material and immaterial — RussellA
"photon" is a concept in the English language, and concepts are something abstract.
Surely mathematical concepts cannot be classified as metaphorical. — Metaphysician Undercover
So give me an example of something material. — flannel jesus
I made the same point myself earlier in the thread but it received no response―which is probably understandable. — Janus
Anti-realists, anti-materialists, anti-physicalists have a vested interest in denying the reality of things in themselves, because to allow them would be to admit that consciousness is not fundamental, and, very often it seems, for religious or spiritual reasons they want to believe that consciousness is fundamental, especially if they don't want to accept the Abrahamic god. One can, without inconsistency, accept the Abrahamic god and be a realist about mind-independent existents. — Janus
Better to say D’Espagnat developed a more complete epistemic idealist theory grounded in transcendental realism, than to say Kant developed a less complete epistemic theory because it wasn’t. — Mww
But "interaction-free measurements" work because there is a physical change in the system behavior due to a change in the experimental context, analogous to closing a slit in the double slit experiment. — Apustimelogist
A classical analogy for interaction free measurements, as in the quantum Zeno Elitzur–Vaidman_bomb_tester, can be given in terms of my impulsive niece making T tours of a shopping mall in order to decide what she'd like me to buy her for her birthday.
... — sime
sorry buddy, "table" is a concept in the English language, and concepts are something abstract. — flannel jesus
Agreed with that. But this doesn't change the fact that it seems quite different from the classical case. In fact, I believe that your example is perfect here. In de Broglie-Bohm, changing the experimental context has a nonlocal effect also on the measured system. — boundless
Taking one example, that of the mathematical concept of zero.
A metaphor is a figure of speech that in mentioning one thing actually refers to another thing, such as "all the world's a stage".
As with Derrida's concept of différance, absence is as important as presence. It is the absence of meaning that allows the presence of interpretation to emerge (Wikipedia - Jacques Derrida).
Zero is metaphorical in that it turns absence into presence. Zero refers to nothing, but it has the sense of something. — RussellA
For me the problem with this 'variant' of Kantianism is that it can only explain the form of appearances, not that there are appearances at all. — boundless
I do believe that the great merit of Kant (and epistemic idealism in general) is his view that mind isn't a 'passive' recorder of 'what happens' but that it actively interprets phenomena. I also believe that we can't easily differentiate what is 'mind-dependent' from what is 'mind-independent', an antinomy if you will. — boundless
Well, I am sympathetic to theism, in fact. IMO, our mind can 'produce' the representation because the 'external reality' is itself intelligible. However, we can only know it by interacting with it and producing a representation of it, which is the 'phenomenal world'. It's not a 'deceptive' veil - at least, if we remember that it is also the result of the interpreteation that our mind makes of the 'external reality'. In fact, I think that the act of 'knowing' is always mediated. The 'external reality' is the 'known', our mind is the 'knower' and the 'phenomenal world' (or the 'representation') is the medium by which our mind can know the external reality. — boundless
If Kant's 'idealism' asserted that appearances are mere mental contents then, it would be subjective idealism. However, Kant also asserts that there is 'something' about phenomena that it is not 'mental'. However, we are left with no clue on how that 'something' is related to appearances. — boundless
I actually think a table is MORE abstract than a photon. — flannel jesus
Yes, ofcourse. Interestingly, you can produce bombtester-like behavior in baths of fluid: e.g. — Apustimelogist
For me, a mechanism like this is the most attractive explanation of quantum theory, something already postulated in the stochastic mechanical interpretation and some versions of Bohm. It sounds weird but it seems quite compatible with the ontologies of quantum field theory imo, which additionally also seems to tell us that there is no truly empty space, i.e. vacuum energy and fluctuations. — Apustimelogist
Yes, and I would say that it can only explain the general forms that our experiences take, and not the commonality of experiences of particular forms (which we might call the content of experiences). — Janus
So, it is hard to say what we might mean by 'mind-dependent' in distinction to 'body/brain dependent'. — Janus
That there are such existents is strongly suggested by science and even by everyday experience. Of course as soon as we perceive something it no longer strictly qualifies to be placed in that category. — Janus
I agree with most of what you say here, although I'm not clear on how you have related it to theism. In Kant was the problem that the senses might thought to be deceptive veils, and I think Hegel effectively dealt with that error in his Phenomenology. — Janus
If we do away with the external world we are left with a mere Phenomenalism, which seems to explain nothing. By "external world" I simply refer to what lies outside the boundaries of our skins. I cannot see any reason to doubt the existence of external reality defined that way. What the ultimate nature of that external reality might be is unknown and perhaps unknowable. It might be ideas in the mind of god, or it might simply be a world of existents. — Janus
You seem to allude to the idea that without god the intelligibility of the external world is inexplicable — Janus
Don't forget that the categories of the understanding and our sensory abilities are factors that we all share. They're not particular to individuals, although individuals 'instantiate' those capacities. I have just responded in the mind-created world discussion to further points along these lines. — Wayfarer
It takes the word out of the context of mathematics, it doesn't bring metaphor into mathematics. — Metaphysician Undercover
right, so you saying table is concrete and photon is not is... not quite it then is it? — flannel jesus
I found Matt Strassler's article about matter and energy very interesting, as it casts doubt on the assumption that matter is energy. Perhaps the equation of the two is simplistic. I need to explore this question further. — Janus
For me the fact that the mind is not "passive recorder" is uncontroversial. We are affected by what is external to our bodies via the senses... — Janus
Presumably it's possible because I have experienced the universe and I have registered that it can exist without conscious minds. — Barkon
A metaphor is a figure of speech that in mentioning one thing actually refers to another thing. For example, the symbol "+" in mathematics refers to the combining of sets. — RussellA
do the fundamental particles and forces contribute to the higher order of a 'table'? If no, then the forces and particles aren't really doing anything... — Barkon
I meant that I prefer d'Espagnat's view than Kant's…. — boundless
Kant also asserts that there is 'something' about phenomena that it is not 'mental'. However, we are left with no clue on how that 'something' is related to appearances. — boundless
Huh? I only see one thing, "the combining of sets". And that is how you defined "+". Where is the other thing, which makes it metaphorical? — Metaphysician Undercover
Perhaps. I know that there are some technical difficulties for de Broglie Bohm's extensions to QFT but I am not competent enough to comment. — boundless
Addition is a metaphorical concept, because one thing, namely 2 + 3, refers to a different thing, namely 5. — RussellA
Energy is taken to be equivalent to mass, and mass is taken to be the fundamental, essential property of matter. — Metaphysician Undercover
The determinist perspective sees the actions of living beings as effects of external causation. The free will perspective sees an internal cause of action which has an effect on what is external. — Metaphysician Undercover
But it is a bit of a stretch to say that all 'formal' properties of experience depend on the regulative faculties of our minds. — boundless
To me the problem is trying to make sense of the mind in purely 'physical' terms, once you assume that the 'physical' is completely devoid of any quality that pertains to mind. — boundless
But the sixth is the 'inner' sense of the mind. So, to a Buddhist when we are aware of a mental content, it's like being aware of a sense object. — boundless
I don't think that even Wayfarer reject that. — boundless
Can we be certain on how the 'external reality' is? I would say no, because our knowledge is limited and imperfect (and not strictly speaking becuase it is mediated). — boundless
Note, however, that the epistemic idealist is right in suggesting that we do not have a direct knowledge of 'reality' and our 'phenomenal world' is our 'best guess' of it, so to speak (to borrow a phrase from St. Paul, 'we know as if through a glass, darkly'). — boundless
Given that we do not have a possibility to 'check' how our 'interpretation of reality' corresponds to 'reality', we IMO should grant the epistemic idealist that we cannot make certain claims on the noumenal. The epistemic idealist might say that the 'noumenal' is beyond concepts, beyond intelligibility and we should be silent on it (and you find quite similar claims in some Buddhist and Hindu tradition, to be honest). — boundless
We can, however, debate on which picture of the 'noumenal' seems more reasonable. — boundless
If physicalism were right, intelligibility of 'the world' seems to that has no explanation at all. Just a brute fact, that allowed our minds to navigate in the world. Note, however, that mathematical and logical laws (the 'laws of reasons' in general) seem to have a character of 'eternality' (or 'time independence') and 'necessity', which both do not seem to be compatible with a view that mind isn't in some sense fundamental. — boundless
He says that there cannot be such existents, that they are neither existent nor non-existent. — Janus
I am not arguing that… ‘the world is all in the mind’. It’s rather that, whatever judgements are made about the world, the mind provides the framework within which such judgements are meaningful. So though we know that prior to the evolution of life there must have been a Universe with no intelligent beings in it, or that there are empty rooms with no inhabitants, or objects unseen by any eye — the existence of all such supposedly unseen realities still relies on an implicit perspective. What their existence might be outside of any perspective is meaningless and unintelligible, as a matter of both fact and principle. — Wayfarer
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.