I think that is a notoriously difficult point in Spinoza's philosophy, whether it amounts to a flat out declaration that Nature is God tout courte. — Wayfarer

Yes, firstly Spinoza did not say the world is God, but that nature is, and it's not clear that he meant both manifest nature and the nature that manifests, or both. The nature that manifests (natura naturans) would seem to be the more likely.See the distinction between natura naturans and natura naturata.

Again, more than one world. The world from the person's perspective ,"see the world through different pairs of eyes" and the external world, "the same world". — RussellA

Are you familiar with Markus Gabriel's ideas? What you say above reminds me of his philosophy. I am somewhat partial to his notion of "fields of sense". He says the world (taken to be an overarching realm that "contains" all the different discursive fields of sense) does not exist; it's a kind of collective hallucination.

Oh yes. My comment was addressed to the epithet "elitist hobby", that philosophy outside the academy is (still) more than that. — 180 Proof

I agree it can be more than that, but I don't think it's inevitable, or even common.

Here’s a little secret (don’t let it get around). Learning how to think is a prerequisite for learning how to live. Pursuing ideas for their own sake is pursuing life for its own sake. — Joshs

Thinking about how to live is a prerequisite for learning how to live. Much of philosophy, and particularly academic philosophy, has little to do with that. So, I don't think the tidy little idea that pursuing ideas for their own sake is pursuing life for its own sake necessarily holds true.

:up: Good point, but does Stoicism not have something to say to the intellectually unsophisticated if they are at least thoughtful?

Would you make that argument about quantum physics or molecular biology? — Joshs

Firstly, I would have thought both of those are of significance to the people.

And secondly, I think philosophy, if it is not about how to live, is just a hobby. That said I'm not opposed to anyone pursuing ideas for their own sake.

Philosophies that are concerned with how to live can be useful even to those who don't have the interest, time, patience or capacity to appreciate the ideas therein in their fullest complexity and nuance.

Agreed. I'm also not a fan of either dada-like compostmoderns or analysis-for-analysis-sake "specialists". — 180 Proof

:lol: "Compostmoderns" ...the incontinental tradition vs the anals; both have produced a lot of shit and fostered normative correctness in their different ways..."a pox on both your houses" I say.

Philosophy that is of no significance to the person in the street is nought but an elitist hobby; which is fine provided the delusion that it is more than that does not set in. Unfortunately...

“For a long time we have been accustomed to the compartmentalization of religion and science was if they were two quite different and basically unrelated ways of seeing the world. I do not believe that this state of doublethink can last. It must eventually be replaced by a view of the world which is neither religious nor scientific but simply our view of the world. More exactly, it must become a view of the world in which the reports of science and religion are as concordant as those of the eyes and the ears.” — Art48

A vision of an intellectual utopia, or dystopia, depending on your perspective.

So is "the chap who wrote Hamlet" a definition of Shakespeare? — Banno

Only if he did write Hamlet would that be a part of the definite description of Shakespeare. It's not necessarily true that he did write Hamlet, no matter how likely we might think it to be.

We can easily modify the description to "the chap most people believe to have written Hamlet". What about "chap"? Maybe Shakespeare was a woman.

Am I? I wrote "one", not you or him/her or people or them. Also, I took your comment about "rational intuition" to be philosophical, not sociological, so it was (meant to be) prescriptive as well as descriptive. — 180 Proof

I thought you were looking at it from the outside because you seemed to be counting behavior as paramount. What I wanted to counterpose was the idea that we look at the quality of our lives from the perspective of how they feel to us. Well, I know I do at least, and I imagine that others feel the same way.

Am I saying people should think this way? No, I'm saying I think they mostly do. As I keep hammering on this theme: I think the idea of rational normativity (beyond consistency) is an abomination; it is anathema to me, at least.

So how does someone have the final say on what we mean by "self" or "free will" — Andrew4Handel

The self is a sense; I think we are imbued with a sense of self, as are animals. It is a sense of continuity and grows to become an idea of unity and identity. We impute continuity, unity and identity to phenomena just as do to ourselves. "The tree itself,,,"

This 'voluntarism' seems to beg the "intuition" question. I'm with Freddy here: judge by example – how one actually lives, particularly one's manifest habits insofar as they embody some "kind of vision" one lives by – practies before principles. — 180 Proof

Sure, but you're looking at the life in question from the outside. We all live our lives from the inside; what's important to the indivdual is the quality of life as it seems to them.

So, of course hypocrisy is possible and "by their fruits shall ye know them", but one must first want to live in a certain way and then strive to embody that personal vision of the good life. Apart from hypocrisy, there are many possible explanations why one might fail to live in accordance with the way one thinks is the most desirable.

(Still feel as though the point I was labouring has somewhat slipped the net here.) — Wayfarer

I think the point you are referring to is the idea of rational intuition. That idea is very much out of favour among contemporary philosophers, but that is a merely a matter of normative correctness, of fashion. The idea may come back into favour again for all we know.

The problem is that it is not in any way demonstrable, so in light of that, I think it is not something that can really be cogently argued for, or against. Its detractors will say that there is no reason to believe in rational intuition, probably because they don't feel any "rightness" in the idea, or they are hoodwinked by feeling a need to be "correct", and, of course, on the grounds that it cannot be demonstrated to be true. Its supporters find reason to believe in it just because they feel it is right, and because it cannot be demonstrated to be false.

The thing is, if you feel you have rational intuition into the nature of reality you will have a very different vision of life than those who reject the idea. So, for me the real issue is an ethical one: how do I want to live and what kind of vision do I want to live by? For me, that would be the only way to decide between rational intuition or no rational intuition, God or no God, and so on.

These kinds of questions will never be definitively settled by philosophy, simply because what constitutes philosophy is itself a contentious question. There are several mutually exclusive understandings of what philosophy is and/ or should be.

You, I, Austin, Wittgenstein, and Kant are similarly sceptical about definitions in philosophy, claiming that we can use these concepts without such "mathematical certainty". — Jamal

I agree with this, that all concepts are more or less fuzzy, polysemous, historically and culturally evolved and evolving, so there cannot be one universal correct changeless definition of any concept. But it is the very polysemy of concepts that makes it advisable that someone initiating a discussion involving some concept or concepts should outline the particular interpretation of the concepts she is working with, so as to avoid the inevitable misunderstandings and distortions that will otherwise follow.

Yes, that's right, but only if a sound argument were given finding flaw in every single premise. That seems incredibly unlikely. Not so with a philosophical tradition. — Isaac

What you're not seeing is that any such argument will be based upon premises that cannot themselves be demonstrated rationally without relying on further premises, which themselves will require rational argument based on even further premises and so on, and thus it will ever remain a matter of opinion.

But that's not what this is about, anyway. What you are failing to see, or at least acknowledge, is that I am only speaking about what is appropriate argumentation in specifically exclusive contexts. So, for the last time I'll give another example to illustrate the point: say someone sets up a discussion which is intended to explore the idea of the trinity and its relationship with and relevance to Abrahamic theology in general.

If someone just wants to argue "theology is flawed from the get-go" or " the trinity is an incoherent idea", that is not going to be relevant to the discussion, which is intended to involve looking at the nature of the ideas themselves and their relations to Abrahamic theology overall, and not the question as to whether they are "flawed", whatever "flawed" might be understood to mean.

Of course, someone could initiate a discussion intended to explore the argument as to whether theology as a whole is flawed, or the idea of the trinity is coherent. If the aim is to have a fruitful discussion within some area of investigation, then it is a good strategy to outline the general aim of the discussion and the relevant definitions of the central terms that will be used, as this will avoid time-wasting and derailing of the discussion.

So, I have nowhere said or implied that I want to rule out disagreement per se, even though you seem to want to keep distorting what I've said to make it appear that I have.

No, I don't think you do because you are cutting out the rest of my quote — schopenhauer1

Okay, you say that the god who created the world must be beyond good and evil; is that because you see the world as being beyond good and evil or just plain evil? In any case. all I've been saying is that some see the world as good, and therefore they can with consistency think the creator good.

I get what you're saying and yet I don't see how

A world where suffering and hardship is supposed to be part of the cosmic game but is beyond the understanding of its participants, is not beautiful, perfect, or good. — schopenhauer1

is a given. It's a possible, even reasonable, attitude, but other attitudes are also possible and reasonable.

That's basically all I've been saying/

Perhaps. or alternatively we might come here to test them, or to quell them...but it doesn't always work. :sweat:

I don't know what point you are trying to make, so you don't need me to render it as fog. If you are saying that religion is bad and should be criticized and eliminated, then I simply disagree with you, and that is from a non-religious point of view. If you are not saying that but saying that all ideology is bad, then I agree with you.

As to not caring about what others think of my viewpoints, I don't think I am anywhere near alone there. In all my time on these forums i have rarely seen anyone change their views on account of a counterargument.

Please do yourself a favour and don't waste any more time on this, you started out off the mark with your purportedly "constructive criticism" and don't seem to have gotten any closer to it along the way.

I want to say that the most interesting and famous philosophers have radically undermined or rejected the premises of their predecessors. If this is an exaggeration, it’s not much of one.

EDIT: should we, along the lines of Kuhn, distinguish normal and revolutionary philosophy? Maybe the analytic logic-choppers and the continental disciples of whichever big postmodern philosopher you care to mention are doing the former. — Jamal

Yes, I agree that most of those we consider the greatest philosophers have found flaws in their predecessors, only to have their own ideas overturned later. I think it's interesting to consider how many foundational premises there have been in all of philosophy, and it seems likely to me that there have not been that many.

Kant rejected the premise of intellectual intuition, for example, which Hegel arguably wanted to reinstate. It's not much in favour these days, so it might seem Kant won the argument. But who's to say it might not come back into favour?

I've never found Kuhn's idea of radical paradigm shifts all that convincing; I think the questions that of concern today are the same questions, albeit perhaps in different garb, that interested the Ancients. I seem to remember reading somewhere that Hegel referred to philosophy as "The same old stew, reheated", but I've never been able to find where he said that, so maybe I dreamed it, who knows. We also have Whitehead's 'philosophy as footnotes to Plato'.

Do we want philosophy to be reduced to being the way Rorty characterized it: "The truth is what your contemporaries will let you get away with saying". I don't and that's why I'm not enamoured of the idea of philosophy as normative rationality.

Not at all. If one can question some of the ideas in a tradition (and find them flawed) it follows that one can question all ideas in a tradition (and find them flawed). There's no logical reason why every tradition must contain at least one non-flawed idea. — Isaac

Ir's not a matter of logic. If what you said were true we could find the whole of science or mathematics to be flawed. Traditions tend to have their own premises, so to reject the entire tradition would be to reject the premises. But if you reject the premises of a tradition then there would no point entering into discussion with those who hold to the premises; you would just wind up talking past one another.

The reason I made the distinction is that rejecting a tradition as a result of questioning its ideas is different to merely rejecting it dogmatically — Isaac

To reject a tradition is to reject its founding principles. Such a rejection is inevitably dogmatic, since premises are not supported by reason; rather they are what reason must, to adhere to any particular tradition, think consistently with.

Yes, absolutely - assuming my argument has any merit (which I can't see how it would with QM), but it seems unarguable that if a discipline is useless, then arguing that case will advance that discipline. Finding out that it is useless is one of the possible end points of a field of enquiry. Phrenology, for example. — Isaac

What? You seem to be saying that disagreeing is off topic. That If I think something is bad, I'm off-topic when discussing it with people who think it's good. — Isaac

No, I'm saying that if people are trying to have what to them would be a productive discussion in, for example, theology you barge in with what amounts to "theology is bullshit" that you will not be contributing to a productive discussion and you will be off-topic. On the other hand if the subject of the discussion were 'is theology a worthwhile pursuit' then that would be a different matter.

The premises of your example phrenology seem arbitrary to begin with. Nonetheless some people may find it yields them insights into character. Astrology is another case (although there the premises seem somewhat less arbitrary); many people find astrology useful. You can say what you like about their motives, but the truth cannot be demonstrated; it remains possible that astrology, even phrenology, could be true.

In any case this discussion is concerned specifically with philosophical traditions; where usefulness is impossible to establish. And in any case even if the uselessness of a whole tradition could be established, that is not going to advance that discipline but rather will demolish it

Which has among other things resulted in the scientific revolution. — Wayfarer

I'm not sure if this is meant to be approval or disapproval.

My tentative answer is that the world is the experience-of-the-world, and so the order we find in reason, is also the order we find in the world, because they're not ultimately separable (a lot rides on 'ultimately' in that sentence.) — Wayfarer

I agree this is true in regard to the collective representation we refer to as 'the phenomenal world'. But we don't know, can't know, whether that representation tells us anything about the world as it is independent of our representations of it.

Logical necessity is nowadays often deemed to be a separate issue to physical causation (something I explored in this offsite post.) But that doesn't seem to me to address the 'unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences' which time and again has produced predictions for which at the time there wasn't even the empirical means to test (e.g. relativity, Dirac's discovery of anti-matter.) I think these are all examples of Kant's synthetic a priori and a testimony to the power of reason. — Wayfarer

I don't believe there is any convincing argument that causation is logically necessary. Apparently, the idea is necessary for us to make sense of our experience. It's true that math does seem to be effective in producing models which enjoy great predictive success. What are the impications of that for metaphysics? Beats me.

Nagel's point is that if we are to be considered rational beings, then this is because we accept the testimony of reason, not because we are compelled to do so by the requirements of adaptation, but because we can see the truth of its statements. I think it is that power to discern apodictic truths which caused the ancients to grant it a kind of quasi-religious status, and conversely the tendency to deprecate reason as simply an evolved capacity is an indicator of a kind of deep irrationality. — Wayfarer

I think we are compelled to think according to the principles of reason, that is to think in ways which are consistent with our premises, if we want to think well. But again, I would say our premises are not themselves underpinned by pure reason. What seems self-evident is not so on the basis of some chain of argument, otherwise it would be relying on some further premises that chain would necessarily be based upon. The buck has to stop somewhere. It's on account of that that I think the dream of working it all out via reason is just that; a dream.

I didn't say 'rejects', I said 'questions'. — Isaac

I was responding to this:

deciding in advance that 'better' only consists of answers which accept both traditions rather than question them — Isaac

Questioning a tradition does not equate to not accepting it. Questioning some ideas within a tradition involves accepting the tradition overall and questioning it from within. So, your locution here suggests that the alternative to questioning a tradition is accepting it, which makes questioning look like not accepting, i.e. rejecting.

Except, it seems the tradition that holds that some traditions are wrongheaded. That, apparently is the exception to your rule, which you proceed here to reject as wrongheaded. — Isaac

I haven't said that thinking some traditions are wrongheaded is unacceptable, but that attempting to participate in a discussion within a tradition by rejecting the whole tradition as wrongheaded is wrongheaded. That is, if you think a tradition is wrongheaded then there is no point attempting to discuss its ideas with those who think it is a good tradition because you will be off topic from the start. It's a kind of "poisoning of the well". On the other hand, if the discussion is about whether or not the tradition is a good or useful one, then by all means have at it.

I don't see why not. Ruling out the possibility that the discipline is useless seems an entirely unnecessary shackle. — Isaac

So you think that, for example, you could advance QM by arguing that the whole discipline is useless? :roll:

I find your suggestion that theistic beliefs only ever result is such benign actions, as attending a church, almost comedic, in it's naivete.
My main point was that I do really care about what other people think, as it influences the actions they take, very strongly, and that has a direct affect on the type of society humans currently have to live under. — universeness

As I already said I'm no fan of ideology, religious or otherwise. I have nowhere claimed that religious belief only leads to benign actions.

If you think it leads to maleficent actions in the majority of cases then I would say it is you that is naive and/or ideologically driven in your thinking.

I don't agree with your normative correctness; I find the notion stifling and a kind of thinking found only in ideologues. As I said I have no time for ideologies; I think they are the very divisive forces that underpin the main problems humanity faces.

I'm reasonably familiar with the arguments in support of rationalism. The problem for me is that reason by itself tells us nothing, it is really just a good practice of consistent thinking. The premises our consistent thinking is based on are not themselves supported by reason.

So, the idea that what the mind intuits about reality is true on the basis of a deep connection between the "inner workings" of the mind and the inner workings of the world is a nice premise, and from there we can reason our way to, for example, Platonist conclusions, but a critical mind will ask the question as to how we know this most attractive thought is actually true.

And I can't see any possible answer other than that it might "feel right". It isn't empirically verifiable, and it isn't logically necessary, so what other ground do we have?

That said, I think we don't know that our intuitions cannot tell us about reality, either, so I also don't reject the idea; I just cannot settle on one or the other belief. A change in consciousness can bring a different vision, and I know from moments of my own experience that what is felt to be "direct knowing" can be so compelling as to dispel all doubt whatsoever, but such an altered state is not perennial. at least not for me.

Direct knowing like that might indeed constitute sufficient evidence for the individual enjoying that state of mind, but it cannot constitute sufficient evidence for anyone else, although they may be moved to believe by something they see or seem to see in the person with the direct knowing.

Nagel, commenting on Peirce’s platonist musings, says that Peirce’s idea of the ‘inward sympathy’ with nature is alarming to many people: — Wayfarer

I'm quite the opposite; I would love to think that there can be purely rational intuition of reality. There have been many, many moments in my life where i have felt this to be true. But the critical side calls this into question, and asks whether this is not just a feeling, a kind of wishful thinking.

Then Banno stuck his nose in in his usual smug, bullshit, lazy way. He pretends he's involved but he doesn't put any effort in. — T Clark

For what it's worth that seems like an accurate characterization of Banno's general approach to me, and I've said much the same on quite a few occasions.

:up:

It's hard to see what you could be meaning by 'value' here. Even if you wanted to gain a 'better' insight into phenomenology, or post-structuralism by your question, deciding in advance that 'better' only consists of answers which accept both traditions rather than question them indicates that you've already decided others are not as capable as you of determining what is and isn't the case, as such the enquiry seems disingenuous. — Isaac

Well, I don't see how you would get a better insight into the relation between two traditions by rejecting one of them. Rejecting a whole tradition as being wrong-headed seems itself to be wrong-headed, in any case. A balanced view sees all traditions as forms of life. I understand that AP is a form of life, that must yield some insight within a certain field of enquiry. The fact that I have little interest in that field of enquiry, says more about me than about AP. What I see as most wrong-headed is the claim that only a certain field of enquiry or approach is really doing philosophy.

Phenomenology and post-structuralism have enough commonality to be mutually cross-fertilizing, but it would seem they are both more or less useless to AP, because the approaches seem incompatible. AP may actually be of some use to Phenomenology and PS, but that may well be on account of the latter two approaches being more open-ended; i.e. they allow that there is more to philosophy than analysis of the role of language.

So. I'm not talking about "deciding in advance", and I'm not defending the continental traditions, but just using them as an example. You won't get far in any field if you call into question the "usefulness" of the entire discipline.

Someone else who wants to make this thread all about me. :grin: — Banno

No you misunderstand or perhaps you just like to think that. It was precisely the opposite: to point out that it is not at all about whatever narrow conception you or anyone happens to have of what philosophy consists in.

Taking a concept and analysing it is most of the work of philosophy. — Banno

This is only true of philosophy as very narrowly conceived. I get that that is the only approach of personal interest to you, but what could you hope to achieve by butting into discussions based on other very different conceptions of philosophy?

But with the definitions and assumptions in place and an expectation that others abide by them, those who don't share them are not involved at all. To put it mildly, that's not always good. — Jamal

Do we ever see productive discussions between those who don't share definitions and assumptions?

In a discussion of phenomenology's relationship with post-structuralism, for example, would there be any value contributed by a participant who only wanted to argue that neither phenomenology nor post-structuralism can contribute anything of philosophical value?

It’s a refusal to abide by the terms of the debate as set out. But this is exactly what philosophy ought to do. The same goes for definitions. — Jamal

That's true but doesn't augur well for discussion
between those who do not share basic assumptions or definitions.

For example say someone starts a discussion proposing to deal with how semiotics or phenome nology helps us understand the nature of consciousness and the human relation to the world. There would be little point in someone asserting that semiotics and phenomenology don't do either of those things, because that would just signal that no discussion is possible between those two interlocutors, at least so it seems to me.

Again, questioning those assumptions is basic to doing philosophy — Banno

Sure, and any questioning is always done on the basis of other assumptions, which are in turn open to question, and so on. So, int absence of empirical obsevables that might decide such issues, where does tha leave us? Just fun and games all the way down?

Like that, for a start. Setting out a definition in order to ground an argument is already taking a stance, which may itself be brought into question. — Banno

Any argument will have its grounding assumptions or premises. A premise that asserts that such and such is so will be based on a particular definition (usage) of the salient terms that constitute "such and such".

There can be no discussion if the interlocutor does not accept the definitions the propounder is working with. Would it not be better to discover such a situation at the outset rather than wasting time and energy on a "discussion" that was doomed from the start due to different definitions being held.

Bringing the definitions of the premises of an argument into question will potentially initiate another discussion with its own argument which has its own premises, and definitions of those premises, and so on. See the problem?

I distrust the motive for claiming the self is illusory. — Andrew4Handel

The idea that the self is illusory is itself illusory, or at least elusive, ambiguous. The claim that it is illusory seems to stem from the fact that precisely what the self is cannot be determined. This is as much so when it comes to the imagined identities of objects as it is with the imagined identity of the self.

Add to that the fact that the self cannot be imagined as any kind of object of the senses other than the body. And yet we don't think of ourselves as "being bodies" but rather as "having bodies". This is sometimes referred to as a "cartesian error" or the myth of the "ghost in the machine", but I would say it is deeper than that and is bound up with the ineradicable dualism of language itself. The machine is as much a myth as the ghost is. (Or perhaps I should have written "story" instead of "myth" since it is not so much that such perspectives are wrong as that they are limited).

You seem to be painting a picture of an individual conscience that compels one to stand up against oppressors, even at great personal risk. This seems to consist in an overriding sense of personal sovereignty, and a refusal to accept transgressions against it. The self stands up for itself and in doing so sees itself as standing up for oppressed others as well.

The dynamic is the same regardless of whether the oppression is real or imagined. just or unjust. Is this the self as "myth", though or rather the self as sense, that is an expression of a sense of self, a sense, however distinct it might be of boundaries, of lines which shall not be crossed? The idea of a myth of self seems more apt in the context of belief in a soul. Animals too will, if they can rise up against their oppressors because they also have a sense of self and of self-preservation.

You speak of the myth of the self being perpetuated by the canonization of heroic rebels, but I think this is more thought of as the myth of the hero, because as I said such heroes (if they really are heroes as opposed to disaffected troublemakers) do not stand up just for themselves, but for others, and symbolically, for the whole of humanity.

I think the story of self (I'm using another term now because the term 'myth' may carry pejorative associations these days) begins with consciousness; consciousness makes things stand out and divides the world up into parts and wholes, entities and identities, all of which becomes all the more binary, self-reflexive and seemingly rigid with the advent of language.

On a very simple view the self of a person is just the character of that person, each one being unique, But again it is like the leaves of any particular species of tree, each one is different from all the others and yet the same. Pattern and individuation.

What, do you mean go to church? I thought you were referring to the moral quality of actions; if not that what would it matter?

Of course some religious ideologues do bad things, but so do some non-religious ideologues.

I don't think people's metaphysical views are generally good predictors of their actions (apart from what they might say, if you want to count that as being in the 'action' category).

Thanks...don't you just love pedantry?

I agree it's not a simple equation, otherwise Being and Time would be just Being.
And there is of course a conceptual difference between #being# and #time#.
I was going off-topic; thinking of Julian Barbour's idea that time is nothing but change. :halo:

Even a coma wants life support...

The equation of being and time seems to be a truistic pseudo-profundity if it is accepted that time is nothing over and above change, and being is nothing over and above becoming.