It's because the domain of the quantifier is explicitly restricted to the marbles in this set. — Srap Tasmaner

OK, perhaps I missed something since I haven't closely read every post. So the four alternatives are specifying the characters of different sets of objects? The first the set of all red objects, the second with at least one non-red object, the third with at least one red object and the last with no red objects; and the four permutations of possibility and necessity are related to whether or not an object, either red or not red, must belong, or could not belong, to the four different sets?

1. Necessary (▢): Necessarily Red = All are red
2. Possible Not (~▢): Not Necessarily Red = At least one is not red (not all are red)
3. Possible (~▢~): Not Necessarily Not Red = At least one is red (not none are red)
4. Impossible (▢~): Necessarily Not Red = None are red — Luke

This way of looking at necessity seems wrong to me. When I think of necessity, I think of something like "all visible objects are spatiotemporal" which makes sense since it is impossible to imagine a non-spatiotemporal visual object.

It is not impossible to imagine any object being red or not being red. So even if all examples of a certain kind of object were red, it does not follow that a non-red object of that kind could not turn up. Even if (although we could never know it) all objects of a certain kind have been, are and will be red it does not seem to follow that it would be necessary that they were, are or will be red. That they were, are and will be all red could be a contingent matter, that is it just so happens that all of those kinds of objects have been, are and will be red.

Some things just can’t be put into words or pictures and only said as math. Quantum field theory in particular. — apokrisis

Yes, that was just what I had in mind. So, how is it then possible to interpret it metaphysically (semantically)?

Thanks, a lot to think about there...I'll take a look at the paper you linked but I won't be surprised if it's above my pay grade. :smile:



:up: Makes sense to me...nothing to disagree with or add...

Some things just can’t be put into words or pictures and only said as math. Quantum field theory in particular. — apokrisis

Yes, that was just what I had in mind. So, how is it then possible to interpret it metaphysically (semantically)?

:chin:

And presumably he would see far more clearly than others what the actual gaps in QM are likely to be, where the science 'runs out' and the point where the metaphysical interpretations can begin. — Tom Storm

I'd say that "where the science 'runs out' and the point where the metaphysical interpretations can begin" is precisely the point where scientific expertise also runs out. In any case my point was only that the question as to whether QM has metaphysical implications is not a scientific question, but a philosophical one.

Feynman, if I remember correctly, reportedly said "if you think you understand quantum mechanics then you don;t understand quantum mechanics" which I take to mean that no one understands what is really going on, but obviously not that no one understands the math.

Understanding the math, though, is just understanding the math, and a similar question to the QM/ metaphysics question has been around for thousands of years: the question as to whether mathematics has any metaphysical implications, and that question remains controversial to this day, with mathematicians and philosophers on both sides of the debate. I don't think it is a question that mathematics expertise can help to answer.

So, a non-epistemic "true or false"? :chin: — 180 Proof

I had thought that the existence of unknowable truths is uncontroversial.

Does language mediate human thought? — creativesoul

Of course it does.

mediate
vb
1. (intr; usually foll by between or in) to intervene (between parties or in a dispute) in order to bring about agreement
2. to bring about (an agreement)
3. to bring about (an agreement) between parties in a dispute
4. to resolve (differences) by mediation
5. (intr) to be in a middle or intermediate position
6. (tr) to serve as a medium for causing (a result) or transferring (objects, information, etc)

Look at '6.' From here

@apokrisis

While I defer to your knowledge of science, I would point out that the question as to whether QM has metaphysical interpretations is not itself a scientific question, which means that no matter how great your scientific knowledge, that will not put you in any better position to answer it. Philosophical questions generally are not susceptible of definitive answers; if they were philosophy would have long since been done and dusted.

Okay. Replace "symbolizes" with "signals" and the argument that that bit was excised from still stands strong. You need to address it along with all the earlier arguments that have went sorely neglected since being made.

Either it's irony or deliberate deception. Neither is acceptable. — creativesoul

I haven't been addressing, or even attempting to address the question of whether animals and humans alike are conscious in ways enabled by the capacity to signal; I'd say yes to that of course.

It's incredible that you impute irony or deliberate deception on my part, when it should have clear to you that I have all along only been addressing the question of the kind of consciousness enabled by symbolic language.

The proof for that is demonstrated by the way you attribute agency to language. Again that's been proven. You've yet to have squared those circles despite repeated attempts at redefinition. — creativesoul

I have never imputed agency to language. If, in your confusion, you think I have, then quote the relevant passage(s).

You cannot avoid anthropomorphism because "linguistically mediated thought" is a prima facie example of anthropomorphism. All this and then some has been more than adequately argued for without subsequent due attention. — creativesoul

Is this a joke? Explain how ""linguistically mediated thought" is a prima facie example of anthropomorphism" or if you think you already have, then cite or quote the relevant passages. Keep in mind my two definitions of anthropomorphism, and be mindful that I only have the "egregious imputation of human characteristics onto the non-human" in mind here, which should be obvious given what I have said I think about the other definition.

Thanks, great discussion, as usual!

Problem of the criterion – you're aware of it's significance? — 180 Proof

Yes, but it's an epistemological problem AFAIK. So, I wasn't asking whether, if a statement has no possibility of empirical verification, we can know it to be true or false, but whether we can know that it could not be true or false.

Axioms are statements not subject to empirical verification. Thus they are not true or false. — T Clark

Does a statement's not being subject to empirical verification entail that it cannot be true or false? Smells like positivist spirit! So in the spirit of the detractors of logical positivism, I can now ask whether your claim that a statement's not being subject to empirical verification means that it cannot be true or false, is itself true or false or neither?

I was merely pointing out that declarations do not necessarily set out how things are, — Janus


What? — Banno

Below is what I quoted from you and responded to:

Recall that declaratives are curious in having two directions of fit: a declaration sets out how things are, yet how things are changes to match the declaration. — Janus

So, it seemed you were claiming that declarations do set out how things are, perhaps you meant not do, but can, in which case it should have been obvious that I was not disagreeing.

I do declare, this counts as a cat, that counts as a mat. — Banno

Recall, this was the original exchange:

Recall that declaratives are curious in having two directions of fit: a declaration sets out how things are, yet how things are changes to match the declaration. — Banno


This doesn't seem right to me: I would have said that declarations set out how things shall be; things which may or may not already be as declared. — Janus

I was merely pointing out that declarations do not necessarily set out how things are, but more commonly set out how things shall or should be; which of course as I acknowledged there, does not rule out that what is declared may set out how things already are,

So, are we actually arguing about anything? Are you wanting to claim that declarations only, or even more commonly, set out how things are, and not how they shall be?

You're not telling me anything about the cat's understanding, but about your perceptions of her behavior. Sure, we know animals recognize food and food dispensers and bowls and so on, and we know they act in ways which seem to show their pleasure. From those kinds of observations what more is there to be said about how they think? We know we think in both abstract ways enabled by our use of symbols and sensorimotor ways; in terms of images, movements and impressions, so we can already surmise that animals think in the latter kinds of ways, but I, for one, would not impute an ability to think in terms of abstraction.

So, any and all attribution of such thought to non humans is anthropomorphism at work. I agree there. Not all language use involves using meaningful marks. — creativesoul

True, langauge use also involves using meaningful sounds or gestures (sign language). I don't know what point you are making with that, though.

The alarm screech symbolizes danger. — creativesoul

I don't think that's right; I think the alarm screech signals danger. Symbolization is more abstract, and this is just where our use of language distinguishes us from the other animals.

The sounding of the alarm is a 'linguistically mediated thought' because it is a thought consisting of correlations drawn between the vocalization and danger. — creativesoul

I disagree. Just because it is a sound, because it is, so to speak, "of the tongue" does not qualify it as linguistic, on account of the etymology. What about bodily gestures that animals use to signal responses; do they qualify as "linguistic", according to you?

We cannot draw and maintain the distinction between the sorts of thoughts that we have and the sorts of thought that other language using animals have with the notion of 'linguistically mediated thought'. — creativesoul

Again I disagree; it is precisely our linguistic competencies, which animals do not possess, which enables human culture, history and literature and self-reflective thought and all kinds of disciplines couched in generalization and abstraction and which distinguishes us from the other animals.

Did you mean something different than this?

“Evidence that an animal is capable of some degree of symbolic, human language processing supports the argument that the animal's consciousness is to some degree human-like.”


One can , of course, distinguish between ‘capacity for’ and natural use of symbolic language. Bonobos have been shown to have this capacity, but only demonstrate it in artificially induced situations prompted by humans. — Joshs

See my replies to creativesoul above. I don't deny that animals' consciousness is more or less human-like, although I think they cannot experience the kinds of self-reflective consciousness that humans do just because they are not competent users of symbolic language. I don't doubt we still have the pre-linguistic "animal" layer of consciousness, although I think it is more or less overshadowed by our self-reflective, symbolic consciousness; and on account of that I would rather say that human consciousness is to some degree animal-like than to say that animal consciousness is to some degree human-like, and also precisely because it is the animal consciousness that is the more general and the human that is the more specific.

Are you denying that these are examples of language use? — creativesoul

I was referring specifically to symbolic language, to linguistic competency.

Unhelpful nonsense. Speaking of anthropomorphism. — creativesoul

Whatever you are calling "linguistically mediated thought" is neither the only nor the simplest kind of thought humans have. Likely it is one of the most complex. — creativesoul

There is no point making bare assertions such as "unhelpful nonsense" without explaining why you think so. That is truly unhelpful.Same with the accusation of anthropomorphism; quote what I have said and explain why you think it is anthropomorphic if want an actual discussion.

Yes, what I am calling linguistically mediated thought is neither the only or the simplest kind of thought, on the contrary it is the most complex: in that it is rich in symbols which allow us the think counterfactually, reflexively and self-referentially; what on Earth led you to think I was claiming otherwise? You seem to be making my argument for me.

But I was, in the part you quoted... so you are not addressing that?

"The cat is on the mat" supposes cats and mats.

The relevance is that such stuff is already an interpretation. — Banno

I don't see what cats being on mats has to do with declarations. Declaratives maybe, I suppose. In any case you should know from many previous posts that I am in agreement with Husserl and Heidegger, (they being, as far as I know, the first philosophers to point it out) that all seeing is "seeing as" or in other words that all perceptions are always already interpretations.

So, nothing controversial there in what you say.

A shame, since it is right. it's just that we get to decide what counts as a simple. — Banno

I wasn't talking about what counts as a simple or what counts as anything else, so I don't know what you are referring to with that. I think it is more correct to say that declarations set out how things shall be, which allows that things may already be or not be as the declaration sets out. I'm thinking more of declarations in the political sense, though, which is what I thought you had in mind. I wasn't thinking of things like:

She declared, "Look, the sun is rising and the clouds are clearing".

I don't think such locutions count so much as declarations, despite the use of "declared", as they count as statements. The 'declared" there seems to me to indicate that the sun rising and the clouds clearing is of some more than usual import. Do you count all statements as declarations, and if not how do you distinguish them?

Donald Hoffman has a lot to answer for. — Tom Storm

I didn't know he was the creator of beetles.

The idea that our closest relatives or other "higher" forms of life might have the capacity, yet to be developed, for symbolic language, seems plausible to me. I had thought that @creativesoul was claiming that there were other species who were capable of symbolic langauge, though, which would be something else altogether.

Recall that declaratives are curious in having two directions of fit: a declaration sets out how things are, yet how things are changes to match the declaration. — Banno

This doesn't seem right to me: I would have said that declarations set out how things shall be; things which may or may not already be as declared.

Don't they? Doesn't just about every living organism? Counts as food. Counts as protection. Counts as scary predator. Counts as my territory. Counts as invader. — Srap Tasmaner

This reminds me of the phenomenological notion of "seeing as" and Gibson's "affordances". It seems plausible to think that animals and humans alike see things as affording possibilities for action. Different animals, for example, will see different things as food; as "to be eaten". But, lacking symbolic language, this would not be potentially self-reflexive; such that the animal could think "I can eat this, therefore it counts as food".

Well, some species of primates use specific vocalizations as alarms for specific predators sighted in the immediate vicinity. It's also my understanding that not all communities of some species do this, or have the same vocalizations for the same predators.

That certainly seems like a case of naturally emerging language use to me. — creativesoul

I can't see the relevance of what you are saying here. There are many examples and kinds of animal signalling. Only humans, as far as is known, are capable of symbolic language and linguistically mediated thought. I certainly haven't said we have nothing in common with animals, if that is what you were thinking. There are many analogies between animal and human behavior; the difficulties arise when we want to posit analogies between human and animal experience.

Humans do it more deliberately, for the sake of sounding the alarm. — creativesoul

Yes. symbolic language enables abstraction, which enables self-reflection and deliberation; in other words it inaugurates linguistically mediated thought.

could you rephrase the following...

...understandings are human-shaped... — creativesoul

Many uniquely (as far as we know) human understandings are linguistically mediated, that is they are in symbolic form. There may also be human understandings which are not linguistically mediated, and some of these also may be unique to humans. We don't really know what animal understandings are like, as to that we can only surmise in our human ways. Our interpretations and speculations are always human interpretations and speculations, couched in the forms that are possible for humans; that is to say our understandings are "human-shaped". That doesn't seem hard to understand.

we should find that it is impossible to be dishonest with oneself.
— Mww — Metaphysician Undercover


I agree. — creativesoul

I think it is well established that humans are capable of deceiving themselves. I've certainly seen self-deception at work in my own case. Perhaps it is impossible to be deliberately dishonest with oneself; self-deception doesn't seem to be intentional (in the psychological, not phenomenological, sense). That said it does seem humanly possible to be willfully blind to things that one really does not want to admit or confront, but still that willfulness does not seem to operate with fully conscious awareness.

I'll buy that!

Perhaps, but does it make sense? — Agent Smith

Are you asking whether I understood what you were saying or whether I think what you said is plausible?

I'd agree that it seems plausible to think that eliminating one class of specialists would, depending on the importance of the specialist field in question to the economy, have a more or less disruptive effect.

Technologies are interdependent and if only one group of specialists is eliminated, civilization will collapse. — Agent Smith

That seems a little bold. Is it so easy to determine the limits of adaptability?

I don't think this is true. If life was disconnected from what sustains it then it would not be sustained. Perhaps you mean that the discursive intellect cannot fully understand life and what sustains it? — Janus


I wrote "Life has always been disconnected from what has sustained it" — RussellA

There are four possible meanings to the statement "we are disconnected from that which sustains us":
1) We are physically disconnected from technology which sustains us in a physical sense.
2) We are physically disconnected from technology which sustains us in an emotionally and intellectually sense.
3) We are emotionally and intellectually disconnected from technology which sustains us in a physical sense.
4) We are emotionally and intellectually disconnected from technology which sustains us in an emotionally and intellectual sense.

I agree with you that item 1) can be removed as illogical. Items 2) and 4) can also be removed as illogical. This leaves item 3). — RussellA

It's not technology which sustains life in the biological sense but air, food and water. Technology may sustain our lifestyles, but that is something else.

The point of (3) which, on a charitably nuanced reading, seems to be that our sense of aliveness may be eroded by technology in various ways through the alienation it can contribute to is something I agree with. It's true that technology has disconnected many people from the sources of the food and water that sustain them.

That is to say, the closest many get to the sources of food and water is, respectively, the supermarket and the tap or the bottle (the supermarket). So, humanity is increasingly alienated from the rest of life by modern technology. Obviously this doesn't apply to those who, for example, grow their own food, or even those who don't, but live in communities where the food is grown locally and they are familiar with those sources. So it remains an over-generalization, just as 'life is suffering', while expressing some truth, is an over-simplification.

Do you agree with all of the following?



1.)Anthropomorphism is when we attribute uniquely human kinds of thought and belief(those that are exclusively human) to things that are not.
2.)Some human thought and/or belief are exclusive to humans.
3.)Some human thought and/or belief are shared by other language using creatures.
4.)Some human thought and/or belief are shared by other language using creatures and language less ones alike. — creativesoul

Nothing there is controversial except "other language using creatures"; I already asked you to identify which other animals you think use language.

I agree that - in the overall bigger evolutionary picture - anthropomorphism was inescapable. I disagree that it remains so to this day. — creativesoul

Again I both agree and disagree depending on your definition of 'anthropomorphism'. That our understandings are human-shaped is inescapable, but egregious uncritical projection of human attributes onto the non-human is avoidable.

Life has always been disconnected from what has sustained it. — RussellA

I don't think this is true. If life was disconnected from what sustains it then it would not be sustained. Perhaps you mean that the discursive intellect cannot fully understand life and what sustains it?

I do not share your pessimism. It's not fait accompli, regardless of whether or not you poison the well. It does not follow from the fact that we are human that all our understandings are anthropomorphic. I sense a bit of chippiness from you. I added quite a bit of substantive examples to discuss earlier. You quoted the first statement of the post and ignored the rest. We can agree to disagree, but it would be far better for us to at least come to clear understanding of what the disagreement is about, and/or where it lies. — creativesoul

I just don't see this the way you do. In one sense anthropomorphism is inevitable because our understandings will always be human-shaped. In another sense anthropomorphism denotes "excessive" projection of human characteristics onto animals, or the world, or reality. Anthropomorphism is, like many other human characteristics, on a spectrum from the inescapable to the egregious.

So, I think that not all human inquiries suffer from anthropomorphism in the egregious sense. I don't know where we disagree, other than perhaps about what I have said about anthropomorphism. If you believed that you had come to some understanding which you believed was completely free from any anthropomorphism whatever, how would you demonstrate that to be so? Would there be a fact of the matter, or does it just come down to definitions or personal opinion?

I don't know what you mean by "poisoning the well" or "chippiness"; I think they are your own projections,it's not what I felt.

Well, that's a fine place to start. I agree. Although, the "think in sensorimotor ways" would be best fleshed out. — creativesoul

Thinking in terms of images, sounds, tactile sensations, smells, tastes or movements as opposed to thinking in symbolic language. What other possibilities can you think of?

I don't know of any other animals that have symbolic language; what did you have in mind?

Perhaps the reason you do not share my optimism regarding avoiding anthropomorphism is because you have difficulty yourself in understanding what sorts of thought and belief are exclusive to humans and what sorts are not. — creativesoul

I disagree with this assessment. Animals without linguistic capabilities obviously do not think in linguistic terms, so presumably they think in sensorimotor ways; whereas we think in both sensorimotor and linguistic ways. All our understandings are, strictly speaking, anthropomorphic, or human-shaped, because we are human; so, leaving aside any imputation of what should be understood to be exclusively human qualities and capacities to animals, I think the question of anthropomorphism is beside the point. Do you have anything substantive to add to that or disagreement to express?

Yes they can breed...surprised? Perhaps better to apply a prophylactic...

Sometimes,a s a discussion unfolds, the only thing to do is to laugh and walk away. — Banno

But that's no fun unless you come back occasionally and make snide comments from the ivory tower.

That's how to avoid anthropomorphism.

The notions of 'linguistically mediated thought' and 'language capable beings' don't - ahem - can't. — creativesoul

Which ought tell you something. That's not something I would or have said, nor does it follow from anything I would or have said. — creativesoul

I have no idea what you are trying to say.

Seems to me that we're perfectly capable of understanding what sorts of thoughts are exclusive to humans and what sorts are not. — creativesoul

You seem to think I have disagreed with this. The only thing I have any issue with is the "humans". I think it should be "language capable beings". Yes, of course we can say that only language capable beings can have linguistically mediated thoughts. It's analytically and trivially (insofar as it doesn't really tell us anything) true.

What is the purpose of suffering? — Yohan

Since suffering has no discernible intrinsic purpose, I take it you mean 'what purpose can we assign to suffering or make it serve'?

Some people, such as ascetics and self-flagellators, purposely inflict suffering on themselves, and the purpose as conceived by them seems to be to gain liberation or salvation.

Other people, such as sadists and masochists, inflict suffering on others or on themselves, the purpose being to experience pleasure.

As Nietzsche says, "what doesn't kill me makes me stronger"; so the purpose suffering would be thought to serve in that understanding would be strength of character. Or like the Buddhists we might see the purpose of suffering as enabling us to come to understand the root causes and then transcend or overcome them.

An artist might see suffering as deepening her creative capacities. A sportsperson might see suffering as necessary to athletic cultivation: "no pain, no gain".

So much for purposely sought or cultivated suffering; for the rest we have to deal with the suffering that comes with mortally embodied being, which is dealt out, sometimes in consequence of self-created conditions, but very often not equally or justly according to desert, but seemingly arbitrarily according to luck,

So, if we are condemned to suffer in one way and degree or another, the question would seem to be as to what purpose we could understand this suffering to serve. In other words what positive outcomes could we imagine and even cause, to come out of suffering. That would seem to be as diverse a suite of possibilities as the individuals who suffer; that is as diverse as the degree of variation of human constitution allows.

Well, there's your problem, then. Allow tedium soak in, to permeate your being; meditate on the fact that you might do anything, but instead do nothing; procure an aspidistra and put it in your front window, watch it by degrees become covered in dust. — Banno

I find it hard to imagine how it would be possible to do nothing. It could be said that I tried for many years via meditation to achieve the state of doing nothing, but I could never get there. Your Aspidistra contemplation sounds like it would be like watching the grass grow, very focused on very little for a very long time. But, it all depends on the state of consciousness. It reminds me of Blake:

To see a World in a Grain of Sand
And a Heaven in a Wild Flower
Hold Infinity in the palm of your hand
And Eternity in an hour

So the conclusion would be that boredom is a state of mind, not a state of doing (or lack of it).

Have you noticed that gum turps leaves a better colour on the handles? — Banno

Yes, agree; better than mineral turps. Better for painting pictures too. When I was cabinet-making I used to heat gum turps and linseed oil (very carefully!) and melt beeswax into it, to make an excellent furniture polish. Just the gum turps and linseed oil is good for that too, but not quite as lustrous as with the added beeswax.

I think these things matter, so I guess we're not going off-topic.

You never have such a clear and distinct apprehension of the fact of being alive as when you are bored shitless. Which entirely undermines your point. — Banno

No, since I was talking about feeling alive, not noticing the fact that you are alive. I hardly ever feel bored, and when I do it certainly does not consist in feeling alive; quite the opposite. But maybe that's just me; you know, human diversity...

I consider myself lucky to have come down vertically and not sideways onto the drop saw that might have led to my demise.

I also use (gum) turpentine and linseed oil on my wooden tool handles. Works well on steel too, once any rust has been removed.

So what matters is that it stop raining. — Banno

Right, so that we can do what makes us feel more alive.

Ankles are so badly designed. Proof that there is no god, or that he's a right arsehole. I think things started to go bad when we came down from the trees. — Banno

Right, down from the trees, or up on two legs. In my case I came down about 2.5 metres on a ladder that slipped out from its position leaning against a wall; I came down vertically and landed with my whole weight on the right foot, it being still on the rung. Never had a problem with my ankles previously.

It's raining up here too. I have a fractured ankle and have been more or less stuck in the house for the last five weeks, so it doesn't make so much difference to me. The dogs would like me to go outside and throw the ball for them, but they're not hassling me as they usually would if it were not raining. Hopefully it'll ease off and I'll be able to attend to their desire for ball action. :smile:

You don't look so happy there; what's the matter?

Why? We might make your unhappy life not a waste by harvesting your organs...

You haven't presented, and can't, present an argument because you can't move from what is the fact to what ought to be the fact.

Otherwise, it's just organ harvesting or advertising slogans. — Banno

If no one feels alive then life is wasted. and harvested organs won't help, so you're only kicking the can down the road.

I don't need to present an argument; it is self-evident that the life lived with a vivid intensity of feeling is better than the unlived life; a life that manifests a paucity of feeling; a life of just organ harvesting and advertising slogans. Is the latter the life you want for yourself and others?

Never used a pubic toilet?

Feeling alive is pleasant, but does it matter? Naturalistic fallacy, yet again.

General gripe: ↪Deus
, ↪Yohan
, ↪Seeker
, ↪I like sushi
and you all posit suggestions that fall at this first hurdle. What we wish to do is not always what we ought to do. Nor can one derive what we ought do from what we in fact do. Basic stuff. — Banno

I was referring to shitting and specifically outhouses, not public toilets. I hate using them and avoid it as much as possible, but I have never needed instructions.

If you don't feel alive then your life is wasted, so of course it matters. It has nothing to do with naturalism.

There is not "what we ought to do", other than try to feel alive and to appreciate the life in others. Everything follows without the need for instructions. Instructions are for the machine men.

True, shitting is essential to survival, but if instructions are required something is terribly amiss. Feeling alive in the sense I have in mind is not essential to survival, but is rare; no instructions can be given and prestige footwear won't help. Go figure, eh?