to together, suggest first causes, if self-actualized, impose identities upon themselves. Do you agree this implies the universe comes into being as self-will unlimited? — ucarr

No. There is no prior imposition. Its just existence. Does an atom will itself to exist? It is by the forces outside of its control. A first cause does not need to have any imposition, consciousness, or awareness of itself. It simply is. Could a first cause come about that had what you note? Yes. But that is only one possibility, it is not necessary.

"That is really similar to a hydrogen atom and it creates other existences besides itself". Sure. But its not a hydrogen atom as we currently define it, because hydrogen atoms cannot do that.
— Philosophim

Explain how the above is not weakened by the existence of water, as well as the other organic compounds containing hydrogen? — ucarr

Because part of the definition of a hydrogen atom is that it can merge with 2 oxygen to create water. This is a set rule. That is part of how we identify a hydrogen atom. If a helium atom joined with two oxygen, it won't make water. That's part of its defined identity by us. If we did not discriminate between a helium and hydrogen atom in our definitions, and called them both a hydrelium atom, we could say such an atom could either become water or not when combined with 2 oxygen. It is our naming that determines how we categorize things, but the reality of what a thing is does not care what we call it.

I just noted that there is no limitation on what could incept as a first cause.
— Philosophim

...we do not identify a hydrogen atom as being able to create ex nihilo.
— Philosophim

How do you explain the above two quotes as non-contradictory? — ucarr

I'm going to repost a quote from a few replies back:

Even if you're not talking about cosmic first cause and instead are talking about one of the subsequent first causes, why must cosmic cause acting without limitation incept a subsequent causality that resembles human logical thinking.
— ucarr

To detail into this, lets say a hydrogen atom appears as a first cause and causes another hydrogen atom. Whether we observe this or not is irrelevant, it is the reality of the situation. To cause something means there is some rule that indicates why the thing caused happened. Meaning, causal logic will always be in play.

If a hydrogen atom appears as a first cause then a helium atom appears as a first cause, the hydrogen atom did not cause the helium atom to appear. So you see, it is impossible for something which causes another to be free of causal logic. The first cause is not free of causal logic either, it is the start. — Philosophim

To state something arises 'ex nihilo' is to state it arises without prior cause. If a first cause, causes something else to appear it does not appear 'ex nihilo'. It arises due to the first cause, and not simply from nothing.

a first cause must act causally
— Philosophim

Do you agree the above contradicts:
A first cause does not necessitate that it be able to do anything.
— Philosophim

I think there's a difference between saying, "There's a reason for everything" and then spelling out what that reason is or how it must unfold.
— Philosophim — ucarr

No, can you add a little more to what you mean here?

Do you agree that:
...because all things are possible as first causes, its equally possible a hydrogen atom, as we identify it, just forms and exists as normal. There is not the need for anything out there...
— Philosophim

does not spell out what the reason is or how first causes unfold? Do you see that, instead, it's presented as a axiom from which your thesis proceeds. As such, it says in effect, eventually everything will be everything because things, like hydrogen, simply are. — ucarr

No, I don't see that conclusion at all. First causes have no prior cause for their existence, yet what they cause can be traced back to that first cause. There is great meaning in cause, which we use today. None of what I'm stating invalidates the scientific method.

Do you see that this -- the core of your thesis -- precludes scientific investigation? — ucarr

No. I believe it may be possible in some instances for us to find a first cause scientifically. The bar for doing so of course is very high, and may be impossible in some situations. I also believe the consideration of first causes as a plausibility should be something to think about. But at the end of the day because the bar is so high, we keep looking for prior causes first.

I do not believe in self-evident truth. Truth is what is.
— Philosophim

Do you see that in the above quote, immediately following your claim to dis-believe self-evident truths, you support this claim with a self-evident truth: "truth is what it is"? — ucarr

Let me clarify. "Self-evident" means "human's can grasp them without needing to prove them". I do not believe in that. I believe in knowledge as the best logical means we have to make claims about reality that are not contradicted by the truth in our use. Truth exists despite what we conclude or think. If you've read my knowledge paper I linked you in another thread, you'll know what I mean.

As for axioms, I believe axioms must be proven, not 'given'. An axiom should be extremely easy to prove, and generally is something that no one has ever been able to demonstrate as false.

Do you accept that some major implications of your thesis include:

a) the universe allows paradoxes — ucarr

No, as covered above.

b) the conservation law re: matter-mass-energy, instead of actually being a law, is merely a plank within a working hypothesis still liable to refutation — ucarr

Yes, but all laws exist this way. Laws are generally so time tested and above reproach that we do not need to call them theories anymore. However, no law is immutable.

c) the universe, because it continues to incept new matter-mass-energy into itself, exists as an open system. — ucarr

No. I've said this several times now and its very important that you understand this. I am not saying, "X first cause happened, will happen, or has happened". Its possible, but it must be proven. It is equally as possible that no other first causes have happened, or will happen. You cannot predict if a first cause will happen. You must conclusively prove that a specific first cause has happened to say it has.

Let me sum it as simple as possible: "All possibilities does not mean any one thing happened or will happen". The only way to see what happened is to prove it. The only way to see what will happen is to live through it. I make no claims that any one particular first cause happened, only that its logically necessary that there must have been at least one.

OK, this is the last arrow in my quiver: Any theory in which time is an emergent property within must be a dynamical theory (for example the theory that explains nothing to spacetime). Time however is the main variable in any dynamical theory. This means that time has to be emergent and at the same time the main variable of such a theory. This is however problematic since time is required for the emergence of time. — MoK

Trying to throw in some extra vocabulary doesn't solve the issue. Lord knows its a common tactic among many on the forums. :D We should be able to explain everything in simple terms. Simply put, if your conclusion is part of your premises "that something cannot emerge within nothing" then its not a viable argument. Remember as well, time cannot exist on its own, so we always have to be referencing spacetime as well. Spacetime is a substance, not emergent.

There is simply no point before the beginning of time so we cannot say what is before the beginning of time. Think of the beginning of time as a solid and impenetrable wall. We cannot get through this wall and ask what is before. In fact, we are committing an error in saying what is before the beginning of time since before indicates the existence of a time before the beginning of time. — MoK

Again, the added vocabulary and sentence structure does not negate the simple fact. There was either something, or nothing. If you claim we cannot reference before spacetime, that means there was nothing before spacetime. If you claim spacetime always existed, then we have an infinite regress. There is no third option, just a desire that we not pick one of the two. 'Nothing' and 'something' are binaries. If there is not something, there is nothing. If there is not nothing, there is something.

Well, that, nothing to spacetime, cannot happen. I think we agree that spacetime is a substance. — MoK

I think you've made a pretty good argument so far, but here is where you're stuck. I think its fine to call spacetime a substance, but plugging it into the argument we haven't proven that spacetime cannot come from nothing. We never noted that substances couldn't come from nothing, only that they needed spacetime. Saying, "Nothing to spacetime cannot happen" is the conclusion, so we can't use it as a premise. We have to have true premises that necessarily lead to the conclusion being true, without the premises needing the conclusion to be true.

What is before the beginning of time and nothing to something are sides of the same coin. It is not proper to say what is before the beginning of time since there is no time before the beginning of time. — MoK

Here you run into another problem. If there is no time before the beginning of time (spacetime), then what is there? There can't be something that's different from spacetime because you required that spacetime exist for change to happen. And you can't have infinitely regressive time as you've already ruled that out. The only option left is that nothing was before spacetime.

‘Swelling’ certainly, as a word, refers to something spatiotemporal, but not what space nor time actually are. In order to understand space better, I have split, conceptually, the concept into two: purely relational vs. actual space (i.e., a pure relation or a substance). — Bob Ross

True, 'swelling' is more of an implicit intention. My point is I don't think you need to introduce space as a 'thing in itself'. Anytime we try to define a 'thing in itself" beyond the barest logical necessity of its existence, we have to remember that we can't. The thing in itself is beyond understanding, identification, or knowledge.

If space is purely relational, then the actual extension which is the form of your experience does not have a correlate in reality—it is just that: the form of your experience. — Bob Ross

What is it for something to be purely relational? We have to relate something. And that thing has to exist somewhere in some form.

However, that does not mean that space does not exist, as if it is purely relational then the spatial relations of an object are real properties of that object and are not, like nihilists or transcendentalists on space think, purely modes by which we intuit and cognize objects. — Bob Ross

Ah, that's your target. I don't think you need "a thing in itself" to prove this. All you have to note is that objects represent things in themselves, and that space is a property of objects. I mean, all you have to do to a nihilist is ask them to volunteer to have a rock dropped on them from above if they don't think its real. :D

If space is actual (i.e., a substance), then, effectively, the extension (i.e., the depth)(e.g., the swelling of something) actually exists in reality just as much as what you phenomenally experience. — Bob Ross

We can't conclude that about the thing in itself. What we can conclude is that if we judge space correctly, then for our viewpoint of reality, the thing in itself does not contradict our conclusion. Does that mean our understanding of space represents the thing in itself's entire space accurately? We can't know because we cannot identify or know a thing in itself beyond it correlation or violations of our perceptions and judgements.

A person who claims space and time are purely relational are claiming that the spatiotemporal relations between objects are real (just like the code in a video game gives reality to spatiotemporal relations in that game) but the actual extension and temporality are not (just like how the game could very well have no means of rendering any extension or temporal sequences for the player to see). — Bob Ross

That's just silly then. A good ol' rousing game of "Drop the rock" will cure that.

The logical necessity is basically that some 'thing' needs to be there for us to observe.

No. Logical necessity is when it is logically impossible to posit any contrary (i.e., one cannot posit any contrary without violating a law of logic): it has nothing to do with what needs to be there for us to observe. — Bob Ross

We can't observe nothing, so we have to observe something. That something is the 'thing in itself'. Our representations of that observation are the way we view the world. As such we can never claim to identify or know "the thing in itself" only our observations of it.

What you seem to be going for is whether spacetime is substantive or imaginative. Which is fine. I just wouldn't use the terminology 'the thing in itself' combined with any explanation of identity or assertions of what it must be. This sentence in particular:

I find it very plausible that spatiotemporal relations are real constraints and properties of the things in themselves. — Bob Ross

We can't ascribe properties to things in themselves. We can represent thing as having properties, and that may, or may not match a thing in itself. Such things are outside of our knowledge. Like I said, it was a quibble of terminology, not a disagreement with the overall intent of your points.

I think its clear that we've both said our piece at this point and no further value can be added to the discussion. I think its fair to say we agree to disagree. Catch you in another thread.

Do you accept the following argument: Since by definition a first cause can't have any derivative first causes, each first cause is a discrete causality chain, and therefore the universe is coming into existence sequentially in time, and thus the big bang and its inception of the entire universe in an instant is wrong. — ucarr

This is really close. Let me break it down to be sure.

"Do you accept the following argument: Since by definition a first cause can't have any derivative first causes"

Yes, agreed.

"Each first cause is a discrete causality chain"

Results in a discrete causality chain that can intersect with other discrete causality chains, yes.

"therefore the universe is coming into existence sequentially in time"

Yes. Just to make sure, this does not preclude other first causes appearing during this time.

" and thus the big bang and its inception of the entire universe in an instant is wrong."

No, I want to clearly state that I am not stating "X is an actual first cause". We don't know how many first causes have happened since the big bang. We're not even sure if the big bang itself is a first cause. All we can logically conclude that there must be at least one, and its equally as probable that there could be more than one.

But to see if I can tackle another idea I see you might be conveying, lets say the big bang was the only first cause. The first cause is the bang. Everything that happens immediately after that is caused by the bang. If no other first causes appeared and had causal associations with what appeared from the big bang, then there would only be one first cause of our universe, the big bang. That of course must be proven.

Would grant me that spacetime is a substance, nothing to spacetime is a change, and spacetime is needed for a change? If yes, then it is obvious that we are dealing with an infinite regress when we deal with nothing to spacetime. — MoK

So I think what you're going for here is saying we would need spacetime to be for spacetime to appear. But that doesn't really make sense right? If spacetime already exists, it doesn't need to create spacetime. The simplest and clearest statement is that "There was nothing, then spacetime". We don't violate that we need spacetime for change. Spacetime appeared from nothing, therefore change. So no, I don't see a reasonable infinite regress that makes sense here.

You did not prove that spacetime cannot come out of nothing.
— Philosophim
If you grant me that nothing to something is logically impossible and spacetime is a substance then it follows that spacetime cannot come out of nothing. — MoK

For the first part, if I were to grant you that nothing to something was impossible, that would preclude the conclusion. That's what we're trying to prove, so I can't grant you that before we've proven it. I can definitely grant you that spacetime is a substance, but I don't see anything here that grants that it cannot come out of nothing. Granted, it doesn't mean we can't still attempt the conclusion, but we need some other premise here for a logical proof.

If the universe had a beginning, what is there before a beginning? Nothing.
— Philosophim
It is not proper to say what was before the beginning of spacetime because you need other spacetime to investigate that. If there is such a spacetime then we are dealing with spacetime as a substance before the beginning of former spacetime instead of nothing. — MoK

I didn't quite get this. You don't need spacetime for spacetime. Spacetime either exists, or it does not. If we say there is a first or beginning, that means at one point it did not exist. Since we don't believe an infinite amount of time (which is a property of spacetime) has existed, then it means that spacetime has not always existed. Meaning that before spacetime, there must have been nothing.

This is a nice attempt, but its just an empirical observation of change withing spacetime.
— Philosophim
I cannot understand. Why the argument is an empirical observation?

What we haven't observed is if its impossible for spacetime to emerge from nothing.
— Philosophim
I already argue against that. — MoK

Because our logic comes from and involves things that already exist. No one has every empirically observed 'nothing' then seen something come from it. Meaning that so far we have not seen this happen. That's the best we can say. We can't say its impossible within our general meaning of the term, 'possibility'.

What i like to do for instances like these is introduce a new term, 'plausibility'. Basically we can logically imagine and conclude all sorts of things. But its not really 'possible' unless its been empirically observed at least once. Anything which could logically be but has not been empirically observed or denied would be 'plausible'. Thus it is plausible that spacetime came from nothing. Of course, it would be equally plausible, at this point, that spacetime has always existed. Since we have two competing plausibilities, and it is currently outside the realm of empirical verifiability, we must demonstrate that one of the arguments is implausible.

Yes, that is one explanation, something can simply exist without any cause. Spacetime is one candidate for such a scenario. — MoK

If something exists without cause, that means 'nothing caused it'. And I don't mean that nothing literally caused it, but that there was nothing, and then something.

That's not quite what I was going for. My point is that we would need spacetime to form at or slightly before something else. In other words, what your notion is proves is that any change from nothing to something must be the emergence of spacetime. You definitely give a valid argument that something cannot form without there being spacetime, but you haven't demonstrated in any logical proof that spacetime cannot emerge within nothing.
— Philosophim
That is impossible because spacetime is a substance. — MoK

All you've been able to logically note so far is that for change to occur, there must be spacetime. You did not prove that spacetime cannot come out of nothing.

There are two arguments against the infinite past — MoK

I don't disagree with you. I think ultimately the logic that there is an infinite past doesn't work out. Some people don't agree with me though, and I'm always open to being shown otherwise. :)

Therefore, the universe has a beginning. — MoK

If the universe had a beginning, what is there before a beginning? Nothing.

It seems to me that you can prove that these are the only 3 options, if you assume that logic is linear. Either causality is a ray (it has a beginning), or a line (it goes to infinity in both directions). If you admit the possibility of noneuclidean geometry, then the line could loop back into itself or cross itself (time travel). Actually, I just realized that there are 2 more options: there could be something without causality (a point), or nothing at all. But these other two options are not consistent with our sensory experience. — Brendan Golledge

True. And I never make a claim that my point is empirically proven, its only logic.

I find it useful, therefore, to assume that there is a first cause, which would be consistent with a creator God, because then I can start to imagine what the purpose of the universe is. I don't see a way forward (with respect to having a moral foundation) if the causality of the universe is infinite. — Brendan Golledge

I have another thread where I'm exploring an objective morality with another fantastic poster, Bob Ross. Its evolved and become more clear than my initial post, but perhaps it might interest you to check it out. Long story short, existence is what is good, and ensuring the most realized and potential existence is what is best. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14834/a-measurable-morality/p1

Why do you say above statement is not knowledge of the identity of the first cause? I ask this question because you identify first cause as what acts without limitation in causing the inception of creation. — ucarr

No, I did not claim a first cause is the inception of all creation. A first cause is the inception of a causality chain. The entirety of our universe may very well be explained by several first causes over time culminating in today. A first cause does not necessitate that it be able to do anything. I just noted that there is no limitation on what could incept as a first cause. But once its incepted, it is what it is, which is possibly limited.

If first cause proceeds without limitation, why do you imply that first cause, acting to cause hydrogen atom, must follow limits that humans use to make sense of the world? — ucarr

To clarify, it is not that humans determine limitations on what can be, it is that identities are imposed limitations on what we call certain things. We do not call an elephant a human for example. Of course, someone could say, "What if a human formed that looked, behaved, and acted exactly as an elephant?"
I would simply say, "That's just an elephant".

To your point about a hydrogen atom, we do not identify a hydrogen atom as being able to create ex nihilo. Now, could someone say, "That is really similar to a hydrogen atom and it creates other existences besides itself". Sure. But its not a hydrogen atom as we currently define it, because hydrogen atoms cannot do that. Do you understand that this is mostly a semantics argument? What we call or identify as something does not limit what can be. But definitions limit us to looking at a narrow band of existence and saying, "That existence is the identity we call 'a hydrogen atom'"

Another thing to understand is that because all things are possible as first causes, its equally possible a hydrogen atom, as we identify it, just forms and exists as normal. There is not the need for anything out there, just as there is not the denial that anything out there is possible. While anything could have been possible, (and would still be as a first cause could happen at any time) what first causes actually happen are part of causality, and discoverable by working up the causal chain. So, if the big bang were a first cause for example, we could work up the chain of causality to find and prove that it is not possible that there was anything prior that caused the big bang.

You imply that first cause must act logically. Why do you not think that's a limitation upon the actions of first cause? Why do you not think implying first cause must act rationally is not a case of you projecting your logical thinking onto first cause? — ucarr

Because a first cause must act causally. A first cause has no prior cause for existence correct? Which means that a first cause cannot cause another first cause. It causes what it does, therefore what and how it causes something is rational. Only the inception of a first cause, and what it would be, is something which cannot be predicted with certainty.

Even if you're not talking about cosmic first cause and instead are talking about one of the subsequent first causes, why must cosmic cause acting without limitation incept a subsequent causality that resembles human logical thinking. — ucarr

To detail into this, lets say a hydrogen atom appears as a first cause and causes another hydrogen atom. Whether we observe this or not is irrelevant, it is the reality of the situation. To cause something means there is some rule that indicates why the thing caused happened. Meaning, causal logic will always be in play.

If a hydrogen atom appears as a first cause then a helium atom appears as a first cause, the hydrogen atom did not cause the helium atom to appear. So you see, it is impossible for something which causes another to be free of causal logic. The first cause is not free of causal logic either, it is the start.

The following is my paraphrase of something you said earlier: A cause that's the first of all first causes doesn't prohibit subsequent non-cosmic first causes for other things.

If this is so, then our universe can be filled with a vast number of non-cosmic first causes. — ucarr

Correct, that's one possibility if we don't yet know the reality.

This is similar to saying, "there's a reason for everything that happens." This is a trivial truth agreed upon by the multitudes. "Everything is everything (for a reason)." — ucarr

I don't see that. I think there's a difference between saying, "There's a reason for everything" and then spelling out what that reason is or how it must unfold.

Why do you not think a universe filled with first causes is a conception of the universe that explodes the following conservation law: matter_mass_energy are neither created nor destroyed. — ucarr

Because that's a law based on what we've observed with the matter that we've seen so far. Its been necessary to do physics. I would say that as an empirical law, this is true. As a logical law, this is not.

If non-cosmic first causes can pop material objects into the universe from nothing, then the total volume of the mass_matter_energy of the universe is constantly fluctuating instead of remaining constant through conservation. — ucarr

True. We are just assuming its remained constant. This logically is not necessarily the case.

If you say incept of every new first cause disappears an earlier, established first cause, the problem is solved. — ucarr

No, I'm not saying that. Its possible that some first causes incept then vanish. Its possible that there are first causes that could exist for trillions of years. I'm only asserting that its possible that first causes happened over the time of the universe's inception, and still today. It doesn't mean they did or will, its just possible if we don't know about them

Does this hold true for the cosmic first cause, with cosmic first cause = the first of the first causes? — ucarr

Yes. If it is the case that there was a 'first' first cause, it may have only existed for a short period of time then vanished. So prior to our universe, there could have been many first causes that blipped in and out of existence making a much more limited impact (or greater!) impact then our own.

Some characterize axioms as self-evident truths. — ucarr

I do not believe in self-evident truth. Truth is what is. Knowledge is our best logical attempt at capturing what truth is. There is knowledge that is clearly sound, and knowledge that is questionable and likely built on some inductions.

This characterization is a preface to saying the assumption upon which we're building our working premise lies beyond the reach of experimentation, observation, collection of data, compiling of data statistics, analysis of data and building logical arguments supported by data. — ucarr

I believe some of the things about first causes are beyond experimentation or observation. Since we cannot predict the inception of a first cause, we cannot predict when one will happen. We could, if the first cause were very specific, trace back through causality and arrive at a point in which 'this X' must necessarily have been a first cause. But this must be proven, which means all other potential causes of 'X's inception must be ruled out.

I hope this answers your questions!

I had to think about this one a while, as part of this conversation with you is learning what needs to be said and what is irrelevant in a discussion about this.

When someone posits a hypothetical with “all else being equal”, they do not mean that the variables at play are equal: they mean that there is a specified set of variables, or conditions, within the hypothetical and everything else that could be said of the hypothetical comparison should be considered equal. — Bob Ross

If we both have a clear grasp of the exact argument, of course. But this isn't a conversation where both of us have a clear picture of what the other is saying. It would be very easy for you to claim there are equal variables, but the situation you're imagining doesn't actually have equal variables. And on my side, I'm not sure what you mean by 'equal variables'. The example I gave are demonstrations of how to approach it for clarity.

That the one is more productive than the other is a variable within the hypothetical comparison, and it is exactly what is needed to demonstrate my point. — Bob Ross

What does "more productive" mean? Give me an example please. Demonstrate the variables that are equal, then the variable that demonstrates more existence than the other. That can be discussed clearly. Remember, we're discussing and I've noted before that this was more exploratory then me saying, "I've got this figured out" I'm not as keen at trying to prove anything at this point, but exploring and seeing ways to approach the idea that lay it out clearly. Lets get very clear examples so there's little ambiguity. THEN lets work on proving or not proving things.

Did you not understand my confetti example vs paper as a tool example?

It completely missed the point, and sidestepped the issue. — Bob Ross

It definitely wasn't intended to. I'm just trying to figure out what you're thinking about with this comparison. Are you including the purpose of a piece of paper? Are you including the fact that this is a conscious agent? If you aren't, then why include people and tools like paper? If you want to eliminate variables, pick situations and objects that don't have those variables in them first.

When you include a human, you include all of the variables that they bring. And I think listening to your examples for a while now has me realizing how best we can both dissect the theory. You have to think bottom up. You cannot think top down. You need to build up to complicated examples because it just causes confusion and a misunderstanding of how everything builds up otherwise. I've been doing this by noting the basics were needed prior to getting to these complicated situations, and now I can articulate why. Its bottom up. You have to start smaller and get larger.

One pattern I see that I need to point out is the pattern of exploding complexity. when we upgrade to chemical reactions, then life, then people, then society. One point that might help you is you can think of each as a factorial explosion in math. An atom is 1X1. Multiple atoms are 2X1. A molecule is 3X2X1. By the time we get to something like life, molecular existence is such an irrelevant factor compared to factor results at the conscious level. When you're talking about a human decision being something like 20X19X18...including atoms as a consideration is insignificant.

This is why I think your examples are confusing to me. You're up in a 20 level factor asking me about a level 2 factor. If you want to discuss level two factors, lets focus the discussion on level 2 factors. In general, we can discuss the factor and one factor higher and lower as a relevant scope to a moral discussion. For now, everything higher or lower than that would be too far out of significance, and I think too complicated to really have a good grasp over. So for example, if you're talking about a human, we can talk one lower which are just basic living things, and one higher which is a society. When talking about a society, we can talk one lower about humans, and one higher about multiple societies. I think this will make things more clear.

So, lets just address the cutting of the paper issue, which is essentially molecular separation, and for now, keep it in the molecular factor. This is good question, because I haven't done this before. :)

P1: More existence is better than less.
P2: Cutting a piece of paper in half, all else being equal, creates more existence than leaving it in one piece.
C: TF, cutting a piece of paper in half, all else being equal, is better than leaving it in one piece. — Bob Ross

Again, lets return to something simple. Lets start with molecules of paper. We have a situation in which right now 1 molecule alone, 2 molecules are together, and 3 are together. When they are together, there is a different type of expressed existence than merely "touching". We'll call it a bond. Let's calculate the total existence as it is now.

6 molecules + 1 bond in the two molecule and (assuming linear bonds for simplicity) 2 bonds on the 3 joined molecule. So 9 expressions total.

All molecules in this setting can bump into each other, and their interactions will be they can bond, not bond, or unbond. In both cases we have six molecules, and all molecules have the same potential interaction with each other molecule. So currently we have three bonds total. The bonds can potentially stay or go, and this will change no matter how many of the same molecules we introduce.

Lets 'cut' one of the bonds. So now we have two individual molecules, and two molecule bonds. Now we have 2 instead of 3 bonds. So 8 expressions total, but the potential existence is still the same in this basic setup. So while the current set up as is is not quite as good as the three bonds, the potential is the same. Of course, this is VERY simple. In this isolated example its better to keep the molecules together, but in general its not that big of a percentage change as long as the potential stays the same.

It is probably just me, but I think your view as evolved since your OP and some of your terms have not been clarified adequately. — Bob Ross

Oh, absolutely. This has been a great way to bounce nascent ideas around in my head, giving them much better form. Already I can tell the whole thing needs a rewrite if its going to be clear to people. Continue to ask any clarifications if you see ambiguities please.

1. Is ‘material existence’ denoting fundamental, identifiable, or concrete entities in reality? Or perhaps something else? — Bob Ross

Fundamental.

2. Is ‘expressive existence’ denoting the relations between fundamental, identifiable, or concrete entities in reality? — Bob Ross

Expressive existence starts as the response that happens when a fundamental comes into contact with another fundamental existence. If two fundamentals express in such a way as to create a new identity between the two; two atoms become a molecule for example, that is a new expressed existence that will respond differently than the expressed existence of the two atoms in their singular state.

3. Is more generic, fundamental, identifiable, or concrete entities better when you say “more existence is better”? — Bob Ross

This is something I hope you'll drill into more. I'll review again the criteria for existence, and now that you see how things work a little bit better, maybe you'll have more questions or another viewpoint on it.

The totality if existence comprises three identifiable parts.

1. The foundation. This is the base thing in itself.
2. The expression. This is how the foundation exhibits itself within reality at any one snapshot of time.
3. The potential. This is the combination of what types of expression are possible within the next shapshot of time.

Now have we proven that spacetime is required for change? No, what we've done is declare it by definition. This isn't necessarily wrong or bad, but we have to be aware it is by definition, and not by empirical discovery.
— Philosophim
Ok, I have an argument for that: Consider a change, A to B. A and B cannot lay at the same point otherwise A and B are simultaneous and there cannot be a change. Therefore, A and B must lay at two different points of a variable. Moreover, the second point, that B resides, must come after the first point, that A resides, if there is a change. This variable we call time. — MoK

This is a nice attempt, but its just an empirical observation of change withing spacetime. What we haven't observed is if its impossible for spacetime to emerge from nothing. Now, to be clear, what we're talking about is a negative. Proving a negative is nigh impossible. For example if I said, "Empirically demonstrate that a unicorn does not exist", the best answer we can give is, "We have not discovered one yet." With a unicorn especially, there isn't even any logical evidence that it needs to exist. So we can probably dismiss that claim.

But can we do the same with 'nothing to something'. There is another age old question which is the idea that as we work up through causality we either reach a point in which there was nothing prior, or we have an infinite regress. Of course, in both cases we ask the question "What caused there to be anything at all?" It can't be something else, as we've reached the limit. In the case of the finite regression, its obvious. A little less obvious, but we also conclude the same with an infinite regress when examining the entire thing as a set. There is no prior cause for why anything should exist. Meaning, something existed despite there being nothing to cause it to exist.

Well, if we accept that spacetime is a substance then nothing to spacetime is also a change that is logically impossible since we need another spacetime for this change. — MoK

That's not quite what I was going for. My point is that we would need spacetime to form at or slightly before something else. In other words, what your notion is proves is that any change from nothing to something must be the emergence of spacetime. You definitely give a valid argument that something cannot form without there being spacetime, but you haven't demonstrated in any logical proof that spacetime cannot emerge within nothing.

Lets take it one more way so you can see it from another angle. Perhaps we cannot empirically demonstrate that something came from nothing, but we also cannot empirically demonstrate that something always existed either. We need a logical reason why this would be, and I believe there are other compelling logical arguments that infinite time passing to get to our existent point today doesn't make any sense. Its a difficult subject for sure. :) But what do you think about this?

This is a good topic Bob. I think it helps to define what space and time are. Space is the property we attribute to a things 'swell of existence'. Space is often seen as relational, though if there was one existent thing, its swell would be space. Time is a measurement of a things state change. When there is a recognition of difference between any snapshot, we have time.

My only quibble is breaking this down into two separate considerations of substances in reality vs things in themselves. To my notion, a thing in itself is nothing that can really be understood except as a logical notation. The idea of a thing in itself is that any details beyond its base logical necessity are beyond human comprehension.

The logical necessity is basically that some 'thing' needs to be there for us to observe. Perhaps there are other base logical necessities that can be gleaned from this, but I'm not sure an analysis of space and time are one of them. For one, that requires us to label some property or aspect of a thing in itself, and the entire logical point of a thing in itself is that it cannot be labeled or identified in anyway beyond its logical necessity that it must exist.

it is not that I disagree with your points, I just think the separation of substance and things in themselves is unnecessary. You can simplify by stating that space and time are properties of things, and all of your points still work. A real 'thing' is always assumed to have a thing in itself behind it that we cannot identify, and thus is largely irrelevant unless we're in very specific discussion about knowledge.

I however think that spacetime is fundamental and cannot be created or emerge so I agree with you that it is better to replace time with spacetime in P1 and P3. — MoK

Ok, with that, lets see if we can break down the underlying essence of what makes the argument compelling.

Spacetime is 'something". Its an existent measurement. And its required for us to have change. Which means that 'change' in your definition, is something that can only happen when things exist.

Now have we proven that spacetime is required for change? No, what we've done is declare it by definition. This isn't necessarily wrong or bad, but we have to be aware it is by definition, and not by empirical discovery.

So then what we've done can be simplified as follows:

1. Spacetime is needed for any change

Basically we say we need something for change to happen. Specifically that something is spacetime. (Though the actual detail of 'spacetime' will be irrelevant to our conclusion. We could call it "A" and it wouldn't matter)

2. Nothing to something is a change.
But we noted earlier that we need something for there to be a change. The only way this still works is if something appears. And this makes sense. Nothing to nothing isn't a change, but nothing to something is.

3. There is no spacetime in nothing
This still works. But does our original conclusion?

C: Therefore, nothing to something is logically impossible.

With our clearer breakdown, we can no longer conclude this. Point two notes that a change can occur when we go from nothing to something. What is is impossible is that nothing to something cannot occur 'without spacetime'.

Revised C: Therefore, nothing to something is logically impossible without spacetime also appearing.

This is the real logical conclusion we can make based on our definitions and premises so far.

But lets follow up a bit because one conclusion out of a set of revised terms doesn't mean that we still don't want to prove our original intent. Maybe with a change we can still do so. To preserve our original intent we can add one thing.

P: Spacetime cannot appear within nothing.

The problem is, this is only by definition and not empirical proof. Meaning at this point we haven't proven anything, we've simply declared it. So I still don't see a way to my mind of salvaging our original intent which was to prove that change nothing to something is logically impossible. But what do you think?

You say, Establishment happens by first cause of the starting point of creation. You say, Inception of creation proceeds without limitation. How does what you say differ from what is said by the rabbi, the priest or the minister? — ucarr

Because the rabbi, priest, or minister claims to have knowledge of what the first cause is. I do not. My definition would put the rabbi, priest, or minister on the spot to prove that a God was the first cause because it is entirely unnecessary, and only one possibility out of an infinite plausible alternatives.

Given the part of your quote underlined above, why cannot a first cause incept a hydrogen atom not limited by its parts and the rules of itself? — ucarr

Because I am going by definitions that we ascribe to things. This is a larger conversation about when we should say, "That's a sheep" vs "That's different enough from a sheep that we call it a goat." Assuming that our definitions accurately describe what a hydrogen atom is, my point is that such an existence wouldn't be a hydrogen atom as we define it today. Whatever it is could exist, and to an untrained eye it might look like a hydrogen atom, but it cannot have the same exact composition as a hydrogen atom, or it would not have the special qualities you note.

Why is your 02) quote not a contradiction of your 01) quote immediately above? — ucarr

To clarify perhaps another part you may be implying, once something exists it enters into causality. So when a hydrogen atom exists, that is what it is. Anything that does not exist as a hydrogen atom, is not a hydrogen atom. Once the existence is in reality, its rules are set.

Do you agree that if a hydrogen atom as first cause is utterly alone, and yet nonetheless can cause things not a hydrogen atom to exist, as its definition of first cause requires, then its ability to cause subsequent inception of all things without limitation is indistinguishable from the creative power of a supernatural deity? — ucarr

Lets not use atom, lets use "object" so we avoid the previous confusion. No. For one, a deity is usually ascribed as having consciousness and intent. An object does not. Second, if an object can incept other things, it must do so within the limitation of what it is. Perhaps what it is does allow anything to come forth, but it would all come forth caused by the first cause and thus follow rules. Anything could be a first cause, but when it exists, it is limited by what it is.

Why do you not agree that positing an infinity of individual causes of an infinity of individual things is a trivial and circular statement about the universe as it's generally known by the public (everything is everything)? — ucarr

Sorry Ucarr, I did not understand the question. I'm not sure what statements I've made that you're referencing here.

It did not exist by any prior cause. It has no intention or possession, as that would be prior to its inception. It simply is, no prior cause.
— Philosophim

Why do you not think the underlined portion of your above quote implies something that simply is is eternal and thus has no inception? I ask this with the understanding inception implies establishment which, in turn, implies a process which is a cause. — ucarr

It does not need to be eternal. A first cause has the potential of happening five seconds from now. A first cause could have happened 10 seconds ago. What formed may very well be completely unstable and exist for a nano-second. Or five seconds. Or 500 years. Or eternal.

I'm just using inception as another term for "started to exist". A first cause does not need a prior process to be, it simply begins to exist.

I'm saying its axiomatic, but not beyond the domains of science, logic, and reason.
— Philosophim

How do science, logic and reason examine what simply exists without the possibility of explanation? — ucarr

I think this question is too broad and you'll need to focus on something specific. What are you referencing in particular that you believe is outside of explanation?

Again, very pointed questions Ucarr. Keep going until you are satisified.

It is not valid to sidestep the hypothetical by mentioning it is impractical, improbable, or to introduce new variables—and, I would argue, this is all you did in your entire response. — Bob Ross

My intention was not to side step your hypothetical. It was to note in this instance, especially because you are still learning the theory, it would be much more practical to give clear context and examples of this "all being equal" to clearly indicate what you mean.

As an example, my hobbyist example demonstrates, contrary to your response (as I think you brought up irrelevant points if we are agreeing that all else is equal), that, all else being equal, building model airplanes in one’s garage is morally better than trying to find a cure for cancer IF the former is done more productively than the latter because the former will produce more identifiable entities than the latter in this case.

Your response completely ignored ‘all else being equal’, and also mentioned or alluded to the probability and practicality of the hypothetical: all of which is irrelevant. — Bob Ross

But Bob, you stated that the one was done more productively than the later, so its not equal. My point is the example is too vague. What do you mean by "all else being equal" when you then also say one is more productive than the other? We have to be a little more detailed because the issue with you is you're imagining half a scenario. Don't just say something is equal, show what that looks like so we have a full intellectual and emotional picture as well.

In terms of the paper example, I don’t see how this doesn’t increase expressions of ‘existence’. Remember, you even agreed that material ‘existence’ is irrelevant: we don’t know what fundamentally exists. — Bob Ross

Did you not understand my confetti example vs paper as a tool example?

Likewise, if you are claiming that “more existence is better”, then it plainly follows that two pieces of paper is better than one all else being equal. — Bob Ross

Again, what does this mean Bob? I need clearer examples of what you're noting is equal here.

Again, material existence doesn’t matter; and expressions of existence are just identifiable entities and their relations. So I don’t see how there are more relations and identifiable entities in a healthy tree when compared to the ashes of a burned down tree. I am not saying you are wrong, I just don’t see it: — Bob Ross

Perhaps we skipped over life too quickly then. Please refer back up section 4 with a ctrl-f to "Alright, if there doesn't seem to be much wrong with the basics prima facia, then I think its time to go to the next step, life." and "To understand life, we first need to understand chemical reactions." The result that you should get from that is that life is, atom for atom, more overall existence than non-life. Perhaps we need to calculate more specifics, and if needed I will.

But in net total they have similar amounts of identifiable entities and relations thereof. What I am trying to express to you, in an nutshell, is that there are an infinite amount of identifiable entities and relations thereof; so they are effectively equal. — Bob Ross

No, they are not infinite. In each case we have a finite amount of matter that makes up that tree as well as time. Ash nor the tree will exist forever.

If, on the contrary, you are prioritizing the evaluation of or just evaluating relations produced from movement, then I see your point. — Bob Ross

Yes, that is one thing you can evaluate.

Either I have not been thorough enough on the patterns of the building blocks leading up to this point, or you misunderstood or forgot the conclusion already established. One thing is for sure, the points and ideas are scattered all over the responses at this point and there's no one place for us to re-reference.
Maybe I need to do a rewrite to consolidate points as the ideas are pretty scattered now throughout the discussion and a more meaningful conglomeration might do better. Of course, such a large bit of writing is a lot of time to write, so we can keep going here as long as you're finding the topic interesting and aren't too lost Bob. If you're feeling like you're just not seeing at all what I'm pointing at despite my attempts at communication, maybe its time I do that.

I've seen you put up some examples of a possible first cause, (like a photon suddenly coming into existence from nothing), but none of your examples make any sense to me. A photon is a quantum of electromagnetic energy, it comes from an electron, it doesn't just come into existence from nothing. — Metaphysician Undercover

Then why not ask me to give a better example? You've been accusing me of being dishonest and besmirching my character instead of asking. It wasn't meant to be a literal example, it was meant to give you a visual of something not being there, then there. The big bang is another typical example. Does that work better?

I've told you why it is illogical to say that there is nothing prior to the first cause, it's restated at the very beginning of this post, in my reply to ucarr. — Metaphysician Undercover

And I've asked you to give a concrete example. I've even noted that I believe you aren't doing it because you know if you do, your point will collapse. That's a challenge anyone who believed in their point would rise to.

A cause, by definition, has an effect on something. The thing which it has an effect on must preexist the cause. In other words, "cause" implies "change", and "change" implies something which changes. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ok, and a first cause is that which is not caused by something else. This does not show that what I stated is wrong. Cause 'implies' change? What does that mean? The definition of cause has been clearly noted, you've recognized it, and this doesn't address the point at all. Also, no example despite my request.

Reasserting the same invalid conclusion gets you nowhere. That there is no prior cause does not imply that there is no prior reason, because reason is the broader term. — Metaphysician Undercover

I've already gone over reason and prior reason. I was the one to say these words first to Ludwig, " All causes are reasons, but not all reasons are causes." So are the words I used to validate my points now invalid?

So I think we're done. I hope our next conversation doesn't have as much animosity from you next time. Especially after we started off so nicely when I said it was good to see you. Remember that? Lets end this on a high note.

Except you can’t break it down that way because “This sentence contains 36 characters” is true but “The sentence in point A contains 36 characters” is false. — Michael

You didn't tag what was true and false in your breakdown, so I assumed that A was true and B was false in isolation. If your intention is that the break down accurately fits the intention of the primary sentence, it does not. My example was the breakdown of a contraction, yours is not.

This sentence contains 36 characters

Should we break the above sentence into the below?

A. This is a sentence
B. The sentence in point A contains 36 characters — Michael

That's another way to break it down if you would like. Same idea.