In the first case, there is harm; in the second, no harm — Banno

There is harm in the second case. We're just not morally obligated to not harm.

This post explains it more clearly.

Value systems are not true or false. — Joshs

My questioning is direct at moral cognitivists, i.e. those who believe that moral propositions are truth-apt. In particular it's directed at ethical non-naturalists, i.e. those who believe that moral facts are non-natural, and robust moral realists, i.e. those who believe that moral facts are mind-independent.

I really don't understand what you are saying.

Here are two possible worlds:

1. We have a moral obligation to save the human race from extinction
2. We do not have a moral obligation to save the human race from extinction

If we believe that we have a moral obligation to save the human race from extinction then what is the practical difference between us being in world 1 (where our belief is true) and us being in world 2 (where our belief is false)?

In neither case do we know which world we're in, but in both cases we believe that we are in world 1.

If there is no practical difference then which world we're in is inconsequential. All that matters is that we believe that we have a moral obligation to save the human race from extinction and so act accordingly.

At least the house members you cited are acting in good faith — NOS4A2

Well that's delusional thinking.

But you cannot make the possibility believable? — unenlightened

I can't make the possibility of any kind of moral obligation believable. That's really what I'm trying to show here.

If it's logically possible for there to be a moral obligation to harm and if it's logically possible for there to be a moral obligation to not harm, and if there's no practical difference between being morally obligated to harm and being morally obligated to not harm, then moral obligations are a vacuous concept.

That’s why an inquiry is in order, to find the answers. — NOS4A2

So because some member of Biden's family (Hunter?) received money from some foreign company an impeachment inquiry into Presidential corruption is warranted? That's one hell of a stretch.

It's far more tenuous than any of the allegations against Trump, and yet you railed against them as being politically motivated. Do you recognize the hypocrisy and bias in your approach to this allegation against Biden?

What's written there is so vague that I can't say. e.g.:

"After the Chinese company wired the Biden associate account the $3 million, the Biden family received approximately $1,065,692 over a three-month period in different bank accounts."

Who is the "Biden associate"? What work was he doing for the Chinese company? Which members of the "Biden family" received money from him, and what work were they doing?

I suspect that the Republicans are being intentionally vague so as to give the false appearance of impropriety as part of their political stunt. Which is why they refused Hunter Biden's offer of a public testimony. They can't falsely accuse him of saying things he didn't actually say if everyone can hear it for themselves.

You would have to make that believable to me. — unenlightened

It simply follows from the fact that "we have a moral obligation to prevent environmental catastrophe and population crash" is not true by definition.

If it's not true by definition then it's not necessarily true, and if it's not necessarily true then it's possibly false. I believe that's straightforward modal logic?

I would not like to be around folk who do that shit. — Banno

What relevance is that? Is liking or not liking to be around folk the measure of obligation?

One ought keep one's promises.

And this because a promise just it the sort of thing one ought to keep. — Banno

Well that's just begging the question.

Such a world would at least have to be a world without humans — unenlightened

Why?

Unless "we have a moral obligation to prevent environmental catastrophe and population crash" is true by definition there is a possible world (with humans) in which we do not have a moral obligation to prevent environmental catastrophe and population crash.

And if it is true by definition then it's a case of ethical naturalism, in which case it's vulnerable to Moore's open question argument.

Well, looking at the first thing in the list, all it says is that "the Biden family" received a lot of money from foreign nationals whilst Joe Biden was Vice President.

What's the issue there? How much money did "the Trump family" receive from foreign nationals whilst Trump was President?

I don't understand what you're saying.

I cannot help you beyond pointing out that moral beliefs are efficacious, and some are life affirming and others life denying. — unenlightened

I agree. Moral beliefs are efficacious. But I'm asking about the efficacy of moral facts.

Given your comments, I have a more tailored question: what is the practical difference between a world in which we have a moral obligation to prevent environmental catastrophe and population crash and a world in which we don't have a moral obligation to prevent environmental catastrophe and population crash, assuming that in both worlds we believe that we have such a moral obligation and so act accordingly.

By my reckoning we could replace moral facts with empirical facts and end up in the same quandary. — Joshs

They’re not equivalent. The world being round or the world being flat has practical consequences. There hasn’t been explained what the practical consequences are of homosexuality being moral or homosexuality being immoral.

Later, we notice that our numbers are dwindling, and there is no one left to change our nappies when we become incontinent. — unenlightened

What does this have to do with the truth or falsity of "one ought not kill babies"?

They don’t have the receipts — NOS4A2

They don't have anything. At best it's a fishing expedition, at worst they know there's nothing to it and are simply carrying it out as a political stunt to hurt Biden and help Trump.

And there are no practical consequences to changing one’s view from ‘it is true that homosexuality is sinful’ to ‘it is false that homosexuality is sinful’? Let’s say the person who has a change of heart is a legislator or a parent of a homosexual child. — Joshs

There are practical consequences to moral beliefs. There appear to be no practical consequences to moral facts.

Imagine two worlds:

1. Homosexuality is immoral but everyone falsely believes that homosexuality is moral
2. Homosexuality is moral and everyone truthfully believes that homosexuality is moral

In both worlds everyone believes that homosexuality is moral. This has practical consequences (e.g. the legality of same-sex marriage). But in one world everyone's belief is correct and in the other everyone's belief is incorrect.

What are the practical consequences of having a true belief? What are the practical consequences of having a false belief? I can't see that there are – or could be – any.

It seems to be a necessary consequence of any ethical non-naturalism that moral facts are irrelevant.

Where are the quotes from everyone else involved, for instance those outlining the evidence so far? I imagine those are all minimized while this one is amplified. — NOS4A2

You mean like this?

Some House Republicans Admit There Is No Evidence to Impeach Biden

Is the belief that homosexuality is sinful a moral belief? — Joshs

Yes.

For example if we all believe it is wrong to kill babies, but we are wrong about that, then there will be more living babies than there ought to be, and hence population overshoot environmental catastrophe, and eventual population crash. — unenlightened

What is the connection between a moral obligation to kill babies and environmental catastrophe?

1. One ought not kill babies, we (truthfully) believe that we ought not kill babies, and if we don't then there will be an environmental catastrophe

2. One ought kill babies, we (falsely) believe that we ought not kill babies, and if we don't then there will be an environmental catastrophe

Whether our belief that we ought not kill babies is true or false has no practical consequences. Either way we believe that we ought not kill babies and if we don't kill babies then there will be an environmental catastrophe.

He said "Donald Trump 2024", therefor he's admitting it's a political sham. — NOS4A2

He said in response to being asked what he was hoping to get from an impeachment enquiry.

Therefor he's admitting real concern for the president's behavior. — NOS4A2

He's feigning real concern.

Openly admitting it's a political stunt.

I see that our interest in high crimes and misdemeanors has really fallen off. — NOS4A2

What high crimes and misdemeanors has Biden committed?

Does the shape of the world not matter? — unenlightened

I address that in my post?

"Unlike other kinds of beliefs, our moral beliefs being right or wrong has no practical consequences."

I think such a consequentialist would say that (3) is self-evidently true, because to feel pain is to suffer; suffering is undesirable; and what is undesirable should—ceteris paribus—be avoided. "Suffering ought to be sought" is a sort of synthetic contradiction. — Leontiskos

Is that a moral claim, or merely a pragmatic claim?

I suppose an ethical naturalist could claim that a moral claim is a pragmatic claim, but how would someone who is both a consequentialist and an ethical non-naturalist explain the difference between those worlds?

This does not demonstrate that it has no shape. — unenlightened

I'm not trying to demonstrate that there are no moral facts, only that moral facts don't matter. It is only our moral beliefs that matter.

Unlike other kinds of beliefs, our moral beliefs being right or wrong has no practical consequences.

1. In a world without morality, folk would kill babies if they wanted to and not if they didn't want to. There would be no law against it or moral opprobrium attached to it. — unenlightened

In a world without moral beliefs this would happen, but I'm not asking about moral beliefs. I clarified that above:

1. No morality but everyone believes that it is immoral to kill babies
2. It is immoral to kill babies and everyone believes that it is immoral to kill babies
3. It is moral to kill babies but everyone believes that it is immoral to kill babies

I think that these worlds would be empirically indistinguishable. Whether or not one's moral beliefs are correct seems to have no practical relevance.

There's your resolution regarding the dissonance. — creativesoul

It doesn't resolve it because I don't know which side to take. Do I accept that, as a categorical imperative, I ought not kick puppies, or do I accept that categorical imperatives make no sense? You might be able to pick a side without justification but I can't.

Hence why I remain a skeptic.

Does it? I mean justificatory regress has to stop somewhere, right? Why not right there? — creativesoul

I did make much the same point elsewhere. You just either accept moral realism or you don't. I remain skeptical.

Need it be 'proven' in order for you to know it? — creativesoul

Well, it needs to be reasonably justified at least.

If you have convinced yourself that feeling disdain for roughly 80 million people is normal, I doubt I'll be able to change your mind. Personally, I think it suggests disconnection from reality. — Tzeentch

If 80 million people will vote for Trump just because their feelings are hurt by Biden voters then 80 million people are idiots.

Perhaps dropping the notions of categorical and hypothetical imperatives would help? — creativesoul

That's the very thing being discussed.

1. A categorical imperative is just "one ought not X".
2. A hypothetical imperative is "according to Y, one ought not X" or "one ought not X or Z will happen."

I cannot rationally justify the truth of any (1), and yet many seem to be true. It's something of a cognitive dissonance.

So that serves as a clear cut counterexample to the notion that all claims in the form of "One ought not X" imply conditions. — creativesoul

If the categorical imperative "one ought not kick puppies" is true then it would be a counterexample to the claim that all imperatives are hypothetical, but it hasn't been proven that the categorical imperative "one ought not kick puppies" is true.

"One ought not kick puppies."

How does your claims quoted above cover that one? Seems perfectly meaningful and true from where I sit despite not needing to be bolstered by what you suggest all such claims require. — creativesoul

That's the exact problem. "One ought not kick puppies" seems meaningfully true and yet the concept of categorical imperatives seems vacuous. I don't know how to resolve this contradiction.

I have something like a visceral acceptance of such categorical imperatives but I cannot rationally accept the almost magical, wishful thinking of them.

I wonder if people realize that this thread in a nutshell explains why Trump might win a second term.

The disdain for ordinary people, the "all means necessary" approach confirming one's own moral bankrutpcy while pretending to have a moral high ground, etc. — Tzeentch

Anyone who would vote for someone like Trump and support his policies simply because they're offended by the disdain others have for them deserves such disdain. They're petulant children. Snowflakes.

If you're going to vote for him then do it only because you agree with the things he wants to do. Although, of course, that deserves its own kind of disdain.

Unnecessarily multiplying entities. Reward and punishment requires a judge. Causality does not. — creativesoul

You're being unnecessarily pedantic. I've clarified my meaning.

Because there is no need for a rule giver(God) or reward/punishment but rather just good ole knowledge of causality. Hence, it is not the case that obligation is vacuous sans a rule giver and/or reward/punishment. — creativesoul

My use of the phrase "reward and punishment" was meant as an inclusive phrase to account for any desirable or undesirable consequence.

Seems like the demonstrably provable negative affects/effects stemming from not honoring one's voluntarily obligations(promises) should work just fine in lieu of a rule-giver and/or reward/punishment. — creativesoul

Sure.

What I was getting at is that the unconditional phrase "one ought not X" being true is vacuous. It is only meaningfully true if implying something like "according to Y, one ought not X" or "one ought not X or Y will happen".

Much like the phrase "X is beautiful" being true must be understood as implying "according to Y, X is beautiful". Beauty is in the eye of the beholder.

Remember when you yourself made the same point I am making? — Leontiskos

The complication is that:

a) (as I said earlier) when someone claims that one ought not X we understand them as attempting to express an objective fact,

b) (as suggested by Anscombe, Wittgenstein, and Schopenhauer) the very concept of obligations sans a rule-giver or punishment and reward categorical imperatives is vacuous, and

c) (as @Banno has suggested many times, and which I think is consistent with ordinary language philosophy) it's something of a truism that we have certain obligations (such as to not kick puppies)

(a) and (b) together would suggest error theory, (a) and (c) together would suggest robust realism, (b) and (c) together would suggest non-objectivism, and all appear to be true.

Perhaps the answer is that moral language is complex and cannot be adequately explained by a single metaethics.

I would say that, by the very substance of anti-realist metaethics, obligations aren't obligatory. If the anti-realist theory intends to be normative, then this makes it incoherent. If the anti-realist theory intends to be merely descriptive, then it is denying the existence of true obligations and substituting some faux placeholder. Folks in this thread flip back and forth between those two options, wanting to have their cake and eat it, too; to have obligations while simultaneously holding that nothing is truly obligatory. — Leontiskos

Then perhaps you could explain what obligations "truly" are.