So if I refuse to answer your question then I'm blind? Or I'm not blind but the carpet is transparent? Or the carpet isn't transparent but also not coloured (and so not white or black either)?

This is clearly ridiculous. Me seeing something has nothing to do with you and nothing to do with speech.

I really don't think you're being honest with me at all. You can't actually believe these things you're saying.

If I have a color detecting machine where when I place a colored object in front of it, it will report the color in its display. However, one day it stops reporting the color on the display. We checking the display and is functioning fine. What sense is there in saying “Nevertheless the machine is still detecting the color even when we place it in front of the machine”

The same goes for a person looking at the colored balls. — Richard B

I can tell you for a fact that I can see the colour of my carpet even though I'm not describing the colour of my carpet.

I'm not so sure. It's not the sort of thing we can check, right? — Moliere

I know from my own experience that I can smell the difference between two different flowers despite not having a word to describe each smell.

I know from my own experience that I can see the difference between two different hues of red despite not having a word to describe each hue.

I know from my own experience that I can see the colour of my wall despite not knowing whether to call it pale blue or grey.

The sensory quality of an experience and English vocabulary are two very different things and I just don't understand why so many here seem to disagree with this. It's like they've been so bewitched by Wittgenstein that they deny the patently obvious.

Cool. So we can agree on embodied cognition. — plaque flag

Except here we have a problem. We accept that me thinking of a number is just the firing of certain neurons. But the firing of these neurons, although not private in principle, is private in practice. You don't open up my head and examine my brain, and even if you did, you wouldn't know what to look for (unless, perhaps, you're an expert neuroscientist).

And yet we can talk about and understand other people thinking of a number. Even young children who know nothing about the brain's neural activity and its relationship to consciousness can talk about and understand other people thinking of a number. They are talking about and understanding something that, even though not private in principle, is private in practice.

Now consider a variation of Wittgenstein's beetle-in-a-box where we can see inside each others' boxes but that we never do. It's private in practice but not private in principle. Does that make any difference at all? I don't think it does. And so if we can talk about something that's private in practice then we can talk about something that's private in principle.

It's really just not that hard to believe that other people have the same kind of inner life that we recognize ourselves as having and so talk about it. We're clever, empathetic creatures.

That language is directed at that shared world ? Toward objects and other selves in it ? — plaque flag

When we talk about the tree it's directed at the shared world. When we talk about our feelings it isn't.

Mind is something a body does , a patterned way of moving. Even that minimal monologue is moving parts. — plaque flag

I've accepted as much when I said that consciousness is reducible to brain activity. The "moving parts" of my inner monologue is the firing of certain neurons.

What I reject is the claim that thinking or perception must be some overt act recognisable by ordinary humans in ordinary situations, e.g. that being in pain is just taking aspirin or that seeing red is just stopping at a red light, to refer back to some things you've said before.

To me this is a strange and very questionable statement. This really does sound like a ghost story from over here. — plaque flag

Not at all. Consciousness might just be reducible to brain activity, and brain activity obviously doesn't extend beyond the brain.

If there's a "ghost story" at all it's with your theory that consciousness extends beyond the stars.

Isn’t intentionality a fundamental part of consciousness? Isn’t that pretty much what consciousness is for? — Jamal

To repeat something else I said earlier: we might nonetheless want to say that the experience is of external world objects, but then what do we even mean by this? What is the word “of” doing here? What does it mean to say that the painting is of Lisa del Giocondo, or that I’m talking about my parents? It’s certainly an interesting question to consider, but I wonder if it actually has anything to do with the epistemological problem of perception. It seems to be an unrelated issue of semantics that isn’t prima facie incompatible with indirect realist theories. The painting is of Lisa del Giocondo, and yet the painting is made of paint and canvas, which are not features of Lisa del Giocondo herself. And so it could be that the experience is of an apple, and yet the experience is made of something like brain activity or sense data or rational inferences, none of which are features of the apple itself.

Isn’t intentionality a fundamental part of consciousness? Isn’t that pretty much what consciousness is for? — Jamal

Yes, and given that consciousness doesn't extend beyond the brain, neither does intentionality. Unless you want to argue that consciousness is some immaterial substance that does extend beyond the brain, the physics should be clear on this (unless there's some hidden physical aspect to consciousness which has so far evaded detection).

'Direct' should be read as inindirect, a negation or cancelling of the original mistake. — plaque flag

Which is no answer at all.

The direct realist says we directly experience external world objects.
The indirect realist says we directly experience mental imagery.

What does "directly" mean?

Consciousness (the semantically slippery eel) seems to extend to distant stars in some sense, or astronomy is bunk. — plaque flag

To repeat again what I said earlier, this is the “illusion” of experience (and in particular sight), and is I believe the driving force behind direct realism. It seems as if external world objects are constituents of my conscious experience, but our scientific understanding of the world and consciousness (as much as we do understand it) shows that this isn’t the case.

For someone who rejects the existence of any kind of private, immaterial thing, I don't know how you can think that consciousness extends beyond the brain, let alone towards distant stars.

I say forget about internal theaters and secret screens. — plaque flag

There is no "internal theatre" or "secret screen". We feel pain and the schizophrenic hears voices, and the pain we feel and the voices the schizophrenic hears aren't external world objects. This is a perfectly acceptable description of the facts and doesn't suggest anything like a "homunculus".

What needs to be explained is the meaning of "direct".

One such explanation is given here:

...the naive realist holds that things appear a certain way to you because you are directly presented with aspects of the world, and – in the case we are focusing on – things appear white to you, because you are directly presented with some white snow. The character of your experience is explained by an actual instance of whiteness [understood in context to be some mind-independent property of snow] manifesting itself in experience.

Another is given here:

Disjunctivists are often naïve realists, who hold that when one perceives the world, the mind-independent objects of perception, such as tables and trees, are constituents of one’s experience.

That experience is direct is that the object itself is present "in" the experience. That experience is indirect is that the object itself isn't present "in" the experience; that experience is (at best) representative of the object.

And to repeat something I said earlier: consciousness, whatever it is, doesn't extend beyond the brain, and so it's physically impossible for an apple and its properties to be constituents of my conscious experience. It might be causally responsible for conscious experience, but that's all it can physically be.

That we have to use language to talk about perception isn't that when talking about perception we talk about language.

To talk about seeing is just as much to talk about talk about seeing. — plaque flag

No it's not. These are two different claims:

1. John can see the apple
2. John can talk about seeing the apple

The problem of perception concerns making sense of 1), not 2).

I said that humans don't always have to apply concepts when they see. — plaque flag

Good. Then can you finally stop talking about language and start talking about seeing?

How is this related to my claim that concepts are norms ? — plaque flag

The point is that, whether you want to talk about perception as involving phenomenal character or as involving concepts, I can see things without saying anything, and without performing any covert action that others can recognize. Even if it's not private in principle, it's private in practice. When going about your ordinary life you can't open up my head and check to see what my brain is doing.

Sure. As a practical matter, for now, you can mutter to yourself so quietly that nobody hears what you say. — plaque flag

I don't "mutter" to myself when I think. I just think. The mute can think.

I claim that 'just thinking' a number not truly but only relatively 'immaterial' and private. — plaque flag

That's fine. You can say that thinking of a number is reducible to brain activity if you want. The point is that it involves no overt action that ordinary humans going about their ordinary lives can recognize as happening.

I don't understand what you're getting at.

As a simple example, I can think of a number and not tell you (or anyone). I don't have to perform any kind of overt action to do this. I just think.

Do you accept this?

I claim that we talk about the tree and not an image of the tree. — plaque flag

Which has nothing to do with perception. I can see footprints in the snow and talk about the animal that left them. I can see mental imagery and talk about the tree that is causally responsible for it.

Seeing something and talking about something are two different things. One involves the eyes and the occipital lobe, the other the mouth and the frontal lobe.

The human applies the concept smoke. — plaque flag

What's a concept? All you appear to have done is replaced the notion of phenomenal character with that of cognition. I'm not sure how that helps you avoid the "private" aspect that you take so much issue with.

I'm challenging this framework itself. — plaque flag

Then I think it's disingenuous of you to characterise your position as being direct realism.

I've noticed that people on TPF sometimes say things like "perception can't be linguistic because I can see things without saying anything," or "language cannot be social because if I were stranded on a desert island I'd still be able to talk and read." In these cases I wonder if they're making a solid point that I'm just not getting, or if they simply don't understand what we mean. — Jamal

I guess I should have clarified. It's about human perception. The idea is that in perceiving, a human cannot help but be linguistic. Both we and dogs perceive, but our perception is inextricably linked to our concepts and thereby to language. — Jamal

Let's take colour as an example. Take someone who doesn't have a colour vocabulary. Show them two balls; one that we would say is red and one that we would say is blue. Do you believe that this person can see these balls? Do you believe that these balls appear coloured to this person? Do you believe that these balls appear differently coloured to this person? I would answer "yes" to each question. This person isn't blind; they can see the balls. The balls won't appear transparent (or white or black). These balls won't have an identical appearance.

Even if they don't have words to describe the colours, they nonetheless see them, just as I can distinguish between a variety of different smells despite not having words for each individual kind of smell.

The chains come later and depend upon us being able to access reality to be able to say — Moliere

I'm sorry but I don't really see how that's an answer. Does it make a difference if I amend my explanation above to end with "the thalamus sends electrical signals to the occipital cortex, generating sense data"?

"directly connected" I'd say means there is no more than one relationship between a perceiver and a percipient. — Moliere

Again, which means what? What is a "relationship"? In the context of visual perception, we know that there is an apple, that the apple reflects light, that the light stimulates the rods and cones in our eyes, that the rods and cones in our eyes send electrical signals along the optic nerve to the thalamus, and that the thalamus sends electrical signals to the occipital cortex, generating a conscious visual experience.

How many "relationships" is that?

Exactly! That's what it means! — Moliere

Almost nobody says that experience happens ex nihilo. Indirect realists accept that experience is a causal consequence of real things – and often things that are external to the body.

There's simply more to the meaning of experience being direct than this.

Only that our perceptions tell us about the real. They are directly connected to the real, in some relation. Because they are directly connected to the real we can utilize them to come to understand the real better. — Moliere

Which means what? What does it mean for a perception to be "directly connected" to the real? All experience, whether veridical or hallucinatory or illusory or imaginary is a causal consequence of some real thing, so it can't just mean this.

I want to float an idea -- What if both experiences of the dress are Directly real? — Moliere

Then I'd question what "direct" even means here.

The direct realist claims that talk about the tree is actually about that tree — plaque flag

Direct realism is a position regarding the nature of perception, not conversation. I really don't understand why you keep talking about language. It just has nothing to do with it at all.

Try starting with the problem of perception and epistemological problems of perception.

What does it mean for you to be convinced that you saw a gold dress ? — plaque flag

There's not really any convincing involved. The character of my experience is just that of a white and gold dress, just as the character of someone else's experience is that of a black and blue dress.

I just see colours. That's it. It has nothing to do with being convinced and nothing to do with language.

As I said, I just don't know what the brain is doing to create the experience of hearing. — frank

We know it has something to do with the cerebral cortex. Those with cortical deafness have functioning ears but damage to their primary auditory cortex and so can't hear but can exhibit reflex responses to sound. Cortical blindness is a comparable condition for sight, where there is damage to the occipital cortex.

When we talk about the schizophrenic hearing voices we're talking about the activation of the primary auditory cortex despite no signals sent from the cochlea. I think it's a perfectly acceptable use of the verb "to hear". Hearing happens when the primary auditory cortex is activated. Seeing happens when the occipital cortex is activated.

I think it's better to talk about people being able to be wrong. The point is they are trying to talk about the world. — plaque flag

This has nothing do with talking about the world and everything to do with sight. I can see things without saying anything. I can see a white and gold dress without saying "I see a white and gold dress".

I see a tree on a private internal screen — plaque flag

There's no seeing "on a private internal screen". There's just seeing. Some see a white and gold dress, some see a black and blue dress. Given that different people see different things despite the shared stimulus there's obviously a (second) meaning of the word "see" that concerns something about the individual rather than something about the external world object. Much like the case of the schizophrenic who hears voices. You don't have to accept the existence of some private, immaterial mind to at least accept this much.

Exposing a brain to a particular wavelength of light to see how the brain or particles/waves of a brain reacts to the light does not necessitate the need to posit “sense data” to understand the science behind the phenomenon. — Richard B

I'm happy to talk about brain activity rather than sense data if you prefer. Pain is a type of brain activity, not a property of whatever external world object stimulates that kind of brain activity. Colour is a type of brain activity, not a property of whatever external world object stimulates that kind of brain activity.

If the biological act of hearing involves using the body to perceive physical sound waves, it cannot be said that a man is hearing voices in his head, because there is neither the biological activity nor the sound waves required to hear such sounds. — NOS4A2

That's obviously not what is meant when we say that the schizophrenic hears voices, and so obviously there is a second meaning of the word.

A philosopher, as such, makes claims about semantic norms — plaque flag

Not always. Sometimes we make claims about trees and colours and experience.

Interestingly, we by-pass the talk of “sense data”, and use everyday ordinary language of objects to set up some sort of correlation. — Richard B

I would say we don't (always). When we talk about pain we're not talking about objects but about sense data. When we talk about colour we're not talking about objects but about sense data.

But you only can say some empty generalization like “it is cause by some mind-independent object.” — Richard B

At first, yes. But then after a detailed scientific analysis (and assuming scientific realism is correct) we can extend it further to the cause being a collection of quarks, neutrons, and electrons, with the latter reflecting photons.

But I do know with great certainty about my “sense data”. Even if I don’t know what is causing my “sense data”, I know for certain what my “sense data” is. And what is that? In this case, “sense data” of a tree. But did you not say that you did not know what is causing your “sense data”, so you can’t say it is “of a tree”. — Richard B

I didn’t say that I don’t know what is causing it.

To what are you appealing to say so ? How could you possibly establish truths about the nature of perception without relying on inferential and semantic norms ? How could any theory avoid absurdity if it neglected to address or even acknowledge the condition of its possibility ? To do philosophy is to take up a duty to conform to certain norms and speak about a world beyond the self. Or is logic a private matter ? But that would be a self-cancelling statement. — plaque flag

I really don’t understand you at all. Whether or not I’m blind has everything to do with whether or not I can see and nothing to do with whether or not I can talk.

It's not I see the tree directly but (much better!) I talk about the tree ( our tree) and not my image of the tree. — plaque flag

Then this has nothing to do with direct and indirect realism, which concerns the nature of perception, not the nature of conversation.

I’m not saying it’s an hallucination. An hallucination is when there is some sensation that appears to be of an external world object but isn’t.

What I’m saying is that in both the case of the veridical and the non-veridical experience, there is a sensation. This sensation can be described as “feeling cold” or “tasting a sweet taste” or “hearing voices” or “seeing a red sphere”. In the case of the veridical experience we can describe this further as “hearing my friends talking” or “tasting an apple” or “seeing my neighbour’s ball”.