We seem to either be suffering from an absence of mirrors in which to see our own selves and conducts on this forum or else from a self-righteous arrogance of somehow being beyond foolishness. Or maybe both.

Because science and its paradigms does not seek to accomplish the exact same feat? Or any other field of human knowledge?

The proscription of thought, debate, and investigation on a philosophy forum by some is telling. — javra

If there are areas in regard to which humans are necessarily ignorant (which I believe is unarguably true) and there is an inveterate human tendency to find this unacceptable, then the filling of this space of mystery with dogma is inevitable.

Science seeks to coherently and consistently explain what is observed while all the time remaining cognizant of the defeasible nature of its theory and knowledge. This is not even remotely similar to the human tendency to simply "make shit up" in the face of the unknown. This is not to say that some scientists, being fallible humans, do not make shit up (falsify the data).

What "proscription of thought, debate and investigation" is going on here in your opinion? Perhaps you could offer an example which is not merely the expression of a different opinion. The other point is that once one starts to talk about "ineffable knowledge" one has entered a realm where argument simply cannot go. Do you think that can that be counted as "doing philosophy"?

You haven't been following the discussion too closely, then. Yes, Socrates/Plato stated that the Good as Form is beyond being. — javra

I haven't read the entire thread. Since Socrates and Plato are not participating in this discussion perhaps you could provide a quote from the latter which unambiguously states this.

Cheers, my fellow pyromaniac. Stay :cool:

The issue was how does one define, else understand, being - this, specifically, in terms of Plato's affirmations. — javra

I think the issue can be raised for many terms that we understand perfectly well until we try to pin down a definition. It is probably nothing more than a problem with language, with its inexactitudes, ambiguities.

I happen to agree. Hence my contention that there is something lost in translation in saying that "the Good is beyond being". This would entail that the Good is not. Which is contrary to Plato's works. — javra

Did someone say that the Good is beyond being? I would have thought that it is only beings or events which could be good or otherwise.

'Before' is a concept. — Wayfarer

Que?

But it's still a quite fuzzy distinction that, while it may suffice for everyday dealings, becomes more problematic as we think and analyze it with some depth. — Manuel

I think the distinction between inside and outside the skin is a useful and valid one. A basic principle of semiotics is the idea that life and experience is only possible once there is a separation between an 'inside' and an 'outside', most primordially realized by the cell membrane.

It's true that when we think about and analyze it we may become confused due to ambiguities of terms.

Sure, you can say external objects are real, but to go on to argue,

that our perceptions of them are real on account of the real affects they, along with environmental conditions, light, sound, molecules of scent and taste, and the nature of our bodies themselves, have on our perceptions.
— Janus

Raises a serious problem.

What about the objects' effects are we interacting with? As Descartes points out, the heat is not in the fire, and as almost everyone says, the orange and yellow colour is not in the fire either, and so on down the list of properties. — Manuel

I don't see that as a serious problem. Whatever is actual and external to the body can act on it to produce perception, and the nature of that perception depends on the actual nature of the body being acted upon. I see no reason to think that what is reliably and cross-sensorially perceived is not real in some sense. After all, that is generally what is meant by the word 'real'.

So, the colours and the heat are real phenomena that exist in the interaction of the body with fire and the light reflected off objects. You say the heat is not in the fire. but the fire can burn objects and even entirely consume them, even in the absence of anyone perceiving the fire.

Heat is defined by science as the agitation of molecules caused by friction or combustion, but of course heat defined as a felt phenomenon is only possible for a percipient.

My interpretation of 'beyond being' is that it means 'beyond the vicissitudes of existence', 'beyond coming-to-be and passing away'.
— Wayfarer

:100: And I'm in agreement with your post in general. — javra

We can know nothing whatsoever about whatever might be "beyond being". The idea is nothing more than the dialectical opposite of 'being'. Fools have always sought to fill the 'domains' of necessary human ignorance with their "knowing". How much misery this has caused humanity is incalculable.

You seem to be conflating change with difference. The image is static, not changing, but all points in the image are not the same as each other. This is almost always the case with the visual field. When I look at the visual field when nothing is moving, then nothing is changing, but there is difference across the whole field.

A big issue, to my mind, is what exactly is meant by external here? People often speaking about external and internal, as if that distinction is very clear, I don't think it is. It would be replied that this sofa I am seeing is external to me, that is, it is not in my mind, so it is external in that sense. — Manuel

This raises an interesting counterpoint. I said a couple posts back

On the assumption that we have no access to the external ('external' here meaning 'external to our bodies') world, what would constitute evidence for evolution? Just answer that one question and we might get somewhere. — Janus

I didn't want to say 'minds' because that would be to reduce us to a kind of "dimensionless point observer", but 'bodies' can't be quite right either since parts of them at least (and all of them if viewed in the mirror) can be external objects (at least visually speaking).

On the other hand, we feel our bodies "from the inside" so to speak; I don't just look at my arm as an external object, but I feel the sensation within it, its movements, its straining and ease, and I feel its continuity with the rest of the body,

On the basis of this "internal sense" we differentiate our bodies from external objects, feeling them to be part and parcel with ourselves. I think we have good reason to think that external objects are real and that our perceptions of them are real on account of the real affects they, along with environmental conditions, light, sound, molecules of scent and taste, and the nature of our bodies themselves, have on our perceptions.

I think it fair and plausible to count this as "having access to external objects" although I go along with Kant in thinking that we have access only to their perceptible qualities as conditioned by the nature of our own bodies and organs of sense.

Correlation, I suppose, would be the only way. Do the things we're experiencing correlate with the expectations Evolutionary Theory posits?

But, I get the feeling I am committed to basically say "its an inference" and im fairly comfortable with that. — AmadeusD

The problem with what you say here as I see it is that the expectations Evolutionary Theory posits are based on the assumption that the evidence for evolution, the fossil record, Carbon dating, DNA testing and so on consists in accurate information about the external world, about the world before humanity even existed.

So, any correlation with those expectations would be baseless without that assumption. You say, "it's an inference", but inferences about the external world, the prehuman world, and the present world must all be based on the assumption that the data they are based upon is accurate, that is to say that we do have access to the external world, or else the inferences would be completely groundless. I don't see how this has anything to do with your subjective feelings of being comfortable; it is well-known that many people may be comfortable with contradicting themselves or making groundless claims.

The veracity of evolution itself is based on the assumption that we have access to external reality
— Janus

I am fairly sure understand your position and am not missing it(that is obviously possibly wrong)... But, my position is still no, it isn't, and that this is the one of the cruxes. — AmadeusD

On the assumption that we have no access to the external ('external' here meaning 'external to our bodies') world, what would constitute evidence for evolution? Just answer that one question and we might get somewhere.

Yeah, that is not what I or Ligotti was claiming in the sense of "meaninglessness". So that is a moot argument. — schopenhauer1

I haven't said you or Ligotti claimed "meaninglessness". I believe you both claim that life can be universally characterized as "suffering" which would mean as 'intrinsically negative', and that is what I have been arguing against.

How so? You said there is no intrinsic value. That is missing the point, that it is only beings that perceive value, and human beings that are self-aware they are perceiving value. And that is what matters, not what the universe is devoid of beings who have value. If that was the case, we wouldn't need to talk about anything. We just wouldn't "be". — schopenhauer1

I have said that value, meaning, purpose is only to be found in the volitions, cognitions and judgements of beings. The value of life as assessed by human beings, and arguably not other animals, may be either positive or negative, depending on the human being doing the assessing, so it seems obvious that there is no intrinsic, universally negative or positive value to life.

We have discussed this before, and I believe I have answered you before regarding this. — schopenhauer1

If you have something to say in response to the passage you quoted, then say it. Vague references to some previous answer you purport to have given are next to useless. If you want to bring in past discussions, then at least bother to cite particular statements.

The value is squarely on the being-in-the-world. It is rather about not the universe devoid of being, but the universe with a being that can feel, comprehend, and in the case of the human, self-reflect. — schopenhauer1

I haven't said that life has no value for living beings; I have said it has no intrinsic negative or positive value. The value or meaning or purpose life has for living beings is diverse just as are the living beings. Trying to dismiss (your version of) what I said as "surface-y" seems a rather desperate tactic.

I don't view "no purpose" as positive or negative either on its face. Rather, it is suffering that is paramount to the pessimist. Suffering can show itself in peculiar ways to the human animal. When doing something tedious, or in prolonged bouts of melancholy, one might see an immense worthlessness to it all. — schopenhauer1

Sure, some minority of people, not animals I would think, may feel something like this. It may be driven by brain chemistry, or it may be on account of trauma, or something else; but whatever its origin might be, it is a subjective emotional state, not a universal truth. Life involves suffering, but it also involves joy, and the proportions of each will vary from living being to living being: seeking to absolutize the characterization of life as suffering is a fool's errand.

Indeed, what better way to be motivated than some external, culturally derived and tested way? — schopenhauer1

Right and there are potentially as many ways to be motivated as there are individuals if you drop the "overarching".

Since we cannot refute this possibility on the basis of the nature of the concepts of existence and cause (as distinguished from the empirical fact that these things always seem to go together), we therefore cannot make the case that it is impossible for anything to come into existence without a cause – after all, anything is possible unless it is logically impossible. — expos4ever

It is fine to say that anything that is not logically contradictory is possible provided the provenance of that "possible" is understood to be confined to the epistemological. That is to say that as far as we can tell anything that is logically possible might be physically or actually possible. On the other hand, there may be things which are logically possible which are not physically or actually possible, even though we cannot determine what those things could be.

I agree, that evolution has done an incredibly good job of making us think this is the case... — AmadeusD

The veracity of evolution itself is based on the assumption that we have access to external reality, so your thinking here is in turn reliant on that assumption. That's what I've been trying to point out.

Fact is, our mind is in receipt of data only. The movie it puts together to play to our experiential faculties isn't actually relevant to that - its an illusion. — AmadeusD

How do you know that is the case? I don't deny that it might be an illusion, but I also think it might not be an illusion. How could we ever definitively tell, one way or the other? On the other hand, since we and the other animals seem to be very good at navigating and surviving in a complex and dangerous world, the evidence seems to point to our perceptions providing us with adequately reliable information about that world.

I'm sure i could find plenty of examples of thinkers relating experience to sense data (perhaps in other words) and carving out "actual objects", as it were, from the data. IN fact, that seems to be the entire thrust of Idealism (more specifically, Kant's Transcendental Idealism). — AmadeusD

Kant, as I read him, thinks that the objects of the senses are real things that are independent of human perception. How we see those things obviously is not independent of human perception, and that's why Kant talks about things in themselves. We have no access to the "in itself' nature of things, but of course we do have access to the 'for us' nature of things.

It isn't. It's derived from the very clear fact that my mind is not actually in touch with any objects, yet my mind is the arena of my experience — AmadeusD

The objects appear to you, how is that a case of "not being in touch with any objects"?

Hmm, point taken, but also I disgree.. but I think you're a step back from the level of analysis i'm at in this discussion.

Yes, that is, superficially, a reason to think those things are 'out there'. Our experiences converge, as it were. But I have already noted that I assume there are things out there. But it's an assumption that those people and their perceptions are also "real", so it's somewhat tautological to rest on that, imo. — AmadeusD

What you say here shows that your perspective converges on solipsism. Solipsism (like any other philosophical position) can neither be disproven nor proven, but its plausibility rating must be thought to be very close to zero.

You show by your action of posting on here with those who disagree with you that you don't believe in solipsism. As Peirce said “Let us not pretend to doubt in philosophy what we do not doubt in our hearts.”

They are all part of the same whole. There is no "true level" of human misery and suffering that we can discover by "cutting through illusion." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Exactly! And it is arguable that pessimism and optimism are both basically dispositional, and as I said earlier, even that they are determined by brain chemistry, which varies from person to person.

Pessimism might better be called something like 'Life Disvalueism', where the basic idea is that life not only has no intrinsic positive value but actually has a negative intrinsic value. I would agree that life has no intrinsic positive value, but I also think it is nonsensical to claim that it has negative intrinsic value.

Some argue that if life has no overarching purpose that it follows that it has a negative intrinsic value, but I think it is arguable that having no overarching purpose is a positive thing, in that it allows us to be free to create our own purposes, rather than submitting to an imposed purpose or else suffer punishment, karmic consequences and so on.

Of course, even so-called overarching purposes are culturally imposed, since they are matters of faith, not something which could be obvious to any unbiased or free minded individual.

I know. And I have answered, many times, my friend: I have experience, and I cannot understand that I have experience, other than as a result of sense data, based on the empirical fact of my experience. — AmadeusD

The more immediate experience is that you sense things, not data. No one prior to the modern scientific era would have thought in terms of sense data, which means the idea is secondary and derivative. If your idea of sense data is derived from modern scientific understanding, the veracity of which in turn is based on the assumption that we have access to external objects, then your belief that you have access to sense data necessarily depends on the latter assumption.

As to your idea that there is no reason to believe the tree you can see is actually there: well, there obviously is, since other people with you will see the same tree and on questioning will confirm that they see the same unique details of the tree, and even animals present will show by their behavior that they also see the tree; e.g. the dog might pee on it and the cat climb it or the bird perch in it.

The single, only thing I have posited I have access to is sense data. Not sense organs. Not external objects. Sense data. That is it. — AmadeusD

What I have been asking is on what basis do you conclude that you have access to sense data? I presume that you, as we all do, experience a world of things, animals, plants and people etc., that are external to our bodies; so, I'm asking how that common experience leads you to conclude that you have access only to sense data and not to the things, animals. plants and people, etc. If you are interested in continuing this conversation, then lay out the reasoning that leads you to your stated conclusion. If you are not interested that's fine, I don't care.

I'm bemused by what I see as your inability to adequately explain and justify your position, or acknowledge your resultant inconsistency and confusion, but I'm happy to leave it there as we seem to be getting nowhere fast.

:up:

I assume the organs of sense are producing the sense data. — AmadeusD

Since your assumption is based on the assumption or inference that you have access to your sense organs, then why would you not infer that you have access to external objects in general? I'm not claiming that you should be certain, I'm merely referring to 'inference to the best explanation'—are you certain that you don't have access to external objects?

I remember seeing an interview with Gore Vidal (who had an extraordinary life), he said that there were plenty of golden moments over his long and successful life (he was round 70 then) but he would never want relive a single one of them. I found this fascinating and immediately understood. — Tom Storm

I would want to relive my best moments, which I have generally enjoyed, just as I want to listen to music or poems, view artworks and sometimes books or movies that I like over and over, I would expect , although the events in the relived life might be the same each time, that my sensual, emotional and intellectual responses would be subtly different, just as I see and feel new things in artworks at each occasion of viewing, reading or hearing.

Even if my life were to be exactly the same on each recurrence, I would still choose it, provided I was unable to remember past iterations.

I think it really is a matter of disposition, and that globally pessimistic and optimistic dispositions may even simply be driven by different brain chemistries. It is common enough for humans to rationalize their own experiences and mind-sets after the fact.

However, I think I'm just biologically disposed to appreciate the long strange trip humanity is on. — wonderer1

:up: I'll second that!

There are still harmless self-observers who believe in the existence of “immediate certainties,” such as “I think,” or the “I will” that was Schopenhauer's superstition: just as if knowledge had been given an object here to seize, stark naked, as a “thing-in-itself,” and no falsification took place
from either the side of the subject or the side of the object… Philosophers tend to talk about the will as if it were the most familiar thing in the world. In fact, Schopenhauer would have us believe that the will is the only thing that is really familiar, familiar through and through, familiar without pluses or minuses. But I have always thought that, here too, Schopenhauer was only doing what philosophers always tend to do: adopting and exaggerating a popular prejudice.

:100:

but if I had the choice would I want to do it all again or not be born at all? I suspect I would choose the latter. — Tom Storm

That's interesting...I. on the other hand, would always choose to do it all again. I've had hard times, but my underlying disposition is one of loving being alive.

It seems to me that this difference of disposition speaks to there being no fact of the matter as to whether life is worth living.

I can't understand my experience under other circumstances. — AmadeusD

So, you can't understand your experience unless you assume that you have access to external objects, and yet you deny that you have access to external objects? Seems like a performative contradiction to me.

How do you know we have a brain or any organs of sense if you have no access to an external world?

On what basis do you conclude that we have sense-data?

You misunderstand. I'm not denying that new areas of study can result in profound changes to human life. Many, if not most, of those changes are on account of the supercharging of technological development. The discovery of fossil fuels was arguably a significant driver of that, and the thermodynamics involved in the development of the steam engine and then the ICE have nothing to do with advances in Quantum Mechanics.

That interesting...I enjoy the language in BM. The only other book of his I have read, many years ago now, is The Road. Over the last couple years I have rediscovered a passion for fiction, after many years wasted ( :wink: ) reading philosophy. As the old saw would have it "there is no accounting for taste".

I am motivated to read some more of his work, so I'll put Suttree at the top of the list on account of your recommendation. :smile:

They're both paradigms, as per Kuhn's terminology. Quantum physics represented a significant departure from classical physics, particularly in its rejection of deterministic, Newtonian mechanics and its introduction of probabilistic and wave-particle duality concepts. — Wayfarer

Newtonian mechanics never purported to deal with the microphysical, so they are not really bets understood as different paradigms, but as different areas of investigation.

The so-called Copernican Revolution came about as a result of more accurate observations made possible by the invention of the telescope and advances in telescope technology.

Sure, you can call these different paradigms, but I think the terminology is a bit overblown and potentially misleading.

Blood Meridian by Cormac McCarthy — Maw

I picked up a secondhand hardback copy in mint condition at a beachside book shop when travelling a few weeks ago and I've been reading it...a most powerfully evocative work!

The previous one was the shift to the Copernican solar system and the ensuing 'scientific revolution'. — Wayfarer

I see both as being merely openings up of new areas of study due to advances in technology, and of course new areas of study are going to involve new ways of understanding.

I wasn't asking you to "go over it again" but to provide an actual argument. If you don't want to do that, that's fine... I don't care.

Sense data. — AmadeusD

To posit sense data you are relying on the idea that our senses give reliable access to the organs of sense, so it seems to me that your position entails a performative contradiction.

That, to me, does not constitute access to them - but, it sounds like we agree, just not on terminology. — AmadeusD

If it doesn't constitute access to external objects, however limited, then what do you think it does gain access to?

In a sense, yes. Though I'm not sure that "arbitrary" is the right world. I have an impression that the experiences seem to fit in to whatever religious/metaphysical framework the experiencer already has. Which is not to say that they may not change how the ideas are expressed and the aspects that are emphasized. — Ludwig V

I used the term 'arbitrary' to indicate that I think mystical and psychedelic experiences can be rationalized in terms of any religious/ metaphysical framework.

That's certainly true. Though aren't some experiences - "bad trips" - paranoid fantasies, which may be life-changing, but not in a good way. That's why I say they have to be assessed, in the end, by their results in the ordinary world. — Ludwig V

My experience is that bad trips may either be indicative of underlying psychoses or be just due to existential anxieties. So, I have known many people who have taken many trips, but no one whose subsequent ongoing psychosis or extreme neurosis could be definitively attributed to the use of psychedelics. That said, I don't doubt that the use of psychedelics can in rare cases trigger incipient psychoses.

It seems to me that there is awfully good evidence from entheogens that some capacity for 'spiritual experience' tends to be a physical characteristic of human brains. — wonderer1

Yes. I agree, having experimented extensively with entheogens myself, and I think the 'spiritual' aspect is a 'feeling' phenomenon which does not support any claim about the metaphysical nature of reality. Religious and metaphysical conclusions are arbitrary, culturally driven, after the fact add-ons.

This is something which I think is so obvious, but those who wish to believe in something transcendent can never seem to, in the face of all the compelling evidence, bring themselves to accept it. Wishful thinking and confirmation bias and the scotomas that go with them rule among the spiritually and religiously minded.

But the fact that some people have such experiences seems undeniable. Dismissing them all as frauds or unbalanced is as implausible as claiming that all such experiences are genuine. In the end, it will come back to common sense and everyday life to sort the sheep from the goats - and the criterion is not truth/falsity. — Ludwig V

Mystics undoubtedly experience something they attempt to evoke in their writings. It is the postulated ontological or metaphysical implications of what is experienced that are questionable and that have nothing at all to do with philosophy, due to their vacuity.

This is not to say that the experience itself is not rich and cannot be inspiring, even life-changing; it is necessarily vacuous only in the propositional. not the poetical. sense.

Ethics do not depend upon a transcendent lawgiver but are based on the pragmatic need to live harmoniously with others.

On the other hand, you may live your live differently if you believe in an afterlife; indeed, you may accord it more importance than this life, and even devalue this life.

:100:

(i.e. ideality is merely abstracted from materiality) — 180 Proof

:up: Yep.