That is to draw a distinction between mimicry and mimicking for the sake of mimicking. — creativesoul

I would say the difference there would be intention, not belief.

The content of the cat's belief is meaningful to the cat. — creativesoul

Sure. The meaning is just what the cat does.

Yawn.

Getting back on track, I think that had claimed that there was no difference between belief and knowledge, and then we'd made some progress with him acknowledging that there was a difference - the things we believe being the things we believe to be true, the things we know being the things we believe to be true which are indeed true. But then he went to the fall back position that we don't know anything, and so that even if there is a difference between knowledge and belief, there is no knowledge so it makes no nevermind.

Or something like that.

To which the reply is simply to show that we do know things. Like, as pointed out, how to type a reply on the Philosophy Forum.

Chet suggested there was some virtue in saying one believed but didn't know. Such virtue resides in being able to correct one's opinion, to change what one believes from what is false to what is true. But if there is no way to know what is true, then all we can do is change our beliefs, true or false; it makes no difference what we believed. If there is virtue in correcting our beliefs, then there must be correct beliefs. Humility is different to ignorance in that humility admits truth.

My statements are intended precisely to call this foolishness into question. A fact or knowledge, both, are only a subset of beliefs.
— Chet Hawkins
I wouldn't use the word only (or mere). It's a subset. — Bylaw

I mean that is just some sort of gloming onto 'their' sentiment. I would maybe see one of 'them' also suggesting that we not use the the derogatory word 'subset' implying inferiority. No, 'only' and 'mere' are PRECISELY the same (to me) in meaning and they are certainly no worse than 'subset'. So, I confess, I do not get this complaint. It's like saying to 'them' that 'OK, if you concede the main point about your door, we will agree to paint it chartreuse, as you direct.'

Even if (perhaps especially if) you assess certain groups (scientists, intellectuals) you will narrow that spread because all of them are closing ranks as a rep of the group DESPITE personal feelings or beliefs or 'known (ha ha) facts' to the contrary, because they would rather do that than let chaos get a toehold further into their protected spaces.
— Chet Hawkins
Yes, groups can do this. On the other hand, given their methodologies, I trust the information I get from some groups and some individuals more than others. I'm not exactly sure what you meant in the two parts I quoted here. — Bylaw

Most 'grouping up' as a fallacious attempt to argue by mass or numbers, is cowardly, if you follow, an approach/need of fear and order. Anger does not care if others agree or not. It will hold the line to the balance of its own belief, regardless. At least that is GOOD anger.

This yields a dynamic where only the most solid and anger standing type of challenger will come against the too set in 'their' ways authorities of any current span in time and location. History is full of such examples where individual challengers were called out as insane or just comically wrong, until that challengers new path was proven by some set of undeniable demonstrations of or overwhelming need for the new change.

All sorts of categories can have as subsets, members that work much better than others. — Bylaw

And this last bit is another appeasement of 'them'. It surreptitiously implies that maybe this application of the word 'subset; even works, but not well.

There are chess players. Magus Carlsen is a chess player. He's not only a chess player or a mere chess player (the word 'only' her taken in a similar sense to 'mere.' But he is an individual subset of the set of chess players. — Bylaw

Knowledge is ENTIRELY belief. Knowledge is ONLY belief because in the sense that I am referring to it is entirely belief. Knowledge is MERELY belief because belief itself is more interesting and useful than 'they' give it credit for.

The fact that there is an intersection for some people into knowledge that means 'beliefs that are believed to have been verified' can be stated, and EXACTLY like that. There is no need to state that statement any other way. There is no need to apologize for the fact that knowledge (colloquially) is only a subset of belief. But as mentioned previously to another user, what 'they' are calling 'knowledge' (colloquial) IS NOT knowledge.

Knowledge, to me must partake of perfection and its parts and its whole cannot be wrong in any way. I would wish to show that there are words that take from or partake in the absolute nature of the term perfection. 'Know' is one of them. 'To Place' would be another one. The implication is perfection inclusive and this should alarm the more accurate observer. It should alarm them because it is not possible so the claim set being made is spurious. We SHOULD doubt it (more) than a claim that humbly includes this doubt up front.

While there are bad dentists, I don't go with a toothache to prison guards or stock traders. — Bylaw

Yes, on some of that we can agree. But we both know that in reality and especially human reality, there are many situations where the fox ends up guarding the henhouse. Why is that? I 'know' (ha ha) why. It's fair to use the fox's tricks against them, maybe (not really) The fox is likely to sell out truth. The fox is likely to call it doubters facetious when they are the serious ones. The fox was appointed by other foxes. It's there to corrupt the serious nature of truth, precisely to let slip things in a certain way. We are all beset by wisdom, by truth. It is too hard to live up to. The 'powers that be' have to make sure that some roads to truth are obscured. This aids in the pragmatic short cutting of truth in daily life. This aids in immorality, the opposite of wisdom.

That is to say, the deadly serious idea of accuracy is not being treated properly at all when we say we 'know' something.
— Chet Hawkins

But we do know things, all sorts of different things, often with good reason. — Banno

This complaint has no quality. You are just repeating the same mistake. You offer no argument.

Science is not the world. Limiting your examples by presuming that science is the only, or even the best, way to determine truth will lead you astray. — Banno

I cannot tell who you are not quoting here. Quote for better responses.

I never said that science was the only anything. So, I will mostly ignore that statement. I tend to agree that science is not the only path to truth. That is something I would say. It is mostly a fear-order path.

You want a moral argument.

As I already pointed out, if all we have is belief, then there is no correcting ourselves. If there is only opinion, then one cannot be mistaken, for to be mistaken is to believe something that is not the case, not true. In the place of learning, there would only be changing one's opinion. If there is no difference between believing and knowing, one cannot cease to believe a lie and so know the truth. — Banno

And your fear here is correct. There is no other way than belief. It is the strength or quality of the belief that is critical. That strength includes elements of the other two paths, desire, and anger.

Desire is included because perfection casts a shadow upon us, upon non-perfection and we sense that very real effect. It causes desire in us and a sense of worthlessness meant to spur us on to greater effort.

Anger causes us to seek all balances. These balances will shove out non resonant beliefs. It will become impossible to stand (to perfection) until we are balanced.

Further, these disruptions of belief caused by desire and anger do show RELATIVE correctness. When an experiment is repeatable reliably it is in balance with truth. It may even break some desire. That is good. Desire is chaos and so many desires run off in immoral directions.

When reason (order) counters a belief or balance (anger) counters a belief they assist us in possibly more awareness. They cannot assist us in knowing. Knowing is too final, too prefect. And we confuse the unaware and the wistful that sense still that our knowing is not the whole answer. And that 'they' is correct. The best that we have right now, is still not perfect. So there is no 'knowing'. To suggest that there is, is to promote confusion.

You are confusing absolute knowledge with knowledge. — Bob Ross

Most people would not know the difference in these terms. That is my point. I contend that in fact those most people are more correct than anyone claiming as you are here.

Knowledge of any kind is just belief. All knowledge is subsumed under the mantle of belief. It cannot be KNOWN. The word know already means absolute. That is how most people take it.

If you mean to say there is some doubt, most people are happier when you say you do not know for sure. That is correct. Most people are wiser than anyone claiming there is a difference between knowing and knowing absolutely.

Saying you know is a deceptive claim that you know absolutely. And that is impossible so the you making that claim would be a liar.

If knowledge is a justified belief that has a high enough probability of being true, then you can know you know X IFF you have a justified belief that has a high enough probability of being true that X. — Bob Ross

All of these other angles on the same thing are just more subterfuge, more deception. Justification can be in error and is only belief as well. What is believed as true is again, also, only a belief. So error creeps in. Blah blah blah.

Knowledge is only belief.

All you have noted, is that you can’t be absolutely certain that it is true; which is not a qualification of knowledge. — Bob Ross

I would say that saying 'to know x' does imply absoluteness. That is the colloquial understanding.

I would say that saying ' I am aware of x' does not imply a closed set of awareness. I would say that colloquially listeners would feel they have more of a right to question the awareness than the knowing. And that is the point. You, the speaker, MUST NOT, morally, say 'know'. You MUST instead, more properly say 'aware of' to show that you acknowledge the lack of perfect awareness and deny absolute knowledge.

That is all.

Meh. You are presenting a pretty stock pop version of pragmatism. You are unwilling to consider where it goes astray.

No helping some folk.

Cheers.

↪Chet Hawkins Meh. You are presenting a pretty stock pop version of pragmatism. You are unwilling to consider where it goes astray.

No helping some folk. — Banno

I agree that there is no helping some folk.

You are again precisely wrong, not just wrong.

Pragmatism is the philosophy that accepts and encourages practical short-cuts, the fear approach to truth. Pragmatism encourages the word 'know' as sufficient given some short cut or cutoff or less than best because its less than perfect approach to awareness. Pragmatism is the fiat-giver, order apology. It allows for wrongness via truth claims when such are not possible and thereby lies to ALL.

Granted that Pragmatism can enjoy this position and that most people will not have the courage to argue against its workable everyday ways. In other words most people are both 1) Willing to accept that when you say you know that knowing is possible. AND 2) That its ok to say you know if you have done some UNKNOWN amount of justifications, especially if some reasonably thought-of-as-known(not really known) authority (group of bozos wearing the same orderly clothing and using the same orderly practices) says so. THAT is Pragmatism.

I adhere to a better way.

My way encourages the more truthful position that doubt may be unpleasant but that certainty is absurd. And I can explain what that really means better than ANY group of order apologists have so far. It is in the nature of Pragmatism, its very definition, to fail at that explanation.

So you are again PRECISELY backwards in your assertion.

Oddly, I am not just an idealist either. I also stand up against their magical thinking in that 'all desires are equal'. Their fungibility error is epic in much the same way (just reverse) as Pragmatisms insistence that we can be certain or 'know' things. Both are unwise. Wisdom is the middle path and there is even more to wisdom than that because the middle way to be wise must also not be lazy, which is the sin of anger. Extreme moderation would be the lazy way.

Pragmatism

The confusion lies in the fact that I am using there term “probability” in a looser, more colloquial sense, than you. If we are talking about “probability” in strictly the sense of a mathematical, quantitative likelihood; then I completely agree with you.

If we use it more loosely, as also “plausibility”, then your issues disappear. The probability, in this sense, of me writing this message is qualitative and to the degree of confidence I have, given the evidence I have to support it, that would suffice for me to claim it is true.

Normally, colloquially, knowledge does not refer to absolute truth. When someone says "I know that the distance to my local grocery store is 10 miles", they do not mean that they are absolutely certain nor that it is absolutely true that <...>; rather, they mean that they are (1) have a belief that , (2) are justified in, (3) and have high enough credence levels to claim that it is true that <...>.

Normally, colloquially, knowledge does not refer to absolute truth. When someone says "I know that the distance to my local grocery store is 10 miles", they do not mean that they are absolutely certain nor that it is absolutely true that <...>; rather, they mean that they are (1) have a belief that , (2) are justified in, (3) and have high enough credence levels to claim that it is true that <...>. — Bob Ross

And all of that is fine. It's all error, not truth in any way. But you can bet on it as highly probable and be correct.

That is to draw a distinction between mimicry and mimicking for the sake of mimicking.
— creativesoul

I would say the difference there would be intention, not belief. — Janus

The term intention has very different uses, particularly between laypeople and philosophers. I'm guessing you know this already. Just thought it worth mention. It's relatively new to me. That said...

If we're using the layman's notion of intention or the philosopher's, intentionally mimicking for the sake of mimicking requires believing one is mimicking for the sake of mimicking. The object of intention(the philosopher's kind) is the mimicry in both cases, it seems to me. Although, I suppose ridicule could be the object in the deliberate cause of mimicry. The difference between mimicking without knowing one is mimicking and intentionally mimicking is the knowing part. In either case, one knows how to mimic when one mimics.

Both cases require believing that there is something to be mimicked; believing that another individual behaved in some certain way; believing that someone else did something or another.

Earlier you wrote that one without hands cannot plane a board. Strictly speaking that's not true of everyone without hands, but yes... that's the gist of the existential dependency I'm setting out regarding knowledge and belief.

I understand that this is not really germane to the thread topic, but it involves belief, and I'm a sucker for that topic.

:joke:

As far as the OP goes, you and I agree much more than disagree. It's when we unpack our respective notions of knowledge and belief that things begin to get more contentious. It seems that way to me anyway.

The content of the cat's belief is meaningful to the cat.
— creativesoul

Sure. The meaning is just what the cat does. — Banno

Meaning is not equivalent to behaviors. The identity of indiscernibles shows that nicely.

As I just said to Janus, you and I are in near complete agreement when it comes to the OP. Best leave it there with you. I'd rather keep liking you.

:lol:

Ok. Thanks for the response. I think I see your point, but I'm not sure it addresses the argument I made. That you are reading this now is not just "plausible"; rather if that is to be doubted, we no longer have a footing for this conversation to proceed. At some point doubt undermines itself. Nor is arithmetic simply plausible. Bringing it into doubt would require at the least a vastly different approach to understanding the way things are.

Anyway, this is a discussion we have probably had before, an it is clear from Chet's posts that he does not have much of a grasp of basic philosophical terms, nor much by way of a capacity to engage in a coherent argument. Yet another case of someone spouting supposed "philosophy" with little to no background knowledge. I had you in that category for a while, but you have shown a capacity to develop and change your ideas. They are still mostly wrong, but they are less wrong than they were... :wink:

Meaning is not equivalent to behaviors. — creativesoul

No, but we see meaning in how someone uses words as well as with other things. The indiscernibility of identity is just using words coherently.

you and I are in near complete agreement when it comes to the OP — creativesoul

Yep. Turns out Chet's position was pretty shallow.

Thanks for that. Interesting take on truth.

Could you explain it a bit more while applying it to the context?

Cheers. I'd rather be encouraging than discouraging. Enacting morality and all.

:wink:

You're often good at that.

Both cases require believing that there is something to be mimicked; believing that another individual behaved in some certain way; believing that someone else did something or another — creativesoul

I would say 'seeing that there is something to be mimicked', 'seeing that another individual behaved in some certain way', 'seeing that someone did something or other'. Unless the case is that those things were not seen but reported by someone else, in which case 'believing' would be, for me, the apt term.

As far as the OP goes, you and I agree much more than disagree. It's when we unpack our respective notions of knowledge and belief that things begin to get more contentious. It seems that way to me anyway. — creativesoul

Yes, I agree. We each have our favored ways of parsing and talking about things. :smile:

:lol: :kiss:

That you are reading this now is not just "plausible"; rather if that is to be doubted, we no longer have a footing for this conversation to proceed.

This is the part I don't see why it is necessary (for knowledge). Are you saying that we must be certain (which, to me, requires absolute truth) of something to have any knowledge?

I would say that we must be very confident that we both exist and are in a discussion to continue the conversation: I don't see why we need to add in 'and I am certain of it'.

Are you saying that we must be certain — Bob Ross

I'm certain I am writing this reply.

Aren't you certain you are reading it?

When I say I am certain that I am writing this, I mean, more or less, that there is no room for doubt here.
I'm not just very confident that we are involved in a discussion. Any doubt would need to be manufactured, contrived - phoney.

What is "absolute truth" here? It's a strange notion to invoke some something as commonplace as replying to or reading a post on a forum. Statements are, generally speaking, true, or they are false. Sometimes we don't know which. There are exceptions, of course, but these need some explanation, some further account, to explain why we might consider such an antirealist position.

Why do we need to add "I am certain"? Why shouldn't I be certain? In order to get things done, one must hold certain things to be the case, not to be in doubt. One must hold some things as certain.

In order to get things done, one must hold certain things to be the case, not to be in doubt. One must hold some things as certain. — Banno

I agree with you on this, but I wonder whether you think that those things we hold certain are in any degree fallible. Do you think they could ever be falsified?

I agree with you on this, but I wonder whether you think that those things we hold certain are in any degree fallible. Do you think they could ever be falsified? — Janus

One can presumably construct games of doubt about anything. Whether these are to be taken seriously is probably a function of one's credulity. But in constructing such games, other things must be held to be undoubted.

I've said a few times that whilst perhaps anything can be brought into doubt, everything cannot coherently be doubted. Is that too subtle a distinction? One doubts this or that by holding something else firm.

It seems to me there are some things (even many things) which cannot be coherently brought into doubt. I agree with your point that to doubt anything other things must be certain, or at least held to be certain.

I've always like Peirce's adage (I believe specifically targeted at Cartesian doubt): "Let us not pretend to doubt in philosophy what we do not doubt in our hearts"

I will not disagree, but wishing to make the logical point that doubt requires us to hold something certain, I'll accept pro tem that anything might be doubted...

Well, if we take it that adiaireta, awareness of something, is a sort of knowledge, it seems like we can possess it without formulating any propositional beliefs about a thing. We can have false propositional beliefs about something, but I'm not sure if we can have a "false awareness" of something. So, at least this sort of knowledge seems possible.

Further, if we think of knowledge as grasping the intelligibility of something, or "making our mind like it," it seems like we can do this either well or poorly. There is a gradation here, not a binary known/unknown. But whenever we act in knowing something at all, there is adiaireta, which is at least some sort of grasp of the phenomena.

I tend to like the ancient and medieval understanding of knowledge as being more or less perfected, as opposed to the total reduction of knowledge to propositional beliefs and their truth values so common in modern analytical philosophy. It seems obvious to me that I know my brother for instances, but I can know him more or less well than I currently know him.

I agree with your point that to doubt anything other things must be certain, or at least held to be certain.

It seems that most forms of "we cannot know anything about the world," rely on a certainty that there is indeed a world and a real truth about it out there. I just don't know how advocates of these theories can claim to know this given their position.

:up: :up:

It seems that most forms of "we cannot know anything about the world," rely on a certainty that there is indeed a world and a real truth about it out there. I just don't know how advocates of these theories can claim to know this given their position. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The infinite nature of perfection, even as a concept, is shown in every experience, and in every philosophical concept in many ways.

That is effectively like saying, 'Experience shows us there is an objective truth.' We feel it. We sense our remoteness from it. Desire itself represents the effect the remote perfection has upon us. That perfection is, to me, the cause of desire itself. This need not be religious, of course. It is a general part of understanding, of wisdom.

If we pretend that everything is subjective, that our choice or intent can change what is objective, then there should be so much more instability in the universe than there is. To me that notion is laughable. It has no leg or meaning to stand on at all. Everything points to an objective and misunderstood truth.

Math itself and the concept of limits shows the asymptotic relationship of our efforts to perfection. I do not know of even a single concept or choice that defies this relationship as a model in any way.

But language and the nature of fear combine to produce in us the foolish, the unwise, need for certainty; when that is unattainable or at least elusive. We do damage to our earning of wisdom, to our awareness, when we suggest or believe that certainty is possible. There are no exceptions.

This does not mean we cannot acknowledge probability and in so doing admit we are partly wrong in all choices. We take the more likely path knowing the likelihood is not and never can be 100%. The discipline of speaking and writing this way, is required to be more moral. It is shunned by those intending a less moral aim.

It is not clear to me which immoral aim is more compelling in these cases. That is to say there is fear which excites people to order apology and they need the comfort of delusional certainty to proceed. Socially this is quite common and leaders everywhere use this CERTAIN language to calm and to incite their constituency. But in every single case that certainty is delusional, no matter how slight the use or implication.

Doubt does not rely on certainty. Doubt relies only on fear, which is finally a reaction to comparison with that extant and felt perfection. Overcoming this fear, in order to assist in the effort to aim at perfection, is one major goal of life, the universe, and everything.

Clearly, a person like myself, that claims knowledge is only belief, does not believe that I know that there is an objective truth out there. I admit to only believing it. That is more honest than to claim literally anything at all as 'knowledge'. It always will be because it's a law of the universe, to me, by way of belief.

I stand to my fears, my doubts, using anger, and desire, as guides. That is a proper approach (is my belief). I admit to knowing nothing, but I claim to be aware of many things. Those are not the same things to me. Indeed, people react less well in general to someone claiming some awareness than they do to someone lying to them and claiming knowing. This is a terrible problem with understanding in most people. It is inherently more correct to applaud and suffer with the person only claiming some awareness. That is the gist of my claim stated fairly plainly.

There are many people who claim to know they did or did not do something. They are ALWAYS wrong to some degree. It is inherent to reality itself. Their memory of what happened, the sensory data, is delusional and incomplete. That is indeed enough for my claim to have more merit than any claim of knowing can ever bring to bear. If this is not understood, I can only pity us all as we suffer more and more because this relatively simple but distasteful matter is not easy enough or seductive enough to accept. If the would be charlatan disguises their efforts towards truth with minimal assertions like 'I wrote something sometime.' their quality of effort is all the revelation one needs. This IS cowardly Pragmatism writ small, again and again. It is a short cut. It is greatly immoral in its aims.

To be objective, one must be perfect. This means any knowing must know everything, or it is not knowing at all. It is in fact only awareness of SOME PART of all. And that IS NOT knowing. All lesser scopes than all are delusional in separation. Separation or reduction is only a process to aid in understanding and NOT a state that is acceptable morally, finally. That is to say, one MUST ALWAYS resolve back to unity (and truth).

It is inherently more correct to applaud and suffer with the person only claiming some awareness. — Chet Hawkins

It makes more sense to me, to applaud and enjoy with the people who demonstrate that they have knowledge. You can't know that it is inherently less correct, right?

It seems that most forms of "we cannot know anything about the world," rely on a certainty that there is indeed a world and a real truth about it out there. I just don't know how advocates of these theories can claim to know this given their position. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think it's a bit of an empty claim. It's intuitively true, if you take the position, but in itself, I don't think it's a claim to certainty. Given that the other option is to be certain, which the position rejects... Perhaps language just doesn't do it's job here, though, as there is obviously a difference between being certain about lack of certainty, and being certain about any real-world concrete proposition.