I think such a consequentialist would say that (3) is self-evidently true, because to feel pain is to suffer; suffering is undesirable; and what is undesirable should—ceteris paribus—be avoided. "Suffering ought to be sought" is a sort of synthetic contradiction. — Leontiskos

Is that a moral claim, or merely a pragmatic claim?

I suppose an ethical naturalist could claim that a moral claim is a pragmatic claim, but how would someone who is both a consequentialist and an ethical non-naturalist explain the difference between those worlds?

This does not demonstrate that it has no shape. — unenlightened

I'm not trying to demonstrate that there are no moral facts, only that moral facts don't matter. It is only our moral beliefs that matter.

Unlike other kinds of beliefs, our moral beliefs being right or wrong has no practical consequences.

1. In a world without morality, folk would kill babies if they wanted to and not if they didn't want to. There would be no law against it or moral opprobrium attached to it. — unenlightened

In a world without moral beliefs this would happen, but I'm not asking about moral beliefs. I clarified that above:

1. No morality but everyone believes that it is immoral to kill babies
2. It is immoral to kill babies and everyone believes that it is immoral to kill babies
3. It is moral to kill babies but everyone believes that it is immoral to kill babies

I think that these worlds would be empirically indistinguishable. Whether or not one's moral beliefs are correct seems to have no practical relevance.

There's your resolution regarding the dissonance. — creativesoul

It doesn't resolve it because I don't know which side to take. Do I accept that, as a categorical imperative, I ought not kick puppies, or do I accept that categorical imperatives make no sense? You might be able to pick a side without justification but I can't.

Hence why I remain a skeptic.

Does it? I mean justificatory regress has to stop somewhere, right? Why not right there? — creativesoul

I did make much the same point elsewhere. You just either accept moral realism or you don't. I remain skeptical.

Need it be 'proven' in order for you to know it? — creativesoul

Well, it needs to be reasonably justified at least.

If you have convinced yourself that feeling disdain for roughly 80 million people is normal, I doubt I'll be able to change your mind. Personally, I think it suggests disconnection from reality. — Tzeentch

If 80 million people will vote for Trump just because their feelings are hurt by Biden voters then 80 million people are idiots.

Perhaps dropping the notions of categorical and hypothetical imperatives would help? — creativesoul

That's the very thing being discussed.

1. A categorical imperative is just "one ought not X".
2. A hypothetical imperative is "according to Y, one ought not X" or "one ought not X or Z will happen."

I cannot rationally justify the truth of any (1), and yet many seem to be true. It's something of a cognitive dissonance.

So that serves as a clear cut counterexample to the notion that all claims in the form of "One ought not X" imply conditions. — creativesoul

If the categorical imperative "one ought not kick puppies" is true then it would be a counterexample to the claim that all imperatives are hypothetical, but it hasn't been proven that the categorical imperative "one ought not kick puppies" is true.

"One ought not kick puppies."

How does your claims quoted above cover that one? Seems perfectly meaningful and true from where I sit despite not needing to be bolstered by what you suggest all such claims require. — creativesoul

That's the exact problem. "One ought not kick puppies" seems meaningfully true and yet the concept of categorical imperatives seems vacuous. I don't know how to resolve this contradiction.

I have something like a visceral acceptance of such categorical imperatives but I cannot rationally accept the almost magical, wishful thinking of them.

I wonder if people realize that this thread in a nutshell explains why Trump might win a second term.

The disdain for ordinary people, the "all means necessary" approach confirming one's own moral bankrutpcy while pretending to have a moral high ground, etc. — Tzeentch

Anyone who would vote for someone like Trump and support his policies simply because they're offended by the disdain others have for them deserves such disdain. They're petulant children. Snowflakes.

If you're going to vote for him then do it only because you agree with the things he wants to do. Although, of course, that deserves its own kind of disdain.

Unnecessarily multiplying entities. Reward and punishment requires a judge. Causality does not. — creativesoul

You're being unnecessarily pedantic. I've clarified my meaning.

Because there is no need for a rule giver(God) or reward/punishment but rather just good ole knowledge of causality. Hence, it is not the case that obligation is vacuous sans a rule giver and/or reward/punishment. — creativesoul

My use of the phrase "reward and punishment" was meant as an inclusive phrase to account for any desirable or undesirable consequence.

Seems like the demonstrably provable negative affects/effects stemming from not honoring one's voluntarily obligations(promises) should work just fine in lieu of a rule-giver and/or reward/punishment. — creativesoul

Sure.

What I was getting at is that the unconditional phrase "one ought not X" being true is vacuous. It is only meaningfully true if implying something like "according to Y, one ought not X" or "one ought not X or Y will happen".

Much like the phrase "X is beautiful" being true must be understood as implying "according to Y, X is beautiful". Beauty is in the eye of the beholder.

Remember when you yourself made the same point I am making? — Leontiskos

The complication is that:

a) (as I said earlier) when someone claims that one ought not X we understand them as attempting to express an objective fact,

b) (as suggested by Anscombe, Wittgenstein, and Schopenhauer) the very concept of obligations sans a rule-giver or punishment and reward categorical imperatives is vacuous, and

c) (as @Banno has suggested many times, and which I think is consistent with ordinary language philosophy) it's something of a truism that we have certain obligations (such as to not kick puppies)

(a) and (b) together would suggest error theory, (a) and (c) together would suggest robust realism, (b) and (c) together would suggest non-objectivism, and all appear to be true.

Perhaps the answer is that moral language is complex and cannot be adequately explained by a single metaethics.

I would say that, by the very substance of anti-realist metaethics, obligations aren't obligatory. If the anti-realist theory intends to be normative, then this makes it incoherent. If the anti-realist theory intends to be merely descriptive, then it is denying the existence of true obligations and substituting some faux placeholder. Folks in this thread flip back and forth between those two options, wanting to have their cake and eat it, too; to have obligations while simultaneously holding that nothing is truly obligatory. — Leontiskos

Then perhaps you could explain what obligations "truly" are.

They might approve if it helps Trump but they might not want to help a liberal president. — Fooloso4

No problem. They rule in Trump's favour and then when a liberal President does the same thing they rule that the facts are different this time and that the liberal President can be prosecuted. Easy peasy.

I thought it was for the same CRIME — Relativist

That's certainly how the Fifth Amendment is worded.

"[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb..."

I think they are smart enough to see that such a ruling could bite them in the ass. — Fooloso4

How so?

You're too obsessed with "isms".

I'll make this easy for you. Whenever one of us says something like "moral realism hasn't been justified", feel free to read it as saying "the moral theory that there are objective moral facts independent from human thought and practice hasn't been justified."

Arguing that people are using the wrong label when discussing the matter is a pointless argument.

"although some accounts of moral realism see it as involving additional commitments, say to the independence of the moral facts from human thought and practice, or to those facts being objective in some specified way"

When most of use the term "moral realism" we are talking about those accounts of morality that involve these additional commitments. Many of us have already accepted that moral sentences are truth-apt and that some are true.

It is a kind of definition or stipulation — Leontiskos

Yes, that's a central aspect of metaethics; the meaning of moral sentences. What does "ought" even mean?

I think the problem is that you have a realist conception of the meaning of "ought" that you (rightly) find incompatible with an anti-realist conception, but your seeming suggestion that anti-realist obligations aren't "real" obligations is begging the question.

By the very substance of anti-realist metaethics, obligations aren't objective/absolute/intrinsic/inherent/unconditional/categorical or however you want to phrase it. Such realist obligations either fail to ever obtain or are incoherent. The only possible meaningful obligations are those that are conditional on some relevant rule-giver. Asking why one ought obey this rule-giver is a meaningless question given the actual meaning of "ought".

Have what?

Would you agree that you don't know of any persuasive argument for moral realism? — frank

I don't know of any persuasive argument for any metaethics. They all seem to have insurmountable problems.

Would you agree that a persuasive argument for moral realism is going to have to account for why morality attaches only to certain kinds of intelligence? — frank

Well yes, any persuasive argument for some metaethics (whether realism, error theory, or subjectivism) is going to have to account for why morality works the way they say it does.

You appeared to agreed with Hyp, in his asserting those incompatible ideas. — Banno

I was agreeing with the claim that if "one ought do X" is true when everyone believes it's true, and if everyone believe that one ought do X, then one ought do X.

So why is your assessment superior to the Bible's? Why do objective moral rules only apply to persons who understand them? — frank

I'm not saying that my assessment is superior to the Bible's. I'm simply providing you with a coherent account of moral realism that can explain why morality applies to humans but not cockroaches.

Not according to the Bible. — frank

Okay?

You have
"One ought do X" is true when everyone believes it's true.
And yet you seem to deny
"You ought to do what everyone believes you should" — Banno

I haven't said this. I have said that one of these is true:

a) no moral sentence is truth-apt
c) no moral sentence is true
e) some moral sentence is true if everyone believes so
f) some moral sentence is true even if nobody believes so

And I've also said that I won't (always) do what I ought to do.

Even if you want to pick a certain point where there was a mutation, this choice for where we draw the moral line is going to be arbitrary. For instance, we know that Homo Sapiens and all our close relatives have a mutation that makes our jaw muscles weak. That would be an objective separating line between us and the other animals. But why would having a weak jaw make us subject to moral rules? — frank

I mentioned an example. Morality applies to any species (or rather, person) with the intelligence to understand morality. I certainly don't think this arbitrary.

Again, for the third or fourth time, your purpose here is obscure. It's not clear where your reasoning leads, or where it comes from. What's your point? Are you supporting subjectivism, or just positing it for the sake of discussion? — Banno

It was a discussion from several years ago that I mentioned in passing. I didn't mean to bring it into this discussion.

The question is: is morality only for humans? The idea is that if morality is only for homo sapiens, then morality is artificial because there's an ancestral continuum between humans and their forebears.

If morality is artificial, then moral realism fails. — frank

Even if it were only for humans it doesn't then follow that it's artificial. Humans are biologically distinct from non-humans yet human biology isn't artificial; it's an objective and natural fact. It may be that humans are morally distinct from non-humans even though morality isn't artificial; it may be an objective fact (whether natural or non-natural) that only obtains for a species that reaches a sufficient level of intelligence, e.g. intelligent enough to conceive of morality.

Taxation is not a just acquisition or transfer. — NOS4A2

It is if Rawls' (or some other) theory is correct. See distributive justice for a more in-depth account.

The problem is that "contracts" aren't aimed at reaching morally just outcomes; they are generally not included at all. So the idea people have an extra-legal moral right to pre-tax income is fundamentally flawed. — Benkei

Why is it flawed? It could be that one has a moral right to some X but no legal right to it. Case in point: abortion in some countries.

Certainly not descriptive ethics. If you don't like my instinct example, go with your version of moral subjectivism:

"One ought do X" is true when everyone believes it's true.

It is not a valid objection to say "Why ought I do something just because everyone believes I should?".
Because it is not an ethical theory that says "You ought to do what everyone believes you should".
It is a metaethical theory that says "The truth of ethical propositions arises from everyone's belief in them".

Raising an ethical objection to a metaethical theory is a mistake. Because it is an is theory, not an ought theory, even though its subject is ought statements.
an hour ago — hypericin

I misunderstood you then. I agree with this.

So we apparently take as true that one ought not eat babies. — Banno

I was saying that I wouldn't eat babies even if I ought to. I am not (only) motivated by moral considerations. I am (more) motivated by self-interest and my "passions" (as Hume would put it).

Human psychology isn't a slave to some supposed duty.

So long as they are just in their transfers there is no reason to prevent someone from becoming wealthy. To do so would be to engage in the unjust transfer of wealth, for instance through theft, exploitation, and forced labor like taxation. — NOS4A2

If Rawls' theory of justice is correct in concluding that "economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged" then this maximin principle may entail that taxation is just.

Although I suspect you agree more with Nozick.

The challenge to moral realism is in asking about what's moral for homo habilis, or homo erectus. — frank

That's a challenge for some theory on normative ethics (e.g. utilitarianism, hedonism, etc.). Moral realism is a theory on meta-ethics and so it doesn't need to answer this question.

But why is it a response to my post? — hypericin

Because your post was saying that Banno and Leontiskos are making a mistake in asking about obligations, whereas I think obligations are the very thing we're discussing.

Are sentences like "one ought not X" true and if so are they true even if we all believe otherwise?

This discussion is on meta-ethics, not descriptive ethics, and your post seems to be discussing the latter.

One would treat this as a reductio, that shows the supposed argument to have gone astray. That one ought not eat babies takes precedence over the argument. — Banno

I think it's worth looking at this

Use of this Latin terminology traces back to the Greek expression hê eis to adunaton apagôgê, reduction to the impossible, found repeatedly in Aristotle’s Prior Analytics. In its most general construal, reductio ad absurdum – reductio for short – is a process of refutation on grounds that absurd – and patently untenable consequences would ensue from accepting the item at issue. This takes three principal forms according as that untenable consequence is:

1) a self-contradiction (ad absurdum)
2) a falsehood (ad falsum or even ad impossible)
3) an implausibility or anomaly (ad ridiculum or ad incommodum)

The first of these is reductio ad absurdum in its strictest construction and the other two cases involve a rather wider and looser sense of the term.

It would be wrong to assert (1) and begging the question to assert (2) in this case. So I take it that you are asserting (3)?

Even if (3) were true it doesn't then follow that one ought not eat babies. Something can be true and implausible.