Ah I see, thanks for clarifying.

Hmm, from my perspective I do see it as obvious given the neurochemical underpinnings of thoughts and that the causal path is quite clear within that framing. But, now I'm clear on what you're saying, I need to think a bit more about what we can strictly say the entailment regarding ideas / propositions is.

Of course it's the brain. Nobody's questioning that. But that's where, not how. We know that wings make an airplane fly. When we ask how, simply repeating "the wings do it" isn't an answer. Certainly, we can mess with subjective experience by affecting voltage gated calcium channels, serotonin reuptake proteins, and any number of other parts of neurons. But that doesn't even begin to address how those physical things don't only release ions when photons of one particular range of wavelengths hit the retina, but experience redness, and don't only act on themselves in feedback loops, but are aware of their own existence. — Patterner

The topic of this thread is not the hard problem of consciousness though. There are plenty of threads on that, and in those threads I have always been happy to say "we don't know".

This thread is about causation, thoughts to thoughts, and that's very clear IMO. As I've said, it's intrinsic to the whole way our minds -- cognition and perception -- work. It's almost all associative. This is demonstrable and testable.

If I have a thought of someone I love, and the brain fires up in all the ways we can now observe, was my thought caused by a yet previous piece of neurochemistry? Couldn't we equally say that the chicken of neurochemistry was preceded by the egg of subjective thought? — J

Or, the position that I am espousing: that they are one and the same thing.
I feel you are poisoning your own well by beginning with the premise that one must cause the other.

Yes, but the opposite is also the case: We can reliably induce chemical and electrical effects on the brain by subjective experiences. — J

Sure: both support the position that thoughts, and subjective experience, are based in neurochemistry.
Or put it this way: are there ever subjective experiences that aren't coincident with activation of areas of the brain?

We don't have a hint of understanding how the brain makes subjective experiences. Which means we don't know that it does. — Patterner

False, and refuted by the other parts of what I said that you didn't quote.
We can reliably, and precisely, induce subjective experiences with chemical, electrical or mechanical effects on the brain. No-one would claim that this constitutes a complete model. But we absolutely do have good grounds for thinking the brain makes subjective experiences.

Noting correlation is not the same as explaining how one causes the other. — Patterner

A lot of loading in just that one sentence (whether intentional or not).

Firstly, "correlation" massively mischaracterizes what we're talking about here. We're not talking about rubbing my lucky rabbit's foot and my team wins the big game.
We're talking about the highest standard of empirical verification: being able to consistently make accurate predictions and inferences. Every time you take an ibuprofen for a headache you are again testing the idea that conscious experiences are one and the same with neurochemistry. (And I am mentioning that as an example of how often the hypothesis is tested, of course, within medicine and neuroscience the millions of tests are also extremely precise).

Secondly, I just said that my position is that thoughts and neural firings are two descriptions of the same phenomenon, yet you're still asking which way the causation goes. My answer is very obviously: neither.
You may as well be asking me whether ball causes sphere or does sphere cause ball? They're two descriptions of the same thing.

Where do you suspect the subjective experience shows up? — Patterner

Yes we don't have a good understanding yet of how the brain makes subjective experiences.
Qualia are a fascinating phenomenon, but the fact that they can be triggered, reliably and precisely with tools like deep brain stimulation suggests that they, like the mind in general, are a product of the brain.

Plus it's pretty hard to square how qualia could work as some external phenomenon or ghost in the machine. For example, we understand a lot of how our brain forms the images we see; the edge detection, movement detection, object persistence algorithms etc that happen, we have localized very well where they happen, and of course can create optical illusions based on our understanding.
We don't yet understand how the brain creates subjective experiences like "redness". But, however that happens, it needs to be embedded right within this set of visual processing algorithms, that are completely physical and even mathematical.

Neuronal events are nothing like thoughts, so the question is, how can they be the same thing? — J

Many phenomena have different characteristics that might seem wholly separate prior to establishing a model linking them. Imagine trying to explain smallpox symptoms as a cellular phenomenon to someone unfamiliar with germ theory. Microscopic jelly-bags with long helices inside is nothing like pain and pustules.

Why should physical experiences such as neurons firing give rise to conscious experience? Are thoughts "really" just brain events? — J

Well I wouldn't use the "really" framing, because I believe both descriptions are valid. We have thoughts and we also have brain events.
But yes, they are different facets of the same thing; this is trivially demonstrable from the fact that physical changes to our brain have a corresponding effect on our conscious experience (e.g. taking an opioid and the effect it has on dopamine receptors and what that feels like).

If you look into the so-called "hard problem of consciousness" as described by Chalmers and others, it will give you a good sense of what the controversy is. — J

I'm familiar with the hard problem of consciousness. Indeed I would put it to you that you have misunderstood it, if you believe the point is to claim that the mind cannot be a neural phenomenon.

You're not missing the point; our conscious experience certainly seems to rely on something like causation. But the OP question focuses on whether it's the content of a thought that causes another thought, or whether, as you describe, it's the neurons firing. Of course it's tempting to say, "They're the same thing," but as you probably know, that thesis has generated a lot of philosophical controversy. — J

If you can summarize one or two of the main points of controversy I would appreciate it, as my understanding is there is no issue with that description (though no-one would say it is complete either).

I think what can sometimes happen is that when we talk about neural correlates of consciousness, the temptation is to imagine it as some trivial mapping. That if I see a yellow ball say, there's a cascade of neural firings all resulting from that, like dominos.

But of course it's a lot more complex than that. While yes, some individual firings can be coupled to simple perception, the overall pattern of firings is continuous, extremely complex and largely based on referencing past data -- the brain running a complex internal model with outside perception just having an effect on the model.

I don't know if this slight rant is relevant here, it's just a framing that often seems assumed in these discussions. That as soon as we talk of synapses firing and cause and effect, the temptation to see cognition as serial, synchronous and passive seems too strong.

I'd say I've had more negative experiences in my life than positive, but regardless, there are things that I look forward to and I want to try lots of experiences. Life is short and death is permanent, and that's the simple equation that keeps me from thinking of suicide.

That said, I'm personally pro euthanasia, and I do believe we should have the freedom to check out if that's the decision we come to.

The problem I often see in movies and TV is a protagonist who hurts (or even kills) innocents (eg persuing cops) because they are on some important mission and see it as the "greater good". And they rarely stop to reflect on what they've done.
In the real world, this kind of "greater good" thinking is often what enables the greatest evils.

That said, the degree to which it is harmful to the audience depends on many factors; I'm not saying that every movie treating an innocent security guard as fodder is necessarily normalizing evil (or violence), but some do.

Finally, I've got to disagree with the OP's characterization of breaking bad. Much of the point of the series was asking difficult moral questions and showing the factors that might lead a formerly good person to "break bad". It's very far from just cheering him on (or his wife being an "empty shrew"). Did you think, for example, when he calls for Gale to be executed, and what that also did to Jessie that we were supposed to find it heroic?

I read the first few posts of this thread, and the last few, and I'm still not that clear really. So apologies if the following point completely misses the point.

The point being, that when it comes to neurology, association is inherently how our brains work. Right from the neuron level, through to nuclei, regions and brainwaves -- this fires, causing that to fire. Sometimes in a linear fashion -- it may be difficult to remember the first bar of a song but after that the rest of the song is often fully recalled without effort. And sometimes horizontally -- the smell of cut grass bringing back a childhood memory.
But more than that, our whole ability to navigate the world requires us to associate many properties that go together.

So yes, thoughts cause thoughts, almost all of our conscious experience relies on it.

Reality is what there is, hence to posit something "beyond reality" is to posit more of what there is, and "beyond reality" is a grammatical error. — Banno

Well I think it's implicit that we're talking about known reality.

The way I look at it is this: I think hypotheses that we are living in the matrix or whatever are vulnerable to occam's razor. They have no better explanatory power than the hypothesis that I am a Homo sapiens on earth 2025, but posit additional entities.

And I think it's also important to stay within this explantory / hypothesis space. Because sometimes people make the claim that everything around us being a dream is somehow simpler than believing in a gigantic universe. But scale, and physicality, are not complexity. Or you sometimes get allusions to a an idea of a universe being "easier"; both of these claims are baseless and/or irrelevant at this time.

The idea that free will requires this sort of "rewind" possibility and that if we reset the whole universe to that moment (including your brain and memories) you could have chosen otherwise is what I've called "rollback incompatibilism" in a paper I wrote a few years ago. I think it's false, but it does seem to be a shared presupposition between libertarians who insist it's required and possible and hard determinists who insist it's required and impossible. — Pierre-Normand

I would go further than just calling it false, I think it's nonsensical. Rewind time and things are either going to be the same, or different for things like quantum indeterminancy (which we don't consider to be a reasoned choice). If there's a third way that could make sense, no-one seems to know what it is.

And this rewind possibility is the standard framing. I've watched or taken part in countless online and in-person debates where the whole premise was this (false) dichotomy of "Determinism vs free will" and usually a subtext of "Could we have chosen differently?"

When I acknowledge that someone's blame is fitting, or feel shame or regret where I should, I'm not just being moved into acting better in the future (though I may be). I'm recognizing that, in this case, I was or wasn't properly responsive to the demands of reason. When I say that I could have done better, I don't mean that I lacked the general ability and opportunity to do better. — Pierre-Normand

I think there's room for a lot of nuance on the concept of blame, but broadly I disagree.

I doubt that blame makes sense from a god's eye view, that is, with perfect knowledge. And I think this whether or not my decisions are predictable.

But I'll start with the nuances.

Firstly, as a practical matter, we have to hold people accountable for their actions. Both because we don't have perfect knowledge (and in terms of predicting actions, we likely never will) and we're limited in what we could do anyway. So it's necessary to praise and encourage the good, and condemn the bad, as part of just having a society.

(I would still say though that justice systems should be primarily based on rehabilitation, deterrence and public protection and not punishment. Because the notion of punishing evil is vulnerable to us finding genes, or neuropathologies highly correlated with violence say.)

Secondly, in terms of what you're saying about not living up to our potential, I get why it feels like that: I look at many dumb things I've done in my life that way. But it's usually the result of having greater knowledge and awareness now, often due to seeing the results of past dumb behaviours.

There's a strong correlation between impulsive behaviours and youth -- does that mean young people aren't their true self? Someone who died at 25 was never their true self?

But anyway, in general, I don't think blame works in the abstract. If God asks me why I did X, I can always give an explanation and it was down to what I understood at the time, and just the way I was wired (e.g. disliking pain, being attracted to women etc). All things God is at least as culpable as me for.

I appreciate this and I apologise if my comment may have been a little curt — Pierre-Normand

Thanks and reading back my own post, I will say the same. My posts are often more acerbic / confrontational really than they need to be and I appreciate you cooling the temperature.

But surely, you must grand that ordinary uses of the phrase, like "I didn't stop by the corner store to buy milk after work (and hence couldn't have chosen differently) because it was closed" are meaningful? — Pierre-Normand

I do agree that that description is meaningful.

I'll try to clarify my position.

I believe that we make choices, but those choices are the product of our knowledge and predilections.
If you could rewind time to the moment I made the biggest mistake of my life, and you "rewind" my memories back to that state, then I'll do the same thing for the same reasons.

Some might balk at calling this "choice" then, but I think this is the *only* thing we can mean by choice. What's a choice that *isn't* the product of knowledge and predilection, what would that even mean?

In a universe is magic, souls and indeterminacy, how do the fairy folk decide between coffee or tea?

I'm a bit curious about the process whereby you are able to look at the concept itself and deem it incoherent. Do you pluck it directly from Plato's Heaven and put it under a microscope? Rather than arguing that you've never heard a formulation of the concept that isn't meaningless or inconsistent (which is not really an argument but more of a gesture of exasperation — Pierre-Normand

It seems to always be the case that when I state my opinion that free will is incoherent, the response is always, essentially, how dare you. No-one ever seems to respond with a coherent definition, or give a description of how it could function in a hypothetical universe.

But anyway, to respond to your points, I have given examples of formulations, like "could have chosen differently", and explained why I think they're meaningless. So I did do the thing you're suggesting.

If you know of better definitions, let's hear them, I'm here for it. In the meantime, yes my opinion is that it's incoherent, not just because all the formulations I have heard have been, but because I've heard all of the most popular ones.

I don't really understand why you think that. Let me be clear in turn that I think that this is a tenable position (that free will may not be a valid concept, or at least that it has serious problems), but it needs to be supported with honest work. — SophistiCat

I gave my reasoning -- that I've never heard a formulation of free will that wasn't meaningless or self-inconsistent.
If you believe that there are definitions of free will that clearly define something that could potentially exist in a hypothetical universe, I'm open to hearing it. I just never have.

"Free will" is a thing, so to say - the concept has been in use for a long time, not only in exalted domains of philosophy and theology, but also in common parlance and in specialized secular domains, such as law. — SophistiCat

Lots of people believe a thing does not make it rational though; concepts and arguments need to stand on their own merits.
Besides, it's not like I'm the sole dissenting voice; there are plenty of philosophers and theologians that believe there's no free will. And I would argue their position is in fact that the concept itself is incoherent even if they don't seem to appreciate it themselves. Now, hear me out, because I know the obvious retort is that I am claiming to know their minds, I am not.

What I mean is, many philosophers, like those I mentioned upthread, will not merely say that there is no free will but that there cannot be free will. The only difference between them and people taking my position, is that by them keeping the focus on our universe, rather than considering whether this concept can be realized in any universe, they don't fully appreciate that the problem is with the concept itself.

I rather think you should begin by asking the bolded question. You may even find that the question of determinism vs indeterminism isn't as relevant to free will as all that, belying your first and second points — SophistiCat

My position is exactly that we should start with asking what we mean by the concept, and that determinism / indeterminism is a red herring -- see my first post in this thread. I was just explaining the steps by which I (and others) got there.

In any case, these first two points prompt the conclusion that free will is impossible, not that it is meaningless. — SophistiCat

True, but it bears the burden of showing it's meaningful.

Let me be clear: there are plenty of things we don't understand, or even are entirely speculative, but are perfectly valid concepts.
Free will has not even attained that level yet though. It's self inconsistent, at least in the formulations that I've seen. A reasoned choice that can't be traced to reasons.

NB: I wouldn't normally derail a thread like this, but seeing that this is yet another pathetic attempt at self-promotion by one of our resident crackpots — SophistiCat

Is that at me? WTH?

Is this why you think that the concept of free will is incoherent? Why? — SophistiCat

Apologies -- I've repeated my position on this so many times, on so many forums that I can forget the need to explain myself on a different site.

1. The concept usually gets framed first around Determinism. The reasoning is that, if the universe is Deterministic I might think I chose coffee or tea, but actually that choice was predictable from the big bang. I only had the illusion of choice.
Fine.

2. Then, when it's pointed out that the universe may well not be determinstic, thanks to quantum indeterminancy, this is usually handwaved away. How can randomness be called choice?

3. But to me, (1) and (2) combined leave a bad smell. In (1) it seemed that the issue was with our decisions being predictable, being integrated in the causal chain of events. When the suggestion (2) arrives that this may not be the case, apparently it's still insufficient to have free will.
So, to me, at this point we should be asking What exactly do we mean by free will, and is it something which could even potentially exist?

4. And basically I've never heard a satisfactory answer to (3). No-one can seem to breakdown how a "true" free will decision would be made, or what it even really means.
The popular "Could have chosen differently" is quite a woolly definition. Every reasoned action I've made in my life I did for reasons, that I could have told you at the time. And some of those reasons were more important to me than others. When we talk about "could have chosen differently" what do we mean in this picture -- that I could have been aware of different things, or would value different things more highly? But these things can also be traced to events / properties external to me.

If some people's notion of free will is incoherent, one option is to advocate for dispensing with the notion altogether. Another one is the seek to capture the right but inchoate ideas that animate it. The idea of free will clearly is conceptually related to the idea of determinism, on one side, and to the idea of personal responsibility, on the other side. Sam Harris and Daniel Dennett have argued over which one of those two attitudes—eliminativist or revisionist, roughly—is warranted. — Pierre-Normand

True, but I think it's a bit misguided, or maybe gets us off on the wrong foot. (I mean their descriptions, not that you are misguided)
For example, Sam Harris, Stephen Law, Alex O' Conner etc will say that they don't believe that there is free will -- tacitly agreeing that "free will" has been well-defined as something which could potentially exist in some reality.

But their reasons for thinking it free will not exist are more fundamental than just talking about Determinism. They talk about where the will comes from, and that random events could not be called free will.

Therefore I think they would struggle to describe any universe that would have this concept. And, furthermore, the scrutiny should then be placed on the concept itself; basically questioning the premise that I just mentioned -- that free will is a meaningful concept that could exist.

My position remains that the concept of free will is incoherent. Let me be clear: I'm not agreeing with the position "there is no free will", I am saying that that position is "not even wrong" because it's meaningless.

A reasoned choice is the product of reasoning: the product of (knowledge of) past events and individual predilections: both of which can be traced to causes outside of the self.

Determinism is a red herring here, because IME no one can give an account of how free will would work and make sense even in a non deterministic universe.

They literally do not. They discuss translocation and mutation. They do not discuss several allele variations. I presume you can quote the passages you are referring to, as I was able to do? — AmadeusD

All genotypes originate as mutations.

Look, let's even take a step back. I'll give you credit for the fact that you tacitly accept that the standard arguments for sex determination to be binary and trivial (on the basis of internal or external genitalia, sexual dimorphism, chromsomes etc) don't work. Because these things can sometimes be equivocal and even when, say, chromosomes fit cleanly in one bracket, another thing like external genitalia might fit in a different bracket.

The problem is that you seem unable or unwilling to acknowledge exactly the same issues with the SRY gene. There are hundreds of different observed genotypes for this gene, and it also may not align with other markers of sex.

You can read the names of the authors. I assume. But am getting less certain of your capabilities in this regard. Luckily, you've simply whittered. So no worries mate. — AmadeusD

Yeah an ad hominem, that totally works as a cite of even one biologist that agrees with your position.

Why not nothing? = Why being? Asking either question assumes being, so being is inscrutable by questioning. — ucarr

To ask the question of why anything exists requires a questioner, yes. But so what?

We also need a questioner to ask what dark matter is made of...does that observation solve the question of what dark matter is? Does it entail that a universe without dark matter is impossible?

Likewise the fact that sentience is a prerequisite for asking why anything exists, does not in any way answer the question. And it doesn't tell us that nothingness is impossible.

This supposed 'Nothing' cannot be. This mistaken 'it' has no it and so it cannot even be meant; therefore existence must be, for it has no alternative, and indeed there is something; so no option. — PoeticUniverse

In English, "logical NOT" and "thing" get concatenated into a noun, nothing, but it's a special noun.

If we say "There's nothing to be afraid of", we don't mean that there's exactly one thing to be afraid of, that we are calling "nothing". We mean there are zero things to be afraid of.

Likewise "nothing existing" in the cosmic sense doesn't mean some entity we're calling "nothing" has the property of existence. It means zero things have the property of existence, including space-time.

I mention English, because not all languages do this thing of concatenating "no + thing" into a noun.
So a sentence like "nothing is still something" translates into absolute gibberish in many languages. e.g. It can translate into "zero things are one thing", or in some cases "it is not the case that thing is a thing".

You can read the quote you quoted. But you are literally incapable of taking in information which is counter to your emotional position. Fortunately for my attitude, I have demonstrated that you are wrong. Several times. With absolutely no retort other than repeating a claim which is incorrect. — AmadeusD

You think that a quote that says that there are hundreds of observed genotypes for the SRY gene, supports your claim that it's strictly binary? WTF level of gaslighting is this?

Anyway, I asked you directly for which biologist has stated your position of SRY being the singular and binary determinator of sex. Say a name or admit that none do.

Also on the topic of the OP, a man spent a month in jail for posting a meme following charlie kirk's death. A meme that seemed to be pointing out Trump's hypocrisy and callousness. The justification for bringing charges though was supposedly that the meme was claimed to have been taken to be a threat against the school.

https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/crime/larry-bushart-charlie-kirk-meme-charges-b2855116.html

People are really stupid and (as it seems you are quite disposed to do) actually look for things to get upset about because it scores them social justice points. — AmadeusD

The irony of this kind of statement, when the whole tangent about transgender is recreational outrage. A tiny number of people are transgender, and are disproportionately victims of crime rather than perpetrators. As I say, it's a drummed up boogieman, the moral panic of our time.

I have now addressed that exact thing four times. You repeating your patently, demonstrable and obviously false position doesn't change it. I have provided ample evidence, with highlights ,providing that you are flat-out, dead wrong and I have provided direct, ample evidence for such. — AmadeusD

So once again your response is "nuh-uh!".
Your own cites told you that there are multiple genotypes for the SRY gene, to summarize:

"Functional" SRY (XY): The typical male genotype, usually resulting in the development of testes and male characteristics.
Non-functional / Mutated SRY (XY): Loss-of-function mutations or deletions in the SRY gene in individuals with an XY karyotype can cause Swyer syndrome (46,XY complete gonadal dysgenesis), where the individual develops female sex characteristics.
Translocated SRY (XX): In cases of 46,XX testicular DSD, the SRY gene is translocated onto one of the X chromosomes. These individuals develop male characteristics despite having a female-typical chromosome pattern.
Various Point Mutations and Variants: More than a hundred different variants (missense, frameshift, and truncating mutations) have been identified in patients with DSDs, especially within the HMG (high mobility group) DNA-binding domain of the protein. These variations can have different impacts on the protein's function, leading to a spectrum of conditions from complete to partial gonadal dysgenesis.

IOW this is useless for the purpose of claiming sex is strictly binary, unless, that is, we just arbitrarily group everyone as functional SRY or "other". In which case, we may as well have grouped genitals, chromosomes etc in a similarly arbitrary way, except even there the problem comes when genitals and chromosomes etc don't align.

All of the ones I posted, including providing quotes and explaining hte slightly nuanced technical language in a way that is easily understood by those who cannot read a biological paper except to cherry pick buzz words they think, but are wrong about, supporting their erroneous view. — AmadeusD

Oh, all the experts agree with you. Great, so let's start with one.
Which one of the experts here has said that SRY is the singular, and strictly binary, determinator of sex?

There is no third genotype. Translocation is the only "third option" for SRY and it is a location aberration. It has nothing to do with sex. Alleles don't come into this. You are wrong. — AmadeusD

There's only so many times I can point out to you that your own cites allude to multiple genotypes of SRY (as there are multiple genotypes for any non-fatal gene), so let's just cut to the chase.

Which human biologists have claimed that human sex is a function of the SRY gene and is binary?

Stating that you have not changed your position does not clarify your understanding, of the points being put to you and whether you have any counter-arguments.

Practical tool, yes. Means to learn about reality? No. Not the TRUE reality.

Like I said, I'm a theoretical person with little concern for practicality. — Copernicus

Yes you said that already.

I responded that the same methodology that delivers us practical tools and inferences also helps us to understand reality, demonstrably so.

You then simply said "sure", so I asked you to clarify whether you are accepting the argument.
Just repeating your original position doesn't give us that clarity.

Please now clarify: do you accept the argument? Do you believe you have found a flaw in it?

Incidentally, I also noticed a significant asymmetry in this discussion among people claiming there is such a thing as a selfish act, but no such thing as a selfless one.

Say we take the example of a man spending all his money on a flash car and fine clothes while his children go hungry...we'd call that selfish, right? Because that person was satisfying his want of nice things and putting that ahead of others that depend on him.

However, if we flip it, and talk about a father that sacrifices because he wants the best for his children, suddenly we can't talk about his wants and motivation in this simple way.
No, we instead now need to go super reductionist, and try to find neurochemical underpinnings, or even the whole evolutionary history of the species, to find an agency-free description.

IMO you can't have it both ways: if you want to take the agency out of selfless acts, you need to do the same for selfish acts and claim there's no such thing as a selfish act either.

people call mass "weight". — Copernicus

Every thread now is just pithy responses. Why are you on a discussion forum, if you're unwilling to discuss the points being put to you?

Anyway, I'll give your response the courtesy you didn't give mine.

The difference with "weight" is that both the technical and colloquial meanings of weight are useful self-consistent terms, used by people speaking English to refer to actual phenomena.

Whereas the idea of "selfless" meaning very literally having no concern for the self, and not even having any biological basis for the behaviour, isn't a term anyone actually uses. Outside of threads like this, that is.
Threads claiming that there is no such thing as a selfless act is the only time we seem to encounter this extreme meaning of the term.

"Sure" what? Do you now acknowledge the solid grounds for having confidence in science, both as a practical tool and as a means to learn about reality?

If you're satisfied with practical benefits then sure. I'm not. I'm a theoretical person. To me, the truth is more important than functionality. — Copernicus

The two go hand in hand. When we are using a scientific model to make accurate predictions, it can be seen as both an attempt to find useful, practical implications and a validation of a claim about reality.

Our understanding of quantum mechanics for example is being tested with every transitor operation in the device that you are using to read this. Billions of tests per second and our accurate predictions are correct every time. That doesn't give you confidence that that model represents at the least partially how this reality works?

The more narrowly we are defining "selfless", the less importance the claim that selfless acts don't exist has.

That's on top of the fact, as already pointed out, that the conception of "selfless" as literally meaning having no concern for the self whatsoever, is nowhere related to what the word actually means.
(NB: I would guess some dictionaries might give a very terse definition, that implies no concern for the self, but they would also probably define words like "monopoly" or "democracy" in similar simple terms that would imply they don't exist either, if taken literally)

So if you want to create a term that means a willful action that's not willed, and not even originating in biology, possibly even causality...then sure, that doesn't seem to exist (or even make coherent sense). I'm with you on that.
Meanwhile back in the real world, people can be motivated by a desire to help others, putting their own needs second (within reason), and that's what people actually mean by the term selfless.

@copernicus "observations" is just one part of science, we make models and then we test those models. The usefulness of this method is easy to demonstrate by eg the device that you are using to read this.

No. That's an odd question. Are you unfamiliar with the scientific method or was it a rhetorical question?

I wouldn't put it that way, since speculation is also part of the scientific method.

But the key difference between the two is prediction and testing, which we can then use in building technology and making decisions.

Sure they are both the same with respect to an impossible standard to meet.

However a difference of course is that science is empirically testable and therefore gives us both a pragmatic and a logical reason for belief.

The pragmatic reason is that science is useful. Just the observation that swallowing foodstuffs sates my hunger is a kind of science. This is very useful information regardless of what the true nature of reality is.
Meanwhile religion might make us feel good but in ways that are easy to explain without the need to assert supernatural involvement. Other than that religion simply makes false claims and false predictions.

And the logical reason is that there can be true facts about this reality regardless of whether it's a simulation or whatever. Induction is useful and we have as much grounds for trust in it as we would in a hypothetical universe that we somehow knew was objectively real.

However, if you look at those doctrinal magisteria as a venn diagram of human wisdom, you may see a small area of overlap, which could be labeled as Philosophy : Rational but not Empirical ; Ideal but not necessarily Real. Plato and Aristotle worked together, but one focused on metaphysical Ideality (abstract & utopian) while the other emphasized physical Reality (practical & pragmatic). Yet their disparate philosophies did overlap in the middle : pursuit of Truth. — Gnomon

This.
Asking how religion and science can integrate is similar to asking how science and philosophy can integrate. Philosophy covers a lot of things that one day could be a science; that could be objectively testable. But today they are not, and so we apply the tools of philosophy as both an end in itself and also to aid in defining the problem in a way that it becomes scientifically studyable.

And so with religion, I think if someone wants to believe a god made the universe say, there's no problem. I mean, I don't agree with the arguments for that position, but in the context of this thread, it's not harmful to science.
And we see that in the fact that vast numbers of scientists, probably the majority, are theists, and it doesn't affect their ability to do their work.

Where science and religion *do* overlap of course, then they cannot be integrated, and very simply science has always won. We learn about reality by observing it, not through revelation.
So religion either steps aside, or you get the sad reality of places like the US, where ignorance of the scientific method and critical thinking must be maintained, so that grown adults can continue to believe it all began with a talking snake and a magic tree.

Neuroscience has shown that our emotional and instinctive systems start the process of action before we even realize it. — Copernicus

I think it's more complex than that; it depends upon what action we're talking about.
And I think you'd likely agree that the subsconscious mind is also part of the person, so I think you're agreeing with me, but coming at it from a slightly different angle.
My position was that our "wiring" is such that we can go into a state where we appreciate that we are responsible for this important, fragile thing, and moment to moment we are not doing a cost/benefit analysis; there's no time for that.
You're suggesting we are internally motivated by our mind seeking particular activation for certain actions: yeah, I'd say those things are alternative descriptions of the same set of phenomena.

If a truly selfless act must have no internal motive at all, then it wouldn’t really be an act of will — it would just be something mechanical, like a leaf falling from a tree. — Copernicus

Agreed. It's also interesting that you throw in the concept of will here, because my main objection to the OP is the same as for the free will debate. But I'll avoid the temptation to tangent into it completely.

To call an act “selfless” just because the person wasn’t aware of its benefit is to confuse consciousness with motivation. Every voluntary act comes from within: from emotion, instinct, or belief — all of which exist because they help the self endure. — Copernicus

I was agreeing with you right to the end :)
Firstly, I don't think we should take the structure of the word that literally; I don't think it's understood as meaning literally absent the self. If a kind person does a kind action, and someone calls it "selfless", we're not saying it appeared from nowhere (which would make it as worthy of praise as being struck by lightning).

And secondly, no, I don't think all voluntary acts necessarily exist for helping the self endure.
Social species have group selection pressures, so there will be some behaviours that are not optimal or even to the detriment of the self. Plus just genetic drift will mean humans are likely saddled with some arbitrary proclivities.

And heck, a mother caring for her child is to the detriment of the self. Hear me out.
I know that parental love is such a strong thing, and a familiar thing to us all. And that all organisms prioritize reproducing above all else. So we casually consider reproducing and caring for the next generation to be aiding the self. And that we "live on".
But the next generation isn't the self.
Those behaviours evolved for the genes' benefit, not mine.
Again, we might not mind at all, because we get the benefit of feeling good about ourselves later. That doesn't make it the reason we behaved that way though.

The problem with this topic is in reasoning that if we find some benefit of an action, or a future beneficial state, that proves it's a selfish action.

But surely the intent matters here? If I help an old man cross the street, and he turns out to be a billionaire who buys me a car, that doesn't make it selfish, because that wasn't my reason for helping.

I know that's a silly example, but I just want to establish the distinction, because now we can take a look at an example from the OP:

The OP mentions a parent caring for their child and mentions things like self satisfaction. And sure, being a good parent feels good. Was that the reason for doing it though?
I would say: no. I wouldn't necessarily say it's "love" either.
I think there is a responsibility hat that we sometimes wear, instinctively. It's only occasionally that we get to stop and think about consequences of *not* looking after a child, or how much we love them or whatever. The rest of the time we're operating out of a sense of duty; someone is depending on us.

Of course, we can take this a step back and say that that instinct of duty exists for selfish (gene) reasons. But to me it's absurd if we're requiring selfless acts to go back beyond this level. We'd be implicitly defining "selfless" as "reasonless, and yet non random". Yes of course a nonsensical thing doesn't exist.

I object to violations of free speech rights on both sides of the political spectrum. If you don't live in the US, why are you defaulting to their oppositional binary?

If you care about free speech, you oppose all violations. — Jeremy Murray

I *do* oppose all violations, I am just focusing on the currently most widespread and dangerous.

As I said in my initial post in this thread, something akin to woke outrage has been the case for decades in the UK, under the banner of "political correctness gone MAD". It was almost always exaggerations if not outright bollocks, but it reliably sold newspapers. It's also made us vote against our own best interests several times (e.g. brexit).

And right now we're on the edge of the same cliff that the US is hurtling down. There's plenty of disinformation about migrants and trans etc in the UK, the latest one being that migrants are eating swans (why is that familiar)? We're in a weird place where accusing someone of racism is treated more seriously than actual racist propaganda.
Which has helped a far-right party lead in election polls. If they get in, I think it's just a matter of time before we have universities, journalists, broadcast media etc gagged in the name of "protecting" us from "woke".

That said, the UK is a more symmetrical situation than the situation in the US. There are things that the left (-ish) wing government has done that I strongly object to, like proscribing Palestine Action as a terrorist group, and the recent arrest of a screenwriter for offensive (but not illegal) views.
The 1 : 100 estimate of severity earlier was meant for the US.