Yes, but, as I said, I don't think it is a strong argument when it depends on ordinary language. It doesn't actually negate moral subjectivism, it just states "ordinary language is used in accordance with moral realism, regardless of whether moral realism is true or not"--and the italicized is what is missing in premise 2. I can agree with the fact that ordinary language aligns with moral realist positions while refraining judgment or even negating that moral realism is true. — Bob Ross

To be clear, I'm saying:

1. Ordinary language philosophy is correct.
2. Moral non-cognitivism and moral subjectivism are inconsistent with ordinary language use.
3. Therefore, moral non-cognitivism and moral subjectivism are incorrect.
4. Therefore, either moral realism or error theory is correct.

I am then saying that if there is no positive evidence in favour of either moral realism or error theory, and if we refuse to remain agnostic, then we must either assume moral realism or assume that it is not the case that one ought not eat babies.

Obviously if you reject the premise that ordinary language philosophy is correct then the argument will fail, but then what better theory of meaning do you have?

which is really an intuition based off of ordinary language (that moral realism is true) — Bob Ross

That's not quite correct. The premise is that non-cognitivism and moral subjectivism are inconsistent with ordinary language use, and so that if ordinary language philosophy is correct then either moral realism or error theory is correct.

We then have to decide which of moral realism or error theory is the better "default" position.

Either moral realism, or it is not the case that we ought not eat babies.

just because "one ought..." is usually linguistically interpreted as a fact of the matter, it does not follow that they actually are. — Bob Ross

The meaning of a word is its linguistic use. That's what Wittgenstein tries to show in his Philosophical Investigations. How can meaning be anything else?

As I said, the argument depends on an acceptance of ordinary language philosophy. If you reject ordinary language philosophy then the argument is going to be unconvincing.

In which case, you will no longer be part of the conversation about how to determine what is objectively real — Patterner

Only if you're right and our experiences are accurate. If you're wrong and our experiences are inaccurate then we might just wake up.

The general premises are something like:

1. The meaning of the word "ought" is such that the statement "one ought not X" is truth-apt (cognitivism).

We can defend this with reference to Wittgenstein. In our ordinary language use, as understood by any competent speaker, we agree or disagree with the claim that one ought not X, and agreement and disagreement only makes sense if the claim is truth-apt.

2. The meaning of the word "ought" is such that if the statement "one ought not X" is truth-apt then either a) for every X the statement "one ought not X" is false (error theory) or b) there is at least one X such that the statement "one ought not X" is objectively true (moral realism)

We can also defend this with reference to Wittgenstein. In our ordinary language use, as understood by any competent speaker, when someone claims that one ought not X we understand them as attempting to express an objective fact. As such, moral subjectivism is inconsistent with ordinary language use, and so it must be that if moral statements are truth-apt then either moral realism or error theory is correct.

3. It is not the case that for every X the statement "one ought not X" is false

We can defend this by arguing that there is insufficient evidence or reasoning to support the claim that for every X the statement "one ought not X" is false, and that if there is insufficient evidence or reasoning to support this claim then we are justified in rejecting it.

It would then follow that there is at least one X such that the statement "one ought not X" is objectively true.

I think 3) is the weakest premise as any opponent could instead replace it with:

4. It is not the case that there is at least one X such that the statement "one ought not X" is objectively true

And, like above, they can defend this by arguing that there is insufficient evidence or reasoning to support the claim that there is at least one X such that the statement "one ought not X" is objectively true, and that if there is insufficient evidence or reasoning to support this claim then they are justified in rejecting it.

So if we accept an ordinary language approach that suggests that either moral realism or error theory is correct then we must decide which of the two is the "default" position absent any positive evidence or reasoning in either's favour.

Either it is the case that one ought not eat babies or it is not the case that one ought not eat babies. If you agree with the former then you're a moral realist; if you're an error theorist then you agree with the latter. Pick your poison.

Why can I assume that my experiences are accurate without reason or evidence but can't assume that my experiences are inaccurate without reason or evidence?

Why is the default position that experiences are accurate?

But is there any reason or evidence to suspect either is the case? — Patterner

Is there any reason or evidence to suspect that neither is the case?

Any reason not to accept that things are as they seem?

Are you suggesting that the reason we believe in the veracity of our experiences is simply that we have no good reason to believe them false? Believing them accurate is the "default" position that should be assumed unless presented with evidence to the contrary?

Perhaps the default position should be to remain agnostic?

Facts can be measured whereas principles can only be observed. — Wayfarer

Is this objectively true?

It was just an example. I am trying to explain moral realism. Some facts are brute, and the moral realist will claim that some brute facts are brute moral facts.

There is some X such that "one ought not X" is objectively true because it is a brute fact that one ought not X.

This meta-ethical position need not then address normative ethics.

Not at all. We know that the simulation of a giant star millions of miles away is a very terrible simulation. — PL Olcott

I'm going to remind you of what I said before:

But if one had only ever experienced a poor simulation of reality and never experienced reality then one wouldn't know that one was experiencing a poor simulation of reality and not experiencing reality.

Perhaps in reality grass is red and the Earth has two moons.

You're begging the question, assuming that the world you have experienced your entire life isn't a simulation, and so claiming that a poor simulation would look different to the world we currently experience.

If we keep seeing the guy that changes the light bulb of the Sun changing its light bulb then we would know that the Sun is not a giant star millions of miles away. — PL Olcott

Okay? I don't see how this answers the question.

If we keep seeing the guy that changes the light bulb of the Sun changing its light bulb then how would we know that we are experiencing reality and not a poor simulation (or vice versa)?

Don't you think that might be asking a little too much? It seems to me that Ockham's Razor suggests it's fairly reasonable to chop off the evil scientist as unparsimonious. — wonderer1

Ockham's Razor is a useful heuristic, not an objective measure of metaphysical truth.

If it was a poor simulation we would never be having this conversation because it would be common knowledge that everyone would know. — PL Olcott

I don't see how this follows.

That seems reasonable to me. But you ask: "How do I know that I am perceiving a physical thing in a real world and not just dreaming or hallucinating..." If you don't know how to tell the difference, how do you know there IS a difference? — Patterner

I know that there's a qualitative difference between the experiences I consider dreams and the experiences I consider wakefulness. I presume that the things I experience when I dream are not of external world objects. I then wonder if perhaps that the things I experience when I'm awake are also not of external world objects. I then further wonder if there are external world objects at all.

We can tell that it is not a poor simulation. — PL Olcott

How so? Maybe this is exactly what a poor simulation is like. Perhaps in reality grass is red and the Earth has two moons.

Is there a difference between reality, dreams, and hallucinations? — Patterner

The things we see when we dream and hallucinate are not mind-independent, and don't continue to exist when we don't see them, whereas (many believe) the things we see when we are awake and not hallucinating are mind-independent, and do continue to exist when we don't see them.

How do you know this? — baker

I actually rephrased my claim to say "there is an objective, mind-independent, non-physical fact-of-the-matter."

It is by definition impossible to detect the difference between reality and a perfect simulation of reality.
If the simulation is less than perfect then there may be tell-tale signs.
If (for example) reality is a projection from one's own mind, then one might see signs of this. — PL Olcott

Sure. But if one had only ever experienced a poor simulation of reality and never experienced reality then one wouldn't know that one was experiencing a poor simulation of reality and not experiencing reality.

Perhaps in reality grass is red and the Earth has two moons.

And they would be wrong in every sense of the word, unless invoking a supernatural source of morality. — AmadeusD

What do you mean by "supernatural"? Do you mean "non-physical"? Well, yes. Moral realists don't usually claim that moral facts are physical facts. Just as mathematical realists don't usually claim that mathematical facts are physical facts.

It's my gut feeling against theirs. — baker

Precisely. You have a gut feeling that moral realism is false. They have a gut feeling that moral realism is true. One of you is right and one of you is wrong. Neither has empirical or self-evident rational justification.

But there is an objective, mind-independent, non-physical fact-of-the-matter (either moral realism is correct or it isn't). So at the very least moral realism isn't inherently incoherent in arguing that there are objective, mind-independent, moral facts-of-the-matter.

I believe the topic is physical things in the real world. — Patterner

How do I know that I am perceiving a physical thing in a real world and not just dreaming or hallucinating or being tricked by an evil scientist who has my brain in a vat and is stimulating my visual cortex with nanomachines?

This question seems relevant to the discussion.

Yes. Because guts aren't reasonable. — baker

How do you know this?

Of course things we aren’t perceiving exist. — Patterner

I don't perceive Santa. Does he exist?

How could I perceive something that doesn’t exist? — Patterner

Dreams? Hallucinations? A VR headset?

To me, a state of affairs is an actual, obtaining situation in the world independent of further judgement. — AmadeusD

And the moral realist will claim that that one ought not harm another is an actual, obtaining situation in the world independent of further judgement.

But it patently is not a state of affairs — AmadeusD

How so? What does “state of affairs” mean to you?

What state of affairs outside of the mind indicates that command is universal? — AmadeusD

That one ought not harm another is the mind-independent state of affairs.

How does a moral realist know something is false? Because their "gut feeling" tells them so? — baker

Possibly.

Do you claim that it is unreasonable to claim to know that something is false because their “gut feeling” tells them so? If you do, how do you know this? Is that your “gut feeling”?

I have no problem with that formulation, i would just prefer to not use the term 'objective' as neither my example, or stretching to obligation, actually speaks to a state of affairs. — AmadeusD

Realists will disagree. That I ought not harm another is as much a state of affairs as that 1+1=2 and that electrons are negatively charged particles and that it will rain over my house tomorrow.

How do moral realists resolve descriptive moral relativism?
How do moral realists explain that different people have different ideas about what is right or wrong?
How do moral realists explain that some people believe that murder is wrong, but some other people believe that murder is not wrong? — baker

I don’t understand the relevance of your questions. People can believe different things about maths and physics and so on, but there are nonetheless right and wrong answers. So too with ethics.

It is one state of affairs among many. Now what? — baker

I’m not sure what you mean. Yes, there are many states of affairs: one ought not murder, my name is Michael, it will rain over my house tomorrow, etc.

You can, it's just not persuasive to the person who believes we ought to harm another, so our differences remain even as you call it a state of affairs. — Moliere

Whether or not it’s persuasive is a separate matter. Flat Earthers often aren’t persuaded.

I’m only trying to explain moral realism, not argue that it’s correct. Moral realists might claim that a moral statement like “you ought not murder” is true because that you ought not murder is a brute, mind-independent state of affairs.

As for how to justify such a claim, they might accept that there is no empirical evidence, but argue that not all justifications are empirical. Certain rational truths simply have no empirical evidence.

But it is objective, in the sense that, it is - given that artificial definition - inarguably and necessarily in that category. — AmadeusD

The same might also be true of obligation. Given the artificial definition of the words “you”, “ought”, “not”, “harm”, and “another” it is necessarily the case that you ought not harm another.

What we say is made true or false because of the states of affairs of the world. — Moliere

And why can’t it be that one such state of affairs is that we ought not harm another?

I'm wanting to know what is at the bedrock of that claim, to support it, in objective terms? — AmadeusD

There seems to be this assumption that it can be an objective brute fact that gravity exists, that pi is irrational, and that I would never have been born had one of my parents died in their childhood, but that it cannot be an objective brute fact that one ought not harm another. Why is that?

a world that I have defined as a non-perceptual exteriority beyond subjectivity that also encompasses subjectivity. — JuanZu

I have no idea what this means.

My use of the term is what I believe is most common.

But rather than split hairs over the meaning of “external world” I’ll be more specific with my claim:

Some objective truths (such as those of mathematics) do not depend on the mind-independent existence of matter, energy, space, time, or abstract objects.

I claim that the essence of objective truths cannot be reduced to either perception or subjectivity — JuanZu

You’re doing more than that: you’re claiming that objective truths depend on the existence of an external world, but this is false.

If only my mind exists then it is objectively true that nothing other than my mind exists (even I were to believe otherwise), and this objective truth cannot be reduced to either perception or subjectivity.

Do mathematical truths have nothing to do with matter and energy? I agree, that's why I'm not a physicalist. — JuanZu

Physicalism is a position regarding what sorts of things exist.

Your claim here suggests that you think that a statement can only be true if it "corresponds" to something that exists, and so that if a true statement is about something non-physical then it must correspond to some non-physical thing that exists.

This is a mistaken view. Not all truths depend on the existence of something.

If you are not a Platonist, mathematical objects may depend on or be nothing more than objects emerging from brain processes. And a physicalist will have to demonstrate that. The conclusion you reach is false. But my argument holds. If we are not Platonists we can say that truths depend on a world beyond the perception that guarantees their possibility. We can, if we are not Platonists, say that we are only talking about physical and chemical processes that occur in the brain and that a mathematical truth is based on these processes. — JuanZu

Mathematical (and other formal) truths have nothing to do with matter, energy, space, time, or Platonic entities. Yours is a false dichotomy.

"All As are Bs, all Bs are Cs, therefore all As are Cs" is a valid argument.

The above statement is objectively true and does not depend on the existence of an external world. Its truth has nothing to do with matter, energy, space, time, my brain, your brain, or a hidden realm of immaterial, magical entities that is somehow able to attach itself to our thought processes.

That the world exists (an abstract concept) is verified to be true (also an abstract concept) on the basis of anything that appears to be any physical sensation (not merely an abstract concept). — PL Olcott

But what isn't verified is that there is more to the world than those physical sensations.

The pain is conclusive proof that the fist exists. — PL Olcott

Pain can be caused by things other than fists.

The argument holds regardless of whether you are a Platonist or not. — JuanZu

If Platonism isn't true and there is an external world then the external world is exhausted by matter, energy, space, and time.

If mathematical truths depend on the existence of an external world and if Platonism isn't true then mathematical truths depend on the existence of matter, energy, space, or time.

Mathematical truths do not depend on the existence of matter, energy, space, or time.

Therefore, either Platonism is true or mathematical truths do not depend on the existence of an external world.