and by 'fact' I mean 'a statement which corresponds to reality such that what it refers to about reality is there' — Bob Ross
Yes. In order to know that there is a difference between two things, one must have access to both in order to compare them. — creativesoul
If they choose to break the code, even unintentionally, perhaps they shouldn't even be coding in the first place. — Outlander
$person->name = 'Mike';
class Person
{
public readonly string $initials;
public function __construct(
public readonly string $first_name,
public readonly string $surname,
)
{
$this->initials = substr($first_name, 0, 1) . substr($surname, 0, 1);
}
}
$person = new Person('John Smith');
echo $person->initials;
I had to Google the "readonly" stipulation. What realistic (or even atypical) case scenarios can you provide that warrants its explicit use? — Outlander
class Person
{
public function __construct(public readonly string $name) {}
}
$person = new Person('Michael');
echo $person->name;
class Person
{
protected $name;
public function __construct($name)
{
$this-name = $name;
}
public function getName()
{
return $this->name;
}
}
$person = new Person('Michael');
echo $person->getName();
I'd much rather a default function-level based "error handling" (ie. not integer detected therefore, perform this) than a top level PHP error that breaks whatever the user is doing (and often the site or at least the specific action page in the process).
Hopefully things haven't changed too much... — Outlander
class Person
{
public function __construct(
public readonly string $name,
public readonly int $age
) {}
}
I see you're using Typescript. — Jamal
By the way, amongst the front-end frameworks, I've found Svelte to be the most enjoyable to work with. — Jamal
"One cannot move pawns backwards."
Is "objectively" true, but only in the context of playing a game of chess. Once that context is removed, it is objectively false: after all, I can move the piece backwards just as easily as any other direction. But note that the form of the sentence is no different than:
"One cannot transmute lead into gold."
Which is not dependent in its truth on any particular context.
So the question is, are the truths of moral statements context dependent or context independent? To satisfy a moral arealist such as Bob Ross I think they must be context independent. But either way, the form in which the statements are posed cannot tell you that. — hypericin
4 is required to get from the facts of hte matter, to the judgement about htose facts. — AmadeusD
If nothing existed, that would be a state of affairs that included Santa not existing. — AmadeusD
The brute facts remain:
1. We exist
2. We can be harmed
3. We can harm others.
4?????? (this is where i'm not seeing any work being done)
5. One ought not harm. — AmadeusD
Which is extant in the state of the physical world - Santa isn't in it. — AmadeusD
That is a physical state of affairs. — AmadeusD
"One ought not x" is only referential if you have a state of affairs to refer to. In this case, you haven't established it. You end up on 'brute fact' but i don't accept that position, so, as i actually began this part of the exchange - we have no further to go on this journey together. — AmadeusD
It's the linguistic representation of a thought, not a state of affairs. If your position is that a sentence is necessarily representative of a state of affairs, i find that bizarre and hard to grasp.
No, i understand the distinction you're making. — AmadeusD
"One ought not x" ... is a thought, not a state of affairs.
it certainly doesn't refer to anything external to the mind. — AmadeusD
all “alien” refers to is non-human, non-Earthbound life forms. All of those elements have direct referents which we almalgamate. — AmadeusD
But noting the issue you’re outlining my question is - what moral facts could exist a priori? That is, without human knowledge of them? — AmadeusD
What are we discovering when we come across moral facts? — AmadeusD
As I understand it, "moral realism" --I don't like and never use this term-- is basically about making a list of what things are right and what are wrong. — Alkis Piskas
Moral truths are necessarily attendant to the world in which we live. They must refer. — AmadeusD
mathematical facts are not moral facts. — AmadeusD
Just because it seems as though there are moral facts because we colloquially express our norms in a moral realist kind of manner does not entail they exist whatsoever: it's a non-sequitur. — Bob Ross
I can't figure out how a moral fact could escape needing to be tied to space and time — AmadeusD
I don't think this is right: the statement is valid, but in that abstract generic form is not truth apt. — Janus
One of the central debates within analytic metaethics concerns the semantics of what is actually going on when people make moral statements such as “Abortion is morally wrong” or “Going to war is never morally justified.” The metaethical question is not necessarily whether such statements themselves are true or false, but whether they are even the sort of sentences that are capable of being true or false in the first place (that is, whether such sentences are “truth-apt”) and, if they are, what it is that makes them “true.” On the surface, such sentences would appear to possess descriptive content—that is, they seem to have the syntactical structure of describing facts in the world—in the same form that the sentence “The cat is on the mat” seems to be making a descriptive claim about a cat on a mat; which, in turn, is true or false depending on whether or not there really is a cat on the mat. To put it differently, the sentence “The cat is on the mat” seems to be expressing a belief about the way the world actually is. The metaethical view that moral statements similarly express truth-apt beliefs about the world is known as cognitivism. Cognitivism would seem to be the default view of our moral discourse given the apparent structure that such discourse appears to have.
I am not quite sure what you mean by "theory of meaning" — Bob Ross
nor why I would need it for this discussion. — Bob Ross
what's the source of the state of affairs — AmadeusD
I can only imagine (as previously mentioned) a supernatural origin for such a brute claim. — AmadeusD
"One ought not harm others". Its a judgment, not a state of affairs. But i've just realised we've been over this — AmadeusD
But the statement is an opinion, not universally held. — AmadeusD
Are you suggesting that what is necessarily an opinion, not universally held, is a brute fact, with this statement? — AmadeusD
or how to get from an is to an ought. — GRWelsh
If there are any examples of (b) then this proves that the world exists
even if the world is mere a projection from one's own mind. — PL Olcott
Indeed, our aggrieved “ordinary language” response to such a situation, if it's revealed, is, “You didn’t mean it!” So what’s going on here? — J
