...there is no limitation upon what can be incepted.
— Philosophim

You're saying inception equals a supernatural deity? — ucarr

No, I'm saying there's no prior cause for a first cause to exist, so there cannot be any prior limitations as to what a first cause had to be. No prior cause means no restraints as to what could have been.

You're saying inception can incept a hydrogen atom not limited by its parts and the rules of itself? — ucarr

No, because then its not a hydrogen atom anymore. A hydrogen atom has a clear definition and limitation of what it can be.

Your saying inception can incept a first cause that possesses a boundary of selfhood beyond which there is no otherness? Moreover, you're saying the boundary of selfhood is simultaneously not a boundary since there is no otherness? — ucarr

By 'otherness' if you mean 'prior causes', then yes to your first question. I don't think that quite fits in for the second. If a hydrogen atom incepts as a first cause, its still a hydrogen atom because that's what it is. If a helium atom incepts as a first cause, its still a helium atom because that's what it is. If a first cause incepts as what appears to be a helium atom, but then turns into a hydrogen atom by the rules of its existence, that's not a helium atom but something else.

With the above two quotes you're saying each family of causation runs parallel with all other families of causation? — ucarr

No, I'm saying the origin of two causal chains cannot cause the origin of each causal chain, as each origin is a first cause. It doesn't mean that a first cause hydrogen atom cannot later bump into a first cause helium atom. Everything past that point would intertwine their causality chains going forward at that point. But this influence is only after the inception of each, and neither can incept the other. If one did, the inceptor of the other would be the first cause of the other. (I am not saying this is what actually happens, all of this is to give a simple example to the abstract)

Moreover, you're saying each new first cause requires a new study of causation starting from scratch? — ucarr

Let pretend we are working backwards up the causal chain for this hydrogen and helium atom. We see the bumped into each other. "So what caused the hydrogen atom to bump into the helium atom" leads off in one way to ultimately arrive at the hydrogen atom's inception. "So what caused the helium atom to bump into the hydrogen atom" leads off in another way to ultimately arrive at the helium atom's inception.

You're saying pre-existing causal chains suggesting general causality predating a new first cause have no pertinence to a new first cause? — ucarr

I'm noting that a first cause cannot have a prior cause for its existence. Meaning if a first cause incepts when there is other existence, that other existence is not the cause of its inception. Of course, claiming "This X" is a first cause that incepted among other existence is going to be difficult to prove. And it must be proven, not merely believed or asserted.

You're saying a first cause can enter into causality in spite of it having no cause? — ucarr

Yes. In fact, if it exists longer than the smallest unit of time, then the second unit of time is caused by rules and forces from the first unit of time. The first unit of time is of course the first cause, and has no prior cause for its existence.

You're saying that first cause, having no cause, took possession of its form by means of a non-existent cause? — ucarr

It did not exist by any prior cause. It has no intention or possession, as that would be prior to its inception. It simply is, no prior cause.

You're saying the number line has an end? — ucarr

No, I'm saying a point in the causal chain is always reached when there is no prior cause for a set of existence.

You're saying being able to intersect doesn't imply merging causal chains share a common first cause? — ucarr

Correct.

You're saying first causation is a phenomenon that transpires with time interval equal to zero? — ucarr

Its more accurate to say the limit to zero.

You're saying first causation is free to violate the conservation laws? — ucarr

Conservation laws are what we observe within what is existent now. There is nothing to prevent something from forming that by its own nature, would also dissolve into nothingness a few seconds from its inception. So if a first cause incepts like matter and energy as we know it, it would of course obey the laws of conservation. But if it incepted itself as something we are unfamiliar with, it of course does not need to follow the laws of conservation.

You're saying first causation is axiomatic and thus beyond the domains of science, logic and reason? — ucarr

I'm saying its axiomatic, but not beyond the domains of science, logic, and reason. Predicting when a first cause would appear or be is of course beyond us. But we can think about the consequences of a first cause and see if we can come to some reasonable conclusions. Further, if we were to trace a causal chain all the way up to a first cause, we might be able to prove that it is indeed, a first cause. It would be extremely difficult of course.

Fantastic questions ucarr, please drill in where needed.

But I don't understand you at all when you say
besides the fact that it exists.
— Philosophim
. Why don't you just say "therefore there is no reason (or cause) for its existence"? I'm not saying there can't be a reason for its existence, just that there may not be one. — Ludwig V

I say there can be no prior cause, and thus no prior reason. But reason is sometimes used as a term of explanation. Depending on a person's use of reason, they can state there is a reason, and that reason is "There is no prior cause". As I mentioned earlier, I don't think its the word "cause" that's giving people trouble, its the word "reason". Ironically it turns out "reason" is not a very reasonable word to use because it has multiple meanings. :)

Thank you very much for your positive contribution. — MoK

Not a problem! We're here to think with each other. Also welcome to the forums. You will encounter some people who will talk down to you or passively insult you for just bringing an idea up. Please ignore them.

P1. Time is needed for any change.
What is time? Without this definition nothing can be proven.
— Philosophim

Time is one component of spacetime that allows change to happen. Spacetime itself is a substance, by substance I mean something that exists and has a set of properties. Spacetime's property is its curvature. — MoK

Good start. Can time exist apart from spacetime? If so, can you describe what it is? If not, then we have to change premise one from "Time" to "Spacetime".

P1) Time is needed for any change
P2) Nothing to something is a change
P3) There is no time in nothing
C) Therefore, nothing to something is logically impossible. (From P1-P3) — MoK

Let me point out a weakness that needs to be resolved here.

P1. Time is needed for any change.
What is time? Without this definition nothing can be proven.

P2. Something appearing within nothing is a change.
Sounds good.

P3. There is no time in nothing.
Since you have not defined time this cannot be declared as true or false.

Its just a bad contraction. If we break out the sentence into its full meaning, its fine.

A. This is a sentence. True
B. The sentence in point A is a false sentence. False.

There ya go.

My difficulty here is that you seem to be treating "existence" as if it were a property of the things that exist. — Ludwig V

Existence is a set of all things that exist.

If that's right, pointing to existence as a cause of anything is incomprehensible. — Ludwig V

I note that its a set of existence. So for example I can say, "What causes rain?" Or, "What causes water?"

I wouldn't rule out the possibility of it qualifying as an non-causal explanation of something, but it can hardly explain why something exists (circularity). — Ludwig V

If we go up the causal chain, it is logically necessary that there be a first cause. The logical conclusion from there being a first cause is that there can be no prior cause for its existence, therefore there is no reason for its existence besides the fact that it exists. That's the full explanation. I don't get what you're missing here, can you try to drill into it a little more?

I had thought that it must be possible to "extend" our time-line beyond the Big Bang 14 billion years ago. If we treat "now" as the origin of the line. That's no different from treating the year Christ was born as the origin and extending it back from there. — Ludwig V

Sure, there is nothing wrong with treating the big bang as an origin. "This is as far back as we can currently go in terms of causality." This is not the same as saying, "We have proven that the big bang is a first cause, and there cannot be anything else which caused it to exist."

I'm not at all sure that this really makes sense. If there are other existences, then the question arises what caused them? If that question has an answer, then the first cause wasn't the first. — Ludwig V

The answer is there was at least one first cause that resulted in the rest of what exists. Just use the example of the big bang as if it were the first cause. If there was nothing that caused the big bang, that's it.

The cause of the explosion is the spark, the molecular structure of the explosive is (part of) the conditions. But that doesn't apply to a first cause like the Big Bang, which is the cause and origin of all the physical things in our universe. Or perhaps it does? — Ludwig V

If the big bang is a proven first cause, then it does. Can I explain the exact laws of how the big bang caused everything to appear from it? No. But that's not the point. The point is that there is no prior cause which made the Big Bang. It just happened.

So philosophim refers back to causation, saying the reason for the first cause is the first cause itself, and that produces the vicious circle. But a vicious circle does not constitute a reason or explanation. — Metaphysician Undercover

We've already gone over this, but I'll say it again if it was missed. If there is no prior cause, there is no prior reason. There is no unspecified temporal point. You ignore the fact that I conjoin 'prior reason' as different from "a reason". A first cause is that which has no prior cause for its existence. I note: " What is the reason why this infinitely regressive chain of causality exists? There is no prior cause for it, it simply is." There isn't a prior reason for its existence, I've simply noted the reason for its existence as an explanation. If it helps, change the sentence to, "What is the cause of this infinitely regressive chain of causalities existence? There is no prior cause for it, it simply is."

But random is inconsistent with "reason". So philosophim refers back to causation, saying the reason for the first cause is the first cause itself, and that produces the vicious circle. But a vicious circle does not constitute a reason or explanation. — Metaphysician Undercover

Random is not inconsistent with an explanation, I'm not sure what you're saying here. And my point is not circular. Its simply a result of what a first cause is. Circular would be something like, "The bible says God exists, and we know the bible is true because God says it is." We're obviously leaving out that we first have to know each is true, and that requires something outside of the reference to each other. I am not doing this to my awareness.

:up: Something circular going on here. It's a feeling I have had for this entire thread. — jgill

Prove that something is circular. Your opinions on the matter don't make them correct.

I have noted many times why this must be, but it might have been missed. First, I'm using 'reason' as an explanation. "Why is this a first cause?" Reason: Because it has no prior cause which caused it. Pretty simple.
— Philosophim

It's not as simple as you make it sound. The question is not "why is this a first cause" because you have not identified a particular "concrete" cause which you claim is a first cause, and asking why is this a first cause. — Metaphysician Undercover

I've given several examples. All I'm asking is for you to do the same. I'm not asking for proof that such a thing exists, just give me a possible example of something which makes logical sense that could exist. In my mind you're dodging the issue here.

We cannot simply assume that there is nothing prior to the first cause because that is unjustified. — Metaphysician Undercover

Metaphysician...I've been kind so far and given you as much benefit of the doubt I can. This is stupid. You are better than this. Go to anyone else besides me and say that sentence and watch their confused looks. This is why I keep asking you for examples. If you cannot show how such a statement can logically exist I'm going to assume you're trolling or you are arguing in bad faith. Work on this and give me something good to think about please.

Since you refused to accept conventional philosophy concerning different types of causation, I've found that I have to approach your argument from the distinction you've made between "cause" and "reason". — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, that's how a philosophical discussion works. The OP sets up clear definitions and makes logical conclusions from it. You can ask for definition clarification, which I have answered. You can critique the conclusion from those definitions, which I have answered. You can even introduce different definitions into the discussion and see if they work within the scope of the argument. This is not about me refusing anything. Please contain your frustration and keep personal accusations out of this.

Look, if there's no prior cause for something, there's no prior reason for something either.
— Philosophim

That is unjustified. To make that claim, you need to demonstrate how all reasons are necessarily causes. — Metaphysician Undercover

What? No. If there's no prior cause, then there is nothing prior which caused a first cause to exist. If there is nothing prior to cause something, there is no prior reason for the existence of it either. Now we can reason about the existent thing. But we cannot say there is a prior reason, as there is nothing prior that caused it. Please demonstrate a situation in which there is no prior cause for something, yet there is a prior, and by this I mean temporal, reason for it.

Furthermore, you have no premise which allows you to conclude that the reason for the first cause is not prior to the first cause, because you have not properly established the reason for the first cause. All you've said is that the reason for the first cause is that there is no prior cause. But that's only the reason why it is "first", it is not the reason why it is "cause". — Metaphysician Undercover

I'll try explaining again. Lets take an example of a photon that appears without prior cause. Now, once it exists, it is bound by causality by what it is. Meaning it can't suddenly act like an atom, because it is a photon. It can't interact with other things as an elephant suddenly, because it is a photon. It is the first cause in a causality chain only because nothing caused it to exist. But its continued existence begins a causal chain with whatever happens at the next time tick of its existence.

I don't know what you're talking about here. You've excluded the possibility of a prior reason being the cause of the first cause through definition. Therefore a prior reason of the first cause must necessarily be something other than a cause, and what you ask is nonsensical. — Metaphysician Undercover

Great, we agree then. Thus you can't have a prior reason if there is no prior cause. Lets stop going over this.

A concrete example of the prior reason for a first cause is not required until you produce a concrete example of a first cause. I tried giving you concrete examples of first causes already, with free will acts, but you ended up rejecting them because they refuted your argument. — Metaphysician Undercover

I have given several examples of potential first causes and how they would work. You gave me examples of free will and claimed they were first causes. I noted they could not fit the definition of first causes and that's when you lost your cool. Its obvious to me your motivation for being against my definitions is you want free will to be a first cause. But you realized quickly that if my arguments about what a first cause is, and its logical consequences are true, then you couldn't have what you wanted.

Give me an example.
— Philosophim

Example of what? — Metaphysician Undercover

You are stalling and trying to avoid it because you know you can't give one. Prove me wrong and give me one.

As said above, "it simply exists" does not qualify as an explanation. So if you are using "reason" as synonymous with "explanation", you'll have to do better. — Metaphysician Undercover

It does when there is no prior cause.

I don't dispute your argument about "there necessarily must be a first cause", I dispute the further unjustified conclusion you make, that the first cause cannot have a prior reason. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, so far you don't like the conclusion, but I haven't seen any examples or reasonable logic to show this point. If you do not attempt to do so in your next reply I will be moving on.

I've already demonstrated that. How quickly you forget. A "first cause" is "first" in relation to a specific chain. There may be a multitude of different chains. The "first" of one chain may be prior in time to the "first" of another chain. Therefore the assertion "there can be no cause prior to a first cause" is illogical. — Metaphysician Undercover

There can be no prior cause that causes a first cause. Not that there cannot be other first causes and chains of causality from those first causes. Those other chains obviously do not cause other first causes. This is basic.

As I've explained to you already. Your conception of "first cause" is a product of an unnecessarily restrictive definition of "cause", one which does not provide for all the things which are commonly, in philosophy, known as causes. Therefore it really is an opinion, your opinion. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ah, you do understand that the argument I've presented works. You have not demonstrated it is unnecessarily restrictive. That's a pretty poor way of just saying, "Yes, your argument is consistent with your specific definitions." Its not an opinion, that's philosophy. Definitions, logic, conclusion. Please give some examples and focus more on the argument then on "me" as the problem in your next reply please.

Because there is no prior cause for a first cause, there is no limitation on what a first cause could be.
— Philosophim

Regarding no limitation, what about the selfhood of the first cause? If selfhood establishes a boundary between self and other, and the first cause is a self, then: a) it's limited by the boundaries of its selfhood; b) the necessary network of self/other, upon which first cause depends for its existence as a self, prevents the solitary, temporal primacy of that said self. — ucarr

To be clear, there is no limitation upon what can be incepted. Once a first cause exists, it is bound to causation by what it is. For example, lets say a hydrogen atom appeared as a first cause. As soon as it exits, it is a hydrogen atom. Its limited by its parts and the rules of itself.

So then:

a) it's limited by the boundaries of its selfhood; — ucarr

Correct

b) the necessary network of self/other, upon which first cause depends for its existence as a self, prevents the solitary, temporal primacy of that said self. — ucarr

I don't think that's quite it. The network of its continued self existence is bound by its formation. Its formation is a first cause only. After that, it is in a temporal and state chain of causality for every tick of time.

You're saying a particular first cause can have a non-causal relationship with other things prior to it? — ucarr

No. I'm staying there can be no prior cause which influences the inception of the first cause. After a first cause exists, it enters into causality with everything it can interact with. So again, something prior could exist, but if none of what exists causes a new existence, that new existence is a first cause. As an example we could have a photon appear in our universe right now uncaused by anything that exists.

Moreover, you're saying the attribute of first cause generally allows for a multiplicity of independent first causes temporally sequenced across a positive interval of time? — ucarr

Correct. There can be no limitation as to how or why a first cause could come to be.

Does this not imply that a particular first cause has a bounded domain of first causal influence upon a sub-set of the totality of existing things? — ucarr

If you mean that when a first cause appears, it is bound by what it is and then is bound by the natural consequences of its specific interactions with other existences, yes. Does this mean that two chains of causation, each with a first cause, cannot intertwine somewhere over time? No. I've described before that with multiple first causes, the intersection of their consequential causality over time ends up being more like a web with the start of a strand representing the first cause. The causality chains are also each one way.

Is this not a description of everyday causes such as: a) a virus causes pneumonia; b) a cloud saturated with water causes rain? — ucarr

No. What you and many other people are accidently doing is confusing an origin with a first cause. An origin is a start for measurement. On a X/Y graph, the common origin is 0,0. However, we can also make the origin 50,50. Does that mean 0,0, suddenly does not exist? No. So imagine a line that represents a finite chain that starts at 1,2. We could do an origin at 0,0, but it would be pointless because there's nothing there. We could follow the line and make the origin at 10,15. Does that mean that the start of the line isn't at 1,2 No, its still there no matter where we create or origin, or pick any point in the causality line as a starting point for our measurements and discussion.

Meaning, I can say, "What caused a fire in the forest? It was a lightning bolt". And if that's all we care about, we end the inquiry. Does that mean the lightning bolt is a first cause? No, that's just an origin on the chain and we need no more explanation. There is of course a much larger chain. "What caused the lightning? What caused the cause of the lightning?" And so on. A first cause is when there is a point in which there is no prior cause. It is irrelevant whether we measure it or realize it. And, as the argument shows, its logically necessary that there eventually be at least one.

Am I mistaken in my understanding of your purpose as being an examination of the first cause of all existing things, including existence itself? — ucarr

Yes, I think by now what I'm stating is that there is at least one first cause. But there could be several.

If first cause passes through time from its first tick to its second tick, time is co-equal with it. — ucarr

A first cause cannot pass through time. A first cause is an inception event. Every time tick afterward is a causal chain that necessarily traces to the inception event.

Further, there is nothing that forbids one thing existing in isolation in theory.
— Philosophim

I'm inclined to think the conservation laws forbid the total isolation of a thing. — ucarr

Yes, if a first cause appears that follows conservation laws. But there is no prior cause which would prevent a first cause from appearing that does not follow conservation laws. It doesn't mean such a thing has happened, I'm just noting there is nothing logical that I can see that would forbid such a first cause from happening.

Alright, I think I addressed everything that didn't repeat! I love your intelligent and pointed approach Ucarr!

Although causal chains seem to be aligned with a passage of time for each link, one has to be cautious about saying "first tick" or something similar. Then you move into relativity of time measurements and if one makes them smaller and smaller the dynamical system described by the chain tends to a continuous process, with associated philosophical interpretations. — jgill

Absolutely. The reason I say "time tick" is because if I said seconds, then we could divide into milliseconds, then...you get it. A first cause exists upon its formation, then enters into causality through time and how its original self influences it from them on.

The first cause is only in the first time tick.
— Philosophim

From this I conclude you're grounding the primacy of first cause within temporal sequence. So, the first cause is first in time before all other things existing in time. — ucarr

No, and I made a slight mistake in my wording here. "A" first cause. Because there is no prior cause for a first cause, there is no limitation on what a first cause could be. As such, there's also no limit to how many first causes could be. The key to being a first cause is that it is not caused by something prior. That does not mean that other things prior to a first cause cannot exist like other first causes.

For example, a photon appears with no prior causality here. Five minutes later and thousands of miles away, a big bang appears uncaused as well. The photon did not cause the big bang; they are both first causes of their respective causality chains.

Sidebar 1 - Notice I've made "forms" bold. If there's a "forms" before the first time tick of existence of the hydrogen atom, then this preceding "forms" (i.e. physical processes) exists before the first time tick of the hydrogen atom. — ucarr

To clarify again, there could have been other first causes and their resultant causality before any one particular first cause and its resultant causality. The important note is that nothing within the prior chain of causality caused the second first cause to exist.

Sidebar 2 - Notice I've made "there" bold. If there's a "there" before the first time tick of existence of the hydrogen atom, then this preceding "there" (i.e. spacetime) exists before the first time tick of the hydrogen atom. — ucarr

If a first cause appears in nothing, its not that nothing caused the first cause to be. Absolute nothingness is also not a thing, but the absence of all things.

If you can posit theoretically the popping into existence of an atom as first cause, why cannot you posit theoretically the popping into existence of a universe as first cause? — ucarr

You can. I've noted this several times through this massive discussion. I'm not expecting you to have read it all, just noting this has long been stated from my end.

In either case, when you categorize the variety of existing things as being unified as one collective thing: a) atom; b) universe, they're all equal (by your own argument above) with respect to temporal primacy of existence. — ucarr

True.

If there's no reason to partition atom and universe with respect to which collective can be first cause temporally, then first cause in terms of temporal sequencing is meaningless. In other words, existence in general, being first cause, makes the notion of a first cause in terms of temporal sequencing meaningless — ucarr

So it is possible, like anything else, that there was only one first cause and that's all of existence. It has the same meaning as any other kind of first or set of first causes we could have. There would be no prior causation for its existence.

If, on the other hand, you posit an innate temporal sequence of existing things, with some things not existing in any conceivable way prior to a specific point in one-directional time, then you must ask yourself if positing any existing thing generates an infinite regress of prior existing things because: a) no existing thing exists in isolation; b) every existing thing is a roadmap to other existing things (i.e. quantum entanglement); c) an existing thing, if divisible, cannot pre-exist that thing's sub-components necessary to its existence. — ucarr

I don't believe so if my point has been clarified.

a. No existing thing exists in isolation

To clarify, there's a reason I call it a first cause. Because immediately after its existence it enters into causality. Meaning one time tick after, its has its own reference at a prior time tick to explain why it state of existence is as it is at the second tick of time. Further, there is nothing that forbids one thing existing in isolation in theory. Nothing I'm noting is negating the universe as it is today, and we clearly have a lot of things. :)

b) every existing thing is a roadmap to other existing things (i.e. quantum entanglement)

Once a first cause exists, it is within causality within its own temporal changes, or if there are other resulting chains of causal existence from other first causes.

c) an existing thing, if divisible, cannot pre-exist that thing's sub-components necessary to its existence. True. Though as you mentioned earlier, " when you categorize the variety of existing things as being unified as one collective thing: a) atom; b) universe, they're all equal (by your own argument above) with respect to temporal primacy of existence."

Really great questions ucarr!

Pretty soon, you've got the entire phenomenal universe as you and I know it today popping into existence as the first cause. But the phenomenal processes I've been describing happen in time. If you remove the time element for an atom, or for a universe, either way the primacy of being first becomes meaningless. — ucarr

Exactly. Which is why a first cause is a cause which has no prior cause for its own existence.

Let's suppose the entire universe is the first cause. If everything has always existed co-temporally, then first cause is meaningless. — ucarr

The universe cannot always have existed co-temporally as a first cause. The first cause is only in the first time tick. In the second time tick, the state of existence is caused by the first cause.

In this example, logical necessity is, by definition, logically prior to the ontic status of the first cause it necessitates. It is the logical cause of the "first" cause. — ucarr

By example, I mean give me an imaginary concrete. I need something less abstract to understand what you're trying to convey here. No cause can come before a first cause. Logic can lead us to conclude what a first cause is. Reason can explain what it is. But there is no prior cause that can cause a first cause.

As an example, my hobbyist example demonstrates, contrary to your response (as I think you brought up irrelevant points if we are agreeing that all else is equal), that, all else being equal, building model airplanes in one’s garage is morally better than trying to find a cure for cancer IF the former is done more productively than the latter because the former will produce more identifiable entities than the latter in this case. — Bob Ross

The problem here is you are looking at the numbers only, yet including emotional implicit outcomes that would likely not align with the numbers.

For example, lets use a much more simple and tried argument. Let us say that I present to you a math situation in which if we kill a baby, more existence will be produced then if we let the baby live. This of course horrifies you and you state, "This can't be right, its monsterous!"

Now I add the details. 20 Jews are hiding under a house that is occupied by Nazi soldiers. If they find the Jews, they'll kill them all including the baby. The baby begins to make noise. If the mother does not muffle the babies noise, the soldiers will find and kill them all. Unfortunately, there's no way to muffle the noise of the child without suffocating and killing the child. Its still a terrible sacrifice and situation, but it now brings context and clarity to the math.

So with your cancer vs model air plane comparison, its important that you mention the specifics of the outcome, not just a casual observation of the math. If not, our brains will fill in implicit situations that seem immoral, and if calculated out, would not align with the actual outcome of the math. I'll just give you a few examples.

1. A person has no background in science and wants to research cancer in their garage. They have no connections with other scientists and no plans to reach out to anyone else even if they found cancer. The works is stressful and that stress negatively impacts their life. Or, they could build model planes. The work is relaxing and positively impacts the rest of their life. Its more moral for them to build model planes.

2. A person could research cancer and save millions of lives with their result. They also build model planes and share it on youtube. Because they did, a certain kid became fascinated by them and spent him time building them. Turns out, if the kid hadn't seen that youtube channel, he would have gotten into politics, started WWIII, and ended the human race. Its more moral for the person to build model airplanes.

My challenge to you, which is what we need to really test the idea, is to think of examples in which we have a case where building model airplanes is factually more moral, but is so against our intuitions that it would be anathema to almost all decently moral minded people.

Another way of thinking about this problem, is that of a simplified example. Take a piece of paper: now, all else being equal, me tearing it in half creates more identifiable entities in reality (because there are now two pieces of paper instead of one); and, thusly, under your view, is seems as though I am obligated to do this, all else being equal, because the goal is to maximize identifiable entities. — Bob Ross

No, the goal is to maximize expressed and potential existence. We need to go back to the atoms example again. Everything starts there, as that's the pattern that continues onwards. I feel like I've already said about all I can on the subject without new feedback, so I'll reference where to read again. All of your criticisms apply to the basics, so again, that's where we must go.

Page 4 ctrl-F for "1. Existence as 'the parts'."
Page 3 ctrl-F for "Lets say that the atoms of our universe are hydrogen."
And of course you can reread the math portion of the OP again if needed.

The point that should be gleaned from all of this is that the build up or tear down is good only if it results in more potential and expressed existence. A conglomeration of paper molecules together or separate offers no innate value on its own. The value of the paper, is that it is a construct of people as a tool. Destroy the tool, and it is no longer useful as that tool, thus destroying its potential existence as a tool into something else.

If I needed confetti, it would be better to tear the paper into chunks. If I needed to print a document, it would be better for me to keep it whole. If I destroy all of my paper for confetti, I will be unable to print a document when I need it. And if there's not cause for the confetti, it most certainly would have been a waste.

Perhaps a better example would be a concrete tool like a wrench. If I so desired I could break my wrench. Cut it up into base chunks of metal. But at that point it loses its intended function to me as a person, the ability to tighten or loosen nuts on a screw. Now my potential existence goes down unless I use the metal parts for something else. What is the outcome of the destruction? Does it generate new existences and potentials around it, or does it just diminish what can be done?

In terms of the destruction vs. construction, let’s take an example. Imagine a tree in perfect health vs. a tree burnt to the ground: what makes the former have more identifiable entities, all else being equal, than the latter? The molecules and atoms are probably about the same, and identifiable relations (i.e., ‘expressions’) between the parts is roughly equal. So what so you? — Bob Ross

Again, you're speaking far too generally without the context. Does the ash on the ground grow trees that could not grow before? Did the tree warm humans? Was there something gained from the tree being burnt?

If it is in isolation from any other consideration, that a tree merely burned to the ground vs it would be alive, the expressed existences aren't even close. A guideline as I've mentioned is that life, per molecule, is a much more condensed set of existence over time than non-life. So alone, it is not the case that the dead and burnt tree has the same overall existence of its continued life and possible reproduction.

If you don't know why, think of all the chemical interactions in even just one cell of the tree. Think of its continued interactions with the soil and air that it breaths. Much more is going on per atom per second than ash on the ground and carbon in the air.

Same thing with non-life. Is an adult human more complex, full of more expressive existences, than a hurricane? I am not sure, and I don’t even see, in principle, how you could make that calculation. — Bob Ross

It would be a difficult calculation for sure. I don't have all of the answers Bob,

As an external critique, I think it should be obvious that a human adult has more moral worth than a hurricane in every reasonably inferred scenario. — Bob Ross

When talking about calculations, we must demonstrate why it is so. Per culture and the survival of the human race, it definitely behooves us to believe that.

Finally, AmadeusD's point is a good similarity to compare explain what I'm stating. Feel free to drill in further.

Alright Bob, I hope that answers some of the questions, I expect many more. My apologies if I'm a little slow in responding, my other 'first cause' thread has been very busy lately so more of my time has been spent answering multiple queries.

It is my experience in philosophy that when you have to bend over backwards and create a convoluted argument why your ultimate goal still holds, its an indicator it does not. But, it DOES mean that there is something to that overall goal that has universal appeal, and we sure do want something about that goal.

So in the case of happiness, I think we all want to be happy. But as has been noted, happiness as the goal in itself has problems. Drugs, evil, and even sloth. We can gain happiness from unvirtuous actions, and to your notion you note that virtues give happiness which is greater and true. As a logical statement, I think we both know there's something wrong with that. But to the deeper notion, that there is more value in happiness from being virtuous over happiness from being unvirtuous, there's an appeal.

So lets dig into that. Maybe happiness is simply an outcome of doing steps, and sometimes the steps can be good or evil. In general, we think of positive happiness when doing the right things, so we mistakenly associate the emotion with doing the right thing. What gives us happiness then?

The fulfillment of our desires. But if we say fulfilling our desires is moral, I think all would disagree. We all have desires that if fulfilled would be less than moral. But why are they less than moral? Because they damage us or people around us. A drug user damages the rest of their brain for an emotion. A person who would make everyone else dumb and happy does the same thing to others. A glutton damages their own body and takes resources from others.

Virtues are ways of fulfilling ones, or others desires without harm to the self or others. To your note about 'maturity', maturity is a skilled and experienced way of fulfilling yours and others desires in the world with minimal harm. This can result in happiness, but not for those who are broken and can only gain pleasure from unvirtuous actions.

For sure one that jumps right out at me is the Unity Principle. Now, I made the term up. So, don't go looking into philosophical canon for it. But you will recognize the idea. The idea is that essentially, 'You are me and I am you.' Every permutation of that statement is true. 'You are God', 'I am God', 'We are each other', 'You are everything.', and even something as wacky as 'You are the table', or 'The table is you.' These are all true and represent the Unity Principle as a concept. — Chet Hawkins

I think this is a good first reason to give if someone asks, "Why should I care if I harm myself or others."

Proof is for cowards. Proof is a bid to certainty, which is delusional. "Doubt may be an unpleasant condition, but certainty is absurd." - Voltaire Is that wisdom. You bet it is. — Chet Hawkins

Ha ha! I had to laugh at this, and I get it. The reality is that much of our life and decisions must occur without proof. Proof is for the academic, and when talking to others who have a different cultural or emotional outlook in life than ourselves. When speaking to those in similar cultures or emotional outlooks, proof is often not needed.

Objectivity relies on facts or reason that must necessarily exist. Otherwise, isn't it just a subjective opinion that an objective morality exists?
— Philosophim
Of course it is and that is also irrelevant. So, what are you asking in that? — Chet Hawkins

If its a subjective opinion that there is an objective morality, then one has not proved that there is an objective morality, they have just given a subjective morality that believes in an objective morality. Again though, it depends on who you are speaking with. Less discerning people, or people of similar culture and values to yourself, will not need much convincing to be persuaded in your direction. In the case of discerning academic, or someone with a far different culture or emotional outlook on life, they will not be convinced.

If maturity is what causes genuine happiness, isn't the real moral thing to chase maturity?
— Philosophim
Wisdom, maturity, and moral aims are synonymous. So, yes.

But Pragmatists mean something different when they ask this question you just did. So I will challenge it. Do you mean people should grow up and stop being idealists in equal measure to pragmatism? Is that what you immorally call maturity? If so, you are wrong. — Chet Hawkins

No, I learned long ago that labels are lazy. I meant what I said in regards to your definition of maturity and nothing more.

Good conversation Chet! :) I appreciate your passion.

So nothing can be prior to it, whether cause or reason.
— Ludwig V

Based on what I said above, this is not a sound conclusion. It appears like the intuitions and concepts which we use to understand our world, and our universe, would not be applicable toward understanding the reality of whatever the conditions were prior to the Big Bang, but this does not imply nothing can be prior to it, in any absolute sense. What it is that was prior to the Big Bang would most likely require a completely different conceptual structure to understand it. — Metaphysician Undercover

Do you understand that if there is something which caused the Big Bang, then the Big Bang is not a first cause? A first cause is not an opinion or belief. It is a reality that we either know about, or do not know about.

My discussion of intention, free will, final cause, did not consist of vague maybes. — Metaphysician Undercover

Your point has largely been, "Maybe there's a prior cause to the first cause." This is what I'm addressing. I have not seen a concrete example that demonstrates a situation in which there is a first cause, then you show that logically, there is actually a prior cause to that. If we had a concrete example, we could look at that. And if you have and I've missed it, don't get mad, just repost it.

Ok, this is a much better point! What you're missing is the phrase 'prior reason'. If you noted I'm not saying that there isn't a reason for a first cause, I'm saying there is not a prior reason.
— Philosophim

That, as I demonstrated is a faulty conclusion. The conclusion is that there cannot be an event prior to the first cause as the cause of it. The conclusion "there is not a prior reason" is unsupported. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is just a repeat of a belief you have, you're not demonstrating why the point I gave you is incorrect. Look, if there's no prior cause for something, there's no prior reason for something either. Give me a concrete example of what you mean by a first cause having a prior reason without that prior reason being the cause of the first cause.

You have no premise to draw this conclusion. A "cause" as described by your "chain of events", is an "event". We might say that a cause, or an event suffices as "the reason" in some instances, but it does not in all instances. This implies that "reason " is the broader term, with a wider range of meaning. If the inverse was the case, if all reasons were causes, then "no prior cause" would imply "no prior reason". But that is not the case, so "no priior cause" does not imply "no prior reason". Conversely, "no prior reason" would imply "no prior cause" as "reason" has logical priority over "cause", "cause" being included within "reason". — Metaphysician Undercover

Give me an example.

Again, you have no logic to support this conclusion, that the reason for the first cause could only be "it simply exists". Your argument does not deal with reasons at all, it deals with causes, so any assertions you make about the reasons for the first cause are only unsupported opinions. — Metaphysician Undercover

I just typed out the definition of reason and noted I'm using it as a synonym to 'explanation'. I'm uninterested in your opinions that I have no logic, I'm interested in if you can take the logic I've noted, and give a good example of counter object that would demonstrate that my logic is wrong.

My reference to empirical evidence was simply to show that your definition of "cause" is not consistent with empirical evidence, it is therefore a false premise. — Metaphysician Undercover

Incorrect. You only have empirical evidence of things which have prior causality. As I've noted, we do not have empirical evidence of things which do not. This does not negate the logic that there necessarily must be a first cause.

Your definition of "cause" is false, and as I've explained many times to you already, you need to broaden your understanding of what a "cause" is. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I don't need to do anything. I've clearly laid out what a cause and first cause is as defined here. You need to demonstrate with some concrete examples why this definition is either impossible, contradictory, or doesn't make sense. If you simply don't like it, that's not my problem. Its on you to demonstrate how one of the most basic logical statements you can construct, "There can be no cause prior to a first cause" is somehow illogical. To my mind where I have given you every benefit of the doubt I can, you have not done so.

n my usage. which I think is also common philosophical usage, a reason is not a cause, because it does not need to be an event or even a spatio-temporal entity. — Ludwig V

I have not been intending to use reason as a cause, but as an explanation. Of why "X" is a cause. I think the problem some people have been having is this is not a universal, and that sometimes reason can be substituted for cause. Part of the reason why some people may have problems with cause is people are having a difficult time grasping what a reason is.

And, as I explained to Philosophim already, if we move to allow that "cause" of an event includes also the "reason" for the event, as a type of cause, then we must remove the defining feature of a chain, series, or sequence, because this type of cause does not occur in a chain.
— Metaphysician Undercover
Quite so. — Ludwig V

I also agree this would be a problem. But I am not using the term reason to explain another cause. That would clearly contradict my notion that a first cause is absolute, so I think even a moderately charitable reading of what I've been expressing would conclude I'm not attempting to blatantly contradict myself.

The reason why there can be no prior reason for a first cause, is that there is no prior causal event. There can be a reason as an explanation for why a first cause exists, "That is it simply exists." But there cannot be a prior reason, as there is nothing prior which causes it. Does this clear up the issue?
— Philosophim

Again, you have no logic to support this conclusion, that the reason for the first cause could only be "it simply exists". Your argument does not deal with reasons at all, it deals with causes, so any assertions you make about the reasons for the first cause are only unsupported opinions. — Metaphysician Undercover

I have noted many times why this must be, but it might have been missed. First, I'm using 'reason' as an explanation. "Why is this a first cause?" Reason: Because it has no prior cause which caused it. Pretty simple.

As I tried to say earlier, the reason you suggest for the first cause/reason is, to me, not a cause/reason at all, but a rejection of the request to provide one. "Because it exists" marks the limits of our explanations - a brute fact or a first cause. — Ludwig V

And I'll note again, "reason" is not being used as "cause", but explanation. So to your point, "Because it exists" marks the limits of our explanations, yes.

I always thought that the existence of something was always an empirical, not a logical question, so I'm treating your first cause as a possibility, not a certainty. — Ludwig V

What is logically necessary may not be empirically certain, this is true. No disagreement from me!

...a photon can appear without any velocity
— Philosophim

Do you dispute that a photon with rest mass entails infinite quantities, and that equations describing practical situations break down upon approach to functions with infinite input/output values? — ucarr

I will clarify with more care. I'm simply using this as an example, not trying to say such a thing actually exists. My point is that there is no way to predict when or how a first cause would form or exist. To say a first cause must form a particular way or is likely to form at a particular time would require a cause outside of itself. A thing which has no causality outside of itself thus can have no restrictions as to what it could be upon existing. I am not sure where you are getting the infinite qualities though. Could you give an example?

More generally, how can something be first cause if its essential makeup entails differentiable constituent components co-equal in primary status? — ucarr

Great question. Lets keep it extremely simple so its clear. Lets imagine that we first spy a hydrogen atom that forms with apparently no prior cause. Any time tick before this, the atom is not there. Once it is there, we know an atom is composed of particular parts. Lets pretend, for simplicities sake, that protons, neutrons, and electrons are fundamental particles. We say, "What causes this atom to exist?" We note the protons, neutrons, and electrons in a particular order. But this is not a prior cause, just the inner causal make up of the atom in general.

Once we get to the fundamental particles, there is no other cause for those particles in terms of parts, or prior time. Meaning that they are the first causes. So what caused the atom? The combination of fundamental parts of the atom formed without prior cause at the same time.

Why do you not think the logical necessity of a first cause positions it as an antecedent to the first cause it necessitates? — ucarr

Could you clarify this with an example? You definitely make good points ucarr, I'm just not quite getting it here.

Why do you not say a first cause is Y & ~Y in superposition? I ask this particular question with the assumption that a first cause must instantiate motion. — ucarr

A first cause does not have to instantiate motion. A first cause may be already in motion, with again, no prior cause as to what it is in motion. As an example, a photon can appear without any velocity, or with velocity. A first cause has no restrictions on how it can or must exist. If it did, there would be something else which caused those restrictions, which is impossible.

Do you agree that causation is the natural form of shape-shifting within the our phenomenal world of material things? — ucarr

I believe causation is the factual reality of some entity X which explains why some entity Y exists. Thus a first cause would be a Y with no other X entity as its cause for existence.

I was just telling you where the information can be found. There's much reading and too much for me to present to you here. Your argument is refuted by the possibility of other types of causes, along with the fact that the "first cause" which you conclude is a different type, as I've shown. — Metaphysician Undercover

I know where the information can be found. You have not demonstrated any specific type of other cause, only vague, "maybes". So far the main point is that a "first cause" means there can be no prior cause by definition. Since you cannot give me a concrete example that gets past this, I see no evidence of any refutation.

OK, I'll stick right to the point. The issue is how you switch from "cause" to "reason" in your argument, without proper definition. You demonstrate the necessity of a "first cause", then you conclude:

""4. Alpha logic: An alpha cannot have any prior reasoning that explains why it came into existence. An Alpha's reason for its existence can never be defined by the Z's that follow it. If an Alpha exists, its own justification for existence, is itself."

You continued to insist that there cannot be any prior reason for the first cause, despite the fact that I pointed out that this is not a valid conclusion. And above, you even denied your own statements with the following:

"Oh, I never claimed that there was no reason for a first cause. The reason for a first cause is that, "It exists without prior cause." Meaning that there is no other reason for why it exists. If there is no other reason for its existence, there cannot be any rule which made it come into being. Meaning the only logical conclusion is that its existence is truly random as I've defined above."

Simply put, your conclusion of "first cause" provides you with no premise for making any statements about the reason for the first cause, without further premises to define what "reason" means. Your conclusions about "the reason" for the first cause are invalid. You cannot conclude that there cannot be a prior reason for the first cause, or that the first cause is its own reason, because you have no premises about "reasons". Any such statements are not conclusions but personal opinions not supported by the argument. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ok, this is a much better point! What you're missing is the phrase 'prior reason'. If you noted I'm not saying that there isn't a reason for a first cause, I'm saying there is not a prior reason. The reason for a first cause's existence, is simply its own existence at that point.

I just replied to Ludwig because he noticed I was using reason which he thought I was using synonymously with cause. I think he missed the "prior" part as well. Just like I told him, there is overlap because if there is no prior cause, there is no prior reason. Of course this does not mean all reasons are causes.

I did not think I would have to define the term 'reason' but I'll do so here if that's a problem. From Oxford Languages the pertinent noun definition is "a cause, explanation, or justification for an action or event." So as you can tell, its easy to have some overlap as sometimes a reason is a cause. When I and you have been referring to 'reason' as different from 'cause', I have been trying to use it as 'explanation'. Does this help?

You show that there is necessarily a "first cause", which means a first event. You then proceed to assert that there could be no "reason" for the first event, as prior to, and being the reason why the first cause occurs. — Metaphysician Undercover

So to be clear here, I'm noting there can be no prior reason. Which includes not only a cause, but explanation or justification.

And since "cause" is defined by "event", and "prior" "a reason" might be something other than an event, yet still prior, as demonstrated by free will and intention. Your argument does not exclude the possibility that the reason why a first cause occurs could be something other than an event. — Metaphysician Undercover

The reason why there can be no prior reason for a first cause, is that there is no prior causal event. There can be a reason as an explanation for why a first cause exists, "That is it simply exists." But there cannot be a prior reason, as there is nothing prior which causes it. Does this clear up the issue?

An "event" as we know it has a cause and an effect, a prior and posterior. This is because it occurs in a duration of time. But the argument produces the conclusion of a "first cause", and this is not consistent with "event" as we know it. Therefore your argument's definition of "cause", restricting it to an "event" is inadequate, false, because the meaning of "event" which is necessitated by the argument is inconsistent with empirical evidence of events. The argument produces the conclusion of an event (first cause) which only has a posterior part, without the prior part, and this is inconsistent with observation. This demonstrates that your definition of "cause" is false causing the argument to be self-refuting. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is not an empirical argument. This is a logical argument. When Einstein constructed his theory of relativity in regards to large bodies, logically, it was sound. It was only after they observed and measured an eclipse that they could empirically confirm it to be true. I make no empirical arguments here. I simply note that logically, if we continue to examine any chain of causality, whether that be finite or infinitely regressive, we will eventually run into a first cause. So no, there is no empirical observation as of yet that refutes this claim, nor any empirical observation that confirms this claim. This discussion is not an attempt at empirical proof, but a logical proof. As such, unless you can logically refute it, it stands.

And this, so far, is the only weakness I've seen in the argument. It is only a logical argument. A logical argument does not mean empirical truth. By the way, Bob Ross is the only other poster to my mind who understood and communicated this right off the bat. Well done, I consider him one of the best philosophers on these boards. :) So, if you wish to say, "I don't care about what logic says, I only care about empirical proof" then I will simply nod my head and state, "That's fine." But that in itself does not show it is a false logical argument.

I don't think I'm asserting anything as a first cause that would later be found to have a prior cause.
— Philosophim
"Later" is a long time. How long would you wait?
For me, it will always seem more likely, and always possible, that any putative first cause will turn out to have a prior cause (or, in my language, that we will develop a prior cause) than the alternative. — Ludwig V

Almost certainly. As I've noted before its incredibly difficult to prove something is a first cause. And it would need to be proven. Not believed, not assumed, not based off of a lack of being able to examine or measure, but proven.

I notice that here, as elsewhere, you use the word "reason" at this point, instead of cause. "Reason" and "cause" are not synonyms, are they? At least, not in philosophy. So what is the significance of this change in language? — Ludwig V

Mostly because I've been ingrained to use different words instead of the same one repeatedly in a sentence. :) In this case there was overlap, as if there is no prior cause, there is no prior reason. But not all reasons are causes just like not all cats are tigers.

In the first paragraph it talks of "existence" being caused - I take that as meaning "existents", things that exist - then slips sideways to constituents - "neutrons, electrons...", but constituents are different to causes; — Banno

This is a good point. I appreciate the specific point out to where cause is ambiguous. I have always considered constituents as causes depending on how the question is asked. For example, "What causes an atom to stay together?" At that point we include its constituents.

To really simplify, to me a cause is what is the historical fact for why something exists. A description of existence can have many attributes such as constituents and time. Thus the general question of cause can be asked and answered in different ways. So if someone said, "What causes an atom?" we can answer with its constituents. This can then be drilled into. We can then ask, "What causes X constituent?" Eventually we will reach a limit of fundamentals, and will be forced to ask the remaining attributes like time. "Why does that exist in its expressed way now instead of one second ago?" And so on until there is nothing prior. Once we reach the point where there is no other causality to drill into besides the existence itself, we have reached a first cause.

Consider a different sequence, that of mothers: A was born from B; B was born from C, C was born from D. For any person, it is legitimate to ask from whom they were born. It is not legitimate to ask that of the sequence of births - it is not a person and so does not have a mother. — Banno

So to take your example, A caused B, which caused C. We may ask that of the sequence of births as well. "What caused the sequence of births?" And we can explain that A had to exist prior to have B, who had to exist prior to C. For B could not have A, nor C have B. Does this answer your question Banno? I understand if you wish to bow out after making a point, so silence does not mean acceptance. It is at least an answer to think about.

Sorry Philosophim, but I am interesting in this issue of alternative interpretations of "change". I might start a new thread if it turns out to be necessary, though. — javra

No apology necessary Javra! :)

Always nice to see an attempt at epistemology. I would say in general your world 1 and world 2 viewpoints seem sound as an introduction. I don't know if you've proposed anything new enough to be a type of epistemology. An epistemology must not just be enough for its times, it must answer questions about knowledge that our current understanding cannot.

For example: How do you solve the idea of belief vs knowledge? If world 2 is a mirror of world 1, how do we know if we're accurate to world 1? A description of how we assess the world at a high level does not inform us how we should properly assess the world to obtain knowledge. So while it is a nice start, I would keep going with it to see if you can properly tackle some of those issues that other epistemological theories have difficulty doing.

If you are interested in reading other takes on epistemology, I have one here. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14044/knowledge-and-induction-within-your-self-context/p1 There's a nice summary from the next poster that covers the topic nicely if you don't want to read the details.

That is not correct. You stated the first cause in a "chain of events". This does not imply "first" absolutely, it only implies first in that chain. That is what allows you to say there might be a multitude of first causes. If you accept this, then you know that "first" does not mean "the first cause period". — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, we agree on this again. To give a less abstract example, imagine that a photon appeared without prior cause somewhere in the universe, while a small bang happens somewhere else five years later. Both are not caused by anything else or each other, they just are.

So, I suggest to you, that if you better understood the concept of "cause", and the multitude of different types of "cause" which have been described over the years, you would see that some types of "cause" do not occur in chains. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is not an argument. If you have in mind a particular idea, please demonstrate it. If not, my point stands.

I recommend that you read some philosophy concerning the concept of causation. Aristotle's outline of the four principal ways that "cause" is used is a good place to start. — Metaphysician Undercover

This again is not an argument and presumptive. You do not know the extent of what I've read on causation. If you find Aristotle's four causes worthwhile to the argument, please refer to my previous request for you to introduce them in a critical way to the discussion.

Are you saying that in front of the first cause of a chain, there's another chain that causes the first cause in the first chain?
— Philosophim

No, I am proposing that there is a type of cause which does not operate through a chain. — Metaphysician Undercover

The chain is just a visual metaphor. How does your proposal work? How do I have a first cause, then have another cause that causes the first cause without there being a causal link between the two? You have to understand by this point, what you're proposing without a concrete example is coming across as a clear contradiction to me.

Look up Aristotle's "formal cause" for an outline of a type of cause which is free from the constraints of a chain. Then you might start to understand how "final cause" as the defining feature of intention and free will is a type of cause which is independent from any chain. — Metaphysician Undercover

If you think it does, please point out exactly how. I may not draw the same conclusions you do, so if you want to communicate what you see, you'll have to do it. At a quick glance, I do not see how the idea of 'final cause' at all applies to what I'm noting here, nor the idea that free will is a first cause.

Philosophim, do you read what I write? I clearly stated that there are "significant days" which are prior to your first birthday, not that there are "prior birthdays to the first birthday" as you straw man. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I am not straw manning, you are. I've clearly laid out that this is an abstract to clear up the issue, and you are in bad faith claiming otherwise. The abstract was clearly indicated to communicate the idea that a "First X" means we cannot have "A prior X". You are saying "But we can have a prior Y" as if "Y = X". It does not. I am not talking about days. I am talking about a specific thing, a first birthday. You pulling a "Y" of "significant days" out of the example when I've clarified the intention for you is the definition of a straw man.

Again, remove replace the birth day example with a "First day" example if that helps you. You claim that there can be prior cause to my first cause. This is the same as claiming "You can have prior days to your first day".

I'll admit when I'm wrong no problem, I do it all the time.
— Philosophim

Then get on with it. Why do I have to repeat the same thing over and over again, while you keep insisting that your mistakes are not mistakes? — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah...see this was an attempt to get you to behave like a stable thinker and adult. Personal attacks on me are unnecessary and meaningless. Its arguments and proof. I understand having an emotional slip up, but now you're not correcting yourself. Let me be frank. The fact you think something can come before the 'first' of something is inane. I could easily dismiss your argument and no one would begrudge me this. But, I've withheld my judgement to see if you would go into more depth to reveal something I've missed. Don't fall into the trap of dismissing another's points outright because of our first emotional reaction to them. Sometimes an argument dismissed at first glance might have been great if dug into.

Now, maybe I'm wrong. But all I see in your argument so far is that you are stating, "There might be a prior X to the first X", when I've declared that the "First X" is absolute and not merely an origin or expression of speech. I see that you comprehend a lot of the rest of the argument, so I'm scratching my head as to why you would do this. I'm starting to gather it has something to do with Aristotle's points, which I'll need explained and pointed out to me. Can you demonstrate how Aristotle's points are valid, apply to the argument, and have a situation in which there is a prior cause to an absolute first cause? Even if you can't demonstrate the first cause part as you initially wanted, I still would like to see what it is you're thinking of.

You accept that there could be a multitude of "first causes" as the beginnings of a multitude of causal chains. Since there is nothing to ensure that the various beginnings are all at precisely the same time, then please confess to your mistake. The following statement or so-called "definition" is incorrect, or inconsistent: "A first cause means there can be no prior cause by definition". — Metaphysician Undercover

Maybe you misunderstand the claim then. A first cause cannot cause another first cause. If an atom appears without prior cause, and a big bang appears a ridiculously long way away five minutes later, and is in no way caused by the atom, they are both first causes. You seem to be implying that the atom could cause the big bang. If the atom did cause the big bang, the atom would be the first cause and the big bang would, necessarily, not be a first cause and instead caused by the atom.

Now, if the atom is a first cause, and the big bang is a first cause, years later the atom could arrive into the resulting universe of the big bang and collide with another atom. At this point, this is where the chains intersect. But the big bang did not cause the atom, and the atom did not cause the big bang. If one caused the other, then only the one which caused the other would be the first cause.

This does not at all help me to understand what you meant by "set of existence". — Metaphysician Undercover

A set of existence is "the universe" for example. The universe is composed of many other existences. A fundamental set would be a set of 1, or an existence that is not composed of other existences. So the answer to, "What caused the universe" would imply that it also includes all the existences within that universe.

Thus, "What caused a finite universe?" and "What caused an infinite universe?" Would include the set of each existence. I am very open to saying this a better way if you can think of one, I'm not married to the phrase, just the concept. Maybe "Set of an existence?" I'm unsure.

Now you propose to define "prior" in a way which renders "prior in time" as unintelligible. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, time is simply one property of causation. So for example I can ask, "What causes an atom to exist?" and the answer is the combination of protons, neutrons, electrons, and force. I can then ask, "What caused the atom to be at the particular state it is right now opposed to one second ago," and now we include time in the equation.

I think what you're trying to say, and correct me if I'm wrong, is that you believe I'm stating nothing can exist prior to a first cause. That's not what I'm saying. I'm saying nothing prior can cause a first cause. Meaning that a first cause could appear in this universe right now, it would just have no prior cause from anything that that exists. If you want to add, "Maybe its caused by something from another universe", that is included in what 'exists'. A first cause cannot be caused by anything prior, period. It does not mean other things cannot exist before that specific first cause, though those things which exist prior to that first cause must necessarily have a first cause in its causality chain.

If you would like, you can introduce why you think Aristotle's four causes is pertinent to this discussion.
— Philosophim

That's very straight forward. In your argument you restrict "cause" by definition, to mean an event which occurs within the context of a chain of events. But the way that we understand reality involves using "cause" in ways which are other than the context of a chain of events. This was very well explained by Aristotle. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not discussing with Aristotle. I'm discussing with you. You obviously see something in Aristotle that counters the argument that I don't. If you want me to see this, you have to point this out. You have not done so. Saying, "But Aristotle so the argument is wrong," is not a valid counter. =)

In our understanding of reality we use "cause" in the way of "final cause", intention and free will, and this is a type of "cause" which is independent of any chain of events. Therefore your definition, which restricts "cause" to an occurrence within a chain of events is not representative of the way that we understand reality, and is thus a false premise. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, mine is not a false premise. This is the premise proposed by the argument and the logical conclusions that result from this premise. You may disagree with the premise, but if you want to indicate the premise is false you need to clearly prove why the premise is false. Pointing out, "Another philosopher defines it differently," does not prove that his premise is true. Demonstrate why Aristotle's premise is true, and why my premise by necessity must be false because his is true.

Everyone here knows the right thing is to say you would if those people were equal in worth to the world as yourself. It would be another matter if it were not an abstract. Armchair ethics is easy, having to be 'in the game', is not.

The issue is the limits to what "cause" means, not the limits to what "first" means — Metaphysician Undercover

If I stated, "The first cause by energy", then of course that leads it open to there being another specific cause like "The first cause by matter". But that's not what I'm stating. I'm stating the first cause period. This is not a specific type of cause, so there can be no other invented type of cause that is separate from what I'm defining.

Yes you've defined it as the first in a chain of causes. However, there are other types of causes which do not occur in a chain like that, specifically the one I mentioned, "final cause". Therefore a "first cause", as defined by you, could still have a cause prior to it, so long as it is a type of cause which does not occur in chains, as per your definition. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm a bit at a loss here on what you're trying to say. Its very simple. Either something is caused by something else, or it isn't. Its not complicated. I'm not sure a final cause makes sense unless this cause ended all of reality. Otherwise causality continues.

You are wrongly interpreting your own argument. The difference between the first cause and the other causes in the chain, is that no part of the chain is prior to the first cause, whereas parts of the chain are prior to all the other causes in the chain. This in no way implies that the first cause "cannot have something prior which explains its existence". — Metaphysician Undercover

I do not understand how you do not see this as a contradiction. Maybe this is what you're saying, correct me if this isn't the case. Are you saying that in front of the first cause of a chain, there's another chain that causes the first cause in the first chain? Because then the first chain's 'first cause' is not a first cause. That's just an extension of the prior chain. A first caused is not demarcated by observation or definition. It is the reality of there being nothing prior. Nothing. No prior cause. You cannot say it is the first cause, but perhaps there's a prior cause. That's a clear contradiction.

The first cause is not an origin set by us. For example, if I say, "The first cause of me dropping this ball is me letting go of my hand," that is not a first cause. A first cause is not 'the starting point from which I choose to reference causality". A first cause is THE first cause in a chain of causality. There is no prior chain, no prior connection, nada. What caused me to release my hand? What caused me to be born? What caused my parents to be born? The chain continues. It only ends when there is absolute no prior cause.

By definition, I cannot be wrong.
— Philosophim

"By definition, I cannot be wrong"? Are you saying that the definition of "Philosophim" is "the person who cannot be wrong"? — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I'm clearly noting the definition of "First cause" is that there is no prior cause. You can't state there is possibly a prior cause to a first cause. That runs counter to the definition. The place where I could possibly be wrong is that a first cause, as defined here, is not logically necessary. But you are not arguing against the idea that a first cause is logically necessary. You are saying there can be a prior cause to a first cause when the definition of a first cause is, "There can be no prior cause of this".

When "my first birthday" occurs, or when it is referred to, it means the first in a chain of significant days. But this does not imply that there are no other significant days in your life prior to your first birthday. So prior to your first birthday, there are many other significant days in your own life. — Metaphysician Undercover

Incorrect. When I say "my first birthday" I mean, "My first birthday" No other days. First birthday. First cause. No other causes. You are saying, "There could be prior cause to the first cause" is the same as "There could be prior birthdays to the first birthday". This is clearly wrong. If the other days in the analogy are making it difficult, eliminate them and just say, "First day". You cannot have a prior X to the "first X" by definition.

The first cause, by your definition, is very explicitly the beginning of the chain. This implies that the reason for the first cause, the cause of the first cause is something which cannot be said to be a part of the chain. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I've already stated the reason it is a first cause is that it has no prior cause that explains its existence. Its part of the definition which I feel I've been pretty consistent and clear on.

The fact that you keep on insisting that your conclusion is valid, after scrutiny shows you that it is not, inclines me to think that your are improperly attached to your conclusion, and would resort to trickery to persuade people of it. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah, I'm going to grow real tired of accusations about my character instead of focusing on the argument. Please be better than this. I'll admit when I'm wrong no problem, I do it all the time.

I'm insisting my conclusion is valid because you have not presented a valid counter to it so far. I'm claiming, "A first cause means there can be no prior cause by definition." You're proposing "A first cause could have some prior cause". You are stating, there could possibly be a prior X to a first X. If this is the case, isn't this a contradiction?

Sorry Philosophim, but "set of existence" seems to be incoherent. Do you mean "set of existents" or "set of existing things"? Maybe you could make another try. — Metaphysician Undercover

I meant exactly what I said. The word "existent' in English is an adjective, not a noun. It means specifically, "having existence or being; existing" https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/existent#:~:text=adjective-,1.,existing%20now%3B%20present%3B%20immediate

An existing thing describes a thing with a verb. Except that people might say that thoughts are not things. So I don't want to describe things, I want to describe what exists.

We largely agree on most of what's being said here, so lets not nitpick over petty grammar though. I really want to figure out this difference between us.

That's not what the argument shows. The argument shows that the first cause is the first in a chain. It does not show that there cannot be a prior cause, it shows that the prior cause cannot be a part of the chain. "First" is in reference to the chain, it designates the beginning of the chain. It does not designate "the first cause" absolutely. This is evidenced by your insistence that there could be many first causes. — Metaphysician Undercover

A prior cause means its part of the chain of causality. I'm more commenting on this comment so you understand what I meant by first causes. A few chains intersecting somewhere is an intersection of causality, and a continuation. The intersection is not a first cause. Multiple first causes would be the start of each chain. When we get to multiple first causes, its probably better thought of as a web, with the first causes being the beginning of each strand.

Anyway, by Aristotelian metaphysics, each and every existent has two distinct requirements needed for it to be. One is matter, the other is form. In this way there is always at least two distinct types of cause needed for a thing to be. If one of these types of cause forms a causal chain with a first cause, there is still the other type of cause, which may well be prior to the first cause of the causal chain. — Metaphysician Undercover

Wait, are you bringing Aristotle's four causes in here? I am in no way talking about causality in regards to Aristotle. If you would like, you can introduce why you think Aristotle's four causes is pertinent to this discussion. But bringing it in here as a quick aside and acting as if it should simply be accepted as a clear counter to the argument does not work.

If you wish to, please demonstrate exactly how Aristotle's four causes fit within the discussion of causality I've introduced here so far. As well, please indicate to me a specific instance in Aristotle's four causes where one cause causes the other cause. Lets not claim, 'may well be prior', lets show it.

jgill is quite right that the topic is complex. In particular, what it is to be a cause has remained fraught throughout this thread, and the logic of necessity in use has never been made clear. — Banno

I don't see it being particularly fraught myself, but I'll define it if need be. Take any set of existence. What caused that set of existence is anything outside of that set of existence which is needed for that set to be. A set which does not need anything outside of itself to exist, is a first cause.

So, what causes an atom to exist? A combination of proton, neutrons, electrons, and various forces. What causes a proton to exist? A combination of quarks. What causes quarks to exist?...and so on. Time is just another dimension of detail. A first cause would have no other cause for its existence besides its own existence.

A chain of causality is when you look at any one point and look at the linked causality to that point. A causes B, causes C, etc. Multiple chains can join and interlink. The initial question asked is whether there is an end to this chain, or do the chains infinitely extend, regress, loop, etc.

In the first case, we have a first cause. But what I noted is that when you examine the entire set, even if it is regressive, there is still the question of what caused the entire regressive set to be. There is no outside cause. Therefore it is a first cause, or a thing that cannot be explained by anything outside of itself. If the universe is finitely regressive in causality, why? Because it is. If the universe is infinitely regressive in causality, why? Because it is. In either case we come necessarily to a first cause.

Hi Chet! Awesome that you decided to post! Its always a vulnerable position to put yourself out there, but glad you did. :)

I have a few starter questions for you.

If creating happiness is moral, then I want you to consider the following situation. Lets say it would make me supremely happy to be superior to other people. I invent a way to dumb down everyone to an extremely low level of intelligence against their will, but they forget afterward and are supremely dumb but happy. Is this moral?

The claim that morality is objective is fine, but can you prove it? Objectivity relies on facts or reason that must necessarily exist. Otherwise, isn't it just a subjective opinion that an objective morality exists?

If maturity is what causes genuine happiness, isn't the real moral thing to chase maturity?

Instead, the position of any cause in the order might be determined on-the-fly, and only when it is necessary to preserve causal consistency.

For why should the universe decide before our measurements and observations, what is and is not an initial cause? That question might look contradictory, but only if it is assumed that the universe consists of an absolute order of events whose existence transcends our observations and measurements of it. — sime

Yes, my description of a first cause has nothing to do with our observations or measurements. It is the reality of whether there was something prior which caused a particular outcome to be, whether we know it or not. In other words, if a tree falls in a forest and no one is there to hear it, it still vibrates the air.

Then what appears, is that if there is a "first cause", there could be absolutely nothing prior to the first cause because "cause" is meant to be all-inclusive. But that's deception, because there must be criteria as to what constitutes a "cause" so there could always be something else outside that category. And that's the deception which Philosophim argues, that prior to the first cause, there could be absolutely nothing, therefore no reason for the first cause's occurrence. That's why I proposed switching for the word "thing", to expose this sort of sophistry. If there is no thing prior to the first thing, it appears like there is absolutely nothing, but that's a mistaken conclusion. — Metaphysician Undercover

I wouldn't call it deception. I'm not trying to trick anyone, I'm trying to have a conversation to see if what I'm claiming holds upon scrutiny. The word thing does not work because a first cause does not mean a prior 'thing' exists. An atom can exist eons away and another atom can appear as a first cause without that atom having anything to do with our new atoms existence.

I claim a first cause is logically necessary. Not that there can be only one first cause. Meaning other things can exist in the universe, and something appears uncaused by anything within that universe. Meaning that the replacement of 'cause' with 'things' doesn't work.

I expected clear logic: Either all things have a prior cause for their existence, or there is at least one thing that does not.

This convoluted language stops me at the very beginning. — jgill

I gather it's intended to be something like

∀x∃yCyx ∨ ∃x¬∃yCyx

'For all x there is some y such that y caused x, or there is an x such that there is no y that caused x'.

it is valid. — Banno

Much appreciated Banno. He is correct.

I've done some searching and find that causality and causal chains is enormously complex, far more than I anticipated. — jgill

Which is fine, but how does that apply to the argument? I cover both finite and infinite chains. We don't have to have any specification as to what the finite or infinite chain looks like correct? So how does putting a chain into an equation challenge the point I've made?

This is what I dispute. You do not have the principles required to say "there is no other reason why it exists. You have your own reason for assuming a first cause, the logic you demonstrated and this produces your conclusion, that the reason for it is "It exists without prior cause", but you cannot be certain that this is the correct reason for it. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are misunderstanding my claim here. I'm defining what a first cause must be. Its just like defining what the term "first" means. I can give examples of what a "first" would be. Like "My first birthday", or "My first bike". There are limits to what "first" means, namely that its a situation which cannot have occurred prior. What I'm hearing you say is, "Yes, you claim its your first birthday at 1 years old, but how do you know you didn't have a birthday prior?" You're claiming that a "first cause" might have a prior cause. This doesn't make any sense.

Therefore unless you know that your logic (the logic which concludes the reason for the first cause is solely to be the first cause) is absolutely certain, without any flaws, then you are not justified in claiming this reason. — Metaphysician Undercover

I believe this is so. I've clearly defined what a first cause would be correct? Its the "first" cause. Not a second. Not a follow up. There is no prior thing which causes itself to exist. As such, logically, there can be no influence that determines why it should or should not exist prior to its existence.

And, I've already shown you that your treatment of infinite regress and the eternal circle is flawed, so I think you ought to also accept that your reason for the first cause is also flawed. — Metaphysician Undercover

You may not understand what I was doing then. I was noting, "If infinite regression exists." If you rule out infinite regression entirely (which I don't mind, I don't think it can exist either) then the point I'm making stands without question.

This cause, the "first cause", has an essential difference, it is not known directly by inductive reasoning, but by deductive logic, which makes it necessary. Therefore what you call "the only difference" is a very significant difference, which makes the two types of causes categorically distinct, one type contingent, the other necessary. — Metaphysician Undercover

Agreed.

You've lost me here. How is it different?
— Philosophim

It is different because causation in the causal chain is defined by empirical observations, and inductive principles. Being an inductive generalization, the causes must be all of the same type, by the defining principles, to be placed in the same category. That there is a prior cause to any contingent cause is a defining feature. If it was not a defining feature we would not have the appearance of infinite regress. The "first cause" does not have this defining feature, therefore it cannot be placed in that category, it must be a distinct type of cause. However, it is still a "cause" in some sense because it has a similar type of effect, which allows you to make it part of, the base for, the causal chain. Therefore we need to allow for the reality of at least two distinct types of "cause". — Metaphysician Undercover

I also agree here. What I don't agree on is how this difference is anything but the fact that a first cause cannot be explained by a prior cause.

The reason for the first cause is its own existence simply being.
— Philosophim

That's your reason for the first cause, but you may be wrong. — Metaphysician Undercover

By definition, I cannot be wrong. I cannot claim I had a first birthday one year after my birth then say, "I might be wrong."

When you say " A first cause can have no other cause besides itself", this is not a sound conclusion. What the logic shows is that the first cause cannot have a "cause" in the same sense of "cause" as in the causal chain. — Metaphysician Undercover

The only difference between a first cause and a normal cause is that a first cause cannot have something prior which explains its existence. That's it. Meaning by definition, there can be no other cause which explains its existence.

You are simply not accepting the reality that the first cause could have a "cause" in another sense of the word "cause", a different type of cause. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I'm rejecting the contradiction of what you are claiming. A first cause cannot have another cause that explains it by definition. If you want to explain to me why there isn't a contradiction, please demonstrate how its not a contradiction for someone to claim that having a first birthday one year after giving birth, doesn't necessarily mean they didn't have a prior birthday.

Great points Bob, this is where we can get into the discussion in earnest.

The hypothetical here, to carve it out even more precisely (to avoid confusion), is that working in my garage making model airplanes has more moral worth than me working on a cure for cancer, under your view, IF my productivity in the former is greater than the latter. No? — Bob Ross

Yes, an excellent question. One thing to remember is that the human being themself is not removed from morality, they are part of it. Meaning we have to consider the long term self-sustainment of the person as well. Not everyone is able or willing to work on curing cancer. Further its questionable how much such a person could do in their garage at this point. Modeling planes may be the happiness and relaxation they need to perform well at their job at work.

A hydrogen atom is a hydrogen atom. A helium atom is a helium atom. Let them each be what they are. That is what creates more existence. Yes, its better to have the potential for the two to join together at times, but we still need free hydrogen and helium atoms as well for optimal existence. They are valuable on their own as well as together. The point is a person should consider what they are, and be the best version of that self they can be which does not destroy themselves in the process.

Now, if you're asking a hypothetical in which there exists a person who both loves model air planes and doing cancer research equally, the answer is different. Perhaps doing either refreshes them and sustains them equally. Further, the person has the capability to actually contribute to the cure. It does seem on the surface then that doing the cancer research would be better. It all depends on the context.

Considering such contexts are difficult to assess, we can go by the guidance that we should allow people the easiest way forward to contribute the most they can to society in a way that is also self-fulfilling. I think few would disagree with that.

Same to you, my friend! I always enjoy our conversations, and I commend your creative thinking. It truly is a rare skill and gift in this world (: — Bob Ross

I appreciate it! To my earlier point, I had the option of playing a video game or answering your point. I chose this instead. Both give me happiness and I think doing this is a little better. :)

Not that semantics matters, but ‘act-consequentialism’ is not the view that one should maximize human good (as that’s a form of utilitarianism) but, rather, the analysis of what is right or wrong in relation to which act has foreseeable consequences which maximizes the desired goal. — Bob Ross

I would say this is fair. It is a direct mathematical comparison to demonstrate what set of existence is greater. Since it is math, the difference is that it is not the opinion of an individual as to what must be done, but something that can be questioned and tested. Moral guidelines are estimates and can change based on context, and anyone could demand more than an estimate if they thought this was inadequate.

I think the main issue I see with your view, at its core, is that it is about creating more identifiable entities in reality and not producing better conditions for life — Bob Ross

I think that's because you believe that these things are in competition with one another, when in reality they are not. Creating more identifiable entities in reality while producing better conditions for life is what is optimum. Many traditional views of morality are often very binary and seem to demand sacrifice. As if suffering for something greater is admirable. When this is correct is only in circumstances in which we have no other choice, or a zero sum situation. The most moral case is to ensure we create great things without suffering or personal sacrifice where possible.

To your point on destruction: destruction, like construction, can temporarily bring a heightened set of existence. Sometimes destruction produces something greater over time than if there was never destruction at all. Just like an atom has the potential to become a molecule, a molecule still has the potential to become atoms again. While we may not personally want the molecule to ever break down, the potential for it to do so is a part of overall existence.

The question then becomes, "When is destruction good?" As noted before, its all about preserving the homeostasis of overall existence. The reason why predators are moral is because they limit the overall destruction of herbivores multiplying too much and destroying all plant life. Sometimes old dead wood must be burned away in a forest to ensure a massive fire doesn't start and burn the whole thing down. Cancer in the body must be destroyed for the body to live. When we destroy something lesser to ensure the continuation of something greater, we have moral destruction. I view the continuation of existence like a sin wave on a graph more than a straight line. It ebbs and flows but hopefully continues to trend upward over time.

So what exactly counts here? You say material and expressive existences, but the more I think about it the more hazy those conceptions really are (to me). If by material existence you mean fundamental entities, then we don’t know of any. Atoms aren’t fundamental, and neither are quarks; and, even if they were, counting those should be roughly equal in a destroyed society vs. one in perfect health. — Bob Ross

Material existence is fundamental existence. So for example, lets say that it was possible that an 'atom' could be erased from existence and never reformed again. This would be evil, as all further expressions and potential would be eliminated permanently. Fortunately for us, we have not yet discovered the fundamental building blocks of the universe, nor are we able to destroy said blocks. Even then, if some destruction of fundamental existence were needed prolong the rest of fundamental existence, it would be a necessary sacrifice.

So for our purposes, it is not material existence that we are concerned about, but expressions of, and potential expressions of existence. The patterns for lower expressions existence apply to us as well. Create as many stable and long term expressions of existence over time as possible.

Now you mention a scenario in which it may be possible that destroying a society would be the right thing to do. The key here is we have to realize that claims of what should be done are contextual to the situation. Yes, we have an overall stable set of mathematical conclusions that work, but that must be applied to the specific situation. So if you imagine a good and stable society being destroyed as moral, you must show that something far greater will appear in its place, making up for all the destruction and lives lost.

One example we can probably give is the destruction of Nazi Germany. If a society strongly violates its moral obligation to individuals, and itself seeks to destroy other societies for short term gain, then it is an evil society. Societies which seek to empower its citizens potential, as well as empower other countries who do not seek to destroy each other creates a much better long term set of existence then something like Nazi Germany.

That being said, it doesn't mean that a good society should naturally intend to destroy an evil society either. A much better alternative would be reformation, or change from within. Destruction of a society does not necessitate that something positive will be built in its place. Only when a destructive society threatens to destroy others without intent, and actual reality of improving the world should it be taken down.

This segues into another worry I have, which is that it is not clear what kinds of identifiable entities you are wanting to consider morally worthy of obtaining: is it any? — Bob Ross

No, because it is contextual to the situation. We follow particular guidelines, and then would ask someone to clearly demonstrate through math why they believe an action meets or violates the guidelines when there is resistance or questions. For example, the death penalty. In general ending a life is a tall order. The existence which must be made up for it needs to equal the remaining potential of that person's remaining life. Is there a way to restrict the evil they can do instead? Sometimes yes, sometimes no.

The more resources and power a society has, the more it can expend on restrictions and reformation instead of elimination. Societies with low power and resources often cannot afford prisons or lengthy amounts of time on such endeavors, and may need to simply eliminate threats for their survival. Thus we can see how the death penalty makes more sense 500 years ago in a small village where famine is a real threat, whereas in a wealthy and powerful society like America it seems less reasonable.

If, on the other hand, we extend our definitions to be more colloquial, by just claiming material is whatever is the most fundamental within the context (the most primitive building block in the context) and expressive as the interactions between those materials, then I am not seeing how a healthy society has more expressions of existence than a destroyed one. — Bob Ross

People expressing a society are like atoms expressing as molecules. Its the same pattern repeated again and again. Its not that there couldn't be a situation in which a destroyed society is somehow better than it existing (like Nazi Germany), but in general its better for there to be molecules that exist than just atoms as our calculations showed. Taken without any consideration of the quality of the society, as long as the society is not actively reducing overall existence, it allows for more interactions than not having any at all.

As a clear example of what I mean, imagine an organism which had superior neural networks, and consequently processing power, than a human but wasn’t capable of having a mind—i.e.., a super-computer made out of organic material like what we are comprised of, but no mind. It very well may be the case that this super-computer non-subject is capable of much more expressive existence than a human being—e.g., perhaps for every 10 years of a human’s activities (of expressions), the super-computer non-subject organism produces 10x that in sheer neural network power of computations. According to you, this super-computer is morally worth more, all else being equal, to a human being. — Bob Ross

This is correct. Sorry, we as individuals are not the end all be all in the universe. We are a part. An extremely moral part! We don't even need to consider a super computer as we have societies. Plenty of people die to ensure that societies are preserved. Or sometimes your limb gets gangrene and it must be sacrificed to preserve the rest of the body. Again, the ideal is for both of us to exist together. You're still thinking only in terms of zero sum situations. The reality is, a zero sum decision is not the situation we're often in, and we do not often need to be in. The ideal is the existence of both co-existing together.

Same thing with non-life. Is an adult human more complex, full of more expressive existences, than a hurricane? I am not sure, and I don’t even see, in principle, how you could make that calculation. — Bob Ross

It would be a difficult calculation for sure. I don't have all of the answers Bob, just a beginning set of rules and calculations. If my theory were true, or at least found merit in consideration, I'm quite sure it would become a field of study which we would be researching for centuries. Following the general rules, its difficult to know. Are hurricanes a form of destruction that creates more existence overall than if they never existed? Will that existence be more than whatever existence the individual would create over the remainder of their life? I don't know the answer. I can say that since we cannot calculate the overall resulting existence of a hurricane, nor can we currently stop one if we wanted, its a moot point. I think what is most helpful is discussing things we can calculate, and situations we have control over.

Alright! This has been fun. Continue to critique where you see it. Feel free at this point to bring in other moral considerations, theories, etc. Perhaps I should introduce the morality of art as it may help to understand how overall existence does not simply apply to humanity alone. Let me know!

secondly that it must fit into your definition of random - i.e. the atom can decay into a refrigerator. — EricH

That still does not explain a first cause. An atom decaying into a refrigerator would have a prior cause of the atom's existence. Its really just the case of nothing, then something.

While the decay of an atom is not random per your definition, if is completely and totally random with respect to the time at which it decays. It could decay 10 seconds from now or 10 billion years from now - but there is no prior event which determines when this happens. — EricH

The first part is true. The second part has no evidence that it is true. The second must be proven to be true, not believed or assumed because we cannot currently see the exact moment before decay occurs.

This is not a matter of lack of knowledge or our inability to measure something. — EricH

No, it is. Look, the quantum mechanics scale is so difficult to measure that our very measurements affect the outcome. Its a ton of estimation and probability combined with limited measurements. In no way would any quantum physicist ever state that our calculations are based on absolute precision measurements and a full understanding of the exact location of electrons and quarks.

In the interest of completeness it should be noted that there are still a small number of folks in the scientific community who are trying to keep some notion of causality alive - but at best causality is on life support. — EricH

I have had this notion told to me only by people on these boards. I have not heard of any scientists who are peddling this notion. Causality is alive and well in science. I would require of examples that show causality is not useful or used instead of broad and unbacked accusations like this.

Good conversation EricH, the last word does not mean I'm correct, it just means we've reached the end of where we can go. :)

This notion of first cause being the existence of the chain is no more than interesting speculation. When I speak of a chain receding to infinity that doesn't leave much to grasp at philosophically, so one resorts to the "being" of the chain , like yanking on an emergency cord. — jgill

I really wish you would stop demeaning the post without anything but a deriding opinion. I have answered your questions and critiques, so I would like a little more respect for what I've written here. Either demonstrate the argument is false, or not.

What I find in metaphysics is logical demonstrations as to why this idea of "a chain receding to infinity" is unrealistic. — Metaphysician Undercover

I also agree, but I decided to take an approach of, "What if it was real?" Turns out it still results in a first cause so the idea of infinite prior causality is moot.

That a first cause is necessary may be proven logically, but it does not follow that there can be no reason for the first cause. — Metaphysician Undercover

Oh, I never claimed that there was no reason for a first cause. The reason for a first cause is that, "It exists without prior cause." Meaning that there is no other reason for why it exists. If there is no other reason for its existence, there cannot be any rule which made it come into being. Meaning the only logical conclusion is that its existence is truly random as I've defined above.

Because of this difference we must class it as categorically different from all the other causes in that causal chain, and the same for all the other causal chains. In other words, the "first cause" does not abide by the inductive (general) principles by which we describe all the other causes of causal chains, it cannot be observed to have a cause, therefore we must categorize it separately. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, its category is merely the first right? Categorizing it or naming it differently doesn't make it any different from what I've noted. The only difference is that it does not have a prior cause. Trying to overcomplicate it doesn't change what it is.

You say that the first cause is not explained by anything other than itself, but this claim is not justified. What is justified is that there is no cause for the first cause, "cause" being as described in the sense of the causal chain. But now we've determined a different type of "cause". — Metaphysician Undercover

You've lost me here. How is it different? If something is not caused by something else, how is my claim not justified? I hear the claim, but I'm not seeing the evidence or reasoning. The first cause is something which is not explained by something else, but is a cause when it interacts with other existences forming the normal chain of causality we understand. Its not different besides the fact that it is an uncaused existence.

Since we have now determined the reality of a different type of cause, there is nothing to indicate that there cannot be any reason for the first cause, the first cause being a completely different type of cause itself. Therefore there could be a reason for the first cause, that reason being a type of cause which is other than a "cause" as described in the causal chain. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, there is no reason that this follows. The reason for the first cause is its own existence simply being. If you have another cause 'cause' a first cause, its not a first cause. This is a clear contradiction Metaphysical.

What this means is that it is not predictable in the same way that other causes are predictable. But this does not imply that it is not predictable in an absolute way. — Metaphysician Undercover

Can you explain why? I've presented a clear argument why it is absolutely not predictable which I'll post again. The reason why patterns, rules, and laws happen is because there is a solid reason besides itself. A reason that does not involve itself, is a cause that is separate from itself. A first cause can have no other cause besides itself. There can be no outside constraint that forces it to be. There can be no outside constraint that forces it not to be. It simply is. Thus it is completely unpredictable and not constrained by any outside cause.

If you say its not absolutely random, how? What is causing it to not be absolutely random? That's the question that you'll have to answer without introducing another cause.

Once we start to identify the real existence of first causes, we may start to understand that they have patterns of occurrence, and that they are, through some mathematical principles, predictable. That there is not a cause for their occurrence, in the sense that "cause" is used to describe the causal chain, does not imply that their occurrence is absolutely unreasonable. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is almost true. First, first causes will never be predictable no matter how much we study them. Study assumes that what is consistent today will be consistent tomorrow. The appearance of a first cause can never be consistent, because some other cause was making it consistent. It would be consistent if it just happened to appear consistent.

Now what I have done in other posts is compared the likelihood of a first cause appearing based on the limitations of space and time. I do not promise that my math is perfect at all and I was hoping for someone to give their own take on it, but it seems that we can use cardinality to demonstrate that first causes would most likely be small. If anything can happen in a cube of space, there is a much higher degree of cardinality that something would appear within in a slice of that cube than the cube itself. I can go into more detail next time if you wish, but we need to settle the point of absolute randomness first.

Back to the point, no amount of study will ever show a first cause to be consistent, because the definition of a first cause prevents there from being any other cause which would constraint it to consistency.

Therefore you do not have the premises required to conclude that the first cause is not caused by anything. It may just be caused by a different type of cause. — Metaphysician Undercover

This right here is the crux. No, this is a contradiction. A first cause cannot, by definition, be caused by another cause.

Taking this example, "the big bang", we trace the causal chain to that event, and as you say, we determine it to be a "first cause". This does not imply that there is "nothing prior to the big bang. — Metaphysician Undercover

No. If it is proven and determined to be a first cause, and it is a first cause, there is nothing prior to the big bang. That's the definition. Anything which has a prior cause does not meet the criterion of a first cause.

Knowledge isn't truth; it is applied when someone has discovered the truth. — Ludwig V

I've written my own viewpoints on knowledge that I've developed over years here if you're interested. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14044/knowledge-and-induction-within-your-self-context/p1 There's a summary by the immediate next poster that nails the paper 100%, so feel free to check it out if you're curious.

And further questions will develop. And people will call all of these things causes. You can insist they are not, but that won't affect the process. — Ludwig V

I don't think I'm asserting anything as a first cause that would later be found to have a prior cause. Claiming something is a first cause is not a trivial task. It must be proven, and proving such a thing is rather difficult. I think my points greatly reduce the need to label something as a first cause, and I am for sure not asserting that anything in our universe that we know of should be labeled as a first cause. I do not believe the Big Bang is an actual first cause, I was simply using it as a hypothetical in examples to remove a bit of abstraction from the overall points.