I agree it should be a general rule to avoid torture, but there are hypothetical cases where it would seem to be the moral thing to do. Shouldn't the government carve out exceptions for those cases? — RogueAI

It would be too complicated, the kinds of arguments you would get would be "Well it applies in that case, why not this one?".

The distinction is between a general rule and those edge cases it cannot reasonably deal with. The law as practiced, whether judicial or moral, is never black and white, but the general rules must be set out as black and white.

:up: Ah, some subtlety!

As I said, we need general rules, but those rules cannot adequately deal with all cases.

No, I'm allowing that society needs general moral rules which I feel I should support but which unfortunately cannot be expected to adequately cover all circumstances. I'm not at all "tied up in knots" about it, it's crystal clear to me, so the seeming must be a projection on your part.

Perhaps seeing the coloured squares as different is not inferential or predictive, but a case of the locations of the squares in different tonal contexts producing the apparent differences simply due to contrast.

What do you mean by "our perceptions are of distal objects" when you say it is false?
— Luke

I don't say that it's false. I have been at pains in this discussion (and others over the past few years) to explain that trying to address the epistemological problem of perception in these terms is a conceptual confusion. It's an irrelevant argument about grammar. — Michael

Saying that distal objects are not constituents of perception or experience is potentially semantically ambiguous, so it cannot unambiguously be framed as a purely epistemological problem, as though there could be a determinate fact of the matter.

And its this that makes his ideas distasteful. We've had enough of dogmatism masquerading as liberalism. His confusion is gross. — Banno

:up: I think you're right that it is dogmatism masked as liberalism; it's couched in terms of being merely Chet's belief, yet it's asserted in a way that is inconsistent with that.

Absolute truth would refer, in your terminology, to anything that is considered true with absolute certainty; and 'absolute certainty' would refer to a level of certainty which cannot be doubted legitimately (e.g., a tautology) as opposed to what one doesn't have good reasons to doubt. — Bob Ross

What's the difference between having no good reason to doubt something and not being able to doubt something legitimately?

Until we are perfect, objective in understanding, until we do 'know'; we have only varying degrees of awareness and of course, belief. — Chet Hawkins

You have your way of thinking about it, and I have mine, and the twain shall never meet, it seems. I think we know many things, as I've said, but I admit there is no perfect, absolute, context-independent knowledge, and since such a thing is impossible, I find it to be an absurd inapt principle by which to attempt to assess and understand our concepts.

I see the tree in the yard but do not believe it's there. — creativesoul

I don't believe it is possible to actively disbelieve in something you see in front of you. Well, I know I can't at least. I also don't see that as supporting the notion that active belief is necessary in those situations. That said, I don't deny that you can talk about believing that the tree you see is there, rather than simply saying you see it there, but I think the former way of speaking is less parsimonious, even redundant. But ye know, that's just me; I don't have a problem with others disagreeing.

I admire your patient circumspection. I admit I am a bit prone to jump to conclusions. What I may or may not be able to conceive is not necessarily an adequate guide to what is conceivable or inconceivable tout court. How do we measure conceivability?

Well, I don't see it that way because I am no moral purist. Of course, torture must be condemned tout court, If I torture the perpetrator to save my family, I will never claim that act is morally justified, because the standard for society has to be "no torture under any circumstances" and I support that. If I feel circumstances call for me to commit an immoral act then I take full responsibility for that, and would feel justified and would not feel myself to have been a hypocrite,

In other words, we have the general rules for society, and then each of us has their own moral sense that we must accept responsibility for. If I didn't torture the perpetrator to find out where my child was, I would feel I had committed an immoral act even though it would have been in accordance with the general rule, and at the same time I would be prepared to accept whatever condemnation or punishment I had rightly subjected myself to and nor would I reject the well-earned epithet of "hypocrite' even though I didn't feel it to be so.

That people might do things they know to be stupid? Just as people might do things they know to be immoral? — Leontiskos

People do things they think to be immoral all the time if it suits them. How much more so will they lose whatever moral compass they may have thought they had when their lives, or the lives of loved ones are threatened?

This reminds me of an argument on another philosophy forum long ago. The question was whether it would be morally right to torture the kidnapper of your wife or child to find where he had hid them, if you knew they had them imprisoned somewhere and had planted a bomb set to go off in a couple hours that would kill them.

The one who posed the question said people were hypocrites to morally condemn torture in any and all circumstances when most of them would torture the kidnapper in that situation. I said that was wrong—even if there is no good argument to support condoning torture in any circumstance, it is nonetheless understandable that anyone who cares about their family would torture the kidnapper in that circumstance and would not be concerned about being justified in doing so. They are two different questions.

No. The moral status of self-defense is an age-old issue. It is not a de facto non-moral issue. — Leontiskos

I didn't say it was a "non-moral issue". I said that its status as a moral issue may be irrelevant to the one defending themselves in the act of defense.

That there might be pacifists whose ideology carries more weight to them than their own wellbeing or survival, even in the mortally threatening moment, doesn't seem relevant. People enslave themselves to all kinds of ideas, human diversity being what it is.

If you can flee, you should flee.

Needless to say, provoking an attack so that self-defense can be invoked is immoral. — BC

Nice pickups!

What might be, from an abstract perspective, immoral would be completely irrelevant to someone acting to save their own lives and/or the lives of their loved ones.

I take it that you mean by "energetic" the concept of energy that is defined by physics? Which, by definition, studies what is physical?
Perhaps St. Augustine's remark about time applies to matter, as well. — Ludwig V

We experience our own efforts all the time. We know energy from the inside, so to speak, and the idea of an interaction that does not involve energy, energy exchange, is inconceivable. So, I start from there, physics is merely an elaboration and formalization of that understanding. Speaking of basics, have you never heard of the four fundamental forces?

For my money, it is the neglect of the elementary point that both "substantial" and "real" do not have a determinate sense outside the context of their use. — Ludwig V

I passed this over before, and I should have made the point that this is a truism that applies to all terms whatsoever. There are no terms that have determinate senses outside the contexts of their use, which makes your point seem somewhat moot.

One way to talk? Sure. A bit shallow though. — creativesoul

If it seems shallow to you, then so be it.

seeing is believing. — creativesoul

No, seeing is seeing and believing is believing. I can see the tree outside the window, I don't need to believe it's there in order to see that it is. Belief is only operative where the possibility of doubt exists.

I think what you mean by 'substantial' and 'substantive' is 'tangible' and/or 'measurable'. Those are the empirical criteria for what is considered to exist. — Wayfarer

In the other thread I said this, which I think answers your question:

It depends on what you mean by 'substantial'; if you mean something like "tangible' then sure. Is mass fundamental in physics, specifically in QM?

If what is is fundamentally energetic, then that is what I would mean by "physical". Is there an alternative view to this?

I wouldn't say they are "empirical criteria for what is considered to exist" so much as they are words denoting what is directly empirically available to us, that it is what it thus available to us and that the notions of real, actual, substantial and tangible denote this availability. How can we apply a term like 'real' to something which is not observable, at least in its physical or perceptible manifestations?

So, for example, mental activity (considered as being something distinct from neural activity) is not directly observable. but its; physical effects and correlates may be. So, I see no problem with saying that mental activity is physical, even though it is not a directly observable object of the senses. If we want to say that mental activity is non-physical or immaterial, I think we should first be able to answer the question as to what we could even mean by immaterial (beyond the obvious "not an object of the senses").

To say that mental activity is not physical, and hence does not exist, and yet is somehow real seems incoherent to me, because it seems impossible to explain what could be meant by that. In what sense could it be thought to be real if it truly is non-physical or immaterial?

Ontic structural realism, things just being the math that describes them, seems like the terminus point for this trend. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I could be mistaken but my understanding of the term "ontic structural realism" is more in line with saying that what is real are the relations that are described by the math, not that those relations just are the math.

If those relations are energetic (which it seems all but the most abstract or merely conceptual relations must be) then the real can still be understood to be substantial, since energy is measurable.

Is it, though? What I took from it, was the sense of ‘misunderstanding the point of being alive.’ It works as a religious metaphor but also as a philosophical one. — Wayfarer

I cannot think of a single philosophy that advocates the idea that there is just one point to being alive, unless you mean living itself (as opposed to being caught up in silly ideas or failing to reach one's potential, however the latter might be conceived). None of this has anything necessarily to do with religion. Religion is only necessary for those who cannot, or don't wish to, think for themselves.

A good example here would be the well-known fact that that physics reveals a physical world that is almost completely insubstantial. "Substantial" and "real" have a meaning in the context of physics, but not one that meets the demands of this philosophical wild-goose chase. — Ludwig V

It depends on what you mean by 'substantial'; if you mean something like "tangible' then sure. Is mass fundamental in physics, specifically in QM?

If what is is fundamentally energetic, then that is what I would mean by "physical". Is there an alternative view to this?

:up: :up:

Again - my claim is that due to the form that Cartesian dualism assumed, that there is a kind of widespread, implicit dualism of mind and body or spirit and matter that is endemic in culture. And that the untenability of the idea of a 'thinking substance' or 'thinking thing' has had huge influence of philosophy of mind ever since, it is one of the principal causes of the dominance of physicalism in mainstream philosohpy (remember your surveys in which only 1% of respondents hold to alternatives to physicalism?) Which is implicit in the question you asked. — Wayfarer

If the physical is naturally understood to have substantial or substantive existence, and it is upon that idea of substance that the notion of reality is founded, and the idea of a mental substance is untenable, then what justification would we have for saying that anything non-physical is real?

The alternative to eliminative physicalism would be to say that mental phenomena are real functions of some physical existents, and that the only sense in which they are not physical is that they do not (obviously) appear as objects of the senses.

It seems to me there are some things (even many things) which cannot be coherently brought into doubt. I agree with your point that to doubt anything other things must be certain, or at least held to be certain.

I've always like Peirce's adage (I believe specifically targeted at Cartesian doubt): "Let us not pretend to doubt in philosophy what we do not doubt in our hearts"

Fuck, I knew there was something else!

One of the consequences of the approach Descartes takes is substance dualism. It's not, for him, the body that does the doubting. — Banno

That's true. I wasn't suggesting Descartes would think that, as I seem to remember (it's a long time since reading Descartes) that he thinks that the reality of the experience of embodiment could be doubted, that it could be an illusion or delusion. Of course I don't hold with that, I think such doubts (like 'brain in a vat') stupid, phony, pointless and toothless.

I was thinking more along the line of what we might be able to infer from the active awareness of doubt.

In order to get things done, one must hold certain things to be the case, not to be in doubt. One must hold some things as certain. — Banno

I agree with you on this, but I wonder whether you think that those things we hold certain are in any degree fallible. Do you think they could ever be falsified?

Both cases require believing that there is something to be mimicked; believing that another individual behaved in some certain way; believing that someone else did something or another — creativesoul

I would say 'seeing that there is something to be mimicked', 'seeing that another individual behaved in some certain way', 'seeing that someone did something or other'. Unless the case is that those things were not seen but reported by someone else, in which case 'believing' would be, for me, the apt term.

As far as the OP goes, you and I agree much more than disagree. It's when we unpack our respective notions of knowledge and belief that things begin to get more contentious. It seems that way to me anyway. — creativesoul

Yes, I agree. We each have our favored ways of parsing and talking about things. :smile:

That is to draw a distinction between mimicry and mimicking for the sake of mimicking. — creativesoul

I would say the difference there would be intention, not belief.

"In that" is not how I would put it. It's that mimicry presupposes at the very least, that the mimicker believe they are mimicking. — creativesoul

OK fair enough—I just don't see why one cannot merely mimic. If I am conscious of an intention to mimic then I know that is what I am trying to do. Some say there can be no knowledge where doubt is not a possibility. I don't see it that way; the way is see it is that there is no place for belief where there can be no doubt. If I'm trying to mimic something, I don't see how there can be any doubt about that.

I agree with you that belief plays a major role in all our lives. I just think we will disagree as to just where it has its roles, or to put it another way, about where it is appropriate to speak about belief being a factor..

The most we seem to be able to conclude from more sophisticated parsings of "I doubt" is that "something doubts", and not what that something is. — Banno

Perhaps "this body doubts"?

I'm not fond of the notion of "proposition" — creativesoul

I just mean by that something like "assertion that something or other is the case".

I think that you're getting at or pointing towards the kind of habitual muscle memory habits that develop given enough time and repetition. With that I'd wholly agree, but as "cross-purposes" implied, that's not what I was talking about. — creativesoul

What I meant about planing boards and riding bikes is that you can watch others doing them, and then have a go, trying different things and improving with practice. I see no need for any particular beliefs in that, just willingness to have a go.

Belief less creatures cannot know how to plane boards. — creativesoul

Creatures without hands cannot plane boards. Look, I agree that you can frame things in terms of belief, and I think they can be framed in terms not including belief. Which is the better framing? That depends on preference and/or intuition.

My point is that we can be aware of a particular thing without believing or knowing anything about that thing, we can believe a particular thing without being aware of or knowing anything about that thing, and we can know how to do something without believing anything or being aware of doing the thing.

Examples may help me to grasp what you're saying here. The above, as written, seems plainly false to me. I would argue that all three candidates/examples/suggestions are false, as they are written. — creativesoul

I can be aware of whatever it is that is present to me right now without believing or knowing anything about it in any propositional sense. You can believe something, for example that your wife is having an affair, without being aware of (having evidence) or knowing anything about any actual infidelity on her part. I can know how to ride a bike without believing anything about bikes, and I can ride a bike without being aware that I am doing it (automatic pilot). I don't know about you, but when I ride a bike I am on automatic pilot for much of the time.

Either all knowledge is existentially dependent upon belief or it is not. — creativesoul

I don't think there is an empirical matter of fact about that (certainly not a determinable one, in any case), just different ways of looking at it, talking about it. So, you can say it is or it isn't. it comes down to personal preference or intuition

But I would go further and suggest that "absolute certainty" is a nonsense formed by concatenating two otherwise innocent words. Trying to make use of such a term leads immediately to misunderstanding. — Banno

I think you're probably right about 'absolute' being a loaded term. Perhaps 'complete certainty' would be a better fit. I'm completely certain, i.e. have no doubt whatsoever that I am currently typing this response to you.

:up:

.

That's intriguing. Especially the 'elevated experince and understanding' part of it. What would be an example of this? Are you thinking enlightenment... gurus and such? — Tom Storm

I don't count "elevated experience and understanding' as being demonstrably more than a feeling. In other words I don't think we can know what the implications of such experiences might be. The guru thing might be helpful for some people, personally I dislike the smell of it.

Perhaps the problem is not, not being able to find "absolute certainty", but the framing of these issues in terms of "absolute certainty". Garbage in, garbage out. — Banno

I agree—absolute certainty is not possible except relative to some context or other.

It is MORE accurate in every way to claim some dearth of awareness by forgoing the term 'knowledge' and similar absolutes that partake of perfection by implication. — Chet Hawkins

I think what we know is restricted to what is right in front of us at any time, and what we have experienced to the extent that we can rely on our memories and what we are able to do.

Beyond that it's all more or less justified belief, with the assessment of justification being reliant on what we do know if it relies on anything at all more substantial than merely a feeling of being more or less certain.

The Gang-gang is a kind of Australian cockatoo. Them dancin' cockatoos is amusin'—better than any fuckin' cat video in my book!

I've also generally held that there is no absolute certainty. And no realm where certainty or truth lives (in the Platonic sense). But I sometimes wonder what is served by adding the word 'absolute'. Isn't certainty finally just a human word, an artifact of language use and convention which can mean various things depending on context?

There are things we can call true because to deny them would result in catastrophe - eating arsenic, jumping from a plane without a parachute, etc. Which unfortunately for my antifoundationalist tendencies suggests that truth (certainly in some instances) is not merely a product of human construction but is grounded in an objective reality that exists independently of our beliefs and perceptions.

On the positive side, having a definition of knowledge or truth is of almost no use in my day-to-day life, so there is that. All I need to know about truth exists in convention, usage or domains of intersubjective agreement. — Tom Storm

I don't believe in any Platonic realm either, but I do believe in the mystical experience, meaning I believe that it is an altered state of consciousness that seems generally to carries with it a sense of elevated experience and understanding—the problems come when people try to use it to prove some metaphysical claim or other. I prefer to draw no conclusions in that regard.

Like you, I'm happy to live with uncertainty, with not-knowing. And I agree with you about the existence of a mind-independent actuality. I have no need of a definition of truth either, I feel as though I know what it is wordlessly, so to speak, and no need to attempt any more fine-grained analysis

I suppose what is noteworthy here would be to ascertain just how well you "got" what the other person was thinking. One thing is to have a general indication of what they may be thinking, the other is those moments of knowing exactly what they are thinking. But sure, point taken. — Manuel

Right, it's always going to be more or less of an approximation, even in relation to knowing what I myself am thinking. I'm not one who believes in perfect introspection..

Cock or two.

They don'tknow it, though, do they? — AmadeusD

Not with absolute certainty. As I have said already absolute certainty is possible only in relation to what is in from of you right now, and then only within the context of what call 'the shared world" and not beyond that to some absolute.

Given that they can be certain of their memories (and that indeed may be questioned), they can be certain about what their partner or good friend has thought about whatever or what thoughts, as expressed, have been in their minds in particular situations or regarding particular issues.

Of course, disregarding the possibility of telepathy, no one can know what is in another's mind in particular situations unless it has been expressed often enough. Of course, it you want to get real cynical, you could say it's possible they've always been lying about what they think.

You may be a good mind-reader. Or you have special powers! — Manuel

I wasn't referring only to myself. I have observed many times that people know what their partners or close friends will think about certain things. This is simply because they know them well, no special powers required.

You are confusing absolute knowledge with knowledge.

If knowledge is a justified belief that has a high enough probability of being true, then you can know you know X IFF you have a justified belief that has a high enough probability of being true that X.

All you have noted, is that you can’t be absolutely certain that it is true; which is not a qualification of knowledge. — Bob Ross

For me 'absolute knowledge' refers to knowledge which is true independent of any and all contexts. I don't believe such knowledge is possible, so I am not confusing ordinary knowledge, which is knowledge relative to contexts, with that.

If you cannot be certain what the probability of something being true is, then you would be operating with a mere belief to support your conclusion that your original belief was justified. An infinite regress ensues.

Absolute certainty is possible within contexts. I can be absolutely certain of what I am doing and experiencing right now. If I look outside and I see that it is raining, I can be absolutely certain that it is raining, or if I see a caterpillar climbing a tree, I can be absolutely certain that there is a caterpillar climbing that tree while I am seeing it. But all of such certainty is within the context of the collective representation we call "the world", it has no application beyond that.

So this:

For example, take correspondence theory of truth: what makes the correspondance theory of truth true? If one accepts that theory, then they would say: it is true IFF it corresponds with reality. — Bob Ross

goes to that point. If I say it is raining my statement will be true if it is raining. If I see that it is raining, I can be certain that I am justified in saying that it is raining. So, my statement would correspond to the actuality, it would be true, I would know it to be true and that would count as knowledge. When it comes to past events I rely on memory, so I can't claim knowledge there because my memory may be faulty (and studies have shown that people's memories very often or even most often, are mistaken).