.if this is an actual question, no judgement, I genuinely want to know WHO is ASKING WHO or WHAT and WHAT they get from the answer and how to carry on from there — Kizzy

Me. Its not what I get, its that we get a foundation for an objective morality. How do we carry on from there? We build from there. That's what I do in the other paper if you want a hint. I'm planning on writing a follow up that breaks the build up down a bit more as that first post was a discussion draft for really one person. But first, that there is a fundamental question, that this is the fundamental question, and this is the answer to that question need to be established and explored first.

I totally get that but when/if it is other than that, its pretty bleak. — Kizzy

I did not find the answer bleak, but incredibly hopeful! This lets us develop a tool and measurement system to evaluate if certain situations are more moral than others. This will eventually build into human morality, but demonstrates morality at a molecular level, animal level, and eventually high intelligence level. It will help us actually answer the moral questions we have apart from social norms, culture, and personal opinions.

This apple on a tree at exactly 1.23 seconds after existence is an apple.
— Philosophim
I do not understand this sentence. Also, "existence" =/= "existing" (i.e. ground =/= grounding). — 180 Proof

I'm trying to demonstrate a snapshot versus existence over time. Existing only happens over time, as actions only happen over time. Do you have a counter proposal for existence 180 Proof? Seeing what you're thinking might help me understand your questions more, or let me explain in terms you think in.

Why would moral theories be required to answer this question? I think most moral theories simply do not answer the question at all. — Leontiskos

Because most moral theories cannot answer that question. There is currently no accepted objective moral theory. They are all subjective at this point in time.

But why are they required to? If they are objective, they need to answer that question because it is the question that underlies all moral questions. How can you claim how one should exist before you can claim that they should exist at all? Subjective moral theories stop at this point because it gives up the game, or they just aren't deep enough to go that far.

Regardless, the question has now been pointed out, shown its importance, and answered.

Existence can be an action ...
— Philosophim
Explain. — 180 Proof

Sure. Actions only happen over time. This apple on a tree at exactly 1.23 seconds after existence is an apple. An apple over time is aging. It is not just an existence, it is existing.

If we are to take that good is, "What should be", then we can take at a base level that there should be existence over nothing.
— Philosophim

Why?
Because existence already is, we're in it, and we want it going?
But by what standard is an "is" a "should be"? — Vera Mont

I'll focus on that part of the OP for you.

a. Assume that there is an objective morality.

b. This leaves two answers to the question, "Should there be existence?". They are, "Yes", or "No".

c. Assume the answer is yes. There is no innate contradiction.

d. Assume the answer is no.

e. If it is the case that there is something objective which concludes there should be no existence, that objectivity must exist.

f. But if it exists, then according to itself, it shouldn't exist.

g. If it shouldn't exist, then the answer "No" objectively shouldn't exist thus contradicting itself.

existence is good
— Philosophim
– for what? — 180 Proof

If we are to take that good is, "What should be", then we can take at a base level that there should be existence over nothing. This is because any morality which proposed that existence should not be would contradict itself.

"There should be existence"
This statement doesn't make sense (i.e. is a category mistake) because "existence" in not an action or practice and therefore cannot be prescribed. — 180 Proof

Existence can be an action or a state. Actions are states over time. States are what existence looks like within a snapshot of time. A person who runs or the picture of someone mid run. We can imagine a button that could eliminate all of existence. Is it objectively moral to press it, or not? Any objective moral approach must answer this fundamental question. While I can't prove that an objective morality exists, if it does exist, the only non-contradictory answer is that existence is better than there being nothing.

Well written Bob!

I think the below hammers it home.

The problem with this sort of rectification, is that the moral judgment is no longer a proposition: the indexical statement is the proposition. Therefore, the moral subjectivist is no longer accepting (implicitly) moral cognitivism. — Bob Ross

Welcome Gingethinkerrr!

Are there any stupid questions? To other people maybe, but you are the ultimate judge right? If you don't know something, it doesn't matter if everyone else does. The only way to know sometimes is to ask a question that's perceived as stupid by some. But there will always be people who understand and want to tell you.

Ask away!

Philosophim: In fact, the first five pages of the document contain a number of arguments for my philosophical positions. I am looking for any constructive feedback, such as counterarguments, corrections, and enhancements. — Philo Sofer

I do understand and did read it. Its more of a "This is what worked for me," summary then a "This is logically why you should do this." I personally disagree with moral nihilism, but then you are also acknowledging that your approach is not factual, but personal. Since there is no moral way to live, you can live however you want. Moral nihilism is a removal of oneself from the stress of discussion, because there can be no right or wrong way to live. So, you have some nice thoughts, life seems to be working for you, and I hope it continues to be so!

If there was anything you doubted, wanted another take on, or were looking for some other alternative answer, feel free to post it. Otherwise who am I to tell a person who's living a good and satisfying life with their world view? I personally could not be happy living in moral nihilism or the removal of politics and managing a house. For me, peace of mind is not the most important thing, living a life where I can challenge myself is. But what works for me does not necessarily work for you. All good. :)

It was a nice little read. It was more of a, "This is how I live my life" sort of paper than really much of an argument for anything. And that's perfectly fine. I'm of the mindset that people live their lives however they want. Did you want any feedback on anything in particular? Some aspect you were looking to have challenged or have a deeper discussion on?

Here's a case. You hate yourself. You want to die. Everything in your life is horrible, no one will miss you, and there is no rational reason for you to keep living. And yet you decide to anyway.

Here's another. You live in an oppressive society. And yet you decide to fight. Rationally, you have almost no chance of winning. You could simply leave the country and go someplace nicer. But this is your home.

I leave you to judge.

Your reasons make me ask, "Is being a theist about what I can get for myself?"

Hi Bob, sorry for the delay on this reply. I've started a new job and been much busier lately. Lets go ahead and wrap this one up as I think we're nearing the end. Feel free to take the last reply. :)

Firstly, what you are noting is a deficiency in the understanding of the reader and not the syllogism itself; and, thusly, it is impractical to provide the exact amount of elaboration needed to expound the view because the knowledge a person comes in with, as a reader, varies. — Bob Ross

True, but this isn't a formal philosophy paper. Its a discussion forum where you have a reader asking for elaboration. And prior to publication, there's usually high levels of review with potentially months of rewrites and careful citations. Its just you and me Bob!

From my view a syllogism is a tool to formalize an argument, but it is not the argument itself, especially on an informal philosophy board. The argument is what I'm addressing.

Secondly, to have a “complete” argument, in the sense you described, is impossible; and I can demonstrate it. For every premise I give, a person can validly ask for clarification; thusly, there is no end to the length of an argument that is fully “complete”. — Bob Ross

I'm not claiming you need an infinite set of validation. I've noted your argument is not complete enough for me to understand the logic that you're undertaking, and I'm not trying to needle in on any gotchas. Again, if you're unable to reach me or convey the idea you see accurately, it doesn't mean the argument is wrong. But from my point, what I do see is subjective to me, and I'm not seeing clear arguments that show otherwise.

Asking “what is intrinsic value?” in the proof that pain has intrinsic value is not an demonstration of an implicit step being skipped. If there were an implicit step in the syllogism, then you would be able to demonstrate that the syllogism is not logically valid; that’s how you know. — Bob Ross

I see it as vague and seems to be a blend of words without underlying concepts. Pointing out you may be missing implicit steps is just something to think about. As your student of your philosophy here, its not adding up to me, but I'm trying to help you show me otherwise.

The nature of an emotion is objective, because it is not dependent on what a subject desires or believes about it. — Bob Ross

If it is spoken about objectively, yes. If we would say, "Hate feels like this objectively," it would be wrong. If we say, "Hate is intense feeling of wanting to destroy something without remorse," then it can be seen as objective. We aren't describing the personal intensity or feeling of experiencing hate, but describing hate in terms of actions that a person will take.

The "nature" of a thing is a bit outdated of a term, and again, something I would want fully detailed in a good conversation. By nature you could mean, "reality" which just 'is'. What just 'is' could be, but often is not the same as what is known. Objective and subjective arguments are not about what 'is', but about the approach we take to claims of belief and knowledge. I prefer the 'definition' of the thing to its 'nature'.

But we're not studying emotions, we're studying 'value'. How you define value is through other people's emotional evaluation of something. That is by definition, subjective. If you defined value something like, "The emotion, rational decision, or societal context that causes humans to preserve, protect, or promote actions or states of being relative to other actions or states of being," then we would have something we could start with that we could objectively evaluate. Stating, "Value is an indefinable concept, we just know it innately" means its a subjectively defined word.

Secondly, not all states are emotions—not even the one’s I have given you up to this point. For example, the state of flourishing is clearly not an emotion. — Bob Ross

True, but to get to flourishing you first need the steps of defining value, then intrinsic value, and showing how we can objectively determine it. It seems like flourishing is a step you consider after establishing all of those basics. I mean, we all like flourishing. We all want flourishing to be good. But feelings are not objective proof.

I know you have a philosophical background, so I would like to say that if you are familiar with Aristotelian ethics, then it is worth mentioning that my view has many similarities to it — Bob Ross

I read Aristotle a very long time ago now. Let me tell you what I learned overall by reading many different philosophies. Any philosophy that was considered good enough for objective measure has been turned into a science. What you are reading are the leftovers, the failures. They are fantastic references to see where humanity has already explored and found to be a dead end. If you want to use some aspect of them that you still think are valuable (after all, its the end that's a failure, not some of the parts necessarily) then its best to make it your own and clearly explain to the audience what you mean.

You've seen this as well in your past posts. You reference one part of an older philosopher's work, and suddenly everyone has their opinion of that philosopher's end work, when you just want to talk about the part. Not explicitly telling people that these are often old, outdated, and ultimately philosophies that could not take the step to science, is in my opinion, philosophies' greatest failure as a study. It elevates the wrong points to discuss, does not explicitly teach the lessons it has learned, and does not clearly tell its students, "You are studying our failures."

So, one of the reasons why I engage so much (thank you by the way, you do as well!) is that I do not apply outside philosophical work to your work, I apply logic and discussions to your ideas. Its your definitions, your thoughts, and your outlook, not Aristotle's. Everything that can be said about Aristotle has likely already been said. But not everything about your idea has been said. :) Good discussion Bob, feel free to cap it.

the premise itself is expressing something objective is to say that its truthity is NOT relative to subjective dispositions (e.g., “this is green” as opposed to “I think this is green”). — Bob Ross

Ok, we might be getting closer here. I think I might finally be understanding what you're implying, but as always, correct me where needed. :) "This is green" is only objective if we know there are objective ways to determine that 'that' is 'green'. There is an implicit understanding in that sentence. The problem with your argument is we don't know if there is an objective way to say, 'This has implicit value." I think what you're saying is if you can craft an argument that's worded without addressing this question.

Let me put it another way.

1. An evil demon exists.
2. Evil demons always compel people to do wrong.
3. Therefore if people do wrong, it might be an evil demon.

As I noted with your argument earlier, this argument is incomplete. The first thing I would ask is, "What's an evil demon?" Then, "How do we know an evil demon exists?" Those need answers, and I would not be able to call this argument objective or subjective until I got them. If you're crafting an incomplete argument and calling it objective while having incompletely defined words, or refusing to answer questions which would let us know whether the premises are concluded by objective or subjective means, its objectivity or subjectivity is not really assessable.

I (hopefully) see our differences now. This reminds me of a similar problem I ran into when learning and teaching math. Let me see if I can show you.

Solve for X: 2X + 1 = 3
2x = 2
2x/2 = 2/2
Conclusion x = 1

The answer is correct, and to a mind who knows that you get 2x = 2 by doing the implicit step of:
2x + 1 -1 = 3 -1, this is a full and logical argument. The problem I would run into in math tutorials was often times implicit steps like this were skipped. My students would note this, and I would have to adapt and make these implicit steps explicit for them to understand.

For a person who knows how 2x=2 happened, the implicit step does not need to be made explicit. Lets go one step further. None of us need a primer to know what 2X is. We've already learned that. Its an implicit step that if listed, would be redundant and a waste of time for both of us. But if you introduced this to a person who said, "I don't know what 2X is," your argument is incomplete for them.

Now, imagine that the person asks, "What does X mean?" and you replied, "It can't quite be defined, its a fundamental that we simply understand," I would be scratching my head because, "But at the end x = 1. Isn't that a number?" If you replied "No, you just have to understand it" then I am right in saying, "Then this is a subjective argument.".

I'm posting it this way because the argument to solve for X is correct and objective if we know all the other objective implicit information that goes along with it. So lets assume that your argument is correct Bob. Its missing steps for me as a reader to see how you arrive at your conclusion. How can we say value is objective when it can't be defined apart from our 'innate understanding? How do you claim that this is objective when every example given so far has been about subjective feelings?

So from your viewpoint, maybe you're seeing something implicit and obvious that doesn't need to be explicated. Either that, or you're unaware there is something implicit underlying your argument that you have not realized. Your readers will help you see that. Remember that this is your idea, and its your job to convince the readers that it makes sense. You could have the perfect idea, but if its implicit steps are not fully explored, a reader is going to think its faulty or subjective. And from their viewpoint? They are going to be right.

I want you to recall some of past conversations over my own writing. Not that I am perfect, but I always intended to follow certain rules. Nothing you asked was too small or stupid. Maybe a question was too complex or out of order, and another concept had to be explained first, but I tried to never shelve a question or point and not come back to it later. If I tried explaining it to you one way and it didn't make sense to you, I tried another example or approach. Because sometimes the writer doesn't understand the implicit step that they're missing as well. A good conversation allows both the writer and reader to catch steps like this and hopefully makes the argument better. If the reader is trying to understand, and cannot despite your explanations, in extremely rare cases its the limitations of the student. 99 times out of 100 its the teaching.

Looking at your example of an objective and subjective argument, all you did was repeat your definition of implicit vs explicit. That didn't answer my question. I asked you to create a claim for intrinsic value that contained the same result, but was from a subjective viewpoint. Just like, "I know green because I experience green," (turns out they are colorblind) vs "I know this is green because of the wavelength." So the examples didn't help me. Its like if I asked, "How did you go from 2X + 1 = 3 to 2x = 2", and all you did was repeat the steps I already have in front of me. It doesn't help.

You cannot overexplain a new concept or theory, but you can very much under explain it. My discussion with you has never even gotten to 'flourishing', because there are steps from my view point that are necessary for me to even start thinking about your conclusion.

Look at when I asked this as well:

How do you specifically evaluate the intrinsic value of things without requiring subjective viewpoints?

One would evaluate whether or not the thing is a source of motivation and is not itself a subject; and this can be done by analyzing other people than oneself OR oneself through an unbiased lens. — Bob Ross

The answer is underexplained. How are we analyzing other people? Are we analyzing them through their subjective feelings about the source of motivation? Are we measuring things like people actions when faced with the source of intrinsic value? What process are we using to determine that someone is viewing oneself through an unbiased lens? You're missing steps that need answering for this to be a complete explanation if you're going to claim this is objective.

How would a psychologist objectively conclude that X has intrinsic value?

This would not be specifically a psychologist’s job, as this endeavor would require knowledge from multiple different sciences—such as sociology, biology, etc. — Bob Ross

This answer essentially says, "I don't know." This is a supposition. We need at least one example from you that a psychologist could at least start with. For example: "Here's the method I propose which works with this one individual. Now we would need to repeat this method thousands of times to make sure that the results stay consistent, and that is out of the scope of what I can do here." Otherwise you don't know, which is fine to admit in an argument.

Finally lets look at this question and reply:

1. What's an example of an object that has intrinsic value? Not our emotional states. Most of your core examples seem to do with pain, awe, etc., or our personal emotions. I'm having a hard time seeing how you're not simply describing personal emotions demanding attention and action instead of the objects themselves.

1. No objects have intrinsic value that I am aware of, although they may exist (I guess, since I cannot technically eliminate their possibility).

2. Not all states that have intrinsic value are constituted of emotions—e.g., a state of indifference. — Bob Ross

Point one is incomplete. How can we not eliminate their possibility? If this is an objective argument, you should demonstrate a situation in which there would be a doubt, vs the times when we're certain it does not have objective value.

Point 2 doesn't counter my point that I'm just seeing this as an analysis of our emotions, and whether they compel us to action. Indifference does not compel us to action, (or does it compel us not to act?) and fits within the point I made. This would be a good time to dig in and demonstrate how this is not merely an analysis of emotions and how we are most likely to respond to them. Because you did not, I as the reader am going to view my interpretation as unchallenged.

I hope you know how much I respect you Bob, and I can tell that emotionally, there's something you really value and see here. If you still see some value on it, keep working on it. Currently your explanation and walkthrough is unclear and incomplete to me. If you want to keep trying to make it clearer through other examples and explanations, we can keep trying. If you feel you've reached your end and you can't explain it any other way, that's also fine. My personal agreement is not contingent on your argument, and I will end this with a salute your way whenever you are ready. :)

Making this sort of distinction, is inevitably to distinguish between two different dependency relations: one being a dependency on subjective dispositions, and the other not—objectivity, in your sense, is defined negatively in relation to subjectivity. — Bob Ross

Logically this is equivalent to noting that subjectivity is defined negatively in relation to objectivity. Objectivity and subjectivity in the general sense are binary. If you're being objective, you're not beings subjective and vice-versa. I'm not sure how this point is anything new, its part of the fundamental relationship between the two concepts.

I'm not intending to use the term truth, but arguments.
— Bob Ross

An argument is about truth: you can’t separate them in any way that would be meaningful for this discussion. The premises, which are propositions, are expressing something objective if they can be evaluated (as true or false) independently of what any person feels or believes about it—and this is what your definition entails (quoted above). — Bob Ross

Are you saying that whatever type of premises we stick inside of a syllogism, are now objective because the structure of a syllogism is objective? That's fundamentally wrong. If I have as a premise, "I believe the color blue is the best color in the world," its true, but still a subjective belief. Subjective and objective premises can be evaluated as true or false. That doesn't change the fact they are subjective or objective.

Same with the structure of what a premise or syllogism is. These are objective structures. That does not suddenly make what the premises contain objective. If I understand what you're saying, you're claiming that anything within a syllogism is objective because the structure of a syllogism or premise is itself objective. If true, that's simply incorrect. Let me know if I have the correct understanding of this.

Objectivity is an approach to thinking that minds take to ensure that the subject of the self is not dependent for the argument

If this is true, then a premise is objective (or expressing something objective) IFF whether or not it is true or false is NOT dependent on any given subjective disposition. — Bob Ross

Incorrect. The truth or falsity of subjectivity and objectivity are irrelevant to what they are. The contents of a premise can be objective or subjective based on what they are claiming.

What you are trying to explicate with your example of smoking, is NOT that the proposition is subjective but, rather, that it is anecdotal and thusly cannot be used to demonstrate a statistic on the effects of smoking on the human body. — Bob Ross

Partially Correct. Upon reviewing that paragraph I neglected to include the conclusion. The old man concludes that smoking is safe for people based on his own experiences. Yes, it is objectively true that the old man has never gotten cancer, but it is his conclusion that is subjective because it relies on the old mans' personal experience, or anecdote. Therefore the argument is a subjective argument, not an objective one.

That you asked for some sort of measurable entity in reality, as opposed to a phenomenal quality, demonstrates sufficiently to me that you are using your definitions incoherently — Bob Ross

You are drawing an incorrect conclusion from my example. If a phenomenal quality can be confirmed independently of one's subjective experience, it is objective. If I claim, "I like the color blue," you know its true, but no one else can get inside of your head to confirm that you actually have the experience of liking it. If you say, "That color is blue," we can confirm it independently of our own subjective experience of 'blue'.

Same with me claiming "Because my favorite color is blue, everyone's favorite color is blue." The conclusion is drawn from a purely subjective experience. Whether its true or not is irrelevant. The argument is drawn and concluded from a subjective viewpoint, not an objective viewpoint. Therefore the argument is a subjective argument.

Now, to provide ample clarification, the feeling of awe does have intrinsic value, although the Grand Canyon does not, because if one removes all the desires and beliefs a person has about the feeling of awe while they are having it, the feeling of awe, as per its nature, will motivate them, to some degree, to value it. — Bob Ross

At this point it seems like all states of intrinsic value are simply what we feel. I'm going to make two requests for your next post.

1. What's an example of an object that has intrinsic value? Not our emotional states. Most of your core examples seem to do with pain, awe, etc., or our personal emotions. I'm having a hard time seeing how you're not simply describing personal emotions demanding attention and action instead of the objects themselves.

2. You claim your value morality is objective. As you've noted, I've been giving both subjective and objective examples of arguments. Now its your turn. Write me an argument for your value morality that is subjective under your view. This will help me to see how you view subjectivity and objectivity beyond the abstract. There should be no barrier to this.

it is still possible to analyze what mind-independent 'things' motivate subjects---by study of the brain, psychology, sociology, the nature of the mind-independent thing, etc. — Bob Ross

I'm not saying its not. But you need to give a specific example and not just a claim that we can. I've given some examples that would fit this, but it doesn't mean they work for your theory. How do you specifically evaluate the intrinsic value of things without requiring subjective viewpoints? How would a psychologist objectively conclude that X has intrinsic value?

I guess I am not fully fathoming what you mean by subjective vs. objective definitions and arguments. I thought you were saying that 'subjective' refers to something which has its truth relative to mind-dependent dispositions (e.g., feelings, thoughts, beliefs, etc.) and that 'objective' refers to something which has its truth NOT relative to mind-dependent dispositions. Am I misunderstanding? — Bob Ross

I'm not intending to use the term truth, but arguments. I would not use 'mind-dependent' as a description for subjective or objective at all. This leads to the mistake in thinking that objectivity exists like some Platonic form. It does not. Objectivity is an approach to thinking that minds take to ensure that the subject of the self is not dependent for the argument. Subjectivity is an approach to thinking that minds take to ensure that the subject of the self is dependent for the argument.

Thus, things like logic, math, concepts, studies, and findings are used for objective arguments. Personal experiences, intuitions, and desires are all subjective arguments. Both are tools, have their strengths and weaknesses, and a complete thinker will be able to apply both effectively to an argument. After all, we are subjects that have personal experiences, and many discussions that involve personal experiences have no objective approach. A lack of understanding this distinction can easily allow confusion between the two.

Consciousness is a great example of this. There are objective ways to approach consciousness, and subjective ways to approach consciousness. Realistically, the only way we can measure consciousness in a human is by physiological measurements and behavior. Asserting a person's personal experience is outside of objectivity because we can never know what its like to be that person.

Subjective consciousness is our individual experience of reality. A person may not exhibit any physical signs of pain, but inside, its an undeniable reality. And it WANTS things. For example, it can want to be immortal, so it invents an idea that it can exist once its body dies. It wants to pretend its not tied to the brain, even though the objective reality is that this is so. It often tries to claim its experiences are objective reality, when they are just really strong feelings of desire that X should be real.

A good thinker can marry the two. You cannot discuss consciousness only in objective, nor only in subjective terms. A good thinker can find the strength in each side, and uses it for its particular tool in the argument. Am I master at this? No. But it is something I and many philosophers who strive to do well will do.

When I point out that you have subjective arguments in your ethical theory, it is not that you should never use subjective arguments. You should be aware of their strengths and weaknesses and use them effectively. People are rarely persuaded by math. They are persuaded by feelings. Feelings without math may be fun, but can lead to alcoholics losing everything they have. Math without feelings may be brilliant, but can die in a dusty book that no one will ever read.

Is intrinsic value objective or subjective?

Is the argument you are giving for intrinsic value subjective or objective? This is determined by what you are using to determine whether something is intrisicly valuable. If your reliance is on the feelings and desires of people, its subjective, plain and simple. "I've smoked every day until 90 years old and never gotten cancer" is subjective. "Smokers have a X% higher chance of getting lung cancer is objective". When you appeal to me to recognize a feeling of value that you call intrinsic value, you are appealing to subjective notions. There can be good reasons for that. But it is not objective.

Is the claim that things can motivate minds objective or subjective?

How could it possibly be subjective? — Bob Ross

Again, is your argument for why things can motivate minds a subjective, or objective one? Do we have evidence of rays that emit from objects, interact with brains, and compel them to do things? Or do we have some people who really WANT that thing over there, therefore believe its not their fault, it must be compelling them? Do you see which argument is objective vs subjective?

To your credit, value is always assigned but, to my credit, it is not always extrinsic value. — Bob Ross

I'm not saying this isn't possible. But you would need something like a 'value atom' or a proof that demonstrated X had value that could be confirmed logically.

Intrinsic value, unlike extrinsic value, is objective because, although we assign it, it is being assigned because the thing actually (mind-independently) motivates people to value it for its own sake and not for the sake of something else: a person is motivated, even if they overcome it, to value a thing with intrinsic value despite what they believe or desire to value it at. It is external motivation (for the subject) which they can not think or desire away. — Bob Ross

This is a run on sentence, so lets break it up into something that goes step by step and we can walk through.

1. There exist things which can compel people to value it.
2. This value is something which does not benefit the person. The person may even hate the thing. But innate to their experience, they still value it.
3. The value is a consistent and undeniable reality within a person's mind, and this is because of the object itself.

An example I would give is, "The Grand Canyon". Such a feeling is usually described as 'awe'. Some might hate the Grand Canyon, but still feel awe, or value. Still, this is a subjective claim. Saying "The Canyon" is causing this is a feeling/belief. There is nothing here that we can measure or evaluate beyond a person's individual feelings about something.

What would an objective claim for this look like? As I noted before, perhaps a wave that extended from things that would provably interact with the mind and cause consistent physiological interactions. Perhaps a massive study that could quantify value and demonstrate how it affects people with researched statistics.

If you wanted to objectively demonstrate that eudaimonia had more value, you would of course have to clearly define value, and then demonstrate that societies with eudaimonia had generated more of this defined value then societies that did not have this.

I hope you can see the difference now. Let me know what you think.

Maybe we're getting closer here Bob. I think you're confusing that a syllogism is itself objective when we're talking about the definitions and concepts within the syllogism. A syllogism's validity is not the focus here. It is the evidence the syllogism uses that determines whether the argument is objective or subjective. When I said it was incomplete, its incomplete to call its arguments subjective or objective.

If you'll read it again, it was not an issue with the premise, it was a request to flesh out your definitions so we could see whether they were objective or subjective. As it was initially written, it was impossible to classify the argument as objective or subjective because I simply don't understand what you mean. Its fine if you wish to write it that way, but then you can't claim its objective either. If a reader needs aspect of your syllogism fleshed out or explained, its a syllogism that needs more work to have the proper rigor. That in itself is not a claim as to whether its arguments are subjective or objective.

I made a point not to dispute your definitions, I only noted what it would take to classify them as subjective or objective. That's why I gave you examples for both sides.

My premises fit this description: they are not themselves appeals to subjective dispositions. — Bob Ross

If you use definitions, it must be known what concepts those definitions represent. Do they represent subjective definitions and concepts, or objective definitions and concepts? Its a fact of language, and not something that you appeal to. Even if they cannot be explicated, is that claim based on subjective or objective premises? It is unavoidable in any discussion, especially when you actively claim they are objective.

I am asking if this syllogism itself is objective—not whether some subsequent one is or not. P1 is a claim which is expressing something objective: it is not saying ~”Something has intrinsic value if I want it to”. — Bob Ross

P1: A thing that is not a mind and motivates a mind to avoid or acquire it (despite that mind's conative or cognitive disposition towards it) has intrinsic value. — Bob Ross

No, the argument is not objective, nor can I tell if its subjective at this point. This is an assertion. How you justify the assertion is what makes it objective or subjective. Is intrinsic value objective or subjective? Is the claim that things can motivate minds objective or subjective? Those are the questions that need answers.

If, by this, you are claiming that an argument is subjective if the fully expounded list of syllogisms (required to prove it)(which would be infinite, by the way) anywhere contains a subjective element; then, my friend, there are not objective arguments. You can’t prove ‘1+1=2’ with an ‘objective argument’ if you are that absurdly strict with your definition of ‘objective argument’. — Bob Ross

No, I'm not asking you to infinitely expand syllogisms. That's silly. Also you cannot objectively claim

"A mind is unique to every person and cannot be explicated," then we have a subjective definition of mind

Do you mean to say that, in this hypothetical, the term ‘mind’ is defined as something of which its meaning is relative to the given subject-at-hand? The fact it is inexplicable, in this scenario, has nothing to do with it being subjective. — Bob Ross

Correct. A claim that something is inexplicable can be founded on objective or subjective premises. In this example, it is a subjective premise.

In sum, I'm not questioning whether the premises are true or false, I'm demonstrating how we can determine if they are subjective or objective. Let me repost part of my conclusion in the last post once again: "A subjective argument is not necessarily wrong, nor is an objective argument necessarily correct. It is about the type of concepts presented and being analyzed." It seems my points were taken as an attack on your theories truth or falsity, when they are simply examples that point out why some of your arguments are subjective, and also examples of how you could make them objective. Address those examples specifically without regards to the truth or falsity of the premises and I think we'll be able to reconcile on subjectivity vs objectivity.

Now, I don't want you, right now, to contend with the premises in the sense of what you merely disagree with; but, rather, I want you to tell me if this syllogism meets your requirements for being an 'objective argument'. — Bob Ross

This is a good start. As written, the argument is incomplete. I'll point out why, and then point out how based on the answers, this can end up being a subjective or an objective argument.

P1: A thing that is not a mind and motivates a mind to avoid or acquire it (despite that mind's conative or cognitive disposition towards it) has intrinsic value. — Bob Ross

How do we determine that it is a thing which motivates a mind? Can it rationally compete with and invalidate the idea that a mind that is motivated towards goals simply uses things to obtain its goals? Is it that the food in front of me has an internal compulsion that expels outward towards my mind demanding that I eat it? Or is it that my mind desires food, and seeing the food triggers my mind to want it for what it wants/needs?

If the answer is, "

I believe in external motivation — Bob Ross

, then this is a subjective answer to the question because belief alone is entirely subjective. Because you have a subjective answer as part of a major foundation of your argument, any part of your argument that relies on this foundation is now a subjective argument.

If the answer is, "Here is the proof that external motivation exists, and we can see this proof holds up despite differences in our feelings or personal experiences", then you have an objective foundation, and any part of your argument that relies on this foundation without including subjectivity is now an objective argument.

As a quick aside, I like that this is a much more straight forward definition of intrinsic value. It might be incomplete from my view, but it gives a much clearer picture of the definition of intrinsic value in one sentence.

P2: The state of pain is not a mind and motivates a mind to avoid it (despite that mind's conative or cognitive disposition towards it). — Bob Ross

My second question would be, "How have you proven that a state of pain is not a mind?" I'll give you a faux example that seems reasonable. "The mind is defined as the aspect of consciousness which analyzes its own states and make decisions based on those states. Pain is a state that the mind decides to act on or react to, therefore it is not the mind itself, just a state that the mind considers."

If we both agree that this is a clear and provable definition that can be accurately applied despite differing states of human subjective experience, then we have something objective to reference. If however we defined it like, "A mind is unique to every person and cannot be explicated," then we have a subjective definition of mind, and thus a subjective argument at its foundation.

A subjective argument is not necessarily wrong, nor is an objective argument necessarily correct. It is about the type of concepts presented and being analyzed. An objective argument can have its definitions challenged as new information comes along. A subjective argument may be the best argument we can present with limited information. So having a subjective argument is not a death knell based on what we know, but it is important that it not claim to be an objective argument. In the case of moral theories, there are countless subjective moral theories out there, so another subjective argument has a high bar to reach to out compete every other theory. The problem is most subjective arguments boil down to subjective preference at their core, meaning people just do what they want and call it moral. And if that's the end case, why bother with a theory at all? Escaping that end result is incredibly difficult, but maybe you can do it.

I hope that was a clear answer to the question!

I appreciate the good question, its in reference to my Measurable Morality thread. I'm planning on rewriting it to start smaller and be tighter in its initial argument due to my discussion with Bob over it, but if you want to read it as is, its here: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14834/a-measurable-morality/p1

My fault for referencing an outside thread. This is Bob's thread and the context should be kept to it.

I don’t see any way for our conversation to progress, because we keep dead-ending at the same spots, so I will just respond to the parts where I think I am adding to the conversation (instead of reiterating). — Bob Ross

Probably true. We have some fundamental differences on certain topics, and they may be irreconsilable. No harm in noting that and agreeing to disagree after giving our sides again.

You use the term ‘objective’ in really nonsensical ways—e.g., ‘objective knowledge’, ‘objective definition’, ‘objective wavelength’, ‘objective argument’, etc. Sometimes its use is straight up incoherent, and other times it adds nothing to what you are saying. — Bob Ross

Bob, I use objective in the common sense. We've discussed this before and you have a very unique way of looking at subjective and objective. Generally this is how I use objective and subjective, so it is not incoherent:

OBJECTIVE arguments are often those that have to do with logos, that is, reason, evidence and logic, generally dealing with material questions (things that can be sensed or measured and have to do with the real outside world, outside of oneself).

SUBJECTIVE arguments are most often those dealing with the personal situation, feelings or experiences of a particular individual, family or group, and are usually arguments from ethos or pathos (though material subjective factors may involve arguments from logos as well).
https://utminers.utep.edu/omwilliamson/engl1312/subjective.htm#:~:text=SUBJECTIVE%20arguments%20are%20most%20often,arguments%20from%20logos%20as%20well).

I have already explicated clearly what objectivity is, and I think your position on it is wrong and confused. — Bob Ross

I have never once heard your explanation of objectivity and thought it made any rational sense. That is your personal definition, but the common definition which people use is as I noted above. Generally I try to avoid the subject directly because it seems to be more of an emotional spot for you. Just in this case its unavoidable.

An argument is an evidence-based proof; and can absolutely include intuitions in it. Arguments are not objective; but are hopefully rational. — Bob Ross

Arguments can be objective or subjective. Intuitions are subjective viewpoints. Objective arguments work to eliminate parts the require a subjective viewpoint. Per my example, the experience of green is subjective and the wavelength of green is objective.

Using your example of green, there is a set wavelength of light that is green. That's the objective wavelength of light for green. How we see or interpret it is subjective, but that right there, is the intrinsic color of green.

You completely missed the point of the example, and failed to explicate what green looks like. — Bob Ross

I'll be more direct in my point then. The personal subjective experience of green cannot be explicated. The objective wavelength can. The personal subjective experience of value cannot be explicated. But if there is an objective intrinsic value, it can.

No. I don't reject this notion. We're talking about value, and you keep changing the subject. Why?

You rejected it many times in our older conversations about epistemology; and it was relevant to what you said, because by saying a concept is simple (and indefinable) is NOT to say that they cannot be known. — Bob Ross

This is still not an answer. Bob, I agree that that a concept can be simple, indefinable, and known subjectively by that one person experiencing it. I'm not challenging that. I'm challenging you to demonstrate that value is simple, indefinable, and can be known objectively by people because it is intrinsic to an object. Pain is an example, but not a breakdown or system we can use.

Personally, why I think you keep going to 'being' or 'green' is because you can't do it with value. The only argument you have given is the subjective experience of pain, and whether we value it or not. I'm not disagreeing with you there that we all have our own subjective experience of pain, and value of it. I'm disagreeing that this somehow reveals objective value intrinsic to a state or object.

Finally, pain can be defined objectively. If your nerves fire with a particular signal up to the brain, that's pain.

This doesn’t completely define pain, because it does not define how it feels (phenomenologically). You can’t completely strip out the subject, Philosophim: it doesn’t work. — Bob Ross

We strip out the subject where possible when we are talking about objectivity. There is a subjective part to pain, and an objective part to pain. I am not denying the subjectivity of pain. I am denying that because you or I place a personal value on pain, that its objective proof that pain has intrinsic value. You have yet to show an objective value that all people, regardless of their subjective experience, can rationally agree represents intrinsic value.

And I did come along and give you a competing definition. So no hypotheticals are needed, why is my definition logically wrong?

I did not mean in the other thread, but in this one. I am not referencing the other thread where possible as this is a fresh take with a different context. This is what I was referring to:

"We can explicate it easily as well. "External value is the attribute a living being gives something else that confers some benefit to the living being and its wants and/or needs." But here's the thing. If "internal" value isn't real, then "external" value is redundant. Meaning that 'external value' just becomes value, and once again, we've explicated value clearly."

Why is this wrong?

Yeah, that's an odd way to remove desires from yourself and imprint them on other things. Things don't motivate us Bob

I believe in external motivation; so I deny this. I think we can have reason which motivate us without us having any desire towards it. You are clearly a Humean, and there’s no easy way to find common ground on that. — Bob Ross

As a belief, this is fine. But a belief is not an objective argument. If someone said they believed in God, therefore he's real, would you think that was objective? Also, I'm not Humean, just human. :)

You seem to confuse the idea that 'mind independent' means 'independent of minds'.

???

Cancer-independent is not identical to being independent of cancer? — Bob Ross

No, my point is that it is subjects who create subjective and objective arguments. I've said this before, and it will be one more time. Objective doesn't mean, 'an object' and subjective doesn't mean, 'a subject'. Objectivity and subjectivity are claims that subjects make. It is independent of one mind, but not independent of minds.

Or if they don't someone else creates a competing induction and we just decide to do based on which one we like more

No, it is based off of what seems more correct—which one is more convincing. Just because you are not convinced, does not make this endeavor subjective: you have a tendency to do that. — Bob Ross

It genuinely isn't because I'm not convinced of the argument. Bob, in my own moral theory, I believe everything has intrinsic value by the fact of its existence. The difference between you and I is mine has a rational foundation that can be measured against other existences. I can explain and justify what good and value are from a place of reason. Even your idea of flourishing fits in my theory nicely. You've taken this the wrong way. My point is you claim objectivity, but clearly cannot back that claim.

You're missing a fundamental step that can elevate your moral theory from, "Just another theory," into something that people can rationally hold in high regard. Don't be angry that I'm pointing out a flaw. Listen to it, give it a fair consideration in your head, and maybe you'll be able to come back with something better.

So, there's my take. This is your thread Bob, so anytime you feel the discussion has met its end or you would like the final say, I will grant it with a bow and let you continue with others.

If something has been determined, by analysis, as inexplicable (i.e., explicated as inexplicable), then one should not continue to try to explicate it — Bob Ross

No doubt, but you have not done this. And that's my issue. There's a lot of assertions and opinions, and inductions. That's not a solid analysis. If you're happy with this, that's fine, but as a philosophical proposal, its weak.

You reject the idea of implicit knowledge: I don’t. — Bob Ross

No. I don't reject this notion. We're talking about value, and you keep changing the subject. Why?

I don’t know why you would believe this. We convey concepts to each other all the time implicitly (through action, experience, and intuition) and they are clearly not subjective. A 5 year old cannot explicate clearly a definition of a triangle, but definitely knows notionally what a triangle is. — Bob Ross

No, that's not proven objective knowledge. Its assumed. You seem to be confusing assumptions, inductions, and general inclinations as proof. We can only put the 5 year old through tests to show that they can prove a triangle, because a triangle has very clearly explained rules. A triangle is 3 straight lines that connect at their ends. And if the 5 year old can't explicate it doesn't mean it can't be explicated. You seem to be saying that because you can't explicate value, it doesn't prove that others can't. That doesn't prove anything.

Claiming to invalidate all possible definitions of value is a tall order that requires some major proof

It’s inductive: I don’t have to provide a proof such that it is impossible. Inductions don’t work like that. — Bob Ross

Then the first person that shows a proof that it can be explicated wins. Or if they don't someone else creates a competing induction and we just decide to do based on which one we like more. That's again, subjective. There is no reason for anyone to accept your premises unless they feel like it.

You seem to confuse the idea that 'mind independent' means 'independent of minds'. No, it means that there is a rationality that holds true despite what other minds may feel. There is nothing rational that allows you rise above emotional feelings on this. 1+1=2 despite what we feel about it, or even if we agree with it because its a solid logical concept from beginning to end. Your whole argument feels like its a matter of faith instead of rationality.

If someone said, "Here is my definition of value that is clearly explicated," do you have a proof that this is impossible?

It isn’t going to be actually or logically impossible, and there is no definitive way to determine whether a concept is simple or simply misunderstood. Abductively, through the attempts to define it and failing to do so, one slowly understands better how primitive the concept is by way of how entrenched it is into all the other concepts one deploys to try and define it. — Bob Ross

So no. :)

There is no proof of this here, which means that someone who comes along and claims they have a definition, automatically competes with your claim at minimum, equally.

Prima facie, this is true. I would then demonstrate that either (1) they begged the question or (2) did not convey properly the concept. If you say “well, Bob, I can explicate what the color green looks like”. I would say “ok, let’s hear it”. — Bob Ross

But we're not talking about the color green. We're talking about value. And I did come along and give you a competing definition. So no hypotheticals are needed, why is my definition logically wrong?

If there is an alternative way of determining value intrinsically, we need that method for me to be able to think in those terms.

The other way, in addition to what I have already explained, is the idea that it is extrinsically motivating for subjects and does not arise out of a subject itself: — Bob Ross

Yeah, that's an odd way to remove desires from yourself and imprint them on other things. Things don't motivate us Bob. We motivate ourselves for things. Its why we all have different values for different feelings, states, and things.

I was saying that IF you think that it is possible for the person to understand that the pain has value despite having no belief or desire that it is; then we have found common ground. If you do not, then it doesn’t help our conversation. — Bob Ross

If the whole proof for intrinsic values rests on what I think, then this is not objective. This is just a conflict of opinions. I have no idea what you mean by a person valuing something and not valuing it at the same time beyond an colloquial expression. People value relief Bob. They value a life free of pain. Pain is only valuable if it helps us avoid and/or heal from injuries. A Masochist might actually value pain in itself, and purposefully injure themselves for it. The idea that we're all going to have the same outlook and value about pain doesn't work out in practice, and thus we have no common ground for intrinsic value.

Finally, pain can be defined objectively. If your nerves fire with a particular signal up to the brain, that's pain. How your brain interprets it and values it may be different. But the only thing intrinsic to pain, is the nerve interplay.

I am trying to dance our way into giving you the intuition. This is similar to debates between people about internal vs. external theories of motivation: one guy can’t see how someone can be motivated to do something without having a desire to do it, and the other can—they then spend days having the former convey the intuition to the latter, and usually to no avail. — Bob Ross

Again, this is all based on subjective experience then. An objective argument wouldn't need my understanding of the intuition. Using your example of green, there is a set wavelength of light that is green. That's the objective wavelength of light for green. How we see or interpret it is subjective, but that right there, is the intrinsic color of green. If you can put forward something similar for value, you'll have an objective argument. Until then, this is just a nice thought experiment but not a strong philosophical argument.

In light of our conversations, I have been trying to come up with different ways to express it; just to try to convey it to you, and I don’t think I have found a better way to explain it. Nevertheless, I will try again; — Bob Ross

Not a worry and I appreciate the attempt! I may also repeat myself a bit, so feel free at any of these points 'Agree to disagree".

Now, because the concept of value is primitive, it does not follow that we cannot analyze how ‘things’ can be valued and what has value—but, merely, what the concept of value means is off limits to proper explication. — Bob Ross

A job of philosophy is to take what cannot be yet explained, and put it into words that consistently make sense and can be used rationally. When we can't do so, its 'giving up'. Its no different to me then if people stated, "We can't know what knowledge is," or "We can't know morality". If value is goodness, and we can't know value, we can't know what goodness is.

Further, if a word is mostly understood in terms of "intuition, experience, and action" this is a subjective term. To be objective is to have a clear term that can be verified independently apart from personal experience. I know you claim that this idea of morality is objective, but I'm not seeing any evidence that this is the case.

Now, because the concept of value is primitive, it does not follow that we cannot analyze how ‘things’ can be valued and what has value—but, merely, what the concept of value means is off limits to proper explication. — Bob Ross

This is a claim that must be proven however. If someone said, "Here is my definition of value that is clearly explicated," do you have a proof that this is impossible? I'm not seeing your claim that value cannot be explicated as anything more than an opinion. Claiming to invalidate all possible definitions of value is a tall order that requires some major proof. There is no proof of this here, which means that someone who comes along and claims they have a definition, automatically competes with your claim at minimum, equally.

How things can be valued, in principle, is two-fold: either (1) the value of a thing is bestowed upon it by a subject or (2) it has it itself. You seem to think that only #1 is possible, but I think both are. — Bob Ross

Its not that I think only #1 is possible. Its that you have not demonstrated any way we can know that #2 is possible. We can't make the mistake that just because I can string two words together, that the concept necessarily exists. That's the unicorn problem. I take a horse, I take a horn, and combine the concepts and 'unicorn'. But does a unicorn actually exist? No. "Intrinsic value" is the combination of intrinsic, and value. We can combine the words, but there's no evidence such a thing exists. That's what you have to prove.

You are right that this is a great example of extrinsic value, and note that ‘value’ did not need to be explicated here; as one would is sufficiently experienced will know exactly what is being conveyed here with the ‘value’ of this clock. — Bob Ross

It doesn't have to be explicated because we know what external value is. We can explicate it easily as well. "External value is the attribute a living being gives something else that confers some benefit to the living being and its wants and/or needs." But here's the thing. If "internal" value isn't real, then "external" value is redundant. Meaning that 'external value' just becomes value, and once again, we've explicated value clearly.

What I think you are saying, is that when in pain the valuing of the negation of that pain is solely the subject’s cognitive or conative evaluation of it—I think this is mistaken. — Bob Ross

This is because it is a knowable example we have of determining value. If there is an alternative way of determining value intrinsically, we need that method for me to be able to think in those terms.

If a person completely believes and desires that pain has no value and you are right that value is purely subjective judgments, then even if they are in tremendous pain the pain will not be have any value; but, if you can envision a person which, in tremendous pain, still appreciates the value of avoiding pain despite not believing and desiring it to have no value, then you have contradicted your own point: the pain must have value independent of the desires and beliefs of the person. — Bob Ross

I'm going to break this down a bit.

Assume that value is subjective.
If a person thinks an emotional state does not have value, then it will not have any value no matter how strong of an emotional state it is.
If however there is a person in tremendous pain who values pain, despite not valuing pain, its a contradiction.

I don't see how the above argument revokes that its subjective. Your conclusion is not a conclusion, but a premise which contradicts itself. Now if you meant, "They value avoiding pain, but don't value pain itself," this is not a contradiction, nor does it revoke the assumption that value is subjective.

Alright Bob, I hope I was able to clearly communicate my points here as well. Feel free to answer what you wish.

Hello again Bob! Its good to see this theory put into one place. I wanted to give others a chance to reply to it before I dug in. I want to focus on what I see as the main question your theory needs to answer before anything else can be addressed.

Linking goodness with value seems straight forward. But then this leads to the question "What is value?" Normally it is living things that give 'value' to other things. For your purposes, this would be 'extrinsic' value. A great example would be the value of two diamonds. One is worth $50 while the other is worth $100 in a particular area. Of course, in a different area, they could be valued at different amounts. The way we determine value is 'evaluation'. In this case again, this is extrinsic, and clear.

But if value is determined by other living things, how do we find intrinsic value? What you're claiming is similar to the idea that that some diamond has an innate value of 25$, no matter what other people are willing to pay for it. That seems at odds with the notion of value. But you seem comfortable with the idea that people can evaluate the value of something differently from what its intrinsic value is. I'm not saying its not possible, but how can we measure intrinsic value and separate this from a measurement of extrinsic value?

You can do this with your example of a clock. Someone can value the clock because it tells time, while someone else could place zero value on the clock because its ugly, and they have a way to tell time already. Clearly this is extrinsic value. But then how do we objectively determine the intrinsic value of the clock? Finishing this example would be helpful.

to determine intrinsic value is a matter of analyzing how much, if at all, a ‘thing’ demands value. — Bob Ross

What is your meaning of 'demand'? How does a clock demand? Can this be described using a different set of words or phrases that avoids personification? I know we had these questions in another thread, and I was curious if given some time, you've been able to construct new answers or approaches. And if there is nothing new to add, I'll simply bow out and let you handle other questions. :)

From my perspective, I gave you two different ways to think about intrinsic value, you ignored both, and segued immediately into a discussion about how you will reject the whole theory if I cannot define 'value' other than as an unanalyzable, simple concept. — Bob Ross

I did not ignore both. I had to understand an objective term of 'value' before 'intrinsic value' made any sense. I also had a definition of value that was analyzable that you did not refute. So its fairly reasonable that I wouldn't consider intrinsic value if I had no reason to accept your definition of value right?

if you don't understand how it is impossible to define what it means to exist, then I am at a loss of words how to explain what a simple concept is to you. — Bob Ross

Its a hard lesson, but if a person is genuinely open to understanding what you're trying to convey, and they respond that it does not make sense and disagree with your viewpoint, that's not on the reader. That's on the writer. The reason I'm shutting this aspect of the conversation down has nothing to do with your or my points. Maybe we could have hashed out a solution with a normal approach. It has to do with the fact that you have had the attitude that it is my fault I don't understand what you're trying to explain. At that point, it is no longer a discussion but a one-sided view. It happens. Passions run high. But I've learned that that's when a discussion needs to end.

Ironically, I don't think people are going to care about that part of the analysis: when I say 'value' is 'worth', people will understand sufficiently what I mean, just like how they will understand that 'being' is 'existence'. Maybe I am wrong about that, but we will find out soon enough when I open a thread on it. — Bob Ross

A good idea! Maybe your idea as a fresh take apart from the context of this conversation I'll see what you're trying to convey more clearly.

In terms of your theory, I think I understand it more than adequately (at this point), and disagree with it. So I don't think there is much more to discuss. — Bob Ross

Not a problem, you already got a free handwave as I mentioned earlier. :) I appreciate the discussion and had a lot of fun diving into it with you. I'll catch you on another post Bob.

Honestly I'm a little peeved that you disregarded my points about values, took a complete tangent to a discussion of being, then put it on me to prove your point for you. Let me be clear. You did not make a good point about values or existence. It is sorely incomplete. This did not distract me from those points. And when I give a good faith effort to address something so far from the original subject of morality, I do not expect to be accused of evading or misunderstanding what you wanted when you never clearly defined the parameters well to begin with. A little more humbleness on your part and a little less accusations towards myself would be welcome.

My advice again is to regroup, think about your theory from the bottom up again, and see if you can address your point clearly enough that you don't need another person to define things for you. My first pass at my knowledge theory didn't quite work at points, and I had to do some revisions to find the right wording. So don't feel bad if this first go around didn't work. If that takes time its fine, I should be around. If for now you want to address other issue of the moral theory in the OP, we can continue there. You may have had some other criticisms or points that didn't involve the intrinsic values theory. But the current discussion on existence and being is unsalvageable from my viewpoint and needs to shift elsewhere.

I'm glad to see you've enjoyed it!

Or just “there is discreet experience”. This is pivotal, because it purports to unify our knowledge of experience over here in the experience of being me, with reality, over there, that any mind would have to see. Logically, this unifies the deductive with the inductive; or better said, we can induce “there is discreet experience” and we can deduce “there is discreet experience.” — Fire Ologist

A great assessment. The next step after this is to ask, "What is doing the discrete experiencing?" And the answer is, "The I".

This quote is essential. It’s why Aristotle came to the law of non-contradiction instead of “there is discreet experience” as fundamental. You are playing in the same playground here. — Fire Ologist

Interesting! I was unaware. I have found that this area of knowledge is shared by many other epistemological philosophies. There's a very similar level of conclusion which then takes off in different directions.

This argument would almost be better without premise 4, because premise 4 introduces a gap between discreet experience and reality. — Fire Ologist

It is not necessarily that there is a gap between discrete experience and reality. The discrete experience you have is real. The gap is whether your judgement that your discrete experience represents more than the experience itself. So for example, its real that if I'm hallucinating, I'm seeing a pink elephant. What's questionable is whether that discrete experience is an accurate representation of reality without contradiction. Its taking the step beyond the experience to say, "But if I fully apply the totality of what a pink elephant entails, will I find its still a pink elephant?"

This is what separates a full deduction, from a partial induction. Honestly, we make very few deductions in our day to day as doing so would be woefully inefficient. But we have to determine what a fully applied aspect of knowledge entails first before we can more accurately assess inductions.

You can unify your discreet experience to your knowledge, bridge that gap, but this diesnt necessitate (by deduction) that you’ve bridged the gap between discreet experience and reality. — Fire Ologist

Correct. And its never claimed that we do. That's why applied knowledge is not an affirmation. It is a test of avoiding contradiction. Thus if I am a person in the middle ages I can look up at the sky and I applicably know that the Sun rotates around the Earth. For me to say the Earth rotates around the sun would be a contradiction, just look at it! Later when knew information enters in, the previous deduction no longer applies. I applicably knew as a person ignorant of astronomy that the Sun rotated around the Earth. With knew information, I now applicably know the Earth rotates around the Sun.

I agree with all of the moving parts you identify. I agree with the way your are talking about them. — Fire Ologist

Thank you, I am humbled by such agreement.

Probability to possibility to plausibility - needed distinctions. — Fire Ologist

Here is a simple breakdown.

Probability - an induction based off of applied knowledge and logical limitations. I know there are 52 cards, and four of them are jacks. I do not know what the result of a random shuffle will be. Logically, its a 4/52 probability that I'll draw a jack if we keep repeating this over time. This is applicably confirmed over time.

Possibility - an induction based off of applicably knowing that 'x' at least one time. No one has ever discovered a unicorn, therefore it is not a possibility. I have applicably known a horse, therefore its possible to applicably know one again. However the likelihood and frequency of expected experience is unknown.

Plausibility - A combination of distinctive knowledge that has no outright logical denial that it could be applied. It has either not been applied yet, or cannot be applied by its definitions. For example, a unicorn as a horse with a horn on its head, no magic. It doesn't seem like there's anything which would deny that this could happen, but no one has ever applicably known such a creature to exist. So a unicorn defined in this way is not possible, only plausible.

And you are right, the gap is a little large. I'll introduce another term to see what you think.

Faith - A combination of distinctive knowledge that has no outright logical denial that it could be applied. However, upon application, it is found to be false. This is often applied to religion, but this can also be applied to faith in oneself. We can experience a moment of reality that is at odds with our own view of ourselves, yet persist in the belief that the view of ourself still stands.

Irrational - a combination of distinctive knowledge that does not make any logical sense, and once applied and found to be false. Despite this, a person still holds it to be true. For example, a mother believes her son did not commit a crime, despite her knowing her sons troubled past, they're being at the scene of the crime, and eyewitnesses. It is found undeniably that the son committed the crime. Yet the mother persists in believing he didn't commit it. This is a step beyond faith into outright delusion.

Thank you Fire Ologist, it is one of the greatest compliments you can give to tell me that my paper gave you something to think about. I appreciate your feedback and will think about it further.

"existence" here is supposed to be referring to the general and generic quality of existing; and not 'the sum of all discrete identities observed and unobserved': your definition just doesn't cover what the word refers to. — Bob Ross

You ask me to give you a definition of existence that doesn't devolve into circularity, then when I do, you're saying my definition doesn't fit what you think it means. Do you see the problem? You can't ask me to give you a definition, then say, "That's not what I wanted you to define it as."

If existence = X, then existence = plurality of X. Your use of 'existence', and its variants, betray your own meaning. — Bob Ross

No, now you're disregarding things I've written. Existence = X. Being equals "some piece of X". Existences are the reference to beings, so "pieces of X".

This completely misses the mark, and is confusing. — Bob Ross

Because its not what I stated or implied. You seem more confused that I defined it in a way you wouldn't. As you consider existence a circular definition, obviously I won't be defining it the same as yourself. That's not an argument against me when you asked me to give you definitions that were non-circular. If you want other people to define a word a certain way, its best to do it yourself instead of asking.

Correct. But do you see how the word 'exist' here isn't referring to what you have been calling 'existence' and how that is really weird? — Bob Ross

No. Because I already mentioned that 'to exist' is a synonym of being, not existence.

There's escaping that under your terminology, because that's how you defined it. Obviously, this doesn't work, as 'that exists' is referring to the quality of existing; and you haven't defined that. — Bob Ross

So every time I define words, you're not going to take a word I didn't bother defining and pull it into the conversation as if I agree to your definition of it, then say its confusing?

The quality of existing, property of existence, 'to exist', does not refer to a slice of existence: it refers to existing itself. — Bob Ross

No. You told me to define a word. I did. You don't get to then say, "No, that's not the word." I have been more than generous entertaining this, and its enough. You are not engaging with me or my definitions and seem caught up in your own understanding which you seem unable to accurately communicate. You keep making up new words I have to define as we go without first addressing what I've defined so far as I've defined it so far. I don't take it personally, as it can happen in any discussion we get passionate about. I think its time to gently cut it off now though, because it isn't going anywhere productive at this point.

The entire point was to give you a platform to come up with a moral theory that would contradict mine right? We've gotten too far away from that. If you want to continue to discuss your theory of morality in its own thread, feel free and see if you can make better headway. As it is, I think you need to think on it some more, organize your thoughts, and try again at a later time. As such, I'm not buying into an intrinsic values morality for the reasons I've stated earlier. It doesn't mean I'm correct or that you're wrong, it means that at this point in the conversation, I have not seen a substantial enough reason for me to consider it a complete enough theory, and its just time to move on.

If you would like, we can continue the conversation on the moral theory that's the topic of this thread, or take a break. I leave it to you.

To be charitable, I don’t think you even tried to define existence in the sense of ‘to exist’ but, rather, are defining ‘existence’ as the ~‘the whole’. I can demonstrate really easily how ‘to exist’ cannot be defined as what you have defined as ‘existence’: — Bob Ross

No charitableness to it, I did not bother trying to define 'to exist'. As noted earlier I wanted to cover existence and being first, as this needs to go step by step. Now that we're good there, I will.

Knocking out existence's 'as a whole' is fine. It was meant to emphasize we're talking about existence, not existences. You don't say "Existences to exist". You say, "That" exists. And when something exists, its a 'to exist'. In other words, 'to exist' is just another terminology to note that something is a slice, or discrete part of existence. To exist, is being.

No circularity. Just a few base words of existence and being, then followed by synonyms based on sentence structure.

Please go down my response where I lay out what existence is

You did not provide a definition in this response, and you gave the definition “Existence being defined as 'everything'” in this response. — Bob Ross

And I clearly stated that it was not a formal definition, just an off hand remark because I was trying to define being. So scratch it. You're supposed to analyze the formal definition I gave you as I asked you to.

Philosophim, a really easy way to help, would be if you just clarified what the definition is. — Bob Ross

Here it is again. This is what you should be analyzing.

No, that was not a formal definition. If you wish that, I will.

We observe the world in discrete identities. A discrete identity which is confirmed to match our perceptions (I claim that is an apple, and that is actually apple), is being. Existence as a whole, is the sum of all discrete identities observed and unobserved. As such, it is an abstract logical concept.

This requires me to amend being, as I had not formally defined existence. So a discrete identity is existence, but unless it is confirmed that the perceived identity is not contradicted by real application, it is not being. — Philosophim

Philosophim, I have linked TWO TIMES my demonstration; and you have ignored it TWO TIMES. — Bob Ross

And I've told you two times that it doesn't apply because you analyzed existence = everything as if that was how I was defining existence. I was not. But if you need, I'll demonstrate.

If ‘existence’ = ‘everything’, then: — Bob Ross

No. I did not say existence = a synonym as the definition. Below is the definition.

" Existence as a whole, is the sum of all discrete identities observed and unobserved."

1. ‘to be’ = ‘to exist’ = ‘to be everything’. the latter presupposes a concept of ‘to be’, ‘to exist’, which was supposed to be being defined.

I never stated these equivalencies above. I never even used the phrase 'to be'.

2. “this exists” = “this is everything”. Same problem as #1, and it makes no sense.

I never stated this either. So yes, it doesn't make any sense.

2. “that should not exist” = “that should not be everything”. this clearly makes no sense, and same problem as #1.

I agree. I have no idea where you got this.

3. “discrete existence” = “everything that exists discreetly”. Same problem as #1.

In no way did I note that an individual discrete 'existence' was the same as everything. I noted that being was a discrete slice of existence.

And that's enough. Please take what I posted above, go through that using the words I used, not phrases or words I didn't mention, and demonstrate where exactly the circularity occurs please.

Also, I am not asking for a definition of what the 'totality of existent things' is: I am asking for a definition of the concept of 'to exist'. — Bob Ross

This was not in your initial request. You just asked me to define being, then in the next request, existence. Lets go over those first instead of continuing to add new requests.

Which is the same definition you gave originally, with the addition of more clarification of what you mean by 'everything'. This has the exact same issues as my response I linked; and you still haven't addressed any of it. — Bob Ross

No it does not. Please go down my response where I lay out what existence is. I do not say, "Existence = everything. I'm trying to answer your question adequately Bob, please address the answers I give adequately as well. Your old example no longer works. If you wish to apply everything as a synonym to existence, that's fine. But that's not the concept. Please go over the concepts I put forward and demonstrate where I fall into circularity please.

So far, you have failed to do so: you saying "I can" doesn't beat the challenge: you have to provide the definition. — Bob Ross

I did. I also gave the definition of 'existence' up above. Did you read through the whole thing carefully? If you believe I've committed circularity please point out specifically where. And circular reasoning is never valid Bob. If the only way we can define the word being is with circular reasoning, then we throw it out. We don't just use a fallacious definition.

You took a jab at it here:

Existence being defined as 'everything' and being as 'a part'.

Ok, so you define ‘existence’ as ‘everything’. This doesn’t work and is circular. — Bob Ross

No, that was not a formal definition. If you wish that, I will.

We observe the world in discrete identities. A discrete identity which is confirmed to match our perceptions (I claim that is an apple, and that is actually apple), is being. Existence as a whole, is the sum of all discrete identities observed and unobserved. As such, it is an abstract logical concept.

This requires me to amend being, as I had not formally defined existence. So a discrete identity is existence, but unless it is confirmed that the perceived identity is not contradicted by real application, it is not being.

My point is I can construct being as a definition without circularity if I really want to do so. If you need circularity for your definitions, its a fallacy and an indicator that your logic isn't on the correct path. Words represent concepts, not other words. If you have a synonym, there's still an underlying concept the two words are representing. If there is no concept, the word means nothing.

That is exactly what you just did!!!! You just said “being” is “a slice of being”. Unless you are really about to tell me that “existence” is different than “being”, which is obviously isn’t, then you are using the term in its definition. — Bob Ross

No, I didn't say that being was a slice of being. I said it was a slice of existence. Existence being defined as 'everything' and being as 'a part'. Its the difference between amorphous existence, and discrete existence. Being = discrete existence. Amorphous and indiscrete existence isn't being. That's at least how I define it.

Thus it is not circular. You cannot define being as a slice of being. While being can have a further slice of being, that fact doesn't explain what being actually is. You can only use such a sentence after you understand that being = discrete existence, not before.

Alright Bob, if you genuinely think your theory has legs, keep trying. I'll give it a fair shake if you think I'm missing something.

I don't like how I've made some key points about your theory, and this seems to have been ignored and turned back around to me. This is your theory Bob. I'm not the reason why its not working.

My challenge to you is simple: (I want you to) define ‘being’ without circularly referencing it. Fair enough? — Bob Ross

I'll try, but its irrelevant to our conversation. Even if we cannot define being without circularity, that does not mean this applies to value. There are clear definitions of value that are out there, including my own. You'll need to first demonstrate why each of these clearly defined terms of value fail before you have a reason to declare its unanalyzable.

No, its not. Being is a slice of existence.

Do you see how you just circular defined ‘being’ referencing ‘existence’ in its definition? So this fails to beat my challenge. — Bob Ross

This isn't circular at all. A slice of existence is a discrete section of existence. Circular would be if I said 'being' is defined as 'narsh' and when you asked what narsh is, I replied with 'being'. That's what your definitions are coming across as right now to me. good = value = worth, with no other explanation.

There are several other philosophers who have also defined being. https://www.britannica.com/topic/Being

But once again, this is irrelevant and coming across as a dodge. You need to define value. You need to demonstrate why value is unanalyzable when other people clearly don't think this is the case. 'Being' is not going to help with that.

Are you asking for how, in my theory, we quantify value, or what value actually is itself? — Bob Ross

I'm asking you what moral value is, and how we can objectively determine it. And yes, if its an objective value, then some things are going to have more moral value than others. Murdering a baby vs saving a baby for example. This is not complicated, and I feel like you're trying to make it so because you're realizing you don't have an answer.

When you say it is ‘very different’, are you referring to that you explain how to quantify value, or that you don’t think ‘importance’ and ‘worth’ are circular references to ‘value’? — Bob Ross

Read the entire reply again please. I'm pointing out how I define value, morality, then quantify moral value. Good is 'what should be', more existence is more good, or moral value. This allows us to compare two potential states of existence, and determine which one we should pick, which is essentially a moral evaluation and value selection.

Moore held that goodness, and ‘good’, is undefinable, unanalyzable, and primitive. — Bob Ross

Well mine and several other theories of morality don't. To prove this is true, they need to explain why other moral attempts to do so are wrong. At the least, mine.

I am just noting that it is not uncommon in metaethics for moral realists to consider goodness primitive in this sense without conceding it is subjective. — Bob Ross

Its irrelevant if its common. That doesn't make it right. Your argument devolves into subjective morality because your only answer so far as to how we can objectively determine it is through majority rule, or expert rule. Arguments by majority or authority are not objective, they're just passed down from on high. We need the method. If you don't have a method, that's fine. But say so and lets be done with it.

Bob, I feel like you dodged trying to define value again, and I've felt like you've been doing this the entire time. Enough. Tell me you have a definition we can objectively verify, or that we don't. Explain to me why your definitions and moral theory demonstrate that my definitions and moral theory are wrong.

My definition of value, is Moorean—not subjective. — Bob Ross

Its not Moorean, its incomplete and ill defined. As such its left up to the subject to fill in what value means. Pointing to being does not absolve you from the fact that value is clearly defined in many theories, including in my theory.

By your reasoning, being is also subject; which is clearly false. — Bob Ross

No, its not. Being is a slice of existence. The primitiveness is in describing 'existence' vs 'non-existence'. Its an abstract of something you experience, therefore you must experience it to know it. How you experience 'being' is subjective, but the term is not.

Value: A designation of importance.

This is no different than defining it as ‘value: a designation of worth’. — Bob Ross

No, its very different. Because I proceed to explain that it can be quantified in a moral sense. Moral value is a moral designation of worth. I feel you're just being stubborn here Bob.

Likewise, value isn’t a designation: it would be, by your definition here, equal to importance. Something designates value, value is not some sort of designation itself; just like how someone can designate tasks, but a task isn’t defined as a designation <of something>. — Bob Ross

Sure, if designation bothers you, replace the word with 'attribute'. We can adjust this until we find something that objectively satisifies. Value is a way to ascribe importance to something. I demonstrate in the moral sense what is more important; more existence. And when I can measure existence, I can measure which state of existence has more value. Its a complete set of definitions all the way down. If you want to hash out word choices in the definitions, we can have that discussion. I can with my theory. We can't with yours because there's nothing but a circular reference of words without non-referenced meaning.

Irregardless, I am confused why you are insisting on disregarding the whole theory, in the sense of not even granting my definition of value for the sake of the conversation, when you clearly understand that my use of ‘value’ is ‘to have worth’; and you know darn well what ‘to have worth’ means, and that it is not itself subjective. — Bob Ross

No Bob, I don't know what it means to 'have worth' besides a reference to value and good, both of which have no other meaning then a reference back to each other. Clearly defining your term so I can understand what it is, is your job in your theory. Define an objective term that does not depend on my innately knowing its meaning. I sympathize with its difficulty greatly. I've tried to assist by giving definitions of value, and trying to ask for clarification where I see it lacking. At the end of the day, if you see something and others don't, you have to keep trying different words and definitions until it can convey an accurate and rational meaning for others to clearly understand. I will always attempt my best to give you a fair analysis and am always open to any changes needed to make it work. But you have to trust me when I say, "I don't know what it means." after all of these attempts.

Try to see it from my viewpoint. You've done this: good = value = worth. And when I've asked you to give an objective definition of any of them, you just refer to another word that has no objective definition. When I ask you to try, you tell me its unanalyzable. Meaning we're just saying noises in the air without any meaning. As such, I'm left to fit in my own subjective idea of what good, value, and worth is, because we have no objective designation.

Without a clear objective definition to value, worth, or good, there's no point moving on to the rest of the theory. Its Gandalfian philosophy at that point. We can continue to talk about what Gandalf would do in a situation, but its pointless because Gandalf at his core, is a fictional character. More importantly, because your meaning of value is so central to your theory, I can't rationally discuss anything higher that uses value. Its a key part of your theory that needs fixing.

People use the term ‘value’ exactly, by-at-large, how I am using it: I am not using it in some generic different way, so I am confused why you ignored the real content of my responses. — Bob Ross

Bob, you're using is subjectively because I still, after all we've discussed, honestly, without playing games, have no idea what it means. If you have to tell me, "I know you know it," and the other person is honestly telling you, "No I don't", then you need to clarify your definition.

There are only a few reasons why a person cannot clearly define a term. 1. They don't know how. In which case, it needs work. 2. They know that if they clearly define a term, it will expose a weakness in their overall argument. Poorly defined words are the haven of weak philosophies. Again, this means it needs work. It does not mean that the other person who is reading and asking for an objective and clear definition of your term is at fault.

Please try again Bob. And if after trying again you cannot refine your definition any further, then I have the rational justification to say its incomplete and move on.

The metaphysical point is this: motion is. Also, identity evades.

The epistemological point is this: we will never be finished coming to know, even one thing. — Fire Ologist

I actually prove we can know at least one thing, and then build up a full knowledge theory from there. You might like it as its approach is from the reader's experience like you've done here. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14044/knowledge-and-induction-within-your-self-context/p1

There's a great summary from the first response if you want to read that first.

The reason I don’t start with it, is because I don’t feel the need, when initially explaining the theory, to explain what ‘value’ is itself: I just use it. Every theory starts with something presupposed; and I find it satisfactory to start with ‘goodness is identical to “having value”’: this is generally, immediately understood by common folk. — Bob Ross

Bob, most philosophers are going to ask, "If good is what we're trying to define, and value it what is good, then what is value?" If you say you can't define it, then it means you can't define good either. Feel free to push that good is equal to value, but if you can't define value, then you have a subjective theory that depends on some amorphous poorly defined word.

I think we are referring to two different things by ‘value’ here. When I say ‘value’ is unanalyzable, I mean it is the sense of ‘what does it mean to be valued or have value?’ (i.e., what is value itself?); whereas you talking about ‘what has value, and how much?’. — Bob Ross

There are several definitions of value already in the philosophical space. If you're not going to use any of them, you'll have to explain why to your reader right? It just comes across as not having a fully fleshed out theory yet. Which its fine if its not, but its a key foundation of your theory and needs some type of explanation.

Comparing this to my own theory, I explain what morality is, and how to evaluate it. Meaning I have definitions of moral value and why there's moral value.

For example:
Value: A designation of importance. If quantified, this importance can be compared.
Moral value: A designation of moral importance. This can be quantified into existing and potential identities over time.

And when people ask, "Why are existing and potential identities valuable?" I can go back to demonstrating what rationally must be if objective good exists. Here of course is my assumption, "That objective good exists." But its clearly defined why its an assumption and why we've reached a limitation.

Since I have noted and backed definitions, and yours doesn't, why would anyone rationally choose the incomplete theory? You have too many competing definitions of value that already exist. If you state its unanalyzable, when several theories already have, its going to need to counter all those other theories that have analyzed it.

I think we can investigate intrinsic value, by means of the scientific method, as it would pertain to the study of discerning value which is derived from a person’s (conative or cognitive) dispositions vs. what mind-independently pressures, by its own nature, a person into valuing it. I think that answers your question pretty well. — Bob Ross

This means you don't currently have an answer for how we can objectively know intrinsic value. I'm not saying you're wrong, its just incomplete. If you want to use the scientific method, you'll need to generate an example of how we could go about determining the intrinsic value out of something using that method. There should be clear steps. As it is now, this is just an admittance that you don't know. Which is fine, it just needs improvement.

No. Take the same pain example, but imagine you genuinely believe, while in that state, that pain has no value — Bob Ross

Bob, one reason why you're having a hard time getting the answer you want is because you have no real definition of value. As such, mine and your definitions are personal, and thus probably don't line up. Do this with 100 people and you're going to get several different answers. Without a clear definition of value, this theory just won't work in a group setting.

I did review your second reply, but again, you're running into the same problem. Value is not objectively defined, therefore it is personally defined by whoever is using it. There's really no point in discussing value when its so subjective. Until that's fixed, this theory is dead.

Alright Bob, I've perused this whole thing. This is still one mess of a theory. If I had any suggestions it would be to go step by step in the proper order. For example you start with "goodness" before you define 'good'. Reverse that. Because if you do, you get this:

Good = value

What is value? Something primitive that cannot be analyzed.

Goodness = valuableness

What is valuableness? That which has value. So things can have goodness by having value. This order makes it much more clear what you're trying to say.

Second, you need to find and fix your contradictions.

But subjects are those that evaluate and determine value

Epistemically, of course we determine value: just like we determine truth, what exists, etc. The question is whether or not what we deem is valuable, actually is. And it only actually can be, if it is intrinsic. — Bob Ross

So value IS something that can be analyzed. It can be determined according to you in two ways:

1. By subjective human evaluation.
2. By something beyond human subjective evaluation.

And because there is a note that we can deem something valuable that actually isn't valuable, then real value is something beyond human subjective evaluation. To prove that such a thing exists, we must have an objective evaluation that proves what is valuable despite differences in subjective conclusions. Oh, and we'll make a phrase to shorten this. "Intrinsic value". So intrinsic value is objective value.

So the big question then is, "How do we objectively evaluate intrinsic value?" Your initial answer was by what the majority of us were compelled to do. But you made a clarification, which is fine, that

I am, and never was, claiming that what is intrinsically valuable—i.e., what is morally good—is contingent on our vote; I was saying that any institution we could create would preserve and gain knowledge of what is intrinsically valuable by way of convergence of experiences of states, as agreed upon by experts in the field. — Bob Ross

Ok, I can get behind this! But that leaves a massive question. How do our experts determine intrinsic value?

For example, the morality of the bible was once determined by a gathering of priests. They would hand out to the public how to interpret the bible, and what things were good and not good. The catholic church at one point sold indulgences, which let you pay money to be absolved of your sins. Now a person who studied the bible would wonder how they arrived at that conclusion when its clear that Jesus died to pay everyone's sin off. We could just go with the experts, but if we're going to be objective, we need to know how the experts arrived at their conclusion.

Philosophim, this is no different than science. Our institutions safeguard and declare scientific knowledge by way of expert consensus. As humans, we have no other way of doing it (institutionally). Does that mean what exists is subjective? Of course not! What nonsense! — Bob Ross

Yes, but we know science is objective because of the scientific method. What method are we using to find intrinsic value?

No, its pretty clear at this point that its value rests on minds and is absolutely subjective. I'm not seeing the case at all that it exists independently of people's judgements

Think of yourself in severe pain. Forget everything else.. Imagine you believe that the avoidance of pain is completely valueless: you will still behave like it has some value (in a negative sense). Why? Philosophim, if pain has no intrinsic value, then your belief or desire that it has no value should be enough to conclude it isn’t valuable; but it clearly isn’t enough, because pain, by its nature, compels you to value it. — Bob Ross

You are confusing the fact that I evaluate what to do about a state as if the state has value apart from my evaluation. Your insistence that I find value in it, is insistence that I evaluate it. That in no rational way, implies it has some innate value. If of course you're going to say that negative value exists, then everything that can be evaluated has value. This makes sense, because value is relative. But that's just noting conscious beings can evaluate any situation they're in. Of course. This isn't anything noteworthy. The question is how to objectively evaluate something and find its 'intrinsic value'. How much is it? How does it compare to other things of intrinsic value?

I think this is enough for now. Instead of going line by line I've tried to get the overall concept and issues I see.

I still think you are misunderstanding what the property of valuableness, in principle, is. It doesn’t reference how much value a thing has—only that it has value. That is the property we discussing: it is the very idea of ‘value’. — Bob Ross

Right, but value without any modifier means nothing. There's monetary value, moral value, emotional value, etc. Just saying 'value' has no reference as to what you mean.

For example:
value - the regard that something is held to deserve; the importance, worth, or usefulness of something.
"your support is of great value"

value -a person's principles or standards of behavior; one's judgment of what is important in life.
"they internalize their parents' rules and values"

My theory doesn’t have any notion or idea of ‘moral value’, because it is does not exist. — Bob Ross

Then you have no objective way of evaluating morality. If there is no moral value in anything, all is permitted.

Now, what I have not noted, is why it does not exist. If you reflect back on my definitions, you will notice that valuableness is more fundamental than goodness. — Bob Ross

According to you, there is no moral value. Meaning that goodness has no value. This, by consequence, means that value is not good either. They are two separate things here.

Where a ‘moral’ marker comes in, is when one denotes a specific type of value, that being intrinsic value, and this is called ‘good’ in a moral sense. — Bob Ross

So then there IS moral value. Intrinsic value is moral value, and moral value is good. Then we refer back to your definitions:

Goodness = ‘to have value’. So now that means that all value, is a value of goodness. Meaning that the value of a gem at $25 is more goodness than a gem valued at $30.

Moral goodness = ‘to have intrinsic value’. — Bob Ross

Here we have moral goodness, or moral 'to have value' (moral value) = intrinsic value. Except that anything which has value is goodness. So all value is goodness, but only moral value, which is moral goodness is intrinsic value. But since value is goodness, then intrinsic value is really intrinsic goodness. So somehow moral evaluation only applies to certain goodness, the intrinsic kind. Except that morality is an evaluation of what is good and not good. So how do we just dismiss some goodness, while other goodness is within morality? Your words don't fit Bob. You cannot have a segment of good that isn't within moral discussion. That's a violation of the term 'morality'.

In conclusion:
valuableness is more fundamental than goodness
Value = Goodness (What is goodness? Is value less fundamental than valuableness?)
Moral goodness = that which has intrinsic goodness.
Moral value = that which has intrinsic value.
Value = that which has extrinsic value

So extrinsic value is extrinsic goodness. Intrinsic value is intrinsic goodness. Yet moral value can only refer to intrinsic goodness, whereas references to extrinsic goodness do not involve moral valuation.
I THINK I get it. Please correct me where needed.

I think the real issue you are having, is that you don’t think intrinsic value, in the sense I am using it, exists; nor how it possibly could; nor how one could go about deciphering what has it, and to what degree. — Bob Ross

Correct.

So, let me try again. Intrinsic value is ‘value which is demanded by virtue of a thing’s nature’. — Bob Ross

This statement has unnecessary redundancy Bob. Lets simplify this to clearer language. Intrinsic value is what a thing demands. A things nature = a thing.

I blundered here before, by saying, at this point in my analysis, that only states which are associated with (sufficiently) living beings: I was confusing epistemology with ontology. — Bob Ross

No worry, you're with a friend. :) I'm not going for cheap gotchas. Feel free to correct, amend, or change anything at anytime, the issue is complicated.

A state which can demand (i.e., innately insistence on having) value is one which IF it were experienced by a subject, then it would compel that subject to value it to a degree equal to its insistence; but such a state could exist, of which no current subject has the capacity to experience it. — Bob Ross

How can a non-living state insist on having something? isn't that personification? I understand that you're talking about a state that could be experienced by a subject that subject has not yet experienced. But subjects are those that evaluate and determine value. Just because we evaluate something as positive, that does not mean the thing we are evaluating insisted on it. Our emotional initial judgement insisted on it. Same thing as if we judge something as not having value. Personifying states is just odd Bob, and I don't see the logic behind it. States simply are. At best you let living things decide their value.

So, how do we determine that a state has intrinsic value? By experience. — Bob Ross

We experience a state, such as pain, and it is clear (to any reasonably rational person with the proper capacities to produce pain [neurologically]) that it compels value in its avoidance. — Bob Ross

The state is not compelling anything. We are reacting to a state and have to make a decision. I don't understand the rationale behind the personification of states still.

Think about, Philosophim, from your own perspective: forget your parents, forget everyone else. Imagine you are in severe pain: you are seriously telling me you cannot fathom how the state of pain compels you to value its avoidance, all else being equal? — Bob Ross

First, the state of pain is a state of a living body. A living judgement allows the being to decide what to do about it. Normally, a moral decision would be, "How should I avoid the pain?" My father has constant back pain and was on opioids for pain relief for a time. He realized he was getting addicted to the pills, so stopped taking them despite having the back pain. Did my father make a moral decision? He accepted the pain despite his desire to avoid it. So in your view, it seems my Dad violated the intrinsic value of pain and committed an immoral act. And no, the 'insistence' to get off the pain pills was not stronger. He made a rational decision based on his experience with addiction to alcohol. So he worked through that stronger desire to pick the thing that 'insisted' he not pick, pain. Again, this is an odd way to speak as if states have demands. Its really just an emotional battle within an experience.

Second, "Imagine you are in severe anger: you are seriously telling me you cannot fathom how the state of anger compels you to value its acceptance, and stab that guy with a knife because he insulted you, all else being equal?" What you're doing here Bob is saying that whenever we are compelled to make a decision one way, that it is the state of the experience expressing its intrinsic value, or good. So whatever we are most compelled to do is good. Meaning if I'm strongly compelled to gas some people because I'm a Nazi and love my country, that's intrinsically good. There are some serious problems here.

Now, like all other empirical studies, our knowledge of intrinsic value as an institutionalized study would be a convergence of perspectives on empirical studies of states, such that we could sufficiently conclude that certain states do compel to be valued, and to a degree equal to its force of compelment. — Bob Ross

Yeah, that's kind of crazy Bob. You're saying that moral evaluation is to be done by majority vote of what people really want to do? We are compelled to make decisions when we are experiencing certain states of reality. Meaning that if the majority of people believe in Islam, Islam is intrinsically good while atheism is intrinsically bad. Meaning that killing the infidels is intrinsically good. Moral value is done by majority action, without question as to whether the majority is making the correct choices by rational analysis.

I don’t hold that valuableness, and subsequently goodness, is a natural property: you can’t scientifically investigate the property, because it is supervenient on the physical constitution of entities (viz., it is supervenient on the natural properties). — Bob Ross

But you basically say they're discovered by what people are most compelled to do. Isn't that in the realm of science? I can say, "70% of Americans are Christians, therefore being a Christian is intrinsic goodness while not being a Christian is intrinsic badness." Therefore science has discovered being a Christian is morally valuable while not being a Christian is not.

if it compels, simply from its own nature, to be valued (e.g., if I really like pizza being thrown across the room, that doesn’t make pizza being thrown across the room inrinsically valuable: whereas, whether I like it or not, being in pain, by its nature, compels me to avoid it — Bob Ross

But if 51% of people are really compelled to throw a pizza across the room, it is intrinsically valuable. Finally I can justify my secret urge! :D

Intrinsic value is factual, because it is value which is objective; and it is objective because its value is exists mind-independently and the truth of the matter whether it exists is stance-independent. — Bob Ross

No, its pretty clear at this point that its value rests on minds and is absolutely subjective. I'm not seeing the case at all that it exists independently of people's judgements. The matter whether moral value exists is very stance dependent. If I take 100 atheists and ask them if they are compelled not to believe in God, then not believing in God is intrinsically good. If we ask the majority of the world to prevent climate change and the majority say "No", then it is intrinsically good not to fight climate change.

Does that help? — Bob Ross

Its helped me to come to the above conclusions. Please correct me where I am wrong.

Goodness is ‘to have value’: so how can you say I haven’t answered what goodness is? You can disagree with what I claimed it was, but you certainly can’t say I didn’t answer. Likewise with valuableness: I said it is an unanalyzable property, like beingness, which is akin to beingness. That’s an answer. — Bob Ross

Because you basically said goodness is an unanalyzable property, then insisted that it could be objectively known, and as we discovered above, be analyzed. Further, you've said that some good is under moral consideration, while other good is not, which is again, a violation of the definition of morality.
I understand a bit better what you intended now, but it was was definitely confusing on a first pass.

Moral goodness? What would immoral goodness be then?

Ah, I am not intending to use ‘moral’, as the adjective here, in the sense of ‘being good’—as that is circular—but, instead, to denote a sub-type of goodness which pertains to morality. — Bob Ross

Per your defintions, moral goodness would be moral value. Goodness would be a value, just not a moral one unless its intrinsic. And again, morality is the study of what is good. What rational reason do you have to say, "Except that good over there." Generally that which is not considered in morality is neither good nor evil. So why do you construct a contradiction between your terms? If there is 'good' that cannot be discussed morally, its not really 'good', and needs another term to not be a contradiction.

Even if I didn’t, it would not follow (from what I said) that alive beings are intrinsically valuable (which is what you said here). Rather, the state, which only an alive being could experience, would be intrinsically valuable. — Bob Ross

Right, living things aren't intrinsically valuable, its living things that decide whether something has value or not when they come across an experience. And if the majority of living beings think a particular state of living/experience/state is more valuable, then it is intrinsically valuable.

No, Kant isn't confused here.

I think Kant is, but I don’t think this is very important to what I am saying. By noting that a thing has value in-itself, I am noting that it has value intrinsic to its nature. — Bob Ross

As long as you aren't saying that intrinsic value is a thing in-itself. Because that is incoherent. It has value in its representation that most people experience.

Alright, if I understand your moral theory here, this is morality through majority judgement. There are a ton of problems here. First, many of your identities for situations don't fit. Intrinsic and extrinsic value can more easily be replaced with Majority value and Minority value. This makes things much more clear. What is value? What states people decide to be in. What is moral? Majority value. Is minority value immoral? No, but it certainly not 'good' then, meaning that the majority can refer to that minority value as not being moral.

What is good? Things that people value. But somehow its only a moral consideration of goodness when the majority is involved. So, its at best a confusing descriptive sense of morality, not normative. And this descriptive morality is 100% subjective. Even if a state has not been experienced yet, its value will only be found by majority judgement. Not to mention that there's nothing which rationally compels anyone for lemming morality.

There are so many problems with this, as there are in every subjective morality. What do we do when there's a conflict of cultures? What happens when the majority changes over time? If what the majority decides is moral, then what justification is there for a minority to choose otherwise or try to change the majority? Am I evil for trying to educate an ignorant populace? If the majority of people used drugs and were addicted, that's moral? I'm not asking you to answer these, because I've had these debates before and already know potential solutions and problems. Overall, I find these theories lacking.

In addition, what you're trying to say here has been said much clearer elsewhere in philosophy. Your construction of this is confusing Bob. Its riddled with at best, odd, and at worst, contradiction or incoherent word choices for concepts. Things need to be simple and as clear as possible. In the end, this is a subjective moral majority philosophy. That's it. And that has no chance in challenging my theory in any rational sense. Your claim that it is objective does not fit. You cannot have a theory that is determined by majority subjectivism and call that rationally objective. I have no reason to buy into what the majority values as moral. That's just an insistence by the majority, and that is not considered a rational request by anyone.

Finally, the death knell of any theory is if its own theory can contradict itself. Bob, what happens if the majority of people don't choose your state of morality? As in we don't find any value in it? Doesn't that mean your moral theory, isn't really a moral theory by the arguments giving within? Since most don't value this theory, It would mean the state of your theory has no intrinsic value. So again, by your own theory, this theory has no intrinsic value or moral worth. Since it has no moral worth, we can just ignore it.

Alright, that's enough from me for now! I do appreciate the time that went into constructing this theory and attempting to clear it up, but as i currently understand it, its just not making any new claims or contributions that haven't already been long considered and disregarded by most people.

To evaluate whether something has the property of valuableness, is just to assess its worth — Bob Ross

I have no issue with this.

which is to say nothing beyond saying it has value. — Bob Ross

So then value is simply a synonym of worth. I have no issue with this. Now you have to identify worth though. None of my questions have changed, just replace my points about 'value' to 'worth' now.

How much value is not something determinable from the (general) property of valuableness itself: if that were the case, then we would have to posit an infinite amount of properties to account for each value—which is clearly misguided. — Bob Ross

This makes no sense. I have a gem worth 25$ and a gem worth 30$. We can both clearly see how much value each gem has. Is it the case that we have to put value into a phrase like 'monetary value'? If you're just saying 'value' alone has no sense of 'valuableness', sure, that's a given. We're talking about value in terms of moral value. How do we objectively determine moral value?

So, how one can determined the exact value of something, which is an ‘evaluation’ in the sense that you implied, has no bearing on whether or not the property of ‘having value’ is primitive or not because the property will necessarily, even if it could be defined, not contain a means of evaluation but rather is the mere idea of ‘worth’ in general. — Bob Ross

Its moral value or moral worth. How do you determine it? If you just say, "It intrinsically has it", then this is saying nothing Bob.

I'm skipping the "Good" analysis for now for my theory as I agree we should focus on what you mean by value first.

Goodness = ‘to have value’. — Bob Ross

This still doesn't answer what value or goodness is. This doesn't answer what good is, or how we can objectively evaluate it.

Moral goodness = ‘to have intrinsic value’. — Bob Ross

Moral goodness? What would immoral goodness be then? Again, I have no idea what value is, or how we know its intrinsic.

This is ‘to have worth’, and this is just to reiterate ‘to have value’ with a synonym. The property itself is primitive, and unanalyzable. — Bob Ross

It is when you put it into a phrase 'moral value'. If you say you can't define it Bob, then its a unicorn word and isn't real.

Likewise, why you should care about intrinsic value, is that it is morally good; and if you are a virtuous person of morally good character, then you will. — Bob Ross

Why is it morally good? Value? What is value? Morally good? Bob, you must see that you're saying a lot of nothing right now right? I feel like you're twisting yourself in avoiding the straight forward question of, "What constitutes moral value? How do we objectively determine it?"

There is nothing that forces, per se, anyone to value anything—but this does not takeaway from the fact that there are moral facts. — Bob Ross

Ok, there's no one that forces somebody to value, then how is value determined? If there are moral facts, how do we determine they are moral facts and not people just saying, "Its moral because it is."

Whether or not someone should care about what has intrinsic value, does not in takeaway from the fact that it has intrinsic value. — Bob Ross

How do I know this is a fact? If someone told me the Earth circled around the Sun, they would need to give me reasons why that is when I can look up into the sky and clearly see that it circles around us.

All you are noting, by asking why anyone should care, is that people can devalue (or not value at all) facts. — Bob Ross

That's to lead up to the question, "How do we objectively know what a thing's value is as a fact?"

I wasn’t using ‘state’ this generically, but that is fine. It is fine to think of states as ‘states of being’, for all intents and purposes, and, to that, I would then clarify that the state of being that a rock has does not have intrinsic value because that state is incapable of any innate insistence/demand (of value). — Bob Ross

Ok, so then a state that can have intrinsic value must be something that is alive.

Under your theory, its fine to destroy matter as we wish as long as it does not affect life.

Correct. This is because the states which have intrinsic value, are only possible for beings which are sufficiently alive.

If only states of life can have value, why?

No. States which are not attributable to beings that are alive can have value—it just isn’t intrinsic. — Bob Ross

There's a bit of a contradiction here. Are you trying to say, "Those with intrinsic value cannot be outright destroyed, but those with value can?" If so, once again, how do we determine value objectively?

Intrinsic value, is value which is demanded in virtue of the nature of the state: that is a very clear definition — Bob Ross

To be clearer, it is demanded in virtue of the nature of a living state. Implicit value is only in living things according to you, so could we address that explicitly so there's no confusion? How does a living thing demand implicit value? Does it ask? Does it yell? How does this word have any meaning an actual example?

The chief mistake Kant made, is thinking that because a thing-in-itself is not directly experienced that it cannot be known at all—which is clearly false. — Bob Ross

Ok, as long as you understand what Kant was stating. If you disagree with him, that's fine.

In a sentence, he is confusing absolute knowledge with things-in-themselves: no one has to concede that they have absolute knowledge of a thing-in-itself to say they have conditional knowledge of it, by way of theirs senses. — Bob Ross

No, Kant isn't confused here. Unless you're referring to something I'm not aware of in Kant elsewhere, here he introduced the concept of 'thing in-itself' to avoid an accusation of being an idealist. If all that exists is phenomenal existence, then there is nothing concrete underneath that we are representing on. The simple point he was making was that we are representers, and there is something that we are representing. As we can only express that something as a representation, it will never capture the essence of what it is in-iteself that we are representing on.

that doesn’t takeaway from the fact that we have good conditional knowledge to claim that the apple itself, which is to immediately discuss as it is in-itself, has mass. — Bob Ross

The 'itself' of the apple is not referring to the 'thing in itself' that we're looking at to represent the apple. It means the representation of the apple itself. Same with mass in itself. Or any 'representation' itself. Referring to the representation itself is not a reference to the thing in-itself that is underlying the representation.

For example, let’s take your reasoning seriously that a thing-in-itself is unknowable because we only every directly experience a representation of it. Ok. Take an apple, for example: does it have mass in-itself? It seems like it does: every bit of evidence points to that conclusion—but, Kant will insist that we can’t absolutely know it is true, because we only have representations to go off of. — Bob Ross

Kant will say it can be reasonably concluded within our representation. But despite this, we still don't know what thing in-itself that we're placing the representation of apple and mass on is. And he's right. We'll never know the truth. But you and I have had enough knowledge discussion in the past to know that what is true is outside of the grasp of humanity. All we have is knowledge.

To Kant's point, he would be ok with saying, "We know that our representation of mass fits within the rational representation of the apple, but we cannot know the truth of the thing in-itself that our representations rest on." Back to my theory of knowledge, "We can construct discrete experiences and apply them. As long as 'reality' (the thing in-itself) does not contradict this identity and its application, we can know it. But knowing it does not make it true, only just that our applied identity is not in contradiction with reality.

So, I have no problem analyzing the nature, the essences, of things—which you cannot do if you take your position seriously because the essence doesn’t pertain to mere appearances but, rather, what a thing’s actual properties are as it is in-itself—while conceding I have only conditional knowledge of it. — Bob Ross

If you want to create a definition of value and demonstrate it objectively exists, that's fine. If you want to refer to living things, as definitions, and refer to that definition by saying, "That living thing itself," that's fine. If you want to create a definition of value, then say its a 'thing in itself' that cannot be represented, then its a unicorn that cannot be sensed and outside of any rational consideration. I have an actual objective definition and application of moral value, and will rationally be able to dismiss yours outright. If you want to propose a serious position of ethics that can counter this, you must clearly define what moral value is, and how we can evaluate it. If you cannot, then by every rational measure your theory falls apart.

I am not referring to absolute knowledge of the nature of a thing, but, rather, conditional knowledge of the nature of a thing. I doubt you deny we can evaluate the natures of things. — Bob Ross

If you claim this, please show this. Define moral value. Demonstrate how we can evaluate it. I've given clear ways to do so on my end. If you put forward a definition of moral value that cannot be evaluated, while I have, then your theory fails.

Even if I were claiming that healthy and rational people always recognize intrinsic value 100% of the time (which I am not) — Bob Ross

Then how do we objectively evaluate intrinsic value? The point that people can decide to choose states that have high or low value is irrelevant if you're not going to give an objective way they can measure and decide.

99.99% of the time a rational + healthy person would behave as if it had value when put in that state—and that is what I mean by “they can only superficially deny its value”. — Bob Ross

This is not a real number. All we can really state is that you believe people usually choose better states than not. I have no problem agreeing with that. But we're discussing an objective morality. What objectively is a better state? How can a person evaluate objectively which state is better?

and that is what I mean by “they can only superficially deny its value”. — Bob Ross

Its superficial merely because they're in the minority? That's not what superficial means. It would be a superficial decision if they only glanced at it and didn't think deeper about it. If you're going to say they need to think deeper about it, how should they objectively do so?

Whether they recognize the value, cognitively their faculty of reason, is a separate question; and the answer is the vast majority probably wouldn’t conclude it has intrinsic value; because they don’t know what that means. — Bob Ross

Yes! I still don't know what intrinsic value means! :D I don't know how they could cognitively evaluate a situation and determine which situation has more intrinsic value than the other. This is a very real problem with your theory so far Bob. I've harped on it enough for now, but you'll need to give an objective definition of moral value, how we can evaluate moral value, and what intrinsic value is and how we can evaluate it objectively as well.