When it comes to welfare, healthcare, guns, abortion, and LGBT issues, there is a huge difference between Democrats and Republicans, and so it’s overly simplistic to say that because they’re both pro-business that it’s a one party state.

Nevertheless Beetles do matter when it comes to the perspectival and idiosyncratic aspects of language that are relative to each individual who must individually adapt their mother tongue in a bespoke inferential fashion to match their own worlds; such beetles are necessary, but lie beyond the aperspectival limitations of social norms and communication. — sime

i.e. an idiolect.

How have (or could) you establish “my private experience of apple is different to yours”? — Richard B

Individual differences in visual science: What can be learned and what is good experimental practice?

We all pass out our lives in private perceptual worlds. The differences in our sensory and perceptual experiences often go unnoticed until there emerges a variation (such as ‘The Dress’) that is large enough to generate different descriptions in the coarse coinage of our shared language. In this essay, we illustrate how individual differences contribute to a richer understanding of visual perception, but we also indicate some potential pitfalls that face the investigator who ventures into the field.

But why do you believe in the apple in the first place ? — plaque flag

Well, this is where my actual beliefs differ from the more limited argument I've been making.

I believe in the existence of objects other than myself and that these objects have a causal effect on my experience. I am unsure as to whether or not I can say anything more about these objects than this, and so unsure as to whether or not I am something of a transcendental idealist à la Kant. Tentatively, I am a scientific realist. I think that something like the Standard Model (or string theory) might describe what Kant would call "noumena".

Given that the entities described by our scientific theories are unlike the entities that appear to us, I do not think it correct to say that the everyday objects we are familiar with (chairs and tables and apples) are reducible to the entities described by our scientific theories. On this account I consider myself something of an antirealist (with respect to everyday objects).

So strictly speaking it's not that I believe in the existence of a perception-independent apple that causes me to see a particular shape and colour but that I believe in the existence of perception-independent entities that cause me to see a red, round apple, and that our talk of these perception-independent entities as being the red, round apple is a pragmatic narrative à la fictionalism.

As to why I believe in the existence of objects other than myself, I suppose it's a parsimonious explanation for the occurrence and regularity of conscious experience. It seems to be more reasonable than solipsism.

How can the illusion, trapped in the brain, be of something red at a distance ? — plaque flag

How does phantom limb syndrome work? I don't know how it happens, I just know that it happens.

Or as a more ordinary example, there is an apparent depth in flat images, e.g when watching TV. Various pixels on a screen being lit up in the right way creates the illusion of one person being behind another. This is even more evident in the case of "3D" films. It seems as if things are reaching out of the screen, but they're not.

Even if that redness is causally connected to the brain, I don't see why you need to put it in the brain.. — plaque flag

It's a characteristic of conscious experience, and conscious experience doesn't extend beyond the brain. Unless you want to argue for some non-physical mind that has some connection to the brain but ultimately reaches beyond it and out into the world?

There's something iffy here. What is this illusion of conscious experience ? — plaque flag

The characteristics of conscious experience create the illusion that they extend beyond the body. It seems as if the red colour I see a property of some external world stimulus, but it isn't. It seems as if my amputated arm is still there and hurting, but it isn't.

Why is conscious experience not real ? — plaque flag

It is real.

I would still say that the apple is red. — plaque flag

If this means “the apple looks red” or “the apple appears red” then I agree.

But the concept red tends to be applied to the objects — plaque flag

Applied wrongly. It’s the naive realist fallacy. The characteristics of conscious experience are falsely projected onto external stimuli. Much like in the case of phantom limb syndrome where a particular feeling is falsely projected onto an empty area of space. This is the illusion of conscious experience. It seems as if it extends beyond the body, which is physically impossible.

I don't see a problem with reference, but the reference is not the meaning. — plaque flag

My point from the start has only been that words like "red", "sweet", and "pain" refer to some characteristic of conscious experience, not to some property of the apple or fire.

The key thing is that concepts of internal entities are still public norms. — plaque flag

The key thing is when the person with synesthesia talks about numbers having colours he's referring to some characteristic of his conscious experience, i.e. his neurological response to certain stimulation.

I think we can include an entity like synesthesia, but its meaning will be the role it plays in claims in inferences. — plaque flag

Synesthesia is the perceptual phenomenon in which stimulation of one sensory or cognitive pathway leads to involuntary experiences in a second sensory or cognitive pathway, e.g. seeing colours when sound waves stimulate the chochlea.

This common sense, scientific understanding is far more believable than the Wittgensteinian account you're pushing.

How does a heretic decide that God is love or tolerates incest ? We can postulate causes, and we'll need premises and inferences to do so. — plaque flag

I'll rephrase it.

If Wittgenstein is right then the person with synesthesia wouldn't describe numbers as having colours, given that his language community doesn't use colour vocabulary that way.

The person with synesthesia does describe numbers as having colours.

Therefore, Wittgenstein is wrong.

I think Wittgenstein has already made a good case against that kind of representationism. — plaque flag

Well, I think he didn't. As I asked above, how does the person with synesthesia come to describe numbers as having colours, given that nobody else in his language community uses colour vocabulary that way?

Yes !

So it's no single inference that gives 'disgusting' its meaning. It's all possible inferences involving claims involving 'disgusting.' — plaque flag

I think you missed the point. There's no inference that gives "disgusting" it's meaning. The meaning of "the apple tastes disgusting" has nothing to do with whether or not Suzy throws the apple out of the car.

OK, but I think that these two mean different things:

1. Suzy thought the apple tasted disgusting
2. Suzy threw the apple out of the car

We should be able to make sense of the meaning of 1) without reference to 2). Especially as there are any number of reasons that can explain 2):

3. Suzy thought the apple smelled disgusting so she threw it out of the car
4. Suzy thought the apple felt disgusting so she threw it out of the car
5. Suzy thought the apple looked disgusting so she threw it out of the car
6. Suzy is sexually aroused by littering so she threw the apple out of the car

Or even:

7. Suzy thought the apple tasted disgusting but she doesn't like to litter so she didn't throw it out of the car

How an apple tastes (or smells or looks) to Suzy is one thing, and her throwing it out of the car is a different thing entirely.

And I would say that how an apple tastes (or smells or looks) to Suzy concerns what's going on in her head (specifically, with her brain).

I say instead that it gets its meaning inferentially. 'Suzy thought the apple tasted disgusting, so she threw it out of the car.' — plaque flag

What does the word "disgusting" mean in the sentence "Suzy thought the apple tasted disgusting, so she threw it out of the car"?

Saying the apples look red sounds to me like dualism, as if one peels off the redness and leaves the real apple behind. — plaque flag

It's no different to saying that apples taste sweet.

I don't think of words like 'sweet' getting their meaning from this or that quale. Instead concepts are norms — plaque flag

Then how are we able to disagree on how an apple tastes?

And how does the person with synesthesia come to describe numbers as having colours, given that nobody else in his language community uses colour vocabulary that way?

But it's the world that's seen and not an image of the world. — plaque flag

I think the focus on sight is a detriment to the discussion. So forget sight for the moment and consider the other senses. It's fine to say that we taste apples, but it's also correct to say that the tastes we taste are not properties of the apple. Tastes are a neurological response to stimulation of the gustatory cells by the chemicals in the apple. We might want to talk about apples having a taste even when not being tasted, but that is properly interpreted in the counterfactual sense of what it would taste like were we to taste it, not in the sense that it has in its own right some material property which is a property of taste. And the claim that there is a right or wrong way for an apple to taste is false. It's not right that sugar tastes sweet. It's just the case that, given the way the human body is, sugar tastes sweet to most humans in most situations. To a different organism (or a human with an uncommon body) sugar might not taste sweet, and that is no more or less correct.

The same with how an apple smells, and how an apples a feels, and how an apple sounds (were it to make a noise).

And the same with how an apple looks. Sight isn't special. The visual characteristics of an apple (such as colour) are a neurological response to stimulation of the photoreceptor cells by light, not properties of the apple. It's not right that apples look red (or green, depending on the apple). It's just the case that, given the way the human body is, apples look red to most humans in most situations. To a different organism (or a human with an uncommon body) apples might not look red, and that is no more or less correct.

I think it's much safer to claim that we could not induce seeing red for the first time with someone who was in the complete dark, had never seen red before, using only the means you're suggesting are required. — creativesoul

Why not? If electromagnetic radiation stimulating the rods and cones in someone's eyes can cause them to see red for the first time then why can't we (with a sufficiently advanced technology) do this artificially? Is there something unique about the electrical signals sent by the photoreceptors such that we cannot in principle replicate them?

In fact we're trying to do exactly that to enable the blind to see.

Okay. Then seeing red does require things outside the head. — creativesoul

It doesn't require it. It's just how it usually works. It only requires the activation of the appropriate parts of the occipital lobe.

The position you're arguing for seems to completely neglect all the events that lead up to the ability to reactivate the biological machinery. — creativesoul

No it doesn't. I accept that we (usually) see red in response to electromagnetic radiation with a wavelength of 700nm stimulating the rods and cones in our eyes, which then send signals which are processed by the occipital lobe. I just reject the claim that the red we see is a property of apples. Like the pain we feel, the red we see is "in the head". It's (usually) a response to things outside us, nothing more.

I'm just baffled by the claim that seeing colours and shapes does not require anything outside the head. — creativesoul

Does feeling pain require something outside the head?

So, the very first time someone sees red, it does not require anything not in the head? — creativesoul

It requires the appropriate areas of the occipital lobe to be activated which does not in principle require anything outside the head (notwithstanding the fact that the brain isn't an isolated system and energy has to come from somwhere).

In fact on this point you might want to look into the notion of Boltzmann brains.

Does it require having seen red before? — creativesoul

No, otherwise nobody could have ever seen red in the first place. At some point in my life I saw red for the first time.

You are willing to project strings on all of reality but not color. — plaque flag

I literally just said above that colour is composed of strings.

Presumably the concept of a sting occurs when the brain is tickled just right. — plaque flag

Yes.

So what was so wacky about me saying that roses are red ? — plaque flag

It's not wacky, it's just wrong. It's like saying that fire is wet. A red colour occurs when the appropriate areas of the occipital lobe are activated. Roses don't have occipital lobes.

Is color strings ? — plaque flag

Yes.

Is consciousness strings ? (If string theory is correct?) — plaque flag

Yes.

So pain is strings ? — plaque flag

If string theory is correct, yes.

I'm not seeing how you get around dualism exactly. — plaque flag

By not arguing that some non-physical substance exists?

If images are just brain activity, and brain activity is strings... ? — plaque flag

Then everything is strings, which is what string theory argues. I don't understand what you're getting at.

Do you believe in consciousness ? — plaque flag

Of course.

Indirect realism has (1) images and (2) reality itself, right ? — plaque flag

Indirect realism is committed to a dualist picture within which there is an ontology of non-physical objects alongside that of the physical. — plaque flag

If there are non-physical objects then they are as much a part of reality as the physical is.

Indirect realism is committed to a dualist picture within which there is an ontology of non-physical objects alongside that of the physical. — plaque flag

I don't think it's committed to this. It's committed to a picture within which there are sensations, which are restricted to the brain, and things like apples and chairs. Many indirect realists may also be dualists and believe that sensations are non-physical, but that's not necessary. I'm explaining a non-dualistic indirect realism. I am simply arguing that colours are of the same kind of thing as pain; a type of brain activity, not a property of apples.

Which is basically dualism, it seems to me. — plaque flag

No, because I'm saying that sensation is a type of brain activity. In the case of visual sensation, that brain activity involves the primary visual cortex.

Isn't indirect realism about a mediating image or consciousness which is not the Real itself ? Presumably created by the nervous system ? — plaque flag

Sensation is the mediation. I am directly aware of feeling pain, which is a sensation, and in being directly aware of that pain I am indirectly aware of my hand being in the fire. I am directly aware of feeling cold, which is a sensation, and in being directly aware of that cold I am indirectly aware of the Arctic air surrounding me. I am directly aware of seeing red, which is a sensation, and in being directly aware of that red I am indirectly aware of the apple on the table.

The issue is that you call everything brain activity — plaque flag

No I don't. I claim that the sensations which constitute conscious experience are brain activity. We know this from the fact that we can stimulate the appropriate areas of the brain, such as the occipital lobe, and the subject will see shapes and colours in response to this stimulation.

Yes

But what can the scientific realist mean — plaque flag

That the entities described by our scientific models are real and discovered rather than just instrumentally useful fictions.

As I said before, if you argue for scientific instrumentalism over scientific realism then you might as well abandon direct realism and just be an idealist (or a transcendental idealist à la Kant).

You think color is just in our head, right ? — plaque flag

Colour is a type of brain activity. Brain activity is real. Therefore, colour is real.
Pain is a type of brain activity. Brain activity is real. Therefore, pain is real.

Apples don't have pain-properties. Trees don't have colour-properties. Fire doesn't have the property of being wet.