Nagel's a champion as far as I'm concerned. He doesn't profess any form of theism, yet he sees right through what he calls neo-Darwinian materialism.

Nagel's review was the subject of the following thread:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/1189/thomas-nagel-reviews-daniel-dennetts-latest/p1

A comment I made at the time:

Dennett's career is based on that apparently outrageous claim, and he's clever enough to be tenured for it. And you may think it pointless, but it is not insignificant, a great deal hinges on it. I get criticized a lot for 'obsessing' about Dennett, but it's because he the most prominent advocate of philosophical materialism in modern culture. So if you want to show the shortcomings of philosophical materialism, the central weakness of its strongest exponent is a good place to start! — Wayfarer

Also, here's a copy of an essay that was a precursor to Mind and Cosmos - Evolutionary Naturalism and the Fear of Religion, originally published in The Last Word.

Oh, and also:

https://www.newyorker.com/books/page-turner/thomas-nagel-thoughts-are-real

https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/weekly-standard/the-heretic

So, is Human Consciousness a form of Matter? If so, what is the missing link? Whence the Illusion?
Or, is Human Awareness perhaps a form of immaterial, but knowable, Information? — Gnomon

What's the distinction between the illusion of consciousness and consciousness?

Physical pain is unpleasant, and explaining how matter can have unpleasant sensations is the hard part. The "illusion" of being in pain seems to also be unpleasant. So what exactly is calling it an illusion bringing to the table?

I don't think consciousness is immaterial, but I don't think dennett is right either. Explanatory power is the measure of any hypothesis.

An illusion is an intrinsically intentional experience that is given to consciousness. So, to say that consciousness is an illusion is essentially to saw off the branch on which you're sitting. For an illusion presupposes a conscious mind that is being deceived by the illusion.

to say that consciousness is an illusion is essentially to saw off the branch on which you're sitting. For an illusion presupposes a conscious mind that is being deceived by the illusion. — Alvin Capello

Exactly. I don’t understand how supposedly cogent and smart philosophers can keep making the same logical error again and again. Dennett must not be very smart.

Exactly. I don’t understand how supposedly cogent and smart philosophers can keep making the same logical error again and again. Dennett must not be very smart. — Olivier5

Yes of course, that's the answer!

...It's a marvel you were ever taught anything. When your physics tutor explained atomic theory to you did you say "well it doesn't seem that way to me, you must not be very smart"?

I’ve always been a brilliant student, a bit too gifted for his own good. You strike me as a closed mind, a bureaucrat of philosophy. You could try and follow your own logic and intuition rather than the authority and habit of others. It’s not that scary you know?

I'll admit to the same sophmoric reaction myself.

illusion
/ɪˈluːʒ(ə)n/
noun
an instance of a wrong or misinterpreted perception of a sensory experience.

The word itself seems to presume consciousness. I can imagine specific conclusions about consciousness being incorrect or about 'human nature' or ontology coming out of our everyday experience and sense of what consciousness is. But that it is an illusion makes no sense to me just on a semantic level. An illusion is one type of experience. I'd also wonder how they are getting their information such that their words have meaning if not via having been conscious of things, arguments....etc. iow it seems problematic for an empiricist to make that blanket statement, not that a rationalist has it easy either

What's the distinction between the illusion of consciousness and consciousness? — Mijin

The same as the distinction between an illusion of consciousness that (like the Chinese Room) doesn't have a proper semantics, and one that does.

The word itself seems to presume consciousness. — Coben

Yeah, it's the difference between consciousness as a subject of investigation and consciousness as an adjunct to investigation.

So an illusion is something which appears to be one thing, but is, in fact, another. So immediately it's about the properties of the causes of the perception.

We could say "whatever is actually happening in our mental process, we'll call that 'consciousness' and work out what properties it has - I think that's the route you're drawn from the sound of it.

Or we could say "well 'consciousness' is already a word with a lot of meaning attached (it's already used in ways which assume certain properties of it) and so we'll continue with that use and if the mental processes we're investigating turn out not to have those properties then calling them 'consciousness' in that sense is incorrect, they seem that way, but aren't". That's the route Dennett takes.

I think his choice of route has more to do with selling books than philosophical merit, but that's not relevant to his conclusions so long as we understand his choice.

OK, that was quite clear, thank you.
It's been a long time since I read Dennett on this. I just took a quick glance at an outline of his argument and I remember more of the issues I have with his position (one right off is his metaphors are extremely poor I think). But that's another thread, or perhaps this one as it develops.

We could say "whatever is actually happening in our mental process, we'll call that 'consciousness' and work out what properties it has - I think that's the route you're drawn from the sound of it. — Isaac

Or we could say "whatever is actually happening in our conscious process, we'll call that 'mind' and work out what properties it has" etc.

Oh, hang on.

Consciousness is the human being's ability to talk to himself about himself, tell his own story and draw long-term conclusions, from where he acquires the ability to promise things.

So my dog's not conscious?

The same as the distinction between an illusion of consciousness that (like the Chinese Room) doesn't have a proper semantics, and one that does. — bongo fury

Then it appears that there is no difference in an illusion of consciousness that doesn't have proper semantics, and one that does. Semantics is derived from the syntax - from the relationship between the rules and what the rules cause one to do or not do.

Meaning is the relationship between cause and effect. Meaning exists wherever causes leave effects. It's not some special thing or process that only exists as a feature of minds.

What I find interesting is how Daniel Dennett's claim, if he did indeed make that claim, that consciousness is an illusion squares with the notion of philosophical zombies.

If physicalism is true then, philosophical zombies are supposedly impossible and here Dennett's asserting that we're all philosophical zombies which would mean that physicalism is false. Has Dennett shot himself in the foot? Not really. After all, the difference between philosophical zombies and normal people requires consciousness to be real i.e. it can't be that "consciousness is an illusion". If "consciousness is an illusion" then the discussion ends there - there's no such thing as consciousness to begin with, ergo, what's the point in entertaining thoughts about situations where its present or absent. Since philosophical zombies no longer make sense the p-zombie argument for non-physicalism is shot to pieces. In fact, non-physicalism, itself predicated on consciousness being real, becomes meaningless. The odd bit is even physicalism (at least as it relates to mind) becomes nonsensical because as per Dennett, "consciousness is an illusion" and if that's the case, the whole business of proving consciousness is physical is an absurdity. Perhaps Dennett is under the impression that physicalism is the default position and, to my reckoning, he's not wrong; after all, the only reason why non-physicalism is still around, alive and kicking as it were, is consciousness, the belief that it's real and our near-complete ignorance regarding its nature.

Dennett's tactic reminds of the time when I saw, as a child myself, two other children fighting over a toy - both wanted it - and they had come to blows over it. An adult intervened and the clever solution was...to promptly remove the toy from the scene. The toy having disappeared, the two children stopped fighting.

However, what does Dennett mean by "consciousness is an illusion"?

Here's what I think Dennett means...

The definition of consciousness, I'm going to use here is awareness of the external world and also of oneself. It's quite obvious that this is what is meant by consciousness by most folks as when these don't occur e.g. when one is asleep or in a coma, we're said to be unconscious.

Imagine now a camera set up in such a way that it captures images of the external world and also of itself with the help of a mirror placed strategically. It's turned on and images of itself and the world are formed inside it. This camera is, in every sense of the word, aware of both the external world and also itself which take the form of images that form inside it, behind the lens.

Compare this camera to what we call consciousness. At the end of the day, consciousness is ultimately, at its core, an image of the world outside and of the self, what we call awareness is just that.

In essence, what we call consciousness is analogous to the images that form in this camera - both being, all things considered, states of awareness of the external world and of the self. However, most of us who don't know any better would, I presume, never say that this camera is conscious but would not hesitate at all in thinking of ourselves as conscious. That means the following must be true:

1. The world and the camera itself take the form of This camera's images. Not consciousness!
2. The world and the person faerself take the form of Mental images. Consciousness!

But 1 and 2 are identical in that both are awareness of the external world and of oneself. Ergo, to think that there's something extra - consciousness - when it comes to what are basically mental images just like the images in this camera is a mistake. Since this camera and us are identical in the sense that both operate in terms of images of the world and of the self there can be no difference on which to make the distinction consciousness and not consciousness. So, to claim that we possess consciousness and this camera not can only mean that consciousness isn't real or, in Dennett's words, consciousness is an illusion.

The same as the distinction between an illusion of consciousness that (like the Chinese Room) doesn't have a proper semantics, and one that does. — bongo fury

I don't think this is right Bongo. The discussion here is about er conscious humans that are supposed to have illusions about their own consciousness. In the case of the Chinese Room (some) conscious humans are under the misconception that a computer is conscious.

But surely reflective awareness must come into the picture. You speak of 'images of the world and the self', but I am not sure that we can divide self and world so easily. Surely this distinction of it is made is itself dependent on consciousness.

The definition of consciousness, I'm going to use here is awareness of the external world and also of oneself. It's quite obvious that this is what is meant by consciousness by most folks as when these don't occur e.g. when one is asleep or in a coma, we're said to be unconscious.

Imagine now a camera set up in such a way that it captures images of the external world and also of itself with the help of a mirror placed strategically. It's turned on and images of itself and the world are formed inside it. This camera is, in every sense of the word, aware of both the external world and also itself which take the form of images that form inside it, behind the lens. — TheMadFool

This is absolutely hopeless stuff Fool my friend. The camera is not aware of anything in the way you are. It doesn't see anything. How can you have got yourself into a position where you think a camera can see things? And Harry Hindu is just as bad, he thinks the beach remembers where you walked, until the waves wash the footprints away.

So, is Human Consciousness a form of Matter? If so, what is the missing link? Whence the Illusion?
Or, is Human Awareness perhaps a form of immaterial, but knowable, Information?
Questions? Comments? — Gnomon

Neither is correct. These ideas are based on Cartesian Dualism, whereby the world is divided into exactly two realms, the physical and the mental, the material and the immaterial. But that's a mistake. We live in one world.

Yeah, it's the difference between consciousness as a subject of investigation and consciousness as an adjunct to investigation. — Isaac

Those two are the same thing, there’s no distinction to make here. Until you understand that the problem involves reflexivity, you won’t be able to make any sense.

The definition of consciousness, I'm going to use here is awareness of the external world and also of oneself. It's quite obvious that this is what is meant by consciousness by most folks as when these don't occur e.g. when one is asleep or in a coma, we're said to be unconscious. — TheMadFool

The problem is that you are still aware when asleep. You wake up suddenly to loud noises. How could you do that unless you were at least partially aware? Are you conscious while dreaming?

Is consciousness just an experience, or does the experience have to have some causal connection with the world outside of the mind, i.e, the experience is in some sense about the world?

But 1 and 2 are identical in that both are awareness of the external world and of oneself. Ergo, to think that there's something extra - consciousness - — TheMadFool

Consciousness is the awareness not the images. It is what continues between the state of unconscious and conscious, as those who become conscious are aware of who they once were.

As for Dennet, why is he and others trying so hard to be a famous nothing. Doesn't he realize that he's nothing but an continuous accident? And why does he even bother writing of he can see past the veil of illusion? Doesn't he see the meaningless of his life? A life of continuous denial. Must be quite empty.

Or we could say "whatever is actually happening in our conscious process, we'll call that 'mind' and work out what properties it has" etc. — bongo fury

Yeah...presuming we have any more confidence that we know what 'our conscious process' distinguishes than we do what 'our mental processes' does.

Meaning exists wherever causes leave effects. — Harry Hindu

So, everywhere. I disagree.

It's not some special thing or process that only exists as a feature of minds. — Harry Hindu

But it's a special fiction indulged by animals capable of playing along.

And vice versa was obviously my point.

The discussion here is about er conscious humans that are supposed to have illusions about their own consciousness. In the case of the Chinese Room (some) conscious humans are under the misconception that a computer is conscious. — Daemon

Agreed.
The Chinese room is about whether we can infer intentionality, let alone subjective states, in another entity based on its behaviour.
This is a very different thing from the idea that some entity can itself be under the illusion of having subjective states.

As I alluded, there's no distinction between being in pain and the illusion of pain if both hurt.

The camera is not aware of anything in the way you are. — Daemon

Let's look at it from another point of view. At any single moment in time when you think of yourself as conscious what exactly are the contents of your mind? You may be out on a walk by the seaside - you see the waves, you hear the gulls, you feel the light breeze, you smell the salty air, you take a sip of the drink in your hand and taste whatever it is that you're drinking and you think how lucky you are to have the time to relax like this. I've covered all the bases in this description of you having a good time insofar as awareness is concerned - there's nothing else you can add to it. These different kinds of awareness (of the external and the internal) come together to produce what is, at the end of the day, an image of the world and yourself in it.

How different is this image from that captured by your phone's camera of the world and itself through a mirror? Can you tell the difference between the sights and sounds in the video recorded on your phone and your experience of them? Apart from your experience being in your head and the recorded video being on your phone's memory, there's no way to distinguish between the two - the surf, the gulls, the sunset if you were lucky enough, everything would be exactly the same between you and your phone's camera. I've left out the other senses because current technology doesn't allow me to paint a realistic picture of all the senses in action. However, if technology can record sights and sounds, there's nothing holding us back from replicating the other senses too. That out of the way, just take note of the fact, in a basic, but adequate to make the point, sense, your phone's camera can record both the world's and its own sights and sounds and that's exactly what's in your or any other person's mind when you/they are conscious. In essence what you call consciousness - seeing and hearing (limiting you to your phone's existing capabilities) the world and yourself - is something your phone's camera can do and does do. If you have difficulty in accepting this, I want to ask you a simple question, "what if your so-called consciousness were transferred to your phone's camera?" What would be different but limit your answer to vision and hearing as even the most advanced phone's aren't exactly bodies with full sensory and motor functions? What you'll see and hear will be exactly what the camera records through its lens and microphone but now you'd be referring to what hasn't changed in any way - the images and sounds in the camera - as consciousness and that's what in my, and probably Daniel Dennett's, book is seeing something that isn't really there and that's what an illusion is. Consciousness is an illusion.

In the case of the Chinese Room (some) conscious humans are under the misconception that a computer is conscious. — Daemon

And the source of the misconception appears to be mistaking mere syntactical proficiency for a proper semantical understanding.

These different kinds of awareness (of the external and the internal) come together to produce what is, at the end of the day, an image of the world and yourself in it.

How different is this image from that captured by your phone's camera of the world and itself through a mirror? — TheMadFool

I'll stop you there. We don't know.
We don't know to what extent images are formed in the brain; we know that sensory data from the eyes is broken down in several ways in the eye and the brain and there is a lot of ongoing research into whether, and to what extent, these elements are brought together.

The sensation of sight certainly *feels* like just seeing one discrete image, but there are reasons to doubt this.
For one thing, if the brain internally makes an image, what views that image? And does it also need to make an internal image, and so on?

For another, there are various optical illusions that cast doubt on this simple idea. The first that comes to mind are the "impossible colors", where it is possible to see a blue that's darker than black or an orange that's lighter than white. Good luck rendering those images.

As I alluded, there's no distinction between being in pain and the illusion of pain if both hurt. — Mijin

There's a clear enough (ethical, even) distinction between a self-driving car able through mere syntax to complain of bodily trauma and an as yet fictional self-driving car able to play the social game of pointing appropriate words at the same trauma.