It was election interference on a mass scale. — NOS4A2

Making it easier for voters to vote isn’t election interference.

There was a massive shadow campaign to alter how the very election was ran, and Big Labor teamed with Big Business and Big Tech to alter election laws, shill for mail in ballots, and of course it favored one candidate over the other. — NOS4A2

Yes, because more voters preferred Biden to Trump, and they made it easier for voters to vote. That's a win for democracy. Unless you're going to accuse them of allowing for wide-spread voter fraud that swung the election then this is a really bizarre comment to make.

Brave = dodging the draft because of bonespurs? — RogueAI

People shouldn’t be demonised for trying to avoid going to war.

There is a lot of speculation, but the fact of the matter is we do not know what he will be charged with. — Fooloso4

According to this,

The charges likely center on the way Mr. Trump and his company, the Trump Organization, handled reimbursing Mr. Cohen for the payment of $130,000 to the porn star Stormy Daniels. The company’s internal records falsely identified the reimbursements as legal expenses, which helped conceal the purpose of the payments, according to Mr. Cohen, who said Mr. Trump knew about the misleading records. (Mr. Trump’s lawyers deny that and have accused Mr. Bragg’s office of targeting the former president for political purposes.)

In New York, falsifying business records can be a crime, and Mr. Bragg’s office is likely to build the case around that charge, according to people with knowledge of the matter.

On a bigger note, Special counsel claims Trump deliberately misled his attorneys about classified documents, judge wrote.

Prosecutors in the special counsel's office have presented compelling preliminary evidence that former President Donald Trump knowingly and deliberately misled his own attorneys about his retention of classified materials after leaving office, a top federal judge wrote Friday in a sealed filing, according to sources who described its contents to ABC News.

U.S. Judge Beryl Howell, who on Friday stepped down as the D.C. district court's chief judge, wrote last week that prosecutors in special counsel Jack Smith's office had made a "prima facie showing that the former president had committed criminal violations," according to the sources, and that attorney-client privileges invoked by two of his lawyers could therefore be pierced.

All vastly more damaging than misappropriation of campaign funds. — Isaac

So because one crime is more damaging than another crime then we shouldn't care about the latter? I don't see why. People can care care about both crimes.

Are you suggesting that people shouldn't care if rich and powerful politicians get away with committing crimes?

Trump says he expects to be arrested on Tuesday

Former US President Donald Trump says he is expecting to be arrested on Tuesday in a case about alleged hush money paid to an ex-porn star.

Mr Trump called on his supporters to protest against such a move in a post on his Truth Social platform.

One of Mr Trump's lawyers said his claim was based on media reports that he could be indicted next week.

So this must be the joke everybody’s talking about….all positions are implausible but any of them might be true. And if one of them turns out to be true, it mustn’t have been implausible after all. — Mww

I'm not sure what you understand "implausible" to mean. It doesn't mean "false" or "impossible". It means something like "unconvincing" or "seemingly improbable".

Which just says substance monism is no better or worse than any other -ism. So what’s the point of it? — Mww

The point of it is that it might be true.

I’d hope a guy with his credentials would posit something useful. And if one of them must be true, does he make any headway in showing his position is? — Mww

Not in that specific paper. That paper is just an explanation of idealism.

So if no position on the mind-body problem is plausible, and substance monism is a position that addresses that problem, what advantage does it hold? — Mww

He's saying that no solution to the mind-body problem is plausible, but one of them must be true.

Yes, or more clearly from the conclusion:

I do not claim that idealism is plausible. No position on the mind–body problem is plausible. Materialism is implausible. Dualism is implausible. Idealism is implausible. Neutral monism is implausible. None-of-the-above is implausible. But the probabilities of all of these views get a boost from the fact that one of them must be true. Idealism is not greatly less plausible than its main competitors. So even though idealism is implausible, there is a non-negligible probability that it is true.

He contrasts idealism with materialism, dualism, and neutral monism. These terms are commonly understood to refer to the views of substance monism/dualism.

From https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/monism

To illustrate these various doctrines for various targets and units, let the target t₁ = concrete objects, and let the unit u₁ = highest type. To be a monist for t₁ counted by u₁ is to hold that concrete objects fall under one highest type. The materialist, idealist, and neutral monist are all monists of this sort (substance monism). They all agree that concrete objects fall under one highest type, disagreeing only over whether the one highest type is material, mental, or something deeper.

To be a pluralist for t₁ counted by u₁ is to hold that concrete objects fall under more than one highest type. The Cartesian dualist is a pluralist of this sort (substance dualism). She holds that concrete objects fall under two highest types: the material (with the primary attribute of extension), and the mental (with the primary attribute of thought).

What version of idealism in a metaphysical sense is Chalmers concerned with? — Mww

Substance monism.

↪Michael's schema does not quite capture the full depth and breadth of idealist thinking... — Banno

I've only had time to read the introduction, but in general it seems to agree with my characterisation:

I will understand idealism broadly, as the thesis that the universe is fundamentally mental, or perhaps that all concrete facts are grounded in mental facts. As such it is meant as a global metaphysical thesis analogous to physicalism, the thesis that the universe is fundamentally physical, or perhaps that all concrete facts are grounded in physical facts. The only difference is that “physical” is replaced by “mental”.

...

As for concreteness: this excludes truths about abstract domains, such as mathematics. In practice most physicalists and idealists are not committed to the strong claim that mathematical truths are grounded in physical or mental truths, and the restriction to concrete domains helps to avoid the issue.

His subsequent breakdown of idealism into "micro", "macro", and "cosmic" doesn't seem to conflict with anything said above.

I'll comment more later today if I have the time to read the rest of the paper.

Materialism takes many forms - as does idealism - but it must rely on there being some ultimately real object or thing, which comprises the basic constituent of all other things. — Wayfarer

That strikes me as atomism, not materialism. String theory is perhaps an example of atomistic materialism, but the Standard Model is perhaps an example of non-atomistic materialism.

Sure. The question remains, what is external doing in the phrase "external reality"? — Banno

"External reality" refers to the notion of a domain of objects existing independently ("outside") of any subjective mental phenomena.

Also not following how you got "idealism as simply being a substance monism" from "all that exists are ideas and the minds, less than divine or divine, that have them" or "there can be no physical objects existing apart from some experience, and this might perhaps be taken as the definition of idealism..", " the idealist denies the mind-independent reality of matter", or "Metaphysical arguments proceed by identifying some general constraints on existence and arguing that only minds of some sort or other satisfy such conditions"... even on bold.

Some Aristotelian notion of substance, I suppose. — Banno

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monism

Substance monism asserts that a variety of existing things can be explained in terms of a single reality or substance. Substance monism posits that only one kind of substance exists, although many things may be made up of this substance, e.g., matter or mind.

But then if nothing is external, the difference between internal and external dissipates. — Banno

Words and concepts can have a meaning even if nothing exists which satisfies the conditions of that meaning. Nothing is "supernatural", but the difference between the natural and the supernatural doesn't dissipate.

Well, that's not the common view. Where did you get this from, or is it just yours? — Banno

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/idealism/

Idealism in sense (1) has been called “metaphysical” or “ontological idealism”, while idealism in sense (2) has been called “formal” or “epistemological idealism”. The modern paradigm of idealism in sense (1) might be considered to be George Berkeley’s “immaterialism”, according to which all that exists are ideas and the minds, less than divine or divine, that have them.

...

We thus agree with A.C. Ewing, who wrote in 1934 that all forms of idealism

"have in common the view that there can be no physical objects existing apart from some experience, and this might perhaps be taken as the definition of idealism..."

...

We also agree with Jeremy Dunham, Iain Hamilton Grant, and Sean Watson when they write that

"the idealist, rather than being anti-realist, is in fact … a realist concerning elements more usually dismissed from reality. (Dunham, Grant, & Watson 2011: 4)"

namely mind of some kind or other: the idealist denies the mind-independent reality of matter, but hardly denies the reality of mind....

Metaphysical arguments proceed by identifying some general constraints on existence and arguing that only minds of some sort or other satisfy such conditions...

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dualism/

Materialist views say that, despite appearances to the contrary, mental states are just physical states.

…

Idealist views say that physical states are really mental.

…

Dualist views (the subject of this entry) say that the mental and the physical are both real and neither can be assimilated to the other.

Idealism is concerned with what does and doesn't exist. This has no prima facie relevance to truth, except insofar as it then follows that "X exists" is only true if X is reducible to mental phenomena.

You’re just playing word games. Dreamlng isn’t just something that is reported after waking. It’s something experienced. It’s the occurrence of visual, auditory, tactile sense data. It’s seeing, hearing, feeling.

Be that as it may, isn’t the prerogative of intelligence, insofar as it deems truth to be a valid idea, to determine what it does depends on, from whence does truth receive its justification? — Mww

I gave examples: "the square root of 4 is 2" being true depends on the square root of 4 being 2; "a yellow ball does not exist" being true depends on a yellow ball not existing.

Just as for truth, there must be something by which the comprehending the appearance of natural relations, becomes possible. — Mww

You seem to be suggesting that all facts are reducible to something which exists? The square root of 4 is 2 only if something exists which makes it so? A yellow ball does not exist only if something exists which makes it so? I don't see why. And in the case of the latter example, it seems even nonsensical. And why end the questioning there? Why not ask what the existence of something depends on? What does the existence of gravity depend on? What does the existence of an external material world depend on? Or does (material?) existence count as a brute fact, and the only possible brute fact?

I don't see any reason to accept that. Perhaps the existence of an external material world is a brute fact. But perhaps the non-existence of a yellow ball is also a brute fact, and doesn't in turn depend on the existence of something else. And perhaps the square root of 4 being 2 is a brute fact, and doesn't in turn depend on the existence of either physical matter or immaterial minds (or on the existence of mind- and matter-independent abstract entities).

What we humans do is report that we have dreams. — Richard B

Because we see and hear and feel things when asleep. That's what dreaming is.

However, the problem here is that both the direct and indirect realist misuse they terms and create great deal of confusion when moved from its ordinary use — Richard B

I agree, which is why it is more productive to ask if things like colour, shape, sound, taste, etc. are properties inherent in external world objects or are properties of experience. That gets to the crux of the real disagreement between direct and indirect realists.

But it does seem as though truth must depend on something — Mww

The truth of “the square root of 4 is 2” depends on the square root of 4 being 2. But the square root of 4 being true doesn’t depend on the existence of gravity or electricity or other material object, and nor does it depend on the existence of some immaterial consciousness.

That the truth depends on something isn’t that it depends on the existence of something. Again as an example, the truth of “a yellow ball doesn’t exist” quite obviously depends on the non-existence of something.

Truth, here, just indicates there is no inherent self-contradiction in the proposition, which, again, requires a mind, does it not? — Mww

I don’t think so. There are plenty of unsolved problems in mathematics. The Reimann hypothesis is either true or false, even though it hasn’t been (dis)proven. Its truth doesn’t depend on what we believe. It doesn’t depend on what inanimate matter believes either. I suppose you could argue for mathematical realism and claim that mathematical entities exist as abstract objects, but that seems both unnecessary and fantastical.

What else is there? — Mww

Probably nothing. The mistake is in thinking that a statement's truth depends on the existence of something.

Imagine that just two things exist; a red ball and a blue ball. The statement "a red ball exists" is made true by the existence of a red ball, and the statement "a blue ball exists" is made true by the existence of a blue ball. But there are many other true statements, e.g. "a yellow ball does not exist". This statement isn't made true by the existence of the red ball or by the existence of the blue ball; rather it's made true by the non-existence of a yellow ball.

Similar situations occur with predictions (if we reject eternalism) and counterfactuals. Statements like "it will rain tomorrow" and "I would have been a father by now had I married at 18" are not made true by anything that exists. The future doesn't exist, but statements about the future can be true. Counterfactual scenarios don't exist, but counterfactual statements can be true.

And, again, the same should be evident with mathematics. The square root of 2 does not depend on the existence of space or gravity or atoms, and nor does it depend on the existence of living, thinking people. But there is a square root of 2. Its truth just has nothing to do with anything that exists.

This also explains why the claim that solipsism entails omniscience is also mistaken. Imagine that just two things exist: John's mind and Jane's mind. These minds do not interact. John is not aware of Jane and Jane is not aware of John. John and Jane each consider two statements: "only my mind exists" and "something or someone other than my mind exists". Neither John nor Jane know which of these two statements is true. Some time later, John dies. Now, only Jane's mind exists. Jane doesn't suddenly find herself knowing that only her mind exists. She still considers it possible that something or someone other than her mind exists. In fact, she might be a non-solipsist and believes that something or someone other her mind does exist. But she's wrong. Even though her mind is the only thing that exists, the truth of "only my mind exists" is independent of her beliefs.

(And as a related point, the above example shows why idealism doesn't entail solipsism. It is entirely possible that everything that exists is fundamentally mental in substance and that there are multiple minds, e.g. John and Jane. The existence of space and gravity and atoms and other material objects is not prima facie necessary for more than one thinking thing to exist.)

I am not arguing the scientific description/explanation of perception but only the metaphysical explanation. — Richard B

What's the difference? We know that the external world is constituted of things like atoms and electromagnetic radiation. We know that electromagnetic radiation is reflected by bundles of atoms into our eyes (which are themselves bundles of atoms). This stimulates brain activity (which is itself bundles of atoms). This triggers the occurrence of visual or auditory or tactical experience. What else is there to add to this?

Many times in human experience, two people can disagree on what they see for many reasons without appeal to "sense data".

And many times in human experience two people disagree on what they see for reasons that do appeal to sense data, e.g. a dress that one person sees as white and gold and another as black and blue.

Another example of sense data having explanatory power is that of dreaming or hallucinations. I see and hear and feel things when I dream. I'm not seeing or hearing or feeling some external world stimulus. I'm not seeing or hearing or feeling my brain. So what am I seeing and hearing and feeling? I think there are two different, equally acceptable, ways to answer this. The ordinary answer is that I see people and hear music and feel warmth. Of course, these people and this music and this warmth are all "in my head", but I see and hear and feel them all the same. The philosophical answer is that I see and hear and feel sense data.

But, the indirect realist says, "this is not the same because we do not know what the tree "really" looks like to compare, we only have our "sense data". This makes no sense because the indirect realist suggests that if only we could "directly perceive" something where we are not involved in the perceiving. It is like saying, "what is the color of the tree when there is no light?" — Richard B

That is the very question that gave rise to the distinction between direct and indirect realism. We wanted to know if the world "really is, objectively" as it appears to be. The direct realists argued that the world "really is, objectively" as it appears to be, because we see it "directly" (whatever that means). It therefore follows that if the world isn't "really, objectively" as it appears to be, then we don't see it "directly" (whatever that means).

The irony here is that you (and many others) appear to be using direct realist terminology but accept the indirect realist's conclusion regarding the disconnect between how things appear and how they "really, objectively" are. And this is why I said before that direct and indirect realists are talking past each other and that the question of whether or not we see things "directly" is a red herring. To repeat my previous comment: the pertinent question is whether or not colour, shape, sound, taste, etc. are properties inherent in external world objects or are properties of experience. That's the issue that has philosophical significance, and I think our best understanding of the world and perception firmly supports the latter view – which is the essence of indirect realism, even if you disagree with the way in which it's often described ("seeing sense data/internal representations").

Roughly, realism holds that some things are as they are, without regard to their relation to us, while idealism holds that things are otherwise; that they are as they are only in relation to us, or some mind of some sort - the details are sketchy.

I don't see that phrasing this in terms of "internal" and "external" helps much. It's got something to do with the world being internal to the mind, I suppose, but what and how... — Banno

I think of idealism as simply being a substance monism, contrasted primarily with materialism and substance/property dualism. I don't think that "things being as they are", or truth-bivalence, depends on either materialism or substance/property dualism being true, and so isn't excluded by idealism being true.

As an example, consider the square root of 2. I don't think the answer is mind-dependent. The square root of 2 does not depend on what I think or you think or anyone else thinks. But it also isn't matter-dependent. The square root of 2 does not depend on the existence of stars or planets or electrons or gravity or even space itself. Mathematical truths are bivalent, but do not depend on materialism or substance/property dualism, and so are not excluded by idealism. Even if everything that exists is fundamentally mental in nature, there is a truth to the square root of 2 and this truth is independent of all the minds that exist. Just as if everything that exists is fundamentally physical in nature, there is a truth to the square root of 2 and this truth is independent of all the matter that exists.

As I mentioned before, there's a distinction between truth and ontology. Counterfactuals and predictions can be true even though their truth has nothing to do with anything that actually exists.

In terms of "internal" and "external", there are a few ways of considering it. If substance/property dualism is true then the "external" world is the material stuff, and the "internal" world is the immaterial stuff. If idealism is true then everything is "internal" and nothing is "external". If materialism is true then the "internal" world is the matter that constitutes our minds and the "external" world is everything else.

I took you to be claiming that the cup was actually quantum in some way, from this:

...it seemed that you thought we had a choice between describing the cup in everyday terms and describing it in quantum terms, but that quantum terms were "proper". — Banno

No, I’m just making this argument:

Objects in the external world are correctly described by quantum fields.
Cups aren't correctly described by quantum fields.
Therefore, cups aren't objects in the external world.

As an analogy, countries are not reducible to landmass. A realist might argue that landmass would continue to exist even if all humans were to die, but they might accept that countries wouldn't continue to exist if all humans were to die. And this isn't simply the trivial fact that nothing would be called a country (as nothing would be called landmass either). It is the more meaningful understanding that being a country is something that only obtains within the context of human perspective and social practices. In the absence of such a context, countries do not exist.

I think that the same logic applies to being landmass, and being a cup, and being red. These predicates only obtain within the context of human perspective and social practices. In the absence of such a context, landmass, cups, and the colour red do not exist. But the things described by something like quantum field theory do continue to exist even if all humans were to die.

So I would say that I'm a (property) dualist who believes in an external material world, and perhaps also a scientific realist, but not a metaphysical realist.

Multiple ways of using language, to talk in different ways about the same thing. — Banno

That’s where I disagree. Quantum field theory doesn’t talk about cups or cupboards or King Charles III, but our everyday language does. Therefore it’s not a case of multiple languages being used to talk about the same thing but multiple languages being used to talk about different things.

Ok. I don't understand what it is "external" to, but let it pass. — Banno

Then how do you distinguish realism from idealism? Surely “external material world” means something to you for you to make sense of being one or the other?

Then I don't understand what your "external world" is. — Banno

It's the world that quantum field theory describes. Do you agree that there is such a world? If so then either a) cups can be described by quantum field theory, or b) cups aren't objects in that external world.

Notice that I dropped the word "external". What is achieved by using it? — Banno

Presumably something, hence why the question you (or rather PhilPapers) asked was "External world: skepticism, non-skeptical realism, or idealism?"

Again, this is why I answered "The question is too unclear to answer". You haven't defined "external world" or "realism" in your question.

Seems to me fairly plain that we have here two very different activities - making tea and building super colliders - with differing languages. It follows that nether way of talking has some innate superiority. — Banno

I'm not saying that either has some innate superiority. I'm saying that they each describe different things. Quantum field theory describes the external world, everyday languages describes a non-external world.

I say the cup in the cupboard is better thought of as having a handle than as being in some odd state similar to a quantum superposition. — Banno

So do I.

Objects in the external world are correctly described by quantum fields. Cups aren't correctly described by quantum fields. Therefore, cups aren't objects in the external world. Unobserved cups aren't objects in the external world either, and for the same reason.

I don't think that we can usefully claim things such as that the world is "properly described by something like quantum field theory and not by our everyday talk of cups and chairs". — Banno

Neither do I. But I do think that it is correct to claim that the external world is properly described by something like quantum field theory.

The familiar world of cups and cupboards is of course properly described by our everyday talk of cups and cupboards (and not by quantum field theory).

And so the familiar world of cups and cupboards isn't the external world.

Really? What is it we talk about , then? — Banno

Cups and cupboards and other everyday stuff, as opposed to quantum fields.

It seems we need to differentiate realism as opposed to anti-realism from realism as opposed to idealism, in order to proceed. — Banno

Yes, which is why I answered "The question is too unclear to answer".

I'll posit that an anti-realist might hold that certain statements are neither true nor false when they do not stand in a suitable relation to an observer. Presumably Schrödinger's cat is such an instance, and perhaps you would add the properties of the cup while it is unobserved in the cupboard.

So does the cup in the cupboard, unobserved, have a handle?

A realist would say it does, an anti-realist might say that there is no truth or falsity to the issue. — Banno

I think there's a distinction between truth bivalence and external world realism. There's no prima facie reason that the former requires the latter. If it is possible that "it will rain tomorrow" is true, and if eternalism is false, then a statement can be true even if it is about something that doesn't exist. So a statement like "it will rain tomorrow" can be true whether external world realism is the case or idealism is the case.

I'd have taken "the cup is in the cupboard" as pretty "normal", to cross my metaphors. — Banno

It is, but I don't think we normally talk about the external world.

Yet that the cup is in the cupboard is presumably the sort of thing that can be true or false. — Banno

That doesn't entail realism. Things are still true or false even if idealism or some other anti-realism is correct.

So, “sense datum” has no explanatory power in this case. — Richard B

I think it has explanatory power in the case of the dress that some see to be black and blue and others see to be white and gold. Each person can be looking at the same photo, in the same lighting conditions, and from the same perspective, but given their differences in eye and brain structure, the quality of their visual experiences differ.

One person sees white and gold, and so uses the phrase "white and gold" to refer to what they see. The other person sees black and blue, and so uses the phrase "black and blue" to refer to what they see. In a quite understandable sense, each person is seeing something different. So if each person is seeing something different, despite the shared external world stimulus, then they aren't seeing that shared external world stimulus.

At the very least this shows an ambiguity with the word "see", such that under one meaning they are seeing the same thing and under another meaning they are seeing a different thing. And this is why I think much of the time both direct and indirect realists are talking past each other, and why I think the very question "do we see the object directly or indirectly" is a red herring. The more pertinent question is whether or not colour, shape, sound, taste, etc. are properties inherent in external world objects or are properties that emerge in the act of seeing, hearing, tasting, etc.

Historically at least, direct (or naive) realists would argue that colour, shape, sound, taste, etc. are properties inherent in external world objects, and indirect realists would argue that they're not. And I think our current understanding of the world, at least with respect to colour, sound, and taste, agrees with the latter.

Then i don't understand why you did not vote for realism. — Banno

Because I don't believe that something like "the cup is in the cupboard" is a proper description of the external world.

Why, or how, would a quantum field theory qualify as idealism? — Banno

I don't think it would.

I voted "The question is too unclear to answer".

If I believe that there is an external world but that it is properly described by something like quantum field theory and not by our everyday talk of cups and chairs, am I a realist or an idealist? I would say that I'm neither. Not all anti-realisms are idealisms.

Similarly, the designer must have been the starting point, not designed by another entity. — gevgala

Why can't an undesigned universe be the starting point?

In fact, your argument can be used to refute the argument that the universe was designed. If the complexity of the universe suggests that it was created, then the complexity of its creator suggests that it too was created. This leads to an infinite regress which is untenable. Therefore, the complexity of the universe does not suggest that it was created.

It's special pleading to argue that this infinite regress proves that the creator wasn't created but not that the universe wasn't created.

Trump pleaded the 5th more than 400 times for the New York AG deposition a couple of days ago. A prudent move given that anything he said would likely confirm his guilt. — Fooloso4

If you’re innocent, why are you taking the Fifth Amendment?

As another example, some Christians believe that homosexuality is wrong because they believe that there is a God who has commanded so.

Can an atheist respond to this by arguing that there is no God, and so therefore these Christians don't believe that homosexuality is wrong? Of course not. Even if the Christians' reason for believing that homosexuality is wrong is false, it is true that they believe that homosexuality is wrong.

Max and Jessica both believe that John shouldn’t marry Jane, but for different reasons and therefore in different contexts. — Ludwig V

Yes, that's been my point. They both believe that John shouldn't marry Jane, and if it's true that John shouldn't marry Jane then their belief that John shouldn't marry Jane is true – even if Jane isn't a horrible person and marriage isn't a terrible practice.

An uncharged crime is not a crime. — Merkwurdichliebe

A crime is a crime without police, prosecutor or courts being involved. When someone steals your wallet, he's a thief and committed a crime. Miraculously, that's even true when he's not prosecuted. — Benkei

Classic example of people misunderstanding "innocent until proven guilty". You're innocent if you didn't do it and guilty if you did, regardless of proof, charges, or conviction. The presumption of innocence simply asserts that the courts shouldn't punish anyone for a crime unless it can be proven.

The only way to properly discriminate between the three individuals is to report their belief as Q because P — creativesoul

It’s not unusual to say “we both believe that John shouldn’t marry Jane, but for different reasons.”

Max believes that John shouldn’t marry Jane because he believes that Jane is a horrible person.

Jessica believes that John shouldn’t marry Jane because she believes that marriage is a terrible practice.

They both believe that John shouldn’t marry Jane.

It’s perfectly appropriate to distinguish beliefs from the reasons for having them. It’s absurd to respond to the above by saying that neither Max nor Jessica believe that John shouldn’t marry Jane.

Suppose Smith persuades Brown to accept a bet, that the man who gets the job will have ten coins in his pocket. Smith gets the job and coincidentally has ten coins in his pocket. Smith will argue that he got it right, on the ground that he has been appointed and has ten coins in his pocket but will accept that his prediction was not entirely accurate. Jones will argue that he did not, on the ground that he is right only by coincidence and that he lost. — Ludwig V

This being a coincidence is why I don't particularly like this example. A different example would be: I believe that my car isn't in my driveway, because I parked it in a garage. However, someone has stolen my car from the garage and is currently driving it on the motorway.

My belief that my car isn't in my driveway is both true and justified, but unlike your (and Gettier's) example, it isn't just coincidentally true.