Dude, I'm not here for eristic. The only philosophical thread I published is an anti-eristic thread. If you're looking to argue for the sake of argument, you'll need to find someone else to do it with. — Leontiskos

I don’t understand this. This is a philosophy forum. Our entire purpose here is to argue the merits of some philosophical theory. Are you just here to evangelise?

"That's not moral and I refuse to say what I mean by 'moral'," is not a proof by contradiction, it's just sophistry. — Leontiskos

I am saying that these are not the sort of sentences that are usually described as being moral sentences. This is a straightforward empirical observation of actual language use.

My hairdresser tells me that I shouldn’t wash my hair every day because it makes the hair brittle. I don’t know anyone who will say that this is a moral obligation. Most will say that this is just a pragmatic suggestion.

You are precisely the one claiming there are moral facts. — Leontiskos

No I’m not.

I am the one claiming there are binding normative propositions. — Leontiskos

But you refuse to explain what this means or how one can verify or falsify the claim that some proposition is normatively binding.

It's purely defensive or eristic and not inquisitive. It looks more like fly-swatting or contradicting than philosophy. — Leontiskos

Proof by contradiction is a valid argumentative response.

And as far as I'm concerned, to reject a definition without providing an alternative is bad faith argumentation. It's, "Effort for thee, but not for me." — Leontiskos

I’m not the one claiming that there are moral facts.

Which of these are moral utterances? Where should we draw the arbitrary line? — Leontiskos

Is it arbitrary? Or is it a fact that some sentences are moral sentences and some sentences aren’t? There may be cases where we’re not sure if a sentence is a moral sentence, but it’s certainly not the case that every sentence is a moral sentence.

What exactly is wrong with my approach? You offer a definition and I provide counter examples that might show the inadequacy of the definition. If you’re willing to accept the counter examples as being a true consequence then just say so.

Ought you listen to my music? Does it then follow that you are morally obligated to listen to my music? Does it then follow that it is an injustice for you to not listen to my music?

All I am saying is that this seems inconsistent with how moral language is actually used. That strikes me as a justified descriptive claim. Perhaps you want to say that moral language isn’t actually used correctly?

I’ve only had a brief look into it, but Derek Parfit’s non-realist cognitivism is an interesting take. The theory is that there are true moral sentences but that there are no (natural or non-natural) moral properties in the world.

It’s a moral objectivism without a realist ontology.

You are the one claiming that they are different, not me. — Leontiskos

You said that moral obligations are concerned with justice. Are you saying that the normative claim “you ought listen to my music” is concerned with justice? If not then you recognize that they are different, and so my questions need answering.

If you think that it is concerned with justice then the same questions can be asked about justice itself. It certainly seems like an unusual use of language to describe listening to my music as being “just” (and presumably not listening to my music as being “unjust”).

But you also vacillate on things like A3 — Leontiskos

I don’t vacillate. I accept that it’s true in the sense that it’s a reasonable pragmatic suggestion (much like “you ought brush your teeth”).

I don’t know what it means for it to be something more which is why I’m asking you to make sense of this “something more”.

But incidentally the syllogism is invalid. The first premise should be “I should not cause suffering for anything like me”.

What remains is that there are conversations about what we ought to do, and that these conversations include true statements. The lengths to which folk go to avoid admitting this are extraordinary. — Banno

I don't avoid admitting it. I've admitted it several times, in fact. What I see you and others avoiding is actually addressing the issues of cognitivist meta-ethics. What does it mean for an obligation to be moral? Are moral obligations discovered or socially constructed (or other)? How does one verify or falsify a supposed moral obligation?

I don't really care. It's true that you should brush your teeth. We can work from that rather than assigning "ism"s. — Banno

If you don’t recognise the difference between a moral obligation and a pragmatic suggestion then you ought try reading some philosophy.

That's neither here no there. But there are such sentences, and some of them are true. QED. — Banno

You think non-cognitivists and error theorists don’t say that I should brush my teeth or that it’s best if I don’t eat too much sugar?

We talk about what might be done, what ought be done, what's the best thing to do, and so on. Whatever word you choose for this behaviour, it would be absurd to deny that you engage in it. — Banno

None of this requires positing the existence of moral facts. We can do all of this without introducing moral language.

So when do you get to the part where you make sense of morality?

You pretend to understand how moral language is used but not what moral language is. That's somewhat disingenuous. — Banno

It’s not pretend. There is a significant amount of well reasoned literature on anti-realist metaphysics, whether that be non-cognitivism, error theory, subjectivism, fictionalism, etc., all of which recognise which claims are supposed moral claims but none of which agree on the meaning (or truth) of such claims, so your apparent suggestion that anyone who doesn’t accept your “common sense” realism is being disingenuous is itself disingenuous.

You made an assessment; this is not a moral obligation; as if you understood what a moral obligation is. — Banno

No, I just understand how people use moral language.

I know that quarks can be up, down, strange, etc., but I don’t know what this means.

I say that a claim like “you ought listen to my music” isn’t a moral claim because I recognise how people use moral language and recognise that they don’t use moral language to describe such a claim.

I accept that a claim like “you ought not hurt puppies” is a moral claim because I recognise how people use moral language and recognise that they use moral language to describe such a claim. But I don’t know what they mean when they describe it as a moral obligation, which is why I’m asking you to explain it.

The issue is that your suggested explanations would include claims that most people wouldn’t describe using moral language and so it seems that your explanations fail in their task.

So I’ll try to make this simple. Here are two interpersonal normative claims:

1. You ought listen to my music
2. You ought not hurt puppies

If the first isn’t a moral obligation but the second is then a) what does it mean to say that the second is a moral obligation and b) what evidence or reasoning determines that the first isn’t a moral obligation but the second is?

How can you make such a claim if you do not know what "moral" is? — Banno

I can remember what sorts of things other people describe as moral.

Sure, suggestion, advice, command, remonstrance, etc. These are all interpersonal 'oughts' — Leontiskos

Doesn’t seem like a moral obligation though so I think you need to revise your definition.

I already told you: "interpersonal 'oughts'." — Leontiskos

Like “you ought to listen to my music, it’s really good”?

Well, if we define morality according to justice, as the realm of interpersonal 'oughts', then A3 is a moral truth. — Leontiskos

So to say that something is moral is to say that it is just? That just shifts the question to a new mystery. What is the ontological status of justice? Is it a natural or non-natural property? Is it a fact we discover, like physics, or is it a fact we construct through social convention? How do we verify or falsify a claim that something is just?

That's odd, given that you have consistently objected that my claims are non-moral. How do you object on the basis of a concept you do not know? — Leontiskos

I don't think I've said this. I've only said that "one ought not X" can be understood in pragmatic terms, and that if Moore's open question argument is correct then "moral" doesn't mean "pragmatic".

It might also be understood in moral terms, but that's on you to explain, not me.

You spoke of ordinary language. Is, "Do not needlessly cause others to suffer," moral according to your understanding of ordinary language? — Leontiskos

Again, I don't know what "moral" means. I only interpret that statement as a command. Someone is telling me what to do. "Don't cause others to suffer", "don't forget to brush your teeth", "don't go outside today because it's raining", etc.

I think you're just being contentious at this point. You consistently refuse the burden of proof, refuse to give substantive answers, and nitpick everything that is said.

You say A1 is not 'moral' by the mysterious definition you consistently refuse to provide. What about A3? Is that 'moral'? — Leontiskos

I don't know what "moral" means so I can't answer. It's pragmatic, sure. So what else is there? You're the one positing the existence of some other quality. The burden is on you to explain it and justify it.

The idea here is that the act involves a moral omission. — Leontiskos

And that needs to be explained, not simply asserted. I don't know what this word "moral" means. Does it refer to some natural property in the world? If so, what? If not then I need someone to actually make sense of it and justify its existence. It seems superfluous. What mystery about the world does it answer?

Meanwhile, I'm going to watch some TV and not worry about whether or not watching TV is "moral". I do it simply because it interests me, and that's enough.

In choosing to play a game you are choosing not to volunteer to fight in Ukraine. Ethics pervades everything you do. — Banno

What does choosing not to volunteer to fight in Ukraine have to do with ethics?

And it must be exhausting for you to have to consider "should I go fight in Ukraine instead?" every time you choose to do something.

I don't think there are non-moral 'oughts'. — Leontiskos

Seems inconsistent with ordinary language.

I ought to brush my teeth. I ought to buy my groceries whilst the sale is on. I ought not go out in the rain without an umbrella. I ought not move my pawn backwards.

This is a perfectly acceptable use of language. Why introduce a new ontological category of "moral" facts? What purpose do they serve?

This conversation is well off the rails. — Banno

Because you won't address what I'm saying.

Not every action is ethical. Not every choice requires ethical deliberation. My decision to play, or not play, baseball has nothing to do with ethics at all.

So you need something other than vague references to "actions" and "choices" if you want to make any sense of, and justify, all this seemingly unnecessary talk about morality. We don't need it. We can get by perfectly well just considering what we want and what's pragmatic.

But you're the one who objected that something cannot be pragmatic and moral in the first place — Leontiskos

I'm not saying that they can't be. I'm only saying that "pragmatic" and "moral" don't mean the same thing (see Moore's open question argument). When I asked you if it was pragmatic or moral, interpret it as an inclusive or.

What's up with all of this mumble-mouth crap? — GRWelsh

He's mentally challenged.

You're the one who said that not causing suffering is both pragmatic and moral, so I'm asking you what you mean by "moral" when you say this.

If that were so, your presence in this forum seems inexplicable. — Banno

Why?

You don't see the incongruity here? — Banno

No. Unless you want to argue for some form of naturalism where "moral" just means "pragmatic"? In which case see Moore's open question argument.

Do you agree with me that, ceteris paribus, one ought not cause suffering for themselves? — Leontiskos

As a pragmatic matter, yes. But I'm asking about morality.

It looks as if you have decided that you cannot act unless you are certain of what to do, and yet you must act and without certainty. So you are stuck. — Banno

I don't need to posit something like "moral obligations" to decide how to act. Wants and pragmatic concerns are more than sufficient.

In all the theorising in this thread we may lose track of the purpose of ethical thinking: to decide what to do. Ethics has to be about the relation between belief and action. — Banno

Lots of things we do have nothing to do with ethics. Lots of things we do are amoral. I don't sleep with men, play baseball, or cut my wrists.

So when do we get to the part where you actually explain morality?

In your other thread you ask if something like A1 is a moral claim or a pragmatic claim.

...

Why can't it be both? — Leontiskos

I accept that I have a pragmatic reason to not cause myself suffering. But what do you mean by saying that we also have a moral reason to not cause myself suffering? What does the term "moral" add? And what evidence or reasoning suggests that, in addition to being pragmatic, avoiding suffering is also moral?

Yep.

You choose for yourself what to believe. You choose whether to laugh with them or to stop them. — Banno

What does any of this have to do with morality and moral obligation?

But outside of this debate, you would not kick the puppy. That's not who you are. That's the point. — Banno

Others do. It's who they are.

One demonstrates the reality of the world by interacting with it, hence the reality of ethical statements by enacting them. — Banno

You don't kick a puppy. I kick a puppy. We've both interacted with the world.

Your comments don't really say anything relevant at all.

The mystery of the missing binder: How a collection of raw Russian intelligence disappeared under Trump

A binder containing highly classified information related to Russian election interference went missing at the end of Donald Trump’s presidency, raising alarms among intelligence officials that some of the most closely guarded national security secrets from the US and its allies could be exposed, sources familiar with the matter told CNN.

Its disappearance, which has not been previously reported, was so concerning that intelligence officials briefed Senate Intelligence Committee leaders last year about the missing materials and the government’s efforts to retrieve them, the sources said.

In the two-plus years since Trump left office, the missing intelligence does not appear to have been found.

The binder contained raw intelligence the US and its NATO allies collected on Russians and Russian agents, including sources and methods that informed the US government’s assessment that Russian President Vladimir Putin sought to help Trump win the 2016 election, sources tell CNN.

The intelligence was so sensitive that lawmakers and congressional aides with top secret security clearances were able to review the material only at CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia, where their work scrutinizing it was itself kept in a locked safe.

The binder was last seen at the White House during Trump’s final days in office. The former president had ordered it brought there so he could declassify a host of documents related to the FBI’s Russia investigation. Under the care of then-White House chief of staff Mark Meadows, the binder was scoured by Republican aides working to redact the most sensitive information so it could be declassified and released publicly.

...

But an unredacted version of the binder containing the classified raw intelligence went missing amid the chaotic final hours of the Trump White House. The circumstances surrounding its disappearance remain shrouded in mystery.

I take it that since you cannot make the possibility of any kind of moral obligation believable, you do not believe it is immoral to kill babies. Therefore there are no possible worlds in which we can discuss these worlds you propose as your presence makes them impossible. — unenlightened

That doesn't make sense. There's a possible world where I believe in moral obligation. There's a possible world where I'm a bartender. There's a possible where I dye my hair.

I'm not sure what you think possible worlds are.

But why must it end there? This seems like fleeing from battle while declaring your victory. Admitting that your belief is just an arbitrary dogma gets you points for honesty but not much else. — goremand

Some here seem overly fond of appeals to the stone.

I think that "queerness" is not easy to establish -- or, at least, is as hard to establish as "not-queer". I don't know how we get to a place where we know, or are even able to judge, what queerness is. — Moliere

Rather than "queer", how about "non-physical" and "non-mathematical"?

We can learn of and test physical and mathematical claims; empirically in the case of the physical and rationally by applying rules of inferences to some set of axioms in the case of mathematics (and other formal logical systems).

What about for moral claims? As that article continues to say, "in order to track such weird properties we would need 'some special faculty of moral perception or intuition, utterly different from our ordinary ways of knowing everything else'."

What evidence or reasoning is there for such a thing? As @hypericin says, it introduces a new ontological category, apparently a propos of nothing. If you cannot justify the existence of such things, why posit them in the first place?

I suspect many just have something like a base need to "validate" their disgust of certain behaviours.

But I will just point out that you have undermined all of your thread which is based on various scenarios of "everyone believes..." — unenlightened

What do you mean by this?

There what is again?