...criteria for the identification of things
— Janus
How do these differ from just plain properties - that is, we can identify the kettle form others if we specify that it is the one on the stove; but being on the stove is not, I suppose, a part of the essence of being that kettle. — Banno

I was thinking in terms of identification of things as kinds of thing, not identification of things as particular things. For the purposes of the latter we could bring relations into consideration. Although all indivduals have unique identifying qualities too.

For example we could say that there are essential characteristics that all tigers share, while there are also unique individual variations of those characteristics. A question I've wondered about is, in the context of modal logic, how far we can go in considering all those properties to be contingent, that is not logically necessary.

Perhaps the subjective experience of information processing systems of sufficient number and/or complexity is awareness. And when sufficient feedback loops are also present, the experience is self-awareness. — Patterner

Whitehead pointed out that any object is "subject" to effects from its environment. So cliffs are weathered, are subject to sunlight, wind and water erosion for example. But we don't usually think of inanimate objects as possessing internally maintained structural integrity. We might think that way about cells and even microphysical particles, though.

So, along with the idea of internally maintained structural integrity comes the biological phenomenon of homeostasis, and this requires the ability to respond to the external and internal environments appropriately, something that a rock responding to the sunlight, wind and rain by being eroded could hardly be said to be doing.

Of course even the most complex organisms, even we humans, are " weathered", "eroded" by the internal and external environments, so we are "subjects" in that sense as well.

I see no problem with the idea of essential qualities or attributes. But should we think of them as logically necessary or merely as criteria for the identification of things?

However, it seems to me that if the 'reality beyond/before phenomena' was structureless, it would not possible for us to give it a 'form'. — boundless

I made the same point myself earlier in the thread but it received no response―which is probably understandable.

Not sufficient to explain the commonality of experience. That's why Kant says there are things in themselves which appear to us as phenomena. Schopenhauer disagreed and claimed there cannot be things in themselves if there is no space and time (both of which are necessary for differentiation) except in individual minds. To posit an undifferentiated, unstructured thing in itself that gives rise to an unimaginably complex world of things on a vast range of scales is, to say the least, illogical. — Janus

Kant may have "gone too far" as you say―it depends on how you read him. There are realist interpretations of Kant―that is there are scholars who interpret him as thinking that things in themselves are mind-independently real, but unknowable as they are in themselves (and that by mere definition) and knowable only as they appear to us.

Anti-realists, anti-materialists, anti-physicalists have a vested interest in denying the reality of things in themselves, because to allow them would be to admit that consciousness is not fundamental, and, very often it seems, for religious or spiritual reasons they want to believe that consciousness is fundamental, especially if they don't want to accept the Abrahamic god. One can, without inconsistency, accept the Abrahamic god and be a realist about mind-independent existents.

Nominalism was clearly part of what was going on, but something as complex as the Renaissance/Reformation must have involved many interacting factors. — Ludwig V

That's right, it is just one thread within the whole tapestry. The attempt to characterize nominalism as 'where we went wrong' is a tendentious, "just-so" story. There are many points in history, right back to the advent of agriculture and land ownership where it could be said we "went the wrong way". The polemic between nominalism and realism of universals is a minor philosophical issue which is of concern only to (some) of the intellectual elites. There are also more nuanced views which avoid this very polemic.

I would go further and suggest that there are no "slam-dunk" arguments anywhere in philosophy. If there were, they would demolish ideas without understand them properly, and in metaphysics all ideas deserve a proper understanding — Ludwig V

Right, I'm obviously not going to disagree (except that you are "going further") since I said as much myself in the very passage you are responding to.

However, your argument proves too much. It is always the case that conclusions depend on what assumptions are made at the start. But that applies to good arguments as much as to bad ones.
I do agree that there is no fact of the matter that will determine the truth or falsity of any metaphysical view. But that doesn't necessarily mean that all views are equal. — Ludwig V

It is strange that you seem to think you are disagreeing with me somehow, when I have already said pretty much what you are saying here. Recall that earlier I said it comes down to what seems most plausible. Of course I agree that there are good arguments and bad arguments, and assuming that we are referring to consistent (with their premises) arguments, then evaluation must comes down to plausibility. It is a little like aesthetics―we all know there are good and bad artworks, but a precise and determinable measure of aesthetic value , just as a precise and determinable measure of plausibility, is not possible.

"Supervenience already implies a function from micro-configurations to macro-properties: if two systems are identical in all micro respects, they must be identical in their macro-properties. But this function need not be definable in purely micro-level terms. The criteria that fix the mapping may depend on high-level structures or capacities that cannot themselves be specified without invoking macro-level concepts." — Pierre-Normand

If you are trying to describe macro-level functions in micro-level terms, then the macro-level description is also indispensable. Otherwise what would it be that you are trying to describe in micro-level terms?

This just seems obvious. But the complaint that seems to be commonly made is that the macro-level description is lost in the micro-level description, and that the micro-level description is thus not a true description. But how could it be otherwise?

I think this problem is what constitutes the so-called "hard problem". No micro-level description will be acceptable to those who demand that physicalism should be able to explain subjective experience, if it eliminates the macro-level description. but it must eliminate the macro-level description (Sellars "manifest image" of human experience and judgement) otherwise it would not be a micro-level description.

So does this substance called mind have a molecular structure? — Wayfarer

And here is a fine example of this conflation of paradigms.

You are probably right that I can become a little verbally aggressive when it becomes obvious to me that the person I am supposed to be discussing with refuses to address my arguments by either distorting them, dismissively labeling them as examples of some ism or other, or simply ignores them. I said you were "full of shit" only once when you claimed to have addressed what I said and that claim was patently untrue. I have probably accused you of intellectual dishonesty a few times for the same reason.

These reactions that express annoyance are not ideal...I acknowledge that, but they have been prompted by frustration. You cannot seriously claim that I don't understand your arguments...in fact you know very well that I do understand them. If I didn't understand them I would ask for clarification, and this is usually not necessary in your case because your writing is clear enough. It is intellectually dishonest to tell someone that they don't understand what you have written if they have not asked for further explanation and if you are not prepared to cite what they have said in response and clearly explain how it constitutes a misunderstanding as opposed to a mere disagreement.

I see you often use this tactic of claiming that your interlocutor simply does not understand in your discussions with others. I will continue to critique what you write if I think it is inconsistent or dogmatic. I reserve the right to call out dogmatism when I see it, and I will always give a clear and sufficient explanation as to why I think it is dogmatic, and then the ball is in your court to defend your claims against the charge of dogmatism by offering cogent arguments as to why it should not be considered to be so. Whether you respond or not is up to you.

:up:

But the claim “mind is brain” is itself conceptual. It relies on the conceptual architecture of science. — Wayfarer

It all depends on your perspective. For the physicalist the claim "mind is brain" is physical, as reasoning is a physical process. Concepts themselves (as conceived) are hypostatized physical processes for the physicalist.

The problem for you is that you think there is a "slam dunk" way of debunking physicalism. There is no slam dunk way of debunking physicalism or any other metaphysical view because everything depends on what assumptions you begin with.

With metaphysics the best you can hope for is consistency and plausibility, you are not going to get any proof.

Yes, the redundancy of ipseity. :wink:

So, according to you it is out of bounds for anyone to join in by expressing their opinion unless it is accordance with yours?

You won't dare to engage with my arguments directly because you know you have no answers for them, so I conclude you are not a genuinely open-minded interlocutor, but are an ideologue, a dogmatist, who reacts defensively by casting aspersions on those who present counterarguments and critiques they cannot deal with.

Gobbledygook.

Sure - I entirely agree, it should be trivial. Some people might disagree, as with everything else in philosophy.

Now the only issue is if you are OK with saying some versions of idealism entail mental mediation or if you think idealism must entail something else. — Manuel

I'm not sure what your are asking here Manuel. I think all worldviews must entail mental mediation insofar as they are worldviews. And I think virtually all worldviews must acknowledge that human experience, perception, cognition entail mental mediation.

Perhaps one exception might be a view that the things we perceive are given to our minds fully formed by God, and this would be a kind of direct realism. Perhaps Berkeley has something like this in mind.

By "something else" do you mean 'something independent of the individual mind'? If that is what you mean then I do think any coherent idealism must entail something else, whether that be an entanglement of all minds, all minds being connected to a collective or universal mind like the Buddhiust ālaya-vijñāna (storehouse consciousness) or God.

So, we need some way of connecting or independently informing individual minds in order to explain the undeniable commonality of experience. For physicalism or materialism that "something else" is the world of mind-independently existing things.


The meaning of life is all about proselytization. :wink:

But there are restrained versions of it which argue is that what we access is necessarily mentally mediated - without making ontological commitments about what these objects are (non-mental, immaterial, mechanistic, etc.) — Manuel

It's more that the way we access what we access is mentally mediated, and that is really a truism, even tautologous, If we say that perception is a mental process.

Transcendental idealism does not claim that the world is a mere figment of individual minds, but rather that the structure of experience is provided by our shared and inherent cognitive systems. — Wayfarer

With no input from the structure of the world or a collective originating mind? That just doesn't compute.

Agreement arises because we all operate with fundamentally similar mental structures. This preserves the objectivity of the external world while acknowledging the active role our minds play in organizing experience. — Wayfarer

Not sufficient to explain the commonality of experience. That's why Kant says there are things in themselves which appear to us phenomena. Schopenhauer disagreed and claimed there cannot be things in themselves if there is no space and time (both of which are necessary for differentiation) except in individual minds. To posit an undifferentiated, unstructured thing in itself that gives rise to an unimaginably complex world of things on a vast range of scales is, to say the least, illogical.

At least Berkeley's idea that all that complexity is generated in the mind of God, which we all participate in, makes some logical sense.

The explanation on offer, "god did it", can account for anything, and so accounts for nothing. Not what I look for in an explanation.

I find it hard to make sense of "collective mind". — Banno

I'm with you on that, but can allow that others think it makes sense. I mean it's really the only thinkable alternative to a mind-independently existent world.

Berkeleyan idealism consists in claiming not that the objects of the senses find their genesis in the individual human mind but in the mind of God, so the problems you enumerated don't seem to be relevant.

The way I see it, the fact that we all experience the same world can be explained only by a collective mind we all participate in or an independently existing material world. We cannot know which alternative is true, the best we can do is decide which seems the more plausible.

Not sure which direct quotation you are referring to. If you mean his saying that the equation should describe the world in a deterministic way, I would interpret that as meaning that, given that the predictive success of QT is unparalleled, and given that the usefulness of any scientific theory consists in its predictive power, he concludes it must be incomplete.

The quoted passage just shows that Penrose is not a rigid determinist, and although Penrose is not quoted as explicitly saying it, according to the author of the article his attack is on the determinism and materialism that dominates the scientific environment, which I would have though is well in line with your ideas on the subject.

His objection is philosophical: the equation should describe the world in a completely deterministic way; they don’t describe ‘what the world is doing’. But what if ‘the world’ is not fully determined by physics? What if it is in some fundamental sense truly probabilistic, not entirely fixed? He doesn’t seem to be able to even admit the possibility. — Wayfarer

This doesn't seem to be true:

Penrose’s attack is directed at determinism and materialism, still dominating the scientific environment and, in particular, neurosciences and believing to be able to reproduce human thought in a computer: «I have my reasons not to believe in this. Some actions of the human thought may be certainly be simulated computationally. For example, the sum of two numbers or even more complex arithmetic and algebraic operations. But human thought goes beyond these things when it becomes important to understand the meaning of that in which we are involved».

From Here

Hence Penrose’s insistence that quantum physics is just wrong - because of his unshakeable conviction in scientific realism. — Wayfarer

I think this is a bit misleading. Here Penrose says that what he means is that QT is incomplete, and when he says 'wrong' he admits he is being "blatant". Also his target for wrongness is not QT as such, but a specific interpretation which claims that it is consciousness which collapses the wave function.

Every proposed fundamental particle has been broken down into further particles in experimentation, implying infinite regress. — Metaphysician Undercover

Why would that necessarily be so? For all we know there is nothing more fundamental than quarks. There does seem to be a limit to the possibility of measurement, that much is known.

Recall that in the early modern scientific model, the measurable attributes of bodies were said to be different from how the object appeared to the senses. This is central to the 'great abstraction' of physics that Berkeley was criticising. — Wayfarer

I'm not sure how you are relating what you say here to the point I made. The idea of fundamental constituents of material objects has been around since Democritus, and as far as I know, those constituents had, until fairly recent times, never been thought to be measurable, and in any case a fundamental limit of measurability has been determined (the Planck length). Rather it would seem to be how the object appears to the senses that is, potentially at least, measurable.

Perhaps we could study philosophy, and also study philosophically, rather than referring everything to science as the arbiter of reality. — Wayfarer

It is not that science is the "arbiter of reality'―the question is rather as to what our metaphysical speculations and conclusions should be guided by.

Science provides no guidance on this. It is a metaphysical question. The fundamental matter/energy assumption falls to infinite regress in scientific experimentation. — Metaphysician Undercover

I could equally say that imagination, intuitions, feelings and wishes provide no guidance on metaphysical questions.

Do you have a reference or an argument for your 'fundamental matter/ energy' claim?

We noted above that what Berkeley denies is not the reality of the objects of sense, but of a material substance — something which underlies and stands apart from the objects it comprises. — Wayfarer

Why would it be thought that material substance "stands apart from the objects it comprises" if it is what constitutes them? This looks like a strawman.

Kant doesn’t say our faculties impose order on “reality in itself” — only on the raw manifold of intuition as it is given to us. — Wayfarer

What is given to the senses cannot plausibly, or even coherently, be thought to be unstructured, undifferentiated in itself and yet give rise to a shared world of phenomena. If all the differentiation and structure originated with the individual human subject the fact of a shared world becomes inexplicable, unless a collective or universal mind be posited, and it is precisely that (God) which Berkeley posits.

Such a universal mind (deity) is a thinkable possibility as is a fundamental substance (matter/ energy) of which all things are constituted. The salient question is which seems the more plausible, and since there is no strict measure of plausibly, the answer to that will vary among folk.

Should we take science as our guide to determine which seems more plausible, or should we take our imagination, intuitions, feelings and wishes?

But that’s not the same as being epistemically open to being proven wrong now, while we’re talking about the evidence. — Sam26

The point was just that there is no strict measure of what evidence should be convincing for everyone, other than direct observation ( and even there we have those who think there is room for skepticism).

The other thing is that we all have limited time and so must prioritize what seems most important to us individually to investigate, if we wish to investigate anything at all. So, I acknowledge that it is possible that if I had researched the NDE phenomena as thoroughly and for as long as you apparently have, then I might be convinced. The problem is it is not important enough for me to motivate doing that because I figure I'll either find out one day when I die (if there is life after death, otherwise not) or if I have my own NDE I might be convinced by that.

Saying “it’s not important” sounds less like humility and more like a way of keeping the question at arm’s length so it doesn’t disturb the framework you’ve already settled into. — Sam26

I'm only saying it's not important to me personally―or at least not important enough to motivate me to investigate it. I don't think there is any fact of the matter as to whether it is important tout court.

I’m not asking you to agree with me—I’m asking you to acknowledge that the evidence exists and that dismissing it wholesale is a choice, not a necessity. Choosing to live with “the reality of our ignorance” should mean keeping the file open, not declaring the case unanswerable before you’ve read it. — Sam26

I do acknowledge that, so I'm not, as I said, saying no one should be convinced by the evidence.

You didn’t personally witness the Big Bang, World War II, or the formation of Mount Everest, but you accept those as realities because the convergence of evidence is strong. — Sam26

I accept the Big Bang provisionally as the most plausible current theory. I can see absolutely no reaosn to doubt that WW2 happened. I accept plate tectonic theory as the most likely explanation for the formation of Everest that we now have.

As for “misremembering, collusion, or fabrication”—those are always possible, but possible in the same way they’re possible in eyewitness testimony for any event. — Sam26

That's true of course, but I think I have less reason to doubt eyewitness accounts of ordinary events than I do of extraordinary ones. And even then I'm fundamentally skeptical of testimony regarding legal claims, having the view of the reliability of human memory and testimony, not to mention honesty, that I do.

(On account of this I would never want to be on a jury, because the thought of wrongfully convicting someone horrifies me. Of course I understand that it is necessary that there be juries, but I'll happily leave the task to those who are more comfortable with passing judgement).

I also hear you say you’re “not all that interested” because you can’t change whatever the truth is. But this isn’t just metaphysical curiosity, it’s about what kind of beings we are, what we mean by “life” and “death,” and how we shape ethics, medicine, and meaning in light of that. — Sam26

The shaping of ethics and medicine should be done only with regard to this life in my view, because I believe this life is all we can know with certainty. Similarly, that's why I think religion, in the sense of otherworldly concerns, should be kept out of politics. As to "meaning", wherever we are not forced to accept meanings imposed by others, we all develop our own meanings out of life experience, and I think that is as it should be.

And finally, the line about never being proven wrong if there’s nothing after death? That’s not an advantage, it’s an evasion. The real question is: are you willing to examine the evidence without protecting your conclusions in advance? If the answer is no, then the conversation isn’t really about evidence, it’s about comfort. — Sam26

If it's an evasion it is not my evasion. I can be proven wrong, because I assume there is no life after death. If there is life after death I will be proven wrong. I will never be convinced by the kind of testimonial evidence you are convinced by. But that's OK―there is no strict measure of plausibility, and we all believe what we personally find most plausible. I just don't think it's that important―I think what is important is living this life the best way we can, which for myself involves accepting the reality of our ignorance in those matters where I believe reliable knowledge is impossible.

So, don't get me wrong―I am not for a minute saying you should not believe in NDEs, I'm just saying that I personally don't find the evidence convincing.

You obviously haven't been paying attention to my argument. You’re assuming from the outset that consciousness surviving clinical death is extraordinary and therefore requires some special, elevated evidential bar. — Sam26

From my perspective it's an extraordinary event simply because I have never experienced such a thing, and none of the many hundreds of people I have known personally have ever claimed to have an NDE.

And if you want to put NDEs in the same box as Bigfoot or UFO abductions, you’re ignoring the key difference: veridical perception—accurately describing events, objects, or conversations that occurred while the brain was offline, and which were later confirmed by independent witnesses. — Sam26

How do I know the corroborations of those witnesses do not consist in misremembering, collusion or fabrication? I don't have any "horse in the race"―if it turns out that my consciousness survives the death of the body, I'll deal with it then. In the meantime I might be convinced if I experienced an NDE myself or perhaps even if sometime whose veracity I trusted sufficiently told me they had such an experience. But even then I might think there could be some other explanation, because after death survival of personal consciousness seems so implausible given what is known about the brain.

I'll confess I'm not all that interested simply because I cannot do anything about whatever turns out to be the reality anyway. I guess one advantage of believing in the survival of consciousness, like the belief in God, is that you cannot be proven wrong―if there is no consciousness after death you will never know you were wrong.

The brain might be a kind of interface or transceiver, not the sole producer of consciousness. Damage the radio, and you can’t hear the broadcast, but that doesn’t mean the signal isn’t still there. — Sam26

The brain is almost infinitely more complex than a radio or a computer, and yet the radio or computer can receive much more information than the brain. If the brain were merely a transceiver why would it need to be so complex?

We rely on multiple classes of testimony across serious domains every day: eyewitnesses in court, patient self-reports in medicine, historical documents in scholarship, field notes in anthropology, and yes, expert statements. — Sam26

Sure we do rely on such inexpert testimony in many contexts, but the testimony relied on in those contexts is about commonly experienced events, not claims about extraordinary events like NDE's, or sighting Bigfoot or UFOs or being abducted by aliens.

That passage reads like nonsense―can't find anything there to respond to.

↪Janus
coherent
Reminds me of that word, “proof”. — Punshhh

Sorry I previously missed this response of yours. I'm not getting what you are getting at.

For what its worth, the dictionaries seem to cite that "real" as a definition of "existent". But it seems pretty clear that "real" in most of its uses does not mean exists and "non-existent" is not an antonym for "unreal", not is "unreal" a synonym for existent. What the dictionaries seem to miss is that the meaning of both "real" and "exists" depends on the context - on what is being said to be real or exist.

Nevertheless, it is hard to believe there are many cases in which one would want to say that something real didn't exist, even though it is quite normal to accept that something unreal does exist - under a different description. A toy car is not a real car, but it is a real toy. A painting may not be a real Titian, but it is a real forgery. &c. One needs to bear in mind several close relations like actual, authentic, genuine, and so on.

It is pretty clear that are used in different ways in many contexts. So I'm afraid that I don't understand what you mean by "But that something -- the distinction itself -- does not depend on our use of "real" and "existent" to describe it." — Ludwig V

Yes, the various meanings and associations of 'real', 'existing' are context dependent. We can say that numbers are real in that they have properties that no one can sensibly deny. We can say that they don't exist, however, because no one has ever seen a number.

On the other hand it could be said that number exists as perceptible quantity. We can see the difference between two oranges and eight oranges, for example. What I object to is the idea that is, at least implicitly, in the OP that there is some absolute "higher" distinction between the terms that only the "illuminated ones" can fathom. Such claims are nothing more than dogma.

Let me be blunt: if you think testimony isn’t evidence, then you’re not just wrong—you’re being selectively inconsistent. You accept testimony as evidence all the time: in courtrooms, in history books, in journalism, in scientific discovery. Much of what you believe about the world has been passed to you through other people’s words. Testimony is a fundamental mode of knowing. That’s not a fringe claim; that’s epistemology 101. — Sam26

There is testimony and then there is testimony. The kinds of testimony you say we all accept is expert testimony which has been tested, documented and peer-reviewed. The testimony you are citing is not of the same kind.

Contrary to protestations and resentment from many, that's what Philosophy is. — Banno

Right...as I seem to remember Hegel putting it: "The same old stew, reheated".

That's very cute! And apt in a way I find I can't articulate.

Idealism is the predominant metaphysics in western society. Surprise, surprise! — Metaphysician Undercover

That seems to be factually incorrect at least when it comes to philosophers: https://survey2020.philpeople.org/survey/results/all

I have been arguing that the picture given by empiricism, the supposed "empirical reality", is incorrect, false and misleading. — Metaphysician Undercover

I haven't seen any argument for that conclusion. Can you briefly state what " inconsistencies, problems, failures" are to be found with empiricism? Be concise, no hand-waving.

To your whole post :up:

That, and that the OP was by Frank, who is at the least earnest in his posts. — Banno

"Do you want me to be Frank? I'll be Ernest if you'd rather" Benny Hill.

It's "reliability" is relative, and context dependent, so your dismissal is just an attempt to avoid the reality that it answers your question, regardless of whether answering your question gets us anywhere or not. — Metaphysician Undercover

Let's grant for the sake of argument that (intellectual) intuition sometimes might give us an accurate picture of the nature of reality ("reality" here meaning something more than mere empirical reality, that is not merely things as they appear to us, but rather some "deeper" truth metaphysically speaking). How do we tell when a particular intuition has given us such knowledge?

I won't respond to the rest of your post as it seems like either sophistical nonsense or inaccurate speculations about my motives.

Hmm, seems like the same accusation was leveled against me. That indicates that the person making the accusation is really the one with the idiosyncratic definition. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, you and Wayfarer share an idiosyncratic definition, and surprise, surprise! you are both idealists. As I said, if we want to say 'there are noumena' that amounts to saying 'noumena exist' under any ordinary understanding of what the term 'exist' means. We would be saying that noumena are not merely imaginary entities, but are real.

We would be saying that noumena are not merely mind-dependent or perception dependent entities (phenomena) but are mind-independently real entities. Saying, as Wayfarer does, that they neither exist nor do not exist may have some evocative or poetic point, but in a discursive context, it is just nonsense, because in its contradiction it tells us nothing.

How can I perceive something that transcends the category of existence? It's hard enough to perceive things that don't exist! Unless -- as I was trying to suggest -- "the world" and "the in-itself" are not the same. This was the distinction I was drawing between "our world" and "the world of noumena." — J

If there are things in themselves (noumena) which appear to us as phenomena, then we do perceive things in themselves, but we do not perceive them as things in themselves (and this is so by mere definition). It there are noumena then by any ordinary definition of 'existence' they can be said to exist.

@Wayfarer wants to insist that his own idiosyncratic definition of 'existence' is the correct one, which is absurd given that the meanings of terms are determined by (predominant) use.

I can give you a more common example. Suppose we can agree to "love and beauty cannot be explained by logic." It does not follow then that "love and beauty involve contradictions," or that "to say one is in love, one must affirm a contradiction." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Such a weak analogy! Many, probably most, people experience love and beauty. They are simply not governed by logic―not things we use logic to understand―we understand them by feeling them. The Trinity is a concept―either an illogical, that is self-contradictory, concept or incoherent, and not a concept at all but just a string of words that make no sense.

To quote C.S. Lewis from The Problem of Pain: — Count Timothy von Icarus

All that quote shows is that God is subject to logic, just like the rest of us. So, not omnipotent.

You are going to be accused of not getting the point, while a coherent explanation of the point will never be forthcoming.

But it's not a rebuttal to the philosophical question: what is the nature of the reality we claim to know? — Wayfarer

Your position entails that we cannot know anything at all about reality "in itself" and I agree with that as far as it goes.. So, we are left with what we know of reality as it appears. We don't know with certainty what appearances tell us outside the context of appearances and I've never claimed otherwise. We simply deal with what seems most plausible.

We certainly do have the faculty of being able to experience.

Again you are wrong. I offer reasoned counterpoints and critiques which you apparently cannot deal with so you resort to insult or you just ignore what I've said. I feel no hostility towards you because I have nothing to defend. The hostility seems to be all from your side. I'm not the one delivering personal attacks, I attack only the ideas, not the person.

I simply express what I think, make the criticisms that I think need to be made. You could try actually engaging the counterpoints and critiques for a change. You might actually learn something. Or if you can successfully refute my objections I will concede as much.

I don't see you engaging with anyone on these forums who disagrees with you.

I see you are offering much the same kind of critique as I have. Let's see how @Wayfarer responds.

This seems a typical obfuscation from you. The evasive slur, when you actually know nothing about my "educational limits" makes you look like a very "poor faith": interlocutor.

Exactly what have I said is both obvious and absurd? Try engaging with others' responses for a change―you might come to understand what they are actually saying.

If all you're saying is that what we experience is mediated by our senses, our bodies and brains, then you are saying nothing controversial.

We can say that because things have their own existences independent of our perceptions, their own existences will not be the just the same as our perceptions and judgements. But you are wont to say that they don't even have their own existences, which makes your position look extremely confused.

Poetic, or perhaps not so poetic, musings. No one denies that children can play nonsense games together.