There seems to be an equivocation involving knowing action. I know others' actions as appearances, whereas I know my own actions " from the inside" so to speak, in the sense that I feel them.

However, I also know them as appearances to some degree depending on the action: I can see my legs moving when I walk, my hands closing on things when i pick them up and so on. The question could be resolved by reformulating the argument I think:

Anything that is an appearance is known mediately,
Action is known only non-mediately
Therefore, action cannot be an appearance.

This makes it clear that the question is whether action is known only non-mediately, and that would seem to be false, which makes the argument as reformulated valid, but unsound.

Materialists must ignore qualities and then insert it in after the fact. They also must contend with the problem of a view from nowhere. — schopenhauer1

Materialists don't have to contend with the problem of "a view from nowhere". To say that the world existed prior to humanity is to express a view, a human view, but it does not follow that it entails that there must be a view from nowhere. In other words, if the world exists absent perceivers, then there is no view, but it does not follow that there is no world, just that there is no perceived world.

Also in the idealist model, if there is a universal mind or God that holds the world in view, that view would be the view from everywhere, or in other words from nowhere in particular, not from nowhere at all, just as such a God, if it existed, would not exist nowhere, but everywhere, and only nowhere in the sense of 'nowhere in particular'. If you said such a god existed nowhere at all, that would be no different than saying that it simply didn't exist.

I don't pretend to speak on behalf of other animal species. — schopenhauer1

And yet you speak on behalf of other species:

I see them, however, as suffering less because of not having the level of self-awareness as humans. — schopenhauer1

You may be right, or you may not be right; we simply don't and cannot, measure the suffering of other species, or even of other humans.

Starting someone else's suffering, with the justification of "but there could be good experiences" or "I have a hunch because ad populum" doesn't justify going ahead and violating these kinds of principles. — schopenhauer1

So it may seem to you, but you make the mistake of thinking there are matters of fact when it comes to whether something is moral or not. If there is any objectivity in morals it could only be the intersubjective opinion about any act you care to name that consists in the most common view. On this question your opinion is so far from the common view that it would arguably seem ridiculous to most people.

In any case, I've thought about it, I've heard all your arguments, I personally never decided to have children, which means I have no skin in the game, and yet I still disagree with you, so there is no point insistently rehearsing all the same arguments I've heard before.

Except that the topic is following rules. — Banno

I thought the topic was "Kripke's skeptical challenge". If the challenge is based on an inconsistency that shows up when thinking of counting as rule-based, have you considered the possibility that not thinking of it as rule-based, but as intuitive, might dissolve the apparent issue?

How do you tell that a child has followed the rule of addition? By looking at a finite set of examples. But, as for all induction, no finite set of observations can imply a universal principle. — Banno

As I said I don't think about it in terms of following rules, so your question is not relevant.

In any case even if it were a matter of following rules my knowing that the child has followed a set of rules is not the same as the child following a set of rules. I don't have to know something, or even be able to know something, in order that it be the case.

I see no reason to think that once a child understands the logic of addition that they would ever lose that understanding, barring, as I said previously, brain damage or senility.

You can be absolutely certain that you are a cat, if you like. — Banno

You cannot be absolutely certain that you are a cat, if you are not. You might feel absolutely certain about it even though you are not a cat. On the other hand, you could be absolutely certain that you are a human being, even though you might not be absolutely certain about that, because being absolutely certain must entail feeling absolutely certain, whereas feeling absolutely certain need not entail being absolutely certain.

But nibbana (Nirvāṇa) is neither ceasing to exist, nor continuing to exist. — Wayfarer

That sounds exactly like what happens when the body dies and its constituent particles continue to exist while the form is consumed and (mostly) disappears into the matrix.

However, it seems to me that there is a solution. It starts with the already-born recognizing the suffering and simply not starting new individual experiences of that suffering. — schopenhauer1

Animals will not do that, they will continue breeding as usual, which means there will always be suffering as long as there are animals to suffer.

I think both of you guys have a rather surprisingly dim view of the value of this life considered just in itself. I can see that life has its dark moments and aspects, but I certainly don't count it as an overall net negative, and I would venture to guess that many, perhaps most, people do not have such a view either. Perhaps it comes down to brain chemistry; some are just cursed with a dearth of serotonin or whatever.

I'm not invoking anamnesis. I also believe it is an established fact that some animals can do basic counting. I think behaviorist accounts neglect half the picture.

Can you explain how you see Kripke's "skeptical challenge" relating to Hume's skepticism regarding induction? I have always understood the latter to be merely pointing out that induction is not deduction, that causation is not logically necessary.

It's an initiation into a language game. — Banno

An initiation which would be impossible if the child did not intuitively get the logic of it. Once understood the logic can be extended indefinitely, and excluding brain damage, should not ever be lost.

There is more than one sense in which we say someone is following a rule. If I if I ask a child what the rule of counting is more than likely she cannot state a rule but will simply demonstrate how it is done by counting. — Fooloso4

I believe counting is intuitive, so no need for rules. All the basic arithmetical operations can be shown with actual objects like stones or marbles. Once this is intuitively grasped the rest is just naming the numbers. The "rules" are just formulations of what is already easily made obvious. by showing.

Fruits, nuts, chickens, and crops all require transport to market. — Agree to Disagree

They are less costly to transport and process than beef cattle. Also, they can be sold locally thus avoiding the need for abattoirs and transport. Chickens can be made ready for the cooking by the famer. Of course, so can cattle on a small scale, but it is a much greater undertaking.

I am not generally in favor of large scale, monoculture cropping, in any case, and the land that is suitable for cattle may well not be suitable for crops. Are you aware of how much forest in South America is being cleared for beef cattle farming?

Only based on your statements which frequently suggest those associations. Seems more likely to me that you are not aware of those own tendencies in your own statements. — Wayfarer

Those associations are yours, not mine; I am well familiar with both empiricism and positivism and although I think there is some truth in both of those positions I don't think they are the whole story.

For example, both Wittgenstein and Popper were associated with and admired by the logical positivists, but both distanced themselves from the Vienna Circle. As I remember Wittgenstein of the Tractatus period rejected the idea that everything that is worth knowing can be explained by science and although he agreed that metaphysical propositions are literally nonsense, in the sense of being non-sense, he saw the arts and literature as being infused with the spirit that animates the questions of metaphysics.

Popper disagreed with the idea that metaphysical speculation is of no use to scientific practice, and he believed, rightly, I think and as history itself attests, that metaphysical ideas may stimulate interest which opens up new avenues of scientific investigation. Think Newton and Kepler for examples.

Also, I don't believe all knowledge comes from the senses, I think we also know things simply on account of being embodied within a world, and also language itself vastly opens up the scope of what can be known. Another point is that we can know in new ways, via thinking through novel concepts, and these new ways of knowing may not be falsifiable or consist in knowing that anything is the case, but they are forms of know-how akin to knowing how to play music, paint or write poetry.

Biogenic carbon (e.g. CO2 and methane) does not make global warming worse.

Non-biogenic carbon (e.g. CO2 from fossil fuels and methane from non-biogenic sources) does make global warming worse. — Agree to Disagree

How are you going to farm the cattle without clearing land or using land that is already cleared that could otherwise be planted with trees, ideally fruit or nut-bearing trees, or grow more efficient animals, such as chickens, or crops, and how will you transport the cattle to market without using fossil fuels?

I have my own ideas but I figured I'd open with the simple question: what is logic? (there is more on this than "what is computation," but a lot of it does not seem to address the big questions)

It seems to me like this question often produces three types of responses:
1. Logic is a set of formal systems; it is defined by the formalism.
2(a). Logic is a description of the ways we make good inferences and determine truth, or at least approximate truth pragmatically.
2.(b). Logic is a general description of the features or laws of thought. (This is more general than 2(a).
3. Logic is a principle at work in the world, its overall order. Stoic Logos, although perhaps disenchanted. — Count Timothy von Icarus

These all seem to be, as you say, common definitons of 'logic'. The question that arises for me is whether these definitions have a common element or thread running through them.

Is logic as a set of formal systems not a set of formulations built based on what we do naturally when we think deductively, "the ways we make good inferences and determine truth, or at least approximate truth pragmatically", a making explicit of what is implicit in our practice of consistent thinking?

Are these formulationsnot all built on a few basic principles. consistency, non-contradiction and excluded middle, which may be thought of as 'laws of thought"?

And do these principles not reflect our experience of the world? It doesn't seem that we see things in the world being inconsistent, such as appearing as a tree then morphing into an animal, or contradictory, being an apple and the same time not being an apple (unless maybe we have partaken of some psychedelic).

If we think of the laws of nature as formulations of the perceived regularities which abound in the natural world, just as the laws of thought are formulations of the natural ways we think, then why can we not say there is a logic, a logos, at work in the world?

I take it by "disenchanted" you mean that we have come to see this natural order as an immanent nature and not as imposed from on high, by a transcendent or divine order?

All the talk of rules seems overdone. This just comes down to counting, as I showed in my last post. It pays to remember that arithmetic used to be done on an abacus. Some animals can apparently do rudimentary counting; should we think they are following rules?

We get along fine when you don't pull your A J Ayer shtick :razz: — Wayfarer

I think the problem is more that you misunderstand what I say and accuse me of being either an empiricist or a positivist. An empiricist believes that all knowledge comes from the senses; I don't believe that. A positivist thinks all metaphysical statements are worthless or meaningless; I don't believe that either.

Which points towards coherence, rather than correspondence. — Wayfarer

I think it would be both coherence and correspondence within our experience. It seems to me that if by 'the world' is meant 'the world as experienced' then there is no problem with correspondence. To claim that what we say could correspond to something not within our experience seems somewhat strange to say the least.

On the other hand, I think we can safely say that our actual or possible experience does not encompass all that is or was, without making any claims about what is or was not included in our experience.

I think in these kinds of debates, we're coming up against that 'invisible order' and that this influences what you're saying about what does and what doesn't constitute valid philosophical insight. The examples you gave of what you call 'direct observation' all refer to sense-able phenomena, things that can be objectively seen and measured, and then maths and logic. You're appealing to those as rules - that's the 'network of rules and meanings'. But there's also an insight, which is neither strictly empirical nor mathematical, which you first acknowledge but then appear to deny. As I said, I get it. Hard questions. Schopenhauer himself spent considerably time and energy grappling with them. — Wayfarer

I think this is right. I don't see the "invisible order" as being the "symbolic dimension", though, as Zizek , following Lacan, seems to be saying. I don't think reality, what we see as reality, is socially constructed, but rather socially mediated. As I've said more than a few times, I think animals "see as" just as we do. and I don't think primal language, and its later transformation into written, pictographic and symbolic language as well as visual representation, would have been possible without the seminal "seeing as". Of course, all of this is just my opinion, what seems most plausible to me, my personal faith: I can't prove any of it is so.

I also agree with you about what you seem to be implying: the wordless insight. So, I do acknowledge it and only deny its literal word aptitude. Evocation, invocation, metaphor, parable in art, poetry, literature and scripture I don't deny but revere most of all.

I think a leap of faith is required. There is no external guarantee - I can't show it.* There are many risks, and there is plenty of potential for self-delusion. Comes with the territory. Krishnamurti's 'pathless land' is often quoted but few mention the final sentence of the leading paragraph - 'If you would attain to the mountain-top you must pass through the valley, climb the steeps, unafraid of the dangerous precipices.' — Wayfarer

Exactly, the leap of faith...nothing creative can be done without that most important element. "Though I walk in the valley of the shadow of death, I shall fear no evil".

There's another unspoken factor here. The terms for all the Indian philosophical systems are 'darshana', meaning 'a seeing'. An audience with a sage/teacher/guru is a darshan. A meeting with a great teacher may convey an understanding impossible to put into words. That would be a 'showing' or 'seeing' which might convey the gist. A canonical example from Buddhism would be the Flower Sermon. Of course, all of this is in the domain of revealed religion, so properly speaking taboo on this forum. — Wayfarer

As I think you know, I have always been drawn to Zen and I think showing what cannot be said is its essence, with the Flower Sermon being understood as its seminal moment. In terms of poetry, the great Haikus of Basho, Buson and Issa (as translated and commented on by R H Blyth) have been a lasting influence.

I don't think you and I are as far apart as it may sometimes seem. :smile:

Christian beliefs suggest that sincere repentance and faith in Jesus can lead to salvation and entrance into heaven, regardless of the timing of the conversion. — gevgala

Is it the "sincere repentance and faith" or the "in Jesus" which saves? And what is heaven...the eternal moment in the here and now, or some unknowable realm in the hereafter?

Don't you know there ain't no devil there's just god when he's drunk — Tom Storm

:lol:

I find lack of compelling reasons to believe in the proposition that god's exist and it seems to me that their absence or 'hiddenness' reinforces this. — Tom Storm

As Tom Waits sings:

God's away, God's away, God's away
On Business. Business.
God's away, God's away, God's away
On Business. Business.

"It amounts to this: that only of a living human being and what resembles (behaves like) a living human being can one say: it has sensations; it sees; is blind; hears; is deaf; is conscious or unconscious’ (§281). : — frank

How very anthropocentric!

As to whether a story about a talking pot is nonsense, it all depends on what is meant by 'nonsense'. If I told someone "I saw a talking pot" it would not be out of the ordinary for them to say "don't talk nonsense".

But then imagining seeing something that logically. even if not actually, could be a manifest phenomenon would not be talking outside the possible context of sense; that is of the senses, so in that sense it is not nonsense.

If I said "I saw God" then that might be thought to be outside the possible context of sense, so in that sense saying I saw God would be truly nonsense.

It is, perhaps, an infelicitous term. I don’t think the goal of either Buddhism or Schopenhauer is being ‘blissed out’ or attaining a ‘meditative high’. What is at issue is not just subjective, even if it is something that can only be known first-person. But you willl say, sure, you can have great feelings, you can ‘alter your consciousness’ - but it can’t amount to knowledge, as it doesn’t meet empirical standards. Is that right? — Wayfarer

I don't think of it in terms of having "blissful feelings" but in terms of being at peace, in a state of acceptance, not anxious about imagined possibilities, being present, not thinking about the past or the future, or about death, being free to create or just to be, however the spirit moves: so, simply in a state where things flow smoothly.

Of course, this can only be known "first person" but it is really, for me at least, when the sense of the "person' is not there at all. The sense of the person is always 'me in relation to others'; this is what I want to be free from. Not free from caring about others, but free from what I might imagine others think of me. I think the unfreedom of such egoic concerns is what Sartre meant when he wrote: "Hell is other people".

This can be cultivated, but it is not a matter of knowing that anything is the case; rather it is knowing how to be, of accepting that I do not really know what the case is. So it does "amount to knowledge" in that sense, and empirical standards have nothing to do with it. I just don't believe that metaphysical claims that the nature of reality can be known in these states are valid. I might feel like I know the nature of reality, but I think that is just an idea that accompanies a profound sense of insight, the details or implications of which I really don't know or understand.

Put another way, experience, even ordinary everyday experience is really ineffable, all our words and thoughts are a kind of overlay' so not to be taken too seriously. We are not going to be able to think ourselves there. There is nothing more important than how we live this life. That's my take anyway.

I’ll put that aside, to venture an answer: learning by doing. But I don’t think the question ‘was the Buddha enlightened?’ is really at issue in the debate. The question is epistemological, what are valid means of knowledge, and my claim was simply that the Buddhist tradition, as an example, does provide a means of testing, finding out, exploring the validity of its methods and claims, which shouldn’t be dismissed simply as ‘mystical and spiritual’. Why not? Well, I know that Stephen Bachelor, a well-known proponent of secular Buddhism, denies that the Buddha was a mystic at all, and I also know that the term ‘spiritual’ is alien to the Buddhist tradition. I’m attempting to establish the theoretically factual basis for there being ‘a blissful escape’, which is the point at issue. — Wayfarer

As you should know from past exchanges, I am well familiar with Stephen Bachelor's secular Buddhism, having read several of his books, and as I have said at least a few times to you, I agree with his approach. So, I have no issue with the idea that through certain practices altered states can be realized; I said as much a few posts ago, when I highlighted the distinction between knowing that and knowing how.

Of course, if you learn to alter your consciousness through meditation then you have acquired know-how, but my point has been all along that on account of an altered state of consciousness you cannot claim to know any metaphysical truth.

As I see it "a blissful escape" can be attained via several means: activities that might lead to flow states, to present centered awareness, the eternity of the now. You should know well enough by now I have no argument with any of that. I have never said that states of consciousness are matters of faith, but that any metaphysical conclusions you might draw from them are.

After all this time I still have no idea what exactly it is about my position that you actually disagree with.

So, Janus denies appealing to empiricist principles while at the same time insisting on empiricist principles. That's where the confusion lies. — Wayfarer

I've outlined the ways that knowledge claims may be tested, by observation, mathematical operations and logic. Can you think of any others? How shall we test the claim that the Buddha was enlightened; just outline the methodology. I believe you know you can't and you just don't want to admit it.

I'm rapidly losing interest in trying to engage with those who are intellectually dishonest and can't see past their own agendas.

The point is that not everyone is equally worth talking to, and not everyone is equally capable of discussing certain subjects. — Leontiskos

Yes, you're right and it seems you are one of those.

In general I am doubtful of whether your views on this subject are particularly rigorous, and this is because you are uncritically shifting between all sorts of different terms and concepts. Some include: intersubjective agreement, public demonstration, intersubjective testability, and empirical verification. These are all very different concepts, and the slipping back and forth from one to another will tend to preclude rigorous philosophical investigation. — Leontiskos

The possibility for public demonstration is the same as intersubjective testability and emprical verifiability. If I claim that it is raining, right here, right now the truth of that is publicly demonstrable, intersubjectively testable and empirically verifiable to those who are able to come and see. The same goes for any claim about observable phenomena.

Insinuating that my views are not rigorous is a suspect move. Attempt instead to address the arguments I make with rigorous counterarguments and then you will be attempting rigorous philosophical investigation.

I should think this is an uncontroversial claim, although "definitively confirmed" is another of those slippery concepts that you are shifting between. But in fact the claim in question is about a subjective state, and subjective states are empirical. Buddhism is, in fact, a highly empirical religion, and this is why it fits well in the West. The whole point of the original post was that, "It can be validated first person," and this is because it is based on a reproducible (and empirical) experience. — Leontiskos

The "definitive" in "definitively confirmed" is only there for emphasis. Confirmation is confirmation. Subjective states are not empirical in the sense of being publicly observable. I can observe only your behavior, not your subjective state, whatever that term might be understood to mean. Only you are privy to that. Buddhism claims that the altered states of consciousness that are called "jñāna", understood as 'direct knowing' may be achieved through practice, and I beleive this is true having experienced such states myself. Tell me, though, what do you think is known in such states?

Christian mystics think they know God, know that God exists. Some Buddhists claim to remember their past lives. None of this can be confirmed, the possibility of self-delusion is always present I believe. But even if it is accepted that it is possible to know such things, it is not possible to demonstrate that they are known. It is also not possible to demonstrate that someone is in such a state; they might be faking it. If you think I am wrong, then explain how such things could be known to be known.

But again, the Buddha's claim is verifiable. That's the whole point. So according to your own reasoning the Buddha's claim is something we can be certain of, and it "constitutes public knowledge." — Leontiskos

This is simply not true, and certainly not according to my own reasoning; how could anyone possibly know the truth of the Buddha's claim, unless they were in the same state as the Buddha. How could they know they were in the same state, and how could they possibly prove to the public that they were? Do you claim to be enlightened? Do you think Osho was enlightened? The foremost living German philosopher Peter Sloterdijk does; he spent a couple of years with Osho at Poona, although what he means by 'enlightenment' may be very different than what you mean. I am not using this as an appeal to authority by the way, because I acknowledge that Sloterdijk might be wrong, but it just shows that anyone could be wrong about any claim that someone, including themselves, is enlightened.

But of course your assertion that "intersubjectively testable claims" constitute public knowledge is false, and furthermore I would be surprised if you yourself have any rigorous idea of what you mean by public knowledge. — Leontiskos

Are you going to give some actual argument or counterexamples or are you just going to leave your statement that my assertion that intersubjectively testable claims (I should add "if true" of course) constitute (I should add "actual or potential" of course) public knowledge. Obviously, a claim must be actually tested and proven true to become actual public knowledge, and I took that as read.

And again, you try to use aspersion instead of argument; "I would be surprised if you yourself have any rigorous idea of what you mean by public knowledge". :roll:

You lay out 68 marbles and then you lay out 57 marbles in a separate row, then you ask the other "what are the names of the numbers of marbles in the two rows". Then you push them together and ask the other to count all the marbles and say what the name for that number of marbles is.

You've obviously made up your own mind, I'm not going to engage in the probably futile task of argument about it. — Wayfarer

I haven't made up my own mind about whether Osho or Gautama were enlightened; I reserve judgement on that question due to lack of evidence, same as I do on the question of whether or not there is a God. I don't even know what it means to be enlightened. Do you? Do you think you know whether or not Osho and Gautama were enlightened, or if you believe Gautama was and Osho was not, do you admit this is a personal conviction and not knowledge? The philosopher in you should admit that, but I suspect the politician in you will not give a straight answer.

You haven't answered the question. The point was that it is not possible to publicly demonstrate whether Osho or Gautama were or were not enlightened.

The intersubjective agreement will be wider when it comes to obvious realities that are accessible to everyone. Are you saying anything more than this? — Leontiskos

Yes, I am saying that some claims can be definitively confirmed by empirical observation and others cannot. That's really all I've been saying all along.

It proves that they exist and that they are achievable, which is a metaphysical truth and is the point in question. — Leontiskos

I would not count that as a metaphysical truth, but as a phenomenological truth. Whatever the metaphysical implications of that truth are cannot be determined but remain purely a matter of faith.

And note I have not said I think people should not have faith, whether Christian, Buddhist or whatever, provided they acknowledge that what they have is faith not knowledge. I have my own articles of faith, which I don't share on here because I don't believe they are philosophically arguable. The problem with thinking that faith is knowledge is that it leads to fundamentalism and that can be very socially dangerous and detrimental.

You wish to talk about "certainty" but you won't venture beyond intersubjective agreement. Intersubjective agreement about a claim does not produce certainty about a claim. You continue to equivocate between intersubjective agreement and stronger claims, akin to knowledge. — Leontiskos

I do venture beyond intersubjective agreement in my own life. We can be certain of intersubjectvely testable claims, barring extreme skepticism, such claims constitute public knowledge. We can feel certain of what our own experience tells us, but what our own experience tells us is true is not knowledge in the intersubjective sense, it is merely personal conviction.

As do you Tom.

It has everything to do with the hoi polloi. When you say that a scientific claim is testable you mean that you would subject it to the scientific expert for confirmation. You don't mean that you would find the average guy on the street and ask him if it is true. Yet when it comes to the Buddha's claim you are apparently content with the average guy on the street. — Leontiskos

Scientific observations are really only augmented empirical observations. Even the "hoi polloi" know how to test claims like "it is raining" or "there is a tree growing three meters from the shed" or :"the surf today is bigger than it was yesterday" and even they can look up tabulated information to determine whether it is true that there is currently global warming. There are countless such truths about the world we share that even the poor moronic hoi polloi can test.

You cannot demonstrate that it is possible to see "the deathless". You might be one hundred percent convinced that you have seen it, just as I might be one hundred percent convinced I have seen a unicorn; my conviction is not intersubjective verification for anyone else that I have in fact seen it, even if there might be those of like mind who agree that I have.

So again this

If you are concerned with intersubjective agreement, then there can be little question that there is significant intersubjective agreement among Buddhists about the various states of consciousness, and that this is based on independent 'experimentation'. — Leontiskos

Is a strawman. I haven't claimed there is no intersubjective agreement and experimentation does not prove a metaphysical claim in the Buddhist context any more than it proves scientific theories in the context of science. That said, at least in science the results of predictions are publicly observable.

That altered states of consciousness happen and that they may sometimes be achievable via certain disciplines is not in question, but even if those states were reliably achievable that does not prove anything metaphysical and it is not even possible for anyone to know with certainty that any particular claim to have achieved such a state is even true; they might be lying about it.

This brings us back to the question as to how you would determine whether Osho was enlightened; there was enormous intersubjective agreement that he was and yet Quixodian thinks he was a charlatan. How does he know he is right, and all Osho's followers were wrong?

And now we come to the Buddha: how do we know he was enlightened when we don't even possess a single word written by him, and we don't know except via historical documents how much intersubjective agreement there was about his enlightenment when he was alive?

:up:

I think ↪Quixodian's post was accurate. You seem to be taking a least-common-denominator approach. "If the hoi polloi cannot verify a claim, then it doesn't possess intersubjective agreement." — Leontiskos

I haven't said there is no intersubjective agreement amongst the religious faithful, I have said there is no definitive intersubjective testability when it comes to religious or metaphysical claims, and I include in that all metaphysical claims including materialism.

My argument is that the only definitive intersubjective testability we have of human knowledge is in relation to empirical observations, mathematical results and logic. This has nothing at all to do with the "hoi polloi".

Also, I don't claim that scientific theories, as opposed to observations, are definitively testable beyond determining whether what they predict is observed. I don't claim that if a scientific theory is predictively accurate that this proves that it is true in any absolute sense.

It is clear how phenomenal observations can be confirmed, how mathematical results can be rigorously tested and how logical claims can be definitively assessed as to their validity (not truth, mind). If you want to claim that it is possible to definitively determine whether or not Osho or the Buddha were enlightened, or whether there is a God or resurrection or karma or rebirth, or whether certain creative works are great and others not, then please present your case.

You seem to me to be uninterested in good faith discussoion. I don't expect you to agree with my views, but if you want to discuss our differences then you should be prepared to argue for your position. Your behavior seems to be more that of a politician than a philosopher. You seem to be incapable of understanding that I honestly disagree with you; and that I'm not being polemical for the sake of it.

You're appealing to empiricism, even if you say you're not. It is not an accusation, it's a description. — Quixodian

"Appealing" is an attitude; don't presume to tell me what I'm appealing to.

Consider the provenance of the word 'enlightenment' that is used in respect of Eastern religious practices. — Quixodian

The provenance of the word, which I am amply familiar with, does not constitute an argument, nor is it relevant to what I've been saying.

I perfectly agree that as a consequence, there are lot of bogus gurus and enlightenment scams in the marketplace. There are many traps, pitfalls and delusions associated with the entire quest. — Quixodian

Right, so how do you know which is fake and which is real? And even if you believe that you do know, how can you demonstrate to others that you do know? You can't, therwise you would, and that's the point I'm making. If you know some mathematical or logical truth, you can demonstrate it. If you have made some empirical observation, you can demonstrate it, but who is enlightened and who isn't, just like which creative works are great and which are not, cannot be definitively demonstrated, and that's all I've been trying to get you to see, or if think it is wrong to make an actual argument that sets out just why you believe it is wrong. that demonstrates it to be wrong.

It's nevertheless claimable under Medicare. — Quixodian

I know that, but it is irrelevant. We know how western medicine works, or at least we have very good theories grounded in observation and experiment. The same cannot be said about acupuncture, which is not to say it doesn't work. I don't know whether it works or not, do you?

But the subject can be and has been rigourously investigated, so there are those who can and do know. There's a 'mindfulness training centre' at Oxford, for heaven's sake. This is an epistemological question - the question of whether the subject has a factual core, or whether it's simply conjecture, custom, or pious belief. — Quixodian

What are seeking to appeal to here? Authority? Or tradition? Sure, it's a kind of epistemological question, but it's also a semantic question because the referents of "subject", "factual", "core" are not clear in this context. So, I'm not even sure what you think the question means.

Intellectual honesty demands no such thing. It requires that this assertion is also culturally-situated and conditioned. It is what our culture takes as a criterion for 'valid knowledge' - as I already said. — Quixodian

No, if you cannot say how the belief in Ch'i is grounded in empirical evidence, mathematics or logic, then you should admit that. If it is only grounded in intuition, it may or may not be true, but how would you go about determining that, or demonstrating its truth or falsity? That is what you need to show.

But I try to stay optimistic. Younger people give me some hope. — Mikie

:up: Optimism is the only attitude worth taking; pessimism brings about its own prophecies...and complacency is capitulation by default. Denial is the worst of all...

Yes, the propaganda, and willful ignorance and complacency, are all strong. If enough people get on the same page, then we will still face the issue that in many democratic nations there is little to choose between candidate parties, and in totalitarian nations, well...revolution will be required. It's not really looking good for a stable future, whatever happens.

That looks like black and white thinking to me. Why think that knowing a bit about the effects of anesthetics doesn't tell us a bit about consciousness. Why think that consciousness is something that might be well understood without knowing all sorts of bits? — wonderer1

It's the presumption that something is known about the real character of consciousness introspectively, or more strongly, that that is the only way anything can be known about the real character of consciousness. Such an attitude may well seem intuitively right, but its correctness or incorrectness can never be demonstrated; hence the interminable arguments that do not consist in arguments.

You obviously have no counter-argument. I've laid out my argument in good faith and all you can apparently do is attempt to dismiss it by labelling it "empiricism". Empirical knowledge is part of our knowledge, we also have purely rational knowledge so characterizing me as an empirical philosopher is a strawman, and a clutching at straws.

Even if my argument were empiricist, it still warrants a decent counter-argument; mere dismissal by fiat or characterization does not amount to participating in discussion. Critique my arguments as hard as you like, if you come up with a decent critique; I might learn something. A disappointing response, as usual!