Who's that, then?

Tell me about him. — Banno

I might have to write a book about it heh. I thought you might help out more with this. @Fooloso4 what do you think?

I'm tempted to say, as I usually do, that behavior determines everything in the world of the Tractarian solipsist, but, what is this behavior responding to might be of greater importance.

Given the OP, I want you to engage with the text. That would give some assurance of commitment.

SO, give me some indication of having read the relevant bits. Tell me what you think they say.

The thing about ethics, and it's something that pisses philosophers off, is that it is not what you say, but what you do, that is of relevance — Banno

So doesn't that mean that many things that are said about ethics arent doable at all in reality? Isn't time to start putting ethics in a base that reflects more actual life and what humans can really achieve? Ethics seem like idealistic fairytale and those who "preach" about them are the first who don't follow them!

Something like that.

The salient point in relation to the OP is that it is the really important stuff that can't be said.

A shallow reading misses this.

SO, give me some indication of having read the relevant bits. Tell me what you think they say. — Banno

I'm going to piggyback of what Fooloso4 has already said in this thread. What do you think can be said about Wittgenstein's Tractarian solipsist?

The salient point in relation to the OP is that it is the really important stuff that can't be said — Banno

I would take it a little further and wonder "can't be said" or maybe we don't "dare" to say them?

Then forgive me if I don't play along.

No; it's what can't be said.

"Whereof on cannot speak..."

And this is why it is vital to refer to the text.

I'm asking if Wittgenstein's solipsist from the Tractatus even had a psychology? If he or she did, then what was it based on? — Shawn

5.541
At first sight it looks as if it were also possible for one proposition to occur in another in a different way.
Particularly with certain forms of proposition in psychology, such as ‘A believes that p is the case’ and A has the thought p’, etc.
For if these are considered superficially, it looks as if the proposition p stood in some kind of relation to an object A.
(And in modern theory of knowledge (Russell, Moore, etc.) these propositions have actually been construed in this way.)

5.542
It is clear, however, that ‘A believes that p’, ‘A has the thought p’, and ‘A says p’ are of the form ‘“p” says p’: and this does not involve a correlation of a fact with an object, but rather the correlation of facts by means of the correlation of their objects.

5.5421
This shows too that there is no such thing as the soul—the subject, etc.—as it is conceived in the superficial psychology of the present day. Indeed a composite soul would no longer be a soul.
— T

W. is not denying the existence of the soul but a particular concept of the soul as an object in the world containing or possessing thoughts, beliefs, etc.

No; it's what can't be said.

"Whereof on cannot speak..."

And this is why it is vital to refer to the text. — Banno

You talk about what Wittgenstein meant to his work? If yes I agree.

But before I asked your thoughts on that. Yes language has its limitations(huge ones) but seems to me that people make also limited use of it! I see fear in using it to express their own deeper thoughts and feelings. Fear of facing their own self maybe if they hear what their thoughts "say" , their world would shake. So they prefer to depress language also as to protect themselves.

Yes, the solipsist is not an object but rather a subject. The only extension in this world of the solipsist is his or her mind.

But, his or her behavior is governed by logic that permeates the world.

So, think about that for a moment... As to whether the subject even has a psychology?

I think it worth considering what Wittgenstein said in his later philosophy in Philosophical Investigations:

“Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a “beetle”. No one can look into anyone else’s box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing. But suppose the word ‘beetle” had a use in these people’s language? If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language game at all; not even as a something: for the box might even be empty. No, one can “divide through” by thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is.

That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of ‘object and designation’ the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant”

Language isn't limited. As Searle pointed out, Anything that can be meant can be said.

The title phrase is not placing a limit on language, so much as on the world. It's the same limit as set out in 1. The world is all that is the case.

And this will be misconstrued, too. You just can't expect to gain an understanding of this stuff from a few aphorisms. It requires a bit of effort.

Now, you may ask why I gave such an importance and started a discussion on that statement-quote, namely "The limits of my language mean the limits of my world". Well, it's not the only one! There are a lot of statements-quotes by prominent philosophers that have been disputed over time. I leave them for some other discussion! :)

For the moment I would really like to hear your opinion on all this ... Thank you. — Alkis Piskas

"The limits of my language mean the limits of my world" does not mean that he denies the existence of the real world outside of the linguistic world. It just means that outside of the proper linguistic world, there are many metaphysical objects such as afterlife, God, free will, infinities ... etc, in which clear and meaningful linguistic communication is not possible due to the limitation of language.

They are, in Wittgenstein, a senseless world. It does not mean it is a useless or illusory world, or non existing world. They are senseless in the sense that logical and clear communication is not easy, if not impossible. They are a senseless world but they rightly exist, and are an important part of the universe.

So, that explains the situation with babies with little or no linguistic capabilities. Their world does exist quite rightly so. They will see and hear and perceive what we do. But due to their limitation of language, they cannot communicate with the grownups in business or engineering skills level, that is all. Their world does exist.

For using computers and driving cars without linguistic knowledge, it is because the computer programmers and motor engineers have designed those devices to be used without any detailed knowledge on how they work. But you still must know how to use the computer i.e. power it on, and login and start your apps or internet browsers to work it. And cars, you must know how to start it with you key or fob, and check the petrol level, and how to put into 1st gear, the next gears and move forward and steer into the direction you want drive safely - you know the skills how to do these things, as you know how to make yourself coffees and drink and make your meals, and how to use your washing machine to do washings etc. These are skills that have nothing / very little to do with linguistic capabilities unless you are writing instruction booklets for them.

...does not mean that he denies the existence of the real world outside of the linguistic world. — Corvus

Yeah, it does.

But yeah, lies to children.

I posted this elsewhere but was wondering what you think about this, @Fooloso4?:

In exploring the theme of Wittgenstein's view of solipsism, G. E. M. Anscombe describes his contrast between what can be expressed (or thought) through language and what can only be shown but not expressed. Language is a mirror of reality: (page 164)

All the logical devices - the detailed twiddles and manipulations of our language - combine, Wittgenstein tells us at 5.511, into an infinitely fine network, forming 'the great mirror' - that is to say, the mirror of language, whose logical character makes it reflect the world and makes its individual sentences say that such-and-such is the case. — Anscombe, G. E. M. An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus. 1971. G. E. M. Anscombe, pg. 164

This mirroring suggests realism. Something is being mirrored. However, the mirroring not only expresses statements about reality but also shows what cannot be expressed: (page 166)

Thus when the Tractatus tells us that 'Logic is transcendental', it does not mean that the propositions of logic state transcendental truths; it means that they, like all other propositions, shew something that pervades everything sayable and is itself unsayable. — Anscombe, G. E. M. An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus. 1971. G. E. M. Anscombe, pg. 166

What is unsayable is in the "limits" of logic which are the world's "limits" (5.61) and the world is "my world" (5.62 and 5.63). This is where solipsism comes in: (page 166)

So, it comes out that it is illegitimate to speak of 'an I'. 'From inside' means only 'as I know things'; I describe those things - something, however, I cannot communicate or express: I try to, by saying I speak 'from an inside point of view'. But there is no other point of view. Suppose others too speak of the 'inside point of view'? That is my experience of my supposition of spoken words. — Anscombe, G. E. M. An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus. 1971. G. E. M. Anscombe, pg. 166

This leads to Wittgenstein's paradoxical view of solipsism expressed in 5.64:

Here we see that solipsism strictly carried out coincides with realism. The I in solipsism shrinks to an extensionless point and there remains the reality coordinated with it. — Anscombe, G. E. M. An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus. 1971. G. E. M. Anscombe, pg. 166

This can be seen as coming from Wittgenstein's view of language as saying what can be said about my world and showing what cannot be said about my world.

Yeah, it does.

But yeah, lies to children. — Banno

Could you elaborate on that please?

...the existence of the real world outside of the linguistic world. — Corvus

Think on that a bit. I've bolded the problematic word. In what way is the real world outside of language? Tell me about something which cannot be put into words.

Think on that a bit. I've bolded the problematic word. In what way is the real world outside of language? Tell me about something which cannot be put into words. — Banno

That is not physically or materially "outside". It means "not possibly described by". Or over the limitation of linguistically describable.

What red looks like, to Mary the super scientist. Do you doubt it?

Language isn't limited — Banno

You really believe this? That language gives people all the tools to express everything inside themselves?? All your actual feelings you find language always appropriate to describe them?
And except that, you get more meaning of what someone means when you talk face to face with him and see his facial expressions too. Facial expressions that might say much more than the actual language. So yes for me language is limited. If it wasn't, people won't have to use almost all of their body as to communicate and fully express themselves.

The title phrase is not placing a limit on language, so much as on the world. — Banno

My understanding on that is that Wittgenstein meant that since human world (reality) is limited by his senses, then language follow this limitations also. And we might need to acknowledge that and break language's borders as to get more "reality" from the world. Things that can't be said (as you mentioned) doesn't mean that don't exist also.

What red looks like — Wosret

You said it.

You really believe this? That language gives people all the tools to express everything inside themselves?? All your actual feelings you find language always appropriate to describe them? — dimosthenis9

That's not what was claimed.

...since human world (reality) is limited by his senses, then language follow this limitations also. — dimosthenis9

Where is this claim made?

Ice skating on the sun is a lot of fun.

Said that too.

I like to turn inside out in the afternoon.

"My world" is small or large depending on what I do in the actual world, how many things I know about life, the actual world and the universe, how many things I have experienced and I am experiencing in my life. And then I can also add the following to "my world": my sufferings, my losses, my feelings in general, my consciousness, my ideas, my intelligence, my skills and abilities, ... All those are part of my world and are dependent only in part on my language. — Alkis Piskas

It is not about the ontology of the world, but the whole point is Wittgenstein's ideas about the relation of language to the world.

That's not what was claimed — Banno

It's what you claimed.

Where is this claim made? — Banno

It is made in my head.That's what I understood.Not necessarily right of course.

"The limits of my language mean the limits of my world" — Alkis Piskas

There's no benefit in imagining unexplainable things; of which this is oddly an example or not.
That's my takeaway. I don't charge for it.

Those who speak do not know. Those who know do not speak — Lao Tzu

Mighty interesting, once you compare the above to,

The limits of my language means the limits of my world — Ludwig Wittgenstein

Lao Tzu seems to be saying that there are things you can know but can't put into words.

Wittgenstein seems to be saying that what you can't put into words, you can't know. Socratic!

1. If you know then you can word it (False as per Lao Tzu, True as per Wittgenstein).

Contradiction!

Both Lao Tzu and Ludwig Wittgenstein seem to be doing a dance around, this is important, ineffables. The former claims that the ineffable is knowable while the latter claims that the ineffable is unknowable.

A sentence taken out of context is meaningless, especially to those unfamiliar with or who have not studied the context from which it's taken. I've read the OP twice and still don't see its point. Or why most respond when you conspicuously have not ever bothered to acquaint yourself with the TLP? @Banno's Socratic shadow-boxing, though surely well meaning, can only embarrass most of you. (Apologies for not contributing something more constructive.)