It’s the fear of force that influences their decision. Sorry. — NOS4A2

The fear is in her head, not in the words written by the judges. So, again, by your own reasoning you cannot blame the court for the Secretary's decision to not add Trump to the ballot (assuming she obeys the court order).

Such things consist - in part at least - of that consists of things that are both physical and nonphysical, hence, I would not put it quite like that... "physical states of affairs". — creativesoul

Okay, so we're getting somewhere.

Obligations are non-physical states of affairs. As it stands it then seems that a moral realist cannot be a physicalist.

So what evidence – whether empirical or rational – suggests that non-physical states of affairs exist?

Coercion is not just speech, I’m afraid. — NOS4A2

And he finally admits that words can influence another's behaviour.

You're welcome ladies and gentlemen.

That's not what I mean either. While you may get bit if you were to kick certain puppies, that's not why you ought not kick them. — creativesoul

But you just quoted yourself saying "demonstrably provable negative affects/effects stemming from not honoring one's voluntarily obligations(promises) should work just fine in lieu of a rule-giver and/or reward/punishment."

If this had nothing to do with explaining what it means for one to be forbidden from kick puppies then why did you bring it up?

So moral obligations are pragmatic suggestions? I ought not kick puppies because... they might bite me in retaliation?

I can accept that. But I don't think that's what moral realists mean.

Metaethics

Metaethics is the attempt to understand the metaphysical, epistemological, semantic, and psychological, presuppositions and commitments of moral thought, talk, and practice. As such, it counts within its domain a broad range of questions and puzzles, including: Is morality more a matter of taste than truth? Are moral standards culturally relative? Are there moral facts? If there are moral facts, what are their origin and nature? How is it that they set an appropriate standard for our behavior? How might moral facts be related to other facts (about psychology, happiness, human conventions…)? And how do we learn about moral facts, if there are any?

It is about far more than just "are moral propositions truth-apt and if so are any true?"

A few pages back I argued how an external judge was not necessary. — creativesoul

Can you link to the post in question? I don't recall an argument, only ever assertions.

Do you think this something we discover, or is it just two ways of talking about numbers? — Banno

Platonism in the Philosophy of Mathematics

Platonism about mathematics (or mathematical platonism) is the metaphysical view that there are abstract mathematical objects whose existence is independent of us and our language, thought, and practices. Just as electrons and planets exist independently of us, so do numbers and sets. And just as statements about electrons and planets are made true or false by the objects with which they are concerned and these objects’ perfectly objective properties, so are statements about numbers and sets. Mathematical truths are therefore discovered, not invented.

I believe that the above is false. I am not a mathematical realist, but I still believe in mathematical truths.

Similarly, one can accept that there are moral truths but not accept that moral truths are "independent of us and our language, thought, and practices". One can believe that moral truths are invented, not discovered.

There is simply more to metaethics than just accepting that some moral sentences are true.

I argued how b was false — creativesoul

You didn't. You just asserted it and threw out vague suggestions to "check the codes of behaviour" without explaining where to find these codes of behaviour and where they come from. Do I check the village noticeboard where the Elders have listed their decrees?

This is boring me.

You objected that you could not make sense of what I wrote.

Is your argument that if you cannot find the applicable code of behaviour which clearly and unambiguously forbids kicking puppies that it does not make sense to you or is it that making sense requires being verifiable/falsifiable? Something else?

What I wrote stands. I'm failing to see the relevance in what you're doing. — creativesoul

I'm trying to show you that the concept of something being forbidden only makes sense in the context of some relevant authority telling you to not do something and possibly threatening you with punishment for disobeying.

If you try to argue that things can be forbidden even without this then you are quite literally talking nonsense. Hence Anscombe's remark that the word "ought" is simply "a word of mere mesmeric force" with no real substance.

Moral realism is a dogma. It baselessly treats a claim like "you ought not kick puppies" as being something of a truism. Unless you can justify this assertion then it is literally an unjustified assertion.

Check the codes of behaviour. — creativesoul

Where do I find them?

Pose a clear question. — creativesoul

How do I verify or falsify the claim that I ought not kick puppies?

From whence punishment from external entity/judge? There is no need on my view. I covered that part already. In the first few posts of this particular discussion. It has since went sorely neglected. — creativesoul

A search for posts by you containing the word "forbidden" for the past year brings up five results, all of which only assert that something is forbidden without explaining what this means.

Are you saying that someone has threatened to punish us if we kick puppies? If not then what does it mean for kicking puppies to be forbidden?

What if such a claim cannot be verified/falsified by your choice of method? — creativesoul

I don't have a choice of method. I'm asking you how to do it. Are you going to answer?

Fourth.

Here, here, and here were the earlier comments.

Sometimes, kicking puppies is forbidden. — creativesoul

If by this you just mean that someone or something bigger and stronger than me has threatened to punish me if I kick puppies then I understand what you mean. If you mean something else then you're going to have to explain it.

I wouldn't put it like that. — creativesoul

They how would you put it? You're arguing that something is the case but seem unwilling to make sense of it.

Sure, Dem judges are ordering the Secretary to remove Trump from the ballot. Is that better? — NOS4A2

Well, to be pedantic they're ordering her not to add him to the ballot, but yes.

But so what? Orders are just words and you're a free speech absolutist.

If it is the case that kicking puppies is forbidden, then it is the case that one ought not kick puppies, and hence "one ought not kick puppies" is true. — creativesoul

The bits in bold are the bits I'm trying to make sense of. Are they physical states-of-affairs?

I’m not sure where you’re going with this except into a deeper hole. — NOS4A2

That if we use your logic then a) you cannot accuse the court of removing Trump from the ballot and b) if Trump is removed from the ballot then it isn't because of some anti-Trump agenda.

If it is the case that we ought not kick puppies, then "we ought not kick puppies" is true. — creativesoul

So I ask again, for the zillionth time: how do I verify or falsify the claim that we ought not kick puppies?

Correspondence is an emergent relation between what is thought and/or believed about what is going on and what is going on. — creativesoul

What is the what is going on with respect to the obligation to not kick puppies?

Are obligations physical objects? Are obligations physical events? Are obligations mathematical conclusions from some set of formal axioms and rules of inference? Are obligations Platonic entities that exist in some abstract realm of Ideas?

but law isn’t just words — NOS4A2

What else is it? It's certainly not magic.

People are employed to obey and expected to enforce those words, for instance the Secretary. Of course, she can disobey and leave him on the ballot because words don’t have the magical powers you pretend they do, but she’ll be punished. — NOS4A2

Yes. So you can blame the Secretary if she doesn't add him to the ballot, but you'd have to accept that she's doing it out of fear of punishment and not because she has some anti-Trump agenda.

They are actually going to evoke Our Democracy after Dem judges remove their political opponent from the ballot — NOS4A2

They didn’t remove him from any ballot. They said that “the Secretary may not list President Trump’s name on the 2024 presidential primary ballot, nor may she count any write-in votes cast for him.”

And, of course, these are just words. They have no power to influence what the Secretary does. If she doesn’t add Trump to the ballot then that’s her choice and only she is responsible.

He’s calling Trump a threat to Our Democracy™ right after a majority of Dem judges removed Trump from the ballot for crimes no one has been convicted of. — NOS4A2

Free speech.

So, physically identical except in respect of its lacking consciousness, possibly physical?

Or, physically identical but different non-physically, in respect of its lacking consciousness, presumed non-physical? — bongo fury

We can conceive of something that is physically identical to us not having consciousness, therefore it is metaphysically possible for something physically identical to us to not have consciousness, therefore consciousness isn't physical.

I don't see a need to reject 2 in order to reject 3. — wonderer1

If consciousness is physical and if we are conscious then anything that is physically identical to us is conscious and anything that isn’t conscious is physically different.

Therefore if we are conscious and if it is possible for something to be physically identical to us but not be conscious then it must be that consciousness is non physical.

I have to think that people considering p-zombies plausible is a result of not having really thought through what is under consideration. — wonderer1

I think you need to read this.

I think they're impossible too. — flannel jesus

Impossible because conscious experience is physical or impossible because non-physical conscious experience is a necessary consequence of brain activity (or other physical processes in the body)?

Perhaps different sorts of claims are true by virtue of different means, or by virtue of corresponding to different sorts of things. — creativesoul

So by what means are moral claims made true? What sort of things (if any) do they “correspond” to? Does the world contain non-natural “moral” properties that can be detected by some non-natural moral “intuition” that supervenes on our physical brain?

I find the focus on what counts as normativity as irrelevant to whether or not some utterances of ought are true. I'm open to be persuaded otherwise — creativesoul

See the distinction between meta ethics and normative ethics. The former addresses the meaning of moral sentences and what sort of things must obtain for them to be true (if they are indeed truth apt). The latter addresses which of them are true.

If you’re only interested in normative ethics then by all means ignore meta ethics. But I’m interested in meta ethics and so that is what my questions are trying to uncover.

And I think an answer to the questions of meta ethics is necessary to answer the questions of normative ethics, hence why I have repeatedly asked for how to verify or falsify a moral sentence. If you don’t know how to verify or falsify a moral sentence then how do you expect to determine whether or not some moral sentence is true? Is it simply a matter of faith?

Time to choose between the archaic taxonomy(categorical imperatives) and what you know is true despite not fully understanding how and/or why it is. — creativesoul

It’s not about taxonomy. It’s about not understanding what it means for a moral sentence to be true and not understanding how to verify or falsify a moral sentence.

This makes them very unlike empirical and mathematical sentences.

If I can’t make sense of this then perhaps I ought abandon my dogma and either accept that all moral sentences are false or that no moral sentence is truth apt.

One of these is a duck. It swims, quacks, and avoids predators. The other is a p-zuck, which does none of that by definition. — noAxioms

Swimming, quacking, and avoiding predators are mechanical behaviours and so they are exactly what a p-duck does.

They throw out the babe with the bathwater, adopting convolute notions in order to avoid the simple fact that ought statements can be true. — Banno

So can mathematical statements, but surely you understand the distinction between mathematical realism and mathematical nominalism?

Which of the metaethical equivalents of mathematical realism and mathematical nominalism is correct?

I certainly don’t think that non-natural or abstract properties or objects exist, and Moore’s open question argument strongly suggests that any naturalist account of morality fails, so something equivalent to mathematical nominalism is most likely.

But with mathematical nominalism we can make sense of it as a kind of coherence theory. I’m not sure how we can make sense of something like “moral nominalism”?

Perhaps those who like substantive theories will be less amenable to ought statements having a truth value because of the execs baggage they attach to truth.

I'm not sure where Michael stands in this regard — Banno

Parfit’s non-realist cognitivism seems like it addresses this distinction.

Going further, the metaphysical non-naturalists believe that, when we make irreducibly normative claims, these claims imply that there exist some ontologically weighty non-natural entities or properties.

Non-metaphysical non-naturalists make no such claims, since they deny that irreducibly normative truths have any such ontologically weighty implications.

One such view in this light is non-realist cognitivism, in which there are some true claims which are not made to be true by the way in which they correctly describe, or correspond to, how things are in some part of reality.

The best analogy I think there is to this is the distinction between mathematical realists and mathematical nominalists. Both believe that there are mathematical truths but the former believe that these mathematical truths depend on the existence of non-natural (abstract) mathematical objects whereas the latter don’t.

So assuming that there are moral truths, do these moral truths depend on the existence of non-natural “moral” properties? This is the kind of substantive (“robust”) realism that many moral antirealists reject, and if one subscribes to physicalism then it certainly seems that one must reject this kind of realism.

But what of Parfit’s “non-realist cognitivism”? It’s difficult to make sense of what it means for a moral proposition to be true if not by accurately describing some non-natural moral property of the world.

I don't think there's any possibility SCOTUS will rule Trump ineligible, with or without that verdict. He's not charged with insurrection, so he can't be found guilty of that. I anticipate SCOTUS will probably base their decision on the lack of due process establishing he engaged in insurrection. — Relativist

https://www.citizensforethics.org/reports-investigations/crew-reports/past-14th-amendment-disqualifications/

Historical precedent also confirms that a criminal conviction is not required for an individual to be disqualified under Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment. No one who has been formally disqualified under Section 3 was charged under the criminal “rebellion or insurrection” statute (18 U.S.C. § 2383) or its predecessors. This fact is consistent with Section 3’s text, legislative history, and precedent, all of which make clear that a criminal conviction for any offense is not required for disqualification. Section 3 is not a criminal penalty, but rather is a qualification for holding public office in the United States that can be and has been enforced through civil lawsuits in state courts, among other means.

The precedent likewise confirms that one can “engage” in insurrection without personally committing violent acts. Neither Kenneth Worthy nor Couy Griffin were accused of engaging in violence, yet both were ruled to be disqualified because they knowingly and voluntarily aided violent insurrections.

Not that I expect the Supreme Court to follow precedent.

Interestingly the case referenced a decision Gorsuch made before joining the Supreme Court:

… a state’s legitimate interest in protecting the integrity and practical functioning of the political process … permits it to exclude from the ballot candidates who are constitutionally prohibited from assuming office.

Neither do I. I'm not sure what in my post made you think I did. — Dawnstorm

P-zombies are a collection of bones and muscles and blood and organs and a central nervous system, including a brain, that reacts to stimuli.

What part of the mechanical body and its internal or external motions does the word “belief” refer to? I say none of it. Not its bones, not its brain, not its limbs or lips moving. The word “belief” points to some non-mechanical aspect of our being, i.e some conscious activity that p-zombies by definition don’t have.

And it's navigating the world and doing its job effectively, and it's doing all this without knowing anything??? How does that work, exactly? — RogueAI

External stimuli such as light and sound stimulate its sense receptors, these signals are sent to the brain which then responds by sending signals to the muscles causing it to move in the manner appropriate to navigate the stimulus.

Me and the p-zombie should then act the same way, only the zombie is dead inside. If all the variables are identical, there should be no divergence between us as we go about our business, right? I go to work, it goes to work. It does my job as well as I do. — RogueAI

Yes

Does the p-zombie have knowledge? — RogueAI

No