"It simply is" is the first cause. — Philosophim

The explanation might end with "there is no first cause". This explanatory end isn't itself a first cause. — Michael

We are actually talking about the same thing. :) Where explanations end is the start of causation. A first cause has no prior explanation for its existence, "it simply is". That base, "X simply is" is a first cause from which other causes can happen. My point is that whether the universe has an finite or infinitely regressive causality, the reason why it is one way over the reason that it isn't another way is, "It simply is." There is no prior explanation or reason for its existence. — Philosophim

Where explanations end is the start of causation. — Philosophim

This is why, in metaphysics, it is important to understand that a thing must have actually been measured in order to have a measurement. As in the examples above, the mountain is commonly assumed to have a "height" prior to being measured, and the jar full of marbles is commonly assumed to have a "quantity" prior to being counted. — Metaphysician Undercover

I ask the same question about 1. Why is there a finite limit to causality? The answer cannot be found by looking to something prior. So the answer is that 'It simply is.' Its the same answer in each case. Essentially the question is, "What caused existence?" And in all cases, there is no prior explanation. The first cause is, "It simply is." — Philosophim

It may simply be a brute fact that there is no first cause. That explanations end somewhere isn't that causation starts somewhere. — Michael

4. Alpha logic: An alpha cannot have any prior reasoning that explains why it came into existence. An Alpha's reason for its existence can never be defined by the Z's that follow it. If an Alpha exists, its own justification for existence, is itself. We could say, "The reversal of Z's causality logically lead up to this Alpha," But we cannot say "Z is the cause of why Alpha could, or could not exist." Plainly put, the rules concluded within a universe of causality cannot explain why an Alpha exists.

5. Infinitely prior, and infinitely looped causality, all have one final question of causality that needs answering. "Why would it be that there exists an infinite prior or infinitely looped causality in existence? These two terms will be combined into one, "Infinite causality. — Philosophim

There is no right or left. It's uniparty all the way down. — NOS4A2

And when it comes to policy, he’s as much part of the uniparty as anyone. — Mikie

if I had the steely self-restraint of a Michael — Baden

Care to share the script? — Lionino

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    const items = ['foo', 'bar', 'baz']

    document.querySelectorAll('.Message').forEach((element) => {

        [/\bisrael.*?\b/ig, /\bjew.*?\b/ig, /\bislam.*?\b/ig, /\bmuslim.*?\b/ig, /\bpalestin.*?\b/ig, /hamas/ig].forEach((pattern) => {
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I just happen to be right when everyone else is wrong so it's justified. — Hanover

I’m not a particularly proactive mod, but I’m very much aware of how hard it is to moderate debates like the Middle East thread — Wayfarer

he is specifically stating a moral outcome does affect the world and the world will be different if the outcome is different — Hanover

1. Assumption: Ethical non-naturalism
2. Assumption: Ethical truths affect choices
3. Assumption (but argued for in this thread): If ethical non-naturalism is true then ethical truths cannot affect choices
4. Therefore, both (ethical truths affect choices) and not (ethical truths affect choices)
5. Therefore, ethical non-naturalism is false. — bert1

On the one hand, we may define the physical as whatever is currently explained by our best physical theories, e.g., quantum mechanics, general relativity. Though many would find this definition unsatisfactory, some would accept that we have at least a general understanding of the physical based on these theories, and can use them to assess what is physical and what is not. And therein lies the rub, as a worked-out explanation of mentality currently lies outside the scope of such theories.

On the other hand, if we say that some future, "ideal" physics is what is meant, then the claim is rather empty, for we have no idea of what this means. The "ideal" physics may even come to define what we think of as mental as part of the physical world. In effect, physicalism by this second account becomes the circular claim that all phenomena are explicable in terms of physics because physics properly defined is whatever explains all phenomena.

We cannot tell what is possible, by way of proof, in favour of one judgment that ‘This or that is good,’ or against another judgment ‘That this or that is bad,’ until we have recognised what the nature of such propositions must always be. In fact, it follows from the meaning of good and bad, that such propositions are all of them, in Kant’s phrase, ‘synthetic’: they all must rest in the end upon some proposition which must be simply accepted or rejected, which cannot be logically deduced from any other proposition.

Then you need to revise your definition, because you are deviating from it ('Then "this is immoral" means "one ought not do this"'). — Leontiskos

the assertion ‘I am morally bound to perform this action’ is identical with the assertion ‘This action will produce the greatest possible amount of good in the Universe’

It's one thing to refuse to define these things, and quite another to claim that they have no bearing on motivation. Everyone who has an inkling of what 'good' or 'moral' means knows they bear on motivation. If your arguments have led you to a contrary conclusion then you have coined new words that no one is familiar with, and it's no wonder that you are causing a great deal of confusion. — Leontiskos

No realist or objectivist need think that moral properties, or facts about their instantiation, will, when apprehended, be sufficient to motivate all persons regardless of their circumstances, including their cognitive and motivational makeup. And realists certainly need not take the view that Mackie ascribes to Plato, that seeing objective values will ensure that one acts, “overruling any contrary inclination” (Mackie 1977,23). An individual might grasp a moral fact, for example, but suffer from temporary irrationality or weakness of will; she might be free of such temporary defects but possess a more indelible motivational makeup that impedes or defeats the motivating power of moral facts. Any plausible account of moral motivation will, and must, acknowledge these sources of motivational failure; and any plausible analysis of moral properties must allow for them. Even those realists or objectivists who maintain that all rational and motivationally unimpaired persons will be moved by moral facts need not think they will be overridingly indefeasibly motivated. As already noted, regardless of their views with respect to broader metaethical questions, contemporary philosophers do not take any position on the precise strength of moral motivation—with the qualification (alluded to earlier) that they reject, apparently universally, the idea that moral motivation is ordinarily overriding.

But you are saying that I ought to make others happy, and that was the point I was at pains to demonstrate. — Leontiskos

you moved the goalposts and started talking about obligations. — Leontiskos

Let us imagine that the concept of categorical/unconditional imperatives/obligations was sensible. Let us also imagine that these are true. What then?

But Moore holds that moral facts do matter because when people do as they ought to, societal good increases. — Hanover

You're asking a question Moore doesn't ask. — Hanover

That is, Moore was a non-naturalist and a consequentialist, which means he cared what the consequence of his behavior was. What made him a non-naturalist was his refusal to provide an essentialist definition of "the good. "

Per Moore, your motivation not to kill wild animals for food (as you have posited that it is immoral) is that by not killing animals, you will promote more good through time. That means you have a goal and purpose for your behavior, which is to maximize the good. — Hanover

but to say that someone should act in a certain way does not necessarily involve obligations. — Leontiskos

What we have are two rationales:

1. She should give me the money if I am to get rich.
2. She should not give me the money if she is to avoid being conned.

When the robber acts to influence Bonita's behavior he is acting on judgment (1). It doesn't matter if he is aware of (2). Knowledge of (2) does not preclude (1). — Leontiskos

He might think, "She should not give me the money if she doesn't want to get conned," but does this mean that he cannot simultaneously think that she should give him the money? — Leontiskos

He doesn't think she should do what he wants him to do? — Leontiskos

But the salesman was not merely wanting, he was acting to influence behavior. So too with the husband. In both cases we have cases of people who act to influence behavior on the basis of their desires. Are the salesman and the husband involved in a judgment about what another person should do? — Leontiskos

I didn't realize that wants were incompatible with oughts. — Leontiskos

To use your example, if someone is trying to sell Bonita a bridge, and they are trying to influence her to act such that she buys the bridge, do they possess the judgment that Bonita should buy a bridge? — Leontiskos

Next, I think that if one is attempting to influence the behavior of another, they are manifesting an explicit or implicit judgment about how that other person should act or behave. Do you agree or disagree? — Leontiskos

Now I say 'ought' involves a judgment about how someone should act. It involves a judgment about how someone should behave. Where such judgments are present, the reality of 'ought' is present. Do you disagree? — Leontiskos

That may be true when you say it but it's not when I say it. When I say "I'd like it if you did this" I am only saying this. — Michael

'Ought' is a reality that is very often present even when the word is not present. Do you agree or disagree? — Leontiskos

That may be true when you say it but it's not when I say it. When I say "I'd like it if you did this" I am only saying this. — Michael

Then you'll need to revise your definition. We are discussing whether an 'ought' is involved. — Leontiskos

Someone who says, "I would be very sad if you cause them suffering," is obviously attempting to influence behavior. — Leontiskos

You speak because you believe I ought to care how you feel — Leontiskos

Whether or not kindness and empathy and charity make the world a better place does matter though. — creativesoul

You are advising — Leontiskos

It not a statement of suggestion that one gives to another - for in the example all who know the alcoholic want him to continue drinking. The example I gave was given as a statement of fact. — javra

2) Why presume that morality is independent of pragmatics? — javra