"You should stop causing suffering," and, "In my opinion you should stop causing suffering," — Leontiskos

I haven't said "in my opinion you should stop causing suffering". I have only said "I would like it if you would stop causing suffering". These propositions mean different things.

We've already acknowledged that the world would be a different, better place if everyone acted morally — Count Timothy von Icarus

I haven't acknowledged this. I can acknowledge that the world would be a different, better place if everyone acted with kindness and empathy and charity, but whether or not kindness and empathy and charity are moral makes no difference.

A) The alcoholic (who thereby self-destroys themselves via alcohol consumption) should become sober, this despite B) the alcoholic and all which surround him wanting the alcoholic to continue drinking alcohol (for whatever reasons, with these possibly ranging from that of wanting the alcoholic to continue being their merry self in the company of others when drunk to that of wanting the alcoholic to die).

What’s missing here for a satisfactory account of moral realism is the reason for why (A) is valid despite (B). Notwithstanding, to me this scenario presents an intuitive truth that I presume is universally shared. If so, then the proposition you’ve offered is not true - this, as you claim, just as the moral realist affirms. — javra

That they should become sober is not an objectively binding moral obligation. It is a pragmatic suggestion, like telling someone that they should brush their teeth.

See here where it's explained that the meaning of the word "should" is not exclusively moral.

Still, when I say to someone, "I'd like it if you stopped causing suffering for others," you are simultaneously saying, "You should stop causing suffering for others." — Leontiskos

That may be true when you say it but it's not when I say it. When I say "I'd like it if you did this" I am only saying this.

To make this clearer, do you accept that non-cognitivists, error theorists, and moral subjectivists exist? Do you accept that they do not believe in objectively binding moral obligations? Do you also accept that they express their personal preferences? Then you must accept that when they express their personal preferences they are not simultaneously asserting the existence of objectively binding moral obligations.

I believe the biconditional is true. I am a moral realist. — Leontiskos

That strikes me as a contradiction. You ought not eat meat if and only if I would like you to not eat meat? That seems like textbook moral subjectivism.

And if the "I" refers specifically to me then why am I the authority on what you should or shouldn't do?

If you want to argue that there is no motivation — frank

I'm not arguing that there is no motivation. I'm explaining that I have no motivation to be moral and am asking others why they have it given that there are no practical benefits to being moral. Is it entirely a matter of principle?

What's the difference between saying "I'd like it if you did X," and, "You should do X"? — Leontiskos

Is this premise true?

1. "You should do X" is true iff I'd like it if you did X

According to moral realists it's not. According to (some) moral subjectivists it is. I'm assuming moral realism, not moral subjectivism, for the sake of this argument. And you've previously argued against moral subjectivism so I presume you believe that the premise is false.

You think we should act in a certain way (seek happiness and avoid suffering) and yet you refuse to call this predilection "moral," even though any definitions of "moral" that you provide entail that your predilection is moral. — Leontiskos

I don't say that we should. I only say that I do, and that I'd like it if you did too.

I would say that those who promote happiness believe that happiness ought be promoted, and given your definition here that would mean that happiness is moral. Is it possible to promote something while not believing that it ought be promoted? When I do something it is because I think it should be done, especially when it is something I've deliberated about. — Leontiskos

I promote happiness because I enjoy it and because I have empathy for others. Moral considerations do not factor into my decision making at all.

But the second question presumably asks why it is immoral to cause suffering. You want to know how to answer the second question on a Moorean ethics, — Leontiskos

I'm trying to explain that it doesn't matter if it is immoral to cause suffering.

If it is impermissible to cause suffering and I cause suffering then the consequences are the same as if it is permissible to cause suffering and I cause suffering.

The permissibility of causing suffering does not affect the outcome of my decision to cause (or not cause) suffering.

Whereas the viability of antibiotics can very much affect the outcome of my decision to take antibiotics. If they're viable then my sickness is cured, if they're not then I will probably die.

The viability of antibiotics matters. The permissibility of causing suffering doesn't. Suffering is just suffering whether permissible or not.

You aren't presenting an argument that shows that its wrong to look at things that way. — frank

I'm not trying to. I'm not arguing in favour of moral realism and ethical non-naturalism over moral subjectivism or error theory or divine command theory or cultural relativism or non-cognitivism. I am only arguing that if moral realism (specifically ethical non-naturalism) is correct then moral facts don't matter.

You have to have some sort of framework or context for the usage, otherwise there isn't any meaning to your expression. — frank

Then "this is immoral" means "one ought not do this".

I don't care if I ought or ought not promote happiness or if I ought or ought not cause suffering. I'm going to promote happiness and not cause suffering either way.

If you were a Roman stoic, you would say the latter is tied up in the former. What is the cultural framework within which you're using the word "moral?" You have to have some sort of context, otherwise it's language on holiday. — frank

I'm not working under any cultural framework. I am assuming, for the sake of argument, that Moore's ethical non-naturalism is correct: that "this is immoral" doesn't mean "this causes suffering". As such it isn't a truism that suffering is immoral.

You might be concerned about whether your existence makes the world better or worse. — frank

I'm concerned about promoting happiness and reducing suffering. I don't care whether happiness or suffering is moral or not.

Perhaps I can make this easier. Assume, for the sake of argument, that everybody knows with irrefutable certainty that it is immoral to kill wild animals for food. Assume also that we are a fully libertarian society that does not punish people (whether legally or socially) for doing things that they ought not do (except where their actions bring harm to other people).

I know with irrefutable certainty that I ought not kill wild animals for food. I also know that I will not be punished or shunned for killing wild animals for food.

Why does it matter that I ought not kill wild animals for food? What is my motivation to be moral? Perhaps I simply don't care that I ought not kill wild animals for food; I'm going to do it anyway because I like the taste of meat.

However, a full analysis would show that I believe antibiotics will cure my infection because they will actually cure my infection, that I think my wife cheated on my because she actually cheated on me, etc. The possibility of false beliefs here doesn't negate this connection if there are ways to come to true beliefs. If beliefs are properly related to facts, including moral facts, I don't see an issue here. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I address this in the first part of my post:

22% of people believe that eating meat is immoral and 88% don't. Either some (or most or all) of the 22% believe what they do because eating meat is immoral or some (or most or all) of the 88% believe what they do because eating meat is moral.

I am accepting, for the sake of argument, that whoever is right believes what they do because of the moral facts.

What I want to know is why it matters who is right?

It matters if antibiotics can cure my infection because if they can then if I take them then I won't die. But why does it matter if eating meat is immoral?

@Merkwurdichliebe has been banned for trolling and child-killing apologism.

Isn't it begging to question to assume the correct moral beliefs are distributed such that being correct about them is a 50/50 proposition? — Count Timothy von Icarus

I'm not saying that they are. 50% was just an example. If you prefer, we can reconsider my question using the actual apparent percentages (according to this):

22% of people believe that eating meat is immoral and 88% don't. Either some (or most or all) of the 22% believe what they do because eating meat is immoral or some (or most or all) of the 88% believe what they do because eating meat is moral.

Why does it matter who is right? The consequences of eating meat (or not eating meat) are the same whether eating meat is immoral or not.

The same seems true with assuming that those who commit immoral acts face no heightened risk of suffering due to later realizing they have acted immorally. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The same is also true of someone who is falsely convinced that they have acted immorally. So it isn't the fact that they have acted immorally that has caused them to suffer but the belief that they have acted immorally that has caused them to suffer. It makes no difference to their suffering if their belief is true or false.

There can be "natural" consequences of immoral acts without morality being constituted by these outcomes. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, but my point is that the immorality of that act is irrelevant. The natural consequences of that act would be the same even if that act wasn't immoral.

This is true only if you assume that people's beliefs about morality have nothing to do moral facts. But if people have the moral beliefs they do because of moral facts (at least in part)... — Count Timothy von Icarus

This isn't relevant to the argument I am making. Let's take this example:

Half of everyone believes that it is moral to eat meat and half of everyone believes that it is immoral to eat meat.

If it is a fact that it is moral to eat meat then those who believe that it is moral to eat meat do so because it is moral to eat meat, and those who believe that it is immoral to eat meat are, in some sense, delusional.

If it is a fact that it is immoral to eat meat then those who believe that it is immoral to eat meat do so because it is immoral to eat meat, and those who believe that it is moral to eat meat are, in some sense, delusional.

So this grants that moral facts can influence moral beliefs.

Now let's assume that everyone who believes that eating meat is moral eats meat and that everyone who believes that eating meat is immoral doesn't eat meat.

Half of everyone eats meat and half of everyone doesn't eat meat. Why does it matter if eating meat is immoral or not?

It's not the case that if it's immoral to eat meat then those who eat meat are going to suffer from some unwanted consequence as a result of their meat eating (or at least not any consequence that wouldn't also be a consequence even if it is moral to eat meat).

So why the motivation to be moral? There are no practical benefits, either for ourselves or for others. Is it entirely a matter of principle?

As long as a hedonist does not purport to derive his 'ought' from natural science, he is not a naturalist. He could do this in two ways: he could argue that pleasure is good, but that its goodness is not an object of natural science, or else he could independently claim that the oughtness that attaches to pleasure is not an object of natural science. In either case he is not a naturalist, and all hedonists I have encountered deny that their valuative/obligatory premises are the product of natural science.

I think you are misreading Moore's argument as overdetermined. The so-called "naturalistic fallacy" depends on his Open Question about the ambiguity of goodness. If that ambiguity fails then the fallacy charge also fails. — Leontiskos

There's an ambiguity in your proposition that "he could argue that pleasure is good". Are you saying that "this is good" means "this is pleasurable" or are you saying that pleasure happens to have the property of goodness? The former is naturalism, the latter is non-naturalism. I think it important not to get too caught up in the particular labels used. If you prefer, rather than use the labels "naturalism" and "non-naturalism" we can use the labels "Type X" and "Type Y".

The reason this distinction is important can be shown with the question I asked earlier:

Given that I believe that it is immoral to cause suffering, what follows if suffering is immoral and what follows if suffering is not immoral?

If "this is immoral" means "this causes suffering" then part of my question would contain a logical contradiction: my belief that it is immoral to cause suffering would be true by definition, and so we cannot even ask what would follow if that belief was false.

But if "this is immoral" doesn't mean "this causes suffering" then there is no such contradiction and so the question is coherent.

So for the sake of this discussion I am assuming non-naturalism (or if you prefer, "Type Y" moral theories): the propositions "this is immoral" and "this causes suffering" do not mean the same thing and the propositions "this is moral" and "this causes pleasure" do not mean the same thing.

Now given the assumption that "this is immoral" doesn't mean "this causes suffering", what does it mean to say that it is immoral to cause suffering? On some accounts we cannot define the proposition "it is immoral" in any simpler terms. However, given that such claims are intended to be normative, I am assuming that "this is immoral" just means "one ought not do this". At the very least this definition allows us to avoid having to explain why we ought not be immoral.

This then entails that the proposition "it is immoral to cause suffering" means "one ought not cause suffering" (and the proposition "it is moral to seek pleasure" means "one ought seek pleasure").

My question, then, is:

Given that I believe that one ought not cause suffering, what follows if it is a fact that one ought not cause suffering and what follows if it is not a fact that one ought not cause suffering?

The problem I see is that nothing follows in either case. The existence or non-existence of such obligations is inconsequential. It is true that if one ought not cause suffering and I cause suffering then I have done something I ought not, but so what? What is my motivation to obey obligations?

Well, the non-natural moral facts would be involved in the consequences of your actions to the extent that your family won't come to see you because they think you acted immorally. — Count Timothy von Icarus

That's a consequence of acting contrary to moral beliefs. They won't come to see me because they believe I acted immorally. They might be wrong.

That's a question that would seem to deal with causality, which would tend to require a naturalistic answer.

The difference for someone like Moore would seem to be precisely that you have acted immorally versus morally in any situation, independent of any causation downstream of your actions. As I understand him, which isn't very well, moral facts aren't reducible to natural facts, and so asking about what changes "in the world," outside of your having acted rightly or wrongly doesn't make sense given his premises. — Count Timothy von Icarus

That's precisely my point. If ethical non-naturalism is correct then moral facts entail no consequential outcomes. Suffering is still suffering, so why does it matter if it's moral or not? Would you really seek suffering if it could be proved that suffering is moral? Or, like me, is your visceral aversion to pain and empathy of others all that matters?

2. Go back and re-respond to this here and explain why my response doesn't now apply, particularly to (b). Just plug in Moore's definition of morality into (b), and that offers a reason why it matters what you think is moral for a non-naturalist. — Hanover

Moore doesn't have a definition. As he says in the Principia Ethica:

‘Good,’ then, if we mean by it that quality which we assert to belong to a thing, when we say that the thing is good, is incapable of any definition, in the most important sense of that word.

And as I mentioned before, the way you've worded your examples doesn't reflect the argument I'm making. You are comparing the case where I believe something is moral with a case where I believe that same thing to not be immoral. I'm considering two cases where I believe that something is immoral (or two cases where I believe that something is not immoral), but where in one case the belief is true and in the other case that same belief is false. This is perhaps clearest when phrased like this:

Given that I believe that it is immoral to cause suffering, what follows if suffering is immoral and what follows if suffering is not immoral?

The consequences of acting immorally would tend to be to make the world shittier, to put it in the simplist terms possible. Because your ordered a veal parm the restaurant is going to order more veal. In the aggregate, the sort of behavior you engage in will lead to many more veal calves leading lives of atrocious suffering, while also contributing to ocean acidification and global warming. — Count Timothy von Icarus

What is the connection between acting immorally and causing suffering? Remember that I'm arguing about the implications of ethical non-naturalism.

I'll ask the previous question a different way:

Given that I already believe that it is immoral to cause suffering, what follows if my belief is true and what follows if my belief is false?

When it comes down to it all you are able to provide are arguments from authority, and this is a problem even ignoring the fact that you are misreading the authorities. — Leontiskos

I'll quote Moore's Principia Ethica:

The name then is perfectly general; for, no matter what the something is that good is held to mean, the theory is still Naturalism. Whether good be defined as yellow or green or blue, as loud or soft, as round or square, as sweet or bitter, as productive of life or productive of pleasure, as willed or desired or felt: whichever of these or of any other object in the world, good may be held to mean, the theory, which holds it to mean them, will be a naturalistic theory. I have called such theories naturalistic because all of these terms denote properties, simple or complex, of some simple or complex natural object.

---

According to Hedonism one ought pursue pleasure and avoid pain.
That one ought or ought not do such a thing is not accessible to natural science.
Therefore, Hedonism is not naturalistic. — Leontiskos

Hedonism is the theory that we ought pursue pleasure because pleasure is good. I'll quote Bentham's An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation:

Now, pleasure is in itself a good; indeed it’s the only good if we set aside immunity from pain; and pain is in itself an evil, and without exception the only evil; or else ‘good’ and ‘evil’ have no meaning!

It is in defining goodness in terms of some natural property – in this case, pleasure – that makes it an ethical naturalist theory. And then, according to Moore, deriving the normative claim that we ought pursue pleasure commits the naturalistic fallacy.

Make me up a non-naturalst ethical theory. — Hanover

There's Moore's impersonal consequentialism.

You may have never read an actual philosopher in your life. — Leontiskos

That would make my degree in Philosophy all the more impressive.

No it's not, and I just gave you an argument for why. Are you able to address arguments? — Leontiskos

Ethical naturalism

Ethical naturalism encompasses any reduction of ethical properties, such as 'goodness', to non-ethical properties; there are many different examples of such reductions, and thus many different varieties of ethical naturalism. Hedonism, for example, is the view that goodness is ultimately just pleasure.

Hedonism

One scientific naturalist argument for hedonism is this: in the value domain we should be scientific naturalists in our methods of inquiry; hedonism is the best option in respect of scientific naturalism; therefore, we should be hedonists about value.

Moral naturalism

Another view that is often closely associated with naturalism is “reductivism.” The reductivist says that moral properties reduce to some other kind of property.

...

We should note at the outset that there is a paradigm example of a reductive view, which is used almost every time a metaethicist discussing reductivism needs a toy example to play with. That paradigm is the hedonic reduction: that goodness is pleasure and therefore reduces to pleasure.

The more relevant question is:

Given that I already believe that this is immoral, what follows if my belief is true and what follows if my belief is false?

In the case of the dead battery, if I believe that the battery is dead then if my belief is true then the car won't run and if my belief is false then the car will run.

Is there anything like this for the case that I believe that eating meat is immoral? Are there consequences to eating meat that occur only if eating meat is immoral, or only if it's not?

Hedonism is an example of ethical naturalism. I'm addressing ethical non-naturalism.
Richard Hare is a non-cognitivist. I'm addressing ethical non-naturalism.
Peter Simpson is an ethical naturalist. I'm addressing ethical non-naturalism.

And as per the SEP article:

In particular, there is widespread agreement that G.E. Moore’s account of goodness in Principia Ethica is a paradigmatically non-naturalist account. Indeed, if a representative sample of contemporary philosophers were asked to name a non-naturalist in meta-ethics then Moore’s name almost certainly would predominate. For better or worse, Moore’s discussion of non-naturalism profoundly shaped 20th century meta-ethics. Thomas Baldwin was not exaggerating much when he claimed that, “twentieth century British ethical theory is unintelligible without reference to Principia Ethica..."

Can we now agree that I'm accurately presenting the ethical non-naturalist view?

In one you have performed an immoral act. — Banno

I'm asking why that matters. What is the motivation to be moral?

The action performed in both (1) and (2) is the same: I eat meat. The outcome of the action performed in both (1) and (2) is the same: my hunger is sated.

Whether I ought or ought not eat meat does not affect the choice and it does not affect the outcome of that choice.

So, in my view, it just doesn't matter. I want to know why ethical non-naturalists believe that it does. As I asked on the second page 7 years ago, "is it just a matter of principle; that we can (unbeknownst to us) be right in our moral convictions?"

practical
adjective
1. of or concerned with the actual doing or use of something rather than with theory and ideas

You see, that we must make choices is what ethics is about. On your account, either we do not make choices, doing only what we would always have done, or the choice makes no difference to the world - has no practical significance. — Banno

1. If a) eating meat is immoral and b) I believe that eating meat is immoral then c) I won't eat meat.

2. If a) eating meat is not immoral but b) I believe that eating meat is immoral then c) I won't eat meat.

In both cases I make a choice and in both cases my choice makes a difference to the world. And in both cases the (a)s have no practical relevance. The choice is the same either way and the outcome of that choice is the same either way.

Indeed, that appears to be a consequence of the path he is adopting in this thread: that we never make choices. — Banno

I haven't said that.

We do make choices. But there are no practical implications of making a moral choice and no practical implications of making an immoral choice. If I choose to eat meat then I eat meat, and whether I ought or ought not eat meat makes no difference to either my choice or the outcome of that choice.

This is unlike, say, whether or not the meat is poisoned. That has practical relevance. If it's poisoned and I eat it then I'm likely to get sick and possibly die.

The Colorado Supreme Court is wrong. — NOS4A2

Possibly, and that will be for the Supreme Court to decide. It certainly hasn't already been decided by a Senate minority.

The 14th amendment applies to those listed who engaged in insurrection, neither of which is true in Trump's case. — NOS4A2

The Colorado Supreme Court disagrees.

He was acquitted of insurrection by the Senate, with the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court presiding. He cannot be removed from office and disqualified to enjoy any Office of Honor. You and the Dems in the Supreme Court are denying this…for what reasons again? — NOS4A2

Being acquitted under Article 1 Section 2 Clause 7 doesn't entail that the 14th Amendment no longer applies. You're reading something into it that just isn't there.

As per the 14th Amendment it takes "a vote of two-thirds of each House" to revoke its imposed ineligibility.

You're denying the antecedent.

Also see https://www.justice.gov/file/19386/download

The Constitution permits a former President to be indicted and tried for the same offenses for which he was impeached by the House of Representatives and acquitted by the Senate.

It says right there in the constitution. — NOS4A2

They are the ultimate authority and final arbiter on whether or not a President is to be removed from office. They are not the ultimate authority and final arbiter on whether or not someone committed a crime or on whether or not someone is eligible to be President.

The Colorado Supreme Court is under no constitutional or legal obligation to accept the outcome of an impeachment trial as binding precedent.