Winner” is a noun. I was talking about the switch from adjectives to nouns, for instance “happy” becomes “happiness”. Try describing “happy” without referencing an object. It’s difficult. Luckily language permits us to make of the adjective a noun, treating it as if it was concrete and its own thing, where we can start to apply more adjectives to it. It becomes a “quality”, “state”, or “condition”. This raises the question: a quality, state, or condition of what thing? In the case of human consciousness, the answer is the human, which is physiological. If we cannot answer that question, we just start compounding adjectives, describing really nothing. — NOS4A2

Then "wet" or "well-dressed".

Of course, the other issue is that in saying "the answer is the human, which is physiological" you're begging the questioning. If there is something like a non-physical consciousness that humans have then humans aren't just physiological; we're physiological and conscious, and when we describe ourselves as being conscious we're describing that non-physiological aspect of ourselves.

The adjective describes the thing, which in the case of an organism is wholly physiological. It does not nor cannot describe anything else. — NOS4A2

When I describe John as being the winner of the race I'm describing John, but being a winner is not the same thing as being John. In fact, nothing about John's base biology has anything to do with him being the winner of the race. Of course, his base biology obviously plays an explanatory role in how he won, but having his biology and being the winner of the race are independent things.

When I describe John as being conscious I'm describing John, but being conscious is not the same thing as being John. And, like above, it may be that nothing about John's base biology has anything to do with him being conscious. Of course, his base biology seems to play an explanatory role in how he's conscious, but having his biology and being conscious may be independent things.

The adjective “conscious” describes the organism, which is physiological. So why would we even approach anything non-physical with the word? — NOS4A2

I don't quite understand this. When I describe myself as English the word "English" is an adjective, being used to describe me, but "Englishness" isn't some physiological thing.

The fact that we use the word "conscious" to describe a physiological organism doesn't mean that consciousness is physiological. That a physiological organism is conscious is that (according to the dualist) the physiological organism has/produces non-physical consciousness.

It’s evident, to me at least, that a person is conscious for biological reasons. — NOS4A2

That a person is conscious for biological reasons isn’t necessarily that consciousness is physiological. Consciousness may be a non-physical product of certain physical processes. Disrupting those physical processes will disrupt consciousness, but they can nonetheless be distinct things.

Otherwise, it creates a legal loophole where a President can commit any crime he wants and then pardon himself, over and over. — GRWelsh

Well, what's supposed to happen is that if the President tried to do this then the upstanding members of Congress would impeach him and remove him from office.

Can a convicted felon even serve as POTUS — GRWelsh

Yes.

What if he gets a sentence of prison time? Can he serve as POTUS from prison? — GRWelsh

I suspect any sentence will be suspended until after his term, and then if it's a federal conviction he will pardon himself. Who knows how the Supreme Court will rule on that.

I'm not sure about a specific moral system, but there's Moore's open-question argument, as explained here:

Moore’s “Open Question Argument” for the conclusion that goodness is a non-natural property is closely related to his worries about the naturalistic fallacy. Consider any proposed naturalistic analysis N of a moral predicate M. The Open Question Argument maintains that it will always be possible for someone competent with moral discourse without conceptual confusion to grant that something is N but still wonder whether it is really M. Whether goodness is co-instantiated with any natural property or set of natural properties is in this sense always a conceptually open question. If, however, N really was an accurate analysis of M then the question, “I know it is N but is it M?” would not be open in this way for a conceptually competent judge any more than the question, “I know he is a bachelor but is he unmarried?” can be an open one.

Another issue with ethical naturalism is related to the problem of deriving an ought from an is. If "this is immoral" just means "this is harmful" then "one ought not be immoral" just means "one ought not be harmful", but how can we justify the assertion that one ought not be harmful? Can we do so with reference to some other natural fact, or must we depend on some non-natural fact?

So there are good reasons to believe that if there are moral facts then these moral facts (whatever they are) must be non-natural facts.

Although, as you say, without a substantive positive definition this is a rather vacuous claim, and if, as I say, non-natural moral facts would have no practical relevance, and if moral facts must have practical relevance, then if there are moral facts then these moral facts must be natural facts.

Which leads us to the crux of the issue: natural moral facts don't appear to work and non-natural moral facts don't appear to work, suggesting some kind of antirealism, whether that be subjectivism (whether individual or social), error theory, or non-cognitivism.

Otherwise you're left with the undefined term of "morality." — Hanover

That is indeed one of my other gripes with ethical non-naturalism. It states what morality is not but seems to lack a substantive positive definition.

I suppose one account is to define it by saying that "X is immoral" just means "one ought not X".

If so then my statements above can be rephrased as:

1. If a) it is the case that one ought not eat meat and b) I believe that it is the case that one ought not eat meat then c) I won't eat meat.

2. If a) it is not the case that one ought not eat meat but b) I believe that it is the case that one ought not eat meat then c) I won't eat meat.

The practical implication of each b) is each c), but I can't see what the practical implication of each a) is.

See the second section of this where I set out ethical non-naturalism.

Yeah, you introduced that only after folk showed the OP wasn't working. — Banno

I alluded to it on the second page, 7 years ago:

Presumably obligations are not identical to natural properties like causing harm, for example. "One ought not kill babies" doesn't mean the same thing as "killing babies causes harm". So it seems to me that obligations, if anything, are something "extra". So there's no prime facie reason to believe that there couldn't be a world that has the same empirical facts as ours but without these obligations (whatever they are). — Michael

I was then explicit about it on the third page, 14 days ago:

What are the practical consequences of having a true belief? What are the practical consequences of having a false belief? I can't see that there are – or could be – any.

It seems to be a necessary consequence of any ethical non-naturalism that moral facts are irrelevant. — Michael

I think it's just the case that some people aren't actually reading what I'm writing.

The practical implications have to do with eating, harvesting, and producing animals, as I already noted. — Leontiskos

They're practical implications of having the belief. I'm asking about the practical implications of that belief being true.

If eating meat is immoral and I believe that eating meat is immoral then I won't eat meat.
If eating meat is not immoral but I believe that eating meat is immoral then I won't eat meat.

Whether or not eating meat is immoral has no affect on whether or not I eat meat or on what will happen if I do or don't.

Yet you refuse to conceive of morality in a non-Kantian manner, and so instead of identifying a flaw in one very localized moral theory, you falsely conclude that all of morality is inherently flawed. — Leontiskos

Firstly, I am specifically addressing ethical non-naturalism, which states that:

1. Ethical sentences express propositions.
2. Some such propositions are true.
3. Those propositions are made true by objective features of the world, independent of human opinion.
4. These moral features of the world are not reducible to any set of non-moral features.

Secondly, I am only saying that if moral features are not reducible to non-moral features (e.g. pain, harm, suffering, etc.) then the existence (or non-existence) of these moral features has no practical implications.

And I'm not necessarily saying that therefore ethical non-naturalism is false. I'm only saying that if it's true then I don't understand the motivation to be moral.

No, not even that, not yet. — Banno

Well as I've made clear several times I am considering the implications of ethical non-naturalism. If ethical non-naturalism is true then ...

If you want to argue against ethical non-naturalism then that's a topic for a different discussion, and one on which I might be inclined to agree with you.

So here's the foundation of ethics: "What to do?" — Banno

I'm not sure what to make of this. Is this even cognitivism?

And yet we each must act, and hence each must choose what to do. — Banno

Yes, so as the OP asks, why consider morality when choosing what to do? Why not just consider our desires and pragmatism?

* Our standing with our fellows, with society at large, and with ourselves is elevated by being moral, and reduced when seen to be immoral. — hypericin

This has nothing to do with moral facts and everything to do with moral beliefs. It is pragmatic to behave in ways that society believes is moral.

* Our moral training induces a feeling of guilt when we are moral immoral, and self-satisfaction when moral — hypericin

This has nothing to do with moral facts and everything to do with moral beliefs. We feel guilty when we behave in ways that we believe are immoral.

Empathy causes us pain when we cause harm to others, by literally feeling it. Similarly, when we see others in pain, we feel that pain, and ease our own suffering by easing theirs. — hypericin

If ethical non-naturalism is true then it might be that causing harm isn't immoral.

So your thread argues that apart from the moral reasons for being moral, there are no other reasons to be moral. — Banno

I'm not even sure it makes sense to say that there's a moral reason for being moral. It's like saying that there are pragmatic reasons for being pragmatic. It strikes me as a strange way to talk. Rather we should only say that there's a moral reason to not eat meat or a pragmatic reason to eat meat.

The question of the OP, then, is why we choose to consider moral reasons at all. At least we get something out of being practical. There are prima facie no benefits to being moral. Being moral for the sake of being moral seems pointless.

An interesting article I've just found:

Why Should I Be Moral? Revisited, Kai Nielson (1984)

Some philosophers have resisted the very posing of this question. They have taken it to be a pseudo question. I first want to respond to them in a rather brisk manner. That is, I will respond to those who want to reject the question not because it is immoral to ask it but for the reason that it is – or so they believe – senseless to ask it. It makes about as much sense, they claim, as asking "Why are all scarlet things red?" If we reflect carefully on the occurrence of the word "should" in the putative question "Why should I be moral" we will come to see, the claim goes, that we are trying to ask for the logically impossible: we are asking for a moral reason to accept any moral reasons at all.

That objection evaporates as soon as we reflect on the fact that not all intelligible uses of "should" are moral uses of the term. When I ask, "Should I put a bandage on that cut?" I am not normally asking a moral question and the "should" does not here have a moral use. When I ask, "Why should I be moral?" I am not asking, if I have my wits about me, "What moral reason or reasons have I for being moral?" That indeed is like asking "Why are all scarlet things red?" Rather, I am asking, can I, everything considered, give a reason sufficiently strong – a non-moral reason clearly – for my always giving an overriding weight to moral considerations, when they conflict with other considerations, such that I could be shown to be acting irrationally, or at least less rationally than I otherwise would be acting, if I did not give such pride of place to moral considerations?

All of this is to say (1) there are consequences to breaking moral codes, (2) the distinction between moral codes and legal codes is idiosyncratic to secular societies and not some metaphysical distinction, and (3) the truth value of a claim can be based upon a social norm that is reducible to nothing more than an idea or belief. — Hanover

This would be something like cultural relativism? That isn't the kind of meta-ethics I'm asking about. As per the OP I'm specifically assuming some kind of robust moral realism (objectivism) – and specifically of the non-naturalist kind.

Change the word "moral" to "legal." Now does it matter? — Hanover

Yes, because there are consequences to the breaking the law.

Morality affects people's behaviors and it affects people's responses to you. — Hanover

Moral beliefs affect people's behaviours. If you believe that it is immoral to eat meat then it makes no difference if your belief is true or false. Either way you're going to bitch at me for eating meat.

It remains that if vegetarianism is true, then eating meat is bad. — Banno

I haven't claimed otherwise.

I'm trying to understand what you're getting at I guess. — Hanover

Assume that it is immoral to eat meat. I eat meat. What are the practical consequences?
Assume that it is not immoral to eat meat. I eat meat. What are the practical consequences?

Any practical consequences in the first case are the same as any practical consequences in the second case. As such, whether or not it is immoral to eat meat makes no practical difference.

Compare with:

Assume that the water is boiling. I put my hand in the water. What are the practical consequences?
Assume that the water is not boiling. I put my hand in the water. What are the practical consequences?

There are practical consequences in the first case that differ from the practical consequences in the second case. As such, whether or not the water is boiling makes a practical difference.

So I can see why it matters if the water is boiling. But I can't see why it matters if it's immoral to eat meat.

Ok, so except for all the morally bad things, nothing morally bad will happen...

Not such a profound observation. — Banno

I didn't say nothing morally bad will happen. I said that nothing non-morally bad will happen.

Clear as mud. "Nothing bad will happen if I disobey an obligation" - the "bad" thing that will have happened is that you will have disobeyed an obligation. — Banno

I didn't mean "bad" in the moral sense. I pre-empted this response and already changed the wording.

As if someone could have a moral belief that they ought not eat meat without believing that "I ought not eat meat" is true. — Banno

I'm not claiming otherwise.

If eating meat is immoral, then "eating meat is immoral" is true, and the direct practical implication is that one ought not eat meaty. — Banno

The existence of the obligation has no practical implication.

If I put my hand in water then it matters if it's boiling. If it is then I will burn my hand.

If I eat meat then it doesn't matter if I ought not eat meat. Nothing detrimental will happen if I disobey an obligation and nothing beneficial will happen if I obey an obligation. So why should I care about such an obligation?

Yes, a very odd post, in which you claim that there are no "practical implications" for vegetarianism while pointing out that the vegetarian will probably not eat meat.

What more practical an implication could you find? — Banno

See here:

Moral beliefs certainly have practical implications, in that if people believe that eating meat is immoral then it is likely that less meat is eaten and fewer animals are harvested, but that's not what I'm talking about.

I'm saying that eating meat actually being immoral has no practical implications and that eating meat actually not being immoral has no practical implications.

And from the OP:

Sure, if we believe that we ought not do X then we might not do X, but then it wouldn't really matter if our beliefs were true; only that we have them.

It's certainly not the case that if my belief that eating meat is wrong is true then I won't eat meat and that if my belief that eating meat is wrong is false then I will eat meat, as if moral facts themselves, as distinct from moral beliefs, influence my behaviour.

Hence the answer I gave previously - that it makes no sense to ask why we ought do what we ought do. — Banno

I'm not asking that.

I don't understand this phrase. — Banno

See here.

How is this not a slide from obligation to motivation? Sure, there are issues of weakness of the will. But they presume an obligation avoided, and hence an obligation.

What you are doing here is indeed incomprehensible. — Banno

Assume that we have some obligation. What is our motivation to obey such an obligation?

That's the question asked by the OP.

My stance is that if obligations have no practical import then the mere existence of an obligation is insufficiently motivating.

I ought do this? Okay, but I won't because I don't want to.

Well to be accurate, homosexuality is wrong by her (Muslim) community ethical standard, not her personal moral code (based on her actions). This is very common for folks' morals to clash with their community ethical standards. But she is, in fact, following her moral code. — LuckyR

She told me that she believes it's wrong and struggles with that belief.

Is your main point here just that you think non-naturalism doesn't work and you're therefore a naturalist consequentialist when it comes to ethics? — Hanover

No, I'm just asking a question of non-naturalists: why be moral? It seems to me that if non-naturalism is true then moral facts are of no practical import and so I wonder why they'd be motivated to be moral.

But now that you mention it, perhaps there's a case to argue that moral facts must be of practical import and so if non-naturalism entails that moral facts are of no practical import then non-naturalism must be false, but that's perhaps a topic for a different discussion.

Then I'll give you a real life example. My friend is a gay Muslim. She genuinely believes in the teachings of Islam – including that homosexuality is wrong – and yet she still dates women. She "knows" that this is "haram" but her desires trump her moral beliefs in deciding how to live her life.

Of course for her the choice is more difficult because she believes that she will be punished for doing wrong, but for the non-religious ethical non-naturalist, there's no such punishment. And so my question stands; what is the motivation to be moral?

Usually, people don't seem to indulge in such moral skepticism, so your thought experiment is moot for them. A philosopher cannot just ignore such things about people. It seems that most people are intuitively and absolutely sure about their sense of right and wrong, and this surety being intuitive and absolute is essential to their sense of morality. — baker

Yes, and what if you are absolutely sure that something you enjoy is wrong and something you're disgusted by is right? Would you change your behaviour to reflect your moral knowledge, or would you decide to continue as you were?

If it could be proved beyond all doubt that there was a God, that divine command theory is true, and that we have a moral obligation to kill infidels then I still wouldn't kill infidels because I don't want to be a killer. Morality be damned.

Either eating meat is immoral or it isn't.

Some people believe that eating meat is immoral and some people believe that eating meat is not immoral.

One of these groups is right and one of these groups is wrong.

What are the practical implications if the former are right? What are the practical implications if the latter are right?

I can't see that there are any in either case.

Regardless of who is right and who is wrong, those who believe that eating meat is immoral probably won't eat meat and those who believe that eating meat is not immoral probably will eat meat.

Like calling Letitia James “peekaboo” which is obviously a stand in for “jigaboo”.

Taken from this.

The SEP article on moral motivation explains it better:

If we are to explain moral motivation, we will need to understand not only how moral judgments so regularly succeed in motivating, but how they can fail to motivate, sometimes rather spectacularly. Not only do we witness motivational failure among the deranged, dejected, and confused, but also, it appears, among the fully sound and self-possessed. What are we to make of the “amoralist”—the apparently rational, strong willed individual who seemingly makes moral judgments, while remaining utterly indifferent?

...

Although contemporary philosophers have been divided with respect to Mackie’s moral skepticism, they have mostly agreed in rejecting his extremely strong claims about what moral motivation, and the objective moral properties that figure in our moral judgments, would have to be like. They have uniformly rejected the suggestion that a grasp of morality’s requirements would produce overriding motivation to act accordingly. And most have rejected efforts to explain moral motivation by appealing to a motivating power emanating from moral properties and the acts and states of affairs that instantiate them.

...

No realist or objectivist need think that moral properties, or facts about their instantiation, will, when apprehended, be sufficient to motivate all persons regardless of their circumstances, including their cognitive and motivational makeup. And realists certainly need not take the view that Mackie ascribes to Plato, that seeing objective values will ensure that one acts, “overruling any contrary inclination” (Mackie 1977,23). An individual might grasp a moral fact, for example, but suffer from temporary irrationality or weakness of will; she might be free of such temporary defects but possess a more indelible motivational makeup that impedes or defeats the motivating power of moral facts. Any plausible account of moral motivation will, and must, acknowledge these sources of motivational failure; and any plausible analysis of moral properties must allow for them. Even those realists or objectivists who maintain that all rational and motivationally unimpaired persons will be moved by moral facts need not think they will be overridingly indefeasibly motivated. As already noted, regardless of their views with respect to broader metaethical questions, contemporary philosophers do not take any position on the precise strength of moral motivation—with the qualification (alluded to earlier) that they reject, apparently universally, the idea that moral motivation is ordinarily overriding.

I'm asking why there is a motivation to be moral if moral facts have no practical implications.

The obvious practical implications are 1) how much meat is eaten, and 2) how many animals are harvested. — Leontiskos

Moral beliefs certainly have practical implications, in that if people believe that eating meat is immoral then it is likely that less meat is eaten and fewer animals are harvested, but that's not what I'm talking about.

I'm saying that eating meat actually being immoral has no practical implications and that eating meat actually not being immoral has no practical implications.

This doesn't quite follow, both because "immoral" and "harmful" might be neither individuals nor kinds, and because as mentioned in previous posts "immoral" and "harmful" might well be set up as extensionally equivalent — Banno

If they're extensionally equivalent then it would be naturalism, not non-naturalism? I'm specifically talking about non-naturalism.

Secondly, the presumption that differences must be observable has been addressed elsewhere — Banno

I'm not saying that differences must be observable. I'm only saying that there don't appear to be any observable differences.

You are asking for an observable difference where the difference at hand is on of attitude, of intent. — Banno

I'm not sure what attitudes and intent have to do with moral truth, unless we're talking about moral subjectivism, which we're not.

Thirdly, your strategy of asking for motivation is... problematic. At some stage, ratiocination must be replaced by action. And this will happen even if there is no reasoned account for the action. Buridan's Ass will not starve, it will eat. — Banno

I don't get what you're saying here. Yes, either I will eat meat or I won't. And either it is immoral to eat meat or it isn't. But whether or not I will eat meat and whether or not it is immoral to eat meat are two different considerations, and I'm interested in discussing the latter and the implications of its answer.

Rigid designation works primarily with individuals. "Michael" refers to Michael in every possible world in which Michael exists. But H₂O and water are kinds, not individuals. Whether "H₂O" and "water" rigidly refer to H₂O and water is a contentious issue. This is leaving aside the problem of whether to differentiate kinds such as these from predicates such as green, or whether green should be considered a kind and ...is green a predicate, and so on. On top of that we have the problem that "immoral" ranges over actions, and it is not entirely uncontroversial that actions are individuals of the sort that can be referred to rigidly. ↪frank is perhaps saying something along these lines. — Banno

You brought up the case of water necessarily being H₂O. I was simply explaining that I don't think the explanation for how this works applies to the case of ethical non-naturalism.

If a posteriori necessity depends on rigid designators referring to the same thing and if "immoral" and "harmful" are not rigid designators referring to the same thing then "harm is immoral" is not an a posteriori necessity.

If you think that there can be a posteriori necessities without rigid designators referring to the same thing then I'd be interested in hearing an explanation of it.

Again, there is a lot more going on here than one might suppose, and introducing alethic modality doesn't help. — Banno

We're not infallible, and so it's possible that some of our moral beliefs are wrong.

I don't think this at all a controversial claim.

So with that in mind, I'm asking about the practical implications of our moral beliefs being true and of those same moral beliefs being false. I don't think that eating meat being immoral has any practical implications and I don't think that eating meat not being immoral has any practical implications. So why would it matter to us if eating meat is immoral or not? Is it simply philosophical curiosity?

I just want to know what he did that was illegal. — NOS4A2

It’s explained in the indictments.