True, but meaningless. — Vera Mont

True, but not meaningless. Why should it be?

Its not for personal benefit like going to the movies or something. Trust me, I can find far more ways to enjoy the money and I wouldn't feel a twinge of guilt. Not everything is about personal benefit. — Philosophim

But then why did you contradict yourself by your previous assertions:

"I will never meet anyone who benefitted from it or gain anything more than a slight emotional satisfaction from it."

"It is better for me to donate, so I do."

Please decide whether you have benefited or not. You cannot have both at the same time.

No, that's not how morality works. When it works.
Who determines the "ought to"? Who obeys it, under what conditions? Who disobeys it, under what conditions? Human motivation is never, not even in the first five years of life, as simple as calculating benefit. — Vera Mont

If I interpret Tucholsky correctly, he does not want to show how morality works, but rather that it does not work at all, at least not for adult people. What we "ought to" is demanded by moralists, philosophers, theologians, teachers and parents. Who obeys it? I think children are the most likely to do it.

Human motivation is based on reward from the reward center in the brain rather than on calculation. In my opinion, the benefit is mainly a good feeling. This good feeling can be triggered from person to person by different things: for one person by money, for another by power, attention, love, gratitude, sociability, favorite pastime ... etc.

This statement can refer to anything, not to a moral issue in particular. — Alkis Piskas

You're right about that, but if it can refer to anything, it can also refer to morality.

As for the context, there is none, since it is an aphorism that stands alone. You can verify it here. It is the penultimate aphorism on that page.

It is better for me to donate, so I do. — Philosophim

Hi, Philosophim,

that's exactly what I meant: you donate because it's better for you.

I don't think that it's really accurate to say that Newton showed that Aristotle was wrong or that Einstein showed that Newton was wrong — Ludwig V

And I don't think it's accurate to say that Hume intended to show that Newton was wrong. I think that his intention was completely different.

I think things are simpler than they appear in this discussion. For my part, I believe that one can very well make predictions based on scientific calculations. The only thing we cannot say is why these principles must be valid tomorrow. We can only say that, as far as we know, they have held true without exception up to now, and that we hope they will hold true tomorrow.

I agree with Hume's criticism of induction, as indicated. I just don't agree with how he proceeds from there. That the problem exists is really quite evident, but I think that Hume moves in the wrong direction, toward portraying it as unresolvable rather than toward finding principles to resolve it. — Metaphysician Undercover

Hi, Undercover, I'm starting to get it. :smile: You agree with Hume about identifying the problem, but you believe there is a solution, now do I have it? I need to reread your previous posts to see if I get your solution and if I agree with it.

That things behaved in such and such a way in the past, is not sufficient to produce the necessity to imply that they will necessarily behave this way in the future. What is needed is another premise which states that the future will be similar to the past. But this again appears to be just a more general form of the same inductive principle, How things have been in the past, will continue to be how they are in the future. So we do not escape the trap of relying on induction, and this does not give us the desired necessity, or certainty. — Metaphysician Undercover

But that is word for word exactly what Hume says. I thought you were against Hume's thesis. :chin:

To better understand my point of view, I would like to give an example:

The electric attraction between an electron and a proton can be described by Coulomb's law, which is given by:

F = (k * q1 * q2) / r^2

This formula has worked brilliantly since its invention until today, but is there a formula that guarantees that Coulomb's law will still be valid tomorrow?

Hi @Count Timothy von Icarus, thank you for your very interesting post.

If anyone said that information about the past could not convince him that something would happen in the future, I should not understand him. One might ask him: what do you expect to be told, then? What sort of information do you call a ground for such a belief? … If these are not grounds, then what are grounds?—If you say these are not grounds, then you must surely be able to state what must be the case for us to have the right to say that there are grounds for our assumption….

-Wittgenstein

I am not the man to say that information about the past could not convince me that something similar will happen in the future. I would be confident that it will happen again in the same way, I just couldn't say what my confidence is based on. That is Hume's point.

Do you know of any law that guarantees the future will necessarily correspond to the past? I for one currently believe there is none. You named a few in your post and I will try to understand and address them soon.

@Metaphysician Undercover, @Ludwig V, @Count Timothy von Icarus

Please tell me what your rationale is for believing that the future will resemble the past.

I don't think you have this quite right. The point Hume makes is that the assumption that the future will be similar to the past cannot be justified by experience, — Metaphysician Undercover

You are right, the assumption about the future cannot be justified by experience either, it cannot be justified by anything.

@Count Timothy von Icarus @Metaphysician Undercover

I believe that Hume meant to say that in mathematics we can gain new knowledge by mere thinking, but in the natural sciences we cannot. For example, if we want to know how two balls will behave when they collide, without having observed a single collision of any objects before, we cannot find out by calculation or thinking.

So we have to do the experiment, we let the balls collide against each other more often from different directions and speeds and note the respective behavior.

Before the next collision, we can now calculate, based on our experience, what will happen, but only based on the assumption that the balls will behave as they did in the previous collisions. The assumption that the future will be similar to the past, however, cannot be justified by any calculation but only by experience.

@Metaphysician Undercover

Ok, let's suppose Hume is wrong. Then try to solve the following problem: A billiard ball rolls toward a second billiard ball. Try to figure out (before they meet) what will happen when the two balls meet and state what method you used to do it.

By what reasoning do you find out whether the balls will attract each other, whether they will bounce off each other and in what direction, whether they will penetrate each other, or disintegrate, or explode, or ... or ...?

@Metaphysician Undercover

Why do you have to keep clinging to single words like "reasoning"? Hume also uses other expressions for what he means, such as "scrutiny" and "examination". What is important is the meaning of these words, all three stand for thinking, reasoning, combining or whatever contributes to finding a solution to a question. Ultimately, he means an effort of the mind. And his thesis is that one cannot derive an effect from a cause by thinking alone. This is only possible by observation.

Please consider the following example of two billiard-balls used by Hume

to illustrate his thesis that cause and effect are entirely distinct events, where the idea of the latter is in no way contained in the idea of the former (EHU 4.9; SBN 29):

The mind can never possibly find the effect in the supposed cause, by the most accurate scrutiny and examination. For the effect is totally different from the cause, and consequently can never be discovered in it. Motion in the second billiard-ball is a quite distinct event from motion in the first; nor is there anything in the one to suggest the smallest hint of the other.

A few lines later Hume describes this example as follows (EHU 4.10; SBN 29):

When I see, for instance, a billiard-ball moving in a straight line towards another; even suppose motion in the second ball should by accident be suggested to me, as the result of their contact or impulse; may I not conceive, that a hundred different events might as well follow from the cause? … All these suppositions are consistent and conceivable. — Graciela De Pierris, Michael Friedman

What Hume

What Hume meant to say is this: when you observe an unknown process for the first time in your life, say the encounter between two unknown creatures from the deep sea, you cannot predict by any reasoning what will happen. The only way to find out is to observe what happens.

What you’re describing is a philosophical attitude, not a scientific hypothesis, known as brain-mind identify theory. There are many cogent arguments against brain-mind identity but I’m not going to bother thrashing that particular dead horse any longer. — Wayfarer

Indeed, I did not intend to describe brain-mind identity theory. I do not hold that brain and mind are identical, rather that mind is a function of the brain, just as digestion is not identical with stomach, but is its function.

@Metaphysician Undercover

Finally I understand that you are not criticizing my interpretation of Hume, but Hume himself. I am so relieved because I am sure he does not need my help. :smile:

I mean you provided the clinching quote from Hume himself, and you still don't understand the predicament which Hume put himself into.

The mind can never possibly find the effect in the supposed cause, by the most accurate scrutiny and examination
— David Hume An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding

If that is not an inductive conclusion which asserts the exact form of certainty, (with "never possibly find..."), which Hume insists that inductive conclusions cannot provide, then how do you explain it? — Metaphysician Undercover

I do not find that it is an inductive inference, because it is not an inference from particular cases to the general case. It is more likely to be a case of analytical reasoning.

I have noticed that both right-wing and left-wing radicals get along very well when it comes to restricting citizens' freedoms and to support dictators.
— Jacques

Really? Like whom? — Isaac

Like indirectly supporting Putin. For example, right-wing and left-wing extremists are united in calling for an end to supporting the Ukrainians' struggle for freedom with weapons.

Yes, it has become very evident that your understanding of Hume is quite sorrowful. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is a pity that we cannot invite Hume for a talk, but fortunately he has given us his thoughts in writing. I quote from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy and leave it to everyone to draw his own conclusions:

Hume concludes that this inference [from cause to effect] has no foundation in the understanding—that is, no foundation in what he calls “reasoning”. How does Hume arrive at this position?

All our inductive inferences—our “conclusions from experience”—are founded on the supposition that the course of nature is sufficiently uniform so that the future will be conformable to the past (EHU 4.21; SBN 37–38):

"For all inferences from experience suppose, as their foundation, that the future will resemble the past …. If there be any suspicion, that the course of nature may change, and that the past may be no rule for the future, all experience becomes useless, and can give rise to no inference or conclusion."

Therefore, what Hume is now seeking, in turn, is the foundation in our reasoning for the supposition that nature is sufficiently uniform.

Section 4, part 1 of the Enquiry distinguishes (as we have seen) between reasoning concerning relations of ideas and reasoning concerning matters of fact and existence. Demonstrative reasoning (concerning relations of ideas) cannot establish the supposition in question,

"since it implies no contradiction, that the course of nature may change, and that an object, seemingly like those which we have experienced, may be attended with different or contrary effects." (EHU 4.18; SBN 35)

Moreover, reasoning concerning matters of fact and existence cannot establish it either, since such reasoning is always founded on the relation of cause and effect, the very relation we are now attempting to found in reasoning (EHU 4.19; SBN 35–36):

"We have said, that all arguments concerning existence are founded on the relation of cause and effect; that our knowledge of that relation is derived entirely from experience; and that all our experimental conclusions proceed upon the supposition, that the future will be conformable to the past. To endeavour, therefore, the proof of this last proposition by probable arguments, or arguments regarding existence, must be evidently going in a circle, and taking that for granted, which is the very point in question. — Graciela De Pierris, Michael Friedman

However, as is well known, correlation is not causation. It is obviously the case that a functioning brain is a requirement for consciousness, but the sense in which the brain ‘produces’ or ‘creates’ consciousness is what is at issue and remains an open question. — Wayfarer

There is consensus among brain researchers that the relationship between neuron activity and mental experiences is one that goes beyond casual correlation and has all the hallmarks of a causal relationship.

I don't see how the one follows from the other. It's perfectly possible for laws opposing civil liberties to receive sufficient support to be implemented in democracies.

There's nothing intrinsic about the method by which a government is chosen which prevents that government from restricting civil liberties. — Isaac

You are right. What I said is because I have noticed that both right-wing and left-wing radicals get along very well when it comes to restricting citizens' freedoms and to support dictators. So at some point, I stopped taking sides with the left or the right. Since then, the dividing line for me runs between those who support and those who fight freedom. In the meantime, left and right have lost their importance, I have nothing against conservatives or progressives as long as they are moderate and as long as they prioritize the preservation of civil liberties above all else.

I hope no one minds that I'm getting in late. I apologize if I repeat something already said.

I don't care about communism and capitalism as much as I care about democracy and autocracy. In other words, if someone acts against civil liberties, I don't care if he is left or right. One can observe that an alliance of right-wing and left-wing radicals is formed when it comes to supporting Putin. In this respect, I am in favor of all moderates who support freedom and solidarity and an enemy of all radicals who strive for the oppression and enslavement of the weaker, be they individuals or states.

@Metaphysician Undercover

I am sorry to say that I cannot see any connection between Hume's thesis on causality and your post. :sad:

But it also applies to your contention of a causal connection between brain and mind, no less than any other causal relationship. — Wayfarer

Of course, the same applies for the causal link between brain activity and mental experiences as for any other causal relationship: no cause, no effect. Similarly, it is also true for this causal relation that it cannot be deduced by any logical conclusion of the world, but only by observation. A single observation of a thought without preceding brain activity is sufficient to say that mental experiences are not always caused by brain activity. However, as said, such a case has never been observed since brain scans have been available.

But you’re the one who keeps insisting on the absolute indubitability of the causal relationship between the brain and the mind. Why is this instance of an inductive causal relationship immune to Hume’s criticism which you’re so happy to apply to anything else? — Wayfarer

If I understand it correctly, Hume is not criticizing the postulation of causal relations per se, (such as friction and heat), rather he is commenting on the procedure by which these causal relations are derived: not by logical reasoning, but only by observation of multiple identical sequences of two successive events, which are then called cause and effect. What Hume claims is that from the observation of the cause alone, one cannot infer its effect; one can infer the effect only by observation and not by logical reasoning.

Hume is saying that causation is founded on reason. — Metaphysician Undercover

Amazing as I find it, I got the impression that Hume is saying that causation is NOT founded on reason. He says:

The mind can never possibly find the effect in the supposed cause, by the most accurate scrutiny and examination. (EHU 4.9) — David Hume An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding

In my understanding, "can never" is a negation and is equivalent to "can not". How you can interpret "can never" as an affirmation is a mystery to me

Sure, in humans and brainy animals. But that's not very interesting. — bert1

If it's not interesting, it's still quite controversial, especially among philosophers. :smile:

... consciousness in rocks only occurs when there is rock-activity — bert1

How can you prove your claim that consciousness occurs in rocks?

@bert1
It's less about conclusions and more about the repeated observation that brain activity always and invariably precedes mental experiences such as thoughts, decisions, or perceptions. The reverse order has not been observed a single time.

Hey guys, let's get back to the topic. Let's put aside Hume's opinion on causality and instead focus on mental experiences, or qualia. Although neuroscientists do not know how qualia arise from brain activity, they have observed that those qualia (perceptions, emotions and thoughts) are caused by brain activity and never the other way around. That means, they have observed that mental experiences always occur after the corresponding brain activities and never without such a lead-up.

You might be thinking like Jaegwon Kim, and for similar reasons (i.e. the causal closure of the physical + the causal exclusion argument + the supervenience of high-level entities and processes over the physical domain.) — Pierre-Normand

I don't know Jaegwon Kim, but if he holds that there are higher levels above the physical realm, then I certainly don't think like him.

So if we say X did such and such out of "Custom" or "Habit", we are really saying that we do not properly understand why X did that, — Metaphysician Undercover

This is exactly what Hume wants to say: that we do not properly understand why the same cause is always followed by the same effect.

Notice the inherent contradiction, or hypocrisy in Hume's words. — Metaphysician Undercover

I am sorry to say that by speaking of "hypocrisy in Hume's words" you show that you have not understood his argument at all.

To say that custom or habit is the cause of something, is just to avoid the question of what is the the real cause of that thing. — Metaphysician Undercover

Hume does not say that custom or habit is the cause of something but rather he is saying that our knowledge of the relation between cause and effect is ...

... founded on the supposition that the course of nature is sufficiently uniform so that the future will be conformable to the past. — David Hume (EHU 4.21)

But demonstrative reasoning (concerning relations of ideas) cannot establish the supposition in question,

... since it implies no contradiction, that the course of nature may change, and that an object, seemingly like those which we have experienced, may be attended with different or contrary effects. — David Hume (EHU 4.18)

@Wayfarer

thoughts and feelings are seen as caused by brain activity. — Jacques

causality is based neither on logical necessity nor on inductive and deductive reasoning, but on custom or habit — Jacques

These two statements do not contradict each other, as you may imply. The first one only says that thoughts are always preceded by a specific brain activity and that no thought has ever been observed that was not preceded by such a brain activity (provided of course that one observes the brain from which the thought originates by means of fMRI). This is consistent with Hume's statement about causality:

... our knowledge [about the relation of cause and effect] is derived entirely from experience; and that all our experimental conclusions proceed upon the supposition, that the future will be conformable to the past. — David Hume (EHU 4.19)

If you continue to find a contradiction between my two statements, you are welcome to point it out.

A careful analysis of the two principle forms of causation reveals that the necessity of "because of physical law" is reducible to a form of the necessity of "because of reason". Simply put, the laws of physics are principles of reason, and the necessity which supports them is a logical necessity, inductive and deductive reasoning. — Metaphysician Undercover

I disagree. I tend to follow Hume's view that causality is based neither on logical necessity nor on inductive and deductive reasoning, but on custom or habit (as stated in his "Enquiry on Human Understanding"):

And though [one] should be convinced, that his understanding has no part in the operation, he would nonetheless continue in the same course of thinking. There is some other principle, which determines him to form such a conclusion. This principle is CUSTOM or HABIT. For wherever the repetition of any particular act or operation produces a propensity to renew the same act or operation, without being impelled by any reasoning or process of the understanding; we always say, that this propensity is the effect of Custom. By employing that word, we pretend not to have given the ultimate reason of such a propensity. We only point out a principle of human nature, which is universally acknowledged, and which is well known by its effects. — David Hume EHU 5.4-5

It appears, then, that this idea of a necessary connexion among events arises from a number of similar instances which occur of the constant conjunction of these events; nor can that idea ever be suggested by any one of these instances, surveyed in all possible lights and positions. But there is nothing in a number of instances, different from every single instance, which is supposed to be exactly similar; except only, that after a repetition of similar instances, the mind is carried by habit, upon the appearance of one event, to expect its usual attendant, and to believe that it will exist. This connexion, therefore, which we feel in the mind, this customary transition of the imagination from one object to its usual attendant, is the sentiment or impression, from which we form the idea of power or necessary connexion. — David Hume EHU 7.28

Neuro-reductionism is the argument that the mind can be "reduced" (made equivalent) to the brain. This sees the brain as identical to its thoughts and feelings. In neuro-reductionism, as neuroscientists study the brain, they gain an understanding of the mind.

"Reduced" does not mean "made equivalent to" but rather "explained by" and it does not mean that the brain is seen as identical to its thoughts and feelings but rather that the thoughts and feelings are seen as caused by brain activity.

The tendency of reductionism is to conflate the two kinds of causation, physical and logical: which is what we do when we say that 'the brain' acts in a particular way, and so 'produces' thought, because of physical causation. The 'because' of reasons - the 'space of reasons', it has been called - can't be explained in those terms, because it belongs to a different level of explanation. — Wayfarer

I would not speak of a different level of explanation, but rather of a different kind of communication: a metaphorical one that should not be confused with reality.

There is a distinction made in Talbott's example between the because of reason and the because of physical causation. To equate the two kinds is to deny the efficacy of reason, as your argument is then already determined by the disposition of your neurons. — Wayfarer

I did not equate the two kinds of causation, because I do not attach any reality to the "causation by reasons". Causation by reasons belongs to a metaphorical way of speaking, which has nothing to do with reality. Indeed, we often give the wrong reasons for our decisions and actions because we are often mistaken about the real reasons.

To claim that our reasons are determined by the disposition of our neurons is not to deny the efficacy of reason - this would only be the case if neurons were not working efficiently.

You might be thinking like Jaegwon Kim, and for similar reasons (i.e. the causal closure of the physical + the causal exclusion argument + the supervenience of high-level entities and processes over the physical domain.) — Pierre-Normand

I don't think there are higher and lower levels of reality, instead I do believe there are only different perspectives on one and the same reality.