I'm only interested in hearing and responding to your arguments, Banno.

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I have to admit that, although the Tractatus has been on my shelves for nearly thirty years, I've never read it right through. I've started a couple times and found the effort required unrewarding. I found the PI more congenial, but I haven't studied that methodically either. I'm generally of the opinion that the great ideas should be able to be fairly adequately summarized by anyone with sufficient familiarity, understanding and eloquence, and that quite often their greatness does not consist in their being unequivocally correct but in the fact they were groundbreaking and facilitated further developments of ideas.

That's much the topic here: The content of beliefs is propositional"

For the purposes of exegesis, keep in mind Tractatus 1: The world is everything that is the case.

Comparing eggs and oranges is fraught. — Banno

That the content of beliefs may be propositional (in the restricted sense that they can in principle be propositionally expressed) does not seem to entail that the world those beliefs are about is propositional.

We can say "the world is everything that is the case" but the world itself is not encapsulated within that statement; it is rather our idea or ideas of the world that may be said to be encapsulated by it, or so it seems to me.

Not sure what you are getting at with the 'eggs and oranges' reference.

Einstein's relativity is a good example of such a principle, derived from intuition, but not properly tested. — Metaphysician Undercover

There is a difference between observational and theoretical claims in science. There are no simple observable confirmations that can be made with theoretical claims in the way there can be with claims about what is directly observed.

So, relativity has been tested insofar as its predictions concerning what we would expect to observe if it were correct have all panned out so far I believe.

Think on that a bit. I've bolded the problematic word. In what way is the real world outside of language? Tell me about something which cannot be put into words. — Banno

Is the animal's world inside language? Is even the human world entirely within the bounds of language? If so, how does that work?

I am not familiar enough with Aristotle's treatment of intuition to comment on that.

Regarding your example, wouldn't you say that the observed connection between sunlight (and other sources of heat). warmth and evaporation is as certain as anything can be? The usual counterexample to this kind of intuitive understanding is Aristotle's belief that heavier things fall faster. Even Aristotle could have tested this theory, though with a heavy sheet and a small stone lighter than the sheet, if he had thought to; the raw materials for the experiment would have been readily available to him.

Right, I agree with Pierre Hadot and you on that.

If beliefs and actions appear to support thriving and happiness in oneself and others, then I would say they count as wise beliefs and actions. i don't claim this could ever be an exact science, but I think a sufficiently open-minded, observant and intelligent inquirer should be able to judge reasonably well as to what promotes peace and harmony and what promotes conflict and disharmony in both oneself and others.

Perhaps, but I'm an enthusiast for Aristotle's idea of phronesis—commonly translated as "practical wisdom". I think wisdom is, and can only be, tested by action. "By their fruits ye shall know them". I think this applies to oneself; by your fruits shall ye know yourself—"talk is cheap".

The problem I see with relying on external "points of reference" is that you would need to already know that those points of reference were manifestations of wisdom. How could you know that unless you could see the fruits of those external points of reference and have the practical wisdom to recognize them as fruits of wisdom?

I think we must make our assessments in acknowledgement of uncertainty and the possibility of doubt as Socrates seems to be advocating. But, you know, that's just me; that others may have different ideas they follow, I also acknowledge.

That prompts no disagreement—it all makes sense to me.

Yes it always by definition one unique individual path, whether one follows one traditional path, many traditional paths at the same or different times or follows no particular traditional path at all

OK it seems I misinterpreted what we're saying. I agree we are not isolated individuals; we always live and think within a received cultural matrix.

Ataraxia can get you anywhere. You need to take the beginning, the center, and the end, i.e., "s", "o", ph", "i", "a", and discard the "ch", "i", "z", "r", "e", "n" to get it right. :smile:

Otherwise put, you need some reference to external realities (and authorities) to make sure you don't go to places where you don't want to be. — Apollodorus

I think on that point we will remain in disagreement. I see the arts and free-thinking philosophy as alternative "ways" to following any of the "external authorities". What you say may be true for some, but not all, in my opinion. I mean how could we possibly justify a belief that we can speak for all anyway?

There are many ways to the top of the mountain but you can only ascend by choosing one. Some form of commitment is necessary. Too many cooks spoil the broth, etc.

But I think we agree on the rest. — Apollodorus

I agree with what you say there that there is only one path for the individual, but paths may cross another and even more so as they approach the top of the mountain which would mean, in this 'climbing the mountain' analogy that one could change paths, while obviously still remaining on that one unique individual path.

What if one finds one's own path, avoiding the beaten tracks

And what if one goes back down the mountain and then climbs again? :wink:

Or what if each culture has it own unique mountain to climb?

:clap: :up:

Philosophically, Pierce blew himself up advocating objective idealism. Yea? Nay? — Mww

My familiarity with Peirce doesn't extend to scholar status, so I'm not sure whether I would class him as an objective idealist. From the reading I have done he is a dense (not in the sense of stupid, obviously), hard nut to crack. One day when I have more time free from what I need to do on the 15 acres I live on to make further progress towards scholar status. I certainly think he is a fascinating figure in the history of ideas.

but "aegis of tutelage" doesn’t Google. Cool soundbite, though. Like something just itching to be said. — Mww

when I searched I get a book, then this:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/1367/fichte-theorist-of-the-i/p3

I don';t believe I invented the term; I'm pretty sure I read it in Hegel and not in a secondary work about Hegel.

Anyway....don’t take my flippancy seriously; it’s only the little George Carlin in me. — Mww

:up: I like George too!

Ah, "mere survival."

Words are significant (unlike survival?). But when we desire something, we're not engaged in problem-solving. You yourself seem to acknowledge this when you referred to a desire becoming a problem. If it hasn't become one, it can't be one, right?

An example of what you believe is a desire which is a problem would be useful. — Ciceronianus the White

I wasn't seeking to depreciate the importance of survival, which might have been the impression you received it seems. I should have written "bare survival"; I wanted to indicate those desires, or better feelings of need, which are urged by necessity and are inherently problematic as opposed to those which may be prompted by desire to improve living conditions or by mere curiosity, and so on.

Something is certainly a problem for us if it threatens survival or the basic needs for adequate food, water, warmth and shelter. Beyond that what would, for you, qualify as being more than merely a desire that becomes a problem insofar as we wish to satisfy it (as opposed to needing to satisfy it)?

Fair enough, I can live with that, although the suggestion of 'mere belief' chafes a bit. — Wayfarer

Funny you should say that because I deliberately refrained form using the terms merely believing or merely faith. Faith and belief are incredibly important in human life (as there is really so little of what is most important to humans that we can be certain of). If people don't arrogate to themselves the idea that their faith or beliefs are, or could be, propositional knowledge then they will be far less likely to condemn, fight with or even kill others for disagreeing with them. As you are probably tired of hearing me say, I think the conflation of faith with knowledge is precisely what (not inevitably of course!) leads to fundamentalism and egregious and gratuitous conflict.

It seems to me you are being pedantic, playing with words. What you suggest would be true of any question other than critical questions dealing with how to merely survive.

What if these forms of higher knowledge really do address a reality, not simply a social or religious convention. — Wayfarer

You mean what if these forms of personal conviction really are higher knowledge of reality? My question is how that could ever be demonstrated or known to be true. How could you ever demonstrate that you know that to be true as opposed to believing it to be true?

So, I am not at all denying the possibility. And I am also not claiming that people ought not believe such things; but merely that they should be honest to both themselves and others and admit that it is a question of faith not knowledge (in the sense of being 'knowledge that' or propositional knowledge at least).

Now we appear to have come full circle back to a point of apparent disagreement. What you say, "It's only for the select few" and the quoted passage from Matthew both suggest that there is only one path to wisdom, or at the very least one kind of path consisting in discipleship of some kind, which is precisely one of the things I've been arguing against.

I would agree that the very concern with wisdom is not overly common, but that is about as elitist as I'm prepared to go on this question. I think discipleship is for those who don't have the capacity/(ies) to inquire and think for themselves and practice in their own way (s); it's valid enough for them, but won't suit a freethinker.

OK, I agree that freely chosen submission to authority is fair enough and may be the way for some or even many people; but I don't accept that it must be the way for all is all.

Totally agree. If lifelong perpetual doubting, questioning, and inquiring, followed by more doubting, questioning, and inquiring, followed by rejection of all conclusions, principles, and guidelines, and systematic dismissal of the possibility of ever actually knowing anything, constitutes "wisdom" then we might as well forget about it. — Apollodorus

What if wisdom consists in ataraxia, though? What if it consists in simply following your inclinations and conscience, of being yourself fearlessly, and being skeptical of external so-called authorities and traditional methods as paths to wisdom and of any claims that we need to rely on such things to gain wisdom?

I agree. But the spiritually unenlightened or unevolved is like a child until he or she has evolved. The children of God (ta tekna tou Theou) must grow to become godlike or Gods. Until that time, they are children who owe obedience to their Father.

The pater familias in Greek and Roman culture was the supreme authority in the house. He was always addressed as "father", not "George" or "Basil" or some other personal name. God himself is addressed strictly as "Father" or "Lord", out of obedience, humility, and respect. — Apollodorus

I am happy with the idea of obedience to the "still small voice" of conscience, but I accept no external authority.

And public servants... — Tom Storm

Thanks for reminding me...an oversight... :lol:

Without humility and obedience you were out of the door, on your way, and on your own. — Apollodorus

I'm OK with humility, but I have no truck with obedience; that is for pets and children.

As I've said before, this stance is essentially positivism. You always react angrily against that, but look at the definition:

positivism a philosophical system recognizing only that which can be scientifically verified or which is capable of logical or mathematical proof, and therefore rejecting metaphysics and theism. — Wayfarer

I'm not going to react angrily against that. I may have reacted impatiently against that in the past because I don't think it is in any sense justified. I recognize way more than can be scientifically or logically verified and I can't understand why you apparently can't see that.

Everything is relevant only within its context, though. Intersubjective knowledge is that, and only that, which can be empirically or logically verified or at least tested. But as I have said many times we can know, in senses of knowing which are other than "knowing that" many other things.We know in this other sense through the arts, music and poetry and religious faith and practice; I have never denied any of that. So, why would you be surprised when I become frustrated and impatient when you apparently misunderstand what I am saying and accuse me of being a positivist?

What if 'the common world' is the mind-created projection of the ego, with no inherent reality? — Wayfarer

I think there is no reason whatsoever to believe that is true. Even if it were true there could be no conceivable way to demonstrate it. Believing that could not change a thing; you would still be run over and killed by the semi-trailer you stepped in front of no matter how enlightened you are.

Maybe.

Stephen King has a catchphrase, born in the Dark Tower series.....”they have forgotten the face of their fathers”, a literary commentary on honor.

Pragmatists, and analytical philosophers in general, have forgotten their fathers, a philosophical commentary on teachings.

Progress, I suppose. — Mww

I don't think this is universally true. Peirce, the pragmat(ic)ist I am most familiar was certainly very familiar with the philosophies of both Kant and Hegel.He did have a scientific perspective on philosophy, which does include the idea of progress. The analytical side of philosophy which is more akin to science and exemplified in the inquiry into the nature of logic and meaning has certainly progressed since Aristotle and Plato.

The synthetic side, which I think is more akin to art, consisting as it does in the intellectual exercise of the imagination, does not progress, but rather evolves, I would say. It is an old chestnut of science that scientists "stand on the shoulders of giants". so I don't think the fathers are entirely forgotten there either; they are acknowledged, but not slavishly followed, of course. Hegel spoke of freeing ourselves from the "aegis of tutelage" as represented by submission to tradition. Kant has something like that in mind also, I believe, with his "sapere aude".

Sounds to me more like a desire. — Ciceronianus the White

You don't think that having a desire for something can become a problem until it is satisfied?

And if one uses this conviction as a starting point, and then practices accordingly, then -- so the official theory -- one attains the fruits of the Path. — baker

All I've been saying is that this purported fact can never be demonstrated in the sense that what is counted as knowledge can.

If you believe that is possible, then fine, but you should be intellectually honest enough to acknowledge that believing that cannot ever be anything more than a matter of faith, — Janus

How can you possibly know that?
The world of spirituality is a world of hierarchy and exceptionalism. Some people are said to be capable of things that others cannot even dream of. — baker

I don't rule out the possibility of such capabilities; all I'm saying is that they cannot be demonstrated. If Gautama believes he can remember his past 5000 incarnations, how could that ever be proven? How could even the Buddha know that he is not deluding himself or mistaken?

Actually, he doesn't have to. If he did it, he'd be playing by your rules. — baker

That's a silly statement. Philosophy consists in rationally supported argument. I have yet to see any argument explaining why I should believe that the purported truth of what the Buddha believes he knows can be rationally or empirically tested.

Are we here to find a guru?

Are you? The world of spirituality operates by its own principles. And if you choose to enter it, you need to bear this in mind, or you'll waste a lot of time. — baker

Yes, I know that and I've already explored that world for more than twenty years and found it wanting. Are you happy with the world of spirituality, and if so, why would you be wasting your time here in the world of logic, rational argument and empirical justification?

It is deteminably communicable and transparently justifiable within the appropriate cultural domain. Again, that has been replaced in modern culture by science, but science doesn't deal in the realities of being, only that of objects and forces. — Wayfarer

Even if that were so what is understand to count as knowing in the common sense of "knowing that" is democratic, not cultic or elitist, not confined to a limited world of the arcane and esoteric.

Having said that I remain unconvinced that what you claim there is so. When the zen master certifies the genuineness of the understanding of the acolyte, I think the truth in that is no more transparent and self-evidently determinate than when the critic certifies the greatness of an artwork.

It is seems clear how knowledge is generally justified: either through empirical observation, or logical entailment. The zen teacher's certification of a student understanding falls into neither of those categories, just as the aesthetic judgements don't.

This is not to say that aesthetic judgements or certifications of religious understanding are without value or significance within their worlds, it is just to say that they are not, and can never be, knowledge in the common sense in the common world. In the common world they could only ever have the status of faith and dogma.

We have no reference cases for them, so to us they can only appear as statements of feeling or faith. That's my take on it. — Wayfarer

My take is different. I think we don't recognize gnosis, noesis and so on as 'knowledge that' because 'knowledge that' should be determinably communicable and transparently justifiable. They would qualify, according to my understanding, perhaps as 'knowing how', but I think even more aptly as what I call 'knowing with', which I think of as the knowledge of familiarity in the biblical sense as expressed in (loosely paraphrased) " and a man shall know his wife and they shall become as one flesh".

It is in this sense that we, for example, know the world in the "alethic" sense, as the world is "unconcealed" as Heidegger would say in the "clearing" that is Dasein. I think this alethic understanding of knowledge is behind Heidegger's priveleging of poetry in his later philosophy. I enjoy reading poetry and I also write, and there is definitely something revealed in poetry; something in a sense that is known. I'd say the same for literature in general and the visual arts and music as well.

:up: If natural human curiosity be considered a problem I guess the pragmatists may have a point.

All I can say is that we must be working with very different notions of what constitutes knowledge then, in which case we will only keep talking past one another. I agree we do share common ground, so that's at least something!

If it is a special state that facilitates paranormal knowledge, then there is a logical possibility that there would be some prescient knowledge of afterlife. — Apollodorus

I agree with this; it may indeed be so; all I have been arguing is that we cannot know that it is.

'I am not an Atheist. I do not know if I can define myself as a Pantheist. The problem involved is too vast for our limited minds. May I do not reply with a parable? The human mind, no matter how highly trained, cannot grasp the universe. We are in the position of a little child, entering a huge library whose walls are covered to the ceiling with books in many different tongues. The child knows that someone must have written those books. It does not know who or how. It does not understand the languages in which they are written. The child notes a definite plan in the arrangement of the books, a mysterious order, which it does not comprehend, but only dimly suspects.' — Wayfarer

You, through Einstein you are making my point for me: "The human mind, no matter how highly trained, cannot grasp the universe."

If you study comparative religion, as I did, there are discernable principles and commonalities. — Wayfarer

I did and continue to study comparative religion, mostly on my own and some at Uni. I started reading eastern philosophy and zen and Daoist literature when I was 16. I was fascinated by the idea of enlightenment until my late 30's, and practiced mediation daily for more than 18 years. I know there are commonalities. Why would there not be? The experience of ego diminishment or dissolution which can be had through meditation, the arts and psychotropics is familiar enough to me, and why would there not be commonalities, even cross-culturally, with such experiences, just as there are with psychedelic experiences? None of that entails that what is felt, no matter with what degree of conviction, is actually knowledge of any metaphysical truth.

If indeed through this 'awakening' one realises an identity as beyond birth and death, then what could possibly exceed that? — Wayfarer

I have enjoyed such experiences both with meditation, psychedelics and with the arts and in nature.They are peak experiences to be sure, but they are basically affective experiences. If you try to explain what great truth you feel, that you may be utterly convinced, you are seeing at such times, you find you cannot do so; which means that there is no "knowledge that" to be had there. These are heightened states of awareness, altered states of consciousness, they tell us nothing certain about the meaning of life or what, if anything happens to our consciousnesses after death, no matter how much we might feel they do.

Actually I'll retract what I said there somewhat; we cannot know that they are telling us anything true about the meaning of life or death, no matter how much we might be convinced that we do. I want to repeat again though, that I see nothing at all wrong with having faith in those convictions, but intellectually we are bound, I believe, to recognize that they are still and always will be articles of faith, not of knowledge. And this is very important because this is how fundamentalism, the proud conflation of faith with knowledge, is avoided.

I don't think we reason, or engage in scientific inquiry, or even think unless we encounter a problem — Ciceronianus the White


.....what may have been the problem needing to be solved, which inspired you to think we do not think unless there is one? — Mww

This wasn't addressed to me, but it's such a funny kind of ironic question that I can't resist an answer. Surely the "problem" here would be the desire to understand why we bother thinking, wouldn't it? :wink:

I don't disagree with you - I am not in the enlightenment business - but a revelatory understanding of all which is true is part of the tradition - which is likely to be a myth.

I personally don't accept that anyone is free of ego. It's more how the ego is managed. Or stage managed... — Tom Storm

Yes, I am not arguing against it being part of the myth; it is the fact that it is part of the myth, and that the idea cannot be counted as knowledge that I am arguing.

I don't know if anyone can be entirely free of egoistic concerns, but I don't know that they cannot either, so I am allowing, for the sake of argument, for the possibility. I do believe that, to the extent that one could be free from egoistic concerns, that that would be the most profound transformation people may be capable of experiencing, because their whole orientation to life would necessarily become radically different than the ordinary.

Interesting. I have not read about enlightenment traditions for decades. Is it not meant to include an awakening or illumination simultaneously with ego diminution? If not, it would hardly seem to count as enlightenment. — Tom Storm

Sure it is meant to include an awakening. To be free of ego and it's delusions would be to wake up. But the further claim is that the awakened sage knows the truth about life and death. I say that they may be convinced that they do, but that would only be on account of their lack of understanding of what knowledge consists in. Just because they may be awakened in the sense of free from ego, it doesn't follow that they could know what is unknowable. If, when we die, we utterly cease to exist, then we could never know that. If when we die consciousness and experience somehow continues, which is not logically impossible, then we could never know that until it happens. So the egoless sage, since she hasn't died yet, cannot know the truth about death. She may have a feeling of utter conviction that she does know, but that is still conviction, not knowledge.

The difference is between knowing things for oneself, or taking for granted that someone else knows. — baker

Yes, I realized that the first is conviction that someone else knows and the second is conviction that oneself knows. Still both just amount to conviction.